Customer Needs and Solutions (2019) 6:49–56

https://doi.org/10.1007/s40547-019-00100-6

RESEARCH ARTICLE

Empirical Research on Political Marketing: a Selected Review

Mitchell J. Lovett1

Published online: 3 September 2019

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019

Abstract
This article reviews empirical research on political marketing. The goal of this selective review is to provide an overview
of this body of research that crosses fields including economics, political science, marketing, information systems, and
communications in order to make it easier for newcomers to quickly identify key papers and understand the state of the
field. The review takes the perspective of the marketing literature and includes a discussion of data sources, modeling and
methodological issues, and some selected, prominent topics.

Keywords Political marketing · Advertising · Social media · Negative advertising · Heterogeneity · Demand estimation ·
Targeting

1 Introduction future research. We focus on the empirical literature on

Political marketing has become a large and substantively
important domain of research in marketing. Campaign bud-
gets and media expenditures have grown dramatically. Pres-
idential spending doubled from 2004 to the 2016 campaign,
and House and Senate races increased from US$0.4 bil-
lion dollars in 1990 to almost US$2.7 billion in 2018. At
the same time, political advertising has become markedly
more negative from hovering below 30 % of ads being
negative through the 1960s to the 1990s [20] to increas-
ing to around 80 to 90 % in recent elections [18]. Both
parties have also dramatically increased their ground cam-
paign using more sophisticated technologies and more field
offices [12]. Media coverage during this period has become
more politically slanted operating as a vehicle of party mes-
sages rather than a neutral arbiter of the conversation [14].
Of course, this same time period has seen the rise of social
media as a major platform for campaigns to communi-
cate and rebroadcast messages [19]. This environment of
change provides a rich backdrop of unanswered questions
for empirical work on political marketing.
This article conducts a selective review of empirical
work on political marketing with the aim to motivate
 Mitchell J. Lovett
mitch.lovett@simon.rochester.edu
1 Simon Business School, University of Rochester, 500 Wilson
Blvd., Rochester, NY 14627, USA
political marketing for US elections. This literature and our
review focuses on measuring the effects of advertising and
related marketing actions (e.g., face-to-face contacts, digital
and social media) as well as determinants of candidate
decisions. This review is organized around the data sources,
modeling issues related to the demand-side (i.e., voter
response), and the current state of research on a selected set
of empirical topics.
2 Review of Main Data Sources
In addition to some custom surveys, a number of standard
datasets have been used to study political marketing.
Three types of data are most commonly used—voting and
demographic data, advertising data, and news coverage data.
We discuss these and other data sources.
2.1 Voting and Demographics
For voting data, aggregations of voting decisions are typ-
ically obtained from the FEC or private sources (e.g.,
uselectionatlas.org) including estimates of voting age pop-
ulation and party registrations. The most common level
of data used in the literature is county. Individual-level
data is available from surveys including the National Elec-
tion Studies (https://electionstudies.org) and the Annenberg
Election Surveys. These survey data provide rich informa-
tion about the individual and their context. Polling data
provides vote intentions and attitudes and such polls are
50
available for national contests (see realclearpolitics.com and
pollingreport.com). Other demographic data come from the
US Census and Bureau of Labor Statistics. One study has
used Simmons data to collect television viewership by polit-
ical stance [39]. Beyond this data used for research, the liter-
ature indicates that campaigns have access to more detailed
data including regular polling data, detailed election district
data, and voter data files that allow more micro-targeting.
2.2 Advertising
Advertising data focuses on television advertising, where
the bulk of media dollars have historically been spent by
campaigns. The original source for most studies has been
the Campaign Media Analysis Group (CMAG) at Kantar.
This original CMAG advertising data covers the full USA
and includes counts and estimates of costs by creative and
provides a story board of each ad.
The Wisconsin Advertising Project (WAP) and the Wes-
leyan Media Project (WMP) use the story board information
from CMAG to manually code each advertisement along
several dimensions including sponsor, tone of advertising,
and various other detailed aspects of the advertising con-
tent. The exact content that is coded depends on the election
year. One limitation of the coded WAP/WMP data is that it
is only available with up to multiple years delay from the
election year and it does not cover the entire USA.
By combining this data with SQAD data on advertis-
ing costs (reported quarterly), several papers have estimated
advertising exposures. Other studies have measured expo-
sure using simple survey-based approaches [24] or more
involved techniques that fuse aggregate advertising data
with crosstabs of viewing from Simmons [39]. Because tele-
vision advertising is targeted to the designated media areas
or DMAs (geographies defined by Nielsen that largely fol-
low county definitions), this data provides variation over
time and across geographies. This latter problem is more
important to address if interested in national election out-
comes. To address these limitations, some studies have used
data purchased directly from Kantar or Nielsen [10].
2.3 News Coverage
Research has also leveraged news coverage data includ-
ing from Google News, LexisNexis (for broadcast tran-
scripts), and for local newspapers, newslibrary.com. Newsli-
brary.com is useful in particular for races below the pres-
idential level because it captures a much broader array
of local newspapers and is searchable (e.g., [40]). Some
research attempts to translate these news article counts into
measures of news exposure, but these efforts require fus-
ing with other data related to distribution of the newspapers
[21], and such coverage areas may be less relevant with
Cust. Need. and Solut. (2019) 6:49–56
the prevalent consumption of internet and mobile app-based
news. Manual coding or text analytics have been used
to evaluate content within articles or broadcast transcripts
(e.g., [15]).
2.4 Other Data
More recently, social media, field offices, and other
innovative data sources have been introduced. Social media
posts are publicly available from Twitter, blogs, and forums,
or available through various social media listening tools [1,
6, 19]. Such data generally require applying text analytics
to extract features from the social media text posts such
as topics or sentiment. One limitation of such social media
data is that posts are far removed from exposures that would
affect voters.
Another area of growing interest is the so-called “ground
campaign.” Earlier work used field experiments [22, 29].
Several recent papers have leveraged data on the placement
of field offices available from “Democracy in Action”
project at the George Washington University and other
news sources [10, 12, 41]. Like advertising data, this field
office data presents challenges in translating counts into
citizen exposures to political communications. While some
research [10] suggests there is correlation between the
placement of field offices and survey measures of contact,
the field office measurement is relatively indirect. Finally,
some other studies have incorporated relatively unique data
such as facial attractiveness of candidates [31].
3 Review of Demand-Side Model
Considerations
Many recent papers have assumed a framework in which
individuals choose the candidate and whether to vote based
on the underlying utility of each of the options. The utility
for individual i in geographical unit m and election year t
for option j ∈ {Republican, Democrat, Not V oting} is
as follows:
uijmt = vijmt + ξjmt + εijmt , (1)
where vijmt are characterized by an assumed function of
observed characteristics of the individual, candidate, or
context, chief among these are the exposures to marketing
actions; ξjmt represent unobserved characteristics (the
econometric error) that are allowed, generally, to take an
arbitrary distribution; and the εijmt are unobserved and
assumed to follow a known distribution such as extreme
value type I or normal. Typically, the outside utility
of not voting is normalized to zero. The individual is
Cust. Need. and Solut. (2019) 6:49–56
assumed to pick the option with the highest utility. Under
the assumption of extreme value type I distributed εijmt ,
integrating out this term leads to a multinomial logit choice
probability, i.e., the expected probability without observing
the εijmt . This assumption, the most typical one used
in the literature, imposes the independence of irrelevant
alternatives (IIA), which implies that substitution between
options is proportional to their shares.
The choice of functions for vijmt requires some special
attention for this setting. To simplify exposition, we focus
on advertising, noting the conceptualization for this setting
can be similar for other marketing actions. To measure
advertising effects, the vijmt includes a (simple) function of
the advertising levels, with the most typical function being
logarithm. Thus,
vijmt = αlog[ajmt ] + ṽijmt , (2)
where in practice, one is added to ajmt prior to logging it to
avoid numerical issues when ajmt = 0. This functional form
imposes a particular diminishing returns. Note also that
for TV advertising, advertisements are placed at the DMA
level, so that ajmt is fixed across multiple geographical
units (e.g., all counties in the DMA for aggregate data
analysis).
3.1 Controls and Fixed Effects
The ṽijmt include controls for factors other than the focal
marketing variable(s). Based on research from the political
science literature, many demographic variables are relevant
as controls including education, age, gender, income, and
geographic location. Incorporating multiple fixed effects to
account for unobservables is also common including party-
election year as well as either county-party or DMA-party
fixed effects. Following [26], including this fuller set of con-
trols appears to now be standard practice [28, 39, 50, 54].
In particular, the county-party fixed effects are viewed as im-
portant to control for a host of stable unobservables (partisan
and participatory tastes) that differ at the county level.
3.2 Separating Turnout and Relative Candidate
Choice Effects
Although the utility and advertising formulation above
follows fairly directly from standard utility approaches used
in marketing, it leads to a significant problem in the political
setting: The effect of a marketing action on turnout (whether
to vote or not) in political contests is not necessarily
expected to have the same sign as that on relative candidate
choice (i.e., given that you vote, how much influence toward
one candidate vs. another). The problem is that in the
51
standard multinomial logit formulation, the sign must be the
same for turnout and choice. Because the model given in
Eqs. 1–2 assumes independence of irrelevant alternatives,
substitution from the no vote and opponent are forced to be
proportional to their shares, so that the estimated effects are
smoothed over these two effects. If turnout effects are small,
but candidate choice effects are moderate, then the effects
(at best) would be measured as somewhere between the two
effects.
Most papers have ignored this concern, but a few address
this partially by using an alternative specification of the
utility function. For example, in [39], two different utility
indexes are posed, one for turnout and one for choice. The
unobservables are allowed to correlate between them and
they implement the unobservables as normally distributed
to produce a bivariate probit model. This issue becomes
particularly problematic when incorporating multiple types
of marketing actions or multiple types of advertising
content. In this case, these standard assumptions lead the
different types to have proportional effects on voters. Recent
research [28] provides an approach to address this model
limitation and applies it to study the effect of positive and
negative advertising. The authors still maintain a utility
specification for each candidate, but allow each advertising
variable to affect both the advertiser’s own utility and the
opponent’s utility. This formulation, for example, allows
negative advertising to both increase the advertiser’s utility
and also decrease the opponent’s utility. This flexibility
allows the net effect of negative advertising to increase
or decrease turnout, while also separately increasing or
decreasing the relative candidate choice.
3.3 Heterogeneity in the Effect of Marketing Actions
Most studies have assumed homogeneity of the effects
or heterogeneity only across observed types of actions
such as third party vs. candidate ads in [10] and
positive versus negative ads in [54] and [28]. Some
studies have tried to incorporate voter-level differences
in the effects, i.e., αi , but these efforts have so far
not resulted in well-identified estimates of unobserved
heterogeneity once the county-party fixed effects are
included. This is perhaps not surprising since, to identify
the unobserved heterogeneity, instruments are required that
measure changes in shares given a change in observables
that is not proportionate to shares. With the constant
choice sets in elections (all major party candidates
on every ballot), this implies obtaining disproportionate
changes in shares for the inside vs. outside good.
With cost instruments or a border discontinuity strategy,
the useful variation to identify heterogeneity appears
limited.
52
One recent working paper [10] has introduced the idea
of using registrations as a proxy for partisanship and
allowing the effects of marketing actions to differ by party.
These registrations data serve to define the distribution
for the unobserved (voter-level) partisan heterogeneity, so
that partisanship is drawn from the observed distribution
of partisan registrations in each county. This approach has
intuitive appeal, but some difficulties in implementation,
including that registrations are contemporary with the
election and may not be predetermined, and that not all
states require registration or have different meaning to a
registration (e.g., in some states one can only vote in party
primaries if registered).
A broader consideration about incorporating unobserved
heterogeneity is the empirical implications. In aggregate
models, the model typically incorporates unobserved
heterogeneity in order to allow more flexible substitution
(i.e., that breaks the constraints of the IIA property).
Since in US elections races typically have only two major
parties plus a not voting option, the primary benefit from
unobserved heterogeneity in aggregate data for elections
is to allow different effects of a candidate’s action on the
turnout versus relative candidate share. This is exactly the
problem discussed earlier that arises with multiple types
of marketing actions or advertising that introducing own
and opponent variables is aiming to solve [28]. Note also
that, unlike in some commercial settings where repeated
purchases are observed, individual-level data may not
provide as useful of information because only one vote per
candidate is possible per individual.
3.4 Endogeneity of Marketing Actions
Endogeneity of marketing actions is considered a major
concern in the marketing literature. Multiple means of
attaining causal effects have been proposed in the liter-
ature, and for this discussion we focus on advertising,
which has received the most treatment among the politi-
cal marketing variables. For aggregate data with a single
aggregated advertising variable, cost instruments interacted
with party fixed effects were proposed in [26]. Others have
applied the border discontinuity method, which assumes
those immediately on either side of the DMA border are the
same ([32, 50, 54]). Using a combination of individual and
aggregate data, [39] identify the advertising effect through
imputed individual-level variation in exposure within a
media market. This data intensive approach requires that
most individuals do not watch TV in order to con-
sume political advertisements. Finally, when incorporating
an advertising function that allows turnout and choice to
have different effects in a common model, [28] use a com-
bination of Waldfogel advertising instruments [38], along
with a double machine learning method, LassoIV [5].
Cust. Need. and Solut. (2019) 6:49–56
The research is somewhat mixed on whether endogeneity
is a major issue in the political setting. Some studies have
shown that though the estimates are meaningfully different
with and without endogeneity corrections the estimates are
sufficiently noisy to not be able to statistically distinguish
the point estimates [26, 38, 39]. Theoretically, endogeneity
concerns could arise such as targeted spending, unobserved
get-out-the-vote efforts, and changes in local politics that
the campaigns observe, but not the researcher. Some studies
have found that without proper corrections for endogeneity
the estimates are significantly different (e.g., [28, 50]).
3.5 Measures of the Effect of Marketing Actions
One last issue with demand-side estimates is the presen-
tation of the results. Because most models are non-linear,
presenting simple coefficients is not sufficient to represent
the effects. The literature has not settled on one approach
with some using marginal effects [39], and others using
elasticities [26], which allows an easy comparison to exist-
ing effects in the commercial marketing literature. More
recently, the so-called persuasion rate (percentage lift in
outcome divided by the percentage receiving the persua-
sion message) has been suggested as a measure [13]. As
was discussed above, beyond these types of measures, an
important distinction for the political setting is between
the effect of actions on turnout and the relative candidate
choice.
4 Review of Results on Selected Empirical
Topics
We consider topics on the demand-side (voter response) and
supply side (candidate decisions). The demand-side topics
include average advertising effects, turnout vs. candidate
choice effects, grassroots contact effects, and heterogeneous
advertising effects. The supply side topics include candidate
decisions to go negative and targeting decisions. We then
discuss research on digital and social media as a political
marketing tool. We discuss the results and current state of
the literature in each of these areas.
4.1 Average Advertising Effects
Most of the recent literature on political advertising appears
to agree on relatively small, positive effects of advertising.
The marketing literature opened with [26], which finds
an elasticity on candidate shares of 0.03, far below even
the short-term average of 0.12 reported in reviews of
commercial effects such as [47]. While the exact effect sizes
of later papers vary, and it is sometimes hard to compare
because of the presentation of results, the results appear
Cust. Need. and Solut. (2019) 6:49–56
similarly small, yet potentially pivotal to races because races
are often so close [27, 39, 50].
4.2 Turnout vs. Relative Candidate Choice Effects
Research that allows separate relative candidate choice and
turnout effects for television advertising provide two broad
conclusions. First, while early papers debated whether
(negative) advertising stimulated or harmed participation
in elections [3, 24], later work overwhelmingly finds that
total advertising has a negligible effect on turnout [4, 32,
35, 39, 50]. Second, research has indicated that the effect
of total candidate advertising on relative candidate choice
is meaningful, but that the real size of the effect might
only be apparent after addressing endogeneity concerns
with advertising [32, 39, 50]. The relative candidate choice
effects are estimated to be large enough to be pivotal in
relatively close races.
The above conclusions are based on research designs
aiming to isolate exogenous variation in advertising without
experimental variation. In a noteable exception [23], a large-
scale randomized controlled experiment for a Gubernatorial
race concludes that advertising in that setting did persuade
voters, but that the influence is relatively short-lived. This
finding is consistent with the small average effects found for
political advertisements that shift voters’ relative candidate
choice, but not turnout.
4.3 Grassroots Contact Effects
These turnout and relative candidate choice effects for total
television advertising are in stark contrast to those for
non-partisan grassroots face-to-face contact aimed at getting
out the vote. Studies using field experiments, (e.g., [22, 29])
demonstrate that face-to-face contacts produce measurable
turnout effects. Recently, research has used data on field offices
to estimate the effect of adding partisan field operations
[12, 41, 42]. One recent paper aims to evaluate both
field operations and advertising jointly [10]. Despite the
field experiments suggesting large effects on turnout, these
papers based on field office data present mixed results with
some studies finding large effects [41], others suggesting
smaller effects [42] and others that the parties may differ
markedly in the effectiveness of their field operations
[10, 42]. It is not yet clear whether these mixed findings
reflect heterogeneity in effects or measurement. This field
operations literature is still early in its investigation of the
multiple potential empirical issues including measurement
of field operations, the use of such operations for both
collecting funds and affecting elections, heterogeneity in the
magnitude and operation of the field offices, and potential
endogeneity in the placement of the operations.
53
4.4 Heterogeneous Advertising Effects
Measuring the effects of different types of advertising is
also still in an early stage. One key dimension that has
received a lot of attention in the literature is the deci-
sion to go negative, i.e., talk about your opponent.1 Early
efforts tried to establish that negative advertising and pos-
itive advertising have different effect sizes (e.g., [2]), but
reviews of the differential effects hypotheses suggests the
evidence is mixed at best [36, 37]. While the body of work
includes lab experiments [2], observational data [24], and
field experiments [45], only recently have studies exam-
ined comprehensive enough field data with identification
strategies that are promising for delivering robust findings.
In [54], they use data from Senatorial races in 2010 and
2012 and employ a border strategy approach. They find
that negative advertising increases both turnout and rel-
ative vote shares, but that positive ads actually decrease
candidate vote shares. The effect sizes are quite small
with elasticities of around 0.013 or 0.015 for negative
ads on candidate shares and near − 0.01 for positive ads
on candidate shares. In contrast, [28] examine presidential
races from 2000 to 2004 and use an instrumental variables
approach. They find that negative advertising decreases
turnout and increases relative candidate share for the adver-
tising candidate, whereas positive advertising increases
turnout and relative candidate share, but has a smaller
average elasticity on relative candidate share than negative
advertising.
Other dimensions beyond the positive-negative tone
are also of interest. Advertising by third-party groups
or political action committees (PACs) are hypothesized
to be different from candidate or party ads [44]. Two
recent studies aim to provide estimates of how different
these effects are. The first [54] separates PAC advertising
from candidate and party advertising and finds that PAC
advertising had little or no effect. In contrast, [10] find that
PAC advertising affects only partisan voters. The studies
on differential or heterogeneous advertising effects in many
respects have only begun to address the broad set of
content differences. The CMAG data provides details of
each advertising creative, and many features are already
coded by the WAP or WMP. Future research can leverage
1 Infact, there are multiple categorizations of tone beyond the“talking
about the opponent” definition given here. For example, the main
WAP/WMP data categorize ads into “promote” ads that speak only
about the advertising candidate, “contrast” ads that contrast the two
main candidates, and “attack” ads that focus primarily on denigrating
the opponent. In much of the empirical work, contrast and attack
ads are considered negative ads, since they both speak about the
competition.
54
this rich data to further delineate the role and effect of
political advertising. The key innovations needed to deepen
this stream of work are ways to identify such differences in
content effects (see [28] for such an approach for ad tone).
4.5 Candidates’ Decisions to Go Negative
A number of early studies document empirical facts about
the campaigns’ decisions to go negative (e.g., [11, 25]).
We review a set of studies that make and evaluate related
theoretical predictions. An early study uses a pseudo-
experimental survey method where political consultants
choose whether to go negative under various hypotheti-
cal scenarios [53]. They corroborate field observations that
front-runners are less likely to go negative than followers,
but also test between two alternative theoretical explana-
tions for this result. One study examines whether candidate
negativity is in response to the estimated impact on voters
and whether there is additional correlation in candidates’
likelihood to go negative [9]. Another study asks why
close races are more negative [40]. That study argues that
close races have more media coverage and more advertis-
ing spending, which leads to more knowledgeable voters.
Better voter knowledge and larger candidate budgets lead
to incentives to go negative and empirically these variables
explain away the correlation between negativity and close
races. A recent study examines the role of media coverage
in the dynamics and competition of advertising tone [15].
They find that media is biased toward covering negative
advertising and that this media coverage leads candidates
to go more negative and to react to each other’s moves
toward negativity (but not toward positivity). As discussed
above, negative versus positive advertising is not the only
content distinction of interest, and studies have considered
other dimensions as well, such as which issues candidates
emphasize (e.g., [51]).
4.6 Candidate Targeting Decisions
Another central supply side question is how actions
are (should be) targeted. The literature has focused
on two dimensions—geographical targeting and targeting
advertising on television shows. In general, candidates
tend to concentrate campaign resource allocations including
campaign visits and television ads on the same battleground
states [33, 49]. One study shows that campaigns also target
their ground campaigns on the same battleground states
[12]. Another uses a model of geographic targeting to argue
that higher turnout in close elections is due to the campaign
efforts targeted to the geographies where the election is
closest [48]. Two studies [17, 27] model the campaign
advertising allocation decisions across geographies under
constrained resources. Such models allow calculating what
Cust. Need. and Solut. (2019) 6:49–56
would happen under counterfactual scenarios but lead to
both parties largely targeting the same battleground states.
In contrast, for targeting across television shows, [46]
find that Democratic and Republican presidential candidates
target different genres with their television advertisements.
However, [39] argue that while such differentiation exists,
such differentiation in targets represents only a small
subset of programming. They argue that if advertising does
not increase turnout, but instead affects which candidate
voters will choose, as [39] and others find, then candidates
should concentrate their resources on the same programs.
They demonstrate that candidates indeed concentrate most
advertising on the same shows, ones with audiences having
relatively high turnout and many swing voters. Thus, the
evidence on targeting in US elections supports the idea
that candidates focus on the same voters, through imperfect
geographic or television program targeting.
4.7 Digital and Social Media Effects
The Internet and social media have changed the way cam-
paigns engage with voters [52]. A number of characteriza-
tions of the use of the Internet and digital advertising are
available (e.g., [16, 52, 55]). Several studies have provided
some initial evidence on the effects of digital advertising
in political campaigns. For example, [30] provides evidence
that banner ads can shift turnout in competitive districts
(but not other races). In contrast, [8] find that Facebook
advertising had no measurable impact on even intermediate
outcomes like positive evaluations.
An important subset of this literature has tried to examine
the relationship between social media activity and voting
outcomes, but the evidence is overall mixed or suggesting
small effects [43]. Social media effects are difficult to
measure outside of a randomized control trial. One study
[7] provides evidence from a large-scale experiment run on
the last day of the 2010 congressional elections. They use
data from a randomized control trial of 61 million Facebook
users receiving a message (or not) on the top of their
newsfeed with 6.3 million matched and validated voters.
The message contained either information (information-
only) or information along with friends’ images (social
message). The results indicate that the social message had
a small, but significant increase in turnout of less than one
percentage point over both the control and the information-
only conditions, which were indistinguishable from each
other. The impact on validated voting was largest for the
social message with the strongest-ties, but other political
behaviors were affected more and by a larger range of ties.
Other studies have examined both the supply and demand
for social media. Studying the 2010 congressional races,
[19] provide evidence of both how campaigns and voters
use social media. They demonstrate that the quantity and
Cust. Need. and Solut. (2019) 6:49–56
type of Twitter activity is correlated with candidate vote
shares after controlling for a number of factors believed
to also influence vote shares. They find that standard
campaign activities have little influence on vote outcomes,
but that activities that try to control the information flow
using links, Twitter @names, and hashtags have a positive
relationship. Using data coded for the tone of social media
posts, [1] estimate the parameters of a structural model
of voter demand for early primary candidates on the
2012 Presidential Republican primary race. They find that
lagged positive social media coverage increases and lagged
negative social media coverage decreases the public polling
shares of candidates. They then study when social media
coverage is highest and find a meaningful strategic element
among these posts that suggests that social media posts may
be largely dominated by the influence of strategic political
elites.
With most campaigns now spending large sums on digital
strategies, including estimates from the 2012 presidential
election campaigns reported to be as high as 25 % of
advertising expenditures [34], digital and social media
effects are an important area to study. The limited scholarly
evidence on effectiveness even on average effects suggests
this is an open area for research.
5 Conclusion
This review provides a brief summary of empirical work
on political marketing with the goal of providing an easy
entry point for new research. We reviewed data sources,
issues with empirical strategies, and a selected set of topics.
The study of political marketing is an exciting area of
research because the setting is dynamic and important, many
questions are unanswered, the current data sources are rich
and underutilitzed, and new data sources are appearing
regularly.
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