teorema

Vol. XXXIV/3, 2015, pp. 159-175

ISSN: 0210-1602
[BIBLID 0210-1602 (2015) 34:3; pp. 159-175]

Experimental Philosophy and Intuitions on What Is Art

and What is Not

Annelies Monseré

RESUMEN
Se acepta generalmente que los filósofos del arte confían en su intuición para justi-
ficar o criticar las definiciones que se proponen sobre lo que es el arte. Sin embargo, los
filósofos experimentales han puesto en duda la importancia de la intuición en filosofía,
dado que la investigación empírica muestra que las intuiciones de los filósofos ni son
ampliamente compartidas, ni son consideradas fuentes fiables de justificación. Este ar-
tículo intenta aplicar estos desafíos experimentales al problema de la definición del arte.
Se mostrará que, aunque los experimentalistas tienen razón al afirmar que no se pueden
utilizar las intuiciones de los filósofos como fundamentos epistémicos para definir lo que
es el arte, la investigación experimental por sí misma tampoco puede proporcionar una jus-
tificación a la hora de definir el arte.

PALABRAS CLAVE: definición de arte, filosofía del arte, filosofía experimental, intuición.

ABSTRACT
It is generally agreed upon that philosophers of art rely on their intuitions to justify
or criticize proposed definitions of art. Experimental philosophers, however, have ques-
tioned the role of intuition in philosophy, since empirical research shows that philoso-
phers’ intuitions are neither widely shared nor reliable sources of justification. This article
aims to apply these experimental challenges to the project of defining art. It will be
demonstrated that while experimentalists are right in claiming that philosophers' intui-
tions cannot be used as epistemic grounds for the definition of art, experimental research
itself cannot provide justification for definitions of art.

KEYWORDS: Definition of Art, Philosophy of Art, Experimental Philosophy, Intuition.

Philosophers of art have given a great deal of thought to the ques-

tion ‘What is art?’. Usually, they try to formulate a definition of the con-
cept of art. Most of them purportedly do this by testing their intuitions
on what falls under the concept. This methodology seems to imply that
the concept of art is a shared concept that is implicitly known to us and,
correspondingly, that we all have the same or highly similar intuitions on

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160 Annelies Monseré

what is art and what is not, i.e. intuitions on which items are art and
which items are non-art. Our intuitions, delivered by this implicit
knowledge, enable us to formulate an analysis of the concept, in other
words, to make the implicit knowledge explicit [Brown (1999), p. 33]. In-
tuition, like perception and memory, is then seen as a valuable, although
not infallible, provider of knowledge [Sosa (2007)]. Nonetheless, there
are vigorous debates over the correct analysis of art. Some philosophers
perceive the disagreements as so deep, that they consider the whole pro-
ject to be pretty hopeless. Still, as with other projects in aesthetics and
the philosophy of art,1 it has been argued that the project of defining art
could progress by carrying out experimental research, in this case by sur-
veying and polling intuitions on what is art [Kamber (2011)]. Disagreement
among philosophers is then explained by the fact that philosophers’ intui-
tions on arthood are corrupted by their philosophical theories.
The idea that philosophical questions can be clarified through ex-
perimental research is part of a broader movement within philosophy,
aptly termed Experimental Philosophy. Unlike traditional ‘armchair’ phi-
losophers, experimental philosophers run empirical studies in order to
answer philosophical questions. Armchair philosophers, so it is generally
claimed, rely on their own, supposedly universally shared and correct, in-
tuitions as evidential base for their philosophical analyses. Experimental
philosophers, on the other hand, argue that it is wrong for philosophers
to assume the universality of their own intuitions, since intuitions show
(cultural) variability and instability [Machery et al. (2004), p. B8]. Alt-
hough all experimental philosophers use the same means, that is, empiri-
cal research methods, they are not at all unified in their aims. Roughly, a
distinction needs to be made between the positive program of experi-
mental philosophy that aims to collect data about intuitions in order to
support or contest philosophical analyses, and the negative program that
aims to establish that intuitions cannot make knowledge about philo-
sophical concepts available to us [Vaidya (2012), p. 111]. In the latter
view, intuitions are seen as a sort of spontaneous judgments that have no
evidential value analogous to perception and memory [Weinberg, Nichols,
and Stich (2006)].
The relevance of experimental philosophy for definitions of art
seems clear: it is generally agreed upon that philosophers of art rely ex-
tensively on their own intuitions in order to formulate and test criteria
for arthood and to criticize rival theories. Accordingly, experimental phi-
losopher Richard Kamber, in his article “Experimental Philosophy of
Art,” proposes that philosophers’ intuitions need to be tested experimen-
Experimental Philosophy and Intuitions on What Is Art and What Is Not 161

tally in order to be able to constitute evidence for definitions of art

[Kamber (2011)]. Still, it is unclear how experimental philosophy can
move forward the project of defining art, and, more specifically, how ex-
perimental data on intuitions can confirm or contest proposed defini-
tions, since experimental research has demonstrated that intuitions on
what is art, are conflicted. Succinctly put, this article aims to clarify
whether intuitions can provide us with knowledge about the concept of art
and whether experimental research can positively contribute to the project
of defining art.
After clarifying the aims and scope of experimental philosophy, I
will point out that the project of defining art is a right target for experi-
mental philosophy, since most philosophers of art explicitly or implicitly
claim that intuitions are evidence for their definitions of art. Then, it will
be examined what experimental research on intuitions tells us about the
project of defining art. Rather than helping to make implicit knowledge
about the concept of art explicit, experimental research adds force to
proponents of the negative program, since this research shows that intui-
tions on arthood are heavily confused and that there is no adequate way
to establish which intuitions are most reliable for grounding a definition
of art. Correspondingly, intuitions, whether attained through armchair
reflection or experimental research, cannot deliver us explicit knowledge
about the concept of art. Therefore, the experimental philosophy of art
seems to be caught in a double bind: either experimental philosophers
fall in the same trap as armchair philosophers and illegitimately use intui-
tions as evidence for philosophical theories, or experimental philoso-
phers deny intuitions this evidential status and their findings seemingly
have not much to contribute to philosophical research. I will suggest that
their findings might still be able to play a role in the project of defining
art, albeit a limited and modest role.

I. EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY: AIMS AND SCOPE

Experimental philosophy is a philosophical movement that aims to

criticize and improve or even abolish so-called armchair philosophy.
Armchair philosophy refers to any a priori philosophical investigation.
The often implicit idea behind armchair philosophy is that philosophers
cannot and need not do experiments, or conduct surveys, to determine,
for instance, what is moral, or what is knowledge. Rather, they consult
their own intuitions on their subject matter to formulate and verify phil-
162 Annelies Monseré

osophical theories. Experimental philosophers, on the other hand, argue

that using philosophers’ intuitions as evidence in philosophy is unjustified,
since experimental research has revealed that these intuitions do not al-
ways match with folk intuitions, are biased, unstable, and show (cultural)
variability.
Experimental philosophy appears to be especially relevant in the
domain of conceptual analysis, since there reliance on intuitions seems
ubiquitous. Although the project of conceptual analysis is not unified
and in many ways ambiguous, most conceptual analysts try to formulate
the conditions under which a concept is commonly applied. Depending
on the context, ‘commonly applied’ can refer to folk as well as expert
application. For example, when philosophers are analyzing a concept
within physics, they are interested in physicists’ intuitions rather than lay
intuitions. Most practitioners of conceptual analysis underwrite descrip-
tivism, not revisionism: they want to reveal how concepts are used, not
how concepts should be used.2 They aim to provide a descriptive analysis
of philosophically interesting concepts such as justice, free will,
knowledge and causation, through consulting their own intuitions. It is
presupposed that intuitions, like perception and memory, provide relia-
ble, yet not infallible, evidence: when somebody reports she saw a bus
driving by a couple of minutes ago, one will take this statement as evi-
dence for the reported fact, provided the reporter does not suffer from
perceptual impairments and was not lying, distracted or confused. Corre-
spondingly, so most defenders of armchair philosophy maintain, when a
philosopher intuits that an action is just, then this is reliable evidence for
the fact that the action is generally accepted as just. Experimental philos-
ophers, on the other hand, question the evidential value of intuitions:
they doubt that philosophers’ intuitions can be used to reveal the estab-
lished application of a concept.
What do experimental philosophers hope to achieve with their ex-
perimental research on intuitions? Some maintain that experimentalists’
data will help to confirm or disconfirm philosophers’ hypotheses [Kamber
(2011), p. 206]. This branch of experimental philosophy is adequately
named ‘Experimental Analysis’ since its aims are moderate and similar to
the aims of conceptual analysis [Nadelhoffer and Nahmias (2007), p.
126]. It represents the positive program of experimental philosophy.
Usually, moderate experimentalists survey laypersons’ intuitions and
point out where these vary from those reported by philosophers. Philo-
sophical intuitions, it is assumed then, do not represent the pre-theoretical
intuitions of the community, whether this entails a folk or an expert com-
Experimental Philosophy and Intuitions on What Is Art and What Is Not 163

munity. Pre-theoretical intuitions, so it is argued, are needed in order to

evaluate philosophical theories. Experimental analysis is continuous with
conceptual analysis: moderate experimental philosophers aim to improve,
not put an end to conceptual analysis. Defenders of the positive program
propose that philosophers should ‘embrace experimental methods as one
more tool in the philosopher’s toolbox’ [Vaidya (2012), pp. 132].
Not all experimental philosophers believe that armchair philosophy
can simply be reinforced by the findings of experimental philosophy.
The negative program of experimental philosophy offers the so-called
‘restrictionist challenge’: they aim to radically revise or even abandon
current armchair philosophical practices [Weinberg, Crowley, et al.
(2012), p. 257]. They do not only hold that philosophers’ intuitions do
not coincide with folk intuitions, they also provide evidence against the
suggestion that we all share similar intuitions regarding philosophically
interesting concepts [Gasparatou (2010), p. 38]. Since intuitions are not
shared, using intuitions to justify philosophical theories equals unjustifi-
ably privileging our own intuitions over those of others [Nadelhoffer and
Nahmias (2007), p. 128].
Armchair philosophers have responded to this challenge by claim-
ing that philosophers’ intuitions are more reliable than folk intuitions
[Kauppinen (2007), p. 101) and have tried to verify this claim by empiri-
cal research [Livengood et al. (2012)]. This response is dubbed the ‘ex-
pert-defense’. Experimental research has indicated that philosophers are
alike in being more reflective than non-philosophers [Livengood et al.
(2012), p. 32). Therefore, philosophers’ intuitions are more reliable than
folk intuitions; philosophers are ‘expert-intuiters’.
Against the expert-defense, restrictionists have formulated several
counterarguments. To begin with, it is easily ascertained that philoso-
phers’ intuitions vary even among peers. How can it be decided which
intuitions are correct when intuitions conflict among ‘expert-intuiters’? It
could be argued that philosophers can rely on confirmed theories in or-
der to do this. However, restrictionists argue that there are no well-
established, consensus theories available in philosophy [Weinberg,
Gonnerman, et al. (2012), p. 63]. Moreover, research has established that
persons more inclined towards reflection have a tendency to impose ‘co-
herent arbitrariness’ on their judgments: they render later judgments
consistent with earlier ones [Weinberg, Gonnerman, et al. (2012), p. 57].
In other words, it is suggested that philosophical thinking is subject to
confirmation bias: philosophers treat evidence in favor of and evidence
against the theories they accept differently [cf. Nanay (2013), p. 356].
164 Annelies Monseré

This explains why philosophers’ judgments are more stable, yet not un-
touched by philosophically-irrelevant factors. In short, the restrictionist
challenge, if the challenge is valid, cannot be met without departing from
the intuition-based methodology. Now, let us turn to the role intuitions
play in definitions of art and see whether experimentalists’ attacks are
relevant in this field.

II. INTUITIONS AND THE DEFINITION OF ART

In the philosophy of art, appeal to intuitions seems by and large

daily practice. Most noticeably, intuitions are used as evidential base for
establishing the truth or falsity of definitions of art: they seem to make
implicit knowledge about what art is explicit. Although many philoso-
phers of art remain silent about their methods and aims, most definitions
of art are rightly characterized as conceptual analyses of art. A conceptu-
al analysis of art gives the conditions under which the concept art is ap-
plied. Most definitions of art aim to be descriptive: they aim to clarify the
concept of art as it is used. Therefore, these definitions need to square
with people’s intuitions: if certain criteria of a proposed definition are
counterintuitive, then the definition needs to be altered.3 It should be
noted that philosophers of art mostly do not aim to accommodate lay
people’s intuitions, but rather the intuitions of competent users of the
concept of art, such as art professionals and art lovers. As Kamber right-
ly points out, although most philosophers do not elaborate much on the
methods they use to define art, they seem to endorse this intuition-based
methodology. As such, defining art is rightly seen as an ‘armchair affair’.
Noël Carroll does elaborate on methodology and claims that analyzing
the concept of art is not an empirical question. Subsequently, the ques-
tion is not settled by ‘taking polls, running experiments, or making ob-
servations’, but rather by reflecting on how we apply the concept of art
and by seeing whether our philosophical theories mesh with our consid-
ered intuitions. He even calls intuitions ‘mother's milk to analytic philos-
ophers’ [Carroll (1999), p. 11-12].
The following examples substantiate the claim that philosophers of
art mostly are in agreement with Carroll and invoke intuitions, explicitly
or implicitly, as evidential base for the truth or falsity of a theory of art.
It is striking that philosophers use intuitions in order to defend clearly
conflicting definitions of art: anti-essentialist, procedural and aesthetic
theories of art are all justified by appeal to intuitions.
Experimental Philosophy and Intuitions on What Is Art and What Is Not 165

Berys Gaut is explicit about his metaphilosophical premises and

states which requirements a theory of art must meet in order to be ade-
quate. One of the main requirements is ‘adequacy to intuition’. This means
that a theory or definition of art ‘[…] must agree with our intuitions
about what we would say about actual and counterfactual cases: if the ac-
count claims that some object satisfies the concept, but it intuitively
doesn’t (or vice versa), then that is one strike against the account’ [Gaut
(2000), p. 30). In a similar vein, Stephen Davies states that important de-
bates regarding the definition of art can only be settled by a theory that
coheres ‘with a wide spread of intuitions about the terms in which art is
discussed and interpreted’ [Davies (1991), p. 47]. Gary Iseminger pro-
vides us with another good example of how intuitions are given eviden-
tial status in the philosophy of art. He states that philosophical
proposals in general explain certain intuitions on the philosophical top-
ic under consideration. Theories that conflict with these intuitions lose
credibility. Iseminger himself takes great pains to show that his aesthet-
ic definition accounts for important intuitions about art [Iseminger
(2004), p. 9-11].4
Most philosophers of art, like Noël Carroll, defend this use of one’s
own intuitions by implicitly or explicitly invoking the expert-defense: we
do not need folk intuitions to ground definitions of art, since philoso-
phers’ intuitions are better informed and less biased. However, this reply
faces restrictionist objections that cannot be easily countered. Like in
other fields, philosophers’, i.e. expert-intuiters’, intuitions often clash
over which items are art. Disagreements arise over hard cases, such as
avant-garde art, culturally and historically remote artifacts, fashion and
popular music. These are items whose art status is contested and there-
fore unclear. As restrictionists have argued, there is no easy answer to
whose intuitions count or, in other words, how these identification prob-
lems are to be resolved. Philosophers of art cannot rely on well-
established theories, since there are no such theories. There is heavy de-
bate regarding virtually every theoretical framework for defining art; phi-
losophers disagree over what kind of concept the concept of art is, what
role intentions, history, institutions and aesthetic properties play in iden-
tifying arthood, and so on.5
Then, how do philosophers address hard cases? Rather than relying
on a consensus theory, they render their identifications of hard cases
consistent with the theory they defend. The way in which hard cases like
avant-garde art and culturally and historically remote art are treated illus-
trates this very well. Jerrold Levinson, Noël Carroll and Arthur Danto
166 Annelies Monseré

define or theorize about art in terms of historical embeddedness. Rough-

ly speaking, this entails that an item can only be identified as art if the
item is adequately related to preceding artworks; whether or not some-
thing is art depends on its historical origin. For them, avant-garde art-
works are uncontested, and often even paradigmatic, artworks.
Moreover, they argue that their theories are superior to other theories
because they are able to account for avant-garde art. Conversely, for
Nick Zangwill, Jerome Stolnitz, and others, who define art in terms of
aesthetics, avant-garde artworks are art to a lesser degree, second order
art or even simply non-art. Since for them, the exhibition of aesthetic
properties or the elicitation of aesthetic experiences is essential to art-
hood, ‘non-aesthetic’ avant-garde art is more or less excluded from the
domain of art. It is clear that intuitions diverge on avant-garde art and
that the defended theory and the philosopher’s intuitions are mutually re-
lated. The same goes for culturally and historically remote art. For Levin-
son, many of these items are not fully art, while for Denis Dutton, Julius
Moravcsik and others, they are paradigmatic artworks. Again, the latter
see it as an advantage of their theories that they include these artifacts in
the domain of art, while Levinson sees it as an advantage of his defini-
tion that it attributes them a borderline status [See Carroll (1993); Danto
(1981); Dutton (2006); Levinson (1993); Moravcsik (1993); Stolnitz
(1979); Zangwill (2002)]. These examples show that philosophers’ intui-
tions and preferred theory are mutually reinforcing. As Dominic Lopes
has pointed out, there is no easy way out of this impasse: both parties
‘naturally believe that they have dealt with the hard cases as befits the
hard cases, whether they rule them in or out of the domain of art works’
[Lopes (2014), 58]. Nick Zangwill, for one, graciously acknowledges that
philosophers of art’s intuitions are corrupted by the theory they defend,
whether they defend an institutional definition, like George Dickie, or an
aesthetic theory, like Zangwill himself [Zangwill (1995), 534]. Moreover,
confirmation bias is apparent in the fact that almost none of the leading
figures within the debate on defining art have substantially altered their
definitions during their careers, although all of their proposed definitions
have been met with serious criticisms.6 Therefore, the restrictionist cri-
tique against the use of intuitions in philosophy is equally applicable to
the philosophy of art.
Undeniably, philosophers need not and do not solely rely on their
own intuitions. These intuitions should be aligned with how the concept
of art is used in artistic practice. David Davies has most ardently defend-
ed this position [Davies (2004); (2009)]. Arguably, this is what many phi-
Experimental Philosophy and Intuitions on What Is Art and What Is Not 167

losophers in fact try to do. They look at what is seen as art in the field of
the arts to evaluate their intuitions. Nevertheless, artistic practice does
not provide us with a consensus approach to the identification of art.
This is revealed when looking at how, for example, culturally remote art
is treated in artistic practice: some remote artifacts are included in art
museums, while others end up in archeological museums; some art histo-
rians include these artifacts in their art histories, others willingly or un-
willingly exclude them. Similar observations can be made regarding
fashion, popular culture and folk arts. In other words, disagreement
among philosophers of art is mirrored by disagreements among practi-
tioners within the fields of the arts. Since different practitioners attribute
art status differently, they cannot provide an answer to the question
which intuitions on what is art and what is not, need to be given priority.
To sum up, the project of defining art is a suitable target for the at-
tacks of experimental philosophers. Correspondingly, Richard Kamber is
right in arguing that philosophers cannot simply presuppose the univer-
sality of their own intuitions and use these intuitions as evidence for their
theories of art. What remains to be seen is what experimental research
on folk or expert intuitions on what is art can positively contribute to the
project of defining art.

III. THE EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF ART

In the following, I will evaluate the significance of the positive and

the negative program of experimental philosophy for the project of de-
fining art. First, I will focus on the positive program. Since Richard
Kamber is the one who has done experimental research to evaluate defi-
nitions of art, his findings will be central. Thereafter, I will apply the re-
strictionist challenge to the positive program of the experimental
philosophy of art and see whether their criticisms of the use of intuitions
in philosophy are equally valid there.
Kamber performed several surveys to determine people’s intuitions
on what is art. His principal aim was ‘to test the effectiveness of art theo-
ries in tracking the intuitions and judgments of art professionals and oth-
ers about what is or is not art’ [Kamber (2011), p. 199]. What is more, he
suggests that disagreements between different definitions of art can be
settled by means of experimental research. Accordingly, his project fits
within the positive program of experimental philosophy. Kamber exam-
ined experimentally the criteria for arthood proposed by philosophers of
168 Annelies Monseré

art such as Clive Bell, Arthur Danto, Noël Carroll and Jerrold Levinson.
The outcomes of his surveys show that definitions of art are not always
good at tracking intuitions. It is noteworthy that Kamber included Danto
and Bell. Both philosophers clearly do not intend to simply track intui-
tions on arthood, rather they want to determine how the concept of art
should be applied. For this reason, as Kamber himself realizes, he cannot
justifiably accuse Bell’s and Danto’s proposals of not accounting for in-
tuitions. Nevertheless, as noted above, many philosophers of art, includ-
ing Noël Carroll and Jerrold Levinson, do refer to intuitions as
grounding evidence for the truth of their theories. As such, they are en-
gaging in descriptive conceptual analysis. It follows that these philoso-
phers must account for intuitions. Philosophers should not use certain
intuitions as evidential base and reject other intuitions because of the
theory they are holding: this would render their philosophical practice
methodologically unsound. A philosopher has to stick either to the de-
scriptive level, in which case intuitions must be honored, or to the nor-
mative level, in which case intuitions may be discarded. If the two levels
are confused, then it is unclear whether a philosopher wants to clarify
how the concept of art is used or how the concept of art should be used
[Cf. De Vreese and Weber (2008)]. Therefore, Kamber rightly uses his
empirical data to criticize these descriptive proposals. The question that
remains to be answered is how his data can help verifying definitions of
art. In the following, the set-up and the results of Kamber’s surveys will
be discussed in more detail.
Since Kamber maintains that most competing definitions of art, like
competing scientific theories, agree on ‘the vast majority of cases to
which they apply’, he focusses on hard cases [Kamber (2011), p. 199).7
Indeed, it would not be very useful to test our intuitions on the art status
of, say, Da Vinci’s Mona Lisa, Bach’s Cello Suites or Jane Austen’s Pride
and Prejudice. Therefore, he chose to survey intuitions on the arthood of
artefacts that have a contested art status. He rightly holds that philoso-
phers of art need a method other than that given by their own theories
to resolve these hard cases. How, then, can quarrels over the art status of
hard cases between competing theories be settled? Kamber suggests that
experimental philosophy is needed in order to ground decisions on hard
cases [Kamber (2011), pp. 205-206]. However, his surveys show that folk
as well as art professionals’ intuitions conflict on cases that are also hard
cases within the philosophy of art, such as bridges, cars, amateur photo-
graphs, ‘very bad art’ and avant-garde art. This result is hardly surprising:
this can also be concluded from studying existing definitions of art, look-
Experimental Philosophy and Intuitions on What Is Art and What Is Not 169

ing at the art world, or listening to people talk about art. The question
that remains to be answered is which intuitions are to be disregarded and
which are to be given centrality and how we can measure centrality and
importance [Miller (2000), p. 233]. It is widely accepted, also among ex-
perimental philosophers, that information about the statistical distribution
of intuitions does not automatically give us reason to accept or reject a
particular philosophical view. Nonetheless, Kamber suggests that these re-
sults do have a direct impact, since he maintains that experimental research
is needed for the resolution of hard cases [Kamber (2011), p. 206].
Let us first have a look at some results of Kamber’s surveys: 68
percent of all surveyed subjects (hereafter: ALL) and 73 percent of the
surveyed art professionals (hereafter: AP) identified Duchamp’s Fountain
as art; 71 percent of ALL and 67 percent of AP identified a documentary
photo as art; 55 percent of ALL and 47 percent of AP identified a con-
ventional amateur picture of a bird as art; 70 percent of ALL and 71 per-
cent of AP identified Homer’s Illiad as art; and 85 percent of ALL and 81
percent of AP identified a ceremonial mask from a primitive tribe in Pat-
agonia as art. What can be concluded from these results? Firstly, it is ob-
vious that we cannot decide that the majority is right, since there is not
always a substantial majority. Therefore, philosophers of art cannot
simply use these empirical data to back up their theories. Take, for ex-
ample, the bird picture, an amateur photo. Nick Zangwill would include
amateur photos in the domain of art provided they are the product of
aesthetic creation, while Arthur Danto and George Dickie would most
likely exclude them, since amateur pictures mostly lack ‘aboutness’, a
necessary criterion for arthood according to Danto, and institutional
embeddedness, a necessary criterion according to Dickie [Zangwill
(1995), p. 534]. Kamber’s results show that the contested status of ama-
teur photography in the philosophy of art is also apparent in judgments
of the folk and art professionals, but these results cannot provide an an-
swer to the question who is right. Even if there are rather substantial ma-
jorities, say starting from 70 to 75 percent, it does not seem legitimate for a
philosopher with descriptive aims to simply discard the minority
[Brunnander (2011), p. 425]. On the contrary, a descriptive analysis should
account for the fact that intuitions diverge on the art status of these cases;
they should have a theory of disagreement. An appeal to artistic practice
will most likely not be of much help, since art professionals also disagree
over the art status of these items. One can, again, argue that we can in-
voke a theory for distinguishing correct intuitions from incorrect ones.
Still, as has been argued above, there are no substantial consensus theo-
170 Annelies Monseré

ries that philosophers of art can rely on. Moreover, provided we could
find a standard for distinguishing correct from incorrect intuitions, phi-
losophers could have no use for intuition anymore [a similar argument
can be found in Cummins (1998), pp. 117-118]. If there were a well-
established theory to distinguish correct intuitions on art identification
from incorrect ones, then we could simply rely on this theory for art
identification, and reference to intuitions would be futile. Therefore, the
restrictionist challenge is equally valid with regard to the positive pro-
gram of experimental philosophy, while it is unclear what philosophical
insights the positive program can offer.

IV. SOME CONCLUSIONS AND SOME HOPE FOR DEFINING ART

Now, let us return to the article’s initial questions: can intuitions

provide us with knowledge about the concept of art and can experi-
mental research positively contribute to the project of defining art? The
first question can be usefully rephrased as follows: should intuitions be
seen as analogues to perception and memory, or rather as spontaneous
judgments like hunches or gut feelings? In the former case, intuitions
provide us with knowledge, in the latter case, they do not. My findings
indicate that intuition does not function like perception or memory in
knowledge acquisition in the way proponents of armchair philosophy
claim. Armchair reflection as well as experimental research has revealed
that disagreement over intuitions is much deeper and more fundamental
than disagreement over perceptions. Under normal circumstances, com-
petent language users will have similar perceptions, and disagreement
over perceptions can usually be resolved quite easily by pointing at failing
perceptual capacities or irregular contexts. In contrast, it has been shown
that intuitions over which items are art differ to a considerably large ex-
tent. These disagreements cannot easily be explained away and there is
no easy answer to the question who is right. Simply put, the answer to
the first question is negative: intuitions on what is art do not make im-
plicit knowledge about the concept of art explicit. They mainly show that
there is no unified established application of the concept.
Secondly, my findings lead to the conclusion that the positive pro-
gram with regard to defining art is misguided.8 Since philosophers’ as
well as surveyed intuitions on what is art are not shared, empirical data
concerning intuitions simply cannot be used to ground definitions of art.
Therefore, the restrictionist challenge is valid with regard to the defini-
Experimental Philosophy and Intuitions on What Is Art and What Is Not 171

tion of art. Radical experimental philosophers have rightly argued that

moderate experimentalists, like armchair descriptive philosophers, need
to provide us with a means to discern which intuitions track the philo-
sophical truth. Yet, like armchair philosophers, moderate experimental-
ists have not offered an adequate way to accomplish this [Alexander,
Mallon, and Weinberg (2010), p. 310].
From these two conclusions, it follows that neither our own nor
surveyed intuitions can be used to justify definitions of art. However,
this does not mean that the project of defining art itself should be abol-
ished. There are other routes to defining art than by eliciting and testing
intuitions, and other goals to attain with a definition of art than descrip-
tive adequacy. This issue cannot be fully addressed here, but some sug-
gestions will be offered. Recent metaphilosophical investigations on
other philosophical topics, such as causation, function and knowledge,
have suggested that descriptivism is not necessarily good in itself. Björn
Brunnander, for example, has argued that the philosophical interest in
‘function’ was spurred by problems within the field and that a descriptive
account of the concept is not what is needed in order to address these
problems [Brunnander (2011), pp. 418-419]. The same could be said
about the project of defining art. The matter became urgent when people
within and outside of the field of the arts were confronted with items
that seemed to claim or deserve art status, while being very dissimilar to
what had been called art hitherto. This uncertainty about what is art and
what is not generated doubt about how to approach these items, whether
they should be subsidized, whether they deserve a place in art museums
and so on. A descriptive analysis of art is unable to answer these prob-
lems, because when intuitions on what is art conflict, there is no way of
telling which intuitions are valid. A fruitful definition of art, however,
should be able to answer these problems. Philosophers have recom-
mended different ways to attain these kinds of goals, such as the theoret-
ical utility model [Weber and De Vreese (2009)], conceptual revisionism
[Bishop (1992); Miller (2000)] and the development of alternative con-
cepts [Brown (1999), p. 49]. Such approaches are normative; they aim to
show how a concept is best used. Definitions of art, then, do not clarify
how the concept of art is applied, rather they construct new concepts of
art that are better suited for solving problems regarding the treatment,
categorization and appreciation of certain artifacts.
Where does this leave experimental philosophy? As pointed out
above, empirical data on intuitions cannot be used to verify descriptive
definitions of art. Nonetheless, experimental research might have anoth-
172 Annelies Monseré

er role to play in the project of defining art. Indeed, we need to know

how the concept is used in a specific practice, in other words, we need to
know where the problems are, before we can formulate alternatives. Phi-
losophers’ intuitions will sometimes not suffice to do this, and there sur-
veying intuitions can be helpful.
Ultimately, undermining the evidential status of intuitions should
not be seen as a destructive conclusion: by getting rid of the obsession
with being in accordance with intuitions and the descriptivist dogma,
room is made for more fruitful lines of research.⁹

Faculty of Arts and Philosophy

Ghent University,
Blandijnberg 2, 9000 Gent, Belgium
E-mail: annelies.monsere@ugent.be

NOTES

1 In some of those other projects, such as the standard of taste, experi-

mental investigation has led to insightful results. See: [Cutting (2007), pp. 79-94;
Meskin et al. (2013)].
2 For a clear exposition on the distinction between descriptive and revi-

sionist conceptual analysis see: [De Vreese and Weber (2008)].

3 Nonetheless, it should be pointed out that there are openly normative

definitions of art, such as Bell’s, Collingwood’s and Zangwill’s definitions. These

philosophers do not aim to account for intuitions: when intuitions conflict with
their theories, intuitions are left aside. Pignocchi usefully distinguishes between
descriptive and normative definitions of art. See: [Pignocchi (2012), p. 2].
4 More explicit reliance on intuitions can be found in: [Levinson (1993);

Stecker (1997); Meskin (2008); Longworth and Scarantino (2010)].

5 The following examples illustrate some of these disagreements: Berys Gaut

and Jerrold Levinson maintain that art is a vague concept, while Arthur Danto ar-
gues that the distinction between art and non-art is absolute [Gaut (2000); Levin-
son (1993), p. 422; Danto (1992), p. 110]. For aesthetic theorists like Nick
Zangwill and Gary Iseminger, aesthetic properties are essential to arthood, while
for Noël Carroll and Jerrold Levinson aesthetic properties are only historically,
and thus contingently, important, but are not necessary conditions for arthood
[Carroll (2009); Iseminger (2004); Levinson (1990); Zangwill (2007)].
6 Jerrold Levinson, for example, did not substantially alter his proposed

definition in a time span stretching from 1979 to 2002 [Levinson (1979); (2002)].
The same tendency can be seen in the work of other main figures within the
Experimental Philosophy and Intuitions on What Is Art and What Is Not 173

project of defining art, such as George Dickie, Noël Carroll, Robert Stecker and
Arthur Danto.
7 On a side note, it should be pointed out that philosophers do not agree

on the vast majority of cases, since there is disagreement over the art status of a
broad collection of objects, such as culturally and historically remote artifacts,
folk arts, popular music and avant-garde art.
8 Renia Gasparatou convincingly argues that the positive program is over-

all misguided. See: [Gasparatou (2010)].

9 I would like to thank Violi Sahaj, Kris Goffin and the audience at the

Annual Conference of the Dutch Association of Aesthetics (18-19/04/2013) for

their comments on earlier versions of this paper. The research for this paper
was supported by the Research Foundation - Flanders (FWO).

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