Overcoming Uncertainty in Ancient

Greek Political Philosophy J. Noel

Hubler
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Overcoming Uncertainty
in Ancient Greek
Political Philosophy
J. Noel Hubler
Overcoming Uncertainty in Ancient Greek
Political Philosophy
 J. Noel Hubler

Overcoming
Uncertainty in
Ancient Greek
Political Philosophy
J. Noel Hubler
Philosophy
Lebanon Valley College
Annville, PA, USA

ISBN 978-3-030-82090-9    ISBN 978-3-030-82091-6 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-82091-6

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature
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MHTPI
 Acknowledgements

It is impossible to thank adequately all the people who provided invalu-

able assistance in the production of the book. I can only name a few. I
would like to thank Jay Bregman and Nancy Ogle for their many words
of encouragement over the years and John Finamore and Robert
Berchman for their insightful questions and comments at many confer-
ences. I would be very remiss not to thank John Dillon for reviewing
drafts and Daniela Cammack for her critiques of my papers. I would also
like to thank an anonymous reviewer for Palgrave Macmillan for numer-
ous helpful suggestions.
There are many of my colleagues at Lebanon Valley College who
deserve acknowledgement, but especially Philip Benesch, Jeffrey Robbins,
and Christopher Dolan. Philip Benesch offered numerous critiques and
crucial suggestions over the course of multiple drafts and Jeffrey Robbins
asked the most insightful questions at key stages of the project. Christopher
Dolan was a constant encouraging presence. I cannot thank them enough.
The final stages of the project occurred during the pandemic of 2020,
requiring me to lean on our library staff even more than usual. I was only
able to complete the project due to their persistent and gracious assis-
tance in overcoming the additional challenges thrown up by numerous
health restrictions. My great appreciation to Maureen Bentz, Julia Harvey,
Donna Miller, Stacie Allison, Becky Chanas, and Michelle Graby for all
their dedication and kindness.
vii
 Contents

1 Introduction  1
References 17

2 Plato and the Uncertain World 21

1 Early Opinion  23
2 Soul as Circular Mover  37
3 Degrees of Truth  47
4 Conclusion  56
References 57

3 Saving Magnesia Through Correct Opinion 61

1 Virtue  66
2 Nocturnal Caucus  74
3 Oligarchy  83
4 Conclusion  90
References 91

4 Aristotle and the Complexities of Opinion 95

1 Objective vs. Subjective Uncertainty  97
2 Reputable Opinions and Induction 102

ix
x Contents

3 Reputable Opinions and Pros Hen Analogy 113

4 Deliberation 123
5 Conclusion 130
References131

5 Aristotle’s Model Polities135

1 Questions of Unity, Order, and the Best Regime 137
2 Reputable Opinions and Their Difficulties 143
3 Pros Hen Analogy and the Core Best Regime 145
4 The Best Regime for Most 156
5 The Polarized Polity 166
6 Conclusion 171
References172

6 Chrysippus’ Uncertain Fools177

1 Opinion and Knowledge 181
2 Subjective Uncertainty 185
Cognitive Impressions  185
Assent 192
Two Forms of Opinion  197
3 Objective Uncertainty 199
4 Conclusion 212
References212

7 Chrysippus and the Rule of Knowledge215

1 Virtue and the Good 218
2 The Universal Community of the Wise 223
3 Natural Law and Appropriate Actions 229
4 Conventional Politics 242
5 Conclusion 248
References248
 Contents xi

C
 onclusion251

Ancient Author Index257

Author Index259

Subject Index263
 Abbreviations

Acad. Pr. Academica Priora

An. post. Posterior Analytics
BFM Best for most
BGP Best for given people
Comm. not. On Common Notions
CP City of Our Prayers
De an. De Anima
De plac. Hipp. et Plat. Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato
De Stoic. On Stoic Self-Contradictions
Diog. Laert. Diogenes Laetrius, Lives of the Philosophers
DK Diels, Herman and Walther Kranz, Die Fragmente der
Vorsokratiker
Eth. Eud. Eudemian Ethics
Eth. Nic. Nicomachean Ethics
Fat. De Fato
Gen. corr. On Generation and Corruption
Hist. an. History of Animals
Math. Adversus Mathematicos
Metaph. Metaphysics
OSAP Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy
Part. an. Parts of Animals
PBACAP Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient
Philosophy

xiii
xiv Abbreviations

PH Pros hen
PHA Pros hen analogy
Pol. Politics
Resp. Republic
RO Reputable opinions
Sext. Emp. Sextus Empiricus
SVF Arnim, Hans von, Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta
Top. Topics
 1
Introduction

Behind liberal rights, republican virtue, and democratic deliberation lie

fundamentally different notions about the nature of political opinion.
The same holds true for the political theories of Plato, Aristotle, and the
Stoics. Unfortunately, ancient debates about the nature of opinion have
done little to inform contemporary assumptions about opinion because
the ancient theories of opinion have largely been ignored. They should
not be ignored because the epistemological issues implicit in the nature
of opinion impact every political theory. Opinion, understood as a form
of uncertainty, is a problem that every political theory must face, whether
explicitly or by mere assumption. The precise nature of uncertainty sets
the conditions for its own management. Opinion matters, not just for
ancient political theories, but also for modern ones, despite the many
differences between the political culture of Ancient Greece and contem-
porary societies. Epistemological issues remain.
The status of opinion is of critical importance to political theorists
seeking to establish deliberation as the model for political decision mak-
ing. Deliberative theories need to be able to explain that some opinions
should be set aside and others pursued in the hopes of establishing con-
sensus. Deliberation depends on the ability to make distinctions between

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 1

J. N. Hubler, Overcoming Uncertainty in Ancient Greek Political Philosophy,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-82091-6_1
2 J. N. Hubler

opinions for the sake of opinion formation. If one is to develop a credible

and workable theory of a deliberative polity, one needs to confront the
nature of political opinion and in this project, the insights and limita-
tions of the Ancient theorists can be of great assistance.
It is not by accident that of the Ancient theorists, only Aristotle priori-
tizes deliberation in his political theory because only Aristotle develops a
theory of opinion that explains the need for and possibility of opinion-­
formation through deliberation. In contrast to Plato and the Stoics,
Aristotle treats opinion as a mix of what can be known with certainty and
that which must remain uncertain. Deliberation relies on such a mixture
because it is employed to deal with uncertainties but does so on the basis
of premises that can be known with certainty. Because it is needed to deal
with uncertain courses of action, Aristotle establishes two models for
deliberative republics—one aspirational and one generally accessible—
with the two models based on different presumptions about the eco-
nomic conditions of their cities. The aspirational “City of Our Prayers”
has sufficient resources to train all its citizens in the virtues required for
judicious deliberation. Since most cities lack such resources, Aristotle
devises a second-best polity with a strong middle class who can deliberate
effectively based on shared interests, rather than virtue. Thus, Aristotle
sets forth both the epistemological and economic conditions for govern-
ment by deliberation that have largely been overlooked by deliberative
theorists, but should not be.
The importance of the nature of opinion for deliberative theory is
made clear by the Ancient alternatives. Neither Plato nor the Stoics hold
to the same mixture of uncertainty as Aristotle and consequently neither
develops a model of politics based in deliberation. For Plato the uncer-
tainty of opinion results from the changeability of the physical cosmos,
while for the Stoics, uncertain opinion represents a subjective failure to
understand the divine law governing the world. Only Aristotle recognizes
the importance of addressing both types of uncertainty—uncertainty
resulting from subjective failure and uncertainty arising from objectively
contingent conditions—and the difference between the two types of
uncertainty grounds his theory of political deliberation in a way not pos-
sible in Plato’s or the Stoics’ theories. Objective uncertainty makes
 1 Introduction 3

deliberation necessary, but to make it possible, one must overcome sub-

jective uncertainty to find shared premises that ground rational
deliberation.
Curiously, despite its importance for deliberation, the precise nature of
opinion in the ancient theorists has been overlooked or misrepresented
by some of the greatest modern advocates of democratic deliberation. In
his landmark study of the rise of public opinion in the Eighteenth
Century, Jürgen Habermas (1989, p. 89) glosses over the key differences
in the notion of opinion that can be found among the classical thinkers.
He states that from Plato to Hegel, the technical philosophical term
“opinion,” meaning “uncertain, not fully demonstrated judgment,” …
“corresponded exactly to the term’s meaning in everyday language.”
Hannah Arendt (1968, p. 233), another advocate of deliberative democ-
racy, misrepresents the nature of opinion in Plato’s work. Arendt asserts
that Plato held that opinion is illusory and opposed to truth. She adds
that the opposition between truth and opinion gave rise to a division
between philosophy and politics, as opinion “was equated with illusion,
and it was this degrading of opinion that gave the conflict its political
poignancy.” Because philosophers deal with truth and citizens with opin-
ion, the opposition between truth and opinion gives rise to “two dia-
metrically opposed ways of life” (1968, p. 232). Contrary to Arendt,
neither Plato nor his immediate successors equate opinion with illusion.
Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics each hold that opinion can be true and
that true opinion has a crucial role to play in politics. Only much later in
the writings of Plotinus does the equation of opinion and illusion lead to
a division between the political and philosophical lives. Arendt is correct
about the mechanism, but incorrect in her attribution. Treating opinion
as illusion does undermine political theory, but it happens long after
Plato’s time, although Plotinus’ enduring influence still colors interpreta-
tions of his master.
Contrary to Arendt, we need to investigate both how opinion can be
true and what role true opinion plays in Ancient Greek political theory.
Contrary to Habermas, we need to explore the different analyses of true
opinion among our principal theorists in order to understand the differ-
ent roles that opinion plays in their political theories. By examining opin-
ion, it becomes clear why Aristotle is the only Ancient political theorist
4 J. N. Hubler

that emphasizes the importance of political deliberation. Understanding

his theory of opinion and deliberation is not only of historical interest,
but it suggests a new, more practical, and overlooked model for a delib-
erative republic based not on virtue, but on the economic independence
of its citizens.
Aristotle outlines two major requirements for judicious deliberation
that presuppose a very specific notion of opinion that allows for its ratio-
nal formation. First is the subject matter for deliberation. We deliberate
when we cannot foresee the best course on our own and we need to enlist
fellow deliberators. When the course of action is clear, we do not need to
deliberate (Eth. Nic. 3.3, 1112a34–b1). This presupposes a degree of
uncertainty inherent in the subject matter of deliberation. Second, delib-
eration proceeds by rational argument (Eth. Nic. 6.9, 1142b14–15). That
means that to proceed we must have premises and conclusions that val-
idly follow from them. This in turn requires that some of our premises be
necessary truths, otherwise the conclusion will not follow validly.
Taken together, these requirements call for the conclusion of judicious
deliberation to be an opinion that is uncertain but informed by necessary
truth. Thus, deliberation combines certainty and uncertainty. If nothing
is uncertain, deliberation is not necessary. On the other hand, if all is
uncertain, deliberation is not possible, for without certainty, there can be
no rational argument and hence no strictly valid deliberation. Judicious
deliberation is an excellence in practice that depends both on certainty
and uncertainty.
However, keeping the combination of uncertainty and certainty in
focus seems difficult, as Aristotle’s competitors make clear. Plato and the
Stoics each ignore the combination of uncertainty and certainty, instead
prioritizing one over the other. For Plato, the subject matter of politics is
uncertain as it is enmeshed in the world of change. The uncertainty of
politics needs to be guided by those who have knowledge and technical
skill, not left to deliberation among those who hold to various uncertain-
ties. At the other extreme, the Stoics deny that there is any uncertainty in
the world because everything is determined by Zeus’ all-­pervading rea-
son. Uncertainty only arises from a subjective ignorance of the objective
certainty in the world, and so the sage who knows the truth holds no
opinions. Therefore, the sage has no need for deliberation because to
 1 Introduction 5

consider opinions is to trade in ignorance. Instead, the sage conforms to

the law of nature that determines what should and should not be done.
An ancient story illustrates the point. Zeno is reported to have said that
there is no need to listen to both sides of an argument. If the first speaker
has proven the point, then it cannot be refuted and if he has not made his
case, it need not be refuted (Plutarch, De Stoic. 1034E). Zeno does not
view deliberation as a contest that can result in rival uncertain conclu-
sions. Instead, it is a matter for conclusive rational proof. By Aristotle’s
lights, if certain conclusions can be found, there is no need for delibera-
tion. We only deliberate when the outcome cannot be clearly seen.
Their differences concerning political theory reflect two distinct
notions of the uncertainty of opinion. As a privation, the uncertainty of
opinion can arise through different causes. At a general level, uncertainty
can result: (1) from ignorance on the part of an opining subject or (2)
from the indeterminacy of an object. (1) Uncertainty can result from a
person not knowing the necessity of a truth. To cite Aristotle’s example,
if a person knows that humans are animals, but does not understand that
being an animal is part of a human’s nature, the person has opinion rather
than understanding (epistēmē) because she does not understand the neces-
sity of the truth (An. post. 1.33, 89a 33–6). This type of opinion can be
termed “subjective uncertainty” because the uncertainty results from the
ignorance on the part of the person who holds an opinion about what
properly can be known. By contrast, objective uncertainty results from
the indeterminacy of the object. In Aristotle’s analysis, anything that is
contingent does not admit of genuine understanding but is a matter of
opinion. Genuine understanding only concerns necessary, not contin-
gent truths (An. post. 1.33, 88b30–4).
Aristotle’s distinction between subjective and objective uncertainty
assumes that there are both necessary and contingent truths. Subjective
uncertainty is an opinion that fails to grasp the necessity of a truth. If
there are no necessary truths, there is no subjective uncertainty in
Aristotle’s sense, for there can be no failure to grasp a necessary truth if
necessary truths do not exist. On the other hand, if there are no contin-
gencies, there are no objective uncertainties. Objective uncertainty is
always about a contingent truth—something that can be other than it is.
In a deterministic world, there are no contingent truths. If everything is
6 J. N. Hubler

necessarily determined, then the only uncertainty remaining is subjective

uncertainty arising from a subject’s failure to grasp the necessity of the
truth of a state of affairs. These may seem to be pretty abstract distinc-
tions, but they are the positions occupied by the major political theorists
of antiquity.
Aristotle holds that there are both necessary and contingent truths and
thus he recognizes both subjective and objective uncertainty. Plato does
not recognize subjective uncertainty in the political sphere because the
physical world is a realm of pure contingency and change. The only nec-
essary truths are eternal and they are the Forms. One cannot have opin-
ions about the Forms. Those who fail to grasp the Forms do not mistakenly
grasp them as contingent truths. They fail to grasp the forms at all. People
do not misunderstand the Forms. They simply do not know them. By
contrast, the Stoics do not recognize objective uncertainty because they
hold that there are no contingent truths. Everything in the world is nec-
essarily determined by Zeus’ all-pervading reason. Consequently, every
uncertainty is a failure to grasp a necessary truth. Every opinion is subjec-
tively uncertain.
For Plato, politics deals with the objectively uncertain because the vis-
ible realm is a realm of contingency. The human world is the object of
opinion and not knowledge, as is clear from the simile of the divided line
and the allegory of the cave, in which opinion concerns that which
changes while intellect grasps eternal being (Resp. 6, 508D; 7, 534A).
Change in the visible realm makes it unfit for genuine understanding and
renders it the object of opinion. This creates difficulties for the philoso-
pher who descends back into the cave and struggles to communicate with
the cave-dwellers about the true realities (7, 517D–E). If the visible realm
is a realm of mere opinion, can there be a place for the philosopher of
eternal truths in the politics of the visible realm?
The division between knowledge and opinion threatens to create an
unbridgeable divide that Plato attempts to ameliorate in his late dia-
logues. He does so by developing a model of true opinion that serves as
the basis for his late political theory. Opinion can be true and true opin-
ion can both be informed by philosophy and also guide non-philosophers
as Plato outlines in the Statesman and explains in detail in the Laws.
 1 Introduction 7

Plato develops the model for true opinion in the Timaeus in the divine
circular motions of the heavenly realm. These motions serve as a model
for true human opinion (42C–D). Plato is not the first to treat the cogni-
tive states of the soul as motions. Among the Presocratics, it was common
to analyze knowledge and opinion as types of motion (see Aristotle, De
an. 1.2, 405a8–19; 1.5, 410a25–6), but in the Timaeus, Plato explains
that circular motions can achieve the kind of stability that is characteris-
tic of truth (Chap. 2). Regular circular motions become the ideal of true
opinion that he seeks to engender in the Laws’ Magnesia. The theory of
circular motion explains both the importance of gymnastic training and
astronomical theology in the political program of the Laws, as Plato seeks
to train the citizens of Magnesia in correct opinion as they contemplate
and comport themselves to the regular heavenly motions. However, true
opinion is inherently unstable and requires the protection and supervi-
sion of those with knowledge. Therefore, in Magnesia, Plato establishes a
Nocturnal Council to study the truths of virtue and to oversee the opin-
ions of its citizens. The largely informal powers of the Nocturnal Council
tip Plato’s purported mixed regime into oligarchy (Chap. 3).
By contrast, Aristotle thinks that politics must deal with both objective
and subjective uncertainty. Like Plato, he recognizes that there is contin-
gency in the physical world and in human affairs. Aristotle’s judicious
deliberator knows how to reason about the best courses of action to deal
with the contingencies faced. The judicious deliberator does so both by
relying on knowledge about the best ends and by recognizing the most
advantageous among particular, contingent courses of action (see Eth.
Nic. 3.3, 1112b16–17; 6.7, 1141b14–15). Because it determines a par-
ticular course of action, the conclusion of deliberation is opinion rather
than knowledge (Eth. Eud. 2.10, 1227a3–5). However, excellence in
deliberation does not rely on opinion alone, but also knowledge of the
best ends (Eth. Nic. 6.12, 1144a26–31) (Chap. 4).
Consequently, the legislator must deal with subjective uncertainty
because people usually fall short of the knowledge needed for judicious
deliberation. They typically misconceive virtue, justice, and the proper
end for the city. The political conflicts between the rich and the poor
result from two insufficient understandings of the nature of justice. The
poor recognize only numerical equality, while the rich believe in equality
8 J. N. Hubler

by merit, leading each side to suspect the other party of injustice (Pol.
5.3, 1303b3–7). Aristotle designs three regimes to deal with the conflict-
ing opinions about justice. In the aspirational best city with sufficient
resources, he devises a city which fulfills both types of justice. In cities
with fewer resources, he introduces either a strong middle class as an
arbiter between the two other classes or institutional mechanisms to bal-
ance the conflicting interests of the rich and poor. The latter two regimes
cope with the subjective uncertainty in the people concerning the true
nature of justice. Only in the aspirational best city are there sufficient
resources to provide an education that can instill the proper knowledge of
justice so as to overcome subjective uncertainty and allow for judicious
political deliberation. However, in the middle polity, the relative equality
of the middle class means that they share common interests that can serve
as a basis for deliberation, although it is not the judicious deliberation of
the aspirational best city (Chap. 5).
While Aristotle’s political theory addresses both subjective and objec-
tive uncertainty, the Stoics reject objective uncertainty. In a purely deter-
ministic world, there is no objective uncertainty and so all uncertainty is
a subjective failure to grasp what can and should be known with cer-
tainty. Thus, the Stoics assert that the sage holds no opinions. The sage
has only certain knowledge and withholds assent from anything about
which she is uncertain. On the other hand, fools have only opinion and
not knowledge (Sext. Emp., Math. 7.152). They are subjectively uncer-
tain about everything. The claim that fools know nothing with certainty
is paradoxical and problematic because the Stoics take sages to be as rare
as phoenixes (Alexander, On Fate 199).1 That means the vast majority of
people know nothing with certainty.
The paradox has not been properly explored because according to the
standard interpretation certain knowledge is one that cannot be over-
come by argument. The standard interpretation does not get to the root
of the problem. The problem for fools is that they mistakenly believe that
external objects can be good or evil. This makes them vulnerable to
excessive emotions and corrupts their power of judgment, rendering their
judgments insecure. The state of uncertainty that fools find themselves

1
For a discussion of the passage, see Brouwer (2014, pp. 105–11).
 1 Introduction 9

does not result from any unknowability of the world, but only from their
own subjective failure. The sage overcomes this failure by the recognition
that virtue, virtuous acts, and the virtuous community are the only goods,
firmly grounding all her other cognitive states as certain knowledge
(Chap. 6).
Stoic political theory focuses on the sage as the model of certain knowl-
edge and virtue. Their theory operates at two levels, at the levels of cos-
mopolitan and conventional politics. At the cosmopolitan level, the sage
is a member of the universal city of the gods and the wise. Everything the
sage does is to benefit the universal city of the wise governed by Zeus’
own reason that is the universal natural law. The universal natural law has
only one command—to act virtuously. Since fools cannot uphold the
commandment, they are exiles from the city of the wise. Still, the sage
operates among fools, and best does so as a king or as an advisor to a king
because then the sage can do the most to promote virtue. Because of his
knowledge, only the sage is a legitimate ruler. Only the sage overcomes
subjective uncertainty and therefore only the sage is fit to rule, and hence
the Stoic preference for kingship (Chap. 7).
The study of the role of opinion among the Ancient Greek political
thinkers shows that in politics, opinion matters. It also matters how opin-
ion is understood, for the nature of the uncertainty inherent in opinion
dictates the means for dealing with it. For Plato, the uncertainty of the
physical world is best overcome by looking to the only true regularity
within it—the motions of the heavenly bodies. For the Stoics, uncer-
tainty lies within the vagaries of one’s own soul, to be overcome by con-
forming oneself to the certainty of the natural law and will of Zeus. For
Aristotle, uncertainty can never be overcome, but it can at least be man-
aged through excellence in deliberation in the best of circumstances and
through the balancing of interests in the others.
Only the combination of subjective and objective uncertainty pro-
motes a deliberative ideal because deliberation requires both. Deliberators
need to be able to distinguish between the type of uncertainty that can be
overcome in order to face the type that cannot. On the other hand, if
uncertainty is purely subjective, it can be completely overcome by one
with knowledge, as in the Stoic system. The Stoic theorists support king-
ship as the best form of rule because if one can rule simply based on
10 J. N. Hubler

knowledge, then clearly the most knowledgeable should rule. The picture
is more complicated when uncertainty is purely objective. In that case
there are numerous solutions possible, but Plato favors a rational solution
by employing knowledge to inform objectively uncertain opinion. Plato
categorizes the mixture of knowledge into the realm of opinion as techni-
cal skill. As a technical skill governing numerous aspects of human life,
Plato does not feel that any one person can be adequate to the task
(Statesman 294B). Neither can the multitude master technical skill
(Statesman 300E), leading Plato to develop an oligarchy under the knowl-
edgeable direction of the Nocturnal Council. Thus, the Greek theorists’
political preferences can be traced to their differing notions of the nature
of political uncertainty.
The differences between the notions of opinion as objective or subjec-
tive uncertainty continue to impact political theory to this day. When
public opinion emerges as an important political notion in the Eighteenth
Century, one can already observe the division between subjective and
objective uncertainty among English and French thinkers. For French
theorists, opinion is primarily subjectively uncertain, while English theo-
rists retort that public opinion is objectively uncertain. In many ways,
their debates set the parameters for modern liberal distrust of political
certainty.
French theorists hold that public opinion is subjectively uncertain
because properly developed, it can attain certainty, unlike objective
uncertainty that can only be managed, not overcome. The French
Physiocrats Anne Robert Jacques Turgot (see Condorcet 1847, p. 224)
and Nicolas de Condorcet (1785, p. i) think that morals and politics can
attain a certitude like that of natural science. For Jacques Necker (1784,
p. 56), true public opinion is characterized by its reasonableness, perma-
nence, and universality—each marks of true judgment.2 Jacques Peuchet
(1789, p. li) maintains that the enlightened writers in society, the true
legislators of the people, “take from public opinion and make it a univer-
sal instrument.” Although progress is slow, we can marshal the resources
of government, religion, the enlightened, and riches to perfect society
(pour perfectionner la societé, 1789, p. cix). The perfectibility of society

2
On Necker’s definition of public opinion, see Burnand (2004, pp. 58, 110–11).
 1 Introduction 11

means that current political opinions are not merely objectively uncer-
tain. Any uncertainty can potentially be overcome, indicating that cur-
rent uncertainty is subjective and correctable.3
For English critics of the Revolution that followed, such confidence in
the power of theory to attain certainty is dangerous, leading to the
excesses of the French Revolution. The differences between people’s
desires and habits renders politics an uncertain art. Edmund Burke con-
tends that the many differences among people makes certainty in politics
impossible. According to Burke (Burke 1892, p. 454), unlike the French
revolutionaries, the ancients understood that politics could not be con-
ducted through “the metaphysics of an undergraduate, and the mathe-
matics and arithmetic of an exciseman,” but required a study of human
nature because of the “many diversities amongst men” arising from nature
and habit that “rendered them as it were so many different species of
animals.”4 Another critic of the French Revolution, Arthur Young (1793,
pp. 4–5), accuses the builder of modern republics as “building castles in
the air.” Young rejects “fine-spun” theories in favor of “common sense.”
Thomas Townshend develops an extensive analysis of the misplaced
confidence of the revolutionaries in the perfectibility of their theories and
condemns the current fascination with the “fantastic formation of wild
theories” (1793, p. 6). He charges that the true voice from France would
say, “Inflamed by the spirit of theory, we rejected government as an exper-
imental science” (1793, p. 13). For Townshend, the theoreticians falsely
assume that politics can attain certainty, but for theory to be true, its
subject matter would have to “be invariable in its nature.” This is not pos-
sible because, “Society is, and ever will be, in an incessant and changeful
agitation.” At base, society is changeable because it is not founded in
theory, but in the variable and differing motives of its people, “The error
of most theorists consists in their reasoning, as if the actions of men were
made on metaphysical speculations, and not through motives of personal
advantage; and as if moral agreements must be determined by

3
For more on the development of public opinion in Eighteenth Century France, see Habermas
(1989, pp. 96–9), Baker (1990, pp. 163–6, 171–99), Ozouf (1997), Sheehan (2009, pp. 64–81).
4
For Burke’s “denial that any philosophical certainty can be achieved in political matters,” see
Hampsher-Monk (1988, p. 465).
12 J. N. Hubler

geometrical exactness” (1793, pp. 16–18). Politics is based in personal

interests of the people, which renders geometrical or scientific certainty
impossible.
Echoes of the Eighteenth-Century critiques of the excessive reliance on
theory reverberate into the twentieth century, particularly in the liberal
tradition. By and large, the liberal tradition rejects not only theory, but
any posit of a common good that directs political decisions. According to
Isaiah Berlin (1998, p. 79), the Eighteenth-Century philosophes failed
because human nature is not a matter of fact. Berlin contrasts monists
and pluralists based upon their belief or skepticism concerning a com-
mon good. Monists believe if they can “establish what is good for men
and how to effect this, the only unsolved problems will be more or less
technical.” On the other side, Berlin (1998, pp. 69–70) includes skeptics
about human perfectibility—relativists, irrationalists, and romantics—
for whom the good is not objective. In other words, like his English
predecessors, Berlin rejects the monists’ claims to objective certainty in
politics. Politics deals with the objective uncertainties of humanity that
cannot be reduced to a scientific model (1998, pp. 79–80).
Many notable liberal theorists follow Berlin’s lead and base their plu-
ralism or liberal neutrality on skepticism about the common good.
According to Charles Larmore (2008, p. 177), “The cardinal liberal prin-
ciple:” is “Our standing as free and equal citizens ought to stand free
from controversial ideas of the human good.”5 Because they are contro-
versial, liberals must eschew positing views about the common good.
John Rawls (1993, pp. 58–9) holds that a recognition of the “burdens of
judgment” constrains one to acknowledge the impossibility of general
political consensus on the basis of fundamental moral principles.
However, not everyone fits into Berlin’s neat dichotomy between
monism and pluralism because not all pluralists are skeptical about defin-
ing an end. In contrast to Berlin, they do not take opinions about the end
to be objectively, but subjectively uncertain. Ronald Dworkin (1985,
p. 203) contends that liberals should not base neutrality on skepticism,
but on the principle of equality, “Liberalism cannot be based on skepti-
cism. Its constitutive morality provides that human beings must be

5
Cf. Larmore (1999, p. 603).
 1 Introduction 13

treated as equals by their government … because that is what is right”

(1985, p. 205). According to Dworkin, equality is fundamental and neu-
trality is derivative, as opposed to a liberalism that takes neutrality as
fundamental. However, “Liberalism based on neutrality finds its most
natural defense in some form of moral skepticism,” which Dworkin
rejects as negative and ineffective (1985, p. 205). If Dworkin is correct
and neutrality can be derived from the goal of equality, then pluralism
need not be based on skepticism about the end. Rather, pluralism, in the
form of liberal neutrality, can and should be derived from the end of
equality. Skepticism about the end is a misplaced subjective uncertainty.
Alternatively, civic republicans and deliberative democrats, dissatisfied
with the mere aggregation of preferences based on liberal skepticism
about the end, have each worked to develop a model for political delib-
eration, but their quest remains difficult in the absence of a common end
that Aristotle says is required for deliberation. For their part, civic repub-
licans such as Cass Sunstein, Quentin Skinner, Philip Pettit and others
claim that the common end should not be presupposed, but be allowed
to emerge through deliberation.6 Sunstein (1988, p. 1549) rejects skepti-
cism and relativism concerning ends because it treats personal preferences
as exogenous to the political process, leading to the mere aggregation of
opinion and the exclusive reliance on bargaining. Rather, a common
good can be found through dialogue based on the agreement of political
equals, which is the pragmatic standard for correctness (1988, p. 1554).
Civic republicanism differs from classical republicanism in that it does
not take virtue to be the end, but as a necessary condition for deliberative
self-government.7 Each theorist sees citizen virtue as essential to main-
taining a free republic and personal political liberty, and it may even need
to be coerced by law.8 They understand citizen virtue as placing the com-
mon good ahead of one’s own private interest.9 Critics charge that civic

6
Sunstein (1988, p. 1554, 1991, pp. 17–18 & 34), Skinner (1995, p. 35, 1996, pp. 15–16), Pettit
(1997, p. 190).
7
Skinner (1984, pp. 214, 218, 1995, p. 30), Sunstein (1988, pp. 1550–1), Pettit (1997, p. 245),
Dagger (1997, p. 17), Spitz (1993, p. 344).
8
Skinner (1995, p. 33), Pettit (1997, p. 254), Spitz (1993, p. 345).
9
Dagger (1997, p. 14), Spitz (1993, p. 344), Pettit (1997, pp. 258–9), Skinner (1995, p. 37),
Sunstein (1994–1995, pp. 742–3).
14 J. N. Hubler

republicanism’s reliance on and possible coercion of citizen virtue is

impractical,10 paternalistic,11 oppressive,12 or even totalitarian.13
Habermas (1999, p. 244) too thinks that civic republicanism’s reliance
on virtue is unrealistic and seeks a third way between liberalism and
republicanism. Like Sunstein, Habermas rejects both dogmatic monism
and skeptical pluralism, or in his terms non-cognitivism about morality
(1999, pp. 5–6) in favor of a common standard, although he posits the
standard as a universal principle of discourse that he contends is more
universal than any conception of a common good. Any common good
must be formulated within a historical, ethical tradition, while the dis-
course principle is universal relying only on the presupposition that par-
ticipants agree to settle their differences through communication rather
than through “violence, or even compromise” (1999, p. 39).
According to Habermas, liberalism’s rejection of a common good
degrades politics into a system of mere bargaining based on the model of
the market. Still, Habermas cannot accept the republican alternative that
he sees based on a presupposed notion of the good. Liberalism relies on
the aggregation of personal preference through voting and bargaining,
while republicanism seeks to forge a common ethical community through
dialogue. Habermas’ view of democracy based on discourse theory rejects
mere bargaining, but also the republican presupposition of a shared ethi-
cal community,

In contrast, a discourse-theoretic interpretation insists on the fact that

democratic will-formation does not draw its legitimating force from a pre-
vious convergence of settled ethical convictions, but from both the com-
municative presuppositions that allow the better arguments to come into
play in various forms of deliberation, and from the procedures that secure
fair bargaining processes. (1994, p. 4)

10
Macey (1988, p. 1679), Herzog (1986, p. 488), Sandel (1996, pp. 337–8), Goodin (2003,
pp. 66–8).
11
Habermas (1999, p. 28), Brennan and Lomasky (2006, p. 241).
12
Young (2000, p. 81).
13
Gey (1993, p. 897).
 1 Introduction 15

Rather than presupposing a common ethical good as classical republican-

ism does, Habermas tries to develop the ethical principles required for
democratic practice from the Discourse Principle required for dialogue.
The Discourse Principle states, “Just those action norms are valid to
which all possibly affected persons could agree as participants in rational
discourses” (2008, p. 107). From it, he derives basic rights, the division
of powers, (1996, pp. 123, 192) and the legitimacy of democratic proce-
dures (2008, p. 103) and of law (1996, pp. 454–5).
There are two key problems with Habermas’ alternative to liberalism
and republicanism. First, it is not at all clear that he can distinguish his
Discourse Principle from a common good in the classical republican
style. According to Habermas (1996, p. 178), “There is no criterion inde-
pendent of the argumentative process.” Legitimacy only comes from the
conditions that allow for “better arguments to come into play” and for
fair bargaining (1996, pp. 278–9). However, the Discourse Principle
invokes a controversial political principle that goes beyond mere argu-
mentative processes for it entails universal participation in rational dis-
course and this is not something that all would accept merely as a principle
of argument. Aristotle, for one, thinks that universal participation in
political discourse is undesirable simply because most people are not
equipped to engage in rational discussions. Further, Aristotle treats the
right to participation in political discourse as one of the most fundamen-
tal and consequential political arguments. According to Aristotle, the
poor and advocates of democracy think that everyone should be able to
participate equally in political discourse, but the rich disagree. The
wealthy think that the right to political participation should be awarded
on the basis of merit (Pol. 1301a28–35). This difference of opinion over
the nature of participation is the leading cause of civic unrest and a major
problem that Aristotle confronts in his theory. The Discourse Principle
constitutes an ethical claim and an ethical good because it prioritizes the
good of universal participation over the good of merit-based participa-
tion, envisioning a very different community than the wealthy of
Aristotle’s time do. It is not at all clear that many in today’s wealthy class
would disagree with Aristotle’s wealthy oligarchs.
A second problem for Habermas’ theory is his characterization of
republican theory because he says that Aristotelian politics requires “the
16 J. N. Hubler

virtues of citizens oriented to the common good” (1996, p. 277).

Habermas is hardly alone in his assessment of Aristotle and of republican
theory more broadly,14 but it is only partially true of Aristotle’s theory.
Aristotle does develop an aspirational “City of Our Prayers” in which
citizen virtue can be developed due to its abundant resources. However,
in addition to the aspirational republic of virtue, Aristotle outlines best
constitutions for other cities with fewer resources and without assuming
extraordinary citizen virtue. The middle polity presents an alternative
republican model not founded on virtuous citizens, but on the political
friendship that can develop among equals. Political friendship, not vir-
tue, serves as the basis for deliberation in the middle polity. Unlike the
rich and poor who have conflicting interests, the middle class shares com-
mon interests that can serve as the basis for political deliberation. It is not
the judicious deliberation of the “City of Our Prayers” because it is not
directed by an understanding of the best life. Still an opinion-based delib-
eration of the middle polity is sufficient to ensure that the city is well run.
In a city without a strong middle class, polarized between rich and poor,
genuine political deliberation is impossible because the rich and poor do
not share a common end necessary for shared deliberation (Pol. 4.11,
1296a29–36). Thus, the wise legislator cannot afford to overlook the eco-
nomic conditions of the city that must be properly developed if citizens
are to share common opinions about their end, thus making political
deliberation possible.
The middle polity neither presupposes a high degree of virtue among
its citizens nor seeks to impose a standard of the good. Its deliberation is
not based on a common understanding of the good life, but upon com-
mon opinions about mutual utility. Unlike Habermas’ deliberative
democracy, it does not suppose that all can recognize the value of univer-
sal participation in discourse. The middle polity only requires that the
middle class is large and strong enough to ensure that those with a com-
mon opinion about their mutual utility can prevent the factional interests
of the rich or poor from dominating. The mutual interest of the middle
class can serve as the basis for effective political deliberation, without

Barker (1918, p. 11), Strauss (1988, p. 40), Rahe (1992, pp. 57–8), Zuckert (1994, p. 182),
14

Gibson (2007, p. 260).

 1 Introduction 17

having to presuppose a universal standard either of discourse or of a good

and virtuous life. The city’s common goals emerge from the opinions of a
suitably empowered middle class. Thus, based on their common goals,
they can deliberate without the need for self-sacrificial virtue advocated
by classical and civic republicans. By showing the economic conditions
necessary for shared deliberation, Aristotle’s middle polity can serve as a
new model for a deliberative republic.

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 2
Plato and the Uncertain World

In Plato’s Republic, Socrates imagines philosophers as reluctant to return

to the cave. To encourage their return, Socrates suggests persuading phi-
losophers that they will be able to see the images in the cave ten-thousand
times better than the others because they know the originals (7, 520C).
The problem is that philosophers will still be trading in images, just like
sophists. In the late dialogues, Plato addresses the problem, by explaining
that opinion can be true if it is based in a stable soul and is directed to
stable objects, such as the motions of the heavenly spheres (Timaeus
47C). In practical matters, opinion can also attain a degree of truth if it
is supplemented by precise measurements that lend opinion a degree of
certainty ultimately derived from knowledge (Philebus 57C–D). In short,
opinion can navigate the sea of uncertainty only if it is grounded in a
stable soul and directed toward a stable object or standard. In this way,
Plato sets up a twin dependency for true opinion in the practical sphere.
On the one hand, true opinion depends on a stable soul and on the other,
it depends on the guidance of knowledge for its standards. The twin-­
dependency of opinion has profound implications for Plato’s late political
theory, primarily developed in the Laws, where the Athenian establishes
a program of education to train well-ordered souls and a Nocturnal

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 21

J. N. Hubler, Overcoming Uncertainty in Ancient Greek Political Philosophy,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-82091-6_2
22 J. N. Hubler

Council to preserve true opinion in the city through its own knowledge
of the ultimate goal of the city in the form of virtue.
Most studies have paid scant attention to the role of opinion in Plato’s
late epistemology and political theory, focusing instead on the status of
the Forms and knowledge. Christopher Bobonich’s Plato’s Utopia Recast is
a noteworthy exception. Bobonich takes appropriate notice of the Laws’
emphasis on opinion-based virtue but in explaining the innovations in
the theory of opinion that ground opinion-based virtue, he takes an alter-
nate, although not contradictory approach to the one proposed here.
Bobonich argues that in the late dialogues, Plato comes to see that knowl-
edge of the Forms is implicit in belief, thereby raising his estimation of
the cognitive ability of non-philosophers (2002, p. 328). Setting aside
Bobonich’s controversial developmental claims, he is correct that belief
requires an implicit knowledge of the Forms, but Plato does more to
upgrade the status of opinion in the late dialogues in two areas that
Bobonich leaves relatively unexplored. They are the theories of cognitive
motion and of mixed science and they serve to provide an account of true
opinion foundational for Plato’s late ethical and political theory.
The theory of cognitive motion is no innovation on Plato’s part. It is
something of a common-place among his predecessors, but Plato draws
attention to its deficiencies in the Theaetetus and then addresses them
squarely in the Timaeus. In the Theaetetus, Socrates charges that no cogni-
tion can be true if either the knower or the known are in motion. His
critique raises a challenge not just for the theory of Heraclitean flux that
he is critiquing, but also for all theories of cognitive motion by requiring
truth be grounded in two stable relata—in the knower and the known. In
the Timaeus, Plato meets the stable-relata requirement by positing natu-
ral, regular motions in the soul that can become true opinion in the
contemplation of the regular motions of the heavenly spheres. The solu-
tion in the Timaeus is narrowly focused on the contemplation of the
heavens and on the regularities of musical harmonies, but Plato expands
the range of stable objects of opinion in the Philebus, by supplementing
opinion with knowledge-based measurements and standards in the the-
ory of mixed science. Still opinion never overcomes its inherent uncer-
tainty and in both its initiation in the training of the soul and in its
 2 Plato and the Uncertain World 23

completion in the mixed sciences, it requires the support of knowledge.

Its dependence on knowledge has significant implications for Plato’s ethi-
cal and political theories to be explored in the subsequent chapter.
Before embarking on the analysis of particular dialogues, a few meth-
odological notes are in order. Despite the skepticism raised about Plato’s
chronology by Jacob Howland (1991, pp. 200–1) and others, most com-
mentators accept that the Philebus, Sophist, Statesman, Timaeus, Critias,
and Laws are late dialogues.1 That chronology will be accepted here, as
well as the assumption that Meno is earlier than the Republic, which is
earlier than the Theaetetus. Second, we will assume a broadly unitarian
view of the dialogues in that it will be assumed that Plato is for the most
part consistent, although there is development within the broad frame-
work of his teaching of the Forms.2 Although consistent, there is still
room for changes in presentation depending on the expertise of the
speakers in any given dialogue.3 Third, we will focus on the status of
opinion and delve neither into metaphysical issues nor questions of the
precise nature of the knowledge of the Forms.

1 Early Opinion
The nature and role of opinion does not remain constant throughout
Plato’s dialogues. In the early and middle dialogues, Plato develops two
very different theories of opinion, chiefly in the Meno and Republic. In
the Meno, opinion can be subjectively uncertain, while in the Republic, it
is objectively so. The notion of opinion simply as uncertainty conceals a
distinction between objective and subjective uncertainty. In its objective
form, uncertainty arises from the side of the object. If an object is inher-
ently uncertain, then one cannot know it with certainty. One can only
have opinion about it in an objectively uncertain sense of opinion. In its
subjective form, uncertainty arises from a failure of a person to know
1
Although critical of stylometry, Thesleff accepts its results for the late dialogues (1982, p. 70 &
1999, pp. 121–2).
For a cogent defense of the findings of stylometry, see Kahn (2002).
2
Cf. Sedley (2019).
3
Cf. Rowe (2007, p. 51).
24 J. N. Hubler

with certainty an object that can be known with certainty. If Socrates

believes that it will rain tomorrow, his opinion is objectively uncertain. It
may be true, but he cannot know it is true with any certainty. If Socrates
believes that the Pythagorean Theorem is true, but he does not know how
to prove it, then his opinion is subjectively uncertain because the theo-
rem can be known with certainty. Socrates just fails to do so.
In the Meno, Socrates presents opinion as subjectively uncertain in
that one can “tie down” opinion with a rational account, yielding knowl-
edge (98A). Opinion is therefore subjectively uncertain because it falls
short of the certainty that it can attain when supplied with a proper
account. In the Republic, traditionally dated after the Meno, the picture
changes dramatically with opinion becoming completely objectively
uncertain. Opinion is uncertain because its objects in the sensible world
are inherently uncertain, while knowledge is distinct because it concerns
objects that are eternally the same and can be known with certainty.
Because Socrates distinguishes knowledge and opinion based on their
objects, opinion can never be corrected in order to become certain. It
remains as uncertain as its objects, which are changeable things in the
sensible realm. Then in the Theaetetus, Socrates refutes the theory of radi-
cal flux thereby raising doubts about the possibility of any truth in opin-
ion at all. Socrates argues that if either knower or known are in motion,
then truth is impossible (182D–E). Socrates’ refutation of flux raises a
challenge for the possibility of true opinion that Plato addresses in the
late dialogues.
In the Meno, Socrates argues that true opinion can be just as effective
as knowledge as a guide for action (97B–C). A person who merely has a
correct opinion about the way to Larissa is no less a good guide than one
who knows the way (97A–B). The difference between true opinion and
knowledge is that knowledge is tied down by argument, while opinion is
liable to slip away from a person’s soul (97E–98A). Socrates is describing
subjective uncertainty because opinion and knowledge can have the same
object and the object of opinion can also be known with certainty.4 The
object is not uncertain in itself, but the uncertainty in opinion arises from

4
For a brief overview of some problems of interpretation of the passage, see Taylor (2008,
pp. 172–4).
 2 Plato and the Uncertain World 25

the subjective failure of a person to know with certainty what can be

known with certainty. It is a subjective failure, meaning that opinion in
the Meno is subjectively uncertain. Roslyn Weiss points out that only in
the Meno does Plato hold that opinion can be as valuable as knowledge.
She notes that opinion “is just as beneficial as knowledge. Nowhere else
in Plato does true opinion enjoy such high praise.”5 The change in status
of opinion occurs because after the Meno, Plato reformulates opinion as
objectively rather than subjectively uncertain.6
Plato transforms the account of opinion in the Republic with the Two-
World Thesis. According to the Two-World Thesis, knowledge and opin-
ion have distinct objects. Knowledge concerns the world of being, while
people have opinions about the sensible world (477B–D). The Two-
World Thesis has significant consequences for the status of opinion.
According to the Thesis, opinion and knowledge are distinguished by
their proper objects. The objects of opinion are inherently uncertain,
while only the objects of knowledge can be known with certainty.
Consequently, opinion is only objectively and not subjectively uncertain.
Opinion is objectively uncertain because its objects in the sensible realm
are constantly changing and cannot be known with certainty. The uncer-
tainty of opinion derives from its objects and does not represent a subjec-
tive failure to attain certain knowledge about sensible objects because
they cannot be known with certainty.
On the other hand, there is also no subjective uncertainty about the
Forms. They can be known with certainty, but no one can form a true,
subjectively uncertain opinion about them because they are not the
objects of opinion at all. Julius Moravcsik (1992, 36–7) argues that there
is no reason that one cannot form opinions about Forms because Socrates
merely claims that if we only have opinions of the Forms, then we can do
better and achieve knowledge of them. Moravcsik does not adequately
account for Socrates’ treatment of opinion and knowledge as distinct
powers with distinct objects. Socrates argues that knowledge and opinion

5
Weiss (2001, p. 153, cf. pp. 7–8). Hallich (2013, 182–3) points out that in the Meno opinion does
not yet have the negative connotations it does in the Republic, where the difference between knowl-
edge and opinion is ontological and epistemological.
6
For a survey of Plato’s treatment of opinion in the early dialogues, see Lafrance (1982,
pp. 119–123).
26 J. N. Hubler

are powers (dunamis) and as powers, they can be distinguished both by

their natural objects and what they accomplish (apergazein). He draws an
analogy to other powers such as sight and hearing (5, 477C–E). For
example, sight sees colors and accomplishes vision. It can be distinguished
from hearing either by its object or by its accomplishment.7 Either object
or accomplishment is sufficient to distinguish sight from hearing.
Accordingly, Glaucon takes the accomplishments of knowledge and
opinion as sufficient to distinguish them as powers, for he says that they
must be distinct as one power is without error, while the other is subject
to error—an assessment with which Socrates agrees (5, 477E). Since one’s
accomplishment is subject to error and the other’s is not, they must be
distinct accomplishments, meaning that the powers are distinct.
Once Socrates and Glaucon have distinguished knowledge and opin-
ion as powers based on their accomplishments, Socrates concludes that
they must have different objects. It is not generally true that powers with
distinct effects must have distinct objects. Gail Fine (1978, p. 128) notes
that husbandry and butchery have very different effects, but the same
objects—domestic animals.8 However, in the case of opinion, knowledge,
sight, and hearing, distinct powers with distinct accomplishments must
have distinct objects because their accomplishments simply are the per-
ception of objects. In the case of perceptual powers, the accomplishment
is necessarily dependent on its object as Socrates’ description of the object
and accomplishment of the power of knowledge makes clear:

Socrates: Knowledge, I suppose, depends on being, to know being

as it is?
Glaucon: Yes (5, 478A).9

Being is the object of understanding and its accomplishment is know-

ing being as it is. Its accomplishment consists in the perception of its
object. Thus, for perceptual powers, if their perceptions are distinct, their

7
Taylor (2008, p. 178) and others use the term “effect” rather than “accomplishment”, but effect
suggests the production of something distinct from the act of perception.
8
For a similar objection, see Dorter (2006, p. 157).
9
Translations from Greek and Latin, here and throughout, are by the author.
 2 Plato and the Uncertain World 27

objects are distinct. So, for perceptual powers, Socrates argues that differ-
ent powers must have different objects in order to accomplish their dis-
tinct effects. If the power of knowledge accomplishes knowledge of what
something is as it is (5, 478A), then its object must be something that is.
If opinion accomplishes true belief about something, then its object must
be the perception of the proper object of true belief.
To summarize, we can say that:

(1) The accomplishment of the power of knowledge is unerring, while

the accomplishment of the power of opinion is subject to error;
(2) Knowledge and opinion are distinct powers;
(3) Knowledge and opinion have distinct objects.

The inference from 2 to 3 works for perceptual powers and not for pow-
ers in general.
Opinion is a distinct power with a different accomplishment and
object than knowledge. Its objects are the many rather than the one and
it accomplishes belief rather than knowledge about them (5, 479D–E).
Using one’s power of opinion, a person forms beliefs about the many
beautiful things rather than the one Form of the beautiful. Therefore, if
one tries to formulate an opinion about the Form of the beautiful, the
best one can accomplish is to form an opinion about many beautiful
things because opinion is a distinct power that can only recognize change-
able things. As a distinct power, opinion is not equipped to attain the
certain knowledge required to know the Forms.
The distinction between knowledge and opinion as powers explains
Socrates’ subsequent comments about proper education. Socrates con-
tends that education is not a matter of placing knowledge into souls, as if
one is placing the power of sight into blind eyes (7, 518B–C). That is
impossible. Instead, the power of knowledge must already be present in
souls and education is a matter of directing the innate power of knowl-
edge toward its proper object—being (7, 518C). Knowledge is a power
that has never been lost from the soul, but has been misdirected and
poorly used (7, 518E–519A). It needs to be redirected toward the Forms
if it is to “see” properly.
28 J. N. Hubler

If the only way to know the Forms is by engaging the power of knowl-
edge, it may seem odd that Socrates employs images to teach Glaucon
about the Form of the Good. As Dirk Baltzly (1997, p. 266) argues,
Socrates’ use of the images of the Sun, the line, and the cave reveal
Socrates’ beliefs about the form of the Good. On the contrary, Lloyd
Gerson (2003, p. 164) claims that Socrates’ beliefs about likenesses are
not beliefs about the Forms, “They are in fact beliefs about likenesses as
likenesses, not as originals.” Further, there is no reason to think that
Socrates cannot use images to turn people toward the Forms. What he
cannot do is use images to have them understand the Forms. They cannot
accomplish this by the power of opinion. It can only be accomplished by
the power of knowledge. There are two primary ways that images can be
useful in turning people to the Forms. One is elenchus. By showing them
the inadequacy of their beliefs, people can be turned to seek something
higher (Republic 7, 524C). The other is consideration of sensible objects
as offspring of the Forms (Republic 6, 507A). As offspring, they bear a
likeness to the Forms. By considering them as likenesses, one can begin
to seek the sources beyond the images. Both are legitimate uses of images
to turn souls to the Forms, but neither represents true opinions about the
Forms. The power of opinion can at most formulate changeable opinions
and changeable opinions cannot represent unchangeable Forms. To know
the Forms, one must be able to recognize that they necessarily are what
they are and opinion cannot do that. Opinion only knows sensible par-
ticulars and they do not admit of necessity. One can no more show the
necessary being of a Form using opinion than one can prove the
Pythagorean Theorem using drawings.
Socrates distinguishes knowledge and opinion primarily as powers or
faculties that are defined by their objects.10 Accordingly, opinion is uncer-
tain because its objects are uncertain. Therefore, it is only capable of
knowing uncertain objects that are uncertain because they are subject to
change. Since it can only achieve cognition of uncertain, changeable
objects, the faculty of opinion is incapable of grasping the Forms, which
are neither changeable nor uncertain. Opinion can no more know the
Forms than sight can see sounds.

10
On the importance of the object in Plato’s epistemology generally, see Lafrance (1981, p. 135).
 2 Plato and the Uncertain World 29

Of course, the analogy to sense faculties is imperfect as one can both

see and hear a ringing bell. The same object can be seen and heard. It is
an opening Aristotle exploits, as he argues that one person can have opin-
ion and another have knowledge about the proposition that humans are
animals. One who knows that it is a necessary truth based on the defini-
tion of a human being has knowledge rather than opinion (An. post. 1.33,
89b3–6). For Plato, to know the necessity of the truth that humans are
animals, one needs to know the Form human and the Form animal and
one needs the power of knowledge, not opinion, to do so.
While upholding the Two-World Thesis, Francisco Gonzales (1996,
p. 272) is willing to grant that the lovers of sight can form opinions about
the Forms in a limited sense. They can have a defective awareness of the
Forms because they know the Forms reflected in sensible objects. Gonzales
understands opinion as an insufficient grasp and argues that the lovers of
sight have a perfectly good grasp of sensible particulars, but an insuffi-
cient grasp of the Forms.11 However, the lovers of sight have opinions
about sensible particulars because they are changeable and they cannot be
the objects of unerring judgments as is required for knowledge. Gonzales’
attribution of opinion about the Forms to the lovers of sight seems like
attributing an opinion about oxygen to Anaxminenes because he is famil-
iar with air. Anaximenes cannot form an opinion about oxygen because
he does not recognize anything more fundamental than air. Likewise, the
lovers of sight recognize nothing beyond sensible particulars so they can-
not have opinions about the Forms. To recognize the Forms requires
knowledge not opinion because to recognize the Forms, one must know
them as necessarily what they are and the apprehension of necessary
truths requires knowledge, not opinion.
The Two-World Thesis creates difficulties for Plato’s political theory for
if the sensible realm is a realm of mere opinion and images, philosophical
rulers need to operate within the scope of appearances just like everyone
else. Gail Fine (1990, p. 88) notes the difficulties that the Two-World
Thesis presents for Plato. The “unattractive consequences” of the thesis
include the impossibility of knowing things in the sensible world and
unclarity as to the philosophers’ fitness for rule since they too lack

11
For similar arguments, see Smith (2000, p. 156), Rowe (2007, pp. 211–12).
30 J. N. Hubler

knowledge of the sensible world.12 To avoid these problems, she denies

that Plato ever held the Two-World Thesis. According to Fine, there can
be opinion about the Forms and knowledge of the world of change. She
bases her interpretation on an alternative reading of Socrates’ claim that
knowledge stands in relation to what is and ignorance to what is not (5,
477A). Fine claims that “what is” in the context must be read veridically,
to the effect that one with knowledge knows what is true.13 Opinion
stands in relation to what is and what is not because some opinions are
true and some are false (1990, pp. 87–8). Socrates’ absolute distinction
between what is known and what is opined presents a major hurdle for
Fine’s interpretation. Socrates asks, “Will what is known and what is
opined be the same, or is that impossible?” Glaucon agrees that it is
impossible (5, 478A). Fine counters that the set of what is known is dis-
tinct from what is opined because the latter set includes falsehoods that
the former does not.
If the set of what is known differs from what is opined only because the
latter includes false beliefs, then the two sets share true beliefs. However,
Socrates presents the objects of knowledge and opinion as mutually
exclusive. For example, Socrates says, “The true lover of learning naturally
strives after being, not remaining among any of the many objects of opin-
ion” (6, 490A–B). Being, the object of knowledge, is distinct from any
object of belief. Socrates further distinguishes the objects of knowledge
and opinion because the former are separate and the latter mixed. Vision
sees the large and small mixed together, while the intellect must see them
as separated (7, 524C). One’s ring finger looks small in comparison to the
middle finger, but large in comparison to one’s pinky (7, 523E). When
one sees the large and small mixed together in the ring finger, it should
drive one to consider the large and small as they exist in themselves,

12
For similar criticisms of the Two-World Thesis, see Smith (2000, pp. 153–4), Annas (1981,
pp. 194 & 279).
13
For an extensive critique of Fine’s veridical reading, see Gonzales (1996, pp. 248–62), cf. Baltzly
(1997, pp. 243–4), Stokes (1992, p. 111). However, the critics do not agree on an alternative to the
veridical meaning of the term einai. Gonzales takes it to be predicative and existential (pp. 258–62);
Baltzly, predicative & veridical (p. 240); and Stokes, existential (pp. 103 & 111–12).
The fact that the critics cannot agree on an alternative reading underlines the ambiguity of the
term, which makes sorting out the argument based on an interpretation of Plato’s use of einai dif-
ficult and ultimately unproductive.
 2 Plato and the Uncertain World 31

which one can only perceive through the intellect. The intellect comes to
understand the large itself, unmixed with the small, and distinct from
perceptible objects in which the large is always mixed with the small.
Vision can never see perceptible objects as separate because they are
always mixed, making them distinct from the objects of knowledge.
Therefore, intellect and opinion are distinct because their objects are dis-
tinct, just as the Two-World Thesis claims.
In yet a further difficulty for Fine’s veridical reading of being as the
object of knowledge, Socrates presents being as the object of knowledge
not in contrast with falsity, but in contrast to becoming and perishing.
Socrates says that philosophers “love any learning that makes clear to
them something of the being that always is and is not led off by coming
to be and perishing” (6, 485B). The being that philosophers seek is
beyond any coming to be or perishing that characterizes the sensible world.
Given the Two-World Thesis, Fine (1990, p. 86) correctly notes that if
philosophers “only have belief about the sensible world—it is unclear
why they are specially fitted to rule in this world.” Similarly, Annas (1981,
p. 279) contends that Socrates does not explain why philosophers “would
have any aptitude or liking for making the practical judgments about
particular situations that ruling would require.” Fine and Annas overstate
the case a bit since Socrates does offer a brief explanation, saying that
philosophers will better perceive sensibles because they know the origi-
nals “there,” and that sensibles are images of them (7, 520C). It is not
much of an explanation, but it is something. Still, it means that in practi-
cal affairs, philosophers are trading in images, just like everyone else.
However, the difficulties for the Two-World Thesis do not end there.
In the Theaetetus, the Eleatic Stranger raises further difficulties, arguing
that if the knower and object are both in motion, knowledge is not at all
possible (182E). Socrates raises the problem specifically to undermine
either the radical theory of flux or the theory of perception as a kind of
motion, but the argument has implications that go beyond the specific
theories Socrates critiques because among Plato’s predecessors both
knowledge and sense perception are commonly understood as types of
motion. If cognitive states are motions, it is difficult to see how they can
attain any truth. In the late dialogues, Plato responds not by abandoning
the theory of cognitive motion, but by developing it in such a way that it
32 J. N. Hubler

can provide an account of the soul as a stable, rational mover that can
come to true opinions about the sensible realm by employing rational
standards.
There are two main questions of interpretation concerning Socrates’
refutation of flux or cognitive motion in the Theaetetus. The first question
is whether the theory of sense perception as motion as outlined by
Socrates is one that Plato endorses or not.14 The second concerns the
target of Socrates’ refutation of the theory of sense perception as motion.
David Bostock and others argue that it only holds against an extreme
Heraclitean version of flux,15 while Myles Burnyeat (1990, pp. 8–9, 61)
thinks it applies more broadly to any empiricism. Whether or not one
takes the theory of perception as Plato’s own, the critiques that Socrates
levels present challenges to any analysis of perception as motion—chal-
lenges that Plato addresses in the Laws, Timaeus and Philebus.
Socrates sketches a theory of perception in terms of motion. Although
many of the details are unclear and disputed, Socrates explains perceiver
and perception as twin offspring of motions that join together. The
motions from the eye and from a near-by object meet and produce the
perception of a white stick or stone. The object does not become white
until its motions meet with those from the eye (156A–E). The same
account holds for all other sensible properties. No qualities are anything
in themselves but come to be through motions from perceiver and object
and their mutual association (157A). Socrates’ account can be under-
stood causally or phenomenologically. As Ian Crombie explains the causal
interpretation, objects such as sticks and stones cause motions that join
with the motions of the eye to create perceptions. In the phenomenologi-
cal account, objects are merely aggregates of perceived properties.
According to Crombie (1963, p. 25), Plato intends to provide a causal
account but fails to distinguish it from a phenomenological one, ending
14
Crombie argues that the theory is Plato’s own (1963, p. 25–6). So also Reed (1972, p. 75), Kahn
(2013, p. 92 n. 59).
By contrast, Day presents a comprehensive and compelling argument that it is not a theory Plato
endorses (1997, pp. 51 & 79). So also, McDowell (1973, p. 139), Fine (1988, pp. 19–22), Sedley
(2004, p. 44), Bostock (1988, pp. 151–3), Polansky (1992, p. 101–2).
15
According to Bostock (1988, p. 108), Plato’s critique is only effective against extreme
Heracliteanism. So also, Crombie (1963, p. 27), McDowell (1973, p. 184), Reed (1972, p. 73), cf.
Polansky (1992, pp. 154, 159).
 2 Plato and the Uncertain World 33

up with a somewhat confused picture. Jane Day (1997, p. 68) takes it the
other way round, arguing that the account is largely phenomenological
but is contaminated by causal elements.16 At present there is no need to
sort through the metaphysical details other than to note that under either
metaphysical picture, perception and perceived qualities only come into
existence together.17
After further investigation of Protagoras’ subjectivism, Socrates returns
to the theory of perception, either to refute it or its radical-flux version,
depending on one’s interpretation. Socrates charges that if the perceived
motion is in motion and it flows, then the motion that generates the
perception of white will also be in motion and flow, becoming another
color. Since the perceived color is always changing, Socrates asks if it is
possible to call it a color. Theodorus responds that it is not because it is
constantly slipping away as one speaks (182D–E). The same argument
holds for the perceiver that is also in motion. Seeing cannot remain as it
is because it is also in motion. It must also undergo change and become
something other than the seeing that it is at any one moment (182E). As
Gerard Boter (2009, pp. 43–4) points out, there is no reason to suppose
that seeing becomes something other than seeing. It does not suddenly
shift into hearing or some other activity. Instead, neither seeing nor hear-
ing can “ever remain in the same seeing or hearing” (182E). Just as from
moment to moment, white becomes another color (182D) and not a
sound or a horse, so also seeing becomes another type of seeing not a type
of hearing. Seeing is constantly changing because the perceiver is
changing.
Because seeing is constantly changing, Socrates concludes, “Therefore,
something cannot be called seeing any more than not-seeing” (182E).
Polansky (1992, p. 158) takes this to mean that seeing can become some-
thing other than seeing or even perception, such as “horseback riding.”

16
Cf. Bostock (1988, pp. 81–2), McDowell (1973, pp. 143–5, 184), cf. Burnyeat (1990,
pp. 16–18).
Polansky (1992, p. 100) prefers to call it “complete nominalism,” and not phenomenalism
(1992, p. 98). Sedley (2004, p. 47) thinks it is a phenomenalism. According to Timothy Chappell
(2004, p. 77), the “flux theory is mentalistic.”
17
For the difficulties inherent in each interpretation, see Day (1997, pp. 65–70), Polansky (1992,
pp. 98–9).
34 J. N. Hubler

Polansky’s conclusion is unwarranted, but Boter’s treatment of Socrates

conclusion is also off the mark. Boter (2009, p. 44) says that “it can be
called not-seeing, because it is not stable, but changes constantly,” chang-
ing even while one speaks. However, Socrates’ point is better rendered to
say that it can neither be called seeing nor not-seeing.18 According to
Boter, it is called “not-seeing.” Instead, Socrates says it cannot be called
not-seeing. Logically speaking, something that cannot be called either F
or not-F is indefinite with regard to F, as a sound is neither white nor
non-white. So also, any act of “seeing” cannot be called either seeing or
not seeing because it is indefinite (apeiron, 183B).
In the preceding argument about white shifting to another color,
Socrates and Theodorus conclude it is not possible to call anything a
color because it slips away as we speak. To be able to call something a
color, it must remain the same color long enough for us to do so. In the
same way to call something seeing, it must remain the same act of seeing
long enough to call it seeing. Seeing stands or falls with color because
perception and color come to be together, according to the twin-motion
theory. If a color does not remain long enough to be called a color, seeing
does not remain long enough to be called seeing any more than not-seeing.
Since Theodorus equates sense perception and understanding, under-
standing is also constantly becoming something other than it is.
Generalizing, we cannot say that anything either is or is not something,
or becomes or does not become something. We can only say that it is not
anything definite (182E–183B). If all is in motion, then perception,
understanding, and even linguistic description become impossible.
Although directed at the teaching of flux, Socrates’ charges apply much
more broadly, applying to any account that explains perception in terms
of motion, which is the dominant mode of explanation in Plato’s time.
Importantly, changes in either the perceiver or perceived qualities renders
perception impossible. If white is constantly moving, perception is
impossible. If the motions from the eye are constantly changing, it is
likewise impossible. Contrary to many interpreters, Socrates’ refutation
does not require a more extreme version of flux than the one behind the
twin-­motion theory of perception. Bostock and others point to Socrates’

18
This is also how Bostock (1988, p. 100) interprets Socrates’ conclusion.
 2 Plato and the Uncertain World 35

assertion that things are always changing in quality as well as place

(181D–E) as evidence of a more extreme version of flux than that of the
twin-motion theory.19 However, there is nothing in the twin-motion the-
ory of perception that allows one to conclude there is any stability either
in perceptible qualities or regarding locomotion. Perceptible qualities are
the product of fast motions that are themselves the products of slow
motions (156C–D). All is in motion. Locomotion is constantly changing
because by definition it cannot rest. If locomotions are constantly chang-
ing, then perceptible qualities are too, because they are products of loco-
motion. We also know that objects are actually bundles of perceptible
qualities (157B–C) and so they are constantly changing too. As Burnyeat
(1982, p. 11, cf. 13) explains, “Nothing is left but a succession of pairings
between perceptual appearances on the one hand and the momentary
states of affairs which they represent on the other.” By insisting that
everything changes through locomotion and in quality, Socrates is not
adding to the theory of flux. He is merely drawing out a consequence of
the twin-motion theory. His refutation therefore extends to the twin-
motion theory of perception.
To appreciate the extensive range of Socrates’ critique, one should note
that Plato’s predecessors widely accept that the soul is a form of motion
and many explain its perceptive states and perceptible properties as forms
of motion. Socrates notes that all the wise other than Parmenides hold
that everything is in motion, constantly becoming rather than being any
one thing (152E). According to Aristotle, Democritus, Anaxagoras,
Diogenes of Apollonia, Heraclitus, and Alcmaeon of Croton teach that
perception, thought, or knowledge is a form of motion in the soul or
mind (De an. 1.2, 405a8–b1). Empedocles and the Hippocratic treatise
Regimen both teach that intelligence is determined by the speed of the
soul’s motions.20 Aristotle tells us less about the perceptible qualities, but
does note that Heraclitus teaches that they are motions. The soul knows
what is moved by itself being moved (to de kinoumenon kinoumenōi
ginōskesthai, 405 a 25–8). Although Aristotle provides no details, the late
19
Bostock (1988, p. 109), Crombie (1963, p. 28), Reed (1972, p. 72), Polansky (1992, p. 157).
20
For Empedocles, see Theophrastus, De Sensu 7; Regimen, 1.35. On the date of Regimen, see
Jacques Jouanna (2012, p. 214). For the parallels between Empedocles and Regimen, see Jouanna
(2012, pp. 214–19) and with Timaeus, see pp. 220–7.
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