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Behnaz Hosseini
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Ethnic Religious
Minorities in Iran
Edited by
S. Behnaz Hosseini
Ethnic Religious Minorities in Iran
S. Behnaz Hosseini
Editor
Ethnic Religious
Minorities in Iran
Editor
S. Behnaz Hosseini
Institute of Social and Cultural Anthropology
University of Oxford
London, UK
ISBN 978-981-19-1632-8 ISBN 978-981-19-1633-5 (eBook)

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Foreword: The Unacknowledged Religious
Minorities in Iran—A Concise
Conceptual Map
Introduction
In a country such as Iran, with the declared Shi’ite Islamic political system
and with the majority of Muslims (99%), religion is a major element in
social orientation. Islam’s arrival in Iran in the seventh century is a turning
point in the country’s history. Since then, a complex combination of pre-
Islamic and Islamic elements has been the salient character of Iranian iden-
tity. Furthermore, the strict distinction between in-group and out-group
in Islamic doctrine made religious affiliation an essential foundation of
social grouping. Safavid Shi’ization (1500s–1700s ce) replaced Islam as a
broad concept with the sectarian Shi’ite denomination. The Shi’ite prin-
ciple of Iranian identity became even more prominent after Iran’s Islamic
Revolution (1979). Even though the Islamic Republic of Iran does not
renounce the pre-Islamic principles of Iranian identity, it furthers the sepa-
ration between pre-Islamic and Islamic principles in favor of the Islamic
(Shi’ite) one. This process is represented tangibly in the building of the
National Museum of Iran.1 The museum opened in 1937 and included
mainly pre-Islamic objects. Later, in 1972, Islamic artifacts were added to
the collection. However, fourteen years after the Islamic Revolution, in
1993, the museum was divided into two separate buildings: the Museum
of Ancient Iran and, next to it, the Museum of Islamic Archeology and Art
of Iran. The intrinsic antagonism of the two roots of Iranian identity, as is
1
See: Barry (2018, pp. 31–32).
v
vi FOREWORD: THE UNACKNOWLEDGED RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN IRAN…
considered by the Islamic Republic of Iran’s official discourse, is repre-

sented in this divided National Museum.
Correspondingly, the definition of the minority in the Islamic Republic
of Iran’s constitution is based on a Shi’ite perspective. In the constitution,
Islam is the official religion of the country, and nowhere is Shi’ism named.
Nonetheless, the Shi’ite tone of the text is easily recognized through the
reiteration of Shi’ite concepts. Article 2 mentions imāmah (leadership) as
the basis of the Islamic Republic system, and Article 5 assigns walı ̄ faqı ̄h
(just and pious jurist) to the society’s leadership during the occultation
period of the twelfth Imam.2 The mentioned parts of the constitution plus
other parts imply that a specific version of Islam—that of juridical Shi’ism—
is meant. Article 13 restricts the recognized religions to Zoroastrians, Jews,
and Christians, who are protected and are free to perform their rites and
educate their people about their religion. Therefore, the constitution has
a clear-cut definition of endorsed religious minorities considered the fol-
lowers of authentic religions, ahl-e Kitāb (the people of the book), accord-
ing to Sharia law. Thus, the acknowledged minorities of the country
altogether comprise only 0.2% of Iran’s population, while the country’s
actual ethnic and religious profile is considerably more complex and more
numerous.3 As a result, based on their legal position, the religious minori-
ties are divided into two categories: the legal minorities who are protected
and their identity is acknowledged, and those whose identity is denied,
and their legal position is ambiguous.
In this short piece of writing, I aim to portray an overview of Iran’s
main religious and ethno-religious minorities in their relationship to the
dominant political discourse of the country that can be served as a general
conceptual map of the minorities.
The Acknowledged Minorities

The Zoroastrians, Jews, and Christians enjoy the liberty of practicing their
religion and having representatives in the Islamic Parliament.4 Nonetheless,
their identification with the country falls in various paradigms.
Islamic Parliament of Iran (2021).

2
According to the 2016 census, the total population of the country is 79,926,270 that
3
includes 130,138 Christians, 23,109 Zoroastrians, and 9826 Jews.

4
Zoroastrians and Jews each has a representative, Assyrians and Chaldeans jointly one
representative, and Armenians of south and north, each have one representative.
FOREWORD: THE UNACKNOWLEDGED RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN IRAN… vii
Zoroastrianism is the indigenous and dominant pre-Islamic religion of the

country. Consequently, the Zoroastrians show a strong identification with
pre-Islamic elements. As it is expected, they consider themselves the bear-
ers of authentic Iranian heritage. The Zoroastrian language—behdı ̄nān
dialect—is an endangered language of central Iranian dialects, which now-
adays is barely spoken, and the people practically speak the local vernacular
of Persian.5
Despite the same legal position of Christians6 and Zoroastrians,
Christian identification, particularly the Armenians, who are most Iranian
Christians, follow different trends. Armenian Christians of Iran are backed
by an Armenian cultural heritage that is not directly linked to the two
main resources of Iranian identity. Their heritage is based on neither pre-
Islamic Iran—like Zoroastrians—nor the Islamic era. They are originally a
scattered diasporic community whose centuries-old presence has made
them an integrated, yet distinguished, part of Iran’s ethnic bricolage. The
distinct language, their names, and specific Armenian institutions
strengthen the boundaries of the community and create a symbolically and
physically private ethnic sphere.7
Considering their historical presence, Jews are standing somewhere
between the Zoroastrian indigenous community and the Armenian dia-
sporic community. The Jew’s residence in Iran dates to the postexilic era
when after they were released from Babylonian captivity (536 bce), many
stayed in the region under the Achaemenid sovereignty. Since then, the
Iranian Jews have known no other actual homeland than Iran for more
than two millennia. However, it is conceivable that the memory of a pri-
mordial homeland and the idea of the promised land have always been
present in the collective memory of the people and may have affected their
identification.8 Although the realization of the Jewish state of Israel (1948)
is quite recent compared to the long history of Jews in Iran, it brings
about some complexities in Iranian Jews identification, something that
requires further studies. The official discourse of the Islamic Republic dis-
tinguished between the Jewish religion, and Zionism as the political ideol-
ogy of Israel, a country that the Islamic Republic does not recognize.
5
Windfuhr (1989).
6
Muslims’ conversion to other religions is forbidden in Iran. Therefore, the number of
Christian neophytes is not available and they are not considered Christian minorities.
7
Such as Ararat sport and culture complex and Armenian publishers, publications, and
churches.
8
See: Loeb (2012, p. 173).
viii FOREWORD: THE UNACKNOWLEDGED RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN IRAN…
Iranian Jews speak standard Persian or other Iranian dialects with some
Hebrew loanwords; however, Hebrew is almost completely liturgical.
Having no obvious markers or symbolic means of separation such as dis-
tinct language makes them almost indistinguishable in the public and able
to mingle with the majority in public.
The Outcasts
Categorizing the religions according to the strict Islamic-Shia Sharia is the
foundation of the constitutional definition of the minorities; however, it
doesn’t cover the actual religious diversity of the country. Certain reli-
gious groups, more or less, fall out of the constitutional definition and
consequently are derived into the realm of ambiguity and oblivion.
Nonetheless, each of these religions has its own position in relation to the
dominant political discourse, which has led their followers to be denied,
suspected, or tolerated as second-class citizens.
Those Who Must Not Be Named

Khātimiyyat is a common belief among Muslims, which simply means that
Islam is the last religion and the prophet of Islam is the last messenger of
God. The Bahā’ullāh’s challenged this conviction by claiming prophecy
and declaring a new religion in nineteenth-century Iran. Bahaism emerged
from the Iranian messianic movement of Babism that itself is rooted in the
Shia belief of the hidden Imam. Expectedly, the emergence of a new reli-
gion sparked heated reactions among Shia orthodoxy and the clergies.9
After early persecutions that occurred in the Qajar era, during the Pahlavi
era, anti-Baha’i moves assumed a subtle and pseudo-legal nature, and after
the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Baha’is’ situation deteriorated.10
There is no information about the number and distribution of Baha’is
in Iran. Talking and writing about them is taboo, and the authorities do
not mention or pronounce their name. Their name also never appears in
the news, newspapers, and magazines. Their identity is denied in the dom-
inant discourse, and their existence is barely tolerated; therefore, they live
a secret, bare life and prefer not to reveal their identity in public.
9
For a comprehensive overview of Bahaism, see: Cole (2012).
10
MacEoin (2011).
FOREWORD: THE UNACKNOWLEDGED RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN IRAN… ix
The People of the Book Who Are Not a Minority

Khūzistān province in the southeast of Iran is the homeland of the
Mandaeans, or as they are locally known the Ṣobbı ̄s or Ṣa ̄bi’ı ̄n. These peo-
ple, probably the last living Gnostic religion followers, are a scattered
community in Khūzistān of about 5000–20,000 numbers.11 The name
Ṣa ̄bi’ı ̄n is mentioned in Quran alongside Jews, Christians, Zoroastrians,
and majūs (people of the book). However, despite the supreme leader’s
fatwa in 2009 that declared them as ahl-e Kitāb—whether because of their
esoteric tendency or obscurity, or the controversy over the true identity—
they were not included in the constitutionally protected religions.12 Since
then, this fatwa has been the reference for their claim to rights they are
deprived of. They are allowed to practice their rites and festivals; but they
face barriers in obtaining jobs and education and suffer from social and
legal discrimination.
No Land for Heretics

It seems that deviation from the orthodoxy—that is, heresy—is less toler-
ated than the totally different belief systems that their difference is already
recognized. The heretics, through their alternative exegeses and practices,
challenge the boundaries of religious identity. Therefore, in a country in
which the state defines the religious identity, every heresy would be the
subject of rejection. Freud calls this aggression against the otherwise simi-
lar groups in the adjoining territories “the narcissism of minor differ-
ences,” which stages a concern for the community’s cohesion and
conformity.13
Dervish sects are among the suspicious minorities whose beliefs and
practices are considered heterodox, if not heresy. While the state overlooks
the Sufi sects in most cases, in a few cases, the dervishes, particularly one
of the most popular Shi’ite dervish sects, faced widespread persecution
after their protest against their leader’s restriction.
Yarsan or ahl-i haqq, an esoteric religion with a substantial number of
followers who mostly live in the western parts of Iran, is perhaps the larg-
est unrecognized group that falls at the threshold of heterodoxy. As a folk
11
Arabestani (2016).
12
Khamenei (2009).
13
Freud (1930/1961, p. 4506).
x FOREWORD: THE UNACKNOWLEDGED RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN IRAN…
religion with no defined canon and loose organization, these people iden-
tify themselves as the followers of Yari, which literally means friendship,
help, and cooperation. At the same time, their beliefs and practices might
be somewhat varied among different circles of followers in various places.
Some ahl-i haqq groups tend to identify with the country’s mainstream
Shia; some groups do not identify themselves with Islam.14 As a result, the
dominant political discourse regards them either as Shia extremists, which
is a heterodoxy, or as heretics. This ambiguous situation reflects the peo-
ple’s ambiguous position as an unrecognized, yet de facto, minority.
A Minority That Is Not a Minority

As mentioned, Islam is the official religion of the country. Nonetheless,
Islam’s definition in the constitution has a clear Shi’ite tenor, so Article 5
defines the Islamic Republic as a political system for the occultation era.15
As a result, a marginal position is assigned to Sunni Muslims of Iran. In
practice, Sunnis developed a minority identity that associates with a feeling
of being subject to discrimination, deprived, and ignored in the dominant
political discourse. The Sunni identity in Iran is a social fact, and the
Sunnis perceive political propaganda’s insistence on the unity of Muslim
society in the country as a denial of their identity.
Reliable statistics about the number of Iranian Sunnis are not available;
however, considering the provinces with the majority of the Sunni popula-
tion, they can be regarded as the biggest religious group in Iran after the
Shia majority. Furthermore, the provinces with the majority of Sunnis are
located at the western and eastern political borders of the country that
makes the Sunni community even more important geopolitically.
Conclusion
Except for Islam, which is the country’s official religion, only three other
religions—Christianity, Judaism, and Zoroastrianism—are legally recog-
nized and enjoy the constitutional rights of minorities. This limited defini-
tion of minority is an ideological straitjacket that doesn’t fit the real
diversity of the country. In the Shiite state of Iran, the very definition of
14
For more information about Yarsanism, see: Hosseini (2020); Mir-Hosseini (1994,
1996); Mir-Hosseini (1994).
15
Gheybat, or the absence period the twelfth imam, according to Twelver Shia beliefs.
FOREWORD: THE UNACKNOWLEDGED RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN IRAN… xi
Islam and ahl-e Kitāb gives way to controversial readings that put minori-
ties such as Sunni Muslims, Mandaeans, Yarsan, and Dervishes in an
ambiguous position prone to be cast out. The Sunnis are Muslims but not
Shiite Muslims, so they do not fit into Islam’s definition through the
state’s Shiite reading of Islam. At best, this reading considers Dervishes
and Yarsans the heterodox followers of Islam and puts them at the thresh-
old of full citizenship. Mandaeans are partly considered as ahl-e Kita ̄b, but
they are not legally included among them. The result of neglecting the
actual religious variety of the country and excluding them from the domi-
nant political discourse is a leftover that is always a source of antagonism.
This excluded identities that do not have a proper position in the domi-
nant discursive field will be non-existing or precarious entities: to borrow
Agamben’s term, they become Homo Sacer.16 In conclusion, this inflexible
dominant discourse that unbales articulates the whole population in its
discursive field leads to a leaking discourse that fails to cover the reality and
produces constant controversies, antagonism, and human suffering.
Mehrdad
Department of Anthropology, University Arabestani
of Tehran, Tehran, Iran
References
Agamben, Giorgio. 1998. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Stanford
University Press.
Arabestani, Mehrdad. 2016. The Mandaeans’ Religious System: From Mythos to
Logos. Iran and the Caucasus 20(3–4): 261–276. https://doi.org/10.116
3/1573384X-20160302.
Barry, James. 2018. Armenian Christians in Iran: Ethnicity, Religion, and Identity
in the Islamic Republic. Cambridge University Press.
Cole, J. 2012. BAHAISM i. The Faith. In Encyclopaedia Iranica Vol. III/4,
438–446. http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/bahaism-i.
Freud, Sigmund. 1930/1961. Civilization and Its Discontents. In Standard
Edition Vol. XXI, ed. James Strachey, Anna Freud, Alix Strachey, and Alan
Tyson, 57–145. London: The Hogarth Press and The Institute of
Psycho-Analysis.
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Migration. Springer.
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Mir-Hosseini, Ziba. 1996. Faith, Ritual and Culture Among the Ahl-e Haqq.
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105–108. http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/behdinan-dialect.
Acknowledgments
As editor of this volume, I would like to thank all the contributors for their
work and for their collaboration during the editing process. These articles
are based on papers given at the conference “Ethnic-Religious Minorities
in Iran” held at Sigmund Freud University in Vienna, Austria, on
November 27, 2020.
I would like to thank my colleague Ourania Roditi for her assistance
and for an excellent job gracefully done.
My particular thanks go to Professor Manfred Hütter for his introduc-
tion to this volume.
I would also like to thank Zukunftsfonds and OH sonder project uni
wien for their support in publishing this volume.
S. Behnaz Hosseini
xiii
Contents
1 Religious
and Ethnic Minorities in Iran: An Introduction 1
Manfred Hutter
2 Iranian
Constitution Under Pro-Center Dogmatic
Authoritarianism and Pro-Persian Cosmopolitanism, and
Its Impacts on Ethno-sectarian and Ethno-linguistic
Minorities 13
Muhammad Asim
3 Sectarianism
and National Cohesion Sunni Political
Activism in Iran 45
James Barry
4 T
he Role of Asheqs in Maintaining and Promoting the
Culture of Khorasan’s Kurds 65
Goli Shadkam
5 Porkhani
and Ishani: Women Healers in the Turkmen
Community in Iran 95
Manijeh Maghsudi
6 Iranian
Jews’ Tendency to Religious Visibility and
Adapted Coexistence109
Ali Hasannia, Zahra Fazeli, and Mohammad Reza Fazeli
xv
xvi Contents
7 Demographic
Aspects of Iranian Immigrants’ Integration
in Israel147
Ashkan Safaei Hakimi
8 An
Islamized Mandaeism: Examining the Impacts of Shia
Muslims on the Religionism of the Iranian Mandaeans169
Iman Amirteimour
9 The
Contemporary Collective Identity of Zoroastrians in
Tehran: Between the Strategies of Dichotomization and
Complementarization201
Paulina Niechciał
10 Sociological
Analysis of Social Trust in the Zoroastrian
Community in Tehran229
Seyedeh Hakimeh Hashemi, Seyed Reza Salehi Amiri, and
Shahla Kazemipour Sabet
11 Transformation
and Appropriation of Religion: A Case
of Yārsāni Community in Iran259
S. Behnaz Hosseini
Notes on Contributors
Iman Amirteimour holds a BA in Philosophy (University of Tehran,

2007) and an MA in Philosophy of Art (Art University of Tehran, 2010).
He also holds an MA (2017) in Religious Studies from University of Oslo.
He has conducted extensive field research among the Iranian Mandaeans
of Khuzestan and within diasporic communities of Iraqi Mandaeans based
in Norway. He has written a full master’s thesis on Iranian Mandaean
community and made documentary pieces about their current circum-
stances (unreleased). He continues to do research on the ongoing meta-
morphosis of orthodox Mandaeism; which is caused by Mandaean Diaspora
and its accompanying net-based activism; this is pursued through moni-
toring creations of Mandaean net activists in Persian/Arabic.
Mehrdad Arabestani is a faculty member at the Department of
Anthropology, University of Tehran, Iran. He holds a PhD in Anthropology
from the University of Malaya. He has explored the hidden logic of human
behaviors; cognition and culture have always been a focus of his research.
As an anthropologist, he has carried out fieldwork in Iran and Malaysia
and has published on the topics of religion, identity, and power relations.
Muhammad Asim is Assistant Professor of Political Science; he is
Government College Fateh Jang (Pakistan), and he is Vice-President of
Pak-Iran Intellectuals Forum.
James Barry, PhD, is a research fellow at the Alfred Deakin Institute
(ADI), Deakin University, Australia. Barry is a political anthropologist
specializing in religious and ethnic minorities in the Middle East, with a
xvii
xviii NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
specific focus on Iran and nationalism, and extensive field experience.

Barry is the author of Armenian Christians in Iran (2019), and has pub-
lished his research in Ethnic and Racial Studies, Third World Quarterly,
and the British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies and Iranian Studies. In
2021, Barry was the host and producer of the Iran Election 1400 podcast,
sponsored by the Middle East Studies Forum at ADI. He speaks Persian
and Arabic.
Zahra Fazeli is a PhD candidate of Political Societies, Azad University,
Sciences and Research Branch, Tehran, Iran.
Mohammad Reza Fazeli is an MA student of Qur’anic sciences, major
of Orientalism, University of Sciences and Teachings of the Holy Qur’an,
Tehran, Iran.
Ashkan Safaei Hakimi is an MA student of Middle Eastern and Islamic
Studies at the University of Haifa and a junior researcher at the Ezri Center
for Iran and Persian Gulf Studies.
Ali Hasannia holds a PhD (2015) in Qur’an and Hadith Studies from
the University of Tehran, Iran, an MA (2006) in Hadith Studies and
Traditional Exegesis, and a BA (2003) in Hadith Studies from the
University of Qur’an and Hadith, Tehran, Iran. He is working as an assis-
tant professor in the Department of Qur’an and Hadith Sciences of Shahed
University, Tehran, Iran (since 2015).
Seyedeh Hakimeh Hashemi holds a PhD in Economic and Development
Sociology, Science and Research Branch, Islamic Azad University, Tehran,
Iran. She is a social researcher and has published articles and researched on
topics such as the effect of religion on population and fertility policies,
religiosity of students and emigration, social trust, sociological analyses of
the Zoroastrian community in Tehran, and translated a book on
Confucianism.
S. Behnaz Hosseini is a visiting research fellow at the Centre for Studies
in Religion & Society, University of Victoria in Canada as well as minority
researcher, project coordinator, and conference organizer at the mobile-
cultures team affiliated with the University of Vienna. She is an honorary
fellow in the Center for Research on Gender and Women at the University
of Wisconsin College. She is also a Middle East media analyst with Persian
media. Hosseini has conducted extensive research on minorities in the
Middle East and has worked with the United Nations as an expert consul-
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS xix
tant on ISIS crimes against religious minorities in Iraq. Her most recent
publications are The Jewish Diaspora After 1945: A Study of Jewish
Communities in the Middle East and North Africa (2020), Temporary and
Child Marriages in Iran and Afghanistan: Historical Perspectives and
Contemporary Issues (Springer, 2021), Trauma and the Rehabilitation of
Trafficked Women: The Experiences of Yazidi Survivors (2020), and Ya ̄rsān
of Iran: Socio-Political Changes and Migration (Palgrave Macmillan,
2020). An earlier publication is Forced Migration of Iraqi Religious
Minorities in Austria (2018). Currently she is working on a project about
the migration of Iranian religious minorities.
Manfred Hütter is the head of faculty of Religious Studies and a profes-
sor at the University of Bonn. His research interests include minority reli-
gions, comparative religions, and pre-Islamic Arabia. From 1997, Hutter
was an associate professor at the University of Graz. During this time, he
was also a visiting professor in Bremen (1997/1998) and a visiting lec-
turer in Linz (1998), until he was appointed to the Chair of Comparative
Religion at the University of Bonn in 2000. In addition to the above-
mentioned research areas, he has since been working on Asian religions in
Germany, on Hinduism as a minority religion in Southeast Asia, and on
Asian forms of Christianity.
Manijeh Maghsudi is an associate professor in the Anthropology
Department at Tehran University. Her research centers on tribal and rural
studies, with a special emphasis on marriage, kinship, and shamanism. She
is an expert in qualitative research methods and participatory rural
appraisal. From 2000 to 2009 she was Head of the Tribal Research at the
Institute of Studies and Research at Tehran University. From 2001 to
2005 she headed the research group for the international company Rio
Tinto in Ghorveh, Kurdistan. In 2000–2007 she was a consultant for the
UNDP Small Grants Programme. In 2016 she was a visiting professor at
Aligarh Muslim University in India.
Paulina Niechciał is an assistant professor in the Center for Comparative
Civilization Studies at Jagiellonian University. She holds MA in Ethnology
(2006) and in Iranian Studies (2008) and a PhD in Sociology (2012). In
her dissertation, based on field research conducted among contemporary
Zoroastrians in Tehran, she analyzed issues of identity and minority reli-
gion. In 2019, as a recipient of the Kosciuszko Foundation Fellowship,
and hosted by the Department of Central Eurasian Studies at Indiana
xx NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
University in Bloomington, she conducted fieldwork within her research

project “Lived Religion” in the Context of Migration: The Case of Zoroastrian
Women in the USA. Her research interests focus on minority issues,
anthropology, and sociology of religion as well as contemporary cultures
of Persianate societies—Iranian, Afghanian, and Tajik. She is the author of
many articles published in scholarly journals, book chapters, and the book
Zoroastrian Minority in Modern Tehran: On Collective Identity in the
Context of Shi’a Domination (in Polish; Kraków: Nomos, 2013).
Shahla Kazemipour Sabet Faculty of Demography, University of
Tehran, Tehran, Iran. She has studied development, social welfare, and
demography. She has published several articles on development, social
welfare, and the demography of Iran and specifically the Zoroastrian com-
munities in Iran. She has published two books: one on methods of popula-
tion analysis and another on the fundamentals of demography.
Seyed Reza Salehi Amiri Faculty of Cultural Management, Science and
Research Branch, Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran, 2005–present.
She is the head of Iranian Cultural Management and Planning Association
since 2018. She has published articles regarding social-cultural factors
affecting identity crisis of youth in Iran, effective factors on youth satisfac-
tion from public spaces, and residential treatment for children and youth
in Tehran, and sociological analyses of the Zoroastrian community in
Tehran. She has published books on national cohesion and cultural diver-
sity; family as the academic center for education; and a model for cultural
capital improvement in Iran.
Goli Shadkam works as a folklore researcher and a consultant of Khorasan
Razavi Spiritual Heritage Registration Organization. She has a bachelor’s
degree in sociology from Khayyam University, Mashhad, Iran. Her field of
research is on the Asheghs a group of local musicians in the northeast
region of Khorasan in Iran, and their brilliant role in Kurdish music and
culture in that part of the country.
List of Diagrams
Diagram 6.1 Assimilation 119

Diagram 6.2 Multiculturalism 123
Diagram 6.3 Recognition 125
Diagram 10.1 Path analysis 252
xxi
List of Figures
Fig. 4.1 Pik (zorna), musical instrument collection of Ali Akbar Bahari 79
Fig. 4.2 Qōšma, musical instrument collection of Ali Akbar Bahari 80
Fig. 4.3 Master Ali Akbar Bahari is making Qōšma, Chenaran 80
Fig. 4.4 Master Ali Akbar Bahari is playing Qōšma, Chenaran 81
Fig. 4.5 Master Heydar Asheq is playing Kamănĉa and his musical
instruments, Dargaz 81
Fig. 4.6 Two Asheqs are playing Pik and Dōl, Dargaz 82
Fig. 4.7 Dōl (dohol), musical instrument collection of Ali Akbar Bahari 82
Fig. 5.1 Female Ishani Ritual, 2001, Haji Ghoshan 102
Fig. 5.2 Female Ishani Ritual, 2001, Haji Ghoshan 103
Fig. 9.1 Zoroastrian cemetery in the Qasr-e Firuzeh area (aramgah-e
zartoshtiyan-e Tehran)204
Fig. 9.2 Traditional clothing (sofreh) prepared for the New Year
celebrations (Jashn-e Nouruz)213
Fig. 9.3 The initiation ceremony (sedreh-pushi) of two young
Zoroastrians, performed in Tehran in 2008 214
Fig. 9.4 Zoroastrian magazines and calendars 218
Fig. 9.5 Traditionally dressed Zoroastrian women performing on the
Women’s Day in Tehran in 2017 222
xxiii
List of Images
Image 8.1 Škanda Fayez Zahrouni (in white dressing) among Shia
pilgrims heading toward Krabala. Mawkib of Iranian
Mandaeans, Chazabeh border point, Khuzestan, Iran 187
Image 8.2 Tarmida Sam Zahrouni, an Iranian Mandaean priest,
performs ritual daily prayers (barākheh) at the shores of
Karun River, Ahvaz, Iran (personal collection of the author) 191
Image 8.3 The late Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammad Zia Abadi, an Iranian
high-ranking Shia cleric, raises his hands to do qunūt
(invocation to Allah)–a distinguishable marker of Twelver
Shia prayer 192
Image 8.4 Škanda Fayez Zahrouni prays over the ill kid of a Shia Muslim
fellow. Ritual service station of Sabaean Mandaeans,
Chazabeh border point, Khuzestan, Iran (snapshot taken
from a Facebook video). 194
xxv
List of Maps
Map 4.1 Map of north of Khorasan (Papoly Yazdi 1991) 75

Map 5.1 Map of Turkmen Sahra in Iran 96
xxvii
List of Tables
Table 6.1 Responses received from only 24% (12of 50) Jews who live
in different cities of Iran 126
Table 10.1 Frequency distribution and percentage of respondents in
terms of “socio-economic status” 236
Table 10.2 Percentage distribution of respondents in terms of “social
trust and its dimensions” 239
Table 10.3 Percentage distribution of respondents in terms of “social
exclusion rate” 241
Table 10.4 Relationship between “Tehrani Zoroastrian’s social trust
and their socio-economic status” 246
Table 10.5 The relationship between the indicators of social exclusion
and the extent to which people enjoy the social trust
indicators246
Table 10.6 The relationship between Tehrani Zoroastrians’ social trust
and their social exclusion 247
Table 10.7 Relationship between individuals’ sense of discrimination
and their level of social trust 248
Table 10.8 Relationship between Tehrani Zoroastrians’ social trust and
their sense of social discrimination 248
Table 10.9 Relationship between the degree of people’s social security
and the extent to which they enjoy the indicators of social
trust248
Table 10.10 Relationship between social trust and respondents’ sense of
social security 249
Table 10.11 Relationship between people’s satisfaction in their lives and
their enjoyment of social trust indicators 250
xxix
xxx List of Tables
Table 10.12 Relationship between the social trust and people’s life
satisfaction250
Table 10.13 Regression test results 250
Table 10.14 The sum of direct and indirect effects of independent
variables253
CHAPTER 1
Religious and Ethnic Minorities in Iran:

An Introduction
Manfred Hutter
The Islamic Republic of Iran has its political and ideological foundation in
the teachings of Islam; thus, Islam is valid for all people and the related
legal system. Therefore, strictly speaking, discrimination on grounds of
ethnicity, gender, or religion is not justifiable. The foundations of such an
understanding can be laid down on two perspectives: Surah 2:256f. of the
Qur’an emphasizes that forced conversion of people of different faiths is
prohibited because God will only pass judgment on non-Muslims in the
Last Judgment. And Surah 109:6 acknowledges the fact that there are
several religions, so that followers of non-Islamic religions are allowed a
limited practice of cult (cf. Surah 9:29). This acceptance of early Islam
applies to the so-called people of the book (ahl-e keta ̄b)—Jews, Christians,
and Zoroastrians. In the course of history, Islamic religious scholars have
always opened up a range of possibilities for exclusivist and graduated plu-
ralistic interpretations of how to deal with religions, which was also the
case in Iran and led to a connection between religious freedom, Islamic
law, and human rights until contemporary times.
M. Hutter (*)
University of Bonn, Bonn, Germany
e-mail: mhutter@uni-bonn.de
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023
S. B. Hosseini (ed.), Ethnic Religious Minorities in Iran,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-1633-5_1
2 M. HUTTER
The total population of Iran was 75,149,669 at the 2011 census, with
the number now estimated at 83 million.1 According to the census,
Muslims make up 99.4% of the population. At least 90% of Muslims
belong to the Twelver Shia, while Sunni Islam remains restricted to ethnic
groups such as Kurds, Azeri, and Balochi. The other religious data col-
lected in the census are as follows: 117,704 Christians, 8,756 Jews, 25,271
Zoroastrians, 49,101 others, and 265,899 people did not provide any
information about their religion. This statistic takes those religions into
account in detail which are mentioned in the Constitution of the Islamic
Republic of Iran (§§ 12–14).2 First and foremost, this includes the Twelver
Shia as the official religion of Iran. The four Sunni schools of law and the
law school of the Zaidiya are also recognized, but subordinate to the
Twelver Shia. Jewish, Zoroastrian, and Christian Iranians are also reli-
giously recognized.
The following two contributions provide a very useful overview of gen-
eral topics of the book. The chapter of Muhammad Asim (Chap. 2) dis-
cusses ethno-linguistic and ethno-sectarian communities from the
perspective of the Iranian constitution. From his chapter the reader gets
first helpful information about the diversity of Iran—in ethnic and linguis-
tic fields as well as religious fields, showing that—despite the Persian and
Shiite dominance—one must be aware of the pluralistic tenets in Iranian
society. The author thoroughly discusses all the important paragraphs of
the constitution referring to non-Persians and non-Shiites in Iran. It is
important to point out that M. Asim makes the precarious situation clear
which can touch Christians (or former Muslims who converted to
Christianity), Bahá’ís, or Yārsānis; but he also makes important observa-
tions on the neglected state of ethnic groups like Azeri, Balochi, Kurdi, or
Turkmen, who demonstrate over perceived injustices or the Persian domi-
nance over their own non-Persian cultures. This inequality is also a source
of dangerous insurgencies which impact both the Iranian society and the
Iranian economy.
1
Hutter 2019: 207f. Other data (Uphoff 2012: 314, 320, 325f.; Sanasarian 2012: 313f.)
are likely to be a little too high; see further the Report on Religious Freedom for 2020,
published on 12 May 2021 in https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-report-on-
international-religious-freedom/iran/ (last online access 01.08.2021).
2
See the constitutional status of the religions in Uphoff 2012: 105–108; Sanasarian 2012:
311f.; Hosseini 2020: 326–331, 367–401. Cf. also the translations of §§ 12–14 of the con-
stitution in Hosseini 2020: 459.
1 RELIGIOUS AND ETHNIC MINORITIES IN IRAN: AN INTRODUCTION 3
Pluralism in terms of ethnicity, linguistics, and religions is also discussed

along the lines of Sunni Islam by James Barry (Chap. 3). First, he makes
the reader aware that Sunni Islam in Iran is no homogenous entity as can
be clearly seen with the Kurdic groups, who not only use three different
Kurdic languages, but in terms of religions, only half of the Kurds are
Sunni Muslims, while the others are either Shiites or Yārsānis. As another
example of pluralism, he refers to Arabs in Khuzistan, most of whom are
Shiites. But in recent years one can observe conversions to (Arabic) Sunni
Islam. Discussing Sunni Islam has to take this intermingling of religious
affiliation, ethnic, and linguistic differences into account. Such a necessary
differentiation must not be overlooked when talking about Sunni Islam in
Iran as one always has to consider the special situation. In terms of govern-
ment politics, the situation is also not uniform. Sunni Muslims (mostly
Kurds) are only represented in a limited number in the government, and
political leaders like former presidents Khatami or Rouhani or the Supreme
Leader of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Khamenei, are eager to empha-
size the unity of Islam. Despite this, they have never succeeded in fully
removing discrimination or marginalizing of Sunni Muslims in Iranian
society. Therefore, tensions between the Shiite majority and the Sunni
(ethnic) minorities in the republic have not disappeared, even if they are
downplayed by the government, as Khamenei (as well as others) explains
them either being stoked by hostile foreign powers to undermine the state
or being the result of Islamic sectarianism invoked by Salafist radical
groups. Such explanations show skepticism against Sunni Islam, which
also leads to restrictions of religious practices, as is evident in the discus-
sion about Sunni mosques in Tehran. Official sources speak of nine
mosques in the Iranian capital, while Sunnis complain that they can only
use the fully functioning Sunni mosque within the premises of the Embassy
of Pakistan, and in other cases they can only do their religious services
either in private locations or in prayer houses—which are not officially
acknowledged as mosques and therefore sometimes shut down—or even
demolished—by official administration. Such actions do not dispel the
Sunnis’ notion that their religious tradition is not fully recognized in the
Islamic Republic of Iran even if the constitution mentions the four Sunni
law schools.
Regulations of the constitution give equal rights to all ethnic minori-
ties, but it must be said that minorities are not always handled on an even
par. In detail, some important contributions make the reader aware of this
unbalanced situation. This can be seen especially with the following
4 M. HUTTER
chapters which discuss various topics of minority rights and culture. The
chapter presented by Maryam Nourzaei (Chap. 4) introduces the culture
of the Afro-Balochi community in the south-eastern provinces of Sistan
and Balochistan. The author first gives an overview of the African origins
of this community whose ancestors were brought to Balochistan since the
eighteenth century as slaves from East Africa. It is important to note that
they are not aware of their African origins, and they have no idea of Africa
as their homeland; therefore they also do not have contacts with other
Afro-Iranians. Their origin as slaves is still relevant today as many of them
live as servants of the Balochi society and many ethnic Balochi look down
upon them. They are at the margins of Balochi society, except in the field
of music, dance, and—connected with it—healing. Ethnic Balochi women
do not sing or dance, so for festive occasions like engagements, marriages,
or circumcisions these Afro-Balochi musicians are invited; but music is
also important in healing ceremonies to counteract the possession of a
person by a jinn or gwat ([bad] wind). Most probably, these healing tradi-
tions are inherited from their African origins and still function as an
identity-marker of this community alongside the Balochi surroundings.
The importance of music as shaping identity and giving a social stand-
ing to an ethnic community can also be seen in the contribution of Goli
Shadkam (Chap. 5) about the Kurdish Asheq in Khorasan. They are
Kurmanji-speaking musicians who traditionally were highly active not only
in entertainment and musical performances at wedding ceremonies, dur-
ing Nowruz festivities, and ceremonies accompanying work, but also with
religious ceremonies during Ramadan. Besides them, there are other (eth-
nic) groups of professional musicians in northern Khorasan like Baxši,
Belirwan, Loloči, or Luti. There was an important change of the engage-
ment of these musicians, as after the Islamic Revolution the involvement
of music in religious celebrations, not only during the Nowruz festivals
but also dancing and singing in the public fields became highly marginal-
ized, thus reducing the Asheqs’ musical activity to family ceremonies
related to weddings and circumcisions. But despite such change the author
emphasizes that the Asheqs’ important contribution to Kurdish culture in
Khorasan is still effective and strong.
For roughly 1000 years Turkmen people—originating from Central
Asia—have been dwelling in northeastern Iran, and the author Manijeh
Maghsudi (Chap. 6) discusses—mainly based on in-depth interviews—
healing practices of Turkmen women. Starting with a short overview of
the main characteristics of Turkmen culture in Iran, the author describes
two different methods of healing in detail: porkhani and ishani. The pork-
hani ritual is a traditional healing which has similarities with shamanic
practices from Central Asia, and one can deduce that this practice is a part
of the Central Asian heritage of the Turkmen, maybe even from times
before meeting Islam. It is not surprising that these healing ceremonies are
accompanied with music which has to invoke the spirits but which also
brings the healer into the mood of ecstasy to be able to interact with the
spirits. The ishani ceremony on the other hand avoids (or at least strongly
limits) the use of music because it is based on Islamic traditions focusing
on prayers to heal the patient. That this type of healing is strongly included
into an Islamic setting also becomes visible in the healer-patient relation-
ship: While female healers who practice the porkhani ritual treat both men
and women, female ishani healers only have female clients. In this way the
chapter makes an interesting contribution about the preservation of earlier
traditions in the Turkmen Islamic culture, but also clearly showing the
change of such a culture, making it suitable to Islamic thought. Thus, all
three chapters can give the reader a glimpse of—very different—aspects
how ethnic minorities can practice their non-Persian culture in present-
day Iran.
Moving to religions mentioned in the constitution, we can first refer to
Judaism. For a very long time, Iran had a sizable number of Jews who
made important contributions to Iranian culture and Iranian languages.3
After the founding of the state of Israel—as in all parts of the Islamic
world—Jews emigrated to Israel in two waves between 1947 and 1951, as
a result of which one third of the Jewish population left Iran. The Jews
who remained in the country formed the richest Jewish community in
Asia—outside of Israel—until 1979, with members belonging to the upper
middle class. In the first years of the Islamic Revolution, three quarters of
the remaining Jewish population left the country. The Jews currently liv-
ing in Iran occupy a marginal position in society, although they repeatedly
have had to prove their loyalty to the Iranian state and their distance from
the state of Israel. Since they largely succeed in this, it should be positively
mentioned that the Jewish community—despite the political hostility
between the two states—experiences relatively safe living conditions in the
Islamic-Iranian environment. The co-authored chapter of Ali Hasannia,
Zahra Fazeli, and Mohammad Reza Fazeli (Chap. 7) focuses on the
3
Cf. e.g. Amirpur 2011; Sarshar 2014 for various aspects of the situation of Jews in the
history and in contemporary Iran. On the legal situation see also Hosseini 2020: 171–173.
6 M. HUTTER
situation of Jewish visibility and adapted coexistence in Iran; the second

term being defined as a more precise terminology than assimilation, mul-
ticulturalism, or simply recognition. After giving a short overview of the
history of Jews in Iran, the authors describe their methodological approach,
using interviews and a questionnaire in addition to publication. The ques-
tionnaire comprises twenty-seven questions, which the authors categorize
in six topics to explain the Jews’ adapted coexistence: “not feeling of mar-
ginalization and being minority,” “religious support,” “neighboring
Muslims,” “freedom to perform religious duties,” “formation of parties
and associations,” and “actions for social recognition.” Judging from the
given answers, the authors come to the result that more than 50% of the
answers (strongly) show a positive experience of the fields in question—
but with one remarkable exception regarding the field of marginalization;
here only a small number of the interviewed persons say that they do not
experience such a marginalization.
The chapter of Ashkan Safaei Hakimi (Chap. 8) looks at Iranian Jews
from another perspective, as the author focuses on the integration of
Iranian immigrants in Israel. The scope of the chapter diverges a bit from
the general topic of minorities in Iran, as the author does not really touch
the minority in Iran, but migrants from Iran to Israel. The central topic of
the chapter is the fertility rates of Iranian Jews in Israel, mentioning that
the first generation of immigrants still had a very high fertility rate, while
among later immigrants the fertility rate decreased—and the author takes
this as an expression of an advanced integration into Israeli society among
the second generation of migrants, which also corresponds with a much
higher degree of exogamy among the second generation of migrants com-
pared to the first generation. Most probably these findings of the author
are correct, but the reader might ask, if or how such findings have any
relevance for Jews in Iran or if one might find comparable results of
decreased fertility rates in Iran as a form of changes in modern times.
The situation of Christians must be viewed in a differentiated manner.
The overwhelming majority of Christians are Armenians, while Chaldeans
and Assyrians just account for more than 10,000 people; around 10,000
Protestants are also likely to live in Iran. Most Christians today live in the
capital Tehran. There is also a larger Armenian population in the Ğ olfa
district in Isfahan, while the Assyrian and Chaldean Christians traditionally
lived in the vicinity of Lake Urmia and the city of Tabriz. The differences
between Armenians, Chaldeans, and Assyrians are referred to in paragraph
64 of the constitution: There it is mentioned that Armenian Christianity is
represented with two representatives, but Assyrian and Chaldean

Christianity only with a joint representative in the Iranian parliament
which can be seen as a slight restriction of these ethno-Christian groups.
Besides this, some Iranian Muslim theologians portray Christianity in a
clearly derogatory manner and provide brochures with information on
how Christianity could best be overcome theologically, which leads to the
social marginalization of Christians.4 This is why Assyrian Christians in
particular have either left Iran or seek protection in the anonymity of the
capital Tehran in the last few decades. The situation of the Armenian
Orthodox Church is more favorable. The pilgrimage to the Monastery of
Saint Thaddeus (Armenian: Surb Tadeosi Vank’) in northwest Iran serves
several thousand pilgrims every July to propagate their own Christian
identity publicly in order to counteract such a social marginalization. A
controversial topic is the conversion of Iranian Muslims to (Western)
Christian denominations, which Muslim fundamentalist circles regard as
apostasy, which sometimes results in long-term prison sentences for con-
verts or occasionally even in murder. Such cases show the current tension
with increasing missionary activity by mainly (small) Protestant free
churches, which hardly hide their activities in order to address Muslims as
a target group who have become politically and religiously alienated from
Islam because of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s interpretation of Islam. On
the part of the state authorities, preachers and pastors experience massive
restrictions and even persecution. It is a pity that detailed case studies of
Christianity are missing—for example, either on conversion topics or on
the reasons of the heavy decline of the numbers of Assyrian and Chaldean
Christians. But as these are highly sensitive topics in the Islamic Republic,
it might have been the reason that it was not possible to include such
studies.
It is also worth mentioning the situation of the Mandaeans in connec-
tion with Christianity, since in the religious-political context of Iran they
are mostly assessed as a Christian group.5 In 2009 Ayatollah Ali Khamenei
even declared in a fatwa that the Mandaeans are to be assessed “like a
people of the book” (ahl-e ketāb). This judgment of the highest religious
authority in the country gives the Mandaeans a secure status to a certain
extent. The very detailed study of Iman Amirteimour (Chap. 9) is an
4
See Stümpel-Hatami 1996. On the situation of the Christian churches in Iran, see also
the details in Vogt 2019: 129–172; Hosseini 2020: 174–182.
5
Motika 1999; Rota-Nik Nafs 2012: 75–159.
8 M. HUTTER
important contribution, firstly by giving the reader a short but balanced

view about the Mandaeans and their teachings in general (the notion of
deity; prophecy; avoidance of conversion), but secondly and more impor-
tantly by highlighting through the author, how Mandaeans today show
many phenomenological similarities between their religious practice and
Shiite practices. Such an interreligious exchange—knowingly or maybe
also unconsciously—shows how Mandaeans have adapted some elements
in daily religion (e.g., name giving; post-funeral assemblies; praying ritu-
als; spiritual healing) from their Shiite neighbors. Taking such information
from the Mandaean popular journal Beitmanda and from the author’s
own observation the chapter is a welcome addition to the scarce knowl-
edge about this religious community in Iran.
The situation of Zoroastrianism6 basically reflects a positive connection
between this religion and the historical Iranian culture. Because of the
inclusion of religion in the nationalization policy under Mohammad Reza
Shah since the 1960s, however, skepticism arose in Muslim fundamentalist
circles against this pre-Islamic religion. This led to some serious attacks on
Zoroastrians during the first years of the Islamic Revolution, leading to
the flight of religious members first to Mumbai and then on to the United
States and Canada. Since around 1983/84, relations between Muslims
and Zoroastrians in Iran have improved in everyday life, which has made
emigration from the country easier for some Iranians in organizational
terms. The majority of Zoroastrians currently live in the capital Tehran. A
larger community still exists in the traditional center of Yazd, while the
number of Zoroastrian families in the villages in the vicinity of Yazd has
decreased significantly in recent decades due to moving to Yazd and
Tehran. Questions of collective identity of Zoroastrians in Tehran are the
topic of Paulina Niechciał’s chapter (Chap. 10). After a concise overview
of the spreading of Zoroastrianism to Tehran, the author mentions the
importance of differentiating between we and they with a set of shared
values and symbols among the insiders. The reader finds very balanced and
detailed information about the main tenets of contemporary Zoroastrian
teaching and practice. Even more interesting is the information about the
Zoroastrian strategy to unite Zoroastrianism with Iranian identity, men-
tioning, for example, the case of Zoroastrian soldiers who died in the Iran-
Iraq war by calling them “martyrs”—just like Iranian Muslims do regarding
6
On Zoroastrianism in general, see Hutter 2019: 28–100, and in particular pp. 92–96 for
developments in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.
their soldiers, or also by propagating a common cultural awareness of

Muslims and Zoroastrians. In conclusion, this strategy can be seen as an
attempt to legitimize the minority’s place in Iranian society through seek-
ing for common elements of Zoroastrian and Muslims Iranians.
Seyedeh Hakimeh Hashemi, Seyed Reza Salehi Amiri, and Shahla
Kazemipour Sabet (Chap. 11) focus their research also on the Zoroastrian
community in Tehran, with the central question of what factors may
decrease or increase the Zoroastrians’ social trust. To evaluate this social
trust, the following elements were mainly taken into account: socioeco-
nomic status, social security, life satisfaction, discrimination, and social
exclusion. As a result, the authors say that personal characteristics do not
have an effect on social trust. But one can clearly see a positive impact of
both the social status and social security and life satisfaction on social trust,
while discrimination and social exclusion have a negative effect on social
trust. With these data this sociological chapter gives interesting informa-
tion about Zoroastrians in Tehran in addition to the findings of Niechciał’s
research.
The religions referred to in the constitution as legal in no way reflect
the religious heterogeneity of Iran, as at least the few thousand Yazidis in
the vicinity of Kermanshah7 and the Kurdish religion of the Yārsān (Ahl-e
Haqq) must be mentioned. The Yārsān are the largest non-Muslim minor-
ity in Iran8; even if the self-declaration of two to three million followers in
Iran is likely to be far too high, half a million members is probably more
realistic. One problem with the numbers is the different self-perception of
the Yārsān with regard to their relationship to the Shia. While traditional
Yārsān west of Kermashah emphasize that they are a religion that is inde-
pendent of Islam, modern religious members—also under pressure from
Islamic authorities—characterize their religion as a Shiite direction, which
results in other options for religious affiliation in the census. This different
self-image shows the difficult situation with which officially unrecognized
religious minorities are confronted in Iran. Behnaz Hosseini (Chap. 12)
discusses in a balanced way the transformation of the Yārsān community in
Iran, resulting from fieldwork and interviews in the Dallahu area of Iranian
Kurdistan. The author offers a very well-researched overview of Yārsāni
7
See Uphoff 2012: 353, 361f.; Hosseini 2020: 171–174.
8
For an overview of the religious ideas of the Yārsānis see Kreyenbroek 2014. On the
problem of exact figures, see Uphoff 2012: 340; cf. also Hutter 2019: 208; Hosseini 2020:
155–160.
10 M. HUTTER
thought, which are not yet very well known in the study of minority reli-
gions of Iran. The main topics treated in the chapter refer to the transmi-
gration of the soul (dūn-a du ̄n), and the Yārsāni idea of god and the
cosmic symbolism of light and darkness. But the author also makes the
reader aware of the importance of music and the playing of the tanbūr in
religious ceremonies, an observation that can be compared with observa-
tions on the use of music mentioned in some other chapters in this vol-
ume. Besides this information on the basic tenets of Yārsāni thought, the
author also highlights some changes of religion—also as challenges of the
religion: Some Yārsānis express their skepticism on religion in general,
while others focus on the importance of religion to help to preserve their
own cultural identity against an environment dominated by Persian Shiite
and Kurdic Sunni Muslims, but also against assimilating the Yārsāni cul-
ture to Muslim culture. In such a way this chapter—like others—shows
again the challenges which a minority group has to overcome in order to
keep their traditions alive.
The Bahá’í religion, originating in the middle of the nineteenth century
in Iran, throughout its history has never been acknowledged as a legal
religion in Iran, which has led to periods of persecution of the faith in the
course of history.9 Despite this situation, Bahá’ís still live in Iran, even if it
is difficult to tell exactly the number of Bahá’ís living there. Often reports
take a number of 300,000 (or maybe even 350,000) Bahá’ís in Iran as a
representative number, which shows that—after the adherents of the
Yārsāni religion—the Bahá’ís are the second largest religious minority,
with centers scattered all over the country. As the religion is judged as
illegal, official structures or community buildings are forbidden by the
government and Bahá’í institutions established locally or regionally are
often raided or shut down by the administration of the Islamic Republic of
Iran at its various levels. This makes religious life for Bahá’ís difficult in
Iran. Leyla Tavernaro-Haidarian (Chap. 13) researches the Bahá’í strategy
of a constructive resilience as a response to such forms of oppression of the
religion. The strategy of resilience bases itself on some main ideas of the
Bahá’í faith, namely the idea of the unity of (a single) humankind and one
earth, but also on the idea of the unity of all religions leading to the idea
of an ongoing and progressive revelation. Such an approach results for
Bahá’ís not only in the search of friendship with all other people and
9
Hutter 2019: 154–202, and especially pp. 194–199 for the situation in Iran; cf. also
Sanasarian 2012: 315; Hosseini 2020: 187f.
nations, but also—especially in the field of Iran and Islam—in a way to

present their own teaching not as an opposition to (Iranian) Islam. This
ideological background commits Bahá’ís to a non-violent resistance of
oppression and to try to overcome tensions of rejections by extending
cooperation for harmony with their opponents. In this way the chapter
shows in an emic way how a minority tries to cope with persecution and
how to overcome this in a constructive way.
The various chapters of the book cannot cover all the important aspects
of ethnic and religious minorities in Iran. But the authors—everyone in
his or her specific methodological approach—have clearly shown that the
connection between state and religion, that is, Shiite Islam, significantly
shapes the (legal) position of non-Muslim religions in the Islamic Republic
of Iran.10 As this connection creates a Shiite-Iranian nationalism,11 all reli-
gions have to prove to be nationally loyal or they will experience—in the
case of Christianity, Judaism, and Bahá’ís—accusations of cooperation
with Western nations or with Israel, thus also violating national Iranian
sentiments. From the political perspective of this nationalism, the situation
of Zoroastrianism as an Iranian religion is more favorable compared to
other minorities. But the chapters also make the reader aware of one often
neglected aspect of religious pluralism and religious minorities: The gen-
eral audience often has only non-Muslim minorities in mind when ques-
tions about religious pluralism are discussed. But this is a shortcoming
because some of the chapters give a good description that also Sunni Islam
must be considered in its own right when talking about the Shiite state
and its relation to the different religious and ethnic communities.
Bibliography
Amirpur, Katajun. 2011. Iran und die Juden. Jahrbuch für Antisemitismusforschung
20: 24–63.
Hosseini, Sevil. 2020. Die Rechtsstellung religiöser Minderheiten im Iran. Baden-
Baden: Nomos.
Hutter, Manfred. 2019. Iranische Religionen. Zoroastrismus, Yezidentum,
Bahā’ı ̄tum. Berlin: de Gruyter.
10
Hosseini 2020: 445–453 summarizes the legal situation of minorities and the conse-
quences for their daily life and their religious practices.
11
On Shiite Iranian nationalism, with the implications for other religions, cf. Sanasarian
2012: 321–323; Hutter 2019: 207–210.
12 M. HUTTER
Kreyenbroek, Philip G. 2014. The Yaresan of Kurdistan. In Religious Minorities in

Kurdistan. Beyond the Mainstream, ed. Khanna Omarkhali, 3–11. Wiesbaden:
Harrassowitz.
Motika, Raoul. 1999. Die aktuelle Lage der iranischen Mandäer und die Verfassung
der Islamischen Republik. Münchner Materialien und Mitteilungen zur
Irankunde 4: 125–141.
Rota-Nik Nafs, Caroline. 2012. Die Mandäer Irans. Kulturelle und religiöse
Identität einer Minderheit im Wandel. PhD University of Bamberg, Bamberg:
Otto-Friedrich-Universität Bamberg.
Sanasarian, Eliz. 2012. Nationalism and Religion in Contemporary Iran. In
Religious Minorities in the Middle East. Domination, Self-Empowerment,
Accommodation, ed. Anh Nga Longva and Anne Sofie Roald, 309–324. Brill.
Sarshar, Houman M. 2014. The Jews of Iran, The History, Religion, and Culture of
a Community in the Islamic World. London: Tauris.
Stümpel-Hatami, Isabel. 1996. Das Christentum aus der Sicht zeitgenössischer ira-
nischer Autoren. Eine Untersuchung religionskundlicher Publikationen in per-
sischer Sprache. Berlin: Schwarz Verlag.
Uphoff, Petra. 2012. Untersuchung zur rechtlichen Stellung und Situation von
nichtmuslimischen Minderheiten in Iran. Frankfurt: Internationale Gesellschaft
für Menschenrechte (IGFM).
Vogt, Matthias. 2019. Christen im Nahen Osten. Zwischen Martyrium und Exodus.
Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
CHAPTER 2
Iranian Constitution Under Pro-Center

Dogmatic Authoritarianism and Pro-Persian
Cosmopolitanism, and Its Impacts
on Ethno-sectarian and Ethno-linguistic
Minorities
Muhammad Asim
Introduction
In many parts of the world, constitutional engineers work tirelessly to
resolve differences and ensure stability and unity. As one of the primary
functions of the constitution, each state tries to regulate its associations
with sects (also religions or faiths1) and languages. The significant purpose
1
Faith can be described as “mysterious (sometimes inexpressible or indefinable) beliefs of an
individual that have become popular and acceptable among a significant group of people”
(Aslan 2016). On the other hand, religion can be defined as “the feeling of absolute depen-
dence” (Finlay 2005, 81–94), “the belief in spiritual beings” (Winzeler 2008, 5), or “unified
system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things” (Durkheim and Cladis 2001, xxi).
While sect is the sub-group of religion, as it has some sort of unique interpretations of the pri-
mary teachings in any religion, such uniqueness motivates adherents of a sect to claim about
following authentic version of religion from which they split (Sims and Rodney 1979, 117–133).
M. Asim (*)
Government College Fateh Jang, Fateh Jang, Pakistan
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 13

Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023
S. B. Hosseini (ed.), Ethnic Religious Minorities in Iran,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-1633-5_2
14 M. ASIM
behind the regulations is to ensure stability and unity in the state. However,
the relationship of sects and languages with the state is a delicate task,
especially when conflict arises.
When a state associates national identity with any specific sect or lan-
guage like Iran,2 this association can trigger other ethno-sectarian and
ethno-linguistic communities to raise their demands. Some demands sects
would be interested in pursuing are specific constitutional rights, special
protections, and the right to experience governance under their sectarian
teachings or socio-cultural norms (IDEA 2014). However, numerous
ethno-sectarian (or religious) and ethno-linguistic communities in Iran
face worse consequences when they seek respective demands3 (Afshari
2011, 4).
Although some states’ constitutions symbolically declare a particular
state-religion and specific national language, the states also respect and
recognize practices of other sects and languages. United Nations General
Assembly adopted “Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging to
National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities” on December
18, 1992, via resolution 47/135. This declaration bounds all the United
Nations (UN) members to not only respect all the ethno-sectarian and
ethno-linguistic communities within their territorial jurisdiction, but they
also have to encourage conditions for promoting their identities
(UNGA 1992).
Even post-1979 Iran is also a UN member state, but Iran’s open exhi-
bition of human rights violations has forced the UN to frequently publish
reports on the “Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of
Iran” (UNGA 2020). More recently, the General Assembly of the United
Nations (UNGA) has adopted a resolution against Iran on December 18,
2019, where there was condemnation against ongoing human rights vio-
lations against different minorities under official patronage (Radio-Farda
2019). However, this study finds Iranian constitution as the actual reason
behind such violations. The Iranian constitution has been constructed
upon two foundations—Pro-Center Dogmatic Authoritarianism and Pro-
Persian Cosmopolitanism. This study defines how both terms trigger and
2
Several Sunni and Shia scholars count Sunni Islam and Shia Islam as the separate religions
rather than considering them as the two major sects of Islam (Saroglou 2014, 232).
Therefore, this study uses both words—sect and religion—together.
3
Sometimes, Iranian officials suppress respective ethno-sectarian (or religious) or ethno-
linguistic communities by forbidding women to go to school or own their businesses (Afshari
2011, 252–253).
2 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION UNDER PRO-CENTER DOGMATIC… 15
encourage Iranian authorities to undermine fundamental human rights of

ethnic minorities in Iran.
Pro-Center Dogmatic Authoritarianism

The Latin word dogma is generally used for defining basic teachings and
principles of any sect, religion, or faith. The term dogmatism (also called
dogmatic theology) deals with the theoretical beliefs of any sect about its
founder(s) or God (Journet 2011, 13–14). Similarly, the term authoritari-
anism refers to highly centralized power in the state. An authoritarian
regime can be based upon the rule of the military or a party representing
any specific political or ethnic identity. This type of regime is universally
known for controlling media, suppressing political or ethnic opposition,
electoral fraud, human rights violations, and spending large budgets on
government officials (Geddes et al. 2018, 1–22). By analyzing both terms,
this study defines the term dogmatic authoritarianism as a “form of gov-
ernment where founder(s) or follower(s) of any sect, religion, or faith
possess absolute power” (Myers 2007, 345). Pro-center or state-centric
form of government hypothesizes as it does not favor greater regional
autonomy to the units of state (Nurrochmat 2005, 2–3). Therefore, this
study concludes that the term “Pro-Center Dogmatic Authoritarianism”
is a “form of government where founder(s) or follower(s) of any sect,
religion, or faith possess absolute power by opposing greater regional
autonomy.”
Pro-Persian Cosmopolitanism
The term Cosmopolitanism is derived from the ancient Greek word kos-
mopolites which is combination of two words: kosmos (means world or
universe) and polites (means citizen). Hence, cosmopolitanism means the
society where people (belong to numerous ethnic, socio-cultural, or reli-
gious communities) live together, interact, and cooperate with each other
as a single community (Norris and Inglehart 2009, 8). On the other hand,
the term “Pro-Persian” is designated to refer to:
1. Native speakers of Persian language (Comrie 2009, 446);

2. Non-Persian ethno-linguistic communities whose literature, cultural
values, and social norms have been influenced by Persian language
and norms (Sharma 2004, 24); and
3. Iranian inhabitants having nationalistic zeal (Stone 2014, 179).
16 M. ASIM
By utilizing all the designated meanings for the term “Pro-Persian,”

this study defines “Pro-Persian Cosmopolitanism” as “a society where
Pro-Persian communities live together and cooperate with each other as a
single community.” Before implication of both terms on Iranian political
system through constitutional engineering, this study needs to look at
demographic division of Iran.4
Iranian Demographic Division

Among linguistic and sectarian (or religious) divisions of Iranian demo-
graphics, firstly this study examines population ratio of distinct major
ethno-linguistic segments where; majority speaks Persian (Awde and
Shahribaf 2006, 5). Furthermore, Azeri, Kurd, Talysh, Arab, Turkmen,
Lari, Baloch, Gilak, Qashqai, Armenian, Assyrian (Neo-Aramaic), Brahui,
Circassian, Georgian, and Tat5 have been found the most significant
minority languages in Iran (Mirvahedi 2019, 7 & 9–17). As different
reports present varied statistics about population ratio of ethno-linguistic
communities in Iran, this study comparatively analyzes the reports help in
understanding the impacts of ethnic dilemmas on Iranian economy and
Iranian foreign policy because they give brief overview about minorities’
4
The latest census in Iran was held in 2016 (Amar 2020). However, the Statistical Center of
Iran (Markaz Amar Iran) did not release population ratios of different social segments within
Iran on ethno-linguistic, ethno-sectarian, or ethno-religious bases; neither in booklet form nor
on official website https://www.amar.org.ir/english (Amar 2020). Similarly, no one researcher
(live in Iran) or organization (based in Iran) is allowed to conduct research for estimating
population ratio of any ethno-linguistic, ethno-sectarian, or ethno-religious community
(Nadjmabadi 2009, 53). Therefore, this study relies upon the reports prepared by numerous
authors in their personal capacity or published by different organizations and research centers
(outside the Iran) regarding comparatively analyzing ratio of distinct ethno-sectarian (or reli-
gions) and ethno-linguistic communities within Iran. Although some of the authors, organiza-
tions, and research centers are being run or assisted by Iranians, they have settled abroad.
5
As the Tati language has no alphabets, Tat people generally use Azeri script for their writ-
ings and literature (Mirvahedi 2019). Therefore, some scholars consider Talysh and Tati
languages similar to each other (Siewierska 1998, 783). However, this similarity is conveyed
only in the Zanjan Province where both people, Talysh and Tat, live among each other. And
this can be the reason that a significant portion of both ethno-linguistic communities in
Zanjan province have the same sentiments for “Movement for sovereign Talysh-Mughan
Republic” or “Talyshstan” (Minahan 2000, 673–676). Conversely, Tat people living in the
Qazvin Province and the Gilan Province have several socio-cultural differences from the Tat
people living in the Zanjan Province (Mirvahedi 2019).
living standards, reasons behind emerging separatisms, and threats to eco-

nomic growth in Iran. According to “Country Profile: Iran” published by
the US Library of Congress, Persian is the mother language of almost
65 percent of Iranians.6 This report also exhibits 16 percent of Iranians
speak the Azeri Turkic language7 (including other Turkic dialectics like
Afshars, Ayromlu, Baharlu, Qajar, and Qarapapaq). Seven percent speak
Kurd language8 (including Gorani, Kurmanji, and Sorani dialectics),
6 percent speak Lari/Luri language9 (including Bakhtiary, Feyli, and
Mamasani dialectics), 2 percent speak Balochi language,10 and 1 percent
speak Turkmen11 language (Tajddin 2020; LoC 2008, 5).
Likewise, Arabic speaking people12 have been counted up to 2 percent,
while Qashqai speakers are estimated as 1 percent (LoC 2008, 5). Gilak
and Mazandarani13 languages are considered much closer to each other by
6
In 2007, Anthony H. Cordesman and Martin Kleiber traced 51 percent native Persian
speakers (Cordesman and Kleiber 2007, 27). However, Ann E. Lucas claims that modern
Iran only has 50 percent native Persian speakers (Lucas 2019, 14–15). On the other hand, a
report published in 2019 by American Foreign Policy Council highlighted 61 percent of the
Iranian population was able to speak Persian language (AFPC 2019, 255).
7
April Fast believes that Azeri ethno-linguistic community covers 25 percent of total pop-
ulation in Iran during 2005 (Fast 2005, 19). Whereas Anthony H. Cordesman and Martin
Kleiber trace this percentage as 24 percent during 2007 (Cordesman and Kleiber 2007, 27).
On the other hand, a report on American Foreign Policy Council records 16 percent popula-
tion of respective community in Iran till 2019 (AFPC 2019, 255).
8
In 1997, Kurd population was recorded as 7.3 million (11.56 percent) out of 63.14 mil-
lion total population in Iran (Meho 1997, 1). In 2005, this ratio came down to 7 percent
and remained almost same till 2008 (Fast 2005, 19; LoC 2008, 5). However, according to
the Human Rights Watch, this percentage was somewhat increased up to 7.10 percent when
4.5 million Kurd population was observed out of nearly 69 million total population in Iran
during 2009 (Ibrahimi 2009, 6). On the other hand, a report published by American Foreign
Policy Council traces 10 percent Kurdish population in Iran till 2019 (AFPC 2019, 255).
9
In 2007, Lur population was recorded as 2 percent of total Iranian population (Cordesman
and Kleiber 2007, 27; Ghazzal et al. 2007, 483). However, during 2008–2015, Lur people
have a 6 percent share of the total Iranian population (Danver 2015, 626).
10
Same population ratio has been recorded by American Foreign Policy Council in 2019
(AFPC 2019, 255).
11
However, April Fast and Christian A. Van Gorder find this number around 2 percent
(Fast 2005, 19; Gorder 2010, 4). On the other hand, Peter Hopkins looks toward Turkmens
as having a 1.5 percent share of the total Iranian population during 2016 (Hopkins 2016, 40).
12
In 2007, Iranian Arabs had a 3 percent share of the total Iranian population (Ghazzal
et al. 2007, 483). However, during 2008 to 2019, their population was recorded as 2 per-
cent of total (AFPC 2019, 255).
13
Mazandarani speakers (other than Gilak) approximately number around 5 to 6 percent
(Ghazzal et al. 2007, 483).
18 M. ASIM
having almost 8 percent of speakers (Ghazzal et al. 2007, 483).

Furthermore, speakers of Talysh language are 1.42 percent (King 2006,
57). In the remaining count, there are Armenians,14 Assyrians,15 Brahui,16
Circassians,17 Georgians,18 and Tat19 as significant ethno-linguistic com-
munities (LoC 2008, 5).
Since the Iranian demographic is divided by religions and sects points
out Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians as the only constitutionally recog-
nized religious minorities in Iran (Esposito and Voll 1996, 72). Although
the majority of Iranian population follows the Twelver sect20 of Shia
Islam, the Iranian constitution also recognizes Hanafi, Shafa’i, Maliki,
and Hambali sects of Sunni Islam21 and the Zaidi sect22 of Shia Islam as
the only officially acceptable branches of Islam within the territorial
jurisdiction of Iran. Other than the respective sects, the constitution nei-
ther recognizes nor gives constitutional privilege to IsmailiShia,23
14
During the 1970s, according to Eliz Sanasarian, Armenians’ population in Iran was
250,000. It then decreased toward 200,000 during the 1990s (Sanasarian 2000, 36).
15
During 1970s, estimated population of Assyrians was 30,000 that became low between
16,000 and 18,000 till 1992 (Sanasarian 2000, 39).
16
Until 2020, the estimated population of Brahui people in Iran is 24,000 (Mirvahedi 2019).
17
Almost 50,000 Circassians have settled in Iran from Russia (Itekushev 2018).
18
Approximately 10,000 Georgians are counted in Iran (Rezvani 2009).
19
The estimated population of Tat people in Iran is 9500 (Mirvahedi 2019).
20
Eighty-nine percent of the total Iranian population follows Twelver sect of Shia Islam
(Armajani 2020, 2).
21
Nine percent Iranians follow Sunni Islam (Armajani 2020, 2).
22
Although Zaidi Muslims once lived in Northern Iran, now they have completely disap-
peared (Hunter 2015).
23
According to the Institute of Ismaili Studies London, Ismaili-Shia Muslims have smaller
population in Iran. However, it did not mention their share in the total Iranian population
(Nanji 2003).
Baha’i,24 Yarsani (AhleHaq),25 and Darvesh26 (Sufi) communities. The

case is the same for followers of Mandaeism,27 Hinduism,28 and Sikhism29.
Constitutional Provisions for Ethno-linguistic

and Ethno-sectarian Communities
Authoritarianism in Iranian sate and society can be easily understood

through the following quotation:
When a state supports one religion, it also tries to demote other religions; at
best other religions will be tolerated, at worst they will be banned.
(Jakubowski 2016, 39)
24
It is difficult to trace the actual population size number of Baha’i people because the
majority of them have been forced to hide their religious identity due to the suppressive
attitude of the post-1979 central government against them. However, in 2002, their popula-
tion was assumed as 4.25 million (6.32 percent) out of Iranian’s total population of
67.28 million (Minahan 2002, 229). While another report counted approximately 300,000
Baha’i people in Iran during 2003 (FIDH 2003, 11). On the other hand, the Australian
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Country’s (DFAT) Information Report about
Iran, published on April 14, 2020, estimated their population to be from 300,000 to about
350,000 (DFAT 2020, 34).
25
Like the Baha’i people, Yarsanis have also been coerced to hide their identity, register
themselves as Twelver-Shia regarding obtaining government services and constitutional priv-
ileges (Brownback et al. 2020, 4 & 6). However, Australian DFAT’s Country Information
Report about Iran identifies one million followers of Yarsanism in the country (DFAT
2020, 35).
26
Population size of Darvesh (Sufi) people in Iran is approximated between two and five
million during 2020 (DFAT 2020, 35).
27
It is also a difficult task to count the Mandaean population due to the three reasons.
First, unavailability and conflicting information about their population within the greater
populations of the countries where the people currently reside (like Iran). Second, the ability
to trace and find Mandaeans who have now been settled outside of Iran. Finally, the lack of
transparency in the information about who left Mandaeism causes an issue about the accu-
racy of the Mandaean population size (Baker 2017, 3). However, in 1989, their total popula-
tion was reported as 6200. Yet in the year 2002, their number was almost as high as 25,000
(Häberl 2009, 10 & 11). During 2017, their number continued to increase, and it was
reported about 10,000 Mandaeans were living in Iran (Baker 2017, 3).
28
PEW Forum on Religion and Public Life and World Population Review trace a Hindu
population of almost 10,000 in Iran (PEW 2012; WorldPopulationReview 2020).
29
Different sources claim varied statistics about Sikh population in Iran. However, they are
in very little number; whereas, historically, they have settled in Iran (especially in Tehran and
Isfahan) for trade from India during late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Singh and
Fenech 2014, 382). According to the caretaker of Gurudwara Sahib Tehran, almost 800
Sikhs are living in Tehran (AllaboutSikhs 2020). Moreover, Sikhs have also settled in Bushehr,
Mashhad, and Isfahan (AllaboutSikhs 2020).
20 M. ASIM
During the researcher’s investigation of Article 12 and Article 13,

Andrzej Jakubowski says both articles clearly display inequalities, favoritism,
and partisanship by describing constitutional provisions for ethno-sectarian
(or ethno-religious) communities (Ibrahimi 2009, 34). Article 12 of the
Iranian constitution declares Twelver-Shia Islam as the official religion of
Iran. Yet, the article also favors followers of the Hanafi, Shafa’i, Maliki,
Hambali, and Zaidi sects of Islam. However, the constitution favors them
only in regard to their sectarian teachings in daily routine life, such as the
ability to enjoy their private lives (regarding marriage, divorce, inheritance,
and wills), to experience domestic rules and regulations within their local
councils, and to make court decisions according to their jurisprudence
(Castellino and Cavanaugh 2013, 128; Jakubowski 2016, 39–40). Article
12 also provides special permission to the above-mentioned Islamic sects to
run their religious schools as how they see fit (Constitution of Iran 1989).
Article 13 provides religious freedom to only three ethno-religious
minorities in Iran—Christians, Jewish, and Zoroastrians. Article 64 of the
Iranian constitution allows these communities to elect their own represen-
tatives for reserved seats in the Iranian parliament. The Jews and Zoroastrians
can each elect one representative, while Christians can elect three represen-
tatives (Barry 2018, 2; Constitution of Iran 1989). However, through criti-
cal investigations of Articles 13 and 64, the articles only define three Iranian
Christian ethno-sectarian communities (Armenians, Assyrians,30 and
Chaldeans31) with religious freedom and the ability to perform rituals and
ceremonies in Iran. These three communities do have representation in the
Iranian parliament. The followers of Armenian Catholic Church have two
reserved seats from the northern (Tabriz and Tehran) and southern
(Isfahan) constituencies, while the Assyrians and Chaldeans can elect one
representative for both groups (Barry 2018, 2; Constitution of Iran 1989).
Another apparent feature of the Iranian constitution displays linguistic
justice (due to Articles 15 and 19); however, practices are contradicted and
biased because of official favoritism and preferences for Persian-speaking
community (Mirvahedi 2019, 11). In fact, scholars explain Articles 15 and
19 as not more than the lip services for the rights of ethno-linguistic minori-
ties (Mirvahedi 2019, 11). In other words, Iran claims it provides
30
Assyrians are not the only ethno-linguistic minority, but they are also counted as one of
the ethno-sectarian communities among Christians in Iran. They mostly follow the Assyrian
Church of the East but several also adhere to the Assyrian Evangelical Church, Assyrian
Pentecostal Church, and Ancient Church of the East (Price 2005, 264–265).
31
Ethnic Assyrians tend to follow the Chaldean Catholic Church (also called Chaldean
Catholics, Chaldean Christians, or Chaldo-Assyrians). The Chaldean Catholic Church origi-
nated from the Church of the East (Price 2005, 264–265).
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Peace and beauty and fortune attend her and all those who do adore
her!
Letizia had not been six months in the chorus before she attracted
the attention of John Richards by some imitations she gave at a
supper party at which, most unusually for him, he was present. If
John Richards’s eyes seemed exclusively occupied with the
personal appearance of the young women who adorned his theatre,
they were not on that account blind to talent. He asked who the
good-looking girl was, remembered now that he had engaged her
himself, was informed that she came of theatrical stock, and made a
note on his cuff that she was to be given an important understudy.
Letizia’s luck held. The lady who played the part she was
understudying was taken ill at Brighton one Saturday afternoon; and
that very night John Richards, who happened to pay one of his
periodical visits to the back of a box in order to be sure that his
company was not letting the show down by slackness, witnessed
Letizia’s performance. He turned to his companion, and asked what
he thought of her.
“I think she’s a marvel.”
“So do I,” said John Richards.
Yet he did not mention a word to Letizia about having seen her. In
fact, neither she nor any of the company knew that the Guv’nor was
in front, for these visits to his theatre were always paid in the strictest
secrecy. However, when in July the musical comedy for the autumn
production was ready for rehearsal, John Richards offered Letizia a
part with three songs that were likely to take London by storm, if the
actress knew how to sing them.
Nancy was acting in Leicester the week that Letizia’s telegram
arrived with its radiant news of the luck her birthday had brought.
She went into the church where twenty-one years ago she and Bram
were married, and there she lighted every candle she could find to
Our Lady of Victories. The pricket blazed with such a prodigality of
golden flames in the jewelled sunlight that the old woman who was
cleaning out the pews came up to find out if this extravagant stranger
was a genuine devotee.
“It’s all right,” Nancy told her. “I was married in this church twenty-
one years ago, and I am thanking Heaven for happiness after much
sorrow.”
The old cleaner smiled so benignly that Nancy gave her half a
crown and begged for her prayers. Then she sought out the priest,
and asked him to say Masses for the soul of Letizia’s great-
grandmother and for herself a Mass of thanksgiving, and still another
Mass for the intention of the Sisters of the Holy Infancy. She gave
him, too, alms for the poor of his parish, and then going home to her
lodgings she knelt beside her bed and wept the tears of unutterable
thankfulness, those warm tears that flow like outpoured wine, so rich
are they with the sunshine of the glad heart.
Letizia’s first night was on the ninth of September. Her mother
decided to give up her autumn engagement, and trust to finding
something later on when the supremely important date was past.
She did not want to worry Letizia during her rehearsals; but her
experience might be of service, and she ought to be near at hand.
Nancy stayed at her old rooms in St. John’s Wood which she had
chosen originally to be near Letizia at school in the days when she
herself was a London actress. Perhaps if she could have mustered
up as much excitement about her own first night in London, she
might have been famous now herself instead of merely being
favourably known to a number of provincial audiences. Yet how
much more wonderful to be the mother of a famous daughter in
whose success she could be completely absorbed without feeling
the least guilt of egotism.
The piece that Autumn at the Vanity was only one of a long line of
musical comedies between which it would be idle to attempt to
distinguish; the part that Letizia played was only one of many similar
parts, and the songs she sang had been written over and over again
every year for many years; but Lettie Fuller herself was different.
She was incarnate London, and this was strange, because she had
neither a cockney accent nor, what was indeed unexpected on the
musical comedy stage, a mincing suburban accent. She did not open
big innocent eyes at the stalls and let her underclothes wink for her.
She neither pursed her lips nor simpered, nor waggled her head. But
she was beautiful with a shining naturalness and an infectious
vitality; and as Mrs. Pottage told her mother, she was as fresh as a
lilac in Spring.
The old lady—the very old lady, for she was now seventy-five—
was sitting with Nancy in the middle of the stalls. Nancy thought that
she would be less nervous there than in a box, and it would be
easier for Letizia not to be too much aware of her mother’s
anguished gaze.
“Well, I’m sorry she’s gone and had herself printed Lettie Fuller,”
said Mrs. Pottage. “Because I’d made up my mind that before I died I
would learn how to spell Letitsia, and I brought my best glasses on
purpose so as I could see the name printed as it should be. And then
she goes and calls herself Lettie, which a baby-in-arms could spell.
And Mrs. Bugbird and pore Aggie Wilkinson was both very anxious
to know just how it was spelt, so they’ll be disappointed. I only hope
Mrs. B. will reckonise her when she comes on, because she won’t
know who she is from Adam and Eve in the programme.”
“Is dear old Mrs. Bugbird here?” Nancy exclaimed.
“Of course she’s here—and pore Aggie Wilkinson, of course. Why,
they wouldn’t have missed it for nothing. It’s only to be hoped that
Mrs. B. don’t fall over in the excitement. She’s in the front row of the
upper circle, and if she did come down she’d about wipe out the front
six rows of the pit. Still, I daresay Aggie will hook one of her pore
crutches in the back of Mrs. B’s bodice which is bound to bust open
in the first five minutes. The last time she and me went to the theatre
she looked more like a tug-of-war than a respectable woman before
the piece was over.”
“The overture’s beginning,” Nancy whispered, for people were
beginning to turn round and stare at the apple-cheeked old lady who
was talking so volubly in the middle of the stalls.
“So any one can see by the airs that conductor fellow’s giving
himself. Why band-conductors should be so cocky I never could
fathom. It isn’t as if they did anything except wave that blessed bit of
wood like a kid with a hoopstick. It’s the same with bus-conductors.
They give theirselves as many airs as if they was driving the blessed
bus itself. That’s it, now start tapping,” she went on in a tone of
profound contempt. “Yes, if he dropped that silly bit of wood and got
down off that high chair and did an honest night’s work banging the
drum, perhaps he might give himself a few airs. Ah, now they’re off,
and depend upon it that conductor-fellow thinks, if he stopped
waving, the band would stop playing, and which of course is
radicalous.”
The overture finished. The first bars of the opening chorus were
being played. The curtain rose.
“There she is! There she is!” Mrs. Pottage gasped when from the
crowded stage she disentangled Letizia’s debonair self. “And don’t
she look a picture, the pretty jool!”
When the moment came for Letizia to sing her first song, her
mother shut her eyes against the theatre that was spinning before
them like a gigantic humming-top. It seemed an hour before she
heard Letizia’s voice ringing out clear and sweet and cool across the
footlights. She saw her win the hearts of the audience until they were
all turned into one great heart beating for her. She heard the surge of
her first encore, and then she might have fainted if Mrs. Pottage had
not dug her sharply in the ribs at that moment.
“Did you hear what that old buffer in front of us said?” Mrs. Pottage
whispered hoarsely.
“Something nice about Letizia?” she whispered back.
“He said he was damned if she wasn’t the best girl John Richards
had found for years. And how I didn’t get up and kiss the blessed top
of his bald head I’m bothered if I know.”
The curtain fell on the first act, and the loudest applause was
always for Letizia.
“Oh, she’s knocked ’em,” Mrs. Pottage declared. “She’s absolutely
knocked ’em. But she’s lovely! And, oh, dear, God bless us both, but
how she did remind me of her pore father once or twice.”
The old lady fumbled for Nancy’s hand and squeezed it hard.
“Well, I don’t mind saying she’s made me feel like a girl again,”
Mrs. Pottage went on after a moment or two of silence. “Every
sweetheart I ever had come into my mind while she was singing that
song. You know! It was like riding on the top of a bus in fine weather
when they’ve just watered the streets and the may’s out in flower
and you say to yourself there’s no place like dear old London after all
and begin to nod and dream as you go jogging along, thinking of old
faces and old fancies and the fun you’ve had years ago.”
The curtain rose on the second act, and with every line she said
and with every note she sang Lettie Fuller became nearer and
dearer to her audience that night.
Once, after a sally had been taken up by the house in roars of
laughter, Mrs. Pottage exclaimed to Nancy:
“Hark! did you hear that? That was Mrs. Bugbird’s laugh above the
lot. Oh, I’d reckonise that laugh if I was in my coffin. You mark my
words, she’ll be whooping in a moment. That’s always the way it gets
her. But pore Aggie’ll pat her back if she whoops too hard.”
In spite of the encores—and Letizia always won by far the loudest
and most persistent of them—the curtain fell at last on another
thundering Vanity success.
“Bravo, bravo, my beauty!” Mrs. Pottage stood up to shout when
Letizia took her call. Lots of other people were standing up and
shouting, so her enthusiasm was not so very conspicuous. Nancy
felt too weak with emotion to stand up herself, and sank back in a
pale trance of joyful relief.
“There’s Mrs. B.!” Mrs. Pottage suddenly exclaimed. “And if she
claps much louder, she’ll clap herself out of that new dress of hers
for good and all. And when she gets out in the Strand she’ll be run in
to Bow Street if she isn’t careful. She’s the most excitable woman I
ever did know.”
At last the audience consented to let the performers retire, and a
few minutes later Nancy held Letizia in her arms.
“Darling mother, was I good?”
“Darling child, you were perfect.”
“And where’s Mrs. Pottage?” Letizia asked. “Did she think I was
good?”
“The dear old soul’s waiting to be invited into your dressing-room.”
“Mrs. Pottage! Mrs. Pottage!” Letizia cried, hugging the old lady.
“You’re coming back to supper with me, aren’t you?”
“Oh, no, duckie. I’ve got Mrs. Bugbird and pore Aggie Wilkinson
waiting to go back to Greenwich. We’re all going to take a cab to
London Bridge.”
“Oh, but they must both come to supper too. They must really. I’ll
get a car to drive you home. You must all come. I won’t be long
dressing.”
And, if it was possible for Nancy to feel any happier that night, it
was when her little daughter showed that success had not made her
heedless of old simple friends.
The very next day Nancy went round to see her agent.
“You don’t mean to tell me you want to get another engagement at
once, Miss O’Finn? Why, I should have thought you would have
wanted to stay and enjoy your daughter’s success. It was wonderful.
What notices, eh? By Jove, it’s refreshing nowadays to hear of
anybody clicking like that.”
“Oh, no, I’ve rested quite long enough,” Nancy said. “I want to be
off on tour again as soon as possible.”
The agent looked at his book.
“Well, I’m awfully sorry, Miss O’Finn, but I don’t believe there’s
anything just at the moment that would suit you.” He paused. “Unless
—but, no, of course, you don’t want to play that line of parts yet.”
“What line?”
“Why, Charles Hamilton is losing Miss Wolsey who has been
playing Mrs. Malaprop, Mrs. Hardcastle, etc., with him for the last
fifteen years.”
“You mean the old women?” Nancy asked.
“Quite—er—quite.”
“I would like to be with Charles Hamilton,” she said pensively. “And
at forty it’s time to strike out in a new line of parts.”
“Well, he’s playing at Croydon this week. If you would consider
these parts, why don’t you go and see him? It’s a pleasant company
to be in. Forty-two weeks, year in year out, and of course he
occasionally has a season in London. Nothing but Shakespeare and
Old Comedy.”
Nancy did not hesitate. Now that her daughter was safely
launched it was time for her to be settling down. She went back to
her rooms and wrote a long letter to Mother Catherine about Letizia’s
triumph. Then she wrote to Charles Hamilton for an interview. She
went to Croydon, interviewed him, and a fortnight later she was
playing with him at Sheffield—Mrs. Candour in The School for
Scandal on Monday, the Nurse in Romeo and Juliet on Tuesday,
Mrs. Malaprop in The Rivals on Wednesday, Mistress Quickly in The
Merry Wives on Thursday, nothing on Friday when Twelfth Night was
performed, but on Saturday Mrs. Hardcastle in She Stoops to
Conquer at the matinée and at night once more the Nurse in Romeo
and Juliet.
Nancy no longer worried over her increasing tendency to
increasing portliness, and she never regretted joining Charles
Hamilton’s company, which now that Mrs. Hunter-Hart had retired
represented the last stronghold of the legitimate drama in Great
Britain. So long as Charles Hamilton went out on tour she
determined to tour with him. The habit of saving so much out of her
salary every week was not given up because Letizia was secure;
indeed she saved more each week, because now that she had taken
to dowagers she could afford to ignore the changes of fashion which
had made dressing a problem so long as she was competing for
parts with younger women.
And then Letizia Fuller after enchanting London for a year
abandoned the stage for ever in order to marry the young Earl of
Darlington.
The following letter to her mother explained her reasons:
125 Gordon Mansions,

Gordon Square,
W. C.
Sept. 15.
My darling darling Mother,
In a few days you will read in the papers that I am
engaged to be married to Lord Darlington. I haven’t said
anything to you about this before, because I wanted to
make up my own mind entirely for myself. He proposed to
me first about two months ago, and though I loved him I
wondered if I loved him enough to give up the stage. You
don’t know how much I was enjoying being loved by the
public. That’s what I wondered if I could give up, not the
ambition to become a great actress. But I’ve come to the
definite conclusion that I’m not really so very ambitious at
all. I think that simple happiness is the best, and my
success at the Vanity was really a simple happiness. It
was the being surrounded by hundreds of jolly people,
every one of whom I liked and who liked me. But I don’t
think I should ever want to be a wonderful Lady Macbeth,
and thrill people by the actress part of me. I’m not really
acting at the Vanity. I’m just being myself and enjoying it.
Of course, people might say that if marriage with an earl
is simple happiness then simple happiness is merely
social ambition. But I assure you that unless I loved
Darlington I would not dream of marrying him. He’s not
very rich, and apart from the pleasure of being a countess
it’s no more than marrying any good-looking, simple,
country squire. The only problems for me were first to find
out if I loved him as much as I loved the public and being
loved by them, and secondly to know if he would agree
that all the children should be Catholics. Well, I do know
that I love him more than I love the public and I do know
that I want his love more than I want the love of the public.
And he agreed at once about the children.
Thanks to you, darling, I’m not likely to seem particularly
out of place in my new part. Perhaps it’s only now that I
realise what you’ve done for me all these years. You shall
always be proud of me. I do realise too what dear Mother
Catherine and the nuns have done for me. I’m writing to
her by this post to try to express a little of my gratitude.
Darling mother, I’m so happy and I love you so dearly.
Your own
Letizia.
Three days later, the engagement of the beloved Lettie Fuller gave
the press one of those romantic stories so dear and so rightly dear to
it. Two days after the announcement Nancy received from Caleb
Fuller a letter addressed to her care of Miss Lettie Fuller, at the
Vanity Theatre.
The Towers,
Lower Bilkton,
Cheshire.
Sept. 18, 1911.
My dear Nancy,
I’ve been intending to write to you for a long time now to
invite you and Lettie to come and stay with us. But this
new house which I have just built has taken longer to get
ready than I expected. It’s situated in very pretty country
about fifteen miles from Brigham, and my architect has
made a really beautiful miniature castle which everybody
admires. I presented dear old Lebanon House to the
Borough of Brigham to be used as an up-to-date lunatic
asylum which was badly required in the district.
Trixie and I do so very much hope that you and Lettie
will come and stay with us and spend a quiet time before
the wedding takes place, of which by the way we have
read. You haven’t met Trixie yet, and it’s always such a
disappointment to her. But I’m sure you’ll understand what
a mess we’ve been in with building. I want you to meet
Norman too. Do you know, he’s fifteen. Doesn’t time fly?
He’s at Rossall, and I’ve made up my mind to give him the
chance his father never had and let him go to the
University.
Are you interested in gardening? Trixie is a great
gardener and spends all her time with her roses. Now, I
think I’ve given you most of our news, and we are waiting
anxiously to hear you are going to give us the pleasure of
your visit. Poor Aunt Achsah and Aunt Thyrza are both
dead. I would have sent you a notice of the funerals if I
had known your address.
With every good wish for your happiness and for the
happiness of dear little Lettie,
Your affectionate brother-in-law,
Caleb Fuller.
To this Nancy sent back a postcard:
Hell is paved with good intentions, Caleb!
It is tempting to prolong this with an account of Letizia’s wedding

and to relate what Mrs. Pottage wore at it and what she said when
Lord Darlington kissed her good-bye, before he and Letizia set out
on their honeymoon. It is tempting to dwell on the wit and the beauty
of Letizia Darlington and still more tempting to enlarge upon her
happiness. But she and her husband belong too much to the present
to be written about and this tale of over eighty years is already too
long. Yet, one more letter must be printed.
C/o Charles Hamilton’s
Shakespeare-Sheridan Company.
Princess’s Theatre,
Bristol.
Dec. 3, 1913.
Darling Letizia,
I’m so overjoyed you’re glad to have a second little boy,
though I hope you’ll have a little girl soon. You are a dear
child to want me to give up acting and settle down with
you at Vipont for the rest of my life. But you know, I am still
comparatively young, only 44, and from every point of
view I think it is better that I should go on acting. I am very
happy with Mr. Hamilton, and the life on tour suits me.
Moreover, it amuses me to feel that one day I may have
quite a nice little nest egg for this new little boy who will be
a younger son, and I know that Vipont requires all the
money you’ve got to keep it up properly. God bless you,
my darling, and let me go on acting quietly in this very
pleasant old-fashioned company which is more like a
family party than anything else.
My dear love to all of you.
Your loving
Mother.
And up and down the length of England, in and out of Wales, over
to Ireland, and across the border into Scotland Nancy O’Finn still
wandered.
THE END
Transcriber’s Note (continued)
This book contains many intentional misspellings of words and names.

They appear in the dialogue and correspondence of certain characters
and are used by the author as a literary device. These misspellings
have been left as they appear in the original publication.
Similarly, exclamations and dialogue in Italian have also been left

unchanged.
For the rest of the text, archaic spelling and inconsistencies in

capitalisation or hyphenation have been left unchanged except where
noted below. Other minor typographical errors have been corrected
without note.
Page 19 – “lovebirds” changed to “love-birds” (a cageful of love-

birds)
Page 57 – “sunsplashed” changed to “sun-splashed” (on a sun-

splashed piazza)
Page 149 – “parlour-maid” changed to “parlourmaid” (an elderly

parlourmaid)
There are a small number of footnotes in chapters I and III which

provide an English translation of some Italian word or phrases that
appear in the text. Each footnote is placed immediately below the
paragraph in which it is referenced.
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Ethnic Religious Minorities in Iran S Behnaz Hosseini Full Chapter

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Ethnic Religious Minorities in Iran S.

ISBN 978-981-19-1632-8 ISBN 978-981-19-1633-5 (eBook)

considered by the Islamic Republic of Iran’s official discourse, is repre-

The Acknowledged Minorities

Islamic Parliament of Iran (2021).

includes 130,138 Christians, 23,109 Zoroastrians, and 9826 Jews.

Zoroastrianism is the indigenous and dominant pre-Islamic religion of the

Those Who Must Not Be Named

The People of the Book Who Are Not a Minority

No Land for Heretics

A Minority That Is Not a Minority

Hosseini, S. Behnaz. 2020. Ya ̄rsān of Iran, Socio-Political Changes and

Iman Amirteimour holds a BA in Philosophy (University of Tehran,

specific focus on Iran and nationalism, and extensive field experience.

University in Bloomington, she conducted fieldwork within her research

Diagram 6.1 Assimilation 119

Map 4.1 Map of north of Khorasan (Papoly Yazdi 1991) 75

Religious and Ethnic Minorities in Iran:

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

Pluralism in terms of ethnicity, linguistics, and religions is also discussed

situation of Jewish visibility and adapted coexistence in Iran; the second

represented with two representatives, but Assyrian and Chaldean

important contribution, firstly by giving the reader a short but balanced

their soldiers, or also by propagating a common cultural awareness of

nations, but also—especially in the field of Iran and Islam—in a way to

Kreyenbroek, Philip G. 2014. The Yaresan of Kurdistan. In Religious Minorities in

Iranian Constitution Under Pro-Center

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 13

encourage Iranian authorities to undermine fundamental human rights of

Pro-Center Dogmatic Authoritarianism

1. Native speakers of Persian language (Comrie 2009, 446);

By utilizing all the designated meanings for the term “Pro-Persian,”

Iranian Demographic Division

living standards, reasons behind emerging separatisms, and threats to eco-

having almost 8 percent of speakers (Ghazzal et al. 2007, 483).

Baha’i,24 Yarsani (AhleHaq),25 and Darvesh26 (Sufi) communities. The

Constitutional Provisions for Ethno-linguistic

Authoritarianism in Iranian sate and society can be easily understood

During the researcher’s investigation of Article 12 and Article 13,

125 Gordon Mansions,

To this Nancy sent back a postcard:

Hell is paved with good intentions, Caleb!

It is tempting to prolong this with an account of Letizia’s wedding

This book contains many intentional misspellings of words and names.

Similarly, exclamations and dialogue in Italian have also been left

For the rest of the text, archaic spelling and inconsistencies in

Page 19 – “lovebirds” changed to “love-birds” (a cageful of love-

Page 57 – “sunsplashed” changed to “sun-splashed” (on a sun-

Page 149 – “parlour-maid” changed to “parlourmaid” (an elderly

There are a small number of footnotes in chapters I and III which

Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions

Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S.

START: FULL LICENSE

To protect the Project Gutenberg™ mission of promoting the

Section 1. General Terms of Use and

1.B. “Project Gutenberg” is a registered trademark. It may only

1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project

1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other

This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United

1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg™ electronic work is

1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg™ electronic work is

1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project

1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying,

Diagram 6.1 Assimilation 119

Map 4.1 Map of north of Khorasan (Papoly Yazdi 1991) 75