Sociology in the Twenty-First Century:

Key Trends, Debates, and Challenges

Simon Susen
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 Sociology
in the
Twenty-First Century
Key Trends, Debates, and Challenges

Simon Susen
Sociology in the Twenty-First Century
 Simon Susen

Sociology in the
Twenty-First Century
Key Trends, Debates, and Challenges
Simon Susen
City, University of London
London, UK

ISBN 978-3-030-38423-4    ISBN 978-3-030-38424-1 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38424-1

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 Foreword

News of the demise of sociology comes regularly across my desk, and if not of
its death, then at least reports of life-threatening epidemics.1 In the social sci-
ences, sociology is peculiarly afflicted by the instability of its paradigms, con-
flicts over methods, and disagreements about the most basic issues. What is
the social? Are we to study individuals or whole societies? The problem is not
that sociology is a relatively new discipline. We can trace its origins to at least
the 1820s. One can identify various causes that underpin its dilemmas.
Sociology is more driven by fashions in theory than other academic disci-
plines. In the 1970s the fashions came from Germany—notably with Jürgen
Habermas, Niklas Luhmann, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Arnold Gehlen, among
others. Later we had a ‘French period’—with Michel Foucault, Jean-François
Lyotard, Jacques Derrida, Pierre Bourdieu, and Luc Boltanski. Perhaps one
peculiarity of contemporary British sociology is the absence of commanding
figures, with the exception of Anthony Giddens. By contrast, we can readily
count the many foreign academics who have brought intellectual brilliance to
our shores—Zygmunt Bauman, Norbert Elias, Ernest Gellner, Hermínio
Martins, John Rex, and more. Simon Susen draws attention to this peculiarity
of British sociology in his discussion of ‘canonicity’, illustrating how British
universities were able to recruit a generation of displaced academics, especially
(albeit not exclusively) those who were fleeing from fascism in continen-
tal Europe.
These fashions are, to some extent, fuelled by the demands of publishers for
new ideas, titles, and authors. In this regard, there is arguably at least one
more positive reason that may explain these fashion-driven episodes of insta-
bility. Over time, there are—unsurprisingly—major changes to society; soci-
ologists have to re-tool to make sense of wholly new phenomena. Technological

v
vi Foreword

changes—such as the role of social media, the use of drones in warfare and
domestic surveillance, or cloning—have demanded new concepts, theories,
and methods. Susen correctly draws attention to aspects of such changes—for
instance, in his analysis of ‘metric power’ and the transformations brought
about by the ‘digital age’. The sociological understanding of new forms of
communication and their consequences required radical changes in sociologi-
cal theories. Susen considers both problems and possibilities in his discussion
of advanced digital technologies, which are powerful research tools employed
largely outside the academic world by corporations to gather and to process
data sets for commercial and strategic reasons. Such research technologies
make traditional sociological methods look insignificant by comparison.
There are less obvious reasons for the constant fluctuations within sociol-
ogy. At least some of its problems appear to be associated with its connection
to social reform movements; hence, its concepts and theories seem to be as
much embedded in advocacy as they are in science. Through their engage-
ment with social movements and their commitment to critical and public
research and debate, sociologists have embraced working-class socialism, the
women’s movement, racial equality, decolonization, and—more recently
still—animal rights movements. These engagements brought on to the scien-
tific agenda a more or less endless cycle of commitments to good causes that
have the unintended consequences of critiques that reformulate and disrupt
existing paradigms. For example, the central concern for class, status, and
power—as basic ingredients of social structure—has been displaced by atten-
tion to gender, sexuality, and identity in contemporary sociology. One result
is a new discourse of intersectionality and positionality that displaced more
conventional approaches.
Against this background, it is perhaps only to be expected that the sociol-
ogy curriculum is constantly challenged and changed. From my own experi-
ence of teaching in North America, there was some agreement of what
constituted the foundations—Karl Marx, Max Weber, Émile Durkheim, and
Georg Simmel—but almost no agreement about what was accepted as ‘mod-
ern sociology’. Was the lecture course to be made up, for instance, of the work
of Robert N. Bellah, C. Wright Mills, Robert K. Merton, Talcott Parsons, and
Charles Tilly? Or was it constituted around European social theorists such as
Habermas, Foucault, Giddens, and Boltanski? What about W. E. B. Du Bois,
Frantz Fanon, and E. Franklin Frazier to question the ‘whiteness’ of the socio-
logical canon? What about recruiting women to challenge this array of elderly
men? My department never came up with a satisfactory solution to these
questions. There was little comfort in the realization that adjacent disciplines
(in particular, anthropology) were confronted with similar problems.
 Foreword vii

The truth is that, in many respects, sociology is not a ‘normal science’. In

The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2012 [1962]),2 Thomas S. Kuhn argued
that normal science involves a way of doing research in terms of a shared para-
digm by a more or less coherent scientific community. Scientists are engaged
in work on a common problem, for which they undertake research to collect
evidence (‘the facts’) to solve it. The advent of normality indicates the coming
of age of a scientific field. All recognized sciences have passed through such a
watershed to emerge around a more or less stable scientific community whose
members share an established set of terminologies, theories, and methodolo-
gies. Around the middle of the last century, it looked as if ‘functionalism’ and
‘social systems theory’, particularly in the work of the North American soci-
ologist Talcott Parsons (1902–1979), were at the watershed of establishing a
shared paradigm. Yet, in the 1960s—in the context of the political disruption
of universities through radical student movements—functionalism began to
fall apart. Various alternatives emerged to challenge existing terminologies,
theories, and methodologies. Students were now exposed to conflict sociol-
ogy, symbolic interactionism, ethnomethodology, and—more recently—
poststructuralism and postmodernism. In Britain, there was also a revival of
Marxist sociology, on the one hand, and the growth of cultural sociology, on
the other. This trend challenged prevailing conventions about what might
count as ‘sociology’. One might say that sociology was slowly hollowed out by
the growth and popularity of cultural studies, gender studies, film studies, and
(mea culpa) body studies. What was left for sociological investigation apart
from researching the instability of personal identity in postmodern societies?
As sociology became attached to successive waves of fashionable theorists
who briefly enjoyed celebrity status, its focus on research problems constantly
shifted—with the result that sociology never entered the social sciences as a
‘normal science’. For university professors of sociology, one might suspect that
the constant disruption of paradigms was invigorating and even exciting.
Who wants normality? For the students of sociology, however, exposure to
such systemic disagreements tends to result in debilitating confusion, leading
eventually to dismay and withdrawal. Unsurprisingly, there have been many
attempts to address the problems facing sociology. Somewhat obviously, the
various national and international professional associations attempt to exer-
cise some oversight of the discipline and impose norms of ‘scholarship’ and
‘good behaviour’. There is equally a wealth of journals that seek to maintain
excellence in scholarship. Here it may be relevant to refer to the Journal of
Classical Sociology, which Simon Susen and I have been co-editing for almost
two decades.3 Inevitably, these academic institutions are—both in intention
and in effect—conservative; they struggle to keep up with sociological
viii Foreword

publications taking place in e-journals and on social media. As a result, what

has been called ‘the war of paradigms’ continues and adds more evidence (if
such was ever required) that nothing has replaced the hegemony briefly
enjoyed in North America by Parsons and his followers (around functional-
ism and systems theory) in the 1950s. Again, as Susen points out in his
account of counterhegemonic scholarship, North American scientific hege-
mony has been displaced by alternative centres in Latin America and, more
generally, in the Southern hemisphere. One such development is the emer-
gence of ‘Southern theory’.4
This war of paradigms is, broadly speaking, the topic of Simon Susen’s
excellent account of contemporary sociology and its possible futures. He is
especially aware of the imperial and colonial context in which sociology
emerged. Although this issue of colonialism has been well rehearsed in anthro-
pology, it has not received sufficient attention in sociology. Susen takes this
discussion to a new level, by driving home the fact that globalization has made
many (perhaps all) of the principal assumptions underlying large parts of
‘Western’ sociology questionable. We inhabit a world that is both highly inter-
connected and deeply diverse. These facets of the global context have forced
sociologists to re-think, among other topics, the meaning of modernity. The
idea of ‘multiple modernities’ in the work of Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt5 (2000)
offers at least one route out of the widespread supposition that ‘modernity’ is
all of a piece. Assumptions about the Western origins of sociology overlook
such figures as Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406), whose Muqaddimah developed the
idea of ‘universal history’. The growth of sociology in China can be traced
back, for example, to an early Department of Sociology, established by the
National Central University in 1928, which evolved into the Nanjing
University Department.6 With the success of the Maoist Revolution, however,
the truth of ‘Marxism-Leninism’ as the official ‘science’ raised questions about
the actual need for sociology, which was defined—and largely rejected—as a
‘bourgeois science’.
If mainstream sociology has been narrowly focused on the Western world,
it has also been too remote from historical research. Susen notes that this
absence of a strong consciousness of the historical context of sociological work
is ironic, given the importance of the work of Norbert Elias on the historical
unfolding of civilization or indeed the research of Max Weber on ancient
Judaism or the causes of the ultimate fall of Rome in his The Agrarian Sociology
of Ancient Civilizations7 (1976 [1924/1909/1896]).
Perhaps more importantly (and referring to the first sentence of my
Foreword), Susen does not propose a death-narrative of sociology. Indeed, in
Chapter 12, he rejects the ‘rhetoric of despair’ that he perceives to have been
prevalent in the second half of the twentieth century. He is deeply critical of
 Foreword ix

the foibles of sociology, while at the same time offering new possibilities of
developing sociology in the context of global interconnectedness. He wants to
treat the crises of the discipline of sociology as opportunities for development
and growth. Postcolonial sociology and subaltern studies represent attempts
to come to grips with global interconnectedness. National sociologies (espe-
cially British and Anglo-American sociology) fail adequately to reflect these
fundamental changes to the modern worlds in which we live. Some of these
concerns were articulated by Ulrich Beck, notably in his criticisms of ‘meth-
odological nationalism’ and his notion of ‘world risk society’,8 and developed
in collaboration with the Korean sociologist Chang Kyung-Sup.9
Many attempts have been made to overcome the war of paradigms to stabi-
lize sociology around an agreed set of theories, concepts, and concerns. Yet, at
the end of the day, sociological scholarship revolves around ‘making social
science matter’.10 In the light of that goal, the quest for normality may be a
false endeavour. It is crucial to illuminate the structure of human societies in
a manner that engages us with issues that are significant and provides us with
clarity of understanding to improve the way we live. Simon Susen’s kaleido-
scopic overview of such sociological endeavours to describe important sub-
jects offers a perspective that is both challenging and rewarding. Established
scholars, as well as both undergraduate and postgraduate students, will find
the clear development of his argument, the comprehensive coverage of issues,
and the cornucopia of references an indispensable resource for further study.

ACU (Sydney, Australia) and CUNY (New York, USA) Bryan S. Turner

Notes
1. See Susen (2020).
2. Kuhn (2012 [1962]).
3. Cf. O’Neill and Turner (2001) as well as Susen and Turner (2011a).
4. See Connell (2007).
5. See, for example, Eisenstadt (2000). Cf. Susen and Turner (2011b) as well as
Turner and Susen (2011).
6. See Skinner (1951).
7. Weber (1976 [1924/1909/1896]).
8. Beck (1999).
9. Kyung-Sup (2010).
10. Flyvbjerg (2001).
x Foreword

References
Beck, Ulrich (1999) World Risk Society, Cambridge: Polity.
Connell, Raewyn (2007) Southern Theory: The Global Dynamics of Knowledge in
Social Science, Cambridge: Polity.
Eisenstadt, Shmuel Noah (2000) ‘Multiple Modernities’, Daedalus 129(1): 1–29.
Flyvbjerg, Bent (2001) Making Social Science Matter: Why Social Inquiry Fails and
How It Can Succeed Again, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kuhn, Thomas S. (2012 [1962]) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 4th Edition,
with an introductory essay by Ian Hacking, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Kyung-Sup, Chang (2010) ‘The Second Modern Condition? Compressed Modernity
as Internalized Reflexive Cosmopolitization’, The British Journal of Sociology
61(3): 444–464.
O’Neill, John and Bryan S. Turner (2001) ‘Introduction—The Fragmentation of
Sociology’, Journal of Classical Sociology 1(1): 5–12.
Skinner, G. William (1951) ‘The New Sociology in China’, The Far Eastern Quarterly
10(4): 365–371.
Susen, Simon (2020) Sociology in the Twenty-First Century: Key Trends, Debates, and
Challenges, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Susen, Simon and Bryan S. Turner (2011a) ‘Tradition and Innovation in Classical
Sociology: Tenth Anniversary Report of JCS’, Journal of Classical Sociology
11(1): 5–13.
Susen, Simon and Bryan S. Turner (2011b) ‘Introduction to the Special Issue on
Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt’, Journal of Classical Sociology 11(3): 229–239.
Turner, Bryan S. and Simon Susen (eds.) (2011) Special Issue: Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt,
Journal of Classical Sociology 11(3): 229–335.
Weber, Max (1976 [1924/1909/1896]) The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations,
trans. Richard Iva Frank, London: NLB.
 Contents

Part I Intimations of Postcoloniality   1

1 Postcoloniality and Sociology  3

2 Postcoloniality and Decoloniality 25

Part II Intimations of Globality  53

3 Globality and Sociology 55

4 Globality and Connectivity 75

Part III Intimations of Canonicity  95

5 Canonicity and Sociology 97

6 Canonicity and Exclusivity127

Part IV Intimations of Historicity 147

7 Historicity and Sociology149

8 Historicity and Novelty169

xi
xii Contents

Part V Intimations of Disciplinarity 195

9 Disciplinarity and Sociology197

10 Disciplinarity and Interdisciplinarity213

Part VI Intimations of Hegemony 239

11 Hegemony and Sociology241

12 Hegemony and Counterhegemony261

Part VII Intimations of Reflexivity 283

13 Epilogue: Critical Remarks285

Conclusion343

References351

Index of Names445

Index of Subjects477
 About the Author

Simon Susen is Professor of Sociology at City, University of London. He is

the author of The Foundations of the Social: Between Critical Theory and
Reflexive Sociology (Oxford: Bardwell Press, 2007), The ‘Postmodern Turn’ in
the Social Sciences (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), Pierre Bourdieu et
la distinction sociale. Un essai philosophique (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2016), and
The Sociology of Intellectuals: After ‘The Existentialist Moment’ (with Patrick
Baert, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017). Along with Celia Basconzuelo
and Teresita Morel, he edited Ciudadanía territorial y movimientos sociales.
Historia y nuevas problemáticas en el escenario latinoamericano y mundial (Río
Cuarto: Ediciones del ICALA, 2010). Together with Bryan S. Turner, he
edited The Legacy of Pierre Bourdieu: Critical Essays (London: Anthem Press,
2011), The Spirit of Luc Boltanski: Essays on the ‘Pragmatic Sociology of Critique’
(London: Anthem Press, 2014), and a Special Issue on the work of Shmuel
Noah Eisenstadt, which appeared in the Journal of Classical Sociology 11(3):
229–335, 2011. In addition, he edited a Special Issue on Bourdieu and
Language, which was published in Social Epistemology 27(3–4): 195–393,
2013. He is Associate Member of the Bauman Institute and, together with
Bryan S. Turner, Editor of the Journal of Classical Sociology.

xiii
 Introduction

The main purpose of this book is to examine key trends, debates, and challenges in
twenty-first-century sociology. Interrogations regarding the nature of sociology
(‘What is sociology?’), the history of sociology (‘How has sociology evolved?’), and
the study of sociology (‘How can or should we make sense of sociology?’) have been,
and will continue to be, essential to the creation of conceptually informed, method-
ologically rigorous, and empirically substantiated research programmes in the disci-
pline. Over the past years, however, there have been numerous disputes and
controversies concerning the future of sociology. Particularly important in this respect
are recent and ongoing discussions on the possibilities of developing new—and,
arguably, post-classical—forms of sociology. The central assumption underlying most
of these projects is the contention that a comprehensive analysis of the principal chal-
lenges faced by global society requires the construction of a sociology capable of
accounting for the interconnectedness of social actors and social structures across
time and space. Exploring the significance and relevance of such an ambitious ven-
ture, this book aims to provide an overview of crucial past, present, and possible
future trends, debates, and challenges shaping the pursuit of sociological inquiry. To
this end, it is structured as follows:

Part I: Intimations of Postcoloniality

Chapter 1—entitled ‘Postcoloniality and Sociology’—highlights the wider
significance of two major historical events: the colonization and, subsequently,
the decolonization of large parts of the world by European powers. The birth
of sociology coincides with the age of imperialism, characterized by extensive
colonization processes across the globe in the late nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries. It is far from clear, however, what both the objective and the

xv
xvi Introduction

normative implications of this concurrence are, let alone how they should be
conceptualized and problematized. As maintained in this chapter, the rise of
postcolonial studies in the late twentieth century is indicative of the need to
grapple with these implications. Postcolonial approaches are confronted with
a twofold challenge: first, to provide a comprehensive critique of the multilay-
ered impact of colonialism on world history; and, second, to take on the task
of crafting viable visions of a genuinely postcolonial world. The chapter sug-
gests that, faced with this twofold challenge, the field of postcolonial studies
has made substantial—and, in several respects, indispensable—contributions
to the development of contemporary sociology.
Chapter 2—entitled ‘Postcoloniality and Decoloniality’—gives a brief
overview of prominent approaches associated with postcolonial studies and,
more recently, decolonial studies. The former have been profoundly shaped by
diasporic scholars from the Middle East and South Asia. The latter have been
developed, above all, by diasporic scholars from South America. Despite sig-
nificant points of divergence, the numerous frameworks situated within these
two currents of analysis are united by the ambition to take issue with
Eurocentric conceptions of history in general and of modernity in particular.
In order to demonstrate that valuable insights can be gained from these two
traditions of thought, the chapter elucidates significant contributions made
by the following thinkers: in relation to postcolonial studies, Edward Said,
Gayatri Spivak, Homi K. Bhabha, Raewyn Connell, and Boaventura de Sousa
Santos; and, in relation to decolonial studies, Aníbal Quijano, Walter
D. Mignolo, and María Lugones.

Part II: Intimations of Globality

Chapter 3—entitled ‘Globality and Sociology’—scrutinizes the implications
of the fact that, in the early twenty-first century, societies across the world are
increasingly interconnected at multiple levels. On this view, the plea for a
global sociology is based on the premise that we live in a global society, implying
that it is the task of the former to shed light on the complexities of the latter.
A connectivist approach—epitomized in the pursuit of a ‘connected sociolo-
gies’ framework—draws attention to the ways in which connected societies
are embedded in connected histories. Put differently, societal developments
occur due to a variety of connections—such as economic, political, cultural,
linguistic, geographical, and/or demographic ones. In addition to spelling out
the core presuppositions underpinning the aforementioned connectivist out-
look, the chapter considers three alternative explanatory paradigms, all of
 Introduction xvii

which aim to make sense of key societal developments on a global scale: (1)
the paradigm of multiple modernities, (2) the paradigm of multiculturalism,
and (3) the paradigm of cosmopolitanism. Upon closer examination, however,
it becomes apparent that these currents of thought fall short of acknowledg-
ing the role that connected histories have played, and continue to play, in
shaping the constitution of modern societies. As illustrated in this chapter, the
emergence of ‘postcolonial sociology’ and ‘subaltern studies’ reflects a serious
effort to account for the global interconnectedness of social realities.
Chapter 4—entitled ‘Globality and Connectivity’—makes a case for a con-
nectivist sociology, insisting that modernity can be regarded as a product of
multiple interconnections across the world. To the extent that we recognize
both the existence and the significance of ‘connected histories’, it becomes
possible to take seriously those ‘other histories’ that are commonly ignored by,
or relegated to the margins of, ‘Western’ collective memories. Such a connec-
tivist approach requires us to face up to the fact that the numerous behav-
ioural, ideological, and institutional patterns of functioning associated with
the historical condition called ‘modernity’—far from possessing a monolithic
origin in the cradle of European civilization—stem from a transcontinental
confluence of human practices and social structures. A truly global sociology,
while rejecting the assumption that civilizations constitute distinct and self-­
sufficient entities, subverts the mainstream historical narrative according to
which, in the context of modernity, the European continent represents the
principal driving force behind, and the crucial reference point for, civiliza-
tional developments across the world. A connectivist approach, in other
words, takes issue with the separation, isolation, and hierarchization of civiliza-
tions as building blocks of human existence. Furthermore, it calls into ques-
tion (1) the historical assumption that modernity has existed as ‘only one
experience’ and (2) the sociological assumption that modernity, insofar as it is
portrayed as a largely European affair, can make a legitimate claim to ‘unique-
ness’ and ‘progressiveness’. Having exposed the fragile foundations of such an
ethnocentric perspective, it becomes feasible, if not imperative, to pursue the
methodological strategy of ‘provincializing’ Europe by deconstructing its epis-
temic claims to universality. Arguably, such an undertaking contributes to the
creation of a ‘global social science community’.

Part III: Intimations of Canonicity

Chapter 5—entitled ‘Canonicity and Sociology’—is concerned with dynam-
ics of canon formation in modern sociology. The formation of an epistemic
canon in sociology can be traced back all the way to the ground-breaking
xviii Introduction

works that have shaped its disciplinary identity from the beginning of its exis-
tence. Notwithstanding the question of whether or not Karl Marx, Émile
Durkheim, and Max Weber deserve to be regarded as the ‘founding figures’ of
sociology, the far-reaching significance of their legacy is undeniable. It appears,
however, that classical sociology is characterized, at best, by a deficient engage-
ment with or, at worst, by the almost complete neglect of the wide-ranging
impact of colonialism on historical developments across the world. This omis-
sion is especially problematic to the degree that Marx, Durkheim, and Weber
have acquired the quasi-religious status of a ‘holy trinity’ in the history of
sociology. A key question that arises in this context is why some scholars have
been more successful than others in setting the agenda and shaping the canon
of their discipline. One of the most remarkable features of canon formation
in British sociology is that—to a large extent—it has been, and continues to
be, based on the works of non-British scholars. More specifically, it is charac-
terized by a curious paradox: non-Anglocentric Anglocentrism. While it has
offered a domestic framework to an impressively large number of non-British
scholars, it has greatly contributed to the hegemonic influence of Anglophone
sociology—not only in Europe, but across the world. Canon formation in
sociology is marked by an asymmetrical distribution of power, as is particu-
larly evident in the field of social theory, which suffers from the ‘white-theory-­
boys syndrome’. In mainstream sociology, theoretical debates tend to be
dominated by privileged, white/Western, male, middle- or old-aged, and
highly educated experts. Irrespective of this socio-epistemic inequality, sociol-
ogy still provides a safe home for scholars from adjacent disciplines.
Chapter 6—entitled ‘Canonicity and Exclusivity’—contends that intellec-
tual canons in mainstream sociology have systematically excluded, and effec-
tively silenced, non-white scholars. A salient example of academic
marginalization processes based on ethnicity is the sidelining of ‘African American
Pioneers of Sociology’—notably W. E. B. Du Bois, E. Franklin Frazier, and
Oliver Cromwell Cox. Through processes of canon formation, it is decided
who is, and who is not, allowed to set the (implicit or explicit) rules underly-
ing social mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion at work in the academic
field. As posited in this chapter, the broadening of a canon may require its
deconstruction, thereby exposing the relatively arbitrary criteria by means of
which scholars and research traditions are included in, or excluded from,
hegemonic processes and structures of knowledge production. It is, to say the
least, an irony that Western discourses of emancipation gained intellectual
currency in the ‘Old World’ at the same time as slavery was being instituted
in the ‘New World’. The serious implications of this matter are hardly ever
explored, let alone problematized, by mainstream Western sociologists. The
 Introduction xix

nexus between the rise of colonialism, epitomized in the age of imperialism,

and the emergence of social-scientific disciplines, such as sociology, is—at
best—insufficiently understood or—at worst—largely ignored by modern
researchers. The mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion that govern the devel-
opment of academic fields cannot be abstracted from those that operate in the
societies in which they are embedded, as illustrated in the stratified—and,
arguably, discriminatory—constitution of Western models of citizenship.

Part IV: Intimations of Historicity

Chapter 7—entitled ‘Historicity and Sociology’—identifies important reasons
why the sociological study of history deserves to be taken seriously. Such an
endeavour is inconceivable without combining and cross-fertilizing two aca-
demic disciplines: history and sociology. A transdisciplinary project of this kind
poses a number of challenges, which need to be tackled when drawing on dis-
tinct, but potentially complementary, analytical frameworks. It appears, how-
ever, that historical approaches have been substantially marginalized in
contemporary sociology, especially in the UK. Indeed, there is plenty of evi-
dence supporting the view that, in recent decades, British sociology has gone
through a major identity crisis. Arguably, this crisis manifests itself in the para-
digmatic preponderance of ‘presentist lenses’, implying that large parts of soci-
ology’s disciplinary agenda fail to contribute to a genuinely historical
understanding of social reality. This epistemic limitation is ironic, given that
the founding figures of sociology—notably Karl Marx, Émile Durkheim, and
Max Weber—as well as subsequent ‘classics’—such as Georg Simmel, Norbert
Elias, Hannah Arendt, Anthony Giddens, Michel Foucault, Pierre Bourdieu,
and Jürgen Habermas—share a deep concern with the historicity of social real-
ity. In the early twenty-first century, however, historical sociology tends to be
considered a highly specialist sub-field in, rather than a core area of, sociology.
This significant conceptual and methodological limitation is reinforced by the
widespread use of simplistic periodizing labels (such as ‘premodern’, ‘modern’,
and ‘late modern’/‘postmodern’). Thus, we are confronted with a curious para-
dox: in mainstream sociological circles, ‘the will to periodize’ remains strong,
just as the analytical focus on the present, rather than the in-­depth engagement
with the past, remains popular. Yet, both ‘stagism’ and ‘presentism’ undermine
the historicist spirit permeating the project of sociology.
Chapter 8—entitled ‘Historicity and Novelty’—grapples with the question
of whether or not contemporary sociology, notably in the British context, has
undergone a paradigmatic turn towards epochalism. The term ‘epochalism’ can
xx Introduction

be defined as the belief that the current era constitutes a historical stage that
is not only fundamentally different from previous ones, but also qualitatively
unique and unprecedented, reflecting a radical break with prior forms of soci-
etal existence. The chapter draws attention to central issues arising in the face
of epochalism, particularly with regard to its reductionist implications—such
as the simplistic juxtaposition between ‘past’ and ‘present’, the proliferation of
sweeping statements concerning allegedly ‘new’ developments, and the incon-
gruity between theoretical and empirical accounts of temporality. The chapter
defends the claim that, as critical sociologists, we need to distinguish between
objective, normative, and subjective dimensions influencing both realities and
narratives of development in general and of change in particular. Informed by
the preceding reflections on the nature of historical analysis in sociological
inquiry, the chapter goes on to give an overview of both the merits and the
pitfalls of Parsonian versions of evolutionism and neo-evolutionism. Parsonian
sociology has been largely sidelined in the contemporary social sciences. Given
its influence on the development of sociology, this seems hardly justified,
especially when considering the question of whether or not it is possible to
provide a non-Eurocentric understanding of modernity. The chapter discusses
the possibility of developing a ‘middle position’ between Eurocentric univer-
salism and anti-Eurocentric relativism, focusing on the epistemic benefits
gained from such a venture.

Part V: Intimations of Disciplinarity

Chapter 9—entitled ‘Disciplinarity and Sociology’—starts from the assump-
tion that sociology has a strong commitment to the empirical study of social
phenomena. In recent decades, however, empirical sociology appears to have
undergone a crisis. The rise of postindustrialism is inextricably linked to the
consolidation of a knowledge economy. In the context of the digital age, this
historical transition is intensified by the gathering, processing, and analysis of
social and transactional data on an unprecedented scale. The growing influ-
ence of metric power is reflected in the ways in which ‘social data’ and ‘trans-
actional data’ are systematically used to obtain valuable information about
behavioural patterns in technologically advanced societies. Particularly impor-
tant in this respect is the emergence of new modes of consumption, the iden-
tification and evaluation of which play a pivotal role in the development of
market strategies in the private sector of the economy. This tendency has pro-
found implications for the status of traditional research methods in sociology.
Advanced digital technologies employed outside the academic sector provide
 Introduction xxi

powerful ways of gathering, processing, and examining data, making tradi-

tional methods used in sociology appear, at best, limited or, at worst, obsolete.
The chapter grapples with both the causes and the consequences of this shift,
casting light on its ethical, epistemological, and methodological implications
for the disciplinary position of sociology.
Chapter 10—entitled ‘Disciplinarity and Interdisciplinarity’—asks why, in
recent years, it has become increasingly common among sociologists to have
strong reservations about the development of their discipline, notably in rela-
tion to the impact of interdisciplinarity and audit culture on both its intellec-
tual autonomy and its institutional identity. As highlighted in this chapter, it
remains to be seen to what degree sociology will be able not only to survive as
a discipline, but also to protect its own intellectual autonomy and institu-
tional identity, while continuing to play a fruitful role in contributing to the
empowerment of individual and collective actors in society. Drawing on the
preceding reflections, the chapter goes on to explore the extent to which the
growing demand for interdisciplinarity, which one encounters both in the natu-
ral sciences and in the social sciences, has shaped sociological research agendas
in recent years. Instead of endorsing a fatalistic account of interdisciplinarity,
however, contemporary sociologists should seek to embrace the opportunities
arising from its pursuit, especially if they want to avoid being relegated to the
fringes of social-scientific research in the twenty-first century. With this task
in mind, the chapter makes a case for a form of ‘epistemic realism’, which aims
to account for both the empowering and the disempowering features of
advanced knowledge economies. Finally, the chapter posits that sociology
needs to expose the poisonous conditions created by the ideology of ‘impact’,
drawing attention not only to its detrimental effects, but also to the ways in
which it can, and should, be challenged and subverted.

Part VI: Intimations of Hegemony

Chapter 11—entitled ‘Hegemony and Sociology’—is built on the premise
that, inevitably, academic disciplines are shaped by the hegemonic modes of
cognitive and behavioural functioning that are prevalent in the societies in
which they are embedded. Based on this supposition, the chapter starts by
observing that the concern with the future of sociology—and, crucially, with its
modus operandi—has been a central issue of discussion in recent decades. Two
narratives of the future are particularly noteworthy: on the one hand, the nar-
rative of decline, suggesting that, at best, we are faced with a global crisis of
unprecedented scope or, at worst, we are witnessing an unstoppable
xxii Introduction

catastrophe of worldwide reach; on the other hand, the narrative of improve-

ment, positing that, in the worst-case scenario, we are confronted with a bun-
dle of serious global problems that can be resolved or, in the best-case scenario,
we are gazing into a horizon of opportunities proving the validity of the
Enlightenment story of progress. Both positions make reference to a number
of key (social, economic, socioeconomic, cultural, political, ideological, scien-
tific, medical, environmental, military, and educational) trends. An important
question that arises in this context is to what degree sociology has the capacity
to delineate both its intellectual and its institutional future path in a genu-
inely transformative and proactive, rather than merely corrective and reactive,
manner. Seeking to respond to this question, four future options for sociology
are considered, none of which can ignore the hegemonic role of the state and
the market in neoliberal societies. The chapter concludes by defending the
idea of a critical and public sociology, capable of defying, and offering viable
alternatives to, both the state-induced managerialization and the market-­
driven commodification of vital aspects of social life.
Chapter 12—entitled ‘Hegemony and Counterhegemony’—rests on the
assumption that, although they are shaped by hegemonic modes of cognitive
and behavioural functioning prevalent in a given society, academic disci-
plines—notably those in the social sciences—provide powerful, and poten-
tially counterhegemonic, tools for calling the legitimacy of the status quo into
question. The chapter offers a brief, but critical, overview of the principal
issues that pose a serious challenge to the discipline’s success in the twenty-
first century. Upon close examination, it becomes clear that recent and cur-
rent debates on the state of sociology are remarkably similar to those that took
place in the second part of the twentieth century. Striking in this respect is the
‘rhetoric of despair’, which appears to be common among sociologists across
different generations, expressing a deep concern with the ways in which the
discipline’s intellectual autonomy and institutional identity can be preserved.
The chapter aims to give a balanced account of the extent to which negative
perceptions of sociology as a discipline, including the historical conditions by
which it is surrounded, are justified. As pessimistic interpretations of the state
of the discipline seem to suggest, sociology finds itself in a situation in which
it is, at best, enduring a crisis or, at worst, on the wane. In the social sciences,
it tends to be regarded as one of the most vulnerable academic disciplines.
This is ironic, since sociology, owing to its general concern with the constitu-
tion of ‘the social’, may be considered the foundational discipline of the social
sciences par excellence. Exploring the reasons behind sociology’s perpetual
legitimacy crisis, the chapter examines key indicators permitting us to assess
the ‘health’ of the discipline. Their critical analysis demonstrates that there are
 Introduction xxiii

both negative and positive trends affecting the discipline’s development. The
chapter concludes by proposing a tentative outline of the crucial issues upon
which contemporary sociologists can, and should, focus when defending the
value and importance of their discipline.

Part VII: Intimations of Reflexivity

In the form of an epilogue, the final part of the book provides some critical
reflections on the key trends, debates, and challenges covered in the preceding
chapters. This epilogue does not aim to demonstrate that the aforementioned
sociological approaches are doomed to failure. Rather, it seeks to shed light on
their main weaknesses and limitations, which—while recognizing their
respective strengths and contributions—need to be taken into consideration
when examining central issues in twenty-first-century sociology. As illustrated
throughout this study, the project of creating a sociology capable of account-
ing for the interconnectedness of social actors and social structures across time
and space is far from straightforward. If anything, the construction of a
cutting-­edge twenty-first-century sociology—regardless of whether this objec-
tive is pursued in ‘postcolonial’ or ‘decolonial’, ‘globalist’ or ‘connectivist’,
‘canonical’ or ‘anti-canonical’, ‘historical’ or ‘post-historical’, ‘interdisciplin-
ary’ or ‘transdisciplinary’, ‘hegemonic’ or ‘counterhegemonic’ terms—is
fraught with difficulties. It is the task of this epilogue to draw attention to the
complexities and contradictions inherent in, and to the major challenges aris-
ing from, such an ambitious endeavour.
 Part I
Intimations of Postcoloniality
 1
Postcoloniality and Sociology

The in-depth analysis of the historical condition commonly described as

‘postcoloniality’ has been on the academic agenda for several decades, not
least in different branches of sociology. Broadly speaking, the term ‘postcolo-
niality’ refers to any set of social constellations directly or indirectly shaped by
both the short-term and the long-term consequences of the history of colo-
nialism, including its demise. In the humanities, ‘the study of postcoloniality
has taken on the form of “postcolonial theory”’,1 emphasizing the relevance of
its conceptual concerns to the inquiry into key aspects of human existence—
notably in disciplinary fields such as philosophy, historiography, arts, law, lin-
guistics, literary studies, religious studies, and cultural studies. In the social
sciences, research on postcoloniality has contributed to a critical understand-
ing of postcolonial practices, stressing the relevance of its empirical dimensions
to the examination of central elements of social life—above all, in disciplines
such as anthropology, geography, political science, and sociology. Interestingly,
however, ‘sociology’s approach to postcolonial issues has been comparably
muted’,2 if not relegated to the fringes of disciplinary activity. Instead of being
elevated to an area of investigation that is located at the core of its intellectual
autonomy and institutional identity as a discipline, the in-depth exploration
of postcoloniality—commonly referred to as ‘postcolonial studies’ and ‘post-
colonialism’—continues to occupy a fringe space within sociology.
Unsympathetic critics may contend that the marginal influence of postco-
lonialism on mainstream sociology is due to the peripheral position of post-
colonial realities in global society. Sympathetic critics, by contrast, may posit
that the limited impact of postcolonialism on mainstream sociology is the
result of hegemonic attempts to deny the omnipresence of postcolonial

© The Author(s) 2020 3

S. Susen, Sociology in the Twenty-First Century,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38424-1_1
4 S. Susen

realities in the national contexts of both ‘the colonized’ and ‘the colonizers’—
that is, in a global universe characterized by a profoundly asymmetrical divi-
sion of power. Notwithstanding the question of which particular stance in
relation to this issue one may wish to defend, a key challenge consists in
exploring the actual (or at least the potential) usefulness of postcolonial stud-
ies ‘for reorienting sociological theory and research’.3 Before fleshing out the
main facets of this task, it is imperative to scrutinize the motivational back-
ground to this endeavour, by reflecting on the historical context in which
sociology emerged and succeeded in establishing itself as one of the most
prominent disciplines in the social sciences.
In this respect, two events that took place in the past centuries are of para-
mount significance:
1. The ‘violent imperial expansion of the European and Anglo-American
states’4 across the world in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, particu-
larly in Africa and Asia, constitutes a large-scale conglomerate of historical
processes generally described as colonization and associated with the era of
colonialism. The acquisition, establishment, and maintenance of colonies
entail the systematic exploitation of territories and populations by foreign
powers. By definition, colonialism represents a form of imperialism, to the
extent that it sets up an unequal relationship between ‘the colonizers’ and
‘the colonized’—that is, between an exogenous and oppressive force and an
indigenous and oppressed population. ‘Beginning in the late nineteenth and
continuing through the early twentieth century, powerful states like
England, France, Germany, the USA, Belgium, Italy, and others mounted
new territorial assaults upon Africa and Asia, creating what has become
known as the period of “high imperialism”.’5 Indeed, it took only a few
decades for ‘modern colonial empires’6 to rule almost ‘all of the globe’7 and
thereby spread their imperial wings to exercise their hegemonic power over
the political, cultural, ideological, linguistic, economic, military, demo-
graphic, and territorial organization of foreign lands and regions.
2. Shortly after the end of World War II in 1945, a historically significant
process commenced, which continued through the 1960s: decolonization.
This tension-laden dynamic was characterized by ‘imperial retrenchment
and decline’8 and, consequently, by ‘the dismantling of those very same
colonial empires that had been expanding previously’.9 To be sure, this
period did not necessarily signal the end of imperialism; rather, it indicated
the transformation of the international division of power into a global
system in which the label ‘colony’ and the reality of ‘colonialism’ were no
longer ideologically defensible, but in which transnational structures of
 1 Postcoloniality and Sociology 5

domination continued to exist.10 Irrespective of the question of whether or

not a neoimperialist period succeeded the age of imperialism, decoloniza-
tion on a global scale implied that, from the 1950s onwards, a ‘multitude
of independent nation-states appeared’,11 especially in the Southern hemi-
sphere. The protagonists and representatives of these postcolonial states
were driven by the ambition to put the various legacies of their conflict-­
ridden past behind them by constructing new sovereign, self-­sufficient,
and prosperous societies.
In summary: Processes of colonization constituted ‘a staggering display of
metropolitan political power’12 based on the hegemonic imposition of behav-
ioural, ideological, and institutional modes of functioning by imperialist
forces on conquered territories and populations. Processes of decolonization,
by contrast, were characterized by ‘the dramatic disintegration of that very
same power’,13 implying not only that colonial empires had withered away
but also that postcolonial actors—notably postcolonial states—were, at least
in principle, in a position to take their destiny into their own hands, embark-
ing upon a new journey, inspired by a desire for genuine, rather than merely
formal, independence.
By definition, critical research in sociology is committed to considering the
impact of spatiotemporally variable sets of circumstances upon the produc-
tion, distribution, classification, stratification, and consumption of knowl-
edge. Thus, both the birth of sociology and the development of sociology need to
be contextualized:

• In relation to the former point, it is worth stressing that sociology came into
existence ‘during the first moment—the age of high imperialism—in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries’.14 In fact, given the allegedly
Eurocentric outlook of its classical variants, one may claim that sociology
was largely complicit in fostering the spirit of epistemic imperialism.
Notwithstanding the question of whether the ‘founding figures’ of the dis-
cipline reinforced or undermined, reproduced or transformed, advocated
or criticized, supported or subverted, sympathized with or distanced them-
selves from Western forms of imperialism, large parts of social-scientific
research—especially to the extent that it involved comparative historical
analysis—‘depended on knowledge of the Other’15 acquired through
European expansion across the world. Some of the central issues with
which classical sociology was grappling were inextricably linked to the mul-
tiple material and symbolic manifestations of imperialism that were present
6 S. Susen

in both the colonizing and the colonized countries in the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries.16
• In relation to the latter point, it is hard to deny that ‘sociology’s engagement
with the issues surrounding the second moment of postcoloniality remains
obscure’.17 Indeed, while sociology has produced an eclectic body of research
on both the constitution and the various normative implications of ‘the
new imperialism’,18 it is far from obvious to what degree it has provided an
adequate analysis, let alone a comprehensive assessment, of both the reality
and the consequences of decolonization, epitomized in the historical condi-
tion of postcoloniality and expressed in the rise of postcolonial studies. Owing
to this deficient engagement with one of the most fundamental aspects of
the modern world, the concern with the role of postcoloniality in shaping
the course of history has been taken more seriously in recent years, leading
to fruitful debates and controversies in contemporary sociology.19

It appears, therefore, that sociology is ‘catching up’, in the sense that, at

least since the early 1980s, neighbouring fields of academic inquiry—espe-
cially anthropology, historiography, cultural studies, literary studies, political
science, and geography—have begun to incorporate postcolonial concerns
into their realms of exploration. In many cases, they have done so discursively
and institutionally, by converting ‘postcolonial studies’ into one of their core
areas of investigation. For the sake of periodizing precision, at least two ‘waves’
of postcolonial studies can be distinguished20:

• The ‘first wave’ of postcolonial studies emerged in the 1950s and 1960s,
shaped by intellectuals such as Aimé Césaire (1913–2008),21 Albert Memmi
(1920–),22 Frantz Fanon (1925–1961),23 and Steven Biko (1946–1977).24
• The ‘second wave’ of postcolonial studies emerged from the 1970s onwards,
shaped by intellectuals such as Edward Said (1935–2003),25 Gayatri Spivak
(1942–),26 and Homi K. Bhabha (1949–).27

Postcolonialism—notably its ‘second wave’ variants—is characterized not

only by a pronounced transdisciplinary outlook but also by a multiperspectival
attitude, combining insights from several traditions of thought, such as criti-
cal theory, poststructuralism, postmodernism, psychoanalysis, and feminism.
Notwithstanding the differences between postcolonial approaches, they share
a general interest in the study of the historical process commonly labelled
‘decolonization’ and its homological societal condition widely described as
‘postcoloniality’.28
 1 Postcoloniality and Sociology 7

To be clear, there is no such thing as a universal understanding of postcolo-

niality—neither in terms of means and strategy (‘How do we get there?’) nor
in terms of goals and ideology (‘What kind of society do we wish to build?’). In
the second part of the twentieth century, the path to social, cultural, political,
economic, and technological development—that is, the pursuit of ‘civiliza-
tional progress’29—could not be dissociated from the ideological and systemic
competition between socialism and liberalism. Both of these major political ide-
ologies and systems represented potentially viable options for the construc-
tion of postcolonial societies, capable of emancipating themselves from
exogenously imposed practices and structures of exploitation, oppression, and
domination.
Yet, ‘the post-independence years were marked by continued exploitation,
violence, and global inequality’,30 implying that ‘older power relations simply
took on more subtle, insidious, and even more potent forms’.31 Put differ-
ently, the world experienced a shift from imperialism and colonialism to neo-
imperialism and neocolonialism. Thus, even if ‘the West’ did not retain its
status as the undeniable centre of overt colonial control in the traditional
sense, it succeeded in preserving its hegemonic position in the global division
of power. As a consequence, the profound inequalities between ‘the West’ and
‘the Rest’—that is, between ‘the Global North’ and ‘the Global South’32—
continued to exist in this ‘postcolonial neocolonized world’.33 The power of
the dominant ideology is most effective when a large number of individual
and collective actors willingly—if not enthusiastically—follow its principles,
values, and imperatives even if it is in their interest to do otherwise.34 In the
context of decolonization, ‘[r]acialized forms of thought persisted among ex-­
colonizers and ex-colonized alike’,35 just as ‘self-negation, cultural annihila-
tion, and feelings of marginalization’36 continued to permeate the consciousness
of postcolonial peoples.
One of the key challenges faced by postcolonial thought, then, consists in
ensuring that it does not get caught up in ‘colonialist knowledge’s misrepre-
sentations and epistemic violence’.37 In order to accomplish this, it needs to
expose the biased, interest-driven, and erroneous nature of hegemonic dis-
courses on the relationship between ‘the Global North’ and ‘the Global South’.
Such a counterhegemonic project aims to call the validity of ‘imperialistic
ways of knowing’38 into question, by casting doubt on ‘the previous dominant
Western ways of seeing things’.39 The power of dominant ideologies depends
on their capacity to minimize the influence of counterhegemonic discourses
by adjusting to potentially changing circumstances and, if necessary, by
absorbing epistemic elements that contribute to their social legitimacy. To the
extent that postcolonial demands and insights are incorporated into
8 S. Susen

dominant ideologies, they run the risk of being defused in a way that renders
them toothless, implying that they may be reduced to serving a decorative,
rather than transformative, function in the construction, and constant recon-
struction, of interconnected and interdependent societies.
Hence, postcolonialism faces a twofold normative challenge:

• to provide a comprehensive critique of the social, cultural, political, eco-

nomic, and ‘psychological impact of colonialism’40 on both ‘the colonized’
and ‘the colonizers’;
• to contribute to ‘crafting visions of a truly postcolonial world’41—that is, of
a world that not only comes after but also succeeds in going beyond ‘the
colonial’ by breaking out of the behavioural, ideological, and institutional
straitjackets previously imposed upon it by hegemonic powers.

An intersectionalist understanding of social reality is central to postcolonial

thought, insofar as it seeks to do justice to the complexity pervading the inter-
play between multiple sociological variables shaping asymmetrically struc-
tured relations established between individual and collective actors.42 Rather
than focusing exclusively on ‘race’, ethnicity, nationality, and/or culture,43
postcolonial analysis explores the degree to which these elements of modern
life forms intersect with other sociological variables—such as class,44 gender,45
age,46 and ability.47 Arguably, all of these factors have to be taken into account
if one seeks to paint a comprehensive picture of both colonial and postcolo-
nial types of domination. On this interpretation, it is misleading to overstate
the significance of economic dimensions of imperialism, since such a short-­
sighted perspective implies ‘overlooking the racialized, gendered, psychologi-
cal, cultural, and semiotic dimensions and legacies of imperial power’.48 Any
kind of monocausalist explanatory determinism—irrespective of whether it
focuses on economic, cultural, or political forces—is erroneous insofar as it
reduces the complexity of social domination to one overriding factor, over-
arching power, or hegemonic epicentre.
One of the principal objectives of postcolonial studies, therefore, consists
in deconstructing ‘the essentializing representations in colonizers’ imagina-
tions and speech’,49 by means of which it was possible to fabricate the norma-
tive opposition between ‘the West’ and ‘the Rest’ in terms of value-laden
binaries—such as ‘superior’ vs. ‘inferior’, ‘civilized’ vs. ‘uncivilized’, ‘advanced’
vs. ‘backward’, and ‘developed’ vs. ‘underdeveloped’. Given that the relation-
ship between colonial and postcolonial dynamics has played, and continues to
play, a pivotal role in shaping the global division of power, it comes as a sur-
prise that a large proportion of introductory textbooks in sociology fail to
 1 Postcoloniality and Sociology 9

provide sufficient, if any, coverage of postcolonial themes (expressed in key-

words such as ‘postcolonialism’, ‘postcolonial theory’, ‘postcolonial studies’,
and ‘postcolonial discourse analysis’). Even if, admittedly, the balance of epis-
temic power has changed in recent decades, the marginalization of ‘the post-
colonial’ remains a problematic feature of contemporary sociology in most of
its ‘national’ traditions.50 The relegation of postcolonial concerns to the fringes
of sociological research agendas cannot be divorced from the paradigmatic
influence of modernization theory51 on twentieth-century understandings of
social development. Its tendency to subscribe to a ‘linear and universal tem-
plate’,52 based on evolutionist assumptions about civilizational progress,
brings it suspiciously close to representing ‘a neocolonial intervention rather
than a postcolonial one’,53 articulating the ideals and interests of hegemonic
powers, rather than those of counterhegemonic movements.
Of course, ‘modernization-development paradigms’54 have been criticized
from different angles, notably by supporters of dependency theory and world-­
systems theory.55 In this respect, the distinction between ‘core’ and ‘periphery’
is particularly important, grasping the historical significance of structural
inequalities between diametrically opposed spheres in the global division of
power and resources—notably between ‘the centre’ and ‘the margins’, ‘the
metropole’ and ‘the satellites’, ‘the North’ and ‘the South’, as well as ‘the West’
and ‘the Rest’.
Dependency, world-systems, and postcolonial theories share the view that
the modern world has been, and continues to be, divided by a hegemonic
‘core’ and a relatively disempowered ‘periphery’. These currents of thought
differ substantially, however, in terms of their understanding of the nature of
global struggles and social inequalities in the contemporary age: dependency
and world-systems theories tend to focus on their economic and material ele-
ments, whereas postcolonial theories tend to concentrate on their cultural and
symbolic aspects.
Postcolonial approaches draw attention to ‘the cultural, psychological, dis-
cursive, epistemic, representational, or textual dimensions of colonialism’.56
Certainly, their advocates do not posit that colonial forms of domination can
be abstracted from economic modes of exploitation. They insist, however,
that the critical analysis of ‘racial difference, religious chauvinism, masculine
domination, and attendant cultural or semiotic processes’57 must not be
degraded to a scholastic exercise of conceptual or empirical irrelevance, since
both the production and the reproduction of intersectionally constituted
power relations are central to the development of stratified societies. On this
account, a noteworthy limitation of grand narratives inspired by Marxist or
world-systems analysis is that they tend to follow a deductivist explanatory
10 S. Susen

logic, aimed at proving the validity of universalist assumptions by endorsing

‘a homogenizing and incorporating world-historical scheme that assimilate[s]
non-synchronous developments, histories, cultures, and peoples to it’.58
While it is imperative to shed light on mechanisms of domination gener-
ated by colonial powers, it is no less important to avoid idealizing the eman-
cipatory potential of life forms generated by colonized subjects. In other
words, postcolonialism ‘does not mean a valorization of the “colonized”, “the
East” or “Global South” in romanticized opposition to “the colonizer”, the
“West”, or the “Global North”.’59 Just as it would be erroneous to portray ‘the
West’ as an entirely destructive, oppressive, and reactionary ‘force for evil’, it
would be misleading to conceive of ‘the Rest’ as an utterly constructive, pro-
gressive, and emancipatory ‘force for good’. A vital normative task of postco-
lonial studies is to transcend the simplistic opposition between ‘the West’ and
‘the Rest’ at both the denotative level and the connotative level—that is, in
relation to both the literal meanings of and the associative meanings evoked by
these terms. Postcolonial approaches, then, are not simply concerned with
‘studying the non-West or the non-European […] world’60; rather, they are
aimed at engaging with ‘the racialized, cultural, discursive, and epistemic
aspects of global inequalities’,61 which mainstream approaches in sociology
have either insufficiently addressed or completely ignored. Defenders of post-
colonial studies seek to grasp the asymmetrical distribution of material and
symbolic resources in global society by advocating the pursuit of a global sociol-
ogy, since the latter can grasp the intricacies of the former only to the degree
that it succeeds in breaking out of conceptual and methodological straitjack-
ets, thereby exposing the limited epistemic and experiential scope of paro-
chial, ethnocentric, and self-referential modes of functioning.
When making a case for a ‘global sociology’,62 it seems necessary to identify
the principal intellectual contributions that postcolonialism has made—and,
arguably, continues to make—to such an ambitious normative project. In this
respect, three areas of contribution appear to be particularly important: (1) the
reconceptualization of agency; (2) the overcoming of counterproductive analyti-
cal binaries; and (3) the acknowledgement of sociology’s complicity in taking an
imperial standpoint, thereby reinforcing the global hegemony of ‘the West’.63

1. Agency
In modern social theory, the concept of agency has been a key issue of conten-
tion, illustrating the impact of underlying epistemic presuppositions on con-
temporary understandings of the human subject. In a traditional sense, agency
may be regarded as a privilege of human beings, given that, presumably, they
are the only creatures in the world capable of speech, reflection, and self-­
justification. As such, they are able to engage in symbolically mediated
 1 Postcoloniality and Sociology 11

interactions and to provide reasons for their actions, as illustrated in the pur-
posive power of their Verstand, the normative power of their Vernunft, and the
evaluative power of their Urteilskraft.64 What traditional social theory has
failed to deliver, however, is a typology of agency.65 Such a conceptual endeav-
our would need to take on the investigative challenge of identifying and
examining crucial forms of agency, such as the following:

a. nonhuman forms of agency

(animals and natural forces)
b. structural forms of agency
(social, cultural, linguistic, political, economic, and technological forces)
c. unconscious forms of agency
(the aforementioned structural forces and the extent to which they operate
‘behind people’s backs’)
d. positional forms of agency
(the aforementioned structural forces and the extent to which they are
shaped by the positions that human actors occupy in different social fields)
e. dispositional forms of agency
(the aforementioned structural forces and the extent to which they are
contingent upon the dispositions that human actors acquire in different
social fields)
From a postcolonial perspective, the main problem with Enlightenment-­
inspired approaches in modern intellectual thought is that they tend to con-
ceive of agency as a transcendental, disembodied, and rationally mediated
quality of the human subject. Consequently, they fail to recognize that agency
constitutes a capacity that is profoundly shaped by—and, thus, contingent
upon—culturally variable and asymmetrically organized practices, structures,
and arrangements. In brief, a genuinely critical conception of social reality
needs to account for the power-laden constitution of agency.
To the extent that sociology sets itself the task of exploring ‘the agency of
colonized and postcolonial subjects and hence the possible limits of metro-
politan (i.e. imperial or colonial) power’,66 it ascribes a degree of autonomy,
particularity, and incommensurability to individual and collective actors,
who—even if they occupy a peripheral position in global society—can chal-
lenge the behavioural, ideological, and institutional parameters dictated by
hegemonic powers in order to reaffirm their authority. Human subjects are
equipped with fundamental capacities—such as the interpretive capacity to
attribute meaning to, the immersive capacity to engage with, the performative
capacity to act upon, and the transformative capacity to change particular
aspects of reality. The idea of a ‘subaltern agency’67 is based on the assumption
12 S. Susen

that these (and other) capacities are conditioned by people’s unequally distrib-
uted access to socially relevant resources, by means of which they manage, or
fail, to take control of their own destiny.
Far from being reducible to a scholastic exercise of intellectual speculation,
the point of rendering subaltern forces ‘agentic’68 is to demonstrate that such
an endeavour ‘does offer insights on questions of agency’69—notably in terms
of postcolonial subjects’ ability to liberate themselves ‘in the face of perpetual
Western power’,70 by emancipating themselves from their putative depen-
dence upon exogenous forces that appear to determine the scope of the pos-
sibilities, and limitations, of their everyday lives.
Such a project, however, rejects ‘any naïve romanticization of subaltern
agency’71 by acknowledging the tension-laden—and, in many ways, contradic-
tory—nature of all individual and collective processes oriented towards the
construction of emancipatory life forms. An undertaking of this kind aims to
provide a comprehensive picture of global society by ‘excavating non-Western
voices and perspectives so as to give voice to voices which had been previously
repressed or ignored’.72 The corresponding paradigmatic shift from a ‘history
from above’ to a ‘history from below’73 is motivated by the conviction that it is
essential to conceive of ‘the subaltern as the maker of his [or her] own des-
tiny’,74 thereby shedding light on, and taking seriously, ‘the contributions made
by the people on their own, that is, independently of the elite’.75 Such a profound
shift in emphasis can be realized only by moving away from the ‘universalist
histories of capital’,76 the nation-state, the rational subject, and other forces
whose presumed significance is captured in specific metanarratives.
‘Refusing to reduce difference to historical time (i.e. rendering peasants
“backwards”) or Orientalist categories (the peasant as “irrational”), it sought
alternative ways of thinking about, and representing, subaltern subjects.’77 On
this account, subaltern agency has to be recognized, and scrutinized, in terms
of its historical specificity, without reducing it to an epiphenomenon of a
teleologically determined history. Following this approach, the subaltern is
not only able to speak but also, crucially, able to speak for itself—that is, on its
own behalf and, thus, without being patronized by exogenous voices legiti-
mized to represent, or to misrepresent, it. This horizon-broadening endeavour
permits us to render visible the limits of subaltern agency as well as ‘the limits
of the West’s own agency’.78 Even if one comes to the conclusion that—owing
to its complexity, heterogeneity, and irreducibility, which can hardly be cap-
tured by Western categories of objectifying scrutiny—the subaltern cannot be
adequately represented,79 a critical sociology of both local and global struggles
needs to contribute to equipping marginalized actors with a sense of material
and symbolic re-empowerment. In order to accomplish this, it has to draw
 1 Postcoloniality and Sociology 13

attention to ‘the traces of the colonized’s ability to disrupt colonial representa-

tions and hence the colonizers’ power to control the meaning of their own
texts’.80
Sociology, therefore, can learn valuable lessons from subaltern studies. In
particular, it needs to take on the normative task of examining the behav-
ioural, ideological, and institutional patterns of existence developed by
peripheralized—and often inferiorized—individual and collective actors.
Instead of conceiving of ‘peripheral agency’ and ‘core agency’ as two diametri-
cally opposed, and largely detached, forms of engaging with the world, sociol-
ogy needs to explore the degree to which they overlap and are structurally
interconnected.
At the micro-, meso-, and macro-levels of sociological analysis, the inter-
connectedness of diametrically opposed (that is, dominant and dominated,
empowered and disempowered, hegemonic and marginalized) actors is cen-
tral to the multilayered construction of social (that is, value-, meaning-, per-
spective-, interest-, power-, and tension-laden) realities. Rather than relegating
the concern with subaltern agency and ‘nonelite subjects’81 to sub-fields of
sociology (such as social movement studies, ethnography, urban studies, and
studies of minority populations), it should be a central object of examination
in most—if not all—areas of social, political, and historical inquiry. For as
long as it is degraded to a ‘niche subject’, the people it scrutinizes are effec-
tively treated as ‘niche actors’. Such a narrow view superiorizes dominant
actors and inferiorizes dominated actors. Furthermore, it fails to acknowledge
that several constitutive components of ‘Western’ civilizations have always
already existed in ‘non-Western’ life forms. This is illustrated, for instance, in
the presence of ‘indigenous or preexisting local discourses of rights’82 in (pre-)
colonized societies. In addition, this is reflected in systematic attempts to
exclude anticolonial revolutions83—such as the Haitian Revolution84
(1791–1804)—from mainstream accounts of other major revolutions—such
as the French Revolution85 (1789–1799)—as if the former were irrelevant to
the latter and as if, moreover, the former could be reduced to peripheral
events, whereas the latter—and the latter only—could be elevated to happen-
ings of ‘world-­historical significance’.86
In order to grasp the global interconnectedness of asymmetrically posi-
tioned actors, it is vital to acknowledge that ‘colonizer and colonized are
mutually constituted, that the history of European states or any powerful met-
ropolitan states is not separable from the history of their so-called Others, and
that power is always exercised in concrete setting[s] and in turn refracted or
reflected by those whom it seeks to control’.87 Put differently, connected histo-
ries and connected societies need to be studied by connected historiographies and
connected sociologies.88
14 S. Susen

2. Binaries
In contemporary social theory, the role of binaries has been a central issue of
controversy, implying that even those who are highly critical of them acknowl-
edge their impact upon concept-formation and system-building in modern
intellectual thought. Irrespective of whether one focuses on ‘relations between
colonizer and colonized, metropole and colony, center and periphery’,89
debates on both colonial and postcolonial societies are profoundly marked by
binaries, which are referred to as ‘dichotomies’, ‘antinomies’, ‘oppositions’, or
‘dualisms’.90 Undoubtedly, the question of the extent to which conceptual
divisions in the social sciences serve a useful function remains a subject of
contention.91 From a Bourdieusian point of view, ‘[o]f all the oppositions that
artificially divide social science, the most fundamental, and the most ruinous,
is the one that is set up between subjectivism and objectivism’.92 From a post-
colonial perspective, of all the oppositions that erroneously divide social sci-
ence, the most crucial, and the most damaging, is the one that is constructed
between ‘the West’ and ‘the Rest’. In both theoretical and practical terms, this
antinomy is detrimental in that it prevents not only critical researchers but
also ordinary actors from comprehending the degree to which ‘identities,
institutions, spaces, or places that might be deemed separate were in fact con-
nected, intertwined, and mutually constituted’.93

One of the key missions of postcolonial theory, then, is to urge, and to

help, social scientists in general and sociologists in particular to overcome
‘analytical bifurcations’94—notably those established on the basis of antago-
nisms such as ‘the West’ vs. ‘the Rest’, ‘North’ vs. ‘South’, ‘core’ vs. ‘periphery’,
‘inside’ vs. ‘outside’, ‘domestic’ vs. ‘foreign’, ‘us’ vs. ‘them’, ‘identity’ vs. ‘differ-
ence’, ‘superior’ vs. ‘inferior’, ‘advanced’ vs. ‘backward’, ‘developed’ vs. ‘under-
developed’, ‘civilized’ vs. ‘uncivilized’. It appears that classical, canonical, and
conventional versions of sociology tend to subscribe to ‘the myth of separa-
tion, or analytic bifurcation, of spaces and places around the world’.95 Indeed,
insofar as they ignore or even ‘suppress the history of colonialism and imperi-
alism’,96 they conceal ‘the West’s entanglements with subject peoples’,97 not
only in terms of their unwillingness to commit to shedding light on the mech-
anisms of their conceptual and empirical marginalization but also in terms of
their own—epistemically masked—complicity in contributing to their
peripheralization.98
It seems, then, that the ‘founding figures’ of European sociology—that is,
Marx, Durkheim, and Weber99—are guilty of failing to conceive of ‘imperial-
ism or colonialism as independent forces in their own right’.100 Consequently,
one gets the misleading impression that, in the major works of classical
 1 Postcoloniality and Sociology 15

sociologists, ‘imperialism was treated as an outgrowth of modernity rather

than constitutive of it’.101 On this account, imperialism can be interpreted, at
best, as an extension or, at worst, as an abnormality of modernity, rather than
as an element that has always been essential to its development—if not to its
very possibility.
Perhaps, it is even more surprising that presumably radical thinkers—
whose writings are known for challenging mainstream sociological wisdoms—
remain caught up in Eurocentric misrepresentations of reality. For instance,
Foucault’s ‘actual historical narratives and genealogies are problematic from
the postcolonial standpoint’,102 insofar as ‘his theory arbitrarily cuts “Europe”
off from its colonies—as if imperial and colonial history were not also Europe’s
history’,103 when, in fact, they have played a pivotal role in its contradiction-­
ridden construction.
A connectivist reading of social history, therefore, needs to do justice to the
fact that ‘so-called “external” colonies of Britain were not “outside” Britain’104
but that, instead, ‘they were British’.105 In a similar vein, it insists that purport-
edly ‘external’ colonies of France ‘were not “outside” of France’106 but that, in
reality, ‘they were French’.107 Indeed, the whole point of the French state’s
attempt to triumph in the Algerian War (1954–1962)108 was ‘to keep Algeria
French’,109 rather than letting it embark upon the path of independence.
Notwithstanding one’s interpretation of key episodes in precolonial, colonial,
and postcolonial history, simplistic binary constructions—regardless of
whether they are mobilized on the basis of common-sense assumptions made
by laypersons or in the name of scientificity advocated by experts—can hardly
provide an appropriate picture of the multifaceted factors and relations shap-
ing connected societies and connected histories.

3. Hegemony
In the contemporary social sciences, the power of hegemony has been exam-
ined and discussed from different perspectives and in relation to diverse his-
torical contexts. The question of which individual or collective actors have the
upper hand in setting behavioural, ideological, and institutional agendas
remains a concern of paramount importance in critical sociology. The ques-
tion of the extent to which sociology has taken, and continues to take, an
imperial standpoint—thereby reinforcing, rather than undermining, the hege-
mony of ‘the West’—remains controversial. Regardless of whether or not one
comes to the conclusion that sociology, in one way or another, takes an impe-
rial standpoint, the accusation stands that it is guilty of a substantial degree of
complicity in terms of stabilizing, rather than subverting, the hegemonic influ-
ence of Western powers across the globe.
16 S. Susen

Surely, ‘sociology’s metropolitan standpoint’110 can be exposed, and problema-

tized, in numerous ways. Crucial in this respect, however, is a detailed reflec-
tion on the epistemological dimensions of such a tacitly or overtly hegemonic
posture. From a postcolonial perspective, it is vital to draw attention to three
insights:

a. that ‘the understanding of the world by far exceeds the Western under-
standing of the world’,111 implying that symbolically mediated horizons of
vocabularies, grammars, and pragmatics must be grasped, and studied, in
terms of their particularity, heterogeneity, and irreducibility;
b. that ‘there is no global social justice without global cognitive justice’,112
meaning that issues of rightness, fairness, and integrity constitute funda-
mental aspects of everyday normativity, whose socio-ontological centrality
is expressed in the quotidian exchange of value-laden claims to validity;
c. that ‘the emancipatory transformations in the world may follow grammars
and scripts other than those developed by Western-centric critical theory,
and such diversity should be valorized’,113 suggesting that processes of
empowerment and mechanisms of disempowerment are embedded in local
contexts, whose sociohistorical specificity is irreducible to the overarching
logic of species-constitutive universality.

Hence, it is essential to uncover the ‘hidden relationship between Orientalist

knowledge and imperial power’,114 by conceding that ‘[c]ategories, discourses,
and silent assumptions about the Orient were not a sideshow to imperial
domination but constitutive of it—part of an entire culture of dominance’.115 In
this light, it becomes clear that the very construction of ‘the West’, as a world-
wide reference point of seemingly unrivalled significance and influence, would
have been inconceivable without the simultaneous fabrication and reification
of ‘the Other’, representing a conglomerate of variegated material and sym-
bolic facets that are not only erroneously homogenized by hegemonic episte-
mologies, but also inferiorized and subjugated by imperial powers.
Postcolonial theory, therefore, helps—and urges—sociology to be suspi-
cious of ‘its tendency towards metrocentrism’,116 which is founded on the pre-
supposition that ‘its particular knowledge, rooted in specific understandings of
Europe and the rest of the world, is universal’.117 According to this universalist
approach, Western sociology has produced, and continues to produce, knowl-
edge that is applicable to non-Western parts of the globe. Owing to its privi-
leged epistemic position, Western sociology appears to be capable of providing
cognitive and normative yardsticks that permit it to make claims to validity
that possess context-transcending currency. In short, metrocentrism constitutes
a hegemonic form of ethnocentric and evolutionist universalism.
 1 Postcoloniality and Sociology 17

Since its institutional beginnings in the nineteenth century, sociology, self-­

defined as a science of the modern (Western) world, has conceptualized modernity
endogenously by taking the social norms, structures, and values characterizing
the so-called Western societies as a universal parameter for defining what mod-
ern societies are and the processes of their emergence as the path to be followed
by other, modernizing countries. Thus, under a sociological lens, ‘non-Western
societies’ appear as economically, politically and culturally incomplete and lack-
ing in the face of the modern pattern, which is exclusively inferred from ‘Western
societies’.118

The aforementioned dichotomy between ‘the West’ and ‘the Rest’ is con-
verted into a normative antinomy between ‘advanced’ and ‘backward’, thereby
establishing a hierarchy between ‘superior’ and ‘inferior’ players in the global
division of power. The result is the self-legitimizing construction of an
imperial(ist) standpoint, whose seizure of epistemic power is reflected in its
capacity to exercise hegemonic influence on the production and distribution
of knowledge across the globe by inferiorizing, trivializing, marginalizing, or
simply ignoring ‘non-Western’ modes of relating and attributing meaning to
reality.119
The question remains, then, what role sociology can, or should, play in
these local and global struggles for epistemic influence and recognition. In
this respect, two (diametrically opposed) options stand out:

• ‘Anti-sociology’: This option is motivated by the conviction that we need to

reject and to abandon sociology altogether, since, even in its most radical
and subversive variants, it cannot emancipate itself from its colonial(ist)
and imperial(ist) roots. On this account, the project of sociology is part of
‘the problem for postcolonialism, not part of the solution’.120 Any serious
attempt to develop truly postcolonial modes of knowledge production in a
postcolonial world needs to step outside the limited horizon of modern sci-
ence, thereby breaking out of the epistemic straitjackets of mainstream aca-
demic disciplines, all of which are tainted by their involvement in the
construction of hegemonic—and, hence, exploitative and effectively dis-
empowering—socio-epistemic orders.
• ‘Pro-sociology’: This option is based on the contention that we need to
defend and to expand sociology, including its sub-fields of inquiry, since—
even in its most conservative and complicit variants—it has contributed,
and will continue to contribute, to the critical analysis not only of its own
colonial(ist) and imperial(ist) roots but also, in a more general sense, of the
variegated power relations shaping social reality as a whole. Any serious
18 S. Susen

attempt to develop truly postcolonial modes of knowledge production in a

postcolonial world needs to draw upon the fruitful horizon of modern sci-
ence, thereby making extensive use of the conceptual and methodological
tools developed by different academic disciplines, all of which—at least in
principle—possess the capacity to play a beneficial role in the construction
of counterhegemonic—and, hence, subversive and potentially empower-
ing—socio-epistemic orders.

In brief, we need to face up to the ‘simultaneous indispensability and inad-

equacy of social science thought’121 if we are prepared to recognize that the
postcolonial project finds itself in the paradoxical position of having to draw
upon disciplinary knowledge, while having to make an enormous theoretical
and practical effort to challenge and, where necessary, to go beyond it.

Notes
1. Go (2013a), p. 3 (italics added). Cf. Go (2016).
2. Go (2013a), p. 3.
3. Ibid., p. 3.
4. Ibid., p. 3.
5. Ibid., p. 3 (italics added).
6. Ibid., p. 3.
7. Ibid., p. 4.
8. Ibid., p. 4.
9. Ibid., p. 4.
10. This view is forcefully expressed in the concepts of ‘neoimperialism’ and
‘neocolonialism’. On the concept of ‘(neo-) imperialism’, see, for instance:
Brewer (1990 [1980]); Bush (2006); Etherington (1984); Mommsen (1980
[1977]); Mommsen and Osterhammel (1986); Noonan (2017); Semmel
(1993). On the concept of ‘(neo-) colonialism’, see, for instance: Crozier
(1964); Jarrett (1996); Ngũgı ̃ (1986); Nkrumah (1965); Sartre (2001
[1964]); Vidyarthi (1988); Woddis (1967).
11. Go (2013a), p. 4.
12. Ibid., p. 4.
13. Ibid., p. 4.
14. Ibid., p. 4 (italics added).
15. Ibid., p. 4.
16. On this point, see, for example: Connell (1997); Giddings (1911); Go
(2013b); Steinmetz (2009). See also Go (2013a), p. 4.
17. Go (2013a), p. 4 (italics added).
 1 Postcoloniality and Sociology 19

18. Ibid., p. 4.
19. On this point, see, for instance: Bhambra (2007a); Bhambra (2013);
Bhambra (2014a); Bhambra et al. (2014); Brisson (2008); Brisson (2018);
Chakrabarty (2003); Connell (2014); Cooper (2005); Dainotto (2007);
Decoteau (2013); Go (2013a); Go (2013b); Hoogvelt (2001 [1997]);
Kerner (2012); Kerner (2018); Lionnet and Shi (2011); McLennan (2013);
Mouzelis (1999); Patel (2014); Persaud and Walker (2015); Santos (2014);
Steinmetz (2009); Steinmetz (2013).
20. See Go (2013a), p. 4. See also, for instance: Young (2001); Young (2003);
Young (2004 [1990]). Cf. Go (2016), esp. Chapter 1.
21. See, for example, Césaire (1970 [1955]).
22. See, for example, Memmi (2003 [1957]).
23. See, for example, Fanon (2004 [1961]).
24. See, for example, Zephaniah (2001) [see poem entitled ‘Biko The Greatness’].
25. See, for example, Said (1978).
26. See, for example, Spivak (1988).
27. See, for example, Bhabha (1994).
28. On this point, see Go (2013a), p. 4.
29. For an excellent critique of this project, see, for example, Allen (2016). See
also, for instance, Wolff (1994).
30. Go (2013a), p. 5.
31. Ibid., p. 5.
32. On the concepts of ‘the Global North’ and ‘the Global South’, see, for example:
Blumberg and Cohn (2016); Chant and McIlwaine (2009); Chant and
McIlwaine (2016); Collyer (2018); Collyer et al. (2018); Confraria et al.
(2017); Farran and Hultin (2016); Green and Luehrmann (2017 [2003]);
Hooks (2016); Horner and Nadvi (2018); Jackson et al. (2016); Mahler
(2018); Mayer-Ahuja (2017); Miller (2013); Miraftab and Kudva (2014);
Pradella (2017); Rigg (2007); Wieringa and Sívori (2013).
33. Spivak (1990), p. 166 (quotation modified). See also Go (2013a), p. 6.
34. On this point, see Susen (2014c) and Susen (2016c).
35. Go (2013a), p. 6.
36. Ibid., p. 6.
37. Ibid., p. 6.
38. Ibid., p. 6.
39. Young (2003), p. 4 (quotation modified). On this point, see also Go
(2013a), p. 6.
40. Go (2013a), p. 6.
41. Ibid., p. 6 (italics added) (quotation modified).
42. On the relationship between postcoloniality and intersectionality, see, for exam-
ple: Banerjee and Ghosh (2018); Bartels et al. (2019); Brah and Phoenix
(2004); Kerner (2017); Mirza (2009); Mollett (2017); Radcliffe (2015), esp.
20 S. Susen

chapter entitled ‘Postcolonial Intersectionality and the Colonial Present’;

Valkonen and Wallenius-Korkalo (2016); Wallaschek (2015).
43. See, for example: Bhambra (2014c); Gilroy (2002 [1987]); Gilroy (2010);
Krishna (2015); Persaud and Walker (2015); Quijano (2010 [2007]);
Quijano (2008 [2000]); Saint-Arnaud (2009 [2003]); Stoler (1995).
44. See, for example: Balibar (1982); Bottomore (1991 [1983]); Clark and
Lipset (1996); Hall (1977); Lee and Turner (1996); Marshall (1964a
[1963]); Quijano (2008 [2000]); Susen (2012a); Waters (1997);
Žižek (2000).
45. See, for example: Connell (2007); Connell (2014); Das Nair and Butler
(2012); Stoler (1995); Taylor et al. (2011).
46. See, for example: Hartung (2016); Kunow (2016); Küpper (2016); Marshall
(2007); van Dyk (2016); van Dyk and Küpper (2016); Zimmermann (2016).
47. See, for example: Campbell (2008); El-Lahib (2015); Loja et al. (2013);
Oliver (2013); Tyler (2015); Wolbring (2008).
48. Go (2013a), p. 6 (punctuation modified).
49. Ibid., p. 7.
50. On this point, see, for instance: Bhambra (2007a); Bhambra (2013);
Bhambra (2014a); Bhambra et al. (2014); Brisson (2008); Brisson (2018);
Chakrabarty (2003); Connell (2014); Cooper (2005); Dainotto (2007);
Decoteau (2013); Go (2013a); Go (2013b); Hoogvelt (2001 [1997]);
Kerner (2012); Kerner (2018); Lionnet and Shi (2011); McLennan (2013);
Mouzelis (1999); Patel (2014); Persaud and Walker (2015); Santos (2014);
Steinmetz (2009); Steinmetz (2013).
51. On modernization theory, see, for example: Abbott (2011 [1983]); Abraham
(1980); Attir et al. (1981); Beck et al. (1994); Billet (1993); Fourie (2012);
Lummis (1972); So (1990); Willis (2011 [2005]).
52. Go (2013a), p. 8. Cf. Susen (2015a), Chapter 4.
53. Go (2013a), p. 8 (quotation modified).
54. Ibid., p. 8.
55. On dependency theory, see, for example: Chilcote and Johnson (1983);
Ghosh (2000); Larrain (1989); Menzel (1992); Nohlen (2002 [1984]);
Seers (1981b); Seers (1981a); Senghaas (1974); So (1990). On world-systems
theory, see, for example: Arrighi et al. (1989); Babones and Chase-Dunn
(2012); Hopkins and Wallerstein (1996); Kardulias (1999); So (1990);
Tétreault and Abel (1986); Wallerstein (1974); Wallerstein (1980);
Wallerstein (1983); Wallerstein (1989); Wallerstein (1999); Wallerstein
(2004a); Wallerstein (2011b); Wallerstein (2015); Wallerstein et al. (2012).
56. Go (2013a), p. 8 (punctuation modified).
57. Ibid., pp. 8–9.
58. Said (2000), p. 210 (quotation modified). On this point, see also Go
(2013a), p. 8.
59. Go (2013a), p. 9 (punctuation modified).
 1 Postcoloniality and Sociology 21

60. Ibid., p. 10.

61. Ibid., p. 10 (italics added).
62. On the concept of ‘global sociology’, see, for instance: Bhambra (2013);
Bhambra (2014a); Bhambra (2014b); Bhambra (2015); Hoogvelt (2001
[1997]); Patel (2014); Persaud and Walker (2015).
63. For a useful summary of these three points, see Go (2013a), pp. 3 and 10.
64. On this point, see, for instance: Susen (2009b), pp. 104–105; Susen (2010c),
pp. 112–113; Susen (2013f ), pp. 326 and 330–331; Susen (2015c),
pp. 1027–1028; Susen (2015a), pp. 13, 105, 215, 219, 234, 236, 259,
and 275.
65. On the concept of ‘agency’ in modern social and political thought, see, for exam-
ple: Archer (1988); Archer (1990); Archer (2000); Archer (2003); Baber
(1991); Bohman (1997); Bohman (1999); Dépelteau (2008); Elbasha and
Wright (2017); Elder-Vass (2008); Elder-Vass (2010); Emirbayer and
Mische (1998); Gell (1998); Hartmann (1985); Holland et al. (2001
[1998]); King (2009); Las Heras (2018); Lovell (2003); Martin and Dennis
(2010); Imbroscio (1999); Lakomski (1984); O’Donnell (2010a);
O’Donnell (2010b); Olsson (2016); Outhwaite (1990); Rubinstein (2001);
Sewell (1992); Shilling (1992); Smith (2001); Sztompka (2015 [1994]);
Varela (1999); Walsh (1998); Wharton (1991).
66. Go (2013a), p. 10 (punctuation modified).
67. Ibid., p. 10. On this point, see also Spivak (1988). Cf. Go (2016), pp. 7, 11,
45–47, 59–65, 77, 93, 123, and 140; in addition, cf. ibid., Chapter 4.
68. See Go (2013a), p. 10. On this point, see also Spivak (1988).
69. Go (2013a), p. 10 (italics in original).
70. Ibid., p. 10.
71. Ibid., p. 10.
72. Ibid., p. 11. On this point, see also Ashcroft et al. (2002 [1989]).
73. On this point, see Susen (2015a), Chapter 4, esp. p. 155.
74. Guha (1984b), p. vii. On this point, see also Go (2013a), p. 11.
75. Guha (1988), p. 39 (italics in original). On this point, see also Go (2013a),
p. 11. (In Go’s article, this passage is slightly misquoted.)
76. Chakrabarty (2002), p. 8. On this point, see also Go (2013a), p. 11.
77. Go (2013a), p. 11 (punctuation modified).
78. Ibid., p. 12 (italics in original).
79. On this point, see Spivak (1988).
80. Go (2013a), p. 12. On this point, see also Bhabha (1994), pp. 85–92.
81. Go (2013a), p. 12.
82. Ibid., p. 13.
83. On this point, see ibid., p. 13. Cf. Go and Watson (2019).
84. See, for example: Dubois (2004); James (1980 [1938]); Magubane (2005).
85. See, for example: Cobban (1968); Cobban (1999 [1964]); Kuhn (2013
[1999]); Lefebvre (2005 [1939/1947]); Soboul (1974 [1962]).
22 S. Susen

86. On this point, see, for example: Armitage (2007); Brisson (2018); Bush
(2006); Chakrabarty (2000); Chakrabarty (2003); Chatterjee (1993); Go
(2013a), esp. p. 13; Moraña et al. (2008); Skocpol (1979).
87. Go (2013a), p. 14 (italics added).
88. On this point, see Chaps. 3 and 4. See also, for example: Bhambra (2007a);
Bhambra (2013); Bhambra (2014a); Fanon (2004 [1961]); Memmi (2003
[1957]).
89. Go (2013a), p. 15.
90. On this point, see Jenks (1998).
91. On this point, see, for example, Susen (2007), esp. pp. 18 and 149.
92. Bourdieu (1990 [1980]), p. 25. See also original publication: Bourdieu
(1980a), p. 43: ‘De toutes les oppositions qui divisent artificiellement la sci-
ence sociale, la plus fondamentale, et la plus ruineuse, est celle qui s’établit
entre le subjectivisme et l’objectivisme’. On this point, see also, for example:
Mouzelis (2000); Susen (2007), pp. 149–157 and 239–240; Susen (2011a),
pp. 456–458; Susen (2011c), pp. 368, 374, and 394; Susen (2011e),
pp. 51–53 and 73–74; Susen (2014d), pp. 679, 690, and 763n569; Susen
(2016a), pp. 45–47 and 104; Susen (2017a), pp. 139–141 and 146.
93. Go (2013a), p. 15 (italics added).
94. Ibid., pp. 3, 10, 14, 15, 17, 22, and 23. On this point, see also Go (2013c).
95. Go (2013a), p. 15.
96. Ibid., p. 15.
97. Ibid., p. 15.
98. On this point, see also, for example: Bhambra (2007a); Bhambra (2013);
Bhambra (2014a); Bhambra (2015); Bhambra et al. (2014); Boatcă (2013);
Boatcă and Costa (2010); Boatcă et al. (2010).
99. See, for example: Craib (1997); Giddens (1996 [1971]); Hawthorn (1987
[1976]); Morrison (2006 [1995]); Sayer (1991). See also Susen (2015a),
pp. 11, 12, 236, and 248. In addition, see Susen and Turner (2011a).
100. Go (2013a), p. 15. On this point, see Seidman (2013).
101. Go (2013a), p. 15 (italics added). On this point, see also Go (2013b).
102. Go (2013a), p. 15. On this point, see also Stoler (1995). Cf. Foucault (1978
[1976]), Foucault (1979 [1975]), Foucault (1980), Foucault (1988),
Foucault (1988 [1984]), Foucault (1997 [1984]), Foucault (2001 [1961]),
Foucault (2002 [1966]), and Foucault (2002 [1969]).
103. Go (2013a), p. 16 (italics in original).
104. Ibid., p. 17.
105. Ibid., p. 17 (italics in original).
106. Ibid., p. 17.
107. Ibid., p. 17 (italics in original).
108. See, for example: Alexander et al. (2002); Alexander and Keiger (2002);
Windrow (1997).
109. See Go (2013a), p. 17.
 1 Postcoloniality and Sociology 23

110. Ibid., p. 18 (italics added).

111. Santos (2014), p. viii (italics added).
112. Ibid., p. viii (italics added).
113. Ibid., p. viii (italics added).
114. Go (2013a), p. 18.
115. Ibid., p. 18 (italics added).
116. Ibid., p. 19 (italics in original) (quotation modified). Cf. Go (2014), esp.
pp. 178–180, 185, and 194–197. See ibid., p. 197n2: ‘The term “metrocen-
tric” traditionally refers to urban-centered thinking, but I adopt it from
recent leads in postcolonial theory within geography studies […] to refer to
“metropole”-centered thinking (as in metropole vs. satellite): any form of
thought (Eurocentric, Anglo-centric, Asian-centric) that analytically privi-
leges one bounded localized space over another (where that space is typically
national but also can be regional, as in “European”)’. On the use of postcolo-
nial theory within geography studies, see Boyle and Kobayashi (2011).
117. Go (2013a), p. 19 (italics added).
118. Boatcă et al. (2010), p. 1 (italics added, with the exception of the definite
article ‘the’, which appears in italics in the original version).
119. On this point, see, for instance: Connell (1997); Connell (2007);
Santos (2014).
120. McLennan (2003), p. 72 (italics in original). On this point, see also Go
(2013a), p. 20. In addition, see Shohat and Stam (1994).
121. Chakrabarty (2000), p. 6. On this point, see also Go (2013a), p. 21. In addi-
tion, see Chakrabarty (2002) and Chakrabarty (2003).
 2
Postcoloniality and Decoloniality

In recent decades, the concepts of ‘postcoloniality’ and ‘decoloniality’ have

received an increasing amount of attention in the humanities and social sci-
ences. These concepts occupy a central place in postcolonial studies and, more
recently, in decolonial studies. Notwithstanding the fundamental differences
between them, all postcolonial and decolonial perspectives are unified by the
ambition to pose a serious ‘challenge to the insularity of historical narratives
and historiographical traditions emanating from Europe’,1 by exposing and
problematizing ‘the parochial character of arguments about the endogenous
European origins of modernity’.2 When seeking to grasp the intricacies of ‘our
global (postcolonial) age’,3 both postcolonial and decolonial frameworks offer
a number of key insights.
An obvious difference between these two currents of thought concerns
their spatiotemporal situatedness. Postcolonial studies have been profoundly
shaped by ‘diasporic scholars from the Middle East and South Asia’,4 acting as
‘imperial interlocutors’5 between ‘Western’ and ‘non-Western’ countries and
regions, especially in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Decolonial stud-
ies, by contrast, have been developed, first and foremost, by ‘diasporic scholars
from South America’,6 focusing on the historical development of the American
continent from the fifteenth century to the present. The challenge, then, con-
sists in bringing the ‘intellectual and material histories’7 of these two research
traditions closer together. The purpose of this undertaking is not only to iden-
tify their main points of convergence and divergence but also, more impor-
tantly, to demonstrate that valuable insights can be obtained from combining
and cross-fertilizing them.

© The Author(s) 2020 25

S. Susen, Sociology in the Twenty-First Century,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38424-1_2
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
Ah, täälläpä vaan sun hauska ois!
Siks' itkein riennät sä täältä pois.

Kun taas käy Päivynen lempimään tuhansien järvien

maata, niin lähdet, pääskykin, lentämään, et kauemmin viipyä
saata. Ja silloin, oi, tervetullut taas! Ja lämmin on ihana
synnyinmaas'!

Raittiusseura Alphan uuden kodin vihkiäisissä 30.5.1887.

Taas on mennyt talven valta, pois on päivät pimeät, aurinko

luo korkealta meihin silmät lempeät.

Taas on noussut nurmen nukkaa,

lehdet puihin puhjenneet.
Silmäns' avannut on kukka,
järven aallot auenneet.

Linnut laulaa laaksoissamme

kilvan kiitosvirsihän,
riemun saavat rinnoissamme
soitollansa syttymään.

Luonnossa on alkanunna elo uusi, iloinen; talven valta

vaihtununna suloisehen sävelehen.

***

Suurellisna silmiämme kohtaa luonnon uudistus. Elpyköön

myös mielissämme usko, toivo, rakkaus.
 Sulakoon jäät sydämenki
virtoina pois vuotamaan!
Pääsköön sinne Herran Henki
armotyötään alkamaan!

Ohjatkoon se, opettakoon

menon irstaan hylkäämään,
valvomahan varoittakoon,
raittihisti elämään!

Alkakohon avut hyvät

kansassamme kasvamaan,
aatteet jalot, suuret, syvät
sydämiä valtaamaan.

Niinkuin kevät kunnaillemme

sulokukkasia luo,
niin uus' aika kansallemme
uudet aatteet, riennot tuo.

Korkealle kohottanut
lippunsa on Raittius.
Voimansa on osottanut
usko, toivo, rakkaus.

Kas kuin nousee uljahana

Raittiuden temppeli!
Innostuksen nostamana
ilmoille se yleni.

Alphall' asunto on oma!

Terve, koti kultaisin!
Terve tupa, suuri, soma! —
Nouskoon noita montakin!

Porin Suomalaisen lysein arpajaisissa 10.3.1887.

Onko meillä onnen päivä,

paistepäivä osanamme?
Onko meillä kirkas päivä,
valon päivä vallassamme?

Riemu on raikkunut ympäri maan.

Päivä on tullut! — näin huudahdellaan.
Tullut on päivä, jo poistunut yö,
virkeä alkanut toimi ja työ!

Ulos käy Suometar — tähystelee

Missä se päivä? — hän tiedustelee.
Onneni päiväkö tullut jo ois?
Valoni päiväkö? Yökö ois pois!

Luuletkos jo päivän tulleen,

päivän kirkkaan koittaneen,
auringon jo vallan saaneen,
yön ja usvat poistuneen?

Viel' ei lämmitä se päivä,

valistaa vaan hiukan voi.
Katso, tuolta metsän takaa
sarastaa vast' aamunkoi!
 Viel' ei ole osanasi
onnen päivä autuas.
Oottaa saat viel', ennenkuin on
valon päivä vallassasi

Onko meillä onnen kesä,

mittumaari osanamme?
Onko meillä kukkaiskesä,
valon kesä vallassamme?

Riemu on raikkunut ympäri maan.

Kesä on tullut! — näin huudahdellaan.
Kesä on koittanut kukkasineen!
Talvi on poistunut pakkasineen!

Ulos käy Suometar — tähystelee.

Missä se kesä? — hän tiedustelee.
Onneni kesäkö tullut jo ois?
Talviko tuima ois paennut pois?

Luuletkos jo kesän tulleen,

juhannuksen joutuneen,
auringon jo vallan saaneen,
hyyt ja hallat poistuneen?

Viel' on tuimat takatalvet,

aamuhallat ankarat.
Vielä viimat, vihaiset käy,
purren hennot orahat.

Vast' on onnen kevät sulla,

valon kevät varhainen,
vast' on kirkas, mutta kylmä
aamuhetki aikainen.

Suometar istuvi murheissaan

hylkynä omassa talossaan,
almuista elävi lapsineen
vierasten saadessa kyllikseen.

Louhi se kassoja hallitsee,

aittojen avaimet vallitsee.
Suometar syrjästä katsoo vaan,
tavaroistansa kun herkkuillaan.

Lieden kun lämpimän äärehen

pyrkivi hänkin, niin ärjyen
soppehen kolkkohon käsketään
pilkkaansa ääneti kärsimään.

Suometar, kärsi viel' hetkinen!

Lapsesi huomaavat vääryyden.
Perintöänsä he valvomaan
nousevat, — sortoas kostamaan!

Lapset Suomettaren kuulkaa,

kuulkaa poiat, tyttäret!
Läheltä ja kaukaa tulkaa —
meill' on aimo aikehet!

Sortoa miks tunnotonta

iän kaiken kärsimme!
Nouskaa, tulkaa — meit' on monta
Jumala on kanssamme!
 Suometar on saatettava
lieden ääreen lämpimän,
pöydän ääreen autettava
emännäksi yksin hän!

Kukistukoon Louhen valta!

Meille auringot ja kuut!
Meille sampo vuoren alta!
Meille kaikki edut muut!

Silloin meill' on omanamme

onnen päivä ainian.
valon päivä vallassamme,
kultapäivä kunnian!

Silloin alkaa meillä suvi

rinnoissamme riemuinen,
silloin yltyy hyöty, huvi,
ilo ylimmiillehen!

Talvi-illalla.

Voi, synkkä on talvi-ilta, kun ulkona myrsky pauhaa ja

oksilta huurteisilta vaan turhaan tyyntä, rauhaa siell' etsivi
lintunen!

Ei lehteä näy, ei kukkaa,

ei perhoa liehumassa.
Mi rohkaista lintu rukkaa
voi yössä nyt kauheassa? —
Sen kevähän toivo voi!

Taas kevät kun armas ehtii —

näin lintunen aatteleepi —
puut, pensahat kukkii, lehtii
ja perhoset leijaileepi —
on riemua kyllin taas!

Mi mieltäni rohkaiseisi?
On sielläkin talvi-ilta.
Mi ruusujen maille veisi
sen oksilta huurteisilta? —
Oi, toivo se armas vie!

Immen tuska.

Niin istun tässä nyt itkemässä, ah, mielein on niin musta!

Voi jospa oisi, ken mulle toisi e'es hieman lohdutusta!

Voi, jospa oisi,

ken mulle voisi
e'es hymyn hellän antaa!
Ah, kunne käännyn!
Suruuni näännyn:
Ken tuskan tään voi kantaa!

Ah, armas kulta! Sä poistut multa, mun tuskani vaikk'

arvaat! Käy impeis luokse, niin eipä juokse näin kyyneleensä
 karvaat!

Luoman Herska.

Tuolla Pohjankankahalla korven kylmän partahalla Luoman

Kerskan mökki on, pieni, köyhä, loistoton.

Siinä Herska isännöipi,

isännöipi, emännöipi.
Leskeksi on jäänyt hän,
orpoja on seitsemän.

Mies on kelvos, kunnollinen,

tehtävissään tunnollinen,
tyly hiukan muodoltaan,
lempeämpi luonnoltaan.

Isä orpojen on oiva,

tuki armas, hellä hoiva.
Aina arvonsa hän ties,
vaikka oli torpanmies.

Rakas hälle on tuo loukko.

Armas on tuo lapsijoukko.
Hän ei luopuis Luomastaan,
vaikka saisi Saksanmaan.

Päivät hän kuin orja raatoi,

kuokki, kaivoi, puita kaatoi,
koki öillä verkkojaan,
nukkui linnun unen vaan.

Tulo kuitenkin on niukka,

sato saita, saalis hiukka:
Mitä halla syönyt ei,
siitä verot puolet vei.

Huolia on Herskall' aina.

Ei tok' epätoivo paina.
Toivoa se rintaan luo,
kun hän muistaa lapset nuo.

Terveinä ne temmeltävät,
huoletonna hyppäjävät.
Viis, kuus vuotta vielä vois
viedä heitä — toistap' ois'!

Isä mielell' ylpeällä

mietti aikaa, jolloin hällä
kaksi kertaa seitsemän
kätt' on apuun käymähän.

Silloinkos tuo korpi jyskäis,

iskuist' aimo poikain ryskäis,
pellot laajat aukeais,
hyyt ja hallat kyydin saisi

Tapahtuispa silloin muutos.

Eipä ahdistaisi puutos.
Korvell' aarteina ois,
joita ryöstäisivät pois.
 Ja niin aatos armas liiti,
toivon silmä kauas kiiti,
huolet, vaivat, vastukset
unhottuivat hetkiset.

Harvoinp' onnetar sen suopi,

mitä mielellemme luopi.
Usein toivo ihanin
tuo vaan myrkkypikarin.

Niin nyt tulee tapaturma —

vähält' ettei käynyt surma —
vähemmästäkin jo vois
kuolla, kun niin suotu ois.

Herska astuu metsätiellä.

Kontion hän kohtaa siellä
yrmeän ja ärtyisän,
suin päin päälle töyttävän.

Taistelu niin alkoi tuima,

sota hirveä ja huima.
Voitto vaihtui, viimein jo
hengetönn' on kontio.

Tila Herskankin on kurja:

Peto ruhjoi hampain hurja
olkavarren, reisiluun,
niinkuin salama lyö puun.

Tuostapa nyt tuska alkaa,

polttaa kättä, polttaa jalkaa;
horjuin, voihkain, houraten
kotihin hän laahaiksen.

Siell' on pienillä nyt hätä.

Sairaassa ei käskijätä
eikä heissä auttajaa,
lääkityksen laittajaa.

Mieleen muistui naapurikin.

Peninkulman pääss' on likin.
Auttaa voisi hän kenties,
kun on kuulu poppamies.

Wilppu, vanhin poika, juoksi

joutuin Taika-Lassin luoksi,
jok' ei ennen eikä nyt
apuansa kieltänyt.

Lassi loitsujansa luki,

nurin paidan päälleen puki,
viskoi suolaa uunihin
kitkatulen liekkeihin.

Leppäpuusta lastat laittoi,

piillään oksiakin taittoi,
sitoi paikat sortuneet,
luut ja lihat särkyneet.

Vaan ei tauti huima taltu,

tuskat tuimat, tuost' ei maltu,
vaikka Lassi laastaroi,
voimin parhain puoskaroi.
 Vieri viikot, riensi aiat,
auttaneet ei Lassin taiat.
Henki vielä Herskass' on,
tila muuten toivoton.

Tuskat yltyi, haavat ärtyi,

kivut luissa kilvan kärtyi,
porotus ei poistunut,
mädännys on alkanut.

Surkeus tuo saapui kerran

korviin kunnon kirkkoherran.
Kiiruhtain nyt kaupunkiin
Herskan kanssa lääkäriin.

Lääkärit on neuvottomat:
kuin näin oltiin huolettomat!
Miks' ei tultu ennemmin?
Nyt on myöhä koittaakin.

Sahata käs', jalka oisi

ainoa, min tehdä voisi.
Henki säilyis niin kenties,
muuten mennyttä on mies.

Aik' ei vitkastella anna.

Täytyihän ne poikki panna.
Lääketieteen kunniaks'
Ei mies mennyt vainajaks'.

Elämään taas Herska alkaa,

ilman kättä, ilman jalkaa, —
vaikeaa, vaan minkäs voi!
Tyydy — Herrahan sen soi!

Mihin mies nyt joutunevi,

orpopuolet oikenevi,
mieron tietä kiertämään,
vaiko nälkään nääntymään?

Ainahan on kristikansa
korjannunna kurjiansa.
Huolittaisko heist' ei nyt?
Loppuiko jo kristityt?

Eipä suinkaan! — vaivaisemme

mekin kyllä hoitelemme,
me ne myymme — totta vie,
tapaa kauniimpaa ei lie!

Meidän aikanahan juuri

ihmisarvo on niin suuri,
on niin kallis — siinä syy,
miks' se vaivaisensa myy!

Kirkoss' on jo kuulutettu,
kappelissa kaiutettu,
että Luoman perhe on
myytävänä turvaton.

Herskaa herjataan jo aina:

Kelpaa sun, ei työ nyt paina!
Nukut jouten päivät, yöt,
leipää huoletonta syöt!
 Herska kauhistuupi noita
"kurjankarjan" markkinoita,
joilla häntä, lapsiaan,
kaupitaan kuin karjaa vaan.

Itse arka arvostansa,

arempi on lapsistansa,
ties kuin kurja, tunnoton
huutolaisten hoito on.

Sydäntä se Herskan särki,

Särki, että petti järki.
Mielessänsä hirmutyöt
asuvat nyt päivät, yöt.

Hornan henget häntä hurmaa,

yhä kuiskaa: Surmaa'! surmaa'.
Mink' on henki arvoinen
moisten kauppakalusten!

Ihmisarvoaan hän turhaan

säilytti, nyt ryhtyy murhaan,
ryhtyy työhön hirmuiseen —
lopettaikse lapsineen!

Yötä viimeistään kun vietti

Luomallaan, niin mutkan mietti:
Salpausi saunaseen —
paloi sinne perheineen!

Arvaas, tokko kyyneleitä

vuoti haudattaissa heitä?
Mink' on henki arvoinen
moisten kauppakalusten?

Tyytyös syömeni.

Tyytyös, syömeni, tyytyös vainen,

vaikka on onnesi vaihtelevainen,
vaikka ei aina
aurinko paista —
riemusi on, näet, taivahan laina
autuiden maista!
Kiittämätöntäpä tottakin ois
suuttua sun,
taivaiset kun
omansa hetkeksi ottavat pois.
Tyydy siis syömeni, tyytyös vainen,
vaikka on onnesi vaihtelevainen!

Iltakello.

Riemastu raukka rinta, jo iltakello soi! Se rauhaa rakkahinta

sinulle huminoi.

Yl' laaksoin, vetten, vuorien

sen ääni raitis raikuu,
hyvyyttä Herran taivaisen
se kaikkialla kaikuu.

Niin siitä riemuitkaamme

me kurjat syntiset,
me sabbatin taas saamme,
olkaamme iloiset!

Se keskeyttää hyörinän meluisen, maailmaisen, ja

kysymykset elämän luo esiin taivahaisen.

Aamuhetki.

Oi, armas aamuhetki,

sä kirkas, kultainen!
Taas äänet tuhannetki
soi kilvan helkkyen.
Taas leivo taivahalla
korkealla
lyö virren vilppahan.
Ja sadastakin suusta
joka puusta
soi ilo ilmahan.

Kuin pauhaa jylhä koski

ja ilma tuoksahtaa!
Kuin hehkuu immen poski
ja rinta riemahtaa!
Ja aamun ihanuuden
 nähden uuden
kuin sydän sykkäilee!
Vaikk' on vait ihmiskieli
totta mieli
taivaisiin ylenee.

Niin on kuin aukeaisi

tuo taivas kaukainen,
ihailla silmä saisi
iloja taivaisten,
kuin siivet enkelitten
loistavitten
taivaalla välkähtäis,
ja laulu lumoovainen,
ihanainen
ylhäältä helkähtäis!

Taivas.

(Mukaelma Saksasta.)

Kun korkea tuo taivas lie?

Sen sanon kernahasti:
Jos linnun siivet saisit sie
lentääkseis liukkahasti
ja yhä, yhä ylös päin
taivaalle kiiruhtaisit
ja viimein tähden kirkkaan näin
kiitäissäs' saavuttaisit,
 kysyisit enkeliltä sie:
"Kuin korkea tuo taivas lie?"
Hän vannaan vastais hämillään:
"En, lapsein, tiedä itsekkään.
Vaan lennä tuohon tähtehen,
se ehkä voisi tietää sen".
On — ei siis mitään kiireen pulmaa —
vaan satatuhatta peninkulmaa.
Mut tähteen tuohon tultuais
se samaa sulle vakuuttais;
ja lentäisitkö kiiruhtain
tähdestä tähteen aina vain —
ei kukaan sitä tietää voisi,
sun kyselysi turhaa oisi:
"Tuo taivas kuin lie korkea?"
Sen tietää yksin — Jumala!

Muutos.

Muinoin kaikki kaunokaiset

mielestäin ol' yhdenlaiset:
Armahat ja rakkahat.
Niin ei nyt —
kylmennyt
on sydän, silmäin sokeat.
Laura vaan
nauramaan
suuni saa ja sydämeni hehkumaan.
Turvaton.

Taivan tähti yksin hellin silmäyksin mua katselee, neuvon

sanat armaat, varoitukset varmat tuuli kuiskailee.

Aamunkoi se mulle lausuu sorretulle hyvän huomenen,

iltarusko suopi, hymyellen luopi viime katsehen.

Enpä vaikerrellen kulje, kujerrellen sentään polkujain.

Toivon tähti hohtaa Sepä mua johtaa kilvoituksissain!

Laula lintuseni.

Laula, pikku lintu, laulamahan luotu!

Taivainen on sulle laulunlahja suotu.
Laula lintuseni, ethän viihdy vait!
Kielin kiitä häntä, kielen keltä sait.

Laula, lintuseni, huolta tunne et sä.

Tuvan, turvan, leivän suopi sulle metsä.
Laula, ystäväsi hellä kuulee sen.
Säveliisi kohta vastaa riemuiten.

Laula lintuseni, tunnethan sä varmaan

immen kultakutrin, neitoseni armaan.
Laula oksalla, min alla istuu hän.
Tunteheni hälle kerro, ystävän'.
 Sinisilmissään jos kyynelhelmi kiiltää,
sydäntänsä silloin murhe musta viiltää.
Ah, niin virka silloin riemuvirsiäis,
niihin ehkä armaan huolet hälviäis!

Ilma-orpo.

Katso tänne, kirkas tähti,

Ilma-orpoon silmäs luo.
Kuutamoon hän yksin lähti,
tervehdyksen sulle tuo.

"Tervehdys niin harras multa

huokaus niin murheinen,
ota, vie, oi tähti kulta,
äidilleni taivaasen!

Päiväni on pitkät aivan,

kaiho karvas, raskas on.
Alla surun, tuskan, vaivan
näännyn orpo onneton.

Tuika tähti armas vielä!

Ah — oi, minkä tuolla nään?
Äidin silmä loistaa siellä,
kutsuu — miks' siis tänne jään!"

Taivahasta enkel' lensi

kirkas, valkosiipinen.