Islamist Party Mobilization: Tunisia’s

Ennahda and Algeria’s HMS Compared,

1989–2014 1st ed. Edition Chuchu
Zhang
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Islamist Party
Mobilization
Tunisia’s Ennahda
and Algeria’s HMS
Compared, 1989–2014

Chuchu Zhang
Islamist Party Mobilization
 Chuchu Zhang

Islamist Party
Mobilization
Tunisia’s Ennahda and Algeria’s HMS Compared,
1989–2014
Chuchu Zhang
School of International Relations
and Public Affairs
Fudan University
Shanghai, China

ISBN 978-981-13-9486-7 ISBN 978-981-13-9487-4 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-9487-4

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 Acknowledgements

This book has been made possible thanks to my Ph.D. supervisor,

Dr. Roxane Farmanfarmaian, and my second supervisor Prof. George
Joffé. I have been lucky to have both with me and would like to express
my sincerest gratitude to both for their insight, patience, and depth of
knowledge. My special thanks go to Dr. Michael Willis and Dr. Hazem
Kandil whose feedback and comments proved invaluable. I am like-
wise indebted to Mr. Ashraf Ayadi, Ms. Kahina Bouagache, Dr. Robert
Parks, Dr. Laryssa Chomiak, Prof. Mohamed Bensalah, and Dr. Laurence
O. Michalak, without whom my fieldwork would never have been done.
I would also like to thank Prof. Lilia Labidi and Prof. Quanan Ha for
inspiring input at critical times. Finally, I would like to thank my mother,
Ms. Yunxia Sun, and my father, Mr. Xiaodong Zhang, for their kind sup-
port and fortitude throughout this long process.

v
 Contents

1 Introduction 1

2 Theorizing Islamist Parties’ Mobilization at the Polls 23

3 Historical Background 51

4 First Trial at the Polls 93

5 Drastic Changes 137

6 Co-optation or Resistance? 173

7 Entering the 2010s 213

8 Conclusion 261

Appendix: Electoral Outcomes of Algerian APN Elections,

1991–2012 275

Glossary 277

Index 281

vii
 Abbreviations

AAV Green Algeria Alliance (Alliance de l’Algérie Verte)

ACT Assembly of the Representatives of the People (Assemblée des
Représentants du Peuple)
AISPP International Association to Support Political Prisoners (l’Association
Internationale de Soutien aux Prisonniers Politiques)
AKP Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi)
ALN National Liberation Army (Armée de Libération Nationale)
ANP People’s National Army (Armeé Nationale Populaire)
APN People’s National Assembly (Assemblée Populaire Nationale)
AST Tunisian Supporters of Islamic Law (Ansar al-Sharia Tunisie)
AUMA Association of Algerian Muslim Ulama (L’Association des Oulémas
Musulmans Algériens)
CCN National Consultative Council (Conseil Consultatif National)
CNLT National Council for Freedom (Conseil National des Libertés en
Tunisie)
CNT National Transition Council (Conseil National de Transition)
CPR Congress for the Republic (Congrès pour la République)
CSO Civil Society Organizations
DRS Department of Intelligence and Security (Département du
Renseignement et de la Sécurité)
EMF French Muslims (Étudiants Musulmans de France)
FAN Algerian New Front (Front de l’Algérie Nouvelle)
FC Front of Change (Front du Changement)
FFS Socialist Forces Front (Front des Forces Socialistes)
FIOE Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe
FIS Islamic Salvation Front (Front Islamique du Salut)

ix
x    Abbreviations

FIT Tunisian Islamic Front (Front Islamique Tunisien)

FJD Justice and Development Front (Front de la Justice et du
Développement)
FJP Freedom and Justice Party
FLN National Liberation Front (Front de Libération Nationale)
GIA Armed Islamic Group (Groupe Islamique Armé)
GMI Young Muslims in Italy (Giovani Musulmani d’Italia)
HCE High Security Council (Haut Comité d’État)
HMS Hamas (Movement for the Society of Peace/Mouvement de la
Société pour la Paix/Harakat Mujtami’a al-Silm)
IAF Islamic Action Front
II The Association for Guidance and Reform (Al-Irchad wa al-Islah)
IMF International Monetary Fund
JI The Islamic Group (Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya)
JM The Unity Group (Al-Jama’a al-Muwahadin)
JN The Renaissance Group (Al-Jama’a al Nahda)
LTDH Tunisian Human Rights League (Ligue Tunisienne des Droits de
l’Homme)
MAB Muslim Association of Britain
MAJD Algerian Movement for Justice and Development (Mouvement
Algérien pour la Justice et le Développement)
MB Muslim Brotherhood
MC Movement of Change (Mouvement de Changement)
MDA Movement for Democracy in Algeria (Mouvement pour la
Démocratie en Algérie)
MDS Movement of Socialist Democrats (Mouvement des Démocrates
Socialistes)
MIA Armed Islamic Group (Mouvement Islamique Armé)
MINAB Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board
MPC Movement for Preaching and Change (Mouvementpour la
Prédicationet et le Changement)
MRI Islamic Renaissance Movement (Movement de la Renaissance
Islamique)
MRN Movement for National Reform (Movement du Renouveau National)
MTI Islamic Tendency Movement (Mouvement de la Tendance Islamique)
MTIPI Islamic Progressive Tendency Movement (Mouvement de la
Tendance Progressive Islamique)
MUP Popular Unity Movement (Le Mouvement de l’Unité Populaire)
NCA National Constituent Assembly
NGO Non-Governmental Organizations
PCT Tunisian Communist Party (Parti Communiste Tunisien)
 Abbreviations    xi

PD Democratic Party (Partito Democratico)

PDM Democratic Modernist Pole (Pôle Démocratique Moderniste)
PDP Progressive Democratic Party (Parti Démocrate Progressiste)
PJD Justice and Development Party (Parti de la Justice et du
Développement)
PLI Islamic Liberation Party (Parti de la Libération Islamique)
PLJ Justice and Liberty Party (Parti de la Liberté et de la Justice)
PSD Socialist Destourian Party (Parti Socialiste Destourien)
PSP Social Liberal Party (Parti Social pour le Progrès)
PST Socialist Workers Party (Parti Socialiste des Travailleurs)
PT Workers Party (Parti des Travailleurs)
RAID Assembly for An International Alternative for Development
(Rassemblement pour une Alternative Internationale de
Développement)
RCD Constitutional Democratic Rally (Rassemblement Constitutionnel
Démocratique)
RSP Socialist Progressive Rally (Rassemblement Socialiste Progressiste)
TD Transmission and Preaching (Tabligh wa Da’wa)
UCOII Union of Islamic Communities and Organizations in Italy (Unione
delle Communita e delle Organizzazioni Islamiche in Italia)
UDU Unionist Democratic Union (Union Démocratique Unioniste)
UGEL General Union of Free Students (Union Générale des Étudiants
Libres)
UGET General Students’ Union of Tunisia (Union Générale des Étudiants
de Tunisie)
UGTA General Union of Algerian Workers (Union Générale des Travailleurs
Algériens)
UGTE Tunisian General Union of Students (Union Générale Tunisienne des
Étudiants)
UGTT Tunisian General Labour Union (Union Générale Tunisienne du
Travail)
UNEA National Union of Algerian Students (Union Nationale des Étudiants
Algériens)
UOIF Union of French Islamic Organizations (Union des Organisations
Islamiques de France)
 List of Figures

Fig. 2.1 Protest voters’ voting behavior in the context of electoral

authoritarianism 27
Fig. 2.2 Interactions and effects of political opportunities,
organizational strength, and framing processes in mobilization 29
Fig. 2.3 Mobilization outcomes of interactions between demand
and supply 36
Fig. 4.1 MTI’s framing strategies in the 1980s 107

xiii
 List of Tables

Table 2.1 A comparison of Tunisia’s Ennahda and Algeria’s HMS 38

Table 6.1 The spectrum of Islamic groups in Algeria in 1999–2008 200
Table 7.1 The field of Islamic groups in Algeria, 2009–2012 246

xv
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Almost three decades after the start of the Third Wave of Democratiza-
tion (Huntington 1993), North Africa experienced tremendous difficul-
ties in getting rid of authoritarian systems. Interestingly, each time when
the region experienced a real weakening in authoritarianism, whether in
the form of top-down liberalization reform or bottom-up protest waves,
Islamist parties rose concomitantly and seized strong positions to capitalize
on political change. Such scenes took place in the 1980s and early 1990s
as Tunisia’s Ennahda, Algeria’s Islamic Salvation Front (Front Islamique
du Salut, FIS), and Yemen’s Islamic Action Front (IAF) each cut a strik-
ing figure in elections. After a short collapse in the late 1990s when most
Islamist groups in the Muslim world witnessed what Schwedler (1998, 27)
called “modest changes” or even sharp declines in vote share, the rise of the
“Islamist vote” seemed to reappear in 2011 as the Arab Spring brought to
power Islamist parties at the ballot box in several North African countries.
North Africa thus appeared to be a region in constant flux struggling with
democratization, with little opportunity to experience over time the role of
Islamists in democratization. This research adopts the definition of democ-
racy proposed by the American and Italian political scientists (Diamond and
Morlino 2004, 21): a form of government which protects citizens’ human
rights, rule of law, free and fair elections, and citizens’ participation in
political and civic life.
To unveil the role of the “Islamist vote,” I explore what Islamist parties
really mean to the electorate and opposition parties accustomed to living

© The Author(s) 2020 1

C. Zhang, Islamist Party Mobilization,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-9487-4_1
2 C. ZHANG

in authoritarianism where lack of democracy is highly politicized (Lust-

Okar 2003, 1). Observation of party politics and elections in North Africa
cannot be based upon the common assumption that they “are integrally
associated with democratic political systems” (Tachau 1994, xiv). Though
superficially sharing institutions called “elections,” the structure of rules
in electoral authoritarianism differs dramatically from that in a democratic
system where elections are freer because they are protected by the rule
of law and pluralistic media. Yet, in the former systems where elections
are controlled and manipulated, citizens can still reject the authoritarian
regime whose misgovernment brings socio-economic and psychological
grievances, and opposition parties including Islamist parties can cater to
such demands by providing Islamic debate, political locations of Islamic
activism, and an alternative discourse to that of the regime. This leads me to
examine how citizens’ demands and Islamist parties’ interaction with each
other in electoral authoritarianism change in different political settings.

The Questions Posed

The central question is: How do Islamist parties mobilize debates, dis-
courses, and environments in electoral authoritarian systems? In unraveling
the answer, two sets of questions arise regarding the two sides involved in
elections, the mobilized, meaning the citizens, and the mobilizer, referring
to the Islamist parties. The first is: What are the concerns of citizens in the
particular political contexts of North Africa? Regarding the mobilizer, here
lies the second question: How do Islamist parties mobilize people to vote
for them in elections? As discussed above, Islamist parties often become the
forces most likely to offer a substitute for an autocratic regime at the polls
in North Africa. The study further examines the mobilization strategies
adopted by Islamist parties and analyzes their effectiveness and costs.
I address these questions through an in-depth comparative study of
two parties, Tunisia’s Ennahda and Algeria’s Hamas/Harakat Mujtami’a
al-Silm (HMS). The central question of my research can thus be broken
down into more specific sub-questions: How did Ennahda and the HMS
survive and develop in responding to the constraints of electoral author-
itarianism? How did Ennahda and the HMS adjust their programs and
incorporate popular views into their agendas? Why and how did Ennahda
and the HMS demonstrate different mobilization capacities in different
time periods? Why and how did Ennahda become the biggest winner in
 1 INTRODUCTION 3

the 2011 election after being excluded from the political scene for two
decades, while the HMS, which had always been included in formal polit-
ical institutions, lose much of its base around the same time? To analyze
these questions, the research involves theoretical studies by interrelating
three theoretical schools—electoral authoritarianism theory, protest vot-
ing theory, and political process theory. It addresses these theories in a
North African setting and expands on them to create new areas of theo-
retical application. Also, it expands the authoritarian accommodation and
framing aspects by adding new, more nuanced interim categories that evolve
inductively from the research and contribute to the sophistication of anal-
ysis, as explained in Chapter 2.
The issue being addressed here is whether the successful mobilization
of an Islamist party is dependent on what it supplies to voters and what
role it plays in society. The research is of value because it offers analysis of
the importance of Islamist parties in North Africa specifically and critical
theoretical insights about confessional party politics in general. Three main
points emerge:
First, the study sheds light on Ennahda’sand the HMS’ historical evo-
lution, which forms the basis for comprehending their legacies of success
and failure, as well as their current organizational dynamics, ideological
orientations, and political agendas.
Second, understanding the voting and mobilization in electoral author-
itarian systems helps elucidate important theoretical concerns regarding
elections and party politics. Until we explore the questions of whether
citizens’ voting decisions are outcomes of emotional sensibilities or metic-
ulous calculation, and what exactly Islamist parties supply to get citizens to
support them, we remain unable to fully understand the elections and the
religious marketplace in electoral authoritarian contexts, and the democra-
tization predicament in the region.
Third, the research provides insights for policy-making regarding politi-
cal reform in North Africa. By exploring “How do Islamist parties mobilize
citizens?”, and “Do Islamist parties always demonstrate strong mobilization
capacity and why?”, the study offers nuanced analysis around the institution
of the Islamist vote and its mythical power. It argues that Islamist parties do
not always demonstrate stronger mobilization capacity than more secular
parties, because although Islamist parties often demonstrate efficiency in
supplying Islamic debates, they often fail to meet specific voter demands
or expectations due to their inability to strike a balance between frame
consistency and compromise.
4 C. ZHANG

In the following sections, definitions of the terms used in this research

will be elaborated, followed by a justification as to why Ennahda and HMS
were chosen as case studies, and an overview of the data collection method.
A review of the literature addressing the region’s party politics and the
theories chosen wraps up the chapter.

Clarification of Definitions
Islamism and Institutionalized Islamism
While there are many definitions of the term “Islamism,” many scholars
agree that the term represents the intertwining of religion and politics
(Ayoob 2005, 955; Roy 2007, 57). In this study, I define Islamism as
an Islam-inspired ideology which reflects and infuses Islamic norms into
politics and society. In the main, this research involves a particular section
of Islamism which is termed institutionalized Islamism, referring to groups
that embrace participation in formal political institutions such as elections.
The other branches of Islamism, that adopt other methods, such as violent
action, are not the focus of this study.

Social Movement Mobilization and Islamist Parties

Political mobilization is defined by Bealey and Johnson (1999, 214) as
“rousing masses of people both to express themselves politically and to
undertake political action.” The topic of political mobilization has mostly
been explored by social movement theorists (Gamson 1990; Oberschall
1973; Tilly 1978; Zald and McCarthy 1987). However, as McAdam (1996,
35–36) notes, one important deficiency of many social movement works is
they avoid looking at mobilization through institutional means including
elections. Like Wilson (1973, 8) who describes a social movement as “a
conscious, collective, organized attempt to bring about or resist large scale
change in the social order by non-institutional means,” many social move-
ment theorists focus their research on the movements’ activities via infor-
mal participation (Gamson 1990; Klandermans 1995; Piven and Cloward
1977).
Yet, it is not uncommon to see social movements, especially Islamist
movements, utilize both institutional (e.g., elections, political parties) and
non-institutional means (e.g., strikes, demonstrations) to realize their goals
of Islamizing society. To grasp the essence of the phenomenon of Islamist
 1 INTRODUCTION 5

parties, this study broadens the range of study about social movement
mobilization while focusing on Islamist movements’ mobilization through
institutional means. In the research, I argue that Islamist parties have origi-
nated from Islamist movements; their creation and participation in institu-
tional systems are key components of Islamist movements; and the voting
share they gain in elections is an important indication of Islamist move-
ments’ mobilization capacity. It is worth noting that Islamist parties derived
from the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) tradition are characterized by the
“party dualities” as described by Joffé (2017), meaning that a political
movement or party focusing more on political action is often wedded to
an original social movement that emphasized Islamic preaching and social
engagement. Consequently, Islamist parties often demonstrate features of
both political parties and social movements (e.g., using charity service as a
means of electoral mobilization), especially when they are first created.

Political Parties and Islamist Parties

“Political parties” are a modern phenomenon and intimately linked to other
modern institutions such as elections, citizenship, and rule of law. In gen-
eral, reasons for political party formation can be classified into two types:
(1) citizens’ cleavages or strains; (2) institutional or political elements, such
as “characteristics of the electoral system and centralization of the govern-
ment,” that expedite the emergence of new organizations (Redding and
Viterna 1999, 493). LaPalombara and Weiner (1966, 6) conclude that
there are four features characterizing political parties: (1) organizational
continuity, referring to a party’s ongoing life span after its founders pass
away; (2) institutionalized connection between the party’s organizations at
the local and national level; (3) intention to seek governmental power; and
(4) intention to seek support at the ballot box. In modern politics, politi-
cal parties have several functions and impacts, ranging from ensuring “the
regulated balancing of power and interests” as Habermas (1994, 7) argues
to acting “as appropriate structures for bridging the gap between state and
society” as Held (1992, 20) contends. Based on the above, I define political
parties as political organizations which represent certain ideologies and cit-
izen aspirations, bridge society and state, and often compose government
(and parliament).
Islamist parties belong to the broader category of political parties. Yet,
they differ from their secular counterparts not only in that they adhere to
specific religious ideologies, but that they strive for “advancing an Islamic
6 C. ZHANG

way of life” and “serving the interests of the Muslim Umma (community
of Muslims)” (Salih and El-Tom 2009, 1–2), intending to organize social,
economic, and political life of citizens by Islamic principles and rules. Mean-
while, Islamist parties recognize the Qur’an and Hadith as a source of law
or code of conduct. In other words, Islamist parties do not recognize a
difference between ethics and laws, nor a distinction in their functions in
the social, economic, cultural, and political fields (ibid.). Moreover, Islamic
values shape their approach to the mission of politics as they struggle to: (1)
report and provide the truth in societies where information has long been
suppressed; (2) achieve social justice and political rights; and (3) balance
modern politics with the values of their religion and culture.
In this study, Islamist parties are defined as organizations which refer to
Islamic interpretations and commitments as an ideological base, bring dis-
courses of Islam into the political arena, and participate in politics through
elections. Apolitical Islamic associations (e.g., Algeria’s Al-Qiyam) and reli-
gious organizations which refuse to engage in elections and insist on armed
struggle as the only means of political participation (e.g., Algeria’s Armed
Islamic Group [Groupe Islamique Armé, GIA]) are not the focus of this
research.

Algerian HMS and Tunisian Ennahda as Study Cases

Tunisia, Morocco, and Egypt witnessed a rise of Islamist parties taking part
in elections in the early 2010s. By comparison, the Algerian Islamist par-
ties’ decline in popularity as an electoral force in the twenty-first century
(Journal Officiel de la Republique Algerienne, JORA 2002, 2007, 2012)
appeared to be a distinguishing phenomenon, considering the FIS’ land-
slide electoral victories two decades ago, and the remarkable vote share
won by the HMS and MRI at the polls in 1995–1997. This study explores
these phenomena by comparing the approach that Ennahda and the HMS
used to link themselves to wide sections of the population, based upon
the two parties’ speeches, writings by their leadership, newspaper reports,
and party platforms. Egypt’s MB and Morocco’s Justice and Development
Party (Parti de la Justice et du Développement, PJD) are less useful for
comparison with the Algerian HMS and are thus not my concern here.
This is because they do not share the level of similarity with the HMS that
Ennahda does, as both the MB and PJD emerged in monarchical systems,
which had different electoral rules from party states (Lust-Okar and Jamal
2002).
 1 INTRODUCTION 7

Ennahda and the HMS shared several important similarities. Rooted in

the MB, both parties drew on the MB’s experiences (Crethiplethi 2015a, b)
of shaping a pyramidal organizational structure, adopting a multi-tier
recruitment system, and participating in politics through electoral engage-
ment. Members of both parties called themselves “moderate Islamists,” as
they generally rejected the use of violence and doctrinal reading of the
scriptures. Moreover, both parties demonstrated considerable flexibility
and made significant compromise over ideological concerns. The compari-
son between Ennahda and the HMS, which share similar roots, ideologies,
structures, and recruitment systems, but differ greatly in terms of their
mobilization and role on the political stage, allows certain elements to be
held as constants, and a focus on a smaller number of dissimilarities such as
organizational strength and framing strategies that can help explain the two
parties’ distinct development trajectories. The time-frame for this research
is 1989–2014, a period between the Islamist parties’ first electoral trials fol-
lowing the political liberalization reforms in both countries and their elec-
toral participation after taking part in governance. The study argues that
Islamist parties find it more challenging to satisfy the electorate’s demand,
maintain their frame consistency, and keep the promises they have made to
supporters from various backgrounds after they start to dominate or take
part in the government’s decision-making.

The Boundaries of the Literature

The literature on Islamist activism and mobilization benefits largely from
general social movement and mobilization literature. Articles of Wik-
torowicz’s book Islamic Activism including those of Hafez (2004), Wik-
torowicz (2004), and Robinson (2004) adopt social movement theo-
ries such as the political process model used by McAdam (1982, 1996),
Tarrow (1998), and Kriesi et al. (1992), but differ from social move-
ment literature as they situate mobilization in religion (Mecham 2017,
22). Scholarship on Islamist parties’ electoral mobilization is domi-
nated by two important themes. The first concerns the demand side
of mobilization, examining who supports or joins and why. Schol-
ars such as Farley (1991), Fuller and Kurpershoek (2003), Hermassi
(1984), Roy (1994), Toth (2003), Waltz (1986), and Pellicer and
Wegner (2015) conduct research on the population segments that
engage in and/or sympathize with Islamism. Toth (2003) and Fuller
and Kurpershoek (2003) argue that an Islamist support base mainly
8 C. ZHANG

consists of the poor and poorly educated, who can easily be manipulated by
religious ideas and attracted by charity services. Conversely, Waltz (1986),
Pellicer and Wegner (2015) contend that Islamist parties’ most critical
backing is the well-educated middle class who pay close attention to pol-
itics and are drawn by their anti-corruption programs. Yet, none of these
works observe Islamist parties’ support base from a dynamic perspective.
Therefore, analysis is sparse regarding how different social groups change
their attitudes as their demands change, and as Islamist parties’ networks,
recruitment strategies, and discourse change.
When analyzing why people support Islamist parties, scholars focus on
different reasons. Onis (1997) analysis of how Islamist parties challenge
the established secular political order and Tessler (1997)’s argument that
societal resentment drives individuals to support credible opposition par-
ties against the government lay important foundations for my develop-
ment of the protest vote framework, as discussed in Chapter 2. Onis nei-
ther successfully explains why people are dissatisfied with the government,
nor explains what they demand that can be supplied by Islamist parties.
Although Tessler (1997) analyzes the immediate causes of popular discon-
tent, he only emphasizes unemployment of the educated and inadequate
housing, and overlooks citizens’ psychological and religious demands. To
fill this gap, this study refers to other works on Muslim votes such as Ayubi
(1991, 27–36)’s focus on citizens’ demands for official respect of traditional
religious values.
The second theme examines the supply side of mobilization, analyz-
ing how Islamist parties exert an impact on the populace. The literature
exploring this theme can be classified into two categories. The first adopts
capacity building, sectarianism, organization mobilization, or framing the-
ories to examine one particular aspect of Islamist parties’ mobilization, such
as religious charity organizations’ fundraising and services provision (Clark
1995, 2003; Denis 1994), mosque mobilization (Parsa 1989), professional
associations and trade union organization (Fahmy 1998; Wickham 1977),
the role of kinship networks (Denoeux 1993; Leenders and Heydemann
2012), ideas and discourse (Wickham 2004; Okruhlik 2004). Rather than
examining one specific aspect of the supply side of mobilization, this study
extends these works not only by analyzing various aspects of the Islamist
parties’ supply (e.g., discourse, leadership, networks, recruitment meth-
ods), but by explaining how they interact with each other in a dynamic
way. The second category examines factors that affect the mobilization of
 1 INTRODUCTION 9

specific political parties, such as Turkey’s two Islamist parties, the Welfare
Party (Akinci 1999; Gülalp 2001; Onis 1997) and Adalet ve Kalkınma Par-
tisi (AKP) (Kalaycıoğlu 2010; Sezer 2002), Egypt’s Freedom and Justice
Party (FJP) (Elsayyad 2014; Farag 2012), Morocco’s PJD (Khan 2012;
Perekli 2012), and Algeria’s FIS (Chhibber 1996; Heristchi 2004). By
comparison, fewer efforts have been made to compare different Islamist
parties’ mobilization. A prominent exception is Shahin (1998)’s rigorous
comparison of the Islamist parties in Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco, which
examines their roots and dynamics, and the tenets of their ideologies from
their creation to the 1990s. Yet, the work is limited in terms of time frames,
and there is lack in comparative studies that analyze different Islamist par-
ties over a longer historical period, or that include the changes since the
Arab Awakening.
To date, little headway has been made to bridge the demand and supply
sides of the mobilization issue or to examine how the mobilizers respond
to the mobilized through generalizable theoretical frameworks based on
empirical data. One exception is Mecham (2017)’s Institutional Origins of
Islamist Political Mobilization which combines social movement theories
with elements of grievance-based theories, and notices how Islamists may
define politics in a way that Muslims demand. Yet, Mecham (2017)’s work
mainly analyzes what political opportunities and contexts are favorable for
the rise of Islamist groups, but does not discuss why and how certain groups
can grasp the opportunity and achieve successful mobilization, whereas the
others cannot even if they enjoy the same favorable opportunities. The value
of this study is to fill the literature gap by analyzing how different Islamist
parties adjust their supply of assets according to voters’ demands in particu-
lar political settings, namely how that affects their agendas, organizational
processes, composition, operation, financial resource allocation, decision
making, and the impacts yielded by these factors.
Moreover, the study aims to extend the literature on mobilization pro-
cesses in Tunisia and Algeria, with particular focus on Ennahda and the
HMS. To understand Ennahda in a broad setting, it refers to Murphy
(1999)’s analysis of Tunisia’s state empowerment methods which develop
theoretical understanding of the relationship between economic liberal-
ization and political change, Perkins (2014)’s introduction of Tunisia’s
socio-economic and political institutions, and Camau and Geisser (2003)’s
analysis of the interaction between authoritarianism and social relations. All
three works are sufficiently substantive and provide important background
on Tunisia’s political history.
10 C. ZHANG

The emergence and rise of Ennahda’s predecessor, Islamic Tendency

Movement (Mouvement de la Tendance Islamique, MTI), in the 1980s
did attract some academic attention. Hermassi (1984)’s surveys of MTI’s
supporters’ profiles and Waltz (1986)’s analysis of Hermassi’s survey results
provide a picture of who supported MTI/Ennahda and why in its early
years. Allani (2009)’s article, “The Islamists in Tunisia between Confronta-
tion and Participation,” which examines MTI/Ennahda’s relationship with
the government, and Shahin (1998)’s Tunisian chapter in Political Ascent:
Contemporary Islamic Movements in North Africa, which unpacks Ennah-
da’s organizational structures and ideologies, are also useful sources to
understand the party’s history.
Ennahda’s development in 1991–2010 is generally neglected in case
studies of North African politics by both Western and Arab scholars. As
Ennahda underwent frequent suppression, little information about it was
available, and no one considered it more important than the other very
minor Islamist parties.
It was not until Ennahda ascended to power in 2011 that it received
detailed attention in academia. A prominent work was conducted by
McCarthy (2015), which, based on field research in Sousse, draws out
the complexity of the Islamic discourse as a political tool in the wake of its
manipulation by Bourguiba and Ben Ali. Many other works analyze Ennah-
da’s rise from various angles and stress different factors, including the lead-
ership’s efficiency in reorganizing the party’s resources after the downfall of
Ben Ali (Lynch 2011), the party’s hard-line position vis-à-vis the vestiges of
the old regime (Haugbølle and Cavatorta 2011), Ennahda’s organizational
unity and efforts to mobilize rural voters in contrast to the fragmentation of
secular parties and ultra-conservative Salafists (Churchill 2011; Wolf 2013),
and adoption of the AKP model (Marks 2017). What these works do not
fully provide is an explanation for the rise of Ennahda after being banned for
two decades—why its organizational capacity proved resilient in integrating
members who had been imprisoned with those returning from abroad, for
example, and how it avoided the pitfalls of extremism. Also, most of these
works only examine how Ennahda reconstructed itself in early 2010s, while
offering little detailed analysis of its development during the decades when
it was banned. It is only in more recent works, including Wolf (2017)’s and
McCarthy (2018)’s, that detail on the party’s ideas and grassroot activities
in this period come to light, adding considerably to the field. By combin-
ing elements from these various studies, this study views Ennahda from a
 1 INTRODUCTION 11

more comprehensive perspective by using the supply-and-demand model

and connecting the early history of Ennahda with its revival after the Arab
Awakening. As most works on Tunisia are written by Western scholars in
English and French, this study draws on works written by Tunisian scholars
including Ennahda members, such as the article of Mabrouk (2012), Minis-
ter of Culture under the Troika government, on the history of Tunisia’s reli-
gious policies and the emergence of different religious currents, Zaalouni
(2012)’s Min Ayam Sizhiina Khaarizh Al-aswaar [In the Days of Impris-
onment outside the Walls] which describes Nahdaouis’ lives in Tunisia in
1991–2011, and works written by Ghannouchi (1992) and Ghannouchi
(1993) as more primary sourcing. Compared to the Western works, Arab
writers especially those who are political activists themselves have more
access to data of Ennahda and provide invaluable evidence of party devel-
opment. Author’s interviews with Nahdaouis and Tunisian Islamists of
other currents, newspaper reports, and party pamphlets also contribute to
the base of the literature available.
This study draws on a broad field of the literature for background knowl-
edge on the political setting in which Algeria’s Islamist partiesincluding the
HMS emerged and developed. A contrast of Julien (1964)’s study of French
theories of colonization in Algeria and Trumbull (2009)’s description of
how narratives of Islamic mysticism affected colonial intervention based on
both Arabic and French sources helps understand Algeria’s colonization
experience. Lowi (2011)’s exploration of Algeria’s economic governance,
Werenfels (2007)’ account of how the state works, and a former Algerian
army officer Aboud (2002)’s French monograph on the military’s structure
provide important insights into the nature of the regime, the FLN, and the
military. Bouandel (2003)’s historical analysis of political parties’ role in
Algeria’s transition and Willis’ two articles on party structure, typology of
parties, and political parties’ role and significance in the Maghreb region
help illuminate the development of party politics generally in Algeria (Willis
2002a, b).
In terms of Algeria’s Islamist parties, early works, the majority by
Algerians (Addi 1992; Al-Ahnaf 1991; Chhibber 1996; Denaud 1997;
Heristchi 2004; Labat 1995; Lamchichi 1992; Mortimer 1991; Zoubir
1996), focus heavily on the FIS, which experienced a spectacular rise in
1990–1991 that stunned both Western and Algerian media and academics.
Apart from the FIS, there is scant literature on other Islamist parties, even
main ones such as the HMS, Islamic Renaissance Movement (Movement
12 C. ZHANG

de la Renaissance Islamique, MRI), or Movement for National Reform

(Movement du Renouveau National, MRN), all of which had longer
electoral experience and achieved important positions on the Algerian
political scene after the FIS was banned. Willis (1998)’s analysis of MRI’s
political discourse, Driessen (2014, 136–180)’s exploration of both HMS
and MRI’s moderation processes, and Hamladji (2002)’s examination of
the interaction between the HMS and ruling elites go some way to filling
this gap. Among them, only Hamladji (2002), an Algerian scholar who
serves in the UNDP as Deputy Regional Director of the Regional Bureau
for Africa, examines specifically the HMS through an empirical assessment
of how its co-optation by ruling elites worked in Algeria. These works
analyze the manner in which the parties fitted themselves into official
political institutions in response to the regime’s co-optive policy, and
how this process affected the parties’ positions and ideologies, but do
not discuss in any detail how the parties justified their change of political
discourse, or how such a change provoked disputes within the parties and
affected their mobilization capacity.
Unlike their counterparts in other North African countries, the HMS-
led Islamist coalition failed to enlarge its support base in elections in the
early 2010s and thus attracted very limited attention in either the media
or academia. The literature that does address this topic is primarily articles
rather than books and analyzes the decline of Algerian Islamist parties gen-
erally, including the HMS, from different perspectives, such as their frag-
mented structures (Ghanem-Yazbeck 2014), professionalization and pro-
regime positions (Khemissi et al. 2012, 553), failure to offer practical solu-
tions to socio-economic problems (Marwane 2018), citizens’ fear about
the recurrence of civil war (McAllister 2013; Lazar and Nehad 2013), and
the state’s rentier economy that alleviated citizens’ grievances (Lazar and
Nehad 2013). Although these works offer insight into the HMS’ decline
in popularity, none of them examine the HMS specifically, and tend to be
descriptive, rather than offering in-depth theoretical engagement. Based
upon these works, as well as news reports, and authors’ interviews with
HMS members and Islamist activists of other currents, this research also
refers to primary sources—original memoirs, party statements, party pam-
phlets, and works written by Algerian Islamists such as Nahnah (1999)’s
literature. By observing the HMS’ developmental trajectories since its cre-
ation and relating the case study to theoretical discussion, this study high-
lights the intricacies of the elements that affected its mobilization capacity
that led to both its successes and its decline.
 1 INTRODUCTION 13

Data Sources
This study is based on a combination of original field data, primary sources
drawn from party records and electoral reports, and secondary studies pro-
duced in the two states themselves, as well as by area specialists. The study
uses the data collected through my fieldwork in Algeria and Tunisia over
a period of nine months in August 2015–April 2016. I conducted 130
interviews (72 in Tunisia, 58 in Algeria) with five groups of people: (1)
29 interviews with current and former members of Ennahda in Tunisia,
and 15 interviews with HMS members in Algeria; (2) five interviews with
Algerian political activists of other Islamist parties and religious groups,
including those who are exiling in Geneva and Zurich, and five interviews
with Tunisian religious activists of non-Ennahda groups; (3) eight inter-
views (four in each country) with journalists and scholars specializing in
Islamist parties; (4) eight interviews (four in each country) with politicians
with more secular agendas; and (5) 60 interviews (30 in each country) with
voters from different age groups, genders, geographic regions, and educa-
tional and professional backgrounds. Interviews were conducted in Arabic,
French, and English. Each interview lasted around one hour. Many inter-
viewees were interviewed several times so that emerging themes could be
pursued later. To protect the identity of individual interviewees, I employ
common Arabic first names for those who asked for anonymity.
Primary sources adopted in the study include (1) Algerian and Tunisian
press reports, speeches of party candidates during electoral campaign pub-
lished in Algerian newspapers such as El Watan, Infor Soir, L’Expression,
and Le Soir d’Algérie, and Tunisian newspapers such as Le Temps and La
Presse, as well as in overseas media such as Al Jazeera, Jeune Afrique, and
BBC News; (2) announcements and electoral platforms of political par-
ties; (3) party documents, histories, manifestos, and publications (print and
web-based); (4) memoirs, biographies, and other publications of political
figures from within the parties, or associated with them; (5) government
documents; and (6) surveys and opinion polls conducted by local and inter-
national institutes.
An important data source used in this research is surveys conducted in
2007, 2011, and 2013 by Arab Barometer, a research network supported
by foundations including US-Middle East Partnership Initiative, BBC, and
Qatar National Research Fund. The public opinion surveys it conducted
reached over 1200 people in Algeria and 1190 in Tunisia aiming to discover
the interviewees’ religious attitudes, political attitudes, and evaluation of
14 C. ZHANG

public institutions. Another data source is surveys conducted by the World

Values Survey, an NGO supported by the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary
Foundation, the Dutch Ministry for Education and Research, and the Rus-
sian Federation. Each of its surveys on Algeria in 2002 and 2014, and on
Tunisia in 2013 used common questionnaires and reached over 1200 peo-
ple, aiming to study people’s changing beliefs.
One important dataset adopted by this study is Turess,1 which is a
Tunisian news service Web site which contains all articles of 45 Tunisian
newspapers from 2001 to 2018. Sources for Tunisia also include Surveys
of Tunisian Public Opinion published in 2011–2014 by the International
Republican Institute, an NGO supported by the National Endowment for
Democracy and Freedom House. Aiming to address citizens’ concerns,
each of the surveys used face-to-face interviewing methods and reached
over 1200 Tunisians. Socio-economic data of Tunisia including unemploy-
ment rates and inflation were accessed in Statistiques Tunisie. Additionally,
the profiles of almost all parliamentary deputies published on the official
Web site of Marsad Majles are conducive to learning about the activities of
Ennahda members over the past three decades. Moreover, securing access
to Ennahda’s internal files including its brochures, conference briefing,
and mailing lists allowed me to make sense of the party’s organizational
structure and propaganda methods.
Among the sources for Algeria, the Journal Officiel de la Republique
Algerienne was a useful resource, as it covers Algerian electoral laws, offi-
cial electoral outcomes, information about the elected candidates of each
political party in disparate constituencies, and voter turnout in every con-
stituency. Two datasets for Algeria, Algeria-Watch and DjaZairess,2 are
also helpful, as they allow access to all articles published by a wide selec-
tion of Algerian Francophone newspapers including El Watan, Infor Soir,
L’Expression, Le Soir d’Algérie, Liberté, and Le Quotidien d’Oran. Algeria-
Watch is a German human rights NGO. Its Web site contains more than
10,000 documents from Algeria, including newspaper articles, working
papers, magazine articles, and videos from 1998 to 2018. Yet, it selects
only those relevant to human rights and therefore does not include all
newspaper articles. DjaZairess is an Algerian news service Web site which
contains all articles of 64 Algerian newspapers from 2001 to 2018. Socio-
economic data of Algeria including unemployment rate and inflation can
be accessed in Office National des Statistiques. Compared to Ennahda,
the HMS is less open to observers, and therefore, its internal files are less
 1 INTRODUCTION 15

accessible. I managed to access a few brochures which proved helpful to

understand the type of political discourse it utilized.

Methodology and Methods

By comparing the elements that have affected the mobilization of Ennahda
and the HMS, the research adopts the “method of similarity” (Mill 1843,
454), a comparative historical approach whereby one compares different
cases which have the same outcome. For instance, although Ennahda and
the HMS adopted different mobilization strategies, they suffered the same
fate of having their electoral gain slashed after taking part in government.
The study primarily adopts qualitative research methods. I used semi-
structured interviews, meaning that while a set of questions were covered
in all interviews, I followed topical trajectories in conversation, enabling me
to bring up new ideas and adjust my interview questions according to the
interviewees’ responses (DiCicco-Bloom and Crabtree 2006). After verbal
data were hand-written and then taped, I analyzed interview transcripts and
categorized the data into theoretical concepts such as demands, political
opportunities, organizational strength, framing.

The Structure of the Study

To fulfill the research objectives, the structure of the study focuses on the
following: first, to explain how Ennahda and the HMS enable citizens
to be informed of their existence, goals, and representatives, and hence,
can be primed to vote for them when the political opportunity presents
itself; second, to extend the argument on the parties to explain why some
Islamist parties mobilize debates, discourses, and environments more suc-
cessfully than others, and why some parties demonstrate stronger mobi-
lization capacity on certain occasions than others; and third, to describe
how electoral politics works in North Africa and what elections really mean
to voters and Islamist parties. Further, it addresses the role of the parties
in introducing and maintaining Islamist discourse as a vital element within
the political sphere.
The research is chronological in form. Chapter 2 discusses the literature
and debates surrounding voters’ behaviors, electoral authoritarianism, and
party mobilization as a theoretical background of the research, and pro-
poses a demand-and-supply framework to address the research question.
Chapter 3 provides a historical overview of the emergence of Islamist parties
16 C. ZHANG

as part of the broader Islamist movement in Algeria and Tunisia, the early
evolution of Ennahda and the HMS, as well as their interactions with the
regimes before their first engagement in elections. Chapters 4 through 8
divide the development of Ennahda and the HMS into four stages and
examine their electoral mobilization strategies and outcomes in each stage.
Specifically, Chapter 4 tests the logics of the demand-and-supply theory
through in-depth comparative studies of Ennahda and the HMS’ first trial
at the ballot box in 1989 and 1991. Chapters 5, 6, and 7 compare Ennahda
and the HMS’s mobilization during three key time periods: 1992–1998,
1999–2010, and the early 2010s. These three chapters focus on how the
political landscape, government actions, and opportunities available for
Islamist parties changed in the two countries, how Ennahda and the HMS
adjusted their organizational and framing strategies in response, and how
the two parties’ mobilizational outcomes varied. The concluding chapter
discusses the generalizability of the model presented in this research and
proposes implications that can be drawn from the analyses.

Notes
1. The database of Turess is accessible at https://www.turess.com/fr.
2. The database of Algeria-Watch is accessible at https://algeria-watch.org/,
and the database of DjaZairess is accessible at https://www.djazairess.
com/fr/.

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 CHAPTER 2

Theorizing Islamist Parties’ Mobilization

at the Polls

A Heuristic Framework of Islamist Parties’

Electoral Mobilization
To address the research questions, an explanatory and comprehensive
framework has to be proposed. Drawing inspiration from the socio-
economic metaphor used in the work of De Witte and Klandermans (2000)
on extreme right-wing parties in Flanders and the Netherlands, this study
builds a supply-and-demand framework, but is based on observation of
North African political contexts. For this purpose, I interrelate three the-
oretical schools—electoral authoritarianism theory, protest voting theory,
and political process theory. However, I employ these theories in a novel
way to develop a structure suited to my research question and which takes
forward the data analysis so that it enables generalization to other cases.
The mobilization process involves two important roles: the mobiliz-
ers and the mobilized. To understand Islamist party mobilization, that is,
what the mobilizers supply and why, I seek to identify what the mobi-
lized demand. Electoral authoritarianism theory offers the means to ana-
lyze political institutions, and protest voting theory helps explore citizens’
voting behaviors. Combing the two theories enables scholars to understand
the demands of the mobilized in particular contexts, in this case, through
the eyes and actions of the mobilizers. I argue that in electoral authoritar-
ian or resilient authoritarian systems, citizens who cast blank votes, vote for
non-regime parties, or refuse to vote at all, still wish to have their voices

© The Author(s) 2020 23

C. Zhang, Islamist Party Mobilization,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-9487-4_2
24 C. ZHANG

heard and through these actions, show they are demanding change. They
are potential supporters of opposition parties including Islamist ones and
constitute the demand side of electoral politics in North Africa. At the cen-
ter of the concerns of the mobilized are two issues: first, whether there exists
a party that can reject the practices of the current regime and change the
status quo, and second, what costs that party and its intentions may bring to
voters. Meanwhile, it is important to analyze the mobilizers’ opportunities
to offer and frame a program for change, show intention, and legitimacy
to bring such change, and the capacity to compete with the ruling party
in elections, the precondition for bringing about any meaningful shift in
the political arena. By analyzing these dimensions, it becomes possible to
evaluate the supply-side elements that affect mobilization outcomes.

The Demand Side: Voting in Electoral Authoritarian Regimes

Classical voting behavior theorists have observed citizens’ voting in Europe
and North America through three perspectives, namely the sociological
model, psychological model, and economic model (Harrop and Miller
1987). The sociological approach focuses on the cleavages between the
haves and have-nots, considering this the crucial factor in shaping citizens’
voting preferences (Berelson 1954; Brooks et al. 2006; Elff 2007; Lazars-
feld et al. 1944; Lipset and Rokkan 1967). In utilizing this model, much of
the Islamic activism scholarship finds a causal relation between sociological
strains and the popularity of Islamist parties (Chhibber 1996; Gulalp 2001;
Onis 1997, 753–757).
The psychological model was pioneered by sociologists such as Campbell
et al. (1960) in the 1960s at University of Michigan and developed by
recent researchers such as Harder and Krosnick (2008), Helal and Hamza
(2015). It argues that party identification is driven by more factors than
sociological status and discontent, and that psychological attachment to a
party is a key determinant of voting behavior (Campbell 1960; Campbell
et al. 1966). In line with this theory, Islamic experts have attributed the
“Islamist vote” to religio-psychological factors, arguing that support for
Islamist parties derives from their ability to reinforce cultural differentiation
from the West and uphold traditional religious values (Ayubi 1991, 27–36;
Burgat and Dowell 1993, 39–41).
The economic model derives from rational choice theory (Edlin et al.
2007; Farber 2009). Unlike the sociological and psychological perspec-
tives, it stresses that voting decisions are made on the basis of sophisticated
 2 THEORIZING ISLAMIST PARTIES’ … 25

cost-benefit calculations. Voters understand how to use voting to their ben-

efit and are likely to choose the parties that best represent their interests
and can deliver on their promises within a competitive field (Downs 1957;
Edlin et al. 2007; Lazarsfeld et al. 1944; Sanders 1993).
The three models are important because they highlight aspects of vot-
ing behavior that over-ride, organize, or rationalize the impact of institu-
tions and party-systems from the perspective of individual choice. They all
interpret voting behavior as a self-driving mechanism for voters to express
demands, identity, and differentiation, but do not consider outside factors,
such as regime type or political risk (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009). This
research makes more complex the analysis by including individual drivers,
such as socio-economic grievances, within the larger political context. Addi-
tionally, the sociological, psychological, and economic theories elucidated
above have mainly been tested in Western political systems where elections
are relatively fair and free (Tachau 1994, xiv). In systems where elections
are controlled by ruling elites who aim to maintain a political monopoly
(Schwedler 1998, 27), people’s voting behavior may be very different, and
reflect factors other than those proposed in frameworks relevant to more
pluralistic systems. By considering non-democratic institutions’ features, it
becomes possible to explore how citizens’ voting behavior is expressed in
electoral authoritarian contexts such as in North Africa.
Most North African states have adopted electoral authoritarianism (Dia-
mond 2002, 23–24; Schedler 2006; Morse 2012), a system that combines
democratic elements including party politics and elections with authoritar-
ian practices such as affecting electoral results by gerrymandering or depriv-
ing certain parties’ right to contend elections. Despite holding elections,
these regimes do not meet basic requirements for a democracy, whether in
terms of the Schumpeterian minimal procedural definition stressing elec-
toral competitiveness and representation (Schumpeter 1942) or in terms of
the substantive conception of democracy such as Dahl (1989)’s proposal
of polyarchy (or pluralism) or Pateman (1970)’s advocacy of participative
democracy, both of which emphasize procedures such as inclusiveness (the
democratic process should be available to every citizen) and control of the
agenda (citizens should be able to indicate the matters that should be dis-
cussed). According to Szmolka, a political theorist of electoral authoritari-
anism, unlike in democratic systems where elections facilitate the selection
of government officials for a specific time period, elections under electoral
authoritarianism serve a different set of functions. Specifically, authoritarian
26 C. ZHANG

elites use the process of elections to show themselves enlightened and open
to modern democratic practices—that is, to convey an image of plural-
ism to the outer world. They also use elections as a tool to strengthen
regime parties’ popular support, illustrate the hopelessness of opposition,
and, critically, provide ruling elites with information about potential dis-
sidents (Szmolka 2006, 40–41). In this context, electoral processes and
outcomes are controlled by the military, the president, the monarch, the
security system, or a hegemonic party through manipulation, to prevent
opposition parties from achieving significant power (Hudson 1994, 6).
For citizens opposed to the status quo in electoral authoritarian regimes,
three voting choices are available to express their protest: voting for a non-
regime party, casting blank votes, or not voting. Whether to take the first
option depends on calculations of benefits (a rejection of the regime and the
potential to change the status quo) and costs (the potential loss of citizen
rights and of social stability). The latter two options neither cost nor benefit
the voters very much, but they are common practices in electoral authori-
tarianism, especially when there lacks a non-regime party that demonstrates
intention and capacity to bring change. In Algeria, for instance, over 60%
of voters choose not to vote and over 4.5% of voters cast blank votes in
every election in the twenty-first century.
Therefore, if the opportunity presents itself, the first option, voting for
an opposition party, is the most common. I argue that voters in this situ-
ation are likely to cast protest votes, which, according to Tessler (1997),
means that citizens calculate which party might actually gain sufficient votes
to achieve some of the benefits they want, even if there are other parties
they prefer, but which they calculate will gain too small a proportion of
votes to actively bring change. Voters must consider what they can achieve
by casting their votes for a party outside the mainstream, and whether there
exists a party that can bring meaningful changes to the existing social order.
I extend the protest voting theory by arguing that a party is likely to gar-
ner protest votes if it can identify problems with the current system and pro-
vide concrete solutions, demonstrate its organizational capacity to compete
with regime parties, and show its intention and legitimacy to make changes.
Meanwhile, I contend that in electoral authoritarian systems, opposition
voting is not without risks, and that to gain protest votes, a party needs to
ensure citizens that voting for it costs them little. Risks include voting in a
party that adopts similar elite practices as the existing regime, and of voting
for a party, such as the FIS, that so threatens the regime that it leads to
 2 THEORIZING ISLAMIST PARTIES’ … 27

Fig. 2.1 Protest voters’ voting behavior in the context of electoral authoritarian-
ism

a complete clampdown and rejection of the vote. Additionally, in the sce-

nario of introducing Islamist ideologies into regime practices (such as the
implementation of sharia [Islamic law]), either through popular inclusion
or regime replacement, for instance, women may worry about their right to
work, to divorce, or to appear in public spaces without a hijab (headscarf)
(Al Jazeera 2012, August 19). Moreover, as extensions of Islamist move-
ments, the ascent of Islamist parties to power could risk facilitating political
activism by more radical Islamist strands such as Salafiyya jihadiyya, which
might threaten the society’s security (Guazzone 2013, 39). Figure 2.1
depicts how a protest voting decision is made in electoral authoritarianism.
It is to be observed that, even in contemporary Tunisia where relatively
free elections have been in place since the Arab Awakening, an inheritance
of the protest vote—voting for a party that is likely to gain sufficient votes to
achieve certain benefits wanted by voters rather than for a party the voters
actually prefer—is still evident (The New York Times 2014, October 27).
This may partly be attributed to absence of prior democratic experience.
Moreover, as Farmanfarmaian (2014, 657) argues, “practices and power
centers [that] carried over from the past, through elite networks of privilege
that have long experience in state capture,” have made the newly established
system more a “resilient authoritarianism”—“a hybrid system of secured
domains combined with certain public freedoms” (p. 661). Among the 30
Tunisians to whom I asked why they voted for Ennahda in the election of
2011, six admitted that they were ideologically more inclined to support
the Congrès pour la République (CPR) and three said they preferred other
small leftist parties. Halina, an undergraduate in Medicine from Nabeul
28 C. ZHANG

explained why she voted for Ennahda rather than the party she actually
preferred: “CPR is a small party and is not strong enough. It will never
achieve dominance in elections. I will not waste my vote … but will vote
for Ennahda instead…to ensure that a strong party against the old regime
can dominate Tunisia after the revolution” (Halina 2015). Halina’s views
were typical among my interviewees.
In sum, in electoral authoritarianism, demand is largely guided by cau-
tious calculation of benefits and costs. As citizens who reject the regime are
likely to vote for a non-regime party if it appears to bring them large ben-
efits and few costs, Islamist parties need to show themselves susceptible to
incorporating popular views into their agendas to garner the protest vote.

Supply Side: Political Opportunities, Organizational Strength

and Framing Processes
This study analyzes the supply side through the political process model,
emphasizing the three elements of organizational strength, political oppor-
tunities, and framing processes. The key dimensions concerning the mobi-
lizers in a mobilization process are: (1) the space that allows them
to demonstrate their capacities (political opportunity), (2) their capacity to
accumulate resources (organizational strength), and (3) their strategies to
convince the mobilized that they are willing and sufficiently legitimate
to bring a real change both through the resources they command and
their ability to minimize risks to the voters (framing process). Applied by
sociologists such as McAdam and Tarrow, the political process framework
argues that when grievances spread and demands for change exist, success-
ful mobilization is only possible in the presence of favorable exogenous
political opportunities, including an increase in the institutional openness
to oppositional forces, or a rise in fierce elite schisms (Jenkins and Perrow
1977; McAdam 1996; Tarrow 1998). In addition to highlighting advan-
tageous political environments, the framework stresses that organizations’
endogenous structures and framing processes are key elements that deter-
mine to what extent the potential for social mobilization can be realized
(McAdam 1986; McCarthy and Zald 1977).
Yet, the political process model, as part of social movement the-
ory, is developed to explain movement participation in uninstitutional-
ized and unconventional actions such as protests (Bayley 1969; Costain
1992; Kitschelt 1986; Meyer 1993) and armed insurgent movements
 2 THEORIZING ISLAMIST PARTIES’ … 29

Fig. 2.2 Interactions and effects of political opportunities, organizational

strength, and framing processes in mobilization

(Alimi 2006; Hafez 2004; McAdam 1999) and largely ignores cases in
which social movements utilize formal means to mobilize mass support.
The political process theorists who pay attention to formal politics exam-
ine Western cases in liberal democracies (Aminzade 1995; Andrews 1997;
Anheier 2003; De Witte and Klandermans 2000), and there is little exam-
ination of non-Western electoral authoritarian cases. The very few works
that apply the political process model to formal political parties in non-
Western cases analyze either the interactions between the regime and oppo-
sition parties (Schwedler 2004), or opposition parties’ activities (Alexan-
der 2000; Eligür 2010). What is completely lacking is analysis relating the
mobilizing parties to their mobilized targets, the citizens.
This research aims to fill the gap in studying mobilization through
formal institutions (McAdam 1996, 35–36) in non-Western electoral
authoritarian contexts. I stress the necessity to link the mobilizers to
the mobilized and to examine to what extent a party’s supply can
satisfy the voters’ demands and prompt a successful protest vote. As
Fig. 2.2 illustrates, I contend that political opportunities, organiza-
tional strength, and framing process determine whether a strong alter-
native option is in place to challenge the regime party. The three
dimensions of the supply side are not isolated factors but interact with
each other in a dynamic way. Below is an elaboration of these points.
30 C. ZHANG

1. Political Opportunities

Political opportunity is conceptualized as the likelihood that challengers

will strengthen their interests or increase the current benefits they can
obtain if they act collectively (Tarrow 1998, 85). Although the term “po-
litical opportunity” is widely used by social scientists (Goodwin and Jasper
1999; Koopmans 1999; Meyer and Minkoff 2004; Osa and Corduneanu-
Huci 2008), little consensus is reached when it comes to identifying specific
elements of political opportunity. Founders of the political opportunities
structure agree on the importance of the following three components: (1)
presence or absence of elite alignments; (2) openness of the political sys-
tem; and (3) level of the state’s repression (Brockett 1991, 254; Kriesi et al.
1992, 220; McAdam 1996, 27). A breakdown in the cohesion among rul-
ing elites provides a vacuum for opposition forces to fill and to interfere
with policy-making (Albrecht 2005, 390–391; Grove 2001, 12). Openings
in the political system and lowered levels of repression can help opposition
parties gain access to formal politics and reduce the cost of collective mobi-
lization (Kitschelt 1986, 62).
I argue that in electoral authoritarianism which combines “democratic
and authoritarian elements” (Diamond 2002, 23) to “capitalize on elec-
toral legitimacy while remaining in power” (Wegner 2011, xvii), the level
of repression and political openness to opposition forces are largely deter-
mined by the elite power structure, which can be dichotomized into undi-
vided and divided structures (Lust-Okar 2004, 159), that is, the “pres-
ence and absence of elite allies” (McAdam 1996, 28). When ruling elites
reduce disputes among themselves either by finding common ground for
all factions or by establishing a hegemonic system with one very powerful
faction, opposition forces are more likely to face intense repression and
political closure. A case in point was Tunisia’s crackdown of Ennahda after
Ben Ali secured hegemonic dominance within the elite circle soon after
taking power (Quandt 1998, 60).
Conversely, a divided structure refers to circumstances where little com-
mon ground is shared by different power factions and none is able to
command hegemony. This leads some ruling elites to “increase political
openness to some political opponents while excluding others” (Lust-Okar
2004, 160) in an effort to counterbalance their adversaries within the elite
circle. For opposition forces such as Islamist parties, such openness can be
in the form of either what Albrecht and Wegner termed as “informal toler-
 2 THEORIZING ISLAMIST PARTIES’ … 31

ance”—allowing the parties to operate and mobilize, but without legalizing

them (Albrecht and Wegner 2006, 123), or “controlled inclusion”—legal-
izing the parties while still constraining their activities (ibid.). The most
straight-forward approach of imposing restrictions is to enact laws to the
disadvantage of legal Islamist activists such as forcing them to remove the
Islamic elements from the parties’ titles and platforms. Willis terms such
methods “legal forms” of interference (Willis 2002, 6). Additionally, covert
means can be used as “supplementary measures” (ibid.). One frequently
used covert method by North African ruling elites is to catalyze inner splin-
tering within opposition parties by financing one power faction and inciting
it to break away from the party (ibid.). Another covert means, often adopted
by President Bouteflika in Algeria, is to encourage the emergence of large
numbers of Islamist groups, provoking inter-group framing competition
to divide and weaken the Islamist camp (Joffé 2009, 943).
Offering different levels of political openness to different opposition par-
ties is a common practice among electoral authoritarian regimes in North
Africa. This was reflected in Algeria’s policy in the late 1990s when it offered
the HMS and MRI controlled inclusion while totally excluding the FIS
(Layachi 2004, 55).
The double-headed arrows linking political opportunities to both orga-
nizational strength and framing processes in Fig. 2.2 indicate that political
opportunities have significant impact on both other factors of the supply
side in the course of mobilization: Political settings will determine mobiliz-
ers’ range of activities, along with the strategy choices available to organize
their structure and frames. Methods commonly used by North African
ruling elites to undermine Islamist parties’ organizational strength and
frames include prohibiting the use of religious terms, catalyzing parties’
inner splintering, or even banning Islamist parties altogether, all of which
reduce political opportunities for mobilization.

2. Organizational Strength

As McAdam (1999, 43–44) observes, a conducive political setting merely

affords mobilizers the chance to realize extensive mobilization. To convert
favorable opportunities into organized action, the mobilizers must possess
sufficient resources.
Organizational strength covers mobilizing organizations’ structural and
networking dynamics and examines how they “combine money, materials,
32 C. ZHANG

people and technology into strategic and tactical action” (Zald and
McCarthy 1987, 45). In North Africa, where religion is dominated by
Sunni Islam, Islamist parties’ connections to religious facilities and organi-
zations yield important strengths compared with secular opposition parties,
which are unable to establish what Hamid called “states-within-states” net-
works composed of mosques, kindergartens, schools, hospitals, think tanks,
banks, etc. (Hamid 2014, 11–12).
Nonetheless, not all Islamist parties are able to optimize these resources,
the effectiveness of which depends on the parties’ organizational structures
and relations to Islamic non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Orga-
nizational structures refer to the organization’s recruitment capabilities
vis-a-vis the population and their mechanisms to resolve internal disputes.
A central question opposition parties must address, and which engenders
considerable debate, is whether to adopt an inclusive or exclusive approach
in membership recruitment. Conventional wisdom, supported by some
academic scholarship (Carty et al. 2000; Zald and Ash 1966), considers
that a welcome-to-all strategy enables a party to enroll as many committed
members as possible. The idea has increasingly been criticized, however,
as an inclusive recruitment strategy can only require minimum levels of
initial commitment, meaning that sympathizers merely give the organiza-
tion general support without much obligation (Zald and Ash 1966, 331).
Zald and Garner claim that exclusive opposition organizations find it eas-
ier to endure than inclusive ones, because they select members who have
the “heaviest initial commitments” (ibid.) and can thus hold constant their
loyalty especially in the context of suppression. Aside from fewer commit-
ment requirements, other conundrums of the inclusive approach include
how to represent different needs and ideas of members from a variety of
backgrounds, and how members with divergent ideas can find common
ground. Charismatic leadership helps, to some degree, to maintain a par-
ty’s’ unity (Salih and El-Tom 2009, 34), as does installing consultation and
consensus mechanisms which are conducive, at least temporarily, to allevi-
ating disagreement. A party with neither difference-settlement mechanisms
nor charismatic leaders is likely to be plagued with ideological conflicts and
power struggles, causing splits and fragmentation (Asal et al. 2011).
Another organizational dimension with bearing on opposition parties’
mobilization is the relationship with Islamic NGOs. Most Islamist par-
ties emerge from a wider social movement composed of a broad variety
of NGOs (Wegner 2011, xxxvii). For instance, the two Islamist parties
 2 THEORIZING ISLAMIST PARTIES’ … 33

discussed in this research, Ennahda and the HMS, respectively originated

from Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya (JI) and Al-Jama’a al-Muwahadin (JM)/Al-
Irchad wa al-Islah (II), two broad religious organizations. Similarly, left-
wing parties are often closely linked to trade unions and communist associa-
tions (Kalfat 2014). While effective interaction between Islamist parties and
their related NGOs helps enhance the parties’ influence and public aware-
ness, ineffective relationships between them make it difficult for NGOs
to play supporting roles for their related political parties. An example was
when disputes arose between the HMS and II in the first decade of 2000,
many II members stopped working with it on charity services and stopped
encouraging grassroots constituents to vote for it in elections.
Effective interactions with NGOs not only enable opposition parties to
carry out face-to-face contact with prospective voters, one-to-one meet-
ings, and door-to-door canvassing at the most grassroots level during cam-
paigning seasons (Delibas 2009, 99), but they can also enable the parties
to remain working in abeyance during periods when political opportunities
are narrowed or shut down altogether (Taylor 1989, 761). In sociologi-
cal terms, abeyance illustrates a holding process whereby movements sus-
tain themselves during periods of unfavorable political opportunities and
“provide continuity from one stage of mobilization to another” (ibid.).
I contend that the rule also works for opposition parties in settings of
electoral authoritarianism. Efficient organizational dynamics and extensive
NGOs are instrumental for repressed parties to survive crackdowns and
ensure “the continuity of the[ir] political agenda” (Delibas 2009, 90).
As the double arrow between organizational strength to political oppor-
tunities suggests, the pattern whereby party organizations emerge, grow,
and develop has important implications for shaping their relationship with
state political institutions (Wegner 2011, xxxvii). The dotted arrow point-
ing from organizational strength to framing process, on the other hand,
implies that rich resources and extensive networks, if utilized properly, help
the spread of a party’s frames.

3. Framing Process

Framing process is the third factor influencing party mobilizations. Defined

as “the conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared
understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate
collective action” (McAdam 1996, 6), framing functions as the catalyst that
34 C. ZHANG

convinces the mobilized to sympathize with and participate in mobilizing

organizations. Benford and Snow (2000, 615) identify three categories of
framing: diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational. The first category refers
to the identification of social problems (ibid.) and expressing how the “au-
thority system is violating the shared moral principles of the participants”
(Gamson et al. 1982, 123). Prognostic framing involves offering solutions
to these problems (Benford and Snow 2000). Successful prognostic fram-
ing makes people believe that the organization itself can bring many benefits
and little damage to the society. The third category, motivational framing,
signifies identity issues or cultural symbols which could be used to arouse
sympathy and resonance (Benford and Snow 2000, 617). Mobilizers must
convince potential supporters that to take action, and cast a vote for the
mobilizing party, can bring the changes they want. A party with strong
organizational strength is more likely to convince prospective voters that it
is capable of competing with ruling elites.
Yet, the party also needs to explain why it is the most legitimate substi-
tute for the ruling regime, and how it will change the status quo. In Benford
and Snow (2000, 619–622) theory, a significant aspect of the framing pro-
cess is frame resonance, meaning the capacity of a frame to resonate with
the population. Frame resonance depends on “the frame’s empirical cred-
ibility in real life” (Wiktorowicz 2004, 16), which means that if there is
an apparent fit between a group’s rhetoric and events in the world, the
frames are likely to be credible and appealing. Additionally, if articulators
can maintain consistency between their frames, and between their frames
and actions, they are likely to reverberate with a large audience. Conversely,
articulators’ diagnostic and prognostic frames can be discredited if there is
mismatch between their frames or between discourse and actions. As fram-
ing inconsistency and variations only become apparent over a long period of
time, the process of looking at adaptations and alternatives over the course
of 25 years is an important aspect of analysis in the following chapters.
The arrows (the first solid and second dotted) linking framing process to
political opportunities and organizational strength respectively in Fig. 2.2
indicate that an opposition party’s framing has direct influence in shap-
ing institutional constraints, but likewise, must reflect a balancing process.
The intensification of an opposition party’s anti-regime rhetoric is likely to
motivate the regime to take hard-line tactics such as restricting its activ-
ity space and even banning the party, while the lessening of the party’s
confrontational stance can result in more media exposure and more access
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shaken, was restored to its equilibrium. Individual rulers had passed
from the board; but Milan, Venice, Florence, Rome, and Naples once
more checked and counter-checked each other’s moves. How could
this temporary disarrangement be said to have concerned Spain,
save to afford a passing triumph for Ferdinand’s diplomacy?
Yet in truth this same expedition was pregnant with results not
only for Spain but the whole of Western Christendom, results so far-
reaching that the history of modern Europe is often said to have
begun at this date. Mediæval Italy had rallied for a moment, but she
had none the less received her death-blow, the very incompetence
and folly of her conqueror revealing her mortal weakness. Never
again, till centuries had passed would her sunny fields and pleasant
cities be free from foreign menace; never again would her native
rulers be left to plot and plan her future undisturbed. Her beauty, her
culture, her luxury had aroused the lust of younger and hardier
nations; and against their strength she could offer no adequate
defence.
Ludovico Sforza had boasted too soon, when he depicted a map of
Italy, with himself broom in hand sweeping the other Powers before
him where he would. In April, 1498, Charles VIII. of France died and
was succeeded by his cousin, Louis, Duke of Orleans, who at once
styled himself King of Naples and Duke of Milan. The assumption of
these titles foretold his invasion of Italy, whenever a favourable
opportunity should occur, a hint of which other Powers were not
slow to take advantage. Venice, at the price of a small stretch of
Lombard territory for her mainland empire, agreed to Ludovico’s
ruin, with a shortsightedness that aroused Peter Martyr’s shrewd
comment to a Venetian friend: “The King of France, after he has
dined with the Duke of Milan, will sup with you.”
The Pope, anxious to found a kingdom in Romagna for his family,
also put away former anti-French prejudices, and granted a divorce,
much desired by Louis XII., in return for a bride and the title “Duke
of Valentinois” for his son, Cæsar Borgia.
The way for French ambition was thus paved; and Ludovico “Il
Moro,” with a retributive justice not often so clearly shown, fell a
victim to the storm he had originally evoked; and, captured by his
rival in April, 1500, was sent to end his days in the dungeons of
Loches. Less deserved but equally irrevocable was the disappearance
of the bastard line of Aragon in Naples. Ferrante II. had died in
September, 1496; and his uncle and successor, Federigo, menaced by
Louis XII., sought assistance from his relations in Spain without
avail. Ferdinand was playing a deeper game than to preserve the
throne of those whom he secretly regarded as having cheated him
out of a rightful inheritance. Only political and financial
embarrassments had caused his father, John II., to acquiesce in
Alfonso V.’s will, leaving Naples to an illegitimate son; and
Ferdinand, with a united Spain behind him, and an army trained for
ten long years in the wars of Granada, saw no reason to continue this
policy. His support of Ferrante II. had been a temporary expedient to
rid Southern Italy of Charles VIII.; but now he boldly approached the
French King with a wholly selfish scheme of spoliation that finally
took shape in the Partition Treaty of Granada of November, 1500.
Federigo had foolishly given an opening to his enemies, when in
despair at his isolation he appealed to the Turks to come to his aid;
and the Pope was thus enabled to denounce him as a traitor to the
Christian Faith and to demand his instant abdication.
 A KING-AT-ARMS

FROM “SPANISH ARMS AND

ARMOUR”

REPRODUCED BY COURTESY OF THE

AUTHOR, MR. A. F. CALVERT

His kingdom, divided into two by a somewhat vague boundary

line, was partitioned by France and Spain, Louis receiving the
northern portion with the town of Naples, Ferdinand the provinces
of Calabria and Apulia. The unfortunate Federigo after a feeble effort
to oppose this settlement, yielded to superior force, and retired to
honourable captivity in France with the title “Duke of Anjou.”
Machiavelli’s contempt for Louis XII.’s share in the treaty was
unbounded. “The French do not understand statecraft,” was his
answer to Cardinal d’Amboise, who on one occasion had suggested
sneeringly that the Italians did not understand war; and there is little
doubt that the Florentine considered his own race the more blest.
That a King who might have controlled the peninsula should
deliberately choose to share his supremacy with a powerful rival was
of all acts the most stupid; and stupid indeed it was to prove; though
it may be questioned if, in the face of Ferdinand’s opposition, Louis
could have conquered Naples at all.
Where war in Southern Italy was concerned, Spain had in many
ways the advantage over France, above all in her extensive eastern
seaboard and her possession of the island of Sicily, which afforded a
convenient base of operations for landing reinforcements and
provisions. Louis would have needed to maintain an enormous army
had he endeavoured to keep Naples entirely free of Spanish
aggression; but his alternative policy of sharing the kingdom
bordered quite as close on the impossible.
Differences of opinion respecting the imaginary boundary (that
had left the ownership of some of the middle provinces undefined);
quarrels as to the right of collecting the tolls paid on the cattle and
sheep passing from their summer quarters in the Abruzzi to the
sheltered valleys of the Capitanata, their winter home; feuds between
those Neapolitan barons, who had originally supported the Angevin
cause, and their opponents, the former Allies of the Aragonese House
—these were matters so productive of strife that any efforts to
establish a permanent peace between France and Spain were
obviously doomed to failure. Thus, by 1502, the royal thieves had
fallen out; and war, occasionally suspended by truces and
negotiations, devastated Naples for the next two years.
Its course is hardly a highway in Castilian history, though its
battles were waged and its victories secured mainly by Castilian
soldiers. The ambitions by which it was dictated were purely
Aragonese; and the final success of Spanish arms in 1504, that drove
the French from Naples, was the crowning triumph of Ferdinand’s
career. Yet, in as much as the issue so vitally affected the future of
Spain, drawing her definitely into a struggle for the supremacy of
Europe, and pitting her against France in a national duel that was to
outlast both Ferdinand and Louis, the campaign demands some
mention here.
 Its actual conduct recalls, not only through its deeds of chivalry
and daring but in the character of its warfare, the struggle in
Granada; and, if Spain owed her success largely to her advantageous
position, she was also indebted to the thorough training her soldiers
had received in guerilla tactics. The mountainous districts of the
kingdom of Naples were peculiarly suited to the quick movements of
light-armed horse; but Gonsalvo de Cordova, Ferdinand’s
Commander-in-chief, though recognizing and using to the full this
knowledge, did not disdain to learn what his enemies could teach
him in other branches of military art; and his infantry, patiently
drilled on the Swiss method, was soon to prove the equal of any body
of troops in Europe.
The real laurels of victory belong indeed to Gonsalvo de Cordova;
for, though the French army could boast heroes of chivalry, such as
Bayard the “knight without fear or stain,” and generals of skill and
courage, such as D’Aubigny, it had no soldier who could in any way
approach the genius of the “Great Captain.” Gonsalvo had been bred
in a school of war, which gave individual talent full scope, and like
his elder brother, Alonso de Aguilar, he had been early singled out by
Isabel for praise and advancement.
 SPANISH MAN-AT-ARMS, FIFTEENTH
CENTURY

FROM “SPANISH ARMS AND

ARMOUR”

REPRODUCED BY COURTESY OF THE

AUTHOR, MR. A. F. CALVERT

To the light-hearted chivalry of the courtier, he united the

prudence and foresight of a practised statesman, and the patience
and equable temperament of the born ruler of men. In the fire before
Granada which destroyed the Queen’s tent, he had been prompt to
put at her disposal his wife’s wardrobe; an act of courtesy that caused
Isabel to remark she was afraid he and his family had suffered more
loss than herself. This and similar deeds of courtesy made him a
pattern of manners in his own day, but like the English Sir Walter
Raleigh he was no mere carpet-knight in search of royal favour. He
was devoid of personal fear, yet, when large issues depended on his
orders, he never let his courage degenerate into recklessness, after
the manner of the average Castilian commander, and perhaps his
greatest military gift was his power of judging whether the occasion
required caution or a daring onslaught. Never was a leader more
intrepid in attack, more cool in the hour of retreat, or less easily
drawn from a good position by feint or scoff.
“A general,” he once remarked, “must obtain the victory at any
price, right or wrong. Afterwards he will be able to make tenfold
compensation to those whom he has injured.”
This specious reasoning is characteristic both of the man and the
age in which he lived; and Gonsalvo, like many of his
contemporaries, was a strange combination of sincerity and
unscrupulous dealing. After the campaign against Charles VIII., in
which he had assisted Ferrante II. to win back his kingdom, the
Spanish General had been rewarded by a lavish grant of Neapolitan
territory. When, however, war broke out once more, and Gonsalvo
found he must lead his troops against his former Allies, his code of
honour prompted him to inform them of his regret at this necessity
and to offer the restoration of their gifts before embarking on hostile
measures. At the surrender of Taranto in 1502, on the other hand,
having promised on oath that the young Duke of Calabria, Federigo’s
eldest son, should be free to go where he liked, he nevertheless
arrested the boy and sent him a prisoner to Spain. It has been argued
that, in the latter case, he had received sudden orders from
Ferdinand not on any account to let the Duke escape; but the excuse,
if true is after all a sorry shelter for his bad faith.
More pleasing, in a country where generals were wont to sell their
services to the highest bidder and yield to bribery with little
hesitation, was Gonsalvo’s persistent loyalty to his sovereign.
Ferdinand was not an easy master to satisfy, for neither his thoughts
nor actions were ordinarily generous, and his cold distrustful nature
was slow to respond to either enthusiasm or anxiety. During the war
of Granada, the task of dispatching an adequate supply of soldiers
and ammunition to the seat of war had fallen, as we have seen, to
Isabel; but with increasing ill-health and worry such affairs had
slipped from her fingers, and preparations for the Neapolitan
campaigns were left to other hands.
In vain Gonsalvo begged for reinforcements and the necessary
money to pay those companies already under his command.
Ferdinand had a shrewd conviction that his general was capable,
when in straits, of making two men perform the work of four, and
doled out his assistance with niggardly craft. Nor did the brilliant
achievements of his young Commander-in-chief, in the teeth of
difficulties he himself had often aggravated arouse his gratitude or
admiration.
“He who is the cause of another’s greatness,” says Machiavelli, “is
himself undone”; and Ferdinand looked with suspicion on a subject
so successful and popular that his possible disloyalty might prove a
source of danger to the Crown. His own reputation as the champion
cheat of Europe was perhaps unassailable; but it carried with it this
penalty: he lived in mortal terror that he would one day be cheated.
In extenuation of his parsimony, the contrast between his wide
ambitions and small treasury must be remembered. Ferdinand, like
Elizabeth of England, was forced to imitate the careful housekeeper
in making a little go a long way; and habitual economy is a virtue
that often borders on vice. Not yet were the gold and silver of South
America and Mexico pouring in a rich flood into the royal coffers;
while every day fresh schemes of government, fresh wars and
discoveries abroad, and the weaving of fresh strands of alliance
demanded monetary support, as well as the King’s minute and
unswerving attention.
Were Spain to pause for a moment in the race, letting Portugal
outstrip her in the Western seas, or France suborn her brilliant
generals and entice away her allies, she must inevitably fall behind
into the second rank of nations. Thus Ferdinand, straining ever after
a prize, whose very magnitude was to prove his country’s ultimate
ruin, spun his web of diplomacy in and out amongst the Powers of
Europe, never neglecting any opportunity that would draw him
nearer his goal.
In the case of Portugal, fate seemed to have willed by the death,
first of Prince Alfonso and then of the young Queen Isabel, that no
Aragonese Infanta should draw closer the union of the two nations;
but in 1500 the spell of tragedy was broken by the marriage of Maria,
the sovereign’s third daughter, with the widower King Emmanuel.
One child alone remained with Ferdinand and Isabel, Catherine
their youngest; and in the following year she also fulfilled her destiny
and carried her father’s olive-branch to a northern home. Born in
December, 1485, she had been betrothed almost from her infancy to
Arthur, Prince of Wales, Henry VII.’s eldest son; and Roger
Machado, on his visit to the Spanish Court, did not in his amazement
at jewels and fine clothes neglect to mention his future Queen, and
how beautiful he had thought her, held up in her mother’s arms to
watch a tilting-match.
So firmly settled was the alliance, grounded on mutual hatred of
England and Aragon for France, that already at the early age of three
the little Infanta was styled “Princess of Wales”; but the intervening
years before the union could be realized did not on this account pass
her over in silence. The correspondence of the time is filled with
frequent disputes between the Catholic sovereigns and Henry VII. as
to the exact financial value of their respective offspring; and the
discussion ranged from Catherine’s marriage portion and the size of
her household to the comeliness of the ladies-in-waiting, who would
accompany her;—the latter a point on which the English King laid
great stress.
At length, however, all was satisfactorily settled; and Henry,
having welcomed the bride, could write to her parents that

although they could not see the gentle face of their beloved daughter, they might be
sure that she had found a second father, who would ever watch over her happiness,
and never permit her to want anything he could procure her.

A few short months and Arthur’s death had left the little Spanish
Princess, then not seventeen years old, a widow in a strange land;
while fatherly kindness wrangled furiously over the cost of her
maintenance and the disposition of her dowry. It was well for the
immediate fortunes of Catherine of Aragon that she soon found a
husband in Arthur’s younger brother Prince Henry, though perhaps,
could she have read the future, she would have preferred to decline
the honour.
 De Puebla, the Spanish Ambassador entrusted by Ferdinand with
the greater part of the marriage negotiations, had also tried his hand
during the years that he resided in England, at enticing the King of
Scotland into the anti-French web. The friendship between France
and Scotland was of ancient date; but De Puebla felt that the offer of
a royal bride from the Spanish Court would make a deep impression
on King James’s susceptible vanity, and since, at the date when this
idea occurred to him, all the Spanish Infantas were either married or
betrothed, he suggested instead Doña Juana, one of Ferdinand’s
illegitimate daughters, concealing as he believed with considerable
statesmanship the fact of the bar sinister. Ferdinand, when he heard
of it, was most contemptuous. Such a deception, he wrote, could not
possibly be maintained and therefore was not worth the lie. Let De
Puebla, on the other hand, hold out false hopes if he could of one of
the real Princesses, and by this bait induce the Scottish monarch to
quarrel with France. Even moderate success in this strategy would
prove of considerable value.
James IV. did not marry a Spanish Princess but Catherine of
Aragon’s sister-in-law Margaret Tudor; and what harm he might
inflict on Spain and her Allies in French interests was a mere pin-
prick to the stab administered by Ferdinand’s immediate family. On
the death of Prince Miguel in July, 1500, Joanna, Archduchess of
Austria, became heiress to the throne of Castile and Aragon; and,
though there was cause for rejoicing that a son had been born to her
early in the same year and thus the succession was assured, yet the
situation arising from the new importance of her position tended
every day to grow more critical. Joanna and her husband had been
from the first an ill-matched pair, his light careless nature acting like
a spark to fire the mine of her sullen temper and quick jealousy; and
his faithlessness and her lack of self-control combined to keep the
Flemish Court in a perpetual flame of scandal.
Had they been merely private individuals, the evil effects of their
passions might have spread no further than the street or town in
which they lived; but unfortunately Joanna had gone to Flanders not
merely as a bride but as an agent to influence her husband’s policy in
her father’s favour, and the odium and exasperation her behaviour
aroused reacted to the detriment of Spain. Philip had nothing in
common with the Castilian race. Their pride irritated him, their deep
religious feeling awoke his incredulity, their sense of reverence and
gravity a flippant scorn and boredom, that his selfishness found it
difficult to disguise. Personal tastes inclined him rather to the
volatile, easy-mannered Frenchman; and, as domestic differences
increased, so also did his dislike for the Aragonese and sympathy
with their enemies.
“The French rule everything,” wrote Fuensalida, the Spanish
Ambassador at the Archduke’s Court despairingly. “They alone
surround him and entice him from feast to feast, from mistress to
mistress.”
 TILTING ARMOUR OF PHILIP THE
FAIR

FROM “SPANISH ARMS AND

ARMOUR”

REPRODUCED BY COURTESY OF THE

AUTHOR, MR. A. F. CALVERT

Fuensalida suggested that Philip and his wife should be induced to

visit Castile as soon as possible, before the evil habits into which the
Archduke had fallen took permanent hold of him; and Ferdinand and
Isabel warmly seconded this idea. Their son-in-law’s behaviour had
been scandalous; but their daughter’s conduct caused them if
anything more uneasiness. At times full of loving memories of her
old home, so that she confessed “she could not think of her mother
and how far she was separated from her for ever without shedding
tears,” Joanna, on other occasions, was taciturn or even defiant when
approached by special emissaries from Spain. Their questions she
met by silence, their allusions to her parents or to the religious
enthusiasm that had stirred her youth, by indifference. It seemed
that jealousy and wounded pride could in a moment slip like a dark
curtain across her mind and blot out all save a brooding fury at her
wrongs.
The mental balance, once a flaw has shaken its equilibrium, is of
all scales the most difficult to adjust; and Isabel’s hopes that a
personal supervision of her daughter would effect a cure were
doomed to disappointment. Philip and Joanna came to Spain in
1502; but their presence was an unwilling acknowledgment that
custom required their recognition as Prince and Princess of Castile
by the national Cortes. That business concluded, the Archduke was
fully determined to return to his own land, if possible as he had come
by way of France, for the reception he had been accorded in Paris
made him eager to renew its delights.
It was his ambition that his son, Charles, heir not only of his
Austrian archduchy and county of Flanders but of all the wide
dominions of Spain, should marry Claude, the infant daughter of
Louis XII., a scheme of alliance by which he himself would be
enabled to pose as the arbiter of European politics, adjudicating
between the two great rival nations with whom he had formed
connections. Ferdinand might be pardoned if he regarded the
Archduke somewhat dubiously in the proposed rôle; and indeed
quarrels over the terms of the Partition Treaty and the subsequent
war in Naples were soon to wreck the would-be arbitrator’s hopes.
Yet, even before this failure was assured, mutual suspicion had
thrown a restraint over the intercourse of father-in-law and son-in-
law, and had even poisoned the relations between Isabel and her
daughter.
Joanna was well aware of her husband’s intention of leaving Spain
at the first possible moment; but she herself was expecting a child
and knew the long journey would be beyond her powers. The thought
that Philip would leave her behind, intensified by the fear that he
would do so with keener pleasure than regret, assumed in her
disordered brain the monstrous proportions of a plot to keep her a
prisoner in Castile. In vain she entreated him to stay until she should
be well enough to accompany him; the Archduke, his ambition once
satisfied by the homage of the Cortes of Toledo and of Saragossa,
impatiently counted the days until he could cross the French border,
and all the Catholic sovereigns’ efforts to entertain him failed
dismally.
In December, 1502, he left Madrid; and Joanna, at his going, sank
into a mood of sullen despondency from which even the birth of her
son, Ferdinand, in March of the following year, could not rouse her.
At length she received a letter from Philip suggesting her return to
Flanders; but war had broken out between France and Spain, making
the journey, if not impossible, at least fraught with danger.
Ferdinand was with his army in Roussillon, and Isabel who was ill
in Segovia sent imploring messages to her daughter at Medina del
Campo, begging her to do nothing rash. Joanna was however
obsessed by the notion that she was the victim of a plot, and in her
passionate desire to escape from Spain was deaf to warnings and
petitions. One evening, lightly clad and followed by her scared
attendants, she started on foot from the castle and was only
prevented from leaving the city by the Bishop of Burgos, who had
been placed by the Queen in charge of her household and who gave
orders that the gates should be closed. The Archduchess commanded
that they should be opened, and even descended to prayers and
entreaties, when she found her authority was of no avail; to all the
Bishop’s persuasions that she should return home she replied by an
uncompromising refusal. Through the long night, in the darkness
and the cold, she maintained her vigil; and when messengers arrived
from Segovia the next day, begging her in her mother’s name to
resist from her project, she would only consent to move into a poor
hovel hard by the gates.
On the second evening, Isabel, who had dragged herself from her
sick-bed at the tale of her daughter’s mad folly, appeared in Medina
del Campo; but Joanna at first greeted her with reproaches and
anger, “speaking” wrote the Queen in her account of the interview to
Fuensalida, “so disrespectfully and so little as a child should address
her mother, that if I had not seen the state of mind she was in, I
would not have suffered it for a moment.”
 JOANNA “THE MAD,” DAUGHTER OF
QUEEN ISABEL

FROM “HISTORIA DE LA VILLA Y

CORTE DE MADRID” BY AMADOR DE
LOS RIOS

In the end Joanna’s stubborn obstinacy was conquered, and she

returned to the castle; but after such a scene few could doubt that she
was at any rate temporarily insane; and the Queen, conscious that
her own days were drawing to a close, trembled at the thought of her
country’s future, delivered to the moods of such a ruler.
“Cursed fruit of the tree that bore her; ill-fated seed of the land
that gave her birth, was this daughter for her mother,” wrote Peter
Martyr bitterly; and Isabel’s star, which had risen in such splendour
out of the murk of Henry IV.’s misgovernment, was destined to sink
amid the shame of Joanna’s folly.
In the spring of 1504 the Archduchess sailed to Flanders; and
Queen Isabel, guessing the scandals that would follow her footsteps
when her own restraining influence was removed, said good-bye to
her with a sick heart. Feeble in body, so that every task seemed an
effort, she herself turned more and more from worldly matters to the
prayers and meditations that drew her ever closer in touch with the
land of her desire towards which she was hastening. Yet neither her
kingdom nor people were far from her thoughts.
In 1503, when Ferdinand had gone north to protect the border
counties from what was rumoured to be an enormous invading army,
her old martial spirit had revived; and she busied herself in Segovia,
as in the old days, in collecting troops and despatching them to the
seat of war. With the news of Spanish victories her conscience smote
her. The flying French! These also were a Christian race, fighting for
their own land. Recoiling from the thought of such a slaughter, she
wrote to Ferdinand, praying him to stay his hand; and, whether
moved by her wish or his own foresight, he contented himself with
driving his foes across the border. Soon afterwards Louis XII. agreed
to an armistice that freed the Pyrenean provinces from war.
Triumph in the north of Spain was followed by the news of
Gonsalvo de Cordova’s victories in Naples; but joy at these successes
was counterbalanced by the serious state of the Queen’s health. She
and Ferdinand had fallen ill of fever in Medina del Campo in the
summer of 1504; and, while his constitution rallied from the attack,
anxiety for him and her own weakness aggravated her symptoms,
and it was feared that these would end in dropsy.
“We sit sorrowful in the palace all the day long,” wrote Peter
Martyr early in the autumn, “tremulously waiting the hour when
religion and virtue shall quit the earth with her.”
Isabel herself knew the end was not far off, and bade those about
her restrain their tears. When she heard of the processions and
pilgrimages made throughout the kingdom in the hope of restoring
her to health she asked that her subjects should pray “not for the
safety of her life but the salvation of her soul.”
On the 12th of October she signed her will, commanding in it that
her body should be taken to Granada, and there buried without
ostentation in a humble tomb. The money that would have provided
an elaborate funeral was to be spent on dowries for twelve poor girls
and the ransom of Christian captives in Africa.
The poverty of the Castilian treasury, in contrast to its heavy
expenses, evidently weighed on her mind; and she gave orders that
the number of officials in the royal household should be reduced, and
gifts of lands and revenues, that had been alienated by the Crown
without sufficient cause, revoked. Her jewels she left to Ferdinand,
that “seeing them,” she said, “he may be reminded of the singular
love I always bore him while living, and that now I am waiting for
him in a better world.”
The future government of the kingdom was her special care; and in
her will, and its codicil added in November, while acknowledging
Joanna as her successor, she begged both her and Philip “to be
always obedient subjects to the King, and never disobey his orders.”
This injunction was amplified by the command that if Joanna should
be absent from Spain, “or although present ... unable to reign and
govern,” Ferdinand should act as regent, until his grandson Charles
was of an age to undertake this task for himself.
Such were the most important clauses of the document, by which
Isabel strove to safeguard her loved Castile from the dangers
threatening her. In others, she insisted that Gibraltar, which she had
acquired for the Crown should never be alienated from it; that her
daughter and son-in-law should not appoint foreigners to any office
or post of trust, that the tax of the alcabala,[10] if found illegal on
inquiry, should be abolished; that a new and more accurate code of
laws should be compiled; and that steps should be taken to secure
the kindly treatment of natives in the New World. It will be seen that
Isabel in her last days was still the ruler, holding in her now feeble
hands all the threads of national government, but clear in mind to
recognize and command the issues.
10. See page 394.
 CODICIL TO ISABEL’S WILL, WITH
HER SIGNATURE

FROM LAFUENTE’S “HISTORIA

GENERAL DE ESPAÑA,” VOL. VII.

On November 26th[11] the end so long expected came; and, having

received the Sacraments and commended her soul to God, the
Queen, clad in a Franciscan robe, passed peacefully away.
11. Peter Martyr says November 22d.

My hand [says Peter Martyr] falls powerless by my side for very sorrow. The
world has lost its noblest ornament ... for she was the mirror of every virtue, the
shield of the innocent, and an avenging sword to the wicked.
It has pleased Our Lord [wrote Ferdinand to the chief citizens of Madrid] to take
to Himself the Most Serene Queen Doña Isabel, my very dear and well-beloved
wife; and although her loss is for me the greatest heaviness that this world held in
store ... yet, seeing that her death was as holy and catholic as her life, we may
believe that Our Lord has received her into His glory, that is a greater and more
lasting kingdom than any here on earth.
 The day after her death, the coffin with its funeral cortège left
Medina del Campo for Granada, amid a hurricane of wind and rain
such as the land had rarely witnessed. Peter Martyr, who was one of
the escort, declared that the Heavens opened, pouring down torrents
that drove the horsemen to shelter in the ditches by the wayside,
while the mules sank exhausted and terrified in the road. Never for a
moment was there a gleam of either sun or star, until on December
25th, as the funeral procession entered Granada, the clouds lifted for
the first time.
There in the city of her triumph, in the Franciscan monastery of
the Alhambra, the very heart of the kingdom she had won for
Christianity, Isabel of Castile was laid to rest.
 CHAPTER XIII
CASTILIAN LITERATURE

“Isabel’s death,” says Butler Clarke, “marks the beginning of a

period of anarchy.”
The peace that she had done so much to promote and that her
presence had insured was threatened by the incapacity of her
successor, and by the restless rivalry of the Archduke Philip and his
father-in-law. Prescott describes Isabel as “Ferdinand’s good genius,”
and her loss was to make obvious to the Castilians his less attractive
side,—the suspicion, and want of faith and generosity, that during
their joint rule her more kingly qualities had tended to disguise. The
old feeling against him as a foreigner, which his personal valour in
the Moorish war had partly obliterated, now reappeared and was
intensified by disgust at his prompt remarriage. Ferdinand was not
in the least sentimental, and thus failed to take into account the large
part played by sentiment in national history. The fact that he
regretted Isabel’s death would have struck him as a foolish reason for
missing any advantage that unfortunate occurrence might afford,
and he re-entered the matrimonial market with great promptitude.
He was now fifty-three and the bride selected by him a girl of
eighteen, Germaine de Foix, a daughter of the Count of Narbonne,
who with her brother Gaston represented the younger branch of the
House of Navarre. Such a union was naturally attractive to
Aragonese ambitions, ever watchful to establish dynastic links with
that northern kingdom, though at the moment as it happened the
Navarrese connection was of merely secondary importance.
Germaine de Foix was a niece of Louis XII., and by his marriage with
her (October, 1505) Ferdinand succeeded in breaking the dangerous
combination of France and Flanders that might otherwise have
proved his ruin.