Fictional Inquiry

8
Dennis Schoeneborn and Joep Cornelissen

Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
Philosophical Foundations of the Epistemology of Fiction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
Purpose 1: Juxtaposing Fictional and Counterfactual Statements Against Empirical Reality
to Generate Novel Insights and Enhance Our Understanding of That Reality . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
Purpose 2: Juxtaposing Fictional/Counterfactual Statements Against Other Scientific
Statements to Probe and Refine These Statements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
Purpose 3: Studying Fictional Realities as Objects of Inquiry in Their Own Right
and Examining Their Impact on Actual Empirical Realities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
Conclusion: Toward an Epistemology of Fiction in Management Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
Cross-References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155

Abstract
This chapter augments established epistemologies of representation and epistemol-
ogies of emancipation by adding a third orientation, which can be termed episte-
mology of fiction. An epistemology of fiction deliberately generates scientific
statements that deviate from actual empirical reality. The chapter is structured
according to three main purposes of fictional inquiry: (1) juxtaposing fictional
and counterfactual statements with empirical reality to reveal new insights and
enhance our understanding of that reality (e.g., through ideal-type thinking or

D. Schoeneborn (*)
Department of Management, Society and Communication (MSC), Copenhagen Business School,
Frederiksberg, Denmark
School of Management and Technology, Institute of Management and Organization, Leuphana
University of Lüneburg, Lüneburg, Germany
e-mail: ds.msc@cbs.dk
J. Cornelissen
Rotterdam School of Management, Department of Business-Society Management, Erasmus
University Rotterdam, Rotterdam, The Netherlands
e-mail: cornelissen@rsm.nl

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 139

C. Neesham et al. (eds.), Handbook of Philosophy of Management, Handbooks in
Philosophy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-76606-1_54
140 D. Schoeneborn and J. Cornelissen

figurative imagination); (2) juxtaposing fictional/counterfactual statements against

other scientific statements to test and refine the latter statements (e.g., via counter-
factual reasoning, thought experiments, or simulation); and (3) drawing on fictional
realities as objects of inquiry in their own right, typically in order to understand the
impact of these fictional realities on current or future (nonfictional) empirical
realities. The chapter concludes with some considerations regarding the fit of an
epistemology of fiction to management studies as an academic field.

Keywords
Counterfactuals · Fiction · Ideal types · Management studies · Simulation ·
Thought experiments

Introduction

In the philosophy of science, one can distinguish two main epistemological orien-
tations that differ in how scientific statements relate to empirical reality. In an
epistemology of representation, scholars strive to develop scientific statements that
should match empirical reality as closely as possible. The main method employed for
accomplishing such a match is to refine scientific statements by means of verification
or falsification (e.g., Popper 1934; Shareff 2007). In an epistemology of emancipa-
tion, by contrast, scholars develop critical or normative statements with the ultimate
aim of transforming empirical reality in such a way that it better matches these
statements (e.g., Ezzamel and Willmott 2014; Scherer and Palazzo 2007). However,
this basic distinction ignores a third possible way in which scientific statements and
empirical reality can be interrelated. In this third epistemological orientation, which
can be termed an epistemology of fiction, scholars develop fictional or counterfactual
images or models without intending to represent nor to change existing empirical
reality but with the aim of contrasting empirical reality with these statements.
Generally speaking, this chapter distinguishes the following three main purposes
of an epistemology of fiction (see Fig. 1): (1) using fictional and counterfactual
scientific statements to contrast them with actual empirical reality as a means of
revealing new insights and enhancing our understanding of that reality; (2) juxtapos-
ing fictional and counterfactual theorizing with other representational or interpreta-
tive scientific statements as a way of probing and potentially enhancing the
robustness of such statements; and (3) examining fictional realities (e.g., fictional-
ized art or narrative fantasies) as objects of inquiry in their own right, typically in
order to understand the impact of these fictional realities on actual (nonfictional)
empirical realities. While the first of these two purposes tend to relate primarily to the
formative, front-end stage of the research process (such as theory development),
the third purpose tends to be related mainly to the back-end stage, that is, to the
execution of the research, treating fictional realities as empirical data.
Beyond these three purposes of fictional inquiry, there is yet another fourth
purpose that is characterized by a primarily practical orientation, as when scholars
8 Fictional Inquiry 141

Probing & refining theories

• Counterfactual statements
• Thought experiments
• Simulation
Fictional/
Representational
counterfactual 2
theories
theories

Revealing novel insights Understanding fictional

1 3
about empirical reality realities & their impact
• Ideal types • Fictionalized data
• Figurative imagination • Fiction as object of inquiry

Fictional Actual empirical

realities realities

Fig. 1 Three purposes of fictional inquiry

use fictional scenarios, creativity, and design thinking to create novel (social)
realities. While this is an important stream of research in its own right (see, for
example, Jelinek et al. 2008) and can be linked to epistemological considerations,
such as the theory of creative action developed by Joas (1996), this approach will
not be covered in depth here since the orientation in these works tends to be more
practical than epistemological. This focus on practicality is evident, for instance, in
the following statement by Jelinek et al. (2008, p. 317–318): “Science raises the
question ‘is this proposition valid or true?’,” while design asks “will it work
better?”
This chapter sketches out the contours of an epistemology of fiction with special
reference to its application in management studies. For this purpose, this chapter
compiles a diverse range of works that can be seen as different variants of fictional
inquiry, including ideal-type thinking, figurative imagination, thought experiments,
counterfactual reasoning, simulation, and the empirical study of fictionalized data,
discussing these inquiries in relation to the three broad purposes defined above. A
key contribution of this chapter is thus to demonstrate that these diverse approaches
can be considered as part of a larger family of fictional inquiry in management
studies, thereby providing a general epistemology of ways of seeing reality and a set
of methodological tools (such as thought experiments and counterfactual reasoning)
to give shape to this inquiry. As argued at the very end of this chapter, this
epistemological orientation exhibits a particularly appropriate fit with management
studies as a field.
142 D. Schoeneborn and J. Cornelissen

Philosophical Foundations of the Epistemology of Fiction

Before elucidating the epistemology of fiction in relation to certain methodologies in

more detail, it is helpful to contextualize its positioning and to define the overall
concept of fiction mobilized in this chapter. Within the philosophy of science and
linguistic philosophy, there are a range of writers and writings that are often
collectively labelled as forming a “philosophy of fiction” (Savage et al. 2018,
p. 975). These include Vaihinger’s (1924) foundational work on the philosophy of
“as if,” Goodman’s (1978) work on counterfactuals and “worldmaking,” Searle’s
(1975) work on speech acts and fiction, Walton’s (1990) work on fiction and
pretense, Iser’s (1993) notion of fictionalizing acts, and Ricoeur’s (1979) philosophy
of fiction and imagination. Drawing on this body of work, the concept of fiction can
be most easily defined by focusing on the process of imagination by which fiction is
generated. In short, this process involves an intentional act of pretending that certain
realities apply, and as such is an essential exercise in almost any form of research,
e.g., in terms of abstracting or projecting certain stylized images or defining hypo-
thetical “constructs” (Podsakoff et al. 2016). This process follows an “as if” modality
by which a set of imaginings are entertained as if they were real and were potentially
descriptive and explanatory of the phenomenon or scenario studied. Because of this
modality, fictions carry with them a somewhat ambivalent epistemological position,
involving a kind of knowledge that may be consciously false but which nevertheless
serves a practical purpose (Vaihinger 1924).
Fictions are in many instances best understood as being not directly verifiable but
as “auxiliary constructs” (Vaihinger 1924, p. 88) that are pragmatically useful in
situations, e.g. in instances where we cannot directly rely on our sense impressions to
fathom a subject but rather must approach it indirectly through our imagination. For
example, when individuals personify an organization through speech (Taylor and
Cooren 1997), such a personification is fictive insofar as the image that it projects is
based on premises we merely pretend to be applicable for the purpose and in the
service of our sensemaking (Phillips 1995). An organization is, simply put, not
factually and literally a human actor of flesh and blood (Halgin et al. 2018).
However, the fictional invocation provides a helpful heuristic for structuring and
directing people’s thinking and thus affords a way of expressing and sharing an
understanding of what would otherwise remain an overly abstract and intractable
concept (cf. Searle 2010). Conceiving an organization in this way thus inevitably
involves an intentional act of imagination “because the creation of a reality that
exists only because we think it exists requires a certain level of imagination” (Searle
2010, p. 40). Such imagination, in turn, involves intentional acts of pretense (Searle
1975), since “we have to treat something as something that it is not intrinsically”
(Searle 2010, p. 121).
The intentional acts of pretense or imagination that constitute fictions are what
enable individuals – including individual researchers – to make sense of and
accordingly enact their understandings of organizations. This focus on the inten-
tionality of imagination, rather than on the fidelity or resonance of what is imagined,
stems from scholarship on fiction within the fields of representational philosophy
8 Fictional Inquiry 143

and symbolic anthropology (Goodman 1978; Iser 1993). It is this focus that distin-
guishes the approach to fiction adopted here from other dramaturgical and symbolic
approaches based on narrative fiction (see, for example, Gabriel 2000; Phillips
1995). Although imagination and pretense can also connote subjective and playful
fantasizing (March 1995), the meaning of fiction put forward here is in accordance
with that developed by Goodman (1978), which is closer to the Latin roots of the
term fictio and which designates serious and instrumental ways of pretending,
postulating, and hypothesizing. In this perspective, while fictions may be literally
false, at least initially, such falsehoods are not merely fanciful but rather serve direct
practical purposes. Taking up the earlier example of the fiction of corporate person-
hood, this fiction not only enables corporate governance and corporate law but also
facilitates the transaction of goods and resources in the real world (Fama and Jensen
1985). Instantiated in corporate imagery, corporate personification may even amplify
the consumption of products and services, turning such consumption into rich
symbolic experiences (Aaker 1997; Marchand 1998). Similarly, the use of fiction
in academic research helps us to grasp abstract phenomena, enabling us to form
novel and potentially useful ideas. The following sections focus on how this
happens, referring to a number of specific methodological tools by which fictional
imagination can be incorporated into the research process.

Purpose 1: Juxtaposing Fictional and Counterfactual Statements

Against Empirical Reality to Generate Novel Insights and Enhance
Our Understanding of That Reality

The epistemology of fiction set out in this section applies especially to the initial
stage of the scientific process, that is, to the genesis of new theoretical ideas. In
critical rationalist epistemology, also known as “falsificationism” (e.g., Popper
1934), which arguably remains the predominant epistemological orientation in the
natural and social sciences today, the process by which new theoretical ideas come
into being is considered as “pre-scientific” and thus as being located outside of the
scientific process as such. As argued in this chapter, however, this “pre-stage” is of
great importance for the advancement of scientific knowledge, comprising as it does
the systematic ways in which novel theoretical ideas are generated in the first place
(see also the notion of “disciplined imagination” by Weick 1989). The imagination
of fictional and counterfactual realities that can expand and illuminate the horizon of
potentialities constitutes an important mechanism for developing new theory
(Cornelissen and Durand 2014) – beyond attempts of representing or “mapping”
empirical reality by means of (law-like) scientific statements. Such forms of imag-
ination may be critical or normative in nature, serving as an antidote to current reality
and/or as an image of how things could or should be. The focus here is on the general
epistemology, regardless of the ends to which such forms of imagination are made to
serve.
This section present a range of approaches in which counterfactual and fictional
thinking is employed, particularly in the phase of theory development and discovery,
144 D. Schoeneborn and J. Cornelissen

that is, at the front-end of the research process. More specifically, the section
introduces and elucidates (1) ideal-type thinking and (2) figurative imagination as
two main forms of fictional inquiry.

Ideal Types
One classical form of fictional inquiry is the development of ideal types (Doty and
Glick 1994). Dating back to the works of the sociologist Max Weber (1904/1969),
ideal types are abstractions from social reality that are logically possible but are
usually not found as such in empirical reality. The development of ideal types is
systematic in that it takes its starting point in empirical reality but involves extending
instances and features of that reality to their logical limit and probing them as part of
conceptualized images or scenarios:

An ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by
the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent
concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged [. . .] into a unified analytical construct.
In its conceptual purity this mental construct cannot be found empirically anywhere in
reality. (Weber 1969, p. 90)

For Weber, ideal types are logically coherent, rational, and at least empirically
possible. At the same time, however, ideal types are not designed to describe
empirical reality as such. According to Popper’s (1934) “border of demarcation”
criterion, therefore, such ideal types would be part of metaphysics and not of the
social sciences because they are not falsifiable. Nevertheless, working with ideal
types can be useful in that they allow for comparing and contrasting analytically
“pure” concepts with actual empirical reality. Accordingly, ideal-type theorizing has
also found its way into the field of management and organization studies (e.g., Doty
and Glick 1994; Meyer et al. 1993; Scherer and Palazzo 2007). For instance,
Voegtlin and his colleagues (2012) have drawn on Habermasian theories of deliber-
ative democracy to develop their ideal type notion of “responsible leadership.” This
idealized notion imposes significant pressure on leaders and managers to consider
stakeholder demands and sensitivities in each and every step of their day-to-day
decision-making. While this ideal in its “pure” form may never be found in actual
managerial reality, the ideal type can nevertheless be analytically valuable as a
conceptual category for capturing the extent to which certain real-life constellations
more or less approximate to this ideal.
In the same context, it is important to note that ideal types in Weber’s initial
conceptualization are not necessarily “ideal” in the sense of being desirable but
rather in the sense of being abstracted from social reality. As shown in the well-
known example of the “homo economicus” (Thaler 1996), however, ideal types
often do end up being misunderstood as descriptive statements about empirical
reality or even as normative statements about how empirical reality should be like.
As such, ideal types may become embedded as base assumptions about empirical
reality rather than continuing to serve their original purpose as useful theoretical
abstractions to which empirical reality can be compared.
8 Fictional Inquiry 145

Figurative Imagination
A further important source of counterfactual and fictional thinking in theory devel-
opment is the figurative imagination of organization and management through the
use of metaphors, analogies, and other rhetorical figures (Morgan 1986; Tsoukas
1993). The work of Gareth Morgan (1986) has provided us with a rich overview of
how figurative imaginations of organization, including imagining an organization as
a machine, organism, or brain, have gained a foothold in the field of organization and
management studies and provided the basis for different theorizations of organiza-
tion. Indeed, comprehending organizations via metaphors and analogies is among
the most common and prominent ways of developing theories of organization
(cf. Cornelissen and Durand 2014; Shepherd and Sutcliffe 2015).
For the context of this inquiry, it is further important to note that, in contrast to
theories that aim to provide as-precise-as-possible representations of phenomena
(as in the case of Popperian epistemology), rhetorical figures such as metaphors and
analogies derive their heuristic value precisely from the distance and dissimilarity
between the epistemic domains they connect with one another. Anthropomorphic
metaphors such as organizational knowledge, memory, and learning, for example, all
benefit from the fact that the metaphor’s target domain (i.e., the organization) is in
many respects not identical with the metaphor’s source domain (i.e., the human
mind) (Schoeneborn et al. 2013). Such metaphors serve in this way to open up
avenues for developing new insights through analogical comparison. In other words,
it is the dissimilarity rather than the similarity between the metaphor and the
phenomenon under investigation that becomes the key driving force of novel
insights. As Cornelissen (2006, p. 1590) puts it:

[. . .] for a metaphor to be apt and effective, the conjoined target and source concepts need to
come from distant domains in our semantic memory; [this requires] the search for ‘between-
domains distance’, which must be fairly large for the metaphor to be effective because close
distances provide little interaction or surprise.

In this sense, therefore, the effective use of metaphors and other rhetorical figures
entails a certain balance or trade-off between their degree of aptness, which requires
a certain “fit” and similarity, and their heuristic value, which is typically increased by
distance and dissimilarity (see Cornelissen 2004, 2005).
A relevant example of the power of dissimilarity can be found in the metaphor of
“organizational sleep and insomnia” (Schoeneborn et al. 2013). While obviously
counterfactual in the sense that organizations do not sleep, at least not in the same
sense as humans, this metaphor can help generate novel readings and insights by
tapping into the source domain of the human mind, including recent research from
the neurosciences, to shed new light on the importance of processual rhythms in
organizational settings (akin to circadian wake-sleep cycles). By virtue of analogical
reasoning, as Schoeneborn et al. (2013) argue, the sleep metaphor is thus useful in
spite of the dissimilarities between these epistemic domains, serving in this case to
highlight the analogous and problematic tendencies of “social acceleration” (see also
Rosa 2013) that apply both to organizational entities and to individual beings. Again
146 D. Schoeneborn and J. Cornelissen

it should be reiterated that metaphors such as the image of organizational sleep are
not intended to “map” the empirical reality of organizations in the sense of providing
an exact correspondence, since otherwise they would merely serve to make the
similar more salient (Cornelissen 2005); rather the intention is to generate partly
counterfactual insights that stem precisely from the distance between the figurative
image and empirical reality.
Finally, it is important to note that the need for dissimilarity between domains in
such fictional inquiry should not be taken to imply that the greater the distance
between these domains the better. In line with Weick’s (1989) considerations on
disciplined imagination and thought trials, the onus here is on researchers to report
openly on the selection criteria applied for their figurative imaginations and the
heuristics by which they seek to connect (innovative) blends of domains (see also the
selection criteria outlined by Cornelissen 2006 or the model of the “responsible
actionability” of metaphors proposed by Schoeneborn et al. 2022). As Cornelissen
(2006, p. 1583) has argued, it is in the same spirit that “researchers need to creatively
search for new, possibly foreign concepts to compare metaphorically with the target
concept of organization in order to probe and possibly advance organization theory
further.” An important additional consideration in this respect is that figurative
imaginations usually differ from ideal-type thinking in the sense elaborated by
Weber, above all in the way that these theorizations relate to empirical reality.
More specifically, figurative imaginations do not serve as nonempirical concepts
by design but instead are employed to build bridges between different epistemic and
empirical domains, in this way facilitating the transferability of insights across these
domains, including even mutual and bidirectional transferability (see also
Schoeneborn et al. 2016). As such, the remnants of metaphors may make their
way into the very fabric of a theory and theoretical assumptions about reality, as in
the case of seeing an organization as a “nexus of contracts” or as an “open system” of
sorts. While initially being used in a heuristic manner, the implications and new
inferences generated by a metaphor may thus be extended into constructs, basic
explanations, and default assumptions, that is, into the underlying structure of
theoretical argumentation (Ketokivi et al. 2017).

Purpose 2: Juxtaposing Fictional/Counterfactual Statements Against

Other Scientific Statements to Probe and Refine These Statements

This section turns the focus of attention to a second main purpose of an epistemology
of fiction, that is, juxtaposing fictional or counterfactual statements against other
(representational or interpretative) statements in order to probe and refine these
statements. Three such forms of fictional inquiry are presented here in particular:
(a) counterfactual reasoning, (b) thought experiments, and (c) simulation.

Counterfactual Reasoning
At its core, a counterfactual is a statement in which a false or contrary-to-fact
premise is followed by some assertion about what would happen if the premise
8 Fictional Inquiry 147

were to be true. Counterfactual reasoning is not only common in our everyday

reasoning (see Paulsen 2014) but also has a rich history within the philosophy of
science. Counterfactual reasoning has been linked to questions of causation and
causal inference (Lewis 1973) as well as to possibilistic thinking that queries existing
beliefs and offers the basis for new ideas and candidate inferences (Goodman 1978).
In the context of causation, David Hume already hinted long ago at the importance of
counterfactuals for causal inferences. The philosopher David Lewis (1973, 1986)
has since elaborated Hume’s original ideas into a separate methodological approach
that recognizes how “we think of a cause as something that makes a difference, and
the difference it makes must be a difference from what would have happened without
it” (Lewis 1986, p. 160). The core idea in Lewis’ (1973, 1986) counterfactual
analysis is that of postulating “possible worlds” that function as disjuncture to the
actual world in which we have observed the presence of antecedent A and effect
B. The idea here is that there is an “actual world” which we observe and assume to be
true while at the same time we can imagine alternative possible worlds, that is, states
of affairs that might have been and where things might have worked out differently
in terms of causation. Some of these imagined worlds are, of course, “closer” (in a
metaphorical sense) than others, and Lewis has suggested that using more closely
imagined alternatives (i.e., more similar worlds) best serves to foster our ability of
establishing the dependency of B on A. By contrast, more remote alternatives are
prone to obscure the comparison of causal relationships. The idea here is that if we
systematically alter a possible antecedent A in an alternative possible world while
keeping everything else constant, we will be better able to decipher A’s effect on B in
the real world. If we do so while still depicting a plausible alternative scenario or
scenarios (in the absence of A), we can zoom in on factors that really matter, using
contrastive reasoning to filter out causal from noncausal dependencies in the real
world (Cornelissen and Durand 2014).
In Lewis’ approach to counterfactual reasoning, the reasoning undertaken by the
researcher in working out whether a premise about A affecting B is likely to be true is
largely conceptual in nature (Durand and Vaara 2009). Another stream of counter-
factual analysis is focused on testing and probing the stability and contours of a
presumed causal relationship (Collins et al. 2004; Woodward 2005). The latter
approach, known as “causal modeling” (Pearl 2000, 2018; Spirtes et al. 2000),
includes a range of techniques based on specifying a set of causal graphs or models
and then running counterfactual tests on them to establish the nature of the causal
relationship involved. Once researchers have formulated a model or graph based on a
presumed “primitive” causal mechanism, they can use counterfactual interventions
to test whether the presumed causal relationships hold, while also accounting for any
spurious effects in the coefficients estimated previously. Here the counterfactual
intervention would take the form of asking what would have happened to the causal
model if A had been absent. As an example, such an inquiry could include testing
whether a firm’s performance would be abnormal if we intervened to make sure that
the firm does not possess strategic resources and capabilities (Durand and Vaara
2009). The effect of the intervention can then be predicted by modifying the
corresponding equations representing the causal model and computing new
148 D. Schoeneborn and J. Cornelissen

probability functions as the surface manifestation of the presumed causal mechanism

(Beebee 2014).
Such counterfactual reasoning geared towards causal inference has been
described by Cornelissen and Durand (2014, p. 1006) as a “lab-rat form of counter-
factual reasoning” that “consists of a researcher contrasting a given actual scenario
with a reasonably different imagined scenario of causal patterns and associations” in
order to “exploit the carefully controlled structure of similarities and differences
between the actual and imagined situation to determine patterns of causality and the
plausibility of rival explanations.” In this kind of counterfactual reasoning, similar to
controlled manipulations in lab experiments (Turner 1996, 2001), the researcher first
attempts to isolate important causal factors and then imagines a comparable ana-
logue as the basis on which to construct plausible alternative theoretical scenarios
and to “test” alternative causal conjectures.
While there has been growing recognition of the role of counterfactual reasoning
in causal inference (Pearl 2018), it is less widely acknowledged that such reasoning
also plays an important role in querying existing conceptual assumptions, theoretical
interpretations and explanations, aiming thereby to check the plausibility of certain
assumptions and/or to generate new theoretical ideas and research questions
(Cornelissen and Durand 2014). Although such reasoning may be connected with
questions of causal inference (Cornelissen and Durand 2014), it is analytically
distinct to the extent that it merits discussion in its own right. One prominent way
in which such possibilistic thinking manifests, for example, is when researchers
reflect on base assumptions and default explanations concerning a particular topic,
interrogating and problematizing those assumptions and identifying possible alter-
natives (Alvesson and Sandberg 2011). Based on asking “what-if” questions in order
to think about a phenomenon differently, researchers construct alternative imagined
scenarios and possible worlds which may incorporate basic variables from a partic-
ular literature or default theory but do so in ways that reframe the subject and suggest
fresh leads and questions for research. Inserting alternative assumptions and expla-
nations comprises a form of analogical reasoning, albeit in this case with such
reasoning oriented towards providing an antidote to existing theoretical thought.
As thought experiments, the purpose of these kinds of “spotlight” counterfactuals
(Cornelissen and Durand 2014) is to highlight the features of a given theory or
literature in such a way as to prompt a rethinking of the theory’s underlying
assumptions and default logics. The counterfactual mirror image derived as a result
of this process typically comprises a basic structure that is easy to discern and which,
once pointed out, leads us to recognize the possibility of a different set of assump-
tions. The main aim is thus to stimulate reflexivity and to identify potential leads for
alternative lines of inquiry and theory (Reed 2011).
When these leads are extended into a more comprehensive theoretical frame,
counterfactual reasoning may take the form of what Cornelissen and Durand
(2014) have termed “constitutive” counterfactual reasoning. In such cases,
researchers reframe an entire topic in a comprehensively new manner, with a
new organizing frame that structures thinking, seeds a new set of theoretical
assumptions regarding the topic, and powers new inferences in the form of specific
8 Fictional Inquiry 149

interpretations and explanations. As Cornelissen and Durand (2014, p. 1006) have

argued, such reasoning involves “a complex blending of a proposed and prior
theoretical frame, whereby the combination of contrasts and similarities, together
with additional assumptions, is simulated and elaborated into an emergent con-
ceptual representation and inferences.” Constitutive counterfactual reasoning, as in
this example, expands theory in a completely new direction. In a single stroke, it
grounds a master frame with a new but logically related set of assumptions,
constructs, and causal inferences. The concept of such reasoning is informed by
philosopher Nelson Goodman’s work on “counterfactual conditionals” (1947).
Goodman argued that rather than operating on a focused set of assumptions, as
in the case of “spotlight counterfactuals,” entire new worlds of interpretation and
explanation come about when researchers adopt a broader approach to reasoning
and interject a completely new conceptual structure, including base assumptions
regarding certain classes of subjects and the causal or processual contingencies
typically involved in such cases. Although Goodman highlighted the contrast
between spotlight and constitutive counterfactuals (see also Fauconnier and Turner
1998), in many instances of research, it may be hard to differentiate these two
types. Indeed, a spotlight counterfactual may be expanded in the course of research
in terms of its scope and machinery to the extent that it becomes a constitutive
counterfactual (Cornelissen and Durand 2014).

Thought Experiments
A further and related form of fictional inquiry with a long history in the sciences
involves thought experiments. Within the social sciences, and in management
research, in particular, there is a widespread recognition that thought experiments
play a crucial role in theory development (see Folger and Turillo 1999). For
example, Simon (1991) used a creative thought experiment involving “a mythical
visitor from Mars” observing the Earth from above as a way of making the case that
organizations rather than markets are the dominant institution of today’s time. While
Simon’s thought experiment was largely educational or illustrative in purpose, other
thought experiments have given shape to entirely new theories. For example, Coase
(1937, p. 388) conducted a thought experiment that asked the main question, “why is
there any organization” if production activities are mechanically driven by price
movements in the market. He envisaged a world governed by markets but also one
mediated by organizations. Coase’s thought experiment centered on the following
two questions (1937, p. 388): (1) “Having regard to the fact that if production is
regulated by price movements, production could be carried on without any organi-
sation at all, well might we ask, why is there any organisation?” and (2) “Why are
some production activities organized in firms rather than markets?” Questions of this
kind laid the basis for transaction costs economics, which has since become one of
the most well-established theories in management and economics. Thought exper-
iments can thus generate new vantage points and newly imagined scenarios that, in
turn, can form the basis for extended theorizing (Folger and Turillo 1999). When
such experiments are done well, moreover, they can also generate new kinds of
conceptual vocabularies that previously did not exist. The question thus arises as to
150 D. Schoeneborn and J. Cornelissen

how a researcher can design and conduct a thought experiment in ways that generate
the potential for useful new theories.
Karl Weick’s (1989) notion of “disciplined imagination” offers a specific
methodology for conducting effective thought experiments. Weick likens theory
construction to an evolutionary process by which researchers first imagine various
representations of a target subject before running these images in their minds and
then selecting the most viable image for further theorizing and research.
Researchers commonly engage in a number of mental experiments or thought
trials when they iterate between reviewed literature, preliminary analyses, back-
ground assumptions, and their own intuition, considering a rich cascade of images
as representations of the subject or problem at hand (imagination) before selecting
and deciding upon a single image that best serves as a starting point for further
inquiry into the problem (discipline). Disciplined imagination is thus typically
abductive and includes a combination of deductive reasoning based upon readings
of the relevant literature and inductive reasoning through intuitive thinking rather
than an exclusive focus on either (Weick 1989). In Weick’s (1989, p. 529) own
words: “Theorists depend on pictures, maps, and metaphors to grasp the object of
study, and have no choice [in this], but can be more deliberate in the formation of
these images and more respectful of representations and efforts to improve them.”
Once researchers have formed such images and mapped them out to some extent,
the next step is to select the most plausible and promising image through the
application of particular selection criteria. These selection criteria are essentially
heuristics for gauging the potential of an image for theory and research, including
questions such as whether or not the image is interesting, real, relevant, and
connected to other ideas, observations, and images. With this process of “disci-
plined imagination,” Weick places emphasis on the process of theorizing itself
rather than its outputs, as well as on how imagination can be fostered by this
process.
A recent paper on thought experiments by Kornberger and Mantere (2020)
extends the creative aspect of thought experiments in Weick’s work with a focus
on the critical functions of such experiments. In their view, thought experiments can
be used to problematize existing theoretical understandings by highlighting limita-
tions and unforeseen implications in order to reveal the problematic nature of any
taken-for-granted assumptions underlying theories. This critical emphasis can be
traced back to Popper (1959), who considered thought experiments as viable tools
for exploring the full range of implications of a theory and its possible unintended or
unforeseen consequences in depth. Kornberger and Mantere (2020) further highlight
how analogy, metaphor, and fiction often comprise the key ingredients and building
blocks of thought experiments. This is the case in creative as well as in critical
thought experiments, since both types involve researchers alternating between
possible theoretical worlds, imaginatively completing and elaborating a set of
ideas or thoughts and mentally running through the full scenario in their minds
(and/or on paper). Given the extent to which many thought experiments rely on these
elements, indeed, it is sometimes hard to distinguish clearly between a thought
experiment and a counterfactual analysis. As such, many counterfactuals of the
8 Fictional Inquiry 151

constitutive kind (see above) can be considered as thought experiments and vice
versa.
In addition to offering new imagery (Weick 1989), including new theoretical
grounds and ways of thinking about a subject, thought experiments can also provide
a direct basis for novel concepts that can channel research in new directions. This
was largely the case with transaction cost economics, for example, where a new
conception of organization (as a production vehicle mediating in markets) gave rise
to a whole range of new questions and directions for research. Kornberger and
Mantere (2020) single out this important role of thought experiments, highlighting
how they can form the basis for new conceptual combinations and leaps that can be
turned into generative concepts. One example they offer is a new image with which
to highlight how the nature of managerial control and indeed the role of managers
may be changing in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic when so many pro-
fessionals are increasingly working at home. Specifically, the authors evoke the
image of a manager as a “rent collector” as a way of capturing this altered role as a
result of the changes to coordination and control entailed in this newly distributed
setting. Kornberger and Mantere (2020, p. 10) derive this image from a systemati-
cally developed and elaborated thought experiment which:

[. . .] focuses on the aspect of control in organizing work in a distributed organization. [. . .]

The transactional relationship between labour contract parties is elevated and the social,
cultural and political aspects of organization become ornamental at best. Digitally charged
Fordist managers that reverse-colonialize the home are rewarded for measuring, incentiviz-
ing and extracting outputs from individuals working from home. It is easy, following this
line of reasoning, to extrapolate to a panoptic setting where the job of the manager will be
handled more ‘effectively’, and ‘impartially’ by an AI, perhaps even a digital character such
as the agents in the movie The Matrix.

Simulation
Another key means of testing and refining existing theoretical assumptions is via
formal modeling and computer-based simulations. Formal models and simulations
have a long-standing tradition in the field of management studies (Hannah et al.
2021; Harrison et al. 2007), including James March’s (1991) classical model of
exploration and exploitation in organizational learning and Cohen et al.’s (1972)
“garbage-can model of organizational choice.”
Two basic types of simulation models can be distinguished. One type generates
probabilistic values derived from observed empirical data (e.g., Pentland et al. 2010),
as in the classic example of weather forecasting based on past data about weather
dynamics. Another type of model makes use of “synthetic data,” that is, data
generated deductively and not derived directly from real-life settings. Scholars
tend to draw on this data type either because certain data are nonexistent or
inaccessible or because such data would be very costly to collect (Louie and Carley
2008). Such synthetic data enables the exploration of basic (causal) mechanisms
between variables. Both types of simulation models (i.e., based either on observed or
synthetic data) can be used to extrapolate and explore nonempirical and counterfac-
tual “what-if” scenarios.
152 D. Schoeneborn and J. Cornelissen

Formal modeling and simulation is not an empirical approach as such, but rather
is located in a space in between theory and empirics. Typically, simulation models
are employed as a tool for theory development and theory testing (see Hannah et al.
2021; Harrison et al. 2007). Since formal models inevitably require abstraction from
empirical reality, they rely on the parsimony principle, also known as “Ockham’s
razor” or the “law of briefness” (e.g., Meier and O’Toole 2008), i.e., the aim of
combining model simplicity (and elegance) with explanatory and predictive power.
While the relatively high degree of abstraction of simulation models may initially
seem like a disadvantage, such abstraction allows models to be used for testing
theories in research areas that are difficult, complex, or costly to investigate through
other empirical means (Hannah et al. 2021). For instance, Haack et al. (2021) have
employed a Markov model to study the interplay between the field-level and
organizational-level dynamics of CSR practice adoption in a combined way,
enabling them to explore dynamics that would otherwise require large-scale and
multisite ethnographic research.

Purpose 3: Studying Fictional Realities as Objects of Inquiry in Their

Own Right and Examining Their Impact on Actual Empirical Realities

This section outlines a set of approaches in which counterfactual or fictional thinking

plays a role in the middle or back-end of the research process, that is, as objects of
inquiry in their own right. One way in which fiction can enter the research process in
this way is when fictionalized content from novels, movies, TV shows, or other
forms of performative art is treated as the main data source of a research study
(Rhodes and Parker 2008). In studying management and organizations, for example,
some scholars have drawn on fictionalized content such as TV shows, ranging from
The Simpsons (Ellis 2008) to The Wire (Zundel et al. 2013). Fictional data is
counterfactual in the sense that it draws on staged and fabricated content that often
exaggerates or dramatizes real-life settings. Scholars have argued that such fiction-
alized content can serve as a valuable source of data in its own right, not necessarily
in the sense of providing a glimpse through the peephole into real-life settings but
rather as affording a way to study cultural manifestations and imaginations of
management and organization (e.g., Griffin et al. 2017; Rhodes and Parker 2008).
Moreover, some fictionalized content is grounded in quasi-ethnographic work
(e.g., the TV series The Wire was based on the diligent work of journalist David
Simon, who studied the homicide division of the Baltimore police for more than a
year), and thus can provide researchers with in-depth insights into certain societal
milieus that would otherwise be inaccessible or hard to capture and collect (Zundel
et al. 2013). A key task for the researcher, in this case, is to distinguish (e.g., by
means of triangulation with other sources) which aspects of fictionalized data are
derived directly from ethnographic insights and which ones are mere exaggerations
or extrapolations.
As Paulsen (2014) points out, moreover, counterfactual and fictional thinking is
part of our day-to-day social life. With the term “everyday counterfactuals,” Paulsen
8 Fictional Inquiry 153

refers to our recurrent imaginations of alternative realities in the sense of “what could
be” or “what could have been.” With reference to the works of Sartre, Bloch, and
Marcuse, he argues that “the human being is first and foremost a creature that
projects itself into potentiality” (Paulsen 2014, p. 162). Accordingly, Paulsen calls
for researchers to investigate the ways in which counterfactual thinking shapes our
social life, potentially by means of other epistemologies. In the context of manage-
ment and organization studies, meanwhile, Durand and Vaara (2009) have pointed to
the importance of counterfactual thinking and what-if scenarios for strategy-making.
Savage et al. (2018) have linked the importance of counterfactual thinking to a
fundamental reconsideration of the notion of organization. In their article on fiction
in organization studies, they unfold a fictional ontology of organization, arguing that
counterfactual games of make-believe in which actors act on behalf of “the organi-
zation” as a fictional entity (see also Ortmann 2004) are ultimately what constitute
organizations in the first place:

Fiction is in this sense not simply a heuristic for understanding organizations but it is the
core, or constitutive, process through which organizations are imagined and made sense of,
and that shapes in a very real sense how people act around them. (Savage et al. 2018, p. 978)

This view invites us to study the micro-processes of “fictional games of make-

believe” through which organizations are recurrently “made up.”
Other scholars have emphasized the importance of fictional accounts and fanta-
sies of the future in fostering intraorganizational and cross-organizational change.
For example, in the context of geoengineering, defined as “radical, deliberate,
planetary-scale technological interventions into the earth’s atmospheric, oceanic,
or terrestrial systems,” Augustine et al. (2019, p. 1930) have demonstrated that
“societal-level imaginaries” of geoengineering “increasingly [have] been treated as
an ‘as-if’ reality.” The authors develop a process model to explain how imagined/
hypothetical distant futures of geoengineering have attained such a degree of
concreteness and credibility that they have come to be taken for “as-if” realities,
even to the extent that actors can orient their behavior toward these imaginaries.
Their study vividly illustrates how counterfactual and fictional imaginations of the
distant future can yield strong formative effects in the here and now (see also Beckert
2016). Such studies further help us to theorize how fictions become “future-making
practices” (see Wenzel et al. 2020).
Similarly, Christensen et al. (2013) argue that “aspirational talk” in the form of a
company’s fictional account of its prospective future achievements in the areas of
CSR and sustainability should not be condemned as mere “greenwashing.” Rather it
is precisely because of the discrepancy between such talk about future states of
affairs and current business practices that fictional and aspirational talk can serve as
an important resource for organizational and social change, as indeed has also been
shown both through empirical studies (e.g., Haack et al. 2012; Penttilä 2020) and
simulation-based studies (Haack et al. 2021). In sum, questions about the ways in
which counterfactual and fictional thinking can influence organizational realities as
this kind of thinking becomes manifest in communications constitute an exciting
154 D. Schoeneborn and J. Cornelissen

avenue of research. Such questions place the locus of inquiry on practices of

meaning-making about organizations rather than using such data as windows into
the supposedly underlying objective reality of organizations implied by representa-
tionalist epistemologies.

Conclusion: Toward an Epistemology of Fiction in Management

Studies

This chapter has laid out the contours of an epistemological orientation in organiza-
tion and management studies that relies on counterfactual and fictional thinking. The
main contribution of this chapter is twofold. First, it has systematically illuminated
the horizon of possibilities in which counterfactual and fictional thinking can enter
the research process. At the same time, the systematization of these various and
heterogeneous approaches is by no means exhaustive but rather selective, being
based primarily on approaches which have already gained significant attention in
management and organization studies. Second, the chapter has added to existing
representational and emancipatory epistemological orientations in management and
organization studies by foregrounding the role of a third epistemology, i.e., that of
fictional orientation.
An epistemology of fiction is not principally concerned with representational
mappings of a presumed objective reality but strives instead to diversify the range of
lenses through which social, managerial, and organizational realities can be per-
ceived and understood. Accordingly, one of the paramount tasks of such epistemo-
logical orientation is the development of new theoretical vocabularies and imageries
(through ideal-type thinking, figurative imaginations, counterfactual thinking, and
thought experiments, as outlined above) that could constitute a basis for downstream
theorizing, such as forming conjectures and hypotheses, developing theoretical
models, and (re)defining base assumptions.
Furthermore, an epistemology of fiction can be said to exhibit a particular fit with
management as a science and practice. This is because such an orientation is focused
on providing new ways of seeing (cf. Shaw et al. 2017) and thus can help widen the
range of options for organizational and managerial actions. Indeed, one might go so
far as to ask whether an epistemology of fiction could provide the science of
management with an epistemology sui generis. The answer to this is almost certainly
negative, of course, since counterfactual and fictional thinking is also prominently
represented in other forms of science and philosophy more generally (see Rescher
2001). Nevertheless, it can be argued that interest in fictional and counterfactual
thinking, in the sense of broadening the option range for organizational and mana-
gerial action, is especially pronounced in management studies, not least as a way of
affording researchers the flexibility to handle the large-scale and complex societal
challenges of today’s times. Moreover, counterfactual thinking can be found across
the various epistemological orientations in management science, including in the
form of testing counterfactual hypotheses in (descriptive-explanatory) multivariate
causal models and in the form of ideal-typical modeling of utopian or dystopian
8 Fictional Inquiry 155

worlds in (normative) critical management studies. In this sense, attending to fiction

also enables us to identify certain frequently overlooked similarities among different
epistemological orientations in management studies.
In the same context, however, it is important to note that an epistemology of
fiction should not be misunderstood as an invitation for an “anything goes” approach
(Feyerabend 1976). On the contrary, and in the spirit of Weick’s (1989) notion of
“disciplined imagination,” an epistemology of fiction calls for researchers to substi-
tute (missing empirical) validity with considerations of plausibility (Weick 1989,
p. 524) and to lay bare the systematic and disciplined character of their inquiry in an
intersubjectively comprehensible manner (see also Cornelissen 2006). As further-
more shown in this chapter, an epistemology of fiction exhibits a strong proximity to
abductive (rather than deductive or inductive) forms of theorizing (cf. Mantere and
Ketokivi 2013; Weick 1989). At the same time, the selection of certain idealizations
for use in as-if scenarios, thought experiments, and other ways of generating
synthetic data, etc., should not be guided solely by the aim of developing new
ways of seeing but also by ethical considerations of what the researcher deems to
be “right.” This requires researchers to be modest about their abilities to control the
meaning of their own theorizations and idealizations and thus to consider the often
unintended effects of these forms of theorizing. (In this regard, see also the some-
what caricaturesque history of the ideal type of the “homo economicus” and the
significant performative effects it has created; Morgan 2006).
Notwithstanding these potential risks, if these forms of imagination are under-
taken in the right manner and with due care and consideration, they can be
immensely useful as heuristic devices to “feed” theory development and to expand
our ways of thinking about, understanding and explaining complex subjects such as
organizations, institutions, and grand societal challenges.

Cross-References

▶ Critical Inquiry
▶ Evidence-Based Management
▶ How Methods of Moral Philosophy Inform Business
▶ Realist Inquiry

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