G.R. No. 72706 October 27, 1987
On the
CONSTANTINO C. ACAIN, vs. IAC
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of respondent.
Court of Appeals in AC-G.R. SP No. 05744 promulgated on August 30, 1985
(Rollo, p. 108) ordering the dismissal of the petition in Special Proceedings
No, 591 ACEB and its Resolution issued on October 23, 1985 (Rollo, p. 72)
denying respondents' (petitioners herein) motion for reconsideration.
The dispositive portion of the questioned decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and respondent Regional Trial
Court of the Seventh Judicial Region, Branch XIII (Cebu City), is hereby
ordered to dismiss the petition in Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB No
special pronouncement is made as to costs.
The antecedents of the case, based on the summary of the Intermediate
Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, (Rollo, pp. 108-109) are as follows:
On May 29, 1984 petitioner Constantino Acain filed on the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City Branch XIII, a petition for the probate of the will of the
late Nemesio Acain and for the issuance to the same petitioner of letters
testamentary, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB (Rollo, p.
29), on the premise that Nemesio Acain died leaving a will in which
petitioner and his brothers Antonio, Flores and Jose and his sisters Anita,
Concepcion, Quirina and Laura were instituted as heirs. The will allegedly
executed by Nemesio Acain on February 17, 1960 was written in Bisaya
(Rollo, p. 27) with a translation in English (Rollo, p. 31) submi'tted by
petitioner without objection raised by private respondents. The will contained
provisions on burial rites, payment of debts, and the appointment of a certain
Atty. Ignacio G. Villagonzalo as the executor of the testament.
disposition of the testator's property, the will provided:
THIRD: All my shares that I may receive from our properties. house, lands
and money which I earned jointly with my wife Rosa Diongson shall all be
given by me to my brother SEGUNDO ACAIN Filipino, widower, of legal age
and presently residing at 357-C Sanciangko Street, Cebu City. In case my
brother Segundo Acain pre-deceased me, all the money properties, lands,
houses there in Bantayan and here in Cebu City which constitute my share
shall be given to me to his children, namely: Anita, Constantino,
Concepcion, Quirina, laura, Flores, Antonio and Jose, all surnamed Acain.
Obviously, Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio. Thus it is the children of
Segundo who are claiming to be heirs, with Constantino as the petitioner in
Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB
After the petition was set for hearing in the lower court on June 25, 1984 the
oppositors (respondents herein Virginia A. Fernandez, a legally adopted
daughter of tile deceased and the latter's widow Rosa Diongson Vda. de
Acain filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds for the petitioner
has no legal capacity to institute these proceedings; (2) he is merely a
universal heir and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been
pretirited. (Rollo, p. 158). Said motion was denied by the trial judge.
After the denial of their subsequent motion for reconsideration in the lower
court, respondents filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction which was subsequently referred to
the Intermediate Appellate Court by Resolution of the Court dated March 11,
1985 (Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 3; Rollo, p. 159).
Respondent Intermediate Appellate Court granted private respondents'
petition and ordered the trial court to dismiss the petition for the probate of
the will of Nemesio Acain in Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB
1
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed this
present petition for the review of respondent Court's decision on December
18, 1985 (Rollo, p. 6). Respondents' Comment was filed on June 6, 1986
(Rollo, p. 146).
On August 11, 1986 the Court resolved to give due course to the petition
(Rollo, p. 153). Respondents' Memorandum was filed on September 22,
1986 (Rollo, p. 157); the Memorandum for petitioner was filed on September
29, 1986 (Rollo, p. 177).
Petitioner raises the following issues (Memorandum for petitioner, p. 4):
(A) The petition filed in AC-G.R. No. 05744 for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction is not the proper remedy under the premises;
(B) The authority of the probate courts is limited only to inquiring into the
extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated and it cannot pass upon
the intrinsic validity thereof before it is admitted to probate;
(C) The will of Nemesio Acain is valid and must therefore, be admitted to
probate. The preterition mentioned in Article 854 of the New Civil Code
refers to preterition of "compulsory heirs in the direct line," and does not
apply to private respondents who are not compulsory heirs in the direct line;
their omission shall not annul the institution of heirs;
(D) DICAT TESTATOR ET MERIT LEX. What the testator says will be the
law;
(E) There may be nothing in Article 854 of the New Civil Code, that suggests
that mere institution of a universal heir in the will would give the heir so
instituted a share in the inheritance but there is a definite distinct intention of
the testator in the case at bar, explicitly expressed in his will. This is what
matters and should be in violable.
(F) As an instituted heir, petitioner has the legal interest and standing to file
the petition in Sp. Proc. No. 591 ACEB for probate of the will of Nemesio
Acain and
(G) Article 854 of the New Civil Code is a bill of attainder. It is therefore
unconstitutional and ineffectual.
Issue
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not private respondents have
been pretirited.
Article 854 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory
heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will
or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but
the devisees and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not; inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution
shall he effectual, without prejudice to the right of representation.
Petition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or
anyone of them either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though
mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited
(Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 450 [1966]; Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114
SCRA 478 [1982]). Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 of the
Civil Code may not apply as she does not ascend or descend from the
testator, although she is a compulsory heir. Stated otherwise, even if the
surviving spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no preterition even if she is
omitted from the inheritance, for she is not in the direct line. (Art. 854, Civil
code) however, the same thing cannot be said of the other respondent
Virginia A. Fernandez, whose legal adoption by the testator has not been
questioned by petitioner (.Memorandum for the Petitioner, pp. 8-9). Under
Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code,
2
adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he
were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal
heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she has totally omitted and
preterited in the will of the testator and that both adopted child and the
widow were deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that
they were not expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of
preterition of the legally adopted child.
Pretention annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to
intestate succession the entire inheritance including "la porcion libre (que)
no hubiese dispuesto en virtual de legado mejora o donacion" Maniesa as
cited in Nuguid v. Nuguid, supra; Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA
[1982]). The only provisions which do not result in intestacy are the legacies
and devises made in the will for they should stand valid and respected,
except insofar as the legitimes are concerned.
The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to
the entire inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will
because the nullification of such institution of universal heirs-without any
other testamentary disposition in the will-amounts to a declaration that
nothing at all was written. Carefully worded and in clear terms, Article 854 of
the Civil Code offers no leeway for inferential interpretation (Nuguid v.
Nuguid), supra. No legacies nor devises having been provided in the will the
whole property of the deceased has been left by universal title to petitioner
and his brothers and sisters. The effect of annulling the "Institution of heirs
will be, necessarily, the opening of a total intestacy (Neri v. Akutin, 74 Phil.
185 [1943]) except that proper legacies and devises must, as already stated
above, be respected.
We now deal with another matter. In order that a person may be allowed to
intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an interest iii the estate, or
in the will, or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or as a
claimant of the estate and an interested party is one who would be benefited
by the estate such as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like
a creditor (Sumilang v. Ramagosa, 21 SCRA 1369/1967). Petitioner is not
the appointed executor, neither a devisee or a legatee there being no
mention in the testamentary disposition of any gift of an individual item of
personal or real property he is called upon to receive (Article 782, Civil
Code). At the outset, he appears to have an interest in the will as an heir,
defined under Article 782 of the Civil Code as a person called to the
succession either by the provision of a will or by operation of law. However,
intestacy having resulted from the preterition of respondent adopted child
and the universal institution of heirs, petitioner is in effect not an heir of the
testator. He has no legal standing to petition for the probate of the will left by
the deceased and Special Proceedings No. 591 A-CEB must be dismissed.
As a general rule certiorari cannot be a substitute for appeal, except when
the questioned order is an oppressive exercise of j judicial authority (People
v. Villanueva, 110 SCRA 465 [1981]; Vda. de Caldito v. Segundo, 117
SCRA 573 [1982]; Co Chuan Seng v. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 308
[1984]; and Bautista v. Sarmiento, 138 SCRA 587 [1985]). It is axiomatic
that the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are not available where the
petitioner has the remedy of appeal or some other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the course of law (DD Comendador Construction
Corporation v. Sayo (118 SCRA 590 [1982]). They are, however, proper
remedies to correct a grave abuse of discretion of the trial court in not
dismissing a case where the dismissal is founded on valid grounds (Vda. de
Bacang v. Court of Appeals, 125 SCRA 137 [1983]).
Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB is for the probate of a will. As stated by
respondent Court, the general rule is that the probate court's authority is
limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the
testator's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or
solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally
comes only after the Court has declared that the will has been duly
3
authenticated. Said court at this stage of the proceedings is not called upon
to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will (Nuguid
v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 449 [1966]; Sumilang v. Ramagosa, supra; Maninang v.
Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478 [1982]; Cayetano v. Leonides, 129 SCRA
522 [1984]; and Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 206 [1985]).
The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Under exceptional
circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation
constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will (Nepomuceno
v. Court of Appeals, supra). In Nuguid v. Nuguid the oppositors to the
probate moved to dismiss on the ground of absolute preteriton The probate
court acting on the motion held that the will in question was a complete
nullity and dismissed the petition without costs. On appeal the Supreme
Court upheld the decision of the probate court, induced by practical
considerations. The Court said:
We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will,
nothing will be gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And
for aught that appears in the record, in the event of probate or if the court
rejects the will, probability exists that the case will come up once again
before us on the same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will.
Result: waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the
practical considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as well meet
head-on the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in question. After
all there exists a justiciable controversy crying for solution.
In Saguimsim v. Lindayag (6 SCRA 874 [1962]) the motion to dismiss the
petition by the surviving spouse was grounded on petitioner's lack of legal
capacity to institute the proceedings which was fully substantiated by the
evidence during the hearing held in connection with said motion. The Court
upheld the probate court's order of dismissal.
In Cayetano v. Leonides, supra one of the issues raised in the motion to
dismiss the petition deals with the validity of the provisions of the will.
Respondent Judge allowed the probate of the will. The Court held that as on
its face the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner the respondent
judge should have denied its probate outright. Where circumstances
demand that intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions be passed upon
even before the extrinsic validity of the will is resolved, the probate court
should meet the issue. (Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, supra; Nuguid v.
Nuguid, supra).
In the instant case private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition
in Sp. Proceedings No. 591 ACEB of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu on
the following grounds: (1) petitioner has no legal capacity to institute the
proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir; and (3) the widow and the
adopted daughter have been preterited (Rollo, p. 158). It was denied by the
trial court in an order dated January 21, 1985 for the reason that "the
grounds for the motion to dismiss are matters properly to be resolved after a
hearing on the issues in the course of the trial on the merits of the case
(Rollo, p. 32). A subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied by the
trial court on February 15, 1985 (Rollo, p. 109).
For private respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will and allowed
the case to progress when on its face the will appears to be intrinsically void
as petitioner and his brothers and sisters were instituted as universal heirs
coupled with the obvious fact that one of the private respondents had been
preterited would have been an exercise in futility. It would have meant a
waste of time, effort, expense, plus added futility. The trial court could have
denied its probate outright or could have passed upon the intrinsic validity of
the testamentary provisions before the extrinsic validity of the will was
resolved (Cayetano v. Leonides, supra; Nuquid v. Nuguid, supra. The
remedies of certiorari and prohibition were properly availed of by private
respondents.
4
Thus, this Court ruled that where the grounds for dismissal are indubitable,
the defendants had the right to resort to the more speedy, and adequate
remedies of certiorari and prohibition to correct a grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, committed by the trial court in not
dismissing the case, (Vda. de Bacang v. Court of Appeals, supra) and even
assuming the existence of the remedy of appeal, the Court harkens to the
rule that in the broader interests of justice, a petition for certiorari may be
entertained, particularly where appeal would not afford speedy and
adequate relief. (Maninang Court of Appeals, supra).

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit

and the questioned decision of respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on
August 30, 1985 and its Resolution dated October 23, 1985 are hereby
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

5
G.R. No. L-47799 June 13, 1941
Administration of the estate of Agripino Neri y Chavez. ELEUTERIO NERI,
ET AL. vs. IGNACIA AKUTIN AND HER CHILDRENMORAN, J.:
Agripino Neri y Chavez, who died on December 12, 1931, had by his first
marriage six children named Eleuterio, Agripino, Agapito, Getulia, Rosario
and Celerina; and by his second marriage with Ignacia Akutin, five children
named Gracia, Godofredo, Violeta, Estela Maria, and Emma. Getulia,
daughter in the first marriage, died on October 2, 1923, that is, a little less
than eight years before the death of said Agripino Neri y Chavez, and was
survived by seven children named Remedios, Encarnacion, Carmen,
Trinidad, Luz, Alberto and Minda. In Agripino Neri's testament, which was
admitted to probate on March 21, 1932, he willed that his children by the first
marriage shall have no longer any participation in his estate, as they had
already received their corresponding shares during his lifetime. At the
hearing for the declaration of heirs, the trial court found, contrary to what the
testator had declared in his will, that all his children by the first and second
marriages intestate heirs of the deceased without prejudice to one-half of the
improvements introduced in the properties during the existence of the last
conjugal partnership, which should belong to Ignacia Akutin. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision with the modification that the will
was "valid with respect to the two-thirds part which the testator could freely
dispose of. "This judgment of the Court of Appeals is now sought to be
reviewed in this petition for certiorari.
Issues:
The decisive question here raised is whether, upon the foregoing facts, the
omission of the children of the first marriage annuls the institution of the
children of the first marriage as sole heirs of the testator, or whether the will
may be held valid, at least with respect to one-third of the estate which the
testator may dispose of as legacy and to the other one-third which he may
bequeath as betterment, to said children of the second marriage.
The Court of Appeals invoked the provisions of article 851 of the Civil Code,
which read in part as follows:
Disinheritance made without a statement of the cause, or for a cause the
truth of which, if contradicted, is not proven, ... shall annul the institution of
the heir in so far as it prejudices the person disinherited; but the legacies,
betterments, and other testamentary dispositions, in so far as they do no
encroach upon the legitime, shall be valid.
The appellate court thus seemed to have rested its judgment upon the
impression that the testator had intended to disinherit, though ineffectively,
the children of the first marriage. There is nothing in the will that supports
this conclusion. True, the testator expressly denied them any share in his
estate; but the denial was predicated, not upon the desire to disinherit, but
upon the belief, mistaken though it was, that the children by the first
marriage had already received more than their corresponding shares in his
lifetime in the form of advancement. Such belief conclusively negatives all
inference as to any intention to disinherit, unless his statement to that effect
is prove to be deliberately fictitious, a fact not found by the Court of Appeals.
The situation contemplated in the above provision is one in which the
purpose to disinherit is clear, but upon a cause not stated or not proved, a
situation which does not obtain in the instant case.
The Court of Appeals quotes Manresa thus:
En el terreno de los principios, la solucion mas justa del problema que
hemos hecho notar al comentar el articulo, seria distinguir el caso en que el
heredero omitido viviese al otorgarse el testamento, siendo conocida su
existencia por el testador, de aquel en que, o naciese despues, o se
ignorase su existencia, aplicando en el primer caso la doctrina del articulo
851, y en el segundo la del 814. (6 Manresa, 354-355.)
6
But it must be observed that this opinion is founded on mere principles (en el
terreno de los principios) and not on the express provisions of the law.
Manresa himself admits that according to law, "no existe hoy cuestion
alguna en esta materia: la pretericion produce siempre los mismos efectos,
ya se refiera a personas vivas al hacer el testamento o nacidas despues.
Este ultimo grupo solo puede hacer relacion a los descendientes legitimos,
siempre que ademas tengan derecho a legitima." (6 Manresa, 381.)
Appellants, on the other hand, maintain that the case is one of voluntary
preterition of four of the children by the first marriage, and of involuntary
preterition of the children by the deceased Getulia, also of the first marriage,
and is thus governed by the provisions of article 814 of the Civil Code, which
read in part as follows:
The preterition of one or all of the forced heirs in the direct line, whether
living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the
testator, shall void the institution of heir; but the legacies and betterments
shall be valid, in so far as they are not inofficious.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or
anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though
mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly
disinherited.(Cf. 6 Manresa, 346.) In the instant case, while the children of
the first marriage were mentioned in the will, they were not accorded any
share in the heriditary property, without expressly being disinherited. It is,
therefore, a clear case of preterition as contended by appellants. The
omission of the forced heirs or anyone of them, whether voluntary or
involuntary, is a preterition if the purpose to disinherit is not expressly made
or is not at least manifest.
Code; Decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain of June 17, 1908 and
February 27, 1909.) In the instant case, no such legacies or betterments
have been made by the testator. "Mejoras" or betterments must be
expressly provided, according to articles 825 and 828 of the Civil Code, and
where no express provision therefor is made in the will, the law would
presume that the testator had no intention to that effect. (Cf. 6 Manresa,
479.) In the will here in question, no express betterment is made in favor of
the children by the second marriage; neither is there any legacy expressly
made in their behalf consisting of the third available for free disposal. The
whole inheritance is accorded the heirs by the second marriage upon the
mistaken belief that the heirs by the first marriage have already received
their shares. Were it not for this mistake, the testator's intention, as may be
clearly inferred from his will, would have been to divide his property equally
among all his children.
Judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and that of the trial court
affirmed, without prejudice to the widow's legal usufruct, with costs against
respondents.

Except as to "legacies and betterments" which "shall be valid in so far as

they are not inofficious" (art. 814 of the Civil Code), preterition avoids the
institution of heirs and gives rise to intestate succession. (Art. 814, Civil

7
G.R. No. 137287 February 15, 2000
REBECCA VIADO NON, JOSE A. NON and DELIA VIADO, vs. CA
VITUG, J.:
Petitioners, in their petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, seek a reversal of the 29th May 1996 decision of the Court
of Appeals, basically affirming that rendered on 30 April 1991 by the
Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Queron City, Branch 23, adjudicating the
property subject matter of the litigation to respondents. The case and the
factual settings found by the Court of Appeals do not appear to deviate
significantly from that made by the trial court.
During their lifetime, the spouses Julian C. Viado and Virginia P. Viado
owned several pieces of property, among them a house and lot located at
147 Isarog Street, La Loma, Quezon City, covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 42682. Virginia P. Viado died on 20 October 1982. Julian C. Viado
died three years later on 15 November 1985. Surviving them were their
children — Nilo Viado, Leah Viado Jacobs, and herein petitioners Rebecca
Viado, married to Jose Non, and Delia Viado. Nilo Viado and Leah Viado
Jacobs both died on 22 April 1987. Nilo Viado left behind as his own sole
heirs herein respondents — his wife Alicia Viado and their two children
Cherri Viado and Fe Fides Viado.
Petitioners and respondents shared, since 1977, a common residence at the
Isarog property. Soon, however, tension would appear to have escalated
between petitioner Rebecca Viado and respondent Alicia Viado after the
former had asked that the property be equally divided between the two
families to make room for the growing children. Respondents, forthwith,
claimed absolute ownership over the entire property and demanded that
petitioners vacate the portion occupied by the latter. On 01 February 1988,
petitioners, asserting co-ownership over the property in question, filed a
case for partition before the Quezon City RTC (Branch 93).1âwphi1.nêt
Respondents predicated their claim of absolute ownership over the subject
property on two documents — a deed of donation executed by the late
Julian Viado covering his one-half conjugal share of the Isarog property in
favor of Nilo Viado and a deed of extrajudicial settlement in which Julian
Viado, Leah Viado Jacobs (through a power of attorney in favor of Nilo
Viado) and petitioner Rebecca Viado waived in favor of Nilo Viado their
rights and interests over their share of the property inherited from Virginia
Viado. Both instruments were executed on 26 August 1983 and registered
on 07 January 1988 by virtue of which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42682
was cancelled and new Transfer Certificate of Title No. 373646 was issued
to the heirs of Nilo Viado.
Petitioners, in their action for partition, attacked the validity of the foregoing
instruments, contending that the late Nilo Viado employed forgery and
undue influence to coerce Julian Viado to execute the deed of donation.
Petitioner Rebecca Viado, in her particular case, averred that her brother
Nilo Viado employed fraud to procure her signature to the deed of
extrajudicial settlement. She added that the exclusion of her retardate sister,
Delia Viado, in the extrajudicial settlement, resulted in the latter's preterition
that should warrant its annulment. Finally, petitioners asseverated that the
assailed instruments, although executed on 23 August 1983, were
registered only five years later, on 07 January 1988, when the three parties
thereto, namely, Julian Viado, Nilo Viado and Leah Viado Jacobs had
already died.
Assessing the evidence before it, the trial court found for respondents and
adjudged Alicia Viado and her children as being the true owners of the
disputed property.
8
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court with
modification by ordering the remand of the records of the case to the court a
quo for further proceedings to determine the value of the property and the
amount respondents should pay to petitioner Delia Viado for having been
preterited in the deed of extrajudicial settlement.
Petitioners are now before the Supreme Court to seek the reversal of the
decision of the Court of Appeals.
The appellate court ruled correctly.
When Virginia P. Viado died intestate in 1982, her part of the conjugal
property, the Isarog property in question included, was transmitted to her
heirs — her husband Julian and their children Nilo Viado, Rebecca Viado,
Leah Viado and Delia Viado. The inheritance, which vested from the
moment of death of the decedent,1 remained under a co-ownership regime2
among the heirs until partition.3 Every act intended to put an end to
indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees would be a partition
although it would purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, a
donation or an extrajudicial settlement.4
In debunking the continued existence of a co-ownership among the parties
hereto, respondents rely on the deed of donation and deed of extrajudicial
settlement which consolidated the title solely to Nilo Viado. Petitioners assail
the due execution of the documents on the grounds heretofore expressed.
Unfortunately for petitioners, the issues they have raised boil down to the
appreciation of the evidence, a matter that has been resolved by both the
trial court and the appellate court. The Court of Appeals, in sustaining the
court a quo, has found the evidence submitted by petitioners to be utterly
wanting, consisting of, by and large, self-serving testimonies. While
asserting that Nilo Viado employed fraud, forgery and undue influence in
procuring the signatures of the parties to the deeds of donation and of
extrajudicial settlement, petitioners are vague, however, on how and in what
manner those supposed vices occurred. Neither have petitioners shown
proof why Julian Viado should be held incapable of exercising sufficient
judgment in ceding his rights and interest over the property to Nilo Viado.
The asseveration of petitioner Rebecca Viado that she has signed the deed
of extrajudicial settlement on the mistaken belief that the instrument merely
pertained to the administration of the property is too tenuous to accept. It is
also quite difficult to believe that Rebecca Viado, a teacher by profession,
could have misunderstood the tenor of the assailed document.
The fact alone that the two deeds were registered five years after the date of
their execution did not adversely affect their validity nor would such
circumstance alone be indicative of fraud. The registration of the documents
was a ministerial act5 and merely created a constructive notice of its
contents against all third persons.6 Among the parties, the instruments
remained completely valid and binding.
The exclusion of petitioner Delia Viado, alleged to be a retardate, from the
deed of extrajudicial settlement verily has had the effect of preterition. This
kind of preterition, however, in the absence of proof of fraud and bad faith,
does not justify a collateral attack on Transfer Certificate of Title No. 373646.
The relief, as so correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, instead rests
on Article 1104 of the Civil Code to the effect that where the preterition is not
attended by bad faith and fraud, the partition shall not be rescinded but the
preterited heir shall be paid the value of the share pertaining to her. Again,
the appellate court has thus acted properly in ordering the remand of the
case for further proceedings to make the proper valuation of the isarog
property and ascertainment of the amount due petitioner Delia Viado.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED, and the decision, dated 29
May 1996, in CA-G.R. No. 37272 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. No
special pronouncement on costs. SO ORDERED.
9
G.R. No. L-31703 February 13, 1930
CARMEN G. DE PEREZ, trustee of the estate of Ana Maria Alcantara, vs.
MARIANO GARCHITORENA, and JOSE CASIMIRO
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
The amount of P21,428.58 is on deposit in the plaintiff's name with the
association known as La Urbana in Manila, as the final payment of the
liquidated credit of Ana Maria Alcantara, deceased, whose heiress is said
plaintiff, against Andres Garchitorena, also deceased, represented by his
son, the defendant Mariano Garchitorena.
And as said Mariano Garchitorena held a judgment for P7,872.23 against
Joaquin Perez Alcantara, husband of the plaintiff, Carmen G. de Perez, the
sheriff pursuant to the writ of execution issued in said judgment, levied an
attachment on said amount deposited with La Urbana.
The plaintiff, alleging that said deposit belongs to the fideicommissary heirs
of the decedent Ana Maria Alcantara, secured a preliminary injunction
restraining the execution of said judgment on the sum so attached. The
defendants contend that the plaintiff is the decedent's universal heiress, and
pray for the dissolution of the injunction.
The court below held that said La Urbana deposit belongs to the plaintiff's
children as fideicommissary heirs of Ana Maria Alcantara, and granted a
final writ of injunction.
The defendants insist in their contentions, and, in their appeal from the
decision of the trial court, assign the following errors:
1. The lower court erred in holding that a trust was created by the will of
Doña Ana Maria Alcantara.
2. The lower court erred in concluding and declaring that the amount of
P21,428.58 deposited with La Urbana is the property of the children of the
plaintiff as "herederos fidei-comisarios."
3. The lower court erred in making the injunction permanent and
condemning defendant to pay the costs.
The question here raised is confined to the scope and meaning of the
institution of heirs made in the will of the late Ana Maria Alcantara already
admitted to probate, and whose legal force and effect is not in dispute.
The clauses of said will relevant to the points in dispute, between the parties
are the ninth, tenth, and eleventh, quoted below:
Ninth. Being single and without any forced heir, to show my gratitude to my
niece-in-law, Carmen Garchitorena, of age, married to my nephew, Joaquin
Perez Alcantara, and living in this same house with me, I institute her as my
sole and universal heiress to the remainder of my estate after the payment
of my debts and legacies, so that upon my death and after probate of this
will, and after the report of the committee on claims and appraisal has been
rendered and approved, she will receive from my executrix and properties
composing my hereditary estate, that she may enjoy them with God's
blessing and my own.
Tenth. Should my heiress Carmen Garchitorena die, I order that my whole
estate shall pass unimpaired to her surviving children; and should any of
these die, his share shall serve to increase the portions of his surviving
brothers (and sisters) by accretion, in such wise that my estate shall never
pass out of the hands of my heiress or her children in so far as it is legally
possible.
Eleventh. Should my aforesaid heiress, Carmen Garchitorena, die after me
while her children are still in their minority, I order that my estate be
10
administered by my executrix, Mrs. Josefa Laplana, and in her default, by
Attorney Ramon Salinas and in his default, by his son Ramon Salinas; but
the direction herein given must not be considered as an indication of lack of
confidence in my nephew Joaquin Perez Alcantara, whom I relieve from the
duties of administering my estate, because I recognize that his character is
not adapted to management and administration.
The appellants contend that in these clauses the testatrix has ordered a
simple substitution, while the appellee contends that it is a fideicommissary
substitution.
This will certainly provides for a substitution of heirs, and of the three cases
that might give rise to a simple substitution (art. 774, Civil Code), only the
death of the instituted heiress before the testatrix would in the instant case
give place to such substitution, inasmuch as nothing is said of the waiver of
inheritance, or incapacity to accept it. As a matter of fact, however, clause XI
provides for the administration of the estate in case the heiress instituted
should die after the testatrix and while the substitute heirs are still under
age. And it is evident that, considering the nature of simple substitution by
the heir's death before the testator, and the fact that by clause XI in
connection with clause X, the substitution is ordered where the heiress
instituted dies after the testatrix, this cannot be a case of simple substitution.
The existence of a substitution in the will is not and cannot be denied, and
since it cannot be a simple substitution in the light of the considerations
above stated, let us now see whether the instants case is a fideicommissary
substitution.
In clause IX, the testatrix institutes the plaintiff herein her sole and universal
heiress, and provides that upon her death (the testatrix's) and after probate
of the will and approval of the report of the committee on claims and
appraisal, said heiress shall receive and enjoy the whole hereditary estate.
Although this clause provides nothing explicit about substitution, it does not
contain anything in conflict with the idea of fideicommissary substitution. The
fact that the plaintiff was instituted the sole and universal heiress does not
prevent her children from receiving, upon her death and in conformity with
the express desire of the testatrix, the latter's hereditary estate, as provided
in the following (above quoted) clauses which cannot be disregarded if we
are to give a correct interpretation of the will. The word sole does not
necessarily exclude the idea of substitute heirs; and taking these three
clauses together, such word means that the plaintiff is the sole heiress
instituted in the first instance.
The disposition contained in clause IX, that said heiress shall receive and
enjoy the estate, is not incompatible with a fideicommissary substitution (it
certainly is incompatible with the idea of simple substitution, where the
heiress instituted does not receive the inheritance). In fact the enjoyment of
the inheritance is in conformity with the idea of fideicommissary substitution,
by virtue of which the heir instituted receives the inheritance and enjoys it,
although at the same time he preserves it in order to pass it on the second
heir. On this point the illustrious Manresa, in his Civil Code (Vol. 6, pp. 142
and 143, 5th ed.), says:
Requirements of fideicommissionary substitution
Or, what amounts to the same thing, the fideicommissary substitution, as
held in the Resolution of June 25, 1895, February 10, 1899, and July 19,
1909, requires three things:
1. A first heir called primarily to the enjoyment of the estate.
2. An obligation clearly imposed upon him to preserve and transmit to a third
person the whole or a part of the estate.
3. A second heir.
To these requisites, the decision of November 18, 1918 adds another,
namely that the fideicommissarius be entitled to the estate from the time the
11
testator dies, since he is to inherit from the latter and not from the fiduciary.
(Emphasis ours.)
It appears from this quotation that the heir instituted or the fiduciary, as
referred to in articles 783 of the Civil Code, is entitled to enjoy the
inheritance. And it might here be observed, as a timely remark, that the
fideicommissum arising from a fideicommissary substitution, which is of
Roman origin, is not exactly equivalent to, nor may it be confused with, the
English "trust."
It should also be noted that said clause IX vests in the heiress only the right
to enjoy but not the right to dispose of the estate. It says, she may enjoy it,
but does not say she may dispose of it. This is an indication of the usufruct
inherent in fideicommissary substitution.
Clause X expressly provides for the substitution. It is true that it does not say
whether the death of the heiress herein referred to is before or after that of
the testatrix; but from the whole context it appears that in making the
provisions contained in this clause X, the testatrix had in mind a
fideicommissary substitution, since she limits the transmission of her estate
to the children of the heiress by this provision, "in such wise that my estate
shall never pass out of the hands of my heiress or her children in so far as it
is legally possible." Here it clearly appears that the testatrix tried to avoid the
possibility that the substitution might later be legally declared null for
transcending the limits fixed by article 781 of the Civil Code which
prescribed that fideicommissary substitutions shall be valid "provided they
do not go beyond the second degree."
Another clear and outstanding indication of fideicommissary substitution in
clause X is the provision that the whole estate shall pass unimpaired to the
heiress's children, that is to say the heiress is required to preserve the whole
estate, without diminution, in order to pass it on in due time to the
fideicommissary heirs. This provision complies with another of the requisites
of fideicommissary substitution according to our quotation from Manresa
inserted above.
Lastly, clause XI more clearly indicates the idea of fideicommissary
substitution, when a provision is therein made in the event the heiress
should die after the testatrix. That is, said clause anticipates the case where
the instituted heiress should die after the testatrix and after receiving and
enjoying the inheritance.
The foregoing leads us to the conclusion that all the requisites of a
fideicommissary substitution, according to the quotation from Manresa
above inserted, are present in the case of substitution now under
consideration, to wit:
1. At first heir primarily called to the enjoyment of the estate. In this case the
plaintiff was instituted an heiress, called to the enjoyment of the estate,
according to clause IX of the will.
2. An obligation clearly imposed upon the heir to preserve and transmit to a
third person the whole or a part of the estate. Such an obligation is imposed
in clause X which provides that the "whole estate shall pass unimpaired to
her (heiress's) surviving children;" thus, instead of leaving the heiress at
liberty to dispose of the estate by will, or of leaving the law to take its course
in case she dies intestate, said clause not only disposes of the estate in
favor of the heiress instituted, but also provides for the disposition thereof in
case she should die after the testatrix.
3. A second heir. Such are the children of the heiress instituted, who are
referred to as such second heirs both in clause X and in clause XI.
Finally, the requisite added by the decision of November 18, 1918, to wit,
that the fideicommissarius or second heir should be entitled to the estate
from the time of the testator's death, which in the instant case, is, rather than
12
a requisite, a necessary consequence derived from the nature of the
fideicommissary substitution, in which the second heir does not inherit from
the heir first instituted, but from the testator.

By virtue of this consequence, the inheritance in question does not belong to

the heiress instituted, the plaintiff herein, as her absolute property, but to her
children, from the moment of the death of the testatrix, Ana Maria Alcantara.

Therefore, said inheritance, of which the amount referred to at the

beginning, which is on deposit with the association known as La Urbana in
the plaintiff's name, is a part, does not belong to her nor can it be subject to
the execution of the judgment against Joaquin Perez, who is not one of the
fideicommissary heirs.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant,
Mariano Garchitorena. So ordered.

13
G.R. No. 113725 June 29, 2000
JOHNNY S. RABADILLA, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA
MARLENA COSCOLUELLA Y BELLEZA VILLACARLOS,
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals,3 dated
December 23, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. CV-35555, which set aside the decision
of Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City, and ordered the
defendants-appellees (including herein petitioner), as heirs of Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, to reconvey title over Lot No. 1392, together with its fruits and
interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja
Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner,
Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee of 511, 855 square meters
of that parcel of land surveyed as Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre.
The said Codicil, which was duly probated and admitted in Special
Proceedings No. 4046 before the then Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, contained the following provisions:
"FIRST
I give, leave and bequeath the following property owned by me to Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla resident of 141 P. Villanueva, Pasay City:
(a) Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. RT-4002 (10942), which is registered in my name according to the
records of the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental.
(b) That should Jorge Rabadilla die ahead of me, the aforementioned
property and the rights which I shall set forth hereinbelow, shall be inherited
and acknowledged by the children and spouse of Jorge Rabadilla.
xxx
FOURTH
(a)....It is also my command, in this my addition (Codicil), that should I die
and Jorge Rabadilla shall have already received the ownership of the said
Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. RT-4002 (10942), and also at the time that the lease of Balbinito G.
Guanzon of the said lot shall expire, Jorge Rabadilla shall have the
obligation until he dies, every year to give to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y
Belleza, Seventy (75) (sic) piculs of Export sugar and Twenty Five (25)
piculs of Domestic sugar, until the said Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza
dies.
FIFTH
(a) Should Jorge Rabadilla die, his heir to whom he shall give Lot No. 1392
of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-
4002 (10492), shall have the obligation to still give yearly, the sugar as
specified in the Fourth paragraph of his testament, to Maria Marlina
Coscolluela y Belleza on the month of December of each year.
SIXTH
I command, in this my addition (Codicil) that the Lot No. 1392, in the event
that the one to whom I have left and bequeathed, and his heir shall later sell,
lease, mortgage this said Lot, the buyer, lessee, mortgagee, shall have also
the obligation to respect and deliver yearly ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of
sugar to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, on each month of December,
SEVENTY FIVE (75) piculs of Export and TWENTY FIVE (25) piculs of
14
Domestic, until Maria Marlina shall die, lastly should the buyer, lessee or the
mortgagee of this lot, not have respected my command in this my addition
(Codicil), Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, shall immediately seize this
Lot No. 1392 from my heir and the latter's heirs, and shall turn it over to my
near desendants, (sic) and the latter shall then have the obligation to give
the ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar until Maria Marlina shall die. I
further command in this my addition (Codicil) that my heir and his heirs of
this Lot No. 1392, that they will obey and follow that should they decide to
sell, lease, mortgage, they cannot negotiate with others than my near
descendants and my sister."4
Pursuant to the same Codicil, Lot No. 1392 was transferred to the deceased,
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44498 thereto
issued in his name.
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife Rufina and
children Johnny (petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida, all surnamed
Rabadilla.
On August 21, 1989, Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza Villacarlos
brought a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 5588, before Branch 52 of
the Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City, against the above-mentioned heirs
of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to enforce the provisions of subject Codicil. The
Complaint alleged that the defendant-heirs violated the conditions of the
Codicil, in that:
1. Lot No. 1392 was mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank and the
Republic Planters Bank in disregard of the testatrix's specific instruction to
sell, lease, or mortgage only to the near descendants and sister of the
testatrix.
2. Defendant-heirs failed to comply with their obligation to deliver one
hundred (100) piculs of sugar (75 piculs export sugar and 25 piculs domestic
sugar) to plaintiff Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza from sugar crop years
1985 up to the filing of the complaint as mandated by the Codicil, despite
repeated demands for compliance.
3. The banks failed to comply with the 6th paragraph of the Codicil which
provided that in case of the sale, lease, or mortgage of the property, the
buyer, lessee, or mortgagee shall likewise have the obligation to deliver 100
piculs of sugar per crop year to herein private respondent.
The plaintiff then prayed that judgment be rendered ordering defendant-heirs
to reconvey/return-Lot No. 1392 to the surviving heirs of the late Aleja
Belleza, the cancellation of TCT No. 44498 in the name of the deceased, Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla, and the issuance of a new certificate of title in the names of
the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza.
On February 26, 1990, the defendant-heirs were declared in default but on
March 28, 1990 the Order of Default was lifted, with respect to defendant
Johnny S. Rabadilla, who filed his Answer, accordingly.
During the pre-trial, the parties admitted that:
On November 15, 1998, the plaintiff (private respondent) and a certain Alan
Azurin, son-in-law of the herein petitioner who was lessee of the property
and acting as attorney-in-fact of defendant-heirs, arrived at an amicable
settlement and entered into a Memorandum of Agreement on the obligation
to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar, to the following effect:
"That for crop year 1988-89, the annuity mentioned in Entry No. 49074 of
TCT No. 44489 will be delivered not later than January of 1989, more
specifically, to wit:
75 piculs of 'A' sugar, and 25 piculs of 'B' sugar, or then existing in any of
our names, Mary Rose Rabadilla y Azurin or Alan Azurin, during December
of each sugar crop year, in Azucar Sugar Central; and, this is considered
15
compliance of the annuity as mentioned, and in the same manner will
compliance of the annuity be in the next succeeding crop years.
That the annuity above stated for crop year 1985-86, 1986-87, and 1987-88,
will be complied in cash equivalent of the number of piculs as mentioned
therein and which is as herein agreed upon, taking into consideration the
composite price of sugar during each sugar crop year, which is in the total
amount of ONE HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P105,000.00).
That the above-mentioned amount will be paid or delivered on a staggered
cash installment, payable on or before the end of December of every sugar
crop year, to wit:
For 1985-86, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY
(P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or before December of crop year 1988-89;
For 1986-87, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY
(P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or before December of crop year 1989-90;
For 1987-88, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY
(P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or before December of crop year 1990-91;
and
For 1988-89, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY
(P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or before December of crop year 1991-
92."5
However, there was no compliance with the aforesaid Memorandum of
Agreement except for a partial delivery of 50.80 piculs of sugar
corresponding to sugar crop year 1988 -1989.
On July 22, 1991, the Regional Trial Court came out with a decision,
dismissing the complaint and disposing as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the aforegoing findings, the Court finds that
the action is prematurely filed as no cause of action against the defendants
has as yet arose in favor of plaintiff. While there maybe the non-performance
of the command as mandated exaction from them simply because they are
the children of Jorge Rabadilla, the title holder/owner of the lot in question,
does not warrant the filing of the present complaint. The remedy at bar must
fall. Incidentally, being in the category as creditor of the left estate, it is
opined that plaintiff may initiate the intestate proceedings, if only to establish
the heirs of Jorge Rabadilla and in order to give full meaning and semblance
to her claim under the Codicil.
In the light of the aforegoing findings, the Complaint being prematurely filed
is DISMISSED without prejudice.
SO ORDERED."6
On appeal by plaintiff, the First Division of the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the trial court; ratiocinating and ordering thus:
"Therefore, the evidence on record having established plaintiff-appellant's
right to receive 100 piculs of sugar annually out of the produce of Lot No.
1392; defendants-appellee's obligation under Aleja Belleza's codicil, as heirs
of the modal heir, Jorge Rabadilla, to deliver such amount of sugar to
plaintiff-appellant; defendants-appellee's admitted non-compliance with said
obligation since 1985; and, the punitive consequences enjoined by both the
codicil and the Civil Code, of seizure of Lot No. 1392 and its reversion to the
estate of Aleja Belleza in case of such non-compliance, this Court deems it
proper to order the reconveyance of title over Lot No. 1392 from the estates
of Jorge Rabadilla to the estate of Aleja Belleza. However, plaintiff-appellant
must institute separate proceedings to re-open Aleja Belleza's estate,
secure the appointment of an administrator, and distribute Lot No. 1392 to
Aleja Belleza's legal heirs in order to enforce her right, reserved to her by
16
the codicil, to receive her legacy of 100 piculs of sugar per year out of the
produce of Lot No. 1392 until she dies.
Accordingly, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE and another one
entered ordering defendants-appellees, as heirs of Jorge Rabadilla, to
reconvey title over Lot No. 1392, together with its fruits and interests, to the
estate of Aleja Belleza.
SO ORDERED."7
Dissatisfied with the aforesaid disposition by the Court of Appeals, petitioner
found his way to this Court via the present petition, contending that the Court
of Appeals erred in ordering the reversion of Lot 1392 to the estate of the
testatrix Aleja Belleza on the basis of paragraph 6 of the Codicil, and in
ruling that the testamentary institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla is a modal
institution within the purview of Article 882 of the New Civil Code.
The petition is not impressed with merit.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in resolving the appeal in
accordance with Article 882 of the New Civil Code on modal institutions and
in deviating from the sole issue raised which is the absence or prematurity of
the cause of action. Petitioner maintains that Article 882 does not find
application as there was no modal institution and the testatrix intended a
mere simple substitution - i.e. the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, was to
be substituted by the testatrix's "near descendants" should the obligation to
deliver the fruits to herein private respondent be not complied with. And
since the testatrix died single and without issue, there can be no valid
substitution and such testamentary provision cannot be given any effect.
The petitioner theorizes further that there can be no valid substitution for the
reason that the substituted heirs are not definite, as the substituted heirs are
merely referred to as "near descendants" without a definite identity or
ISSUES:
1. WON this is a modal institution. -yes
2. WON there is an absence or prematurity of cause of action - no
3. WON respondent Maria only holds a right of usufruct, and not the right to seize the property. - no
4. WON the MoA bet. Maria and Alan works as a substantial compliance on the part of Johnny Rabadilla - no
reference as to who are the "near descendants" and therefore, under
Articles 8438 and 8459 of the New Civil Code, the substitution should be
deemed as not written.
The contentions of petitioner are untenable. Contrary to his supposition that
the Court of Appeals deviated from the issue posed before it, which was the
propriety of the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of prematurity of
cause of action, there was no such deviation. The Court of Appeals found
that the private respondent had a cause of action against the petitioner. The
disquisition made on modal institution was, precisely, to stress that the
private respondent had a legally demandable right against the petitioner
pursuant to subject Codicil; on which issue the Court of Appeals ruled in
accordance with law.
It is a general rule under the law on succession that successional rights are
transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent10 and compulsory
heirs are called to succeed by operation of law. The legitimate children and
descendants, in relation to their legitimate parents, and the widow or
widower, are compulsory heirs.11 Thus, the petitioner, his mother and
sisters, as compulsory heirs of the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,
succeeded the latter by operation of law, without need of further
proceedings, and the successional rights were transmitted to them from the
moment of death of the decedent, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the
property, rights and obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death.
Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of subject
Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his death. And
since obligations not extinguished by death also form part of the estate of
the decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Codicil on the
deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his compulsory
heirs upon his death.
17
In the said Codicil, testatrix Aleja Belleza devised Lot No. 1392 to Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, subject to the condition that the usufruct thereof would be
delivered to the herein private respondent every year. Upon the death of Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla, his compulsory heirs succeeded to his rights and title over
the said property, and they also assumed his (decedent's) obligation to
deliver the fruits of the lot involved to herein private respondent. Such
obligation of the instituted heir reciprocally corresponds to the right of private
respondent over the usufruct, the fulfillment or performance of which is now
being demanded by the latter through the institution of the case at bar.
Therefore, private respondent has a cause of action against petitioner and
the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint below.
Petitioner also theorizes that Article 882 of the New Civil Code on modal
institutions is not applicable because what the testatrix intended was a
substitution - Dr. Jorge Rabadilla was to be substituted by the testatrix's
near descendants should there be noncompliance with the obligation to
deliver the piculs of sugar to private respondent.
Again, the contention is without merit.
Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to take
the place of the heir or heirs first instituted. Under substitutions in general,
the testator may either (1) provide for the designation of another heir to
whom the property shall pass in case the original heir should die before
him/her, renounce the inheritance or be incapacitated to inherit, as in a
simple substitution,12 or (2) leave his/her property to one person with the
express charge that it be transmitted subsequently to another or others, as
in a fideicommissary substitution.13 The Codicil sued upon contemplates
neither of the two.
In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in default of the
first heir by reason of incapacity, predecease or renunciation.14 In the case
under consideration, the provisions of subject Codicil do not provide that
should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla default due to predecease, incapacity or
renunciation, the testatrix's near descendants would substitute him. What
the Codicil provides is that, should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill
the conditions imposed in the Codicil, the property referred to shall be seized
and turned over to the testatrix's near descendants.
Neither is there a fideicommissary substitution here and on this point,
petitioner is correct. In a fideicommissary substitution, the first heir is strictly
mandated to preserve the property and to transmit the same later to the
second heir.15 In the case under consideration, the instituted heir is in fact
allowed under the Codicil to alienate the property provided the negotiation is
with the near descendants or the sister of the testatrix. Thus, a very
important element of a fideicommissary substitution is lacking; the obligation
clearly imposing upon the first heir the preservation of the property and its
transmission to the second heir. "Without this obligation to preserve clearly
imposed by the testator in his will, there is no fideicommissary
substitution."16 Also, the near descendants' right to inherit from the testatrix
is not definite. The property will only pass to them should Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the obligation to deliver part of the usufruct to
private respondent.
Another important element of a fideicommissary substitution is also missing
here. Under Article 863, the second heir or the fideicommissary to whom the
property is transmitted must not be beyond one degree from the first heir or
the fiduciary. A fideicommissary substitution is therefore, void if the first heir
is not related by first degree to the second heir.17 In the case under
scrutiny, the near descendants are not at all related to the instituted heir, Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla.
The Court of Appeals erred not in ruling that the institution of Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla under subject Codicil is in the nature of a modal institution and
therefore, Article 882 of the New Civil Code is the provision of law in point.
Articles 882 and 883 of the New Civil Code provide:
18
Art. 882. The statement of the object of the institution or the application of
the property left by the testator, or the charge imposed on him, shall not be
considered as a condition unless it appears that such was his intention.
That which has been left in this manner may be claimed at once provided
that the instituted heir or his heirs give security for compliance with the
wishes of the testator and for the return of anything he or they may receive,
together with its fruits and interests, if he or they should disregard this
obligation.
Art. 883. When without the fault of the heir, an institution referred to in the
preceding article cannot take effect in the exact manner stated by the
testator, it shall be complied with in a manner most analogous to and in
conformity with his wishes.
The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is what is
known in the law of succession as an institucion sub modo or a modal
institution. In a modal institution, the testator states (1) the object of the
institution, (2) the purpose or application of the property left by the testator,
or (3) the charge imposed by the testator upon the heir.18 A "mode"
imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee but it does not affect the
efficacy of his rights to the succession.19 On the other hand, in a conditional
testamentary disposition, the condition must happen or be fulfilled in order
for the heir to be entitled to succeed the testator. The condition suspends
but does not obligate; and the mode obligates but does not suspend.20 To
some extent, it is similar to a resolutory condition.21
From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it can be gleaned unerringly
that the testatrix intended that subject property be inherited by Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla. It is likewise clearly worded that the testatrix imposed an
obligation on the said instituted heir and his successors-in-interest to deliver
one hundred piculs of sugar to the herein private respondent, Marlena
Coscolluela Belleza, during the lifetime of the latter. However, the testatrix
did not make Dr. Jorge Rabadilla's inheritance and the effectivity of his
institution as a devisee, dependent on the performance of the said
obligation. It is clear, though, that should the obligation be not complied with,
the property shall be turned over to the testatrix's near descendants. The
manner of institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is evidently
modal in nature because it imposes a charge upon the instituted heir
without, however, affecting the efficacy of such institution.
Then too, since testamentary dispositions are generally acts of liberality, an
obligation imposed upon the heir should not be considered a condition
unless it clearly appears from the Will itself that such was the intention of the
testator. In case of doubt, the institution should be considered as modal and
not conditional.22
Neither is there tenability in the other contention of petitioner that the private
respondent has only a right of usufruct but not the right to seize the property
itself from the instituted heir because the right to seize was expressly limited
to violations by the buyer, lessee or mortgagee.
In the interpretation of Wills, when an uncertainty arises on the face of the
Will, as to the application of any of its provisions, the testator's intention is to
be ascertained from the words of the Will, taking into consideration the
circumstances under which it was made.23 Such construction as will sustain
and uphold the Will in all its parts must be adopted.24
Subject Codicil provides that the instituted heir is under obligation to deliver
One Hundred (100) piculs of sugar yearly to Marlena Belleza Coscuella.
Such obligation is imposed on the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his
heirs, and their buyer, lessee, or mortgagee should they sell, lease,
mortgage or otherwise negotiate the property involved. The Codicil further
provides that in the event that the obligation to deliver the sugar is not
respected, Marlena Belleza Coscuella shall seize the property and turn it
over to the testatrix's near descendants. The non-performance of the said
19
obligation is thus with the sanction of seizure of the property and reversion
thereof to the testatrix's near descendants. Since the said obligation is
clearly imposed by the testatrix, not only on the instituted heir but also on his
successors-in-interest, the sanction imposed by the testatrix in case of non-
fulfillment of said obligation should equally apply to the instituted heir and his
successors-in-interest.

Similarly unsustainable is petitioner's submission that by virtue of the

amicable settlement, the said obligation imposed by the Codicil has been
assumed by the lessee, and whatever obligation petitioner had become the
obligation of the lessee; that petitioner is deemed to have made a
substantial and constructive compliance of his obligation through the
consummated settlement between the lessee and the private respondent,
and having consummated a settlement with the petitioner, the recourse of
the private respondent is the fulfillment of the obligation under the amicable
settlement and not the seizure of subject property.

Suffice it to state that a Will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by
which a person disposes of his property, to take effect after his death.25
Since the Will expresses the manner in which a person intends how his
properties be disposed, the wishes and desires of the testator must be
strictly followed. Thus, a Will cannot be the subject of a compromise
agreement which would thereby defeat the very purpose of making a Will.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the

Court of Appeals, dated December 23, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. CV-35555
AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

20
G.R. No. L-3891 December 19, 1907
ELENA MORENTE vs. GUMERSINDO DE LA SANTA
WILLARD, J.:
The will of Consuelo Morente contains the following clauses:lawphil.net
1. I hereby order that all real estate which may belong to me shall pass to
my husband, Gumersindo de la Santa.
2. That my said husband shall not leave my brothers after my death, and
that he shall not marry anyone; should my said husband have children by
anyone, he shall not convey any portion of the property left by me, except
the one-third part thereof and the two remaining thirds shall be and remain
for my brother Vicente or his children should he have any.
3. After my death I direct my husband to dwell in the camarin in which the
bakery is located, which is one of the properties belonging to me.
Her husband, Gumersindo de la Santa, married again within four months of
the death of the testatrix. Elena Morente, a sister of the deceased, filed a
petition in the proceeding relating to the probate of the will of Consuelo
Morente pending in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Tayabas in
which she alleged the second marriage of Gumersindo de la Santa and
asked that the legacy to him above-mentioned be annulled.
Objection was made in the court below by the husband to the procedure
followed by the petitioner. The court below, however, held that the
proceeding was proper and from that holding the husband did not appeal.
From the judgment of the court below, the petitioner, Elena Morente,
appealed.
In its judgment the court denied the petition. It was said, however, in the
decision, as we understand it, that the husband having married, he had the
right to the use of all the property during his life and that at his death two-
thirds thereof would pass to Vicente, a brother of the testatrix, and one-third
thereof could be disposed of by the husband. The construction given to the
will by the court below is not accepted by the appellant. She claims that by
the mere act of marriage the husband at once lost all rights acquired by the
will. It is neither alleged nor proven that any children have been born to the
husband since the death of the testatrix. lawphil.net
Article 790 of the Civil Code provides that testamentary provisions may be
made conditional and article 793 provides that a prohibition against another
marriage may in certain cases be validly imposed upon the widow or
widower.
ISSUE
But the question in this case is, Did the testatrix intend to impose a condition
upon the absolute gift which is contained in the first clauses of the will? It is
to be observed that by the second clause she directs that her husband shall
not leave her sisters. It is provided in the third clause that he must continue
to live in a certain building. It is provided in the second clause that he shall
not marry again.
To no one of these orders is attached the condition that if he fails to comply
with them he shall lose the legacy given to him by the first clause of the will.
It is nowhere expressly said that if he does leave the testatrix's sisters, or
does not continue to dwell in the building mentioned in the will he shall forfeit
the property given him in the first clause; nor is it anywhere expressly said
that if he marries again he shall incur such a loss. But it is expressly
provided that if one event does happen the disposition of the property
contained in the first clause of the will shall be changed. It is said that if he
has children by anyone, two-thirds of that property shall pass to Vicente, the
brother of the testatrix.
21
We are bound to construe the will with reference to all the clauses contained
therein, and with reference to such surrounding circumstances as duly
appear in the case, and after such consideration we can not say that it was
the intention of the testatrix that if her husband married again he should
forfeit the legacy above mentioned.

In other words, there being no express condition attached to that legacy in

reference to the second marriage, we can not say that any condition can be
implied from the context of the will. In the case of Chiong Joc-Soy vs. Jaime
Vano (8 Phil. Rep., 119), we held that the legacy contained in the will therein
mentioned was not conditional. It is true that case arose under article 797 of
the Civil Code, which perhaps is not strictly applicable to this case, but we
think that it may be argued from what is said in article 797 that, in order to
make a testamentary provision conditional, such condition must fairly appear
from the language used in the will.

Whether the children mentioned in the second clause of the will are natural
children or legitimate children we do not decide, for no such question is
before us, the contingency mentioned in that part of the clause not having
arisen, and we limit ourselves to saying merely that by the subsequent
marriage of the husband he did not forfeit the legacy given to him by the first
part of the will. That was the only question before the court below. the
judgment of that court, denying the petition, is accordingly affirmed, with the
costs of this instance against the appellant. So ordered.

22
[G.R. No. L-40789. February 27, 1987.]
INTESTATE ESTATE OF PETRA V. ROSALES. IRENEA C. ROSALES, v.
FORTUNATO ROSALES, MAGNA ROSALES ACEBES, MACIKEQUEROX
ROSALES and ANTONIO ROSALES,
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; WILLS AND SUCCESSION; INTESTATE SUCCESSION;
INTESTATE OR LEGAL HEIRS; CLASSIFICATION. — Intestate or legal
heirs are classified into two (2) groups, namely, those who inherit by their
own right, and those who inherit by the right of representation. Restated, an
intestate heir can only inherit either by his own right, as in the order of
intestate succession provided for in the Civil Code, or by the right of
representation provided for in Article 981 of the same law.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; DAUGHTER-IN-LAW, NOT AN INTESTATE HEIR OF HER
SPOUSE’S PARENT. — There is no provision in the Civil Code which states
that a widow (surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The
entire Code is devoid of any provision which entitles her to inherit from her
mother-in-law either by her own right or by the right of representation. The
provisions of the Code which relate to the order of intestate succession
(Articles 978 to 1014) enumerate with meticulous exactitude the intestate
heirs of a decedent, with the State as the final intestate heir. The
conspicuous absence of a provision which makes a daughter-in-law an
intestate heir of the deceased all the more confirms Our observation. If the
legislature intended to make the surviving spouse an intestate heir of the
parent-in-law, it would have so provided in the Code.
3. ID.; ID.; WIDOW OR WIDOWER MENTIONED IN ARTICLE 887 OF THE
CIVIL CODE REFERS TO SURVIVING SPOUSE. — Petitioner argues that
she is a compulsory heir in accordance with the provisions of article 887 of
the Civil Code. the aforesaid provision of law refers to the estate of the
deceased spouse in which case the surviving spouse (widow or widower) is
a compulsory heir. It does not apply to the estate of a parent-in-law.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; SURVIVING SPOUSE CONSIDERED A THIRD PARTY
WITH RESPECT TO ESTATE OF PARENT-IN-LAW. — Indeed, the
surviving spouse is considered a third person as regards the estate of the
parent-in-law. We had occasion to make this observation in Lachenal v.
Salas, to wit: "We hold that the title to the fishing boat should be determined
in Civil Case No., 3597 (not in the intestate proceeding) because it affects
the lessee thereof, Lope L. Leoncio, the decedent’s son-in-law, who,
although married to his daughter or compulsory heir, is nevertheless a third
person with respect to his estate. . . . ." (Emphasis supplied).
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT OF REPRESENTATION; BLOOD RELATIONSHIP;
BASIS THEREOF. — Article 971 explicitly declares that Macikequeroz
Rosales is called to succession by law because of his blood relationship. He
does not succeed his father, Carterio Rosales (the person represented) who
predeceased his grandmother, Petra Rosales, but the latter whom his father
would have succeeded. Petitioner cannot assert the same right of
representation as she has no filiation by blood with her mother-in-law.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; INCHOATE RIGHT TO ESTATE EXTINGUISHED BY
DEATH OF HEIR. — Petitioner contends that at the time of the death of her
husband Corterio Rosales he had an inchoate or contingent right to the
properties of Petra Rosales as compulsory heirs. Be that as it may, said right
of her husband was extinguished by this death that is why it is their son
Macikequerox Rosales who succeeded from Petra Rosales by right of
representation. He did not succeed from his deceased father, Carterio
Rosales.
DECISION
GANCAYCO, J.:
23
In this Petition for Review of two (2) Orders of the Court of First Instance of
issue:
Cebu the question raised is whether the widow whose husband
predeceased his mother can inherit from the latter, her mother-in-law.
It appears from the record of the case that on February 26, 1971, Mrs. Petra
V. Rosales, a resident of Cebu City, died intestate. She was survived by her
husband Fortunato T. Rosales and their two (2) children Magna Rosales
Acebes and Antonio Rosales. Another child, Carterio Rosales, predeceased
her, leaving behind a child, Macikequerox Rosales, and his widow Irenea C.
Rosales, the herein petitioner. The estate of the deceased has an estimated
gross value of about Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00).
On July 10, 1971, Magna Rosales Acebes instituted the proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased in the Court of First Instance of
Cebu. The case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 3204-R.
Thereafter, the trial court appointed Magna Rosales Acebes administratrix of
the said estate.
In the course of the intestate proceedings, the trial court issued an Order
dated June 16, 1972 declaring the following individuals the legal heirs of the
deceased and prescribing their respective share of the estate —
Fortunato T. Rosales (husband) 1/4; Magna R. Acebes (daughter), 1/4;
Macikequerox Rosales, 1/4; and Antonio Rosales (son), 1/4.
This declaration was reiterated by the trial court in its Order dated February
4, 1975.
These Orders notwithstanding, Irenea Rosales insisted in getting a share of
the estate in her capacity as the surviving spouse of the late Carterio
Rosales, son of the deceased, claiming that she is a compulsory heir of her
mother-in-law together with her son, Macikequerox Rosales.
Thus, Irenea Rosales sought the reconsideration of the aforementioned
Orders. The trial court denied her plea. Hence this petition.
In sum, the petitioner poses two (2) questions for Our resolution. First — is a
widow (surviving spouse) an intestate heir of her mother-in-law? Second —
are the Orders of the trial court which excluded the widow from getting a
share of the estate in question final as against the said widow?
Our answer to the first question is in the negative.
Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two (2) groups, namely, those who
inherit by their own right, and those who inherit by the right of
representation. 1 Restated, an intestate heir can only inherit either by his
own right, as in the order of intestate succession provided for in the Civil
Code, 2 or by the right of representation provided for in Article 981 of the
same law. The relevant provisions of the Civil Code are;.
"Art. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their
own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares."cralaw virtua1aw library
"Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other
children who are dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own right, and
the latter by right of representation."
"Art. 982. The grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of
representation, and if any one of them should have died, leaving several
heirs, the portion pertaining to him shall be divided among the latter in equal
portions."
"Art. 999. When the widow or widower survives with legitimate children or
their descendants and illegitimate children or their descendants, whether
24
legitimate or illegitimate, such widow or widower shall be entitled to the
same share as that of a legitimate child."
There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow (surviving
spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The entire Code is devoid
of any provision which entitles her to inherit from her mother-in-law either by
her own right or by the right of representation. The provisions of the Code
which relate to the order of intestate succession (Articles 978 to 1014)
enumerate with meticulous exactitude the intestate heirs of a decedent, with
the State as the final intestate heir. The conspicuous absence of a provision
which makes a daughter-in-law an intestate heir of the deceased all the
more confirms Our observation. If the legislature intended to make the
surviving spouse an intestate heir of the parent-in-law, it would have so
provided in the Code
Petitioner argues that she is a compulsory heir in accordance with the
provisions of Article 887 of the Civil Code which provides that:
"Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate
parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with
respect to their legitimate children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287;
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not excluded by those in
Nos. 1 and 2; neither do they exclude one another.
In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.
The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes mentioned,
shall inherit from them in the manner and to the extent established by this
Code."
The aforesaid provision of law 3 refers to the estate of the deceased spouse
in which case the surviving spouse (widow or widower) is a compulsory heir.
It does not apply to the estate of a parent-in-law.
Indeed, the surviving spouse is considered a third person as regards the
estate of the parent-in-law. We had occasion to make this observation in
Lachenal v. Salas, 4 to wit:
"We hold that the title to the fishing boat should be determined in Civil Case
No. 3597 (not in the intestate proceeding) because it affects the lessee
thereof, Lope L. Leoncio, the decedent’s son-in-law, who, although married
to his daughter or compulsory heir, is nevertheless a third person with
respect to his estate. . . ." (Emphasis supplied).
By the same token, the provision of Article 999 of the Civil Code aforecited
does not support petitioner’s claim. A careful examination of the said Article
confirms that the estate contemplated therein is the estate of the deceased
spouse. The estate which is the subject matter of the intestate estate
proceedings in this case is that of the deceased Petra V. Rosales, the
mother-in-law of the petitioner. It is from the estate of Petra V. Rosales that
Macikequerox Rosales draws a share of the inheritance by the right of
representation as provided by Article 981 of the Code.
The essence and nature of the right of representation is explained by
Articles 970 and 971 of the Civil Code, viz —
"Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of
which the representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person
25
represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were
living or if he could have inherited.

"Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not
by the person represented. The representative does rot succeed the person
represented but the one whom the person represented would have
succeeded." (Emphasis supplied.)

Article 971 explicitly declares that Macikequerox Rosales is called to

succession by law because of his blood relationship. He does not succeed
his father, Carterio Rosales (the person represented) who predeceased his
grandmother, Petra Rosales, but the latter whom his father would have
succeeded. Petitioner cannot assert the same right of representation as she
has no filiation by blood with her mother-in-law.

Petitioner however contends that at the time of the death of her husband
Carterio Rosales he had an inchoate or contingent right to the properties of
Petra Rosales as compulsory heir. Be that as it may, said right of her
husband was extinguished by his death that is why it is their son
Macikequerox Rosales who succeeded from Petra Rosales by right of
representation. He did not succeed from his deceased father, Carterio
Rosales.

On the basis of the foregoing observations and conclusions, We find it

unnecessary to pass upon the second question posed by the petitioner.

Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We so hold, that a surviving

spouse is not an intestate heir of his or her parent-in-law.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby DENIED for

lack of merit, with costs against the petitioner. Let this case be remanded to
the trial court for further proceedings. SO ORDERED.

26
G.R. No. 184148 June 9, 2014
NORA B. CALALANG-PARULAN and ELVIRA B. CALALANG, vs.
ROSARIO CALALANG-GARCIA
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
The facts, as culled from the records, follow:
In a Complaint4 for Annulment of Sale and Reconveyance of Property filed
with the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan on June 10, 1991, the respondents
Rosario Calalang-Garcia, Leonora Calalang-Sabile, and Carlito S. Calalang
asserted their ownership over a certain parcel of land against the petitioners
Nora B. Calalang-Parulan and Elvira B. Calalang. The said lot with an area
of 1,266 square meters and specifically identified as Lot 1132, Cad. 333,
Bigaa Cadastre situated in Brgy. Burol 2nd, Municipality of Balagtas,
Province of Bulacan, was allegedly acquired by the respondents from their
mother Encarnacion Silverio, through succession as the latter’s compulsory
heirs.
According to the respondents, their father, Pedro Calalang contracted two
marriages during his lifetime. The first marriage was with their mother
Encarnacion Silverio. During the subsistence of this marriage, their parents
acquired the above-mentioned parcel of land from their maternal
grandmother Francisca Silverio. Despite enjoying continuous possession of
the land, however, their parents failed to register the same. On June 7,
1942, the first marriage was dissolved with the death of Encarnacion
Silverio.
On November 6, 1967, Pedro Calalang entered into a second marriage with
Elvira B. Calalang who then gave birth to Nora B. Calalang-Parulan and
Rolando Calalang. According to the respondents, it was only during this time
that Pedro Calalang filed an application for free patent over the parcel of
land with the Bureau of Lands. Pedro Calalang committed fraud in such
application by claiming sole and exclusive ownership over the land since
1935 and concealing the fact that he had three children with his first spouse.
As a result, on September 22, 1974, the Register of Deeds of Bulacan
issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-28715 in favor of Pedro
Calalang only.
On February 17, 1984, Pedro Calalang sold the said parcel of land to Nora
B. Calalang-Parulan as evidenced by a Deed of Sale6 executed by both
Pedro Calalang and Elvira B. Calalang. Accordingly, the Register of Deeds
of Bulacan cancelled OCT No. P-2871 and issued Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 283321 in the name of Nora B. Calalang-Parulan. On
December 27, 1989,7 Pedro Calalang died.
The respondents assailed the validity of TCT No. 283321 on two grounds.
First, the respondents argued that the sale of the land was void because
Pedro Calalang failed to obtain the consent of the respondents who were co-
owners of the same. As compulsory heirs upon the death of Encarnacion
Silverio, the respondents claimed that they acquired successional rights over
the land. Thus, in alienating the land without their consent, Pedro Calalang
allegedly deprived them of their pro indiviso share in the property. Second,
the respondents claimed that the sale was absolutely simulated as Nora B.
Calalang-Parulan did not have the capacity to pay for the consideration
stated in the Deed of Sale.
In their Answer,8 the petitioners argued that the parcel of land was acquired
during the second marriage of Pedro Calalang with Elvira B. Calalang. They
stressed that OCT No. P-2871 itself stated that it was issued in the name of
"Pedro Calalang, married to Elvira Berba [Calalang]." Thus, the property
belonged to the conjugal partnership of the spouses Pedro Calalang and
Elvira B. Calalang. The petitioners likewise denied the allegation that the
sale of the land was absolutely simulated as Nora B. Calalang-Parulan was
27
gainfully employed in Spain at the time of the sale. Moreover, they alleged
that the respondents did not have a valid cause of action against them and
that their cause of action, if any, was already barred by laches, estoppel and
prescription. By way of counterclaim, the petitioners also sought the
payment to them of moral and exemplary damages plus costs of suit for the
filing of the clearly unfounded suit.
On July 10, 2001, the trial court rendered decision in favor of the
respondents. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and
against the defendants in the following manner:
1. Ordering the defendants to reconvey in favor of the plaintiffs, their rightful
share to three-fourth (3/4) of one-half (1/2) or a total of 474.75 square
meters at 158.25 square meters for each of the three plaintiffs, namely:
Rosario, Leonora, and Juanito all surname[d] Calalang, of the real property
covered by TCT No. 283321 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan
corresponding to their shares in the conjugal estate of the late Encarnacion
S. Calalang [sic];
2. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiffs the amount of ₱50,000.00 for moral
damages; ₱50,000.00 for attorney’s fees and another ₱50,000.00 for
litigation expenses.
3. Dismissing the defendants’ counterclaims.
With costs against the defendants.
SO ORDERED.9
The trial court declared that the parcel of land was jointly acquired by the
spouses Pedro Calalang and Encarnacion Silverio from the parents of the
latter. Thus, it was part of the conjugal property of the first marriage of Pedro
Calalang. When this marriage was dissolved upon the death of Encarnacion
Silverio on June 7, 1942,the corresponding shares to the disputed property
were acquired by the heirs of the decedent according to the laws of
succession. In particular, the trial court allocated half of the disputed
property to Pedro Calalang as his share in the conjugal partnership and
allocated the other half to the three respondents and Pedro Calalang to be
divided equally among them. The trial court then ordered all of Pedro’s share
to be given to Nora B. Calalang-Parulan on account of the sale. The trial
court also ruled that because the application for free patent filed by Pedro
Calalang was attended by fraud and misrepresentation, Pedro Calalang
should be considered as a trustee of an implied trust.
Aggrieved by the adverse ruling, the petitioners appealed the case to the CA
which rendered the assailed Decision on December 21, 2007. The
dispositive portion of the CA decision reads,
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing premises, the Decision dated July
10, 2001of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan is hereby
MODIFIED to read as follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, and
against the defendants in the following manner:
1. Ordering the defendants to reconvey in favor of the plaintiffs, their rightful
share to the property owned by their common father Pedro Calalang,
equivalent to one half(1/2) portion of the whole area or 633 square meters to
be divided equally by the three plaintiffs, namely:
Rosario, Leonora and Carlito, all surnamed Calalang, each getting an area
of 211 square meters of the property covered by TCT No. 2883321 of the
Registry of Deeds of Bulacan corresponding to their shares in the property
of their late father Pedro Calalang;
28
2. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiffs the amount of ₱50,000.00 for moral
damages; ₱50,000.00 for attorney’s fees and another ₱50,000.00 for
litigation expenses.
3. Dismissing the defendants’ counterclaims.
With costs against the defendants.
SO ORDERED.
SO ORDERED.10
The CA reversed the factual findings of the trial court and held that Pedro
Calalang was the sole and exclusive owner of the subject parcel of land.
Firstly, it held that there was insufficient evidence to prove that the disputed
property was indeed jointly acquired from the parents of Encarnacion
Silverio during the first marriage. Secondly, the CA upheld the indefeasibility
of OCT No. P-2871. It held that although the free patent was issued in the
name of "Pedro Calalang, married to Elvira Berba [Calalang]" this phrase
was merely descriptive of the civil status of Pedro Calalang at the time of the
registration of the disputed property. Thus, contrary to the ruling of the trial
court, upon the death of Encarnacion Silverio on June 7, 1942, the
respondents did not acquire any successional rights to the parcel of land
which was exclusively owned by Pedro Calalang. However, applying the
rules of succession, Pedro’s heirs namely, Rosario Calalang-Garcia,
Leonora Calalang-Sabile, Carlito Calalang, Nora B. Calalang-Parulan, Elvira
B. Calalang, and Rolando Calalang, succeeded Pedro to the land in equal
shares upon his death. Thus, the CA ordered the petitioners to reconvey in
favor of the respondents their rightful shares to the land. The CA ruled that
the sale by Pedro Calalang to Nora B. Calalang-Parulan was fraudulent and
fictitious as the vendee was in bad faith and the respondents were unlawfully
deprived of their pro indiviso shares over the disputed property. As regards
the issue of prescription, the CA ruled that the prescriptive period for
reconveyance of fraudulently registered real property is ten years. Since the
property was registered in the name of Nora in1984 and the action for
reconveyance was filed in 1991, the action has not yet prescribed.
On January 23, 2008, petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration. The
CA, however, denied their motion in its Resolution dated July 25, 2008.
Hence, this petition raising the sole issue:
Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred in rendering its December 21,
2007 Decision modifying the July 10, 2001 Decision of the trial court, and in
issuing its July 25, 2008 Resolution denying petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration dated January 23, 2008.11
Essentially, the only issue in this case is whether Pedro Calalang was the
exclusive owner of the disputed property prior to its transfer to his daughter
Nora B. Calalang-Parulan.
The petitioners argue that the disputed property belonged to the conjugal
partnership of the second marriage of Pedro Calalang with Elvira B.
Calalang as evidenced by OCT No. P-2871 which was issued to Pedro
Calalang during the subsistence of his marriage to Elvira B. Calalang. On
the other hand, the respondents claim that the disputed property was
transferred by their maternal grandmother, Francisca Silverio, to their
parents, Pedro Calalang and Encarnacion Silverio, during the latter’s
marriage. Thus, the respondents argue that it belonged to the conjugal
partnership of the first marriage of Pedro Calalang with Encarnacion Silverio.
The petition is meritorious.
Preliminarily, we note that the resolution of the issue in this case requires a
reevaluation of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties
in order to trace the title of the disputed property. What is involved is indeed
a question of fact which is generally beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to
29
resolve in a petition for review on certiorari.12 However, a recognized
exception to the rule is when the RTC and CA have conflicting findings of
fact as in this case.13 Here, while the trial court ruled that the disputed
property belonged to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage of Pedro
Calalang with Encarnacion Silverio, the court a quo declared that the
evidence proved the sole and exclusive ownership of the disputed property
of Pedro Calalang.
We have carefully reviewed the records of this case and sustain the finding
of the CA that Pedro Calalang is the sole and exclusive owner of the
disputed property.
The trial court ruled that the respondents were able to establish that Lot
1132, Cad. 333 originated from the parents of Encarnacion, and therefore
said property "either became property of Encarnacion in her own right or
jointly with her husband Pedro Calalang in 1936." In so ruling, the trial court
relied on the testimony of Rosario Calalang-Garcia that her parents built a
nipa house on the subject lot and lived there before and after World War II.
The trial court further noted that Rosario’s testimony was corroborated by
her cousin and adjacent neighbor Manolo Calalang.14
However, as correctly pointed out by the CA, a close perusal of the records
of this case would show that the records are bereft of any concrete proof to
show that the subject property indeed belonged to respondents’ maternal
grandparents. The evidence respondents adduced merely consisted of
testimonial evidence such as the declaration of Rosario Calalang-Garcia that
they have been staying on the property as far as she can remember and that
the property was acquired by her parents through purchase from her
maternal grandparents. However, she was unable to produce any document
to evidence the said sale, nor was she able to present any documentary
evidence such as the tax declaration issued in the name of either of her
parents. Moreover, we note that the free patent was issued solely in the
name of Pedro Calalang and that it was issued more than 30 years after the
death of Encarnacion and the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains
of the first marriage. Thus, we cannot subscribe to respondents’ submission
that the subject property originally belonged to the parents of Encarnacion
and was acquired by Pedro Calalang and Encarnacion.
We likewise cannot sustain the argument of the petitioners that the disputed
property belongs to the conjugal partnership of the second marriage of
Pedro Calalang with Elvira B. Calalang on the ground that the title was
issued in the name of "Pedro Calalang, married to Elvira Berba [Calalang]."
The contents of a certificate of title are enumerated by Section 45 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree:
SEC. 45. Statement of personal circumstances in the certificate. – Every
certificate of title shall set forth the full names of all persons whose interests
make up the full ownership in the whole land, including their civil status, and
the names of their respective spouses, if married, as well as their
citizenship, residence and postal address. If the property covered belongs to
the conjugal partnership, it shall be issued in the names of both
spouses.1âwphi1
A plain reading of the above provision would clearly reveal that the phrase
"Pedro Calalang, married to Elvira Berba [Calalang]" merely describes the
civil status and identifies the spouse of the registered owner Pedro Calalang.
Evidently, this does not mean that the property is conjugal. In Litam v.
Rivera,15 we declared:
Further strong proofs that the properties in question are the paraphernal
properties of Marcosa Rivera, are the very Torrens Titles covering said
properties. All the said properties are registered in the name of "Marcosa
Rivera, married to Rafael Litam." This circumstance indicates that the
properties in question belong to the registered owner, Marcosa Rivera, as
30
her paraphernal properties, for if they were conjugal, the titles covering the
same should have been issued in the names of Rafael Litam and Marcosa
Rivera. The words "married to Rafael Litam" written after the name of
Marcosa Rivera, in each of the above mentioned titles are merely descriptive
of the civil status of Marcosa Rivera, the registered owner of the properties
covered by said titles.
It must likewise be noted that in his application for free patent,16 applicant
Pedro Calalang averred that the land was first occupied and cultivated by
him since 1935 and that he had planted mango trees, coconut plants,
caimito trees, banana plants and seasonal crops and built his house on the
subject lot. But he applied for free patent only in 1974 and was issued a free
patent while already married to Elvira B. Calalang. Thus, having possessed
the subject land in the manner and for the period required by law after the
dissolution of the first marriage and before the second marriage, the subject
property ipso jure became private property and formed part of Pedro
Calalang’s exclusive property.17 It was therefore excluded from the conjugal
partnership of gains of the second marriage.18
As the sole and exclusive owner, Pedro Calalang had the right to convey his
property in favor of Nora B. Calalang-Parulan by executing a Deed of Sale
on February 17, 1984. The CA therefore erred in ruling that Pedro Calalang
deprived his heirs of their respective shares over the disputed property when
he alienated the same.
It is hornbook doctrine that successional rights are vested only at the time of
death. Article 777 of the New Civil Code provides that "[t]he rights to the
succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent."
In Butte v. Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc.,19 we proclaimed the fundamental
tenets of succession:
The principle of transmission as of the time of the predecessor's death is
basic in our Civil Code, and is supported by other related articles. Thus, the
capacity of the heir is determined as of the time the decedent died (Art.
1034); the legitime is to be computed as of the same moment (Art. 908), and
so is the in officiousness of the donation inter vivas (Art. 771). Similarly, the
legacies of credit and remission are valid only in the amount due and
outstanding at the death of the testator (Art. 935), and the fruits accruing
after that instant are deemed to pertain to the legatee (Art. 948).
Thus, it is only upon the death of Pedro Calalang on December 27, 1989
that his heirs acquired their respective inheritances, entitling them to their
pro indiviso shares to his whole estate. At the time of the sale of the
disputed property, the rights to the succession were not yet bestowed upon
the heirs of Pedro Calalang. And absent clear and convincing evidence that
the sale was fraudulent or not duly supported by valuable consideration (in
effect an in officious donation inter vivas), the respondents have no right to
question the sale of the disputed property on the ground that their father
deprived them of their respective shares. Well to remember, fraud must be
established by clear and convincing evidence. Mere preponderance of
evidence is not even adequate to prove fraud.20 The Complaint for
Annulment of Sale and Reconveyance of Property must therefore be
dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The
Decision dated December 21, 2007 and Resolution dated July 25, 2008 of
the Thirteenth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 72531 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 370-M-91, or the Complaint for
Annulment of Sale and Reconveyance of Property filed by the respondents
with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 21 of Malolos, Bulacan, on June 10,
1991, is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
31
G.R. No. 138774 March 8, 2001
REGINA FRANCISCO AND ZENAIDA PASCUAL, vs. AIDA FRANCISCO-
ALFONSO
PARDO, J.:
May a legitimate daughter be deprived of her share in the estate of her
deceased father by a simulated contract transferring the property of her
father to his illegitimate children?
The case before the Court is an appeal via certiorari from the decision of the
Court of Appeals1 declaring void the deed of sale of two parcels of land
conveyed to petitioners who are illegitimate children of the deceased to the
exclusion of respondent, his sole legitimate daughter.
The facts are:
Respondent Aida Francisco-Alfonso (hereafter Aida) is the only daughter of
spouses Gregorio Francisco and Cirila de la Cruz, who are now both
deceased.
Petitioners, on the other hand, are daughters of the late Gregorio Francisco
with his common law wife Julia Mendoza, with whom he begot seven (7)
children.
Gregorio Francisco (hereafter Gregorio) owned two parcels of residential
land, situated in Barangay Lolomboy, Bocaue, Bulacan, covered by TCT
Nos. T-32740 and T-117160. When Gregorio was confined in a hospital in
1990, he confided to his daughter Aida that the certificates of title of his
property were in the possession of Regina Francisco and Zenaida Pascual.
After Gregorio died on July 20, 1990,3 Aida inquired about the certificates of
title from her half sisters. They informed her that Gregorio had sold the land
to them on August 15, 1983. After verification, Aida learned that there was
indeed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Regina Francisco and Zenaida
Pascual. Thus, on August 15, 1983, Gregorio executed a "Kasulatan sa
Ganap na Bilihan, whereby for P25,000.00, he sold the two parcels of land
to Regina Francisco and Zenaida Pascual. By virtue of the sale, the Register
of Deeds of Bulacan issued TCT No. T-59.585 to Regina Francisco and TCT
T-59.586 to Zenaida Pascual.4
On April 1, 1991, Aida filed with the Regional Trial Court, Bulacan a
complaint against petitioners for annulment of sale with damages.5 She
alleged that the signature of her late father, Gregorio Francisco, on the
Kasulatan sa Ganap na Bilihan dated August 15, 1983, was a forgery.
In their joint answer to the complaint, petitioners denied the alleged forgery
or simulation of the deed of sale. After due proceedings, on July 21, 1994,
the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint. The dispositive
portion reads:
"WHEREFORE, on the basis of the evidence adduced and the law
applicable thereon, the Court hereby renders judgment:
"a) sustaining the validity of the "Kasulatan Sa Ganap Na Bilihan" (Exh."G")
executed on 15 August 1993 by the late Gregorio Francisco in favor of the
defendants;
"b) affirming the validity of the Transfer Certificates of Title No. T-59.585
(Exh. "I") issued to defendant Regina Francisco and No. T-59.386 (Exh. "H")
issued to defendant Zenaida Pascual; and
"c) dismissing the complaint as well as the defendants' counterclaim for
damages and attorney's fees for lack of merit." 6
In time7, respondent Alfonso appealed to the Court of Appeals.8
32
After due proceedings, on April 30, 1999, the Court of Appeals promulgated
its decision reversing that of the trial court, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
"WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 21, 1994 of the court a quo is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another rendered as follows:
"1. The Kasulatan Sa Ganap na Bilihan dated August 15, 1983 (Exhibit "G")
is declared null and void from the beginning and TCT Nos. T-59.585 (M) and
T-59-586 (M), both of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan (Meycauayan
Branch) in the names of Regina Francisco and Zenaida Pascual,
respectively, are annulled and cancelled;
"2. The Register of Deeds of Bulacan (Meycauayan Branch) is ordered to
cancel the aforementioned TCT Nos. T-59.585 (M) and T-59.586 (M) and to
reinstate Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-132740 and T-117160 both in
the name of Gregorio Francisco.
"3. Defendants-appellees Regina Francisco and Zenaida Pascual jointly and
solidarily are ordered to pay plaintiff-appellant Alfonso the amount of
P5,000.00 as moral damages, P5,000.00 as exemplary damages and
P5,000.00 as attorney's fees.
"4. The counterclaim of defendants-appellees is dismissed for lack of merit.
"Costs of suit against said defendants-appellees." 9
Hence, this petition.10
The main issue raised is whether the Supreme Court may review the factual
findings of the appellate court. The jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought
before it from the Court of Appeals under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court is limited to review of pure errors of law. It is not the function of this
Court to analyze or weigh evidence all over again, unless there is a showing
that the findings of the lower court are totally devoid of support or are
glaringly erroneous as to constitute grave abuse of discretion.11
The findings of fact of the Court of Appeals supported by substantial
evidence are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable
by this Court,12 unless the case falls under any of the recognized
exceptions to the rule.13
Petitioner has failed to prove that the case falls within the exceptions.14
We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals because:
First: The kasulatan was simulated. There was no consideration for the
contract of sale. Felicitas de la Cruz, a family friend of the Franciscos,
testified that Zenaida Pascual and Regina Francisco did not have any
source of income in 1983, when they bought the property, until the time
when Felicitas testified in 1991.15
As proof of income, however, Zenaida Pascual testified that she was
engaged in operating a canteen, working as cashier in Mayon Night Club as
well as buying and selling RTW (Ready to Wear) items in August of 1983
and prior thereto.
Zenaida alleged that she paid her father the amount of P10,000.00. She did
not withdraw money from her bank account at the Rural Bank of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, to pay for the property. She had personal savings
other than those deposited in the bank. Her gross earnings from the RTW
for three years was P9,000.00, and she earned P50.00 a night at the club.16
Regina Francisco, on the other hand, was a market vendor, selling nilugaw,
earning a net income of P300.00 a day in 1983. She bought the property
from the deceased for P15,000.00.17 She had no other source of income.
33
We find it incredible that engaging in buy and sell could raise the amount of
P10,000.00, or that earnings in selling goto could save enough to pay
P15,000.00, in cash for the land.
The testimonies of petitioners were incredible considering their inconsistent
statements as to whether there was consideration for the sale and also as to
whether the property was bought below or above its supposed market value.
They could not even present a single witness to the kasulatan that would
prove receipt of the purchase price.
Since there was no cause or consideration for the sale, the same was a
simulation and hence, null and void.18
deprive respondent of her share in her father's estate. By law, she is entitled
to half of the estate of her father as his only legitimate child.21
The legal heirs of the late Gregorio Francisco must be determined in proper
testate or intestate proceedings for settlement of the estate. His compulsory
heir can not be deprived of her share in the estate save by disinheritance as
prescribed by law.22
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G. R. CV No. 48545 is AFFIRMED, in toto.
No costs. SO ORDERED.

Second: Even if the kasulatan was not simulated, it still violated the Civil
Code19 provisions insofar as the transaction affected respondent's legitime.
The sale was executed in 1983, when the applicable law was the Civil Code,
not the Family Code.

Obviously, the sale was Gregorio's way to transfer the property to his
illegitimate daughters20 at the expense of his legitimate daughter. The sale
was executed to prevent respondent Alfonso from claiming her legitime and
rightful share in said property. Before his death, Gregorio had a change of
heart and informed his daughter about the titles to the property.

According to Article 888, Civil Code:

"The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of

the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother.

"The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half subject to the rights of
illegitimate children and of the surviving spouse as hereinafter provided."

Gregorio Francisco did not own any other property. If indeed the parcels of
land involved were the only property left by their father, the sale in fact would

34
G.R. No. L-13386 October 27, 1920
SEGUNDA MARIA NIEVA with her husband ANGEL ALCALA, vs.
MANUELA ALCALA and JOSE DEOCAMPO
JOHNSON, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the
Province of Tayabas, absolving the defendants from all liability under the
plaintiff's complaint, without any finding as to costs.
Juliana Nieva, the alleged natural mother of the plaintiff Segunda Maria
Nieva, married Francisco Deocampo. Of said marriage Alfeo Deocampo was
born.
Julian Nieva died intestate on April 19, 1889, and her said son, Alfeo
Deocampo, inherited from her, ab intestate, the parcels of land described in
Paragraphs V and X of the complaint.
Alfeo Deocampo died intestate and without issue on July 7, 1890.
Thereupon the two parcels of land above-mentioned passed to his father,
Francisco Deocampo, by intestate succession. Thereafter Francisco
Deocampo married the herein defendant Manuela Alcala, of which marriage
was born Jose Deocampo, the other defendant herein.
Francisco Deocampo died on August 15, 1914, whereupon his widow and
son, the defendants herein, took possession of the parcels of land in
question, under the claim that the said son, the defendant Jose Deocampoo
(a minor) had inherited the same, ab intestate, from his deceased father.
On September 30, 1915, the plaintiff herein, claiming to be an acknowledged
natural daughter of the said Juliana Nieva, instituted the present action for
the purposes of recovering from the defendants the parcels of land in
question, particularly described in Paragraphs V and X of the complaint,
invoking the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code.
The lower court held that, even granting, without deciding, that the plaintiff
was an acknowledged natural daughter of Juliana Nieva, she was not
entitled to the property here in question because, in its opinion, an
illegitimate relative has no right to the reserva troncal under the provisions of
article 811 of the Civil Code.
The first question presented by this appeal is, whether or not the plaintiff is
an acknowledged natural daughter of the deceased Juliana Nieva. It
appears from the record that the said Juliana Nieva, while unmarried, gave
birth to the plaintiff on March 29, 1882, and that the plaintiff was duly
baptized as her natural daughter, of unknown father (Exhibit C, baptismal
certificate); that the said Juliana Nieva nourished and reared her said child,
the plaintiff herein; that the plaintiff lived with her said mother until the latter
was married to Francisco Deocampo; that the said mother treated the
plaintiff, and exhibited her publicly, as a legitimate daughter. (See testimony
of Antero Gala, pp. 5-6; Prudencio de la Cuesta, pp. 16-17; and Mamerto
Palabrica, pp. 26-27, sten. notes.)
The foregoing facts, which are not controverted, are analogous to the facts
in the case of Llorente vs. Rodriguez (3 Phil., 697, 699). Under the decision
of this court in that case we are of the opinion and so decide, without
rediscussing here the law and legal principles involved, that the plaintiff
Segunda Maria Nieva is an acknowledged natural daughter of Juliana Nieva.
(See also In re estate of Enriquez and Reyes, 29 Phil., 167.)
issue:
The other and more important question presented by this appeal is, whether
or not an illegitimate relative within the third degree is entitled to the reserva
troncal provided for by article 811 of the Civil Code. That article reads as
follows:
35
Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property acquired by
the latter gratuitously from some other ascendant, or from a brother or sister,
is obliged to reserve such of the property as he may have acquired by
operation of law for the benefit of relatives within the third degree belonging
to the line from which such property came.
The property here in question was inherited, by operation by law, by
Francisco Deocampo from his son Alfeo Deocampo, who, in turn, had
inherited it, in the same manner, from his mother Juliana Nieva, the natural
mother of the plaintiff. The plaintiff is the natural sister of Alfeo Deocampo,
and she belongs to the same line from which the property in question came.
Was Francisco Deocampo obliged by law to reserve said property for the
benefit of the plaintiff, an illegitimate relative within the third degree of Alfeo
Deocampo? If he was, then, upon his death, the plaintiff, and not his son the
defendant Jose Deocampo, was entitled to the said property; if he was not,
the plaintiff's action must fail.1awph!l.net
There can be no question whatever but that, under said article 811 of the
Civil Code, the plaintiff would be entitled to the property in question if she
were a legitimate daughter of Julian Nieva. (Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil.,
295.) But in said article 811 the legislator uses the generic terms
"ascendant," "descendant," and "relatives," without specifying whether or not
they have to be legitimate. Does the legislator, then, refer to legitimate as
well as to illegitimate relatives? Counsel for the appellant, in a lengthy and
carefully prepared brief, attempts to maintain the affirmative.
This question, so far as our investigation shows, has not been decided
before by any court or tribunal. However, eminent commentators on the
Spanish Civil Code, who have devoted their lives to the study and solution of
the intricate and difficult problems that may arise under the provisions of that
Code, have dealt with the very question now before us, and are unanimous
in the opinion that the provision of article 811 of the Civil Code apply only to
legitimate relative. One of such commentators, undoubtedly the best known
of them all, is Manresa. We believe we can do no better than to adopt his
reasons and conclusions, in deciding the question before us. In determining
the persons who are obliged to reserve under article 811, he says:
Is every ascendant, whether legitimate or not, obliged to reserve? Should
the natural father or grandfather reserve the properties proceeding from the
mother or other natural ascendant? Article 811 does not distinguish; it
speaks of the ascendant, without attaching the qualification of legitimate,
and, on the other hand, the same reason that exists for applying the
provision to the natural family exists for applying it to the legitimate family.
Nevertheless, the article in referring to the ascendant in an indeterminate
manner shows that it imposes the obligation to reserve only upon the
legitimate ascendant.
Let us overlook for the moment the question whether the Code recognizes
or does not recognize the existence of the natural family, or whether it
admits only the bond established by acknowledgement between the father
or mother who acknowledges and the acknowledged children. However it
may be, it may be stated as an indisputable truth, that in said Code, the
legitimate relationship forms the general rule and the natural relationship the
exception; which is the reason why, as may be easily seen, the law in many
articles speaks only of children or parents, of ascendants or descendants,
and in them reference is of course made of those who are legitimate; and
when it desires to make a provision applicable only to natural relationship, it
does not say father or mother, but natural father or natural mother; it does
not say child, but natural child; it does not speak of ascendants, brothers or
parents in the abstract, but of natural ascendants, natural brothers or natural
parents. (See, for example, articles 294, 302, 809, 810, 846, 935, to 938,
944 and 945 and 946 to 955.)
Articles 809 and 810 themselves speak only of ascendants. Can it in any
way be maintained that they refer to legitimate as well as to natural
ascendants? They evidently establish the legitime of the legitimate
36
ascendants included as forced heirs in number 2 of article 807. And article
811, — and as we will see also article 812, — continues to treat of this same
legitime. The right of the natural parents and children in the testamentary
succession in wholly included in the eighth section and is limited to the
parents, other ascendants of such class being excluded in articles 807, No.
3, and 846.
Therefore, the place which article 811 occupies in the Code of proof that it
refers only to legitimate ascendants. And if there were any doubt, it
disappears upon considering the text of article 938, which states that the
provisions of article 811 applies to intestate succession, which is just
established in favor of the legitimate direct ascending line, the text of articles
939 to 945, which treat of intestate succession of natural parents, as well as
that of articles 840 to 847, treating of their testamentary succession, which
do not allude directly or indirectly to that provision.
Lastly, the principle which underlies the exception which article 811 creates
in the right to succeed neither admits of any other interpretation. Whether
the provision is due to the desire that the properties should not pass, by
reason of new marriage, out of the family to which they belonged, or is
directly derived from the system of the so-called "reserva troncal," and
whether the idea of reservation or that of lineal rights (troncalidad)
predominate the patrimony which is intended to be preserved is that of the
legitimate family. Only to legitimate ascendants and descendants do article
968 et seq. of the Code refer, arising as they do from the danger of second
or subsequent marriage; only to legitimate parents do the special laws of
Navarra, Aragon, Vizcaya and Cataluña concede the right to succeed with
respect to lineal properties (bienes troncales); only to the legitimate
ascendants does article 811 impose the duty to reserve.
The convenience of amplifying the precept to natural parents and
ascendants may be raised just as the question whether it would be
preferable to suppress it altogether may be raised; but in the realm of the
statute law there is no remedy but to admit that article 811, the interpretation
of which should on the other hand be strict was drafted by the legislator with
respect only to legitimate ascendants. (Manresa, Codigo Civil, vol. 6, 3d ed.,
pp. 249-250.)
The same jurist, in determining the persons in whose favor the reservation is
established, says:
Persons in whose favor the reservation is established. — This is one of the
most delicate points in the interpretation of article 811. According to this
article, the reservation is established in favor of the parents who are within
the third degree and belong to the line from which the properties came.
It treats of blood, relationship, which is applicable to questions on
succession, according to articles 915 to 920. It could not be otherwise,
because relationship by affinity is established between each spouse and the
family of the other, by marriage, and to admit it, would be to favor the
transmission of the properties of the family of one spouse to that of the
other, which is just what this article intends to prevent.
It also treats of legitimate relationship. The person obliged to reserve it a
legitimate ascendant who inherits from a descendant property which
proceeds from the same legitimate family, and this being true, there can be
no question, because the line from which the properties proceed must be the
line of that family and only in favor of that line is the reservation established.
Furthermore, we have already said, the object is to protect the patrimony of
the legitimate family, following the precedents of the foral law. And it could
not be otherwise.
Article 943 denies to legitimate parents the right to succeed the natural child
and viceversa, from which it must be deduced that natural parents neither
have the right to inhering from legitimate ones; the law in the article cited
established a barrier between the two families; properties of the legitimate
37
family shall never pass by operation of law to the natural family. (Ibid. pp.
251-252.)

Scævola, after a very extended discussion of this same subject, arrives at

the same conclusion as Manresa. "La reserva del articulo 811 es privilegio
de la familia legitima. (The reservation in article 811 is a privilege of the
legitimate family.)" (See Scævola, Codigo Civil, Vol. 14, pp. 211-224, 3401-
305.)

Article 943, above referred to by Manresa, provides as follows:

A natural or legitimated child has no right to succeed ab intestate the

legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother who has
acknowledged it; nor shall such children or relatives so inherit from the
natural or legitimated child.

To hold that the appellant is entitled to the property left by her natural
brother, Alfeo Deocampo, by operation of law, would be a fragrant violate of
the express provision of the foregoing article (943).

For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the lower court is hereby
affirmed, without any finding as to costs. So ordered.

38
G.R. No. 83484 February 12, 1990
CELEDONIA SOLIVIO vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
CONCORDIA JAVELLANA VILLANUEVA
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision dated January 26, 1988 of the
Court of Appeals in CA GR CV No. 09010 (Concordia Villanueva v.
Celedonia Solivio) affirming the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No.
13207 for partition, reconveyance of ownership and possession and
damages, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiff and against
defendant:
a) Ordering that the estate of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. be divided into
two (2) shares: one-half for the plaintiff and one-half for defendant. From
both shares shall be equally deducted the expenses for the burial,
mausoleum and related expenditures. Against the share of defendants shall
be charged the expenses for scholarship, awards, donations and the
'Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Memorial Foundation;'
b) Directing the defendant to submit an inventory of the entire estate
property, including but not limited to, specific items already mentioned in this
decision and to render an accounting of the property of the estate, within
thirty (30) days from receipt of this judgment; one-half (1/2) of this produce
shall belong to plaintiff;
c) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P5,000.00 as expenses of litigation;
P10,000.00 for and as attorney's fees plus costs.
SO ORDERED. (pp. 42-43, Rollo)
This case involves the estate of the late novelist, Esteban Javellana, Jr.,
author of the first post-war Filipino novel "Without Seeing the Dawn," who
died a bachelor, without descendants, ascendants, brothers, sisters,
nephews or nieces. His only surviving relatives are: (1) his maternal aunt,
petitioner Celedonia Solivio, the spinster half-sister of his mother, Salustia
Solivio; and (2) the private respondent, Concordia Javellana-Villanueva,
sister of his deceased father, Esteban Javellana, Sr.
He was a posthumous child. His father died barely ten (10) months after his
marriage in December, 1916 to Salustia Solivio and four months before
Esteban, Jr. was born.
Salustia and her sister, Celedonia (daughter of Engracio Solivio and his
second wife Josefa Fernandez), a teacher in the Iloilo Provincial High
School, brought up Esteban, Jr.
Salustia brought to her marriage paraphernal properties (various parcels of
land in Calinog, Iloilo covered by 24 titles) which she had inherited from her
mother, Gregoria Celo, Engracio Solivio's first wife (p. 325, Record), but no
conjugal property was acquired during her short-lived marriage to Esteban,
Sr.
On October 11, 1959, Salustia died, leaving all her properties to her only
child, Esteban, Jr., including a house and lot in La Paz, Iloilo City, where
she, her son, and her sister lived. In due time, the titles of all these
properties were transferred in the name of Esteban, Jr.
During his lifetime, Esteban, Jr. had, more than once, expressed to his aunt
Celedonia and some close friends his plan to place his estate in a
foundation to honor his mother and to help poor but deserving students
obtain a college education. Unfortunately, he died of a heart attack on
February 26,1977 without having set up the foundation.
39
Two weeks after his funeral, Concordia and Celedonia talked about what to
do with Esteban's properties. Celedonia told Concordia about Esteban's
desire to place his estate in a foundation to be named after his mother, from
whom his properties came, for the purpose of helping indigent students in
their schooling. Concordia agreed to carry out the plan of the deceased. This
fact was admitted by her in her "Motion to Reopen and/or Reconsider the
Order dated April 3, 1978" which she filed on July 27, 1978 in Special
Proceeding No. 2540, where she stated:
4. That petitioner knew all along the narrated facts in the immediately
preceding paragraph [that herein movant is also the relative of the deceased
within the third degree, she being the younger sister of the late Esteban
Javellana, father of the decedent herein], because prior to the filing of the
petition they (petitioner Celedonia Solivio and movant Concordia Javellana)
have agreed to make the estate of the decedent a foundation, besides they
have closely known each other due to their filiation to the decedent and they
have been visiting each other's house which are not far away for (sic) each
other. (p. 234, Record; Emphasis supplied.)
Pursuant to their agreement that Celedonia would take care of the
proceedings leading to the formation of the foundation, Celedonia in good
faith and upon the advice of her counsel, filed on March 8, 1977 Spl.
Proceeding No. 2540 for her appointment as special administratrix of the
estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. (Exh. 2). Later, she filed an amended
petition (Exh. 5) praying that letters of administration be issued to her; that
she be declared sole heir of the deceased; and that after payment of all
claims and rendition of inventory and accounting, the estate be adjudicated
to her (p. 115, Rollo).
After due publication and hearing of her petition, as well as her amended
petition, she was declared sole heir of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr.
She explained that this was done for three reasons: (1) because the
properties of the estate had come from her sister, Salustia Solivio; (2) that
she is the decedent's nearest relative on his mother's side; and (3) with her
as sole heir, the disposition of the properties of the estate to fund the
foundation would be facilitated.
On April 3, 1978, the court (Branch II, CFI, now Branch 23, RTC) declared
her the sole heir of Esteban, Jr. Thereafter, she sold properties of the estate
to pay the taxes and other obligations of the deceased and proceeded to set
up the "SALUSTIA SOLIVIO VDA. DE JAVELLANA FOUNDATION" which
she caused to be registered in the Securities and Exchange Commission on
July 17,1981 under Reg. No. 0100027 (p. 98, Rollo).
Four months later, or on August 7, 1978, Concordia Javellana Villanueva
filed a motion for reconsideration of the court's order declaring Celedonia as
"sole heir" of Esteban, Jr., because she too was an heir of the deceased. On
October 27, 1978, her motion was denied by the court for tardiness (pp. 80-
81, Record). Instead of appealing the denial, Concordia filed on January 7,
1980 (or one year and two months later), Civil Case No. 13207 in the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 26, entitled "Concordia Javellana-
Villanueva v. Celedonia Solivio" for partition, recovery of possession,
ownership and damages.
On September 3, 1984, the said trial court rendered judgment in Civil Case
No. 13207, in favor of Concordia Javellana-Villanueva.
On Concordia's motion, the trial court ordered the execution of its judgment
pending appeal and required Celedonia to submit an inventory and
accounting of the estate. In her motions for reconsideration of those orders,
Celedonia averred that the properties of the deceased had already been
transferred to, and were in the possession of, the 'Salustia Solivio Vda. de
Javellana Foundation." The trial court denied her motions for
reconsideration.
40
In the meantime, Celedonia perfected an appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA
GR CV No. 09010). On January 26, 1988, the Court of Appeals, Eleventh
Division, rendered judgment affirming the decision of the trial court in toto.
Hence, this petition for review wherein she raised the following legal issues:
1. whether Branch 26 of the RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction to entertain Civil
Case No. 13207 for partition and recovery of Concordia Villanueva's share
of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. even while the probate proceedings
(Spl. Proc. No. 2540) were still pending in Branch 23 of the same court;
2. whether Concordia Villanueva was prevented from intervening in Spl.
Proc. No. 2540 through extrinsic fraud;
3. whether the decedent's properties were subject to reserva troncal in favor
of Celedonia, his relative within the third degree on his mother's side from
whom he had inherited them; and
4. whether Concordia may recover her share of the estate after she had
agreed to place the same in the Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana
Foundation, and notwithstanding the fact that conformably with said
agreement, the Foundation has been formed and properties of the estate
have already been transferred to it.
I. The question of jurisdiction—
After a careful review of the records, we find merit in the petitioner's
contention that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, lacked jurisdiction to
entertain Concordia Villanueva's action for partition and recovery of her
share of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. while the probate proceedings
(Spl, Proc. No. 2540) for the settlement of said estate are still pending in
Branch 23 of the same court, there being as yet no orders for the
submission and approval of the administratix's inventory and accounting,
distributing the residue of the estate to the heir, and terminating the
proceedings (p. 31, Record).
It is the order of distribution directing the delivery of the residue of the estate
to the persons entitled thereto that brings to a close the intestate
proceedings, puts an end to the administration and thus far relieves the
administrator from his duties (Santiesteban v. Santiesteban, 68 Phil. 367,
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Escolin, et al., L-27860, March
29, 1974, 56 SCRA 266).
The assailed order of Judge Adil in Spl. Proc. No. 2540 declaring Celedonia
as the sole heir of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. did not toll the end of
the proceedings. As a matter of fact, the last paragraph of the order directed
the administratrix to "hurry up the settlement of the estate." The pertinent
portions of the order are quoted below:
2. As regards the second incident [Motion for Declaration of Miss Celedonia
Solivio as Sole Heir, dated March 7, 1978], it appears from the record that
despite the notices posted and the publication of these proceedings as
required by law, no other heirs came out to interpose any opposition to the
instant proceeding. It further appears that herein Administratrix is the only
claimant-heir to the estate of the late Esteban Javellana who died on
February 26, 1977.
During the hearing of the motion for declaration as heir on March 17, 1978, it
was established that the late Esteban Javellana died single, without any
known issue, and without any surviving parents. His nearest relative is the
herein Administratrix, an elder [sic] sister of his late mother who reared him
and with whom he had always been living with [sic] during his lifetime.
xxxxxxxxx
41
2. Miss Celedonia Solivio, Administratrix of this estate, is hereby declared as
the sole and legal heir of the late Esteban S. Javellana, who died intestate
on February 26, 1977 at La Paz, Iloilo City.
The Administratrix is hereby instructed to hurry up with the settlement of this
estate so that it can be terminated. (pp, 14-16, Record)
In view of the pendency of the probate proceedings in Branch 11 of the
Court of First Instance (now RTC, Branch 23), Concordia's motion to set
aside the order declaring Celedonia as sole heir of Esteban, and to have
herself (Concordia) declared as co-heir and recover her share of the
properties of the deceased, was properly filed by her in Spl. Proc. No. 2540.
Her remedy when the court denied her motion, was to elevate the denial to
the Court of Appeals for review on certiorari. However, instead of availing of
that remedy, she filed more than one year later, a separate action for the
same purpose in Branch 26 of the court. We hold that the separate action
was improperly filed for it is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction
to make a just and legal distribution of the estate.
In the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and conflicting
dispositions of a decedent's estate, a court should not interfere with probate
proceedings pending in a co-equal court. Thus, did we rule in Guilas v.
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, L-26695, January 31,
1972, 43 SCRA 111, 117, where a daughter filed a separate action to annul
a project of partition executed between her and her father in the proceedings
for the settlement of the estate of her mother:
The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only
after the payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the
heirs entitled to receive the same. The finality of the approval of the project
of The probate court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to make distribution,
has power to determine the proportion or parts to which each distributed is
entitled. ... The power to determine the legality or illegality of the
testamentary provision is inherent in the jurisdiction of the court making a
just and legal distribution of the inheritance. ... To hold that a separate and
independent action is necessary to that effect, would be contrary to the
general tendency of the jurisprudence of avoiding multiplicity of suits; and is
further, expensive, dilatory, and impractical. (Marcelino v. Antonio, 70 Phil.
388)
A judicial declaration that a certain person is the only heir of the decedent is
exclusively within the range of the administratrix proceedings and can not
properly be made an independent action. (Litam v. Espiritu, 100 Phil. 364)
A separate action for the declaration of heirs is not proper. (Pimentel v.
Palanca, 5 Phil. 436) partition by itself alone does not terminate the probate
proceeding (Timbol v. Cano, 1 SCRA 1271, 1276, L-15445, April 29, 1961;
Siguiong v. Tecson, 89 Phil. pp. 28, 30). As long as the order of the
distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the probate
proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated Siguiong v. Tecson,
supra); because a judicial partition is not final and conclusive and does not
prevent the heirs from bringing an action to obtain his share, provided the
prescriptive period therefore has not elapsed (Mari v. Bonilia, 83 Phil. 137).
The better practice, however, for the heir who has not received his share, is
to demand his share through a proper motion in the same probate or
administration proceedings, or for reopening of the probate or administrative
proceedings if it had already been closed, and not through an independent
action, which would be tried by another court or Judge which may thus
reverse a decision or order of the probate or intestate court already final and
executed and re-shuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of.
(Ramos v. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730, 741-742; Timbol v. Cano, supra; Jingco v.
Daluz, L-5107, April 24, 1953, 92 Phil. 1082; Roman Catholic v. Agustines,
L-14710, March 29, 1960, 107 Phil. 455, 460-461; Emphasis supplied)
42
In Litam et al., v. Rivera, 100 Phil. 364, where despite the pendency of the
special proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of the
deceased Rafael Litam the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil action in which
they claimed that they were the children by a previous marriage of the
deceased to a Chinese woman, hence, entitled to inherit his one-half share
of the conjugal properties acquired during his marriage to Marcosa Rivera,
the trial court in the civil case declared that the plaintiffs-appellants were not
children of the deceased, that the properties in question were paraphernal
properties of his wife, Marcosa Rivera, and that the latter was his only heir.
On appeal to this Court, we ruled that "such declarations (that Marcosa
Rivera was the only heir of the decedent) is improper, in Civil Case No.
2071, it being within the exclusive competence of the court in Special
Proceedings No. 1537, in which it is not as yet, in issue, and, will not be,
ordinarily, in issue until the presentation of the project of partition. (p. 378).
However, in the Guilas case, supra, since the estate proceedings had been
closed and terminated for over three years, the action for annulment of the
project of partition was allowed to continue. Considering that in the instant
case, the estate proceedings are still pending, but nonetheless, Concordia
had lost her right to have herself declared as co-heir in said proceedings,
We have opted likewise to proceed to discuss the merits of her claim in the
interest of justice.
The orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, in Civil Case No. 13207
setting aside the probate proceedings in Branch 23 (formerly Branch 11) on
the ground of extrinsic fraud, and declaring Concordia Villanueva to be a co-
heir of Celedonia to the estate of Esteban, Jr., ordering the partition of the
estate, and requiring the administratrix, Celedonia, to submit an inventory
and accounting of the estate, were improper and officious, to say the least,
for these matters he within the exclusive competence of the probate court.
II. The question of extrinsic fraud—
Was Concordia prevented from intervening in the intestate proceedings by
extrinsic fraud employed by Celedonia? It is noteworthy that extrinsic fraud
was not alleged in Concordia's original complaint in Civil Case No. 13207. It
was only in her amended complaint of March 6, 1980, that extrinsic fraud
was alleged for the first time.
Extrinsic fraud, as a ground for annulment of judgment, is any act or conduct
of the prevailing party which prevented a fair submission of the controversy
(Francisco v. David, 38 O.G. 714). A fraud 'which prevents a party from
having a trial or presenting all of his case to the court, or one which operates
upon matters pertaining, not to the judgment itself, but to the manner by
which such judgment was procured so much so that there was no fair
submission of the controversy.
For instance, if through fraudulent machination by one [his adversary], a
litigant was induced to withdraw his defense or was prevented from
presenting an available defense or cause of action in the case wherein the
judgment was obtained, such that the aggrieved party was deprived of his
day in court through no fault of his own, the equitable relief against such
judgment may be availed of. (Yatco v. Sumagui, 44623-R, July 31, 1971).
(cited in Philippine Law Dictionary, 1972 Ed. by Moreno; Varela v.
Villanueva, et al., 96 Phil. 248)
A judgment may be annulled on the ground of extrinsic or collateral fraud, as
distinguished from intrinsic fraud, which connotes any fraudulent scheme
executed by a prevailing litigant 'outside the trial of a case against the
defeated party, or his agents, attorneys or witnesses, whereby said defeated
party is prevented from presenting fully and fairly his side of the case. ... The
overriding consideration is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing
litigant prevented a party from having his day in court or from presenting his
case. The fraud, therefore, is one that affects and goes into the jurisdiction
of the court. (Libudan v. Gil, L-21163, May 17, 1972, 45 SCRA 17, 27-29;
43
Sterling Investment Corp. v. Ruiz, L-30694, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA
318, 323)
The charge of extrinsic fraud is, however, unwarranted for the following
reasons:
1. Concordia was not unaware of the special proceeding intended to be filed
by Celedonia. She admitted in her complaint that she and Celedonia had
agreed that the latter would "initiate the necessary proceeding" and pay the
taxes and obligations of the estate. Thus paragraph 6 of her complaint
alleged:
6. ... for the purpose of facilitating the settlement of the estate of the late
Esteban Javellana, Jr. at the lowest possible cost and the least effort, the
plaintiff and the defendant agreed that the defendant shall initiate the
necessary proceeding, cause the payment of taxes and other obligations,
and to do everything else required by law, and thereafter, secure the
partition of the estate between her and the plaintiff, [although Celedonia
denied that they agreed to partition the estate, for their agreement was to
place the estate in a foundation.] (p. 2, Record; emphasis supplied)
Evidently, Concordia was not prevented from intervening in the proceedings.
She stayed away by choice. Besides, she knew that the estate came
exclusively from Esteban's mother, Salustia Solivio, and she had agreed
with Celedonia to place it in a foundation as the deceased had planned to
do.
2. The probate proceedings are proceedings in rem. Notice of the time and
place of hearing of the petition is required to be published (Sec. 3, Rule 76 in
relation to Sec. 3, Rule 79, Rules of Court). Notice of the hearing of
Celedonia's original petition was published in the "Visayan Tribune" on April
25, May 2 and 9, 1977 (Exh 4, p. 197, Record). Similarly, notice of the
hearing of her amended petition of May 26, 1977 for the settlement of the
estate was, by order of the court, published in "Bagong Kasanag" (New
Light) issues of May 27, June 3 and 10, 1977 (pp. 182-305, Record). The
publication of the notice of the proceedings was constructive notice to the
whole world. Concordia was not deprived of her right to intervene in the
proceedings for she had actual, as well as constructive notice of the same.
As pointed out by the probate court in its order of October 27, 1978:
... . The move of Concordia Javellana, however, was filed about five months
after Celedonia Solivio was declared as the sole heir. ... .
Considering that this proceeding is one in rem and had been duly published
as required by law, despite which the present movant only came to court
now, then she is guilty of laches for sleeping on her alleged right. (p. 22,
Record)
The court noted that Concordia's motion did not comply with the requisites of
a petition for relief from judgment nor a motion for new trial.
The rule is stated in 49 Corpus Juris Secundum 8030 as follows:
Where petition was sufficient to invoke statutory jurisdiction of probate court
and proceeding was in rem no subsequent errors or irregularities are
available on collateral attack. (Bedwell v. Dean 132 So. 20)
Celedonia's allegation in her petition that she was the sole heir of Esteban
within the third degree on his mother's side was not false. Moreover, it was
made in good faith and in the honest belief that because the properties of
Esteban had come from his mother, not his father, she, as Esteban's
nearest surviving relative on his mother's side, is the rightful heir to them. It
would have been self-defeating and inconsistent with her claim of sole
heirship if she stated in her petition that Concordia was her co-heir. Her
omission to so state did not constitute extrinsic fraud.
44
Failure to disclose to the adversary, or to the court, matters which would
defeat one's own claim or defense is not such extrinsic fraud as will justify or
require vacation of the judgment. (49 C.J.S. 489, citing Young v. Young, 2
SE 2d 622; First National Bank & Trust Co. of King City v. Bowman, 15 SW
2d 842; Price v. Smith, 109 SW 2d 1144, 1149)
It should be remembered that a petition for administration of a decedent's
estate may be filed by any "interested person" (Sec. 2, Rule 79, Rules of
Court). The filing of Celedonia's petition did not preclude Concordia from
filing her own.
III. On the question of reserva troncal—
We find no merit in the petitioner's argument that the estate of the deceased
was subject to reserva troncal and that it pertains to her as his only relative
within the third degree on his mother's side. The reserva troncal provision of
the Civil Code is found in Article 891 which reads as follows:
ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property
which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another
ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he
may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are
within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said property
came.
The persons involved in reserva troncal are:
1. The person obliged to reserve is the reservor (reservista)—the ascendant
who inherits by operation of law property from his descendants.
2. The persons for whom the property is reserved are the reservees
(reservatarios)—relatives within the third degree counted from the
descendant (propositus), and belonging to the line from which the property
came.
3. The propositus—the descendant who received by gratuitous title and died
without issue, making his other ascendant inherit by operation of law. (p.
692, Civil Law by Padilla, Vol. II, 1956 Ed.)
Clearly, the property of the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., is not
reservable property, for Esteban, Jr. was not an ascendant, but the
descendant of his mother, Salustia Solivio, from whom he inherited the
properties in question. Therefore, he did not hold his inheritance subject to a
reservation in favor of his aunt, Celedonia Solivio, who is his relative within
the third degree on his mother's side. The reserva troncal applies to
properties inherited by an ascendant from a descendant who inherited it
from another ascendant or 9 brother or sister. It does not apply to property
inherited by a descendant from his ascendant, the reverse of the situation
covered by Article 891.
Since the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., died without descendants,
ascendants, illegitimate children, surviving spouse, brothers, sisters,
nephews or nieces, what should apply in the distribution of his estate are
Articles 1003 and 1009 of the Civil Code which provide:
ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or
a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate
of the deceased in accordance with the following articles.
ART. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of
brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among
them by reason of relationship by the whole blood.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals correctly held that:
Both plaintiff-appellee and defendant-appellant being relatives of the
decedent within the third degree in the collateral line, each, therefore, shall
45
succeed to the subject estate 'without distinction of line or preference among
them by reason of relationship by the whole blood,' and is entitled one-half
(1/2) share and share alike of the estate. (p. 57, Rollo)
IV. The question of Concordia's one-half share—
However, inasmuch as Concordia had agreed to deliver the estate of the
deceased to the foundation in honor of his mother, Salustia Solivio Vda. de
Javellana (from whom the estate came), an agreement which she ratified
and confirmed in her "Motion to Reopen and/or Reconsider Order dated
April 3, 1978" which she filed in Spl. Proceeding No. 2540:
4. That ... prior to the filing of the petition they (petitioner Celedonia Solivio
and movant Concordia Javellana) have agreed to make the estate of the
decedent a foundation, besides they have closely known each other due to
their filiation to the decedent and they have been visiting each other's house
which are not far away for (sic) each other. (p. 234, Record; Emphasis
supplied) she is bound by that agreement. It is true that by that agreement,
she did not waive her inheritance in favor of Celedonia, but she did agree to
place all of Esteban's estate in the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana
Foundation" which Esteban, Jr., during his lifetime, planned to set up to
honor his mother and to finance the education of indigent but deserving
students as well.
Her admission may not be taken lightly as the lower court did. Being a
judicial admission, it is conclusive and no evidence need be presented to
prove the agreement (Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227; Granada v.
Philippine National Bank, L-20745, Sept. 2, 1966, 18 SCRA 1; Sta. Ana v.
Maliwat, L-23023, Aug. 31, 1968, 24 SCRA 1018; People v. Encipido,
G.R.70091, Dec. 29, 1986, 146 SCRA 478; and Rodillas v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. 58652, May 20, 1988, 161 SCRA 347).
The admission was never withdrawn or impugned by Concordia who,
significantly, did not even testify in the case, although she could have done
so by deposition if she were supposedly indisposed to attend the trial. Only
her husband, Narciso, and son-in-law, Juanito Domin, actively participated in
the trial. Her husband confirmed the agreement between his wife and
Celedonia, but he endeavored to dilute it by alleging that his wife did not
intend to give all, but only one-half, of her share to the foundation (p. 323,
Record).
The records show that the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation"
was established and duly registered in the Securities and Exchange
Commission under Reg. No. 0100027 for the following principal purposes:
1. To provide for the establishment and/or setting up of scholarships for such
deserving students as the Board of Trustees of the Foundation may decide
of at least one scholar each to study at West Visayas State College, and the
University of the Philippines in the Visayas both located in Iloilo City.
2. To provide a scholarship for at least one scholar for St. Clements
Redemptorist Community for a deserving student who has the religious
vocation to become a priest.
3. To foster, develop, and encourage activities that will promote the
advancement and enrichment of the various fields of educational endeavors,
especially in literary arts. Scholarships provided for by this foundation may
be named after its benevolent benefactors as a token of gratitude for their
contributions.
4. To direct or undertake surveys and studies in the community to determine
community needs and be able to alleviate partially or totally said needs.
5. To maintain and provide the necessary activities for the proper care of the
Solivio-Javellana mausoleum at Christ the King Memorial Park, Jaro, Iloilo
46
City, and the Javellana Memorial at the West Visayas State College, as a
token of appreciation for the contribution of the estate of the late Esteban S.
Javellana which has made this foundation possible. Also, in perpetuation of
his Roman Catholic beliefs and those of his mother, Gregorian masses or
their equivalents will be offered every February and October, and Requiem
masses every February 25th and October llth, their death anniversaries, as
part of this provision.
6. To receive gifts, legacies, donations, contributions, endowments and
financial aids or loans from whatever source, to invest and reinvest the
funds, collect the income thereof and pay or apply only the income or such
part thereof as shall be determined by the Trustees for such endeavors as
may be necessary to carry out the objectives of the Foundation.
7. To acquire, purchase, own, hold, operate, develop, lease, mortgage,
pledge, exchange, sell, transfer, or otherwise, invest, trade, or deal, in any
manner permitted by law, in real and personal property of every kind and
description or any interest herein.
8. To do and perform all acts and things necessary, suitable or proper for the
accomplishments of any of the purposes herein enumerated or which shall
at any time appear conducive to the protection or benefit of the corporation,
including the exercise of the powers, authorities and attributes concerned
upon the corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines in general,
and upon domestic corporation of like nature in particular. (pp. 9-10, Rollo)
As alleged without contradiction in the petition' for review:
The Foundation began to function in June, 1982, and three (3) of its eight
Esteban Javellana scholars graduated in 1986, one (1) from UPV graduated
Cum Laude and two (2) from WVSU graduated with honors; one was a Cum
Laude and the other was a recipient of Lagos Lopez award for teaching for
being the most outstanding student teacher.
The Foundation has four (4) high school scholars in Guiso Barangay High
School, the site of which was donated by the Foundation. The School has
been selected as the Pilot Barangay High School for Region VI.
The Foundation has a special scholar, Fr. Elbert Vasquez, who would be
ordained this year. He studied at St. Francis Xavier Major Regional
Seminary at Davao City. The Foundation likewise is a member of the
Redemptorist Association that gives yearly donations to help poor students
who want to become Redemptorist priests or brothers. It gives yearly awards
for Creative writing known as the Esteban Javellana Award.
Further, the Foundation had constructed the Esteban S. Javellana Multi-
purpose Center at the West Visayas State University for teachers' and
students' use, and has likewise contributed to religious civic and cultural
fund-raising drives, amongst other's. (p. 10, Rollo)
Having agreed to contribute her share of the decedent's estate to the
Foundation, Concordia is obligated to honor her commitment as Celedonia
has honored hers.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted. The decision of the trial
court and the Court of Appeals are hereby SET ASIDE. Concordia J.
Villanueva is declared an heir of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. entitled to
one-half of his estate. However, comformably with the agreement between
her and her co-heir, Celedonia Solivio, the entire estate of the deceased
should be conveyed to the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javallana Foundation,"
of which both the petitioner and the private respondent shall be trustees, and
each shall be entitled to nominate an equal number of trustees to constitute
the Board of Trustees of the Foundation which shall administer the same for
the purposes set forth in its charter. The petitioner, as administratrix of the
estate, shall submit to the probate court an inventory and accounting of the
estate of the deceased preparatory to terminating the proceedings therein.
SO ORDERED.
47
G.R. No. 68843-44 September 2, 1991
MARIQUITA O. SUMAYA and LAGUNA AGRO-INDUSTRIAL COCONUT
COOPERATIVE, INC. vs. IAC
MEDIALDEA, J.:
The parties entered into a stipulation of facts in the court a quo, which is
summarized as follows:
Raul Balantakbo inherited from two (2) different ascendants the two (2) sets
of properties subject of this case: 1) A one-third (1/3) interest, pro-indiviso in
a parcel of land situated in Dita, Lilio (Liliw) Laguna and described in
paragraph 7 of the complaint in Civil Case No. SC-956 from his father Jose,
Sr., who died on January 28, 1945; and 2) A one-seventh (1/7) interest pro-
indiviso in ten (10) parcels of registered lands described in paragraph 6 of
the complaint in Civil Case No. SC-957 from his maternal grandmother,
Luisa Bautista, who died on November 3, 1950.
On June 13, 1952, Raul died intestate, single, without any issue, and leaving
only his mother, Consuelo Joaquin Vda. de Balantakbo, as his sole surviving
heir to the real properties above-mentioned.
On November 3, 1952, Consuelo adjudicated unto herself the above
described properties in an Affidavit entitled "Caudal Herederario del finado
Raul Balantakbo" which provided, among others:
I. Que de mi legitimo matrimonio con mi difunto esposo, Jose Balantakbo,
he tenido varios hijos, entre ellos si difunto hijo, llamado Raul Balantakbo.
II. Que mi referido hijo Raul Balantakbo, fallencio el 13 de Junio de 1952, en
la Ciudad de Pasay, durante su minolia de edad sin dejar testamento
alguno.
III. Que el finado Raul Balantakbo al morir no ha dejado descendiente
alguno.
IV. Que soy la unica ascendiente superviviento de mi referido hijo Raul
Balantakbo y por lo tanto su unica heredera formosa, legitima y universal.
V. Que el finado Raul Balantakbo murio sin dejar deuda alguna.
VI. Que el finado al morir dejo propiedades consistentes en bienes
inmuebles situados en la Provincia de Laguna.
VII. Que dichas propriedades fueron a su vez adquiridas por el finado Raul
Balantakbo per herencia de su difunto padre, Jose Balantakbo, y de su tia
abuela Luisa Bautista.
xxx xxx xxx
(Rollo, p. 29)
On December 21, 1959, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo sold the
property described in Civil Case No. SC-956 to Mariquita H. Sumaya. The
sale was evidenced by a deed attached as Annex "C" to the complaint. The
same property was subsequently sold by Mariquita Sumaya to Villa Honorio
Development Corporation, Inc., on December 30, 1963. On January 23,
1967, Villa Honorio Development Corporation transferred and assigned its
rights over the property in favor of Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc.
The documents evidencing these transfers were registered in the Registry of
Deeds of Laguna and the corresponding certificates of titles were issued.
The properties are presently in the name of Agro-Industrial Coconut
Cooperative, Inc., 2/3 share and the remaining 1/3 share is in the name of
Sancho Balantakbo.
Also on December 30, 1963, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo sold the
properties described in the complaint in Civil Case No. SC-957 to Villa
48
Honorio Development Corporation, Inc. The latter in turn transferred and
assigned all its rights to the properties in favor of Laguna Agro-Industrial
Coconut Cooperative, Inc. which properties are presently in its possession.
The parties admit that the certificates of titles covering the above described
properties do not contain any annotation of its reservable character.
On June 3, 1968, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo died.
On March 4, 1970, Amadeo, Sancho, Donato, Luis, and Erasto, all
surnamed Balantakbo, brothers in full blood of Raul Balantakbo and Luisa,
Jose and Dolores, also all surnamed Balantakbo, surviving children of
deceased Jose Balantakbo, Jr., another brother of the first named
Balantakbos, filed the above mentioned civil cases to recover the properties
described in the respective complaints which they claimed were subject to a
reserva troncal in their favor.
The court a quo found that the two (2) cases varied only in the identity of the
subject matter of res involved, the transferees, the dates of the conveyances
but involve the same legal question of reserva troncal. Hence, the
consolidation of the two (2) cases.
After trial, the court a quo rendered a joint decision in favor of the
Balantakbos, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in both Civil Cases Nos. SC-956 and SC-957, judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, as
follows:
1. Ordering the defendant Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc.
to convey to the plaintiffs —
a) In Civil Case No. SC-956 — the one-third (1/3) interest and ownership,
pro-indiviso, in and over the parcel of land described in paragraph three (3)
sub-paragraph 1, of pages one (1) and two (2) of this decision;
b) In Civil Case No. SC-957 — the one-seventh (1/7) interest and
ownership, pro-indiviso, in and over the ten (10) parcels of land described in
paragraph three (3), sub-paragraph 2, of pages two (2) and three (3) of this
decision;
c) The plaintiffs are to share equally in the real properties herein ordered to
be conveyed to them by the defendants with plaintiffs Luisa, Jose and
Dolores, all surnamed Balantakbo, receiving one-third (1/3) of the one share
pertaining to the other plaintiffs who are their uncles:
2. Ordering the Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc. to account
for and pay to the plaintiffs the value of the produce from the properties
herein ordered to be returned to the plaintiffs, said accounting and payment
of income being for the period from January 3, 1968 until date of
reconveyance of the properties herein ordered:
3. In each of Civil Cases Nos. SC-956 and SC-957, defendants are to pay
plaintiffs —
a. One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos in litigation expenses.
b. Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos in attorney's fees.
4. Defendants are to pay the costs in each of Civil Cases Nos. SC-956 and
957.
xxx xxx xxx
(p. 46, Rollo)
This decision was appealed to the appellate court which affirmed the
decision of the court a quo in toto. The motion for reconsideration was
49

denied (p. 65, Rollo) by the appellate court which found no cogent reason to
reverse the decision.
This petition before Us was filed on November 12, 1984 with the petitioners
assigning the following errors allegedly committed by the appellate court:
I. The trial court erred in not finding defendants an (sic) innocent purchaser
for value and in good faith of the properties covered by certificates of title
subject of litigation.
issue:
II. The trial court erred in finding it unnecessary to annotate the reservable
interest of the reservee in the properties covered by certificates of title
subject of litigation.
III. The trial court erred in finding that the cause of action of the plaintiffs
(private respondents) has not yet prescribed.
IV. The trial court erred in awarding moral and actual damages in favor of
the plaintiffs by virtue of the institution of Civil Cases Nos. 956 and 957.
Petitioners would want this Court to reverse the findings of the court a quo,
which the appellate court affirmed, that they were not innocent purchasers
for value. According to petitioners, before they agreed to buy the properties
from the reservor (also called reservista), Consuelo Joaquin vda. de
Balantakbo, they first sought the legal advice of their family consultant who
found that there was no encumbrance nor any lien annotated on the
certificate of title coveting the properties.
The court a quo found otherwise. Upon the death of the propositus, Raul
Balantakbo, the reservista, Consuelo vda. de Balantakbo caused the
registration of an affidavit of self-adjudication of the estate of Raul, wherein it
was clearly stated that the properties were inherited by Raul from his father
sold to Sumaya
Jose, Sr., as regards the subject matter of Civil Case No. SC-956 and from
his maternal grandmother, Luisa Bautista, as regards the subject matter of
sold to villa honorio
Civil Case No. SC-957. The court a quo further ruled that said affidavit was,
in its form, declaration and substance, a recording with the Registry of
Deeds of the reservable character of the properties. In Spanish language,
the affidavit clearly stated that the affiant, Consuelo, was a lone-ascendant
and heir to Raul Balantakbo, her son, who died leaving properties previously
inherited from other ascendants and which properties were inventoried in the
said affidavit.
It was admitted that the certificates of titles covering the properties in
question show that they were free from any liens and encumbrances at the
time of the sale. The fact remains however, that the affidavit of self-
adjudication executed by Consuelo stating the source of the properties
thereby showing the reservable nature thereof was registered with the
Register of Deeds of Laguna, and this is sufficient notice to the whole world
in accordance with Section 52 of the Property Registration Decree (formerly
Sec. 51 of R.A. 496) which provides:
Sec. 52. CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE UPON REGISTRATION. — Every
conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien attachment, order, judgment, instrument
or entry affecting registered land shall, if registered, filed or entered in the
Office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land to
which it relates lies, be constructive notice to all persons from the time of
such registering, filing or entering.
Thus, in Gatioan v. Gaffud, G.R. No. L-21953, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA
706, 712-713, cited in People v. Reyes, We held:
When a conveyance has been properly recorded such record is constructive
notice of its contents and all interests, legal and equitable, included therein .
..
Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined
every instrument of record affecting the title. Such presumption is
50
irrebuttable. He is charged with notice of every fact shown by the record and
is presumed to know every fact which an examination of the record would
have disclosed. This presumption cannot be overcome by proof of
innocence or good faith. Otherwise, the very purpose and object of the law
requiring a record would be destroyed. Such presumption cannot be
defeated by proof of want of knowledge of what the record contains any
more than one may be permitted to show that he was ignorant of the
provisions of the law. The rule that all persons must take notice of the facts
which the public record contains is a rule of law. The rule must be absolute,
any variation would lead to endless confusion and useless litigation. . . .
In the case of Bass v. De la Rama, 73 Phil. 682, 685, the rule was laid down
that the mere entry of a document in the day book without noting it on the
certificate of title is not sufficient registration. However, that ruling was
superseded by the holding in the later six cases of Levin v. Bass, 91 Phil.
420. As explained in Garcia v. CA, et al., G.R. Nos. L-48971 and 49011,
January 20, 1980, 95 SCRA 380, 388, which is the prevailing doctrine in this
jurisdiction.
That ruling was superseded by the holding in the later six cases of Levin v.
Bass, 91 Phil. 420, where a distinction was made between voluntary and
involuntary registration, such as the registration of an attachment, levy upon
execution, notice of lis pendens, and the like. In cases of involuntary
registration, an entry thereof in the day book is a sufficient notice to all
persons even if the owner's duplicate certificate of title is not presented to
the register of deeds.
On the other hand, according to the said cases of Levin v. Bass, in case of
voluntary registration of documents an innocent purchaser for value of
registered land becomes the registered owner, and, in contemplation of law
the holder of a certificate of title, the moment he presents and files a duly
notarized and valid deed of sale and the same is entered in the day book
and at the same time he surrenders or presents the owner's duplicate
certificate of title covering the land sold and pays the registration fees,
because what remains to be done lies not within his power to perform. The
register of deeds is duty bound to perform it. (See Potenciano v. Dineros, 97
Phil. 196).
In this case, the affidavit of self adjudication executed by Consuelo vda. de
Balantakbo which contained a statement that the property was inherited
from a descendant, Raul, which has likewise inherited by the latter from
another ascendant, was registered with the Registry of Property. The failure
of the Register of Deeds to annotate the reservable character of the property
in the certificate of title cannot be attributed to Consuelo.
Moreover, there is sufficient proof that the petitioners had actual knowledge
of the reservable character of the properties before they bought the same
from Consuelo. This matter appeared in the deed of sale (Exhibit "C")
executed by Consuelo in favor of Mariquita Sumaya, the first vendee of the
property litigated in Civil Case No. SC-956, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
That, I (Consuelo, vendor) am the absolute and exclusive owner of the one-
third (1/3) portion of the above described parcel of land by virtue of the Deed
of Extra-judicial Partition executed by the Heirs of the deceased Jose
Balantakbo dated December 10, 1945 and said portion in accordance with
the partition above-mentioned was adjudicated to Raul Balantakbo, single,
to (sic) whom I inherited after his death and this property is entirely free from
any encumbrance of any nature or kind whatsoever, . . . (p. 42, Rollo)
It was admitted though that as regards the properties litigated in Civil Case
SC-957, no such admission was made by Consuelo to put Villa Honorio
Development on notice of the reservable character of the properties. The
affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Consuelo and registered with the
Registry would still be sufficient notice to bind them.
51
Moreover, the Court a quo found that the petitioners and private
respondents were long time acquaintances; that the Villa Honorio
Development Corporation and its successors, the Laguna Agro-Industrial
Coconut Cooperative Inc., are family corporations of the Sumayas and that
the petitioners knew all along that the properties litigated in this case were
inherited by Raul Balantakbo from his father and from his maternal
grandmother, and that Consuelo Vda. de Balantakbo inherited these
properties from his son Raul.
The obligation to reserve rests upon the reservor, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de
Balantakbo. Article 891 of the New Civil Code on reserva troncal provides:
Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property
which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another
ascendant or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he
may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are
within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said property
came. (Emphasis supplied)
We do not agree, however, with the disposition of the appellate court that
there is no need to register the reservable character of the property, if only
for the protection of the reservees, against innocent third persons. This was
suggested as early as the case of Director of Lands v. Aguas, G.R. No.
42737, August 11, 1936, 63 Phil. 279. The main issue submitted for
resolution therein was whether the reservation established by Article 811
(now Art. 891 of the New Civil Code) of the Civil Code, for the benefit of the
relatives within the third degree belonging to the line of the descendant from
whom the ascendant reservor received the property, should be understood
as made in favor of all the relatives within said degree and belonging to the
line above-mentioned, without distinction legitimate, natural and illegitimate
ones not having the legal status of natural children. However, in an obiter
dictum this Court stated therein:
The reservable character of a property is but a resolutory condition of the
ascendant reservor's right of ownership. If the condition is fulfilled, that is, if
upon the ascendant reservor's death there are relatives having the status
provided in Article 811 (Art. 891, New Civil Code), the property passes, in
accordance with this special order of succession, to said relatives, or to the
nearest of kin among them, which question not being pertinent to this case,
need not now be determined. But if this condition is not fulfilled, the property
is released and will be adjudicated in accordance with the regular order of
succession. The fulfillment or non-fulfillment of the resolutory condition, the
efficacy or cessation of the reservation, the acquisition of rights or loss of the
vested ones, are phenomena which have nothing to do with whether the
reservation has been noted or not in the certificate of title to the property.
The purpose of the notation is nothing more than to afford to the persons
entitled to the reservation, if any,
due protection against any act of the reservor, which may make it ineffective
. . . (p. 292, Ibid)
Likewise, in Dizon and Dizon v. Galang, G.R. No. 21344, January 14, 1926,
48 Phil. 601, 603, this Court ruled that the reservable character of a property
may be lost to innocent purchasers for value. Additionally, it was ruled
therein that the obligation imposed on a widowed spouse to annotate the
reservable character of a property subject of reserva viudal is applicable to
reserva troncal. (See also Edrozo v. Sablan, G.R. No. 6878, September 13,
1913, 25 Phil. 295).
Since these parcels of land have been legally transferred to third persons,
Vicente Galang has lost ownership thereof and cannot now register nor
record in the Registry of Deeds their reservable character; neither can he
effect the fee simple, which does not belong to him, to the damage of Juan
Medina and Teodoro Jurado, who acquired the said land in good faith, free
of all incumbrances. An attempt was made to prove that when Juan Medina
52
was advised not to buy the land he remarked, "Why did he (Vicente Galang)
not inherit it from his son?"
Aside from the fact that it is not clear whether this conservation took place in
1913 or 1914, that is, before or after the sale, it does not arise that he had
any knowledge of the reservation. This did not arise from the fact alone that
Vicente Galang had inherited the land from his son, but also from the fact
that, by operation of law, the son had inherited it from his mother Rufina
Dizon, which circumstance, so far as the record shows, Juan Medina had
not been aware of. We do not decide, however, whether or not Juan Medina
and Teodoro Jurado are obliged to acknowledge the reservation and to note
the same in their deeds, for the reason that there was no prayer to this effect
in the complaint and no question raised in regard thereto.
Consistent with the rule in reserva viudal where the person obliged to
reserve (the widowed spouse) had the obligation to annotate in the Registry
of Property the reservable character of the property, in reserva troncal, the
reservor (the ascendant who inherited from a descendant property which the
latter inherited from another descendant) has the duty to reserve and
therefore, the duty to annotate also.
The jurisprudential rule requiring annotation in the Registry of Property of the
right reserved in real property subject of reserva viudal insofar as it is
applied to reserva troncal stays despite the abolition of reserva viudal in the
New Civil Code. This rule is consistent with the rule provided in the second
paragraph of Section 51 of P.D. 1529, which provides that: "The act of
registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as
third persons are concerned . . ." (emphasis supplied)
The properties involved in this case are already covered by a Torrens title
and unless the registration of the limitation is effected (either actual or
constructive), no third persons shall be prejudiced thereby.
The respondent appellate court did not err in finding that the cause of action
of the private respondents did not prescribe yet. The cause of action of the
reservees did not commence upon the death of the propositus Raul
Balantakbo on June 13, 1952 but upon the death of the reservor Consuelo
Vda. de Balantakbo on June 3, 1968. Relatives within the third degree in
whose favor the right (or property) is reserved have no title of ownership or
of fee simple over the reserved property during the lifetime of the reservor.
Only when the reservor should die before the reservees will the latter
acquire the reserved property, thus creating a fee simple, and only then will
they take their place in the succession of the descendant of whom they are
relatives within the third degree (See Velayo Bernardo v. Siojo, G.R. No.
36078, March 11, 1933, 58 Phil. 89). The reserva is extinguished upon the
death of the reservor, as it then becomes a right of full ownership on the part
of the reservatarios, who can bring a reivindicatory suit therefor.
Nonetheless, this right if not exercised within the time for recovery may
prescribe in ten (10) years under the old Code of Civil Procedure (see Carillo
v. De Paz, G.R. No. L-22601, October 28, 1966, 18 SCRA 467, 473) or in
thirty years under Article 1141 of the New Civil Code. The actions for
recovery of the reserved property was brought by herein private respondents
on March 4, 1970 or less than two (2) years from the death of the reservor.
Therefore, private respondents' cause of action has not prescribed yet.
Finally, the award of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) for actual litigation
expenses and two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) for attorney's fees is proper
under Article 2208(2) of the New Civil Code. Private respondents were
compelled to go to court to recover what rightfully belongs to them.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED. The questioned decision of the
Intermediate Appellate Court is AFFIRMED, except for the modification on
the necessity to annotate the reversable character of a property subject of
reserva troncal. SO ORDERED.
53
G.R. NO. 176422 : March 20, 2013
MARIA MENDOZA v. JULIA POLlCARPIO DELOS SANTOS, substituted by
her heirs, CARMEN P. DELOS SANTOS, ET. AL.
DECISION
REYES, J.
Reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the return of a
reservable property to the third degree relatives belonging to the line from
which the property originally came, and avoid its being dissipated into and
by the relatives of the inheriting ascendant.
The Facts
The properties subject in the instant case are three parcels of land located in
Sta. Maria, Bulacan: (1) Lot 1681-B, with an area of 7,749 square meters;2
(2) Lot 1684, with an area of 5,667 sq m;3 and (3) Lot No. 1646-B, with an
area of 880 sq m.4 Lot Nos. 1681-B and 1684 are presently in the name of
respondent Julia Delos Santos5 (respondent). Lot No. 1646-B, on the other
hand, is also in the name of respondent but co-owned by Victoria Pantaleon,
who bought one-half of the property from petitioner Maria Mendoza and her
siblings.
Petitioners are grandchildren of Placido Mendoza (Placido) and Dominga
Mendoza (Dominga). Placido and Dominga had four children: Antonio,
Exequiel, married to Leonor, Apolonio and Valentin. Petitioners Maria,
Deogracias, Dionisia, Adoracion, Marcela and Ricardo are the children of
Antonio. Petitioners Juliana, Fely, Mercedes, Elvira and Fortunato, on the
other hand, are Valentin's children. Petitioners alleged that the properties
were part of Placido and Dominga's properties that were subject of an oral
partition and subsequently adjudicated to Exequiel. After Exequiel's death, it
passed on to his spouse Leonor and only daughter, Gregoria. After Leonor's
death, her share went to Gregoria. In 1992, Gregoria died intestate and
without issue. They claimed that after Gregoria's death, respondent, who is
Leonor's sister, adjudicated unto herself all these properties as the sole
surviving heir of Leonor and Gregoria. Hence, petitioners claim that the
properties should have been reserved by respondent in their behalf and
must now revert back to them, applying Article 891 of the Civil Code on
reserva troncal.
Respondent, however, denies any obligation to reserve the properties as
these did not originate from petitioners' familial line and were not originally
owned by Placido and Dominga. According to respondent, the properties
were bought by Exequiel and Antonio from a certain Alfonso Ramos in 1931.
It appears, however, that it was only Exequiel who was in possession of the
properties.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 6, found merit
in petitioners' claim and granted their action for Recovery of Possession by
Reserva Troncal, Cancellation of TCT and Reconveyance. In its Decision
dated November 4, 2002, the RTC disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premised from the foregoing judgment is hereby rendered
1. Ordering respondents (heirs of Julia Policarpio) to reconvey the three (3)
parcels of land subject of this action in the name of the plaintiffs enumerated
in the complaint including intervenor Maria Cecilia M. Mendoza except one-
half of the property described in the old title, TCT No. T-124852(M) which
belongs to Victorina Pantaleon;
2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Bulacan to cancel the titles in the name
of Julia Policarpio, TCT No. T-149033(M), T-183631(M) and T-149035(M)
and reconvey the same to the enumerated plaintiffs; and
54
3. No pronouncement as to claims for attorney's fees and damages and
costs.
SO ORDERED.7
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed and set aside the RTC
decision and dismissed the complaint filed by petitioners. The dispositive
portion of the CA Decision dated November 16, 2006 provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the November 4, 2002 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Br. 6, Third Judicial Region, Malolos, Bulacan, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Third Amended Complaint in Civil Case
No. 609-M-92 is hereby DISMISSED. Costs against the Plaintiffs-Appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied the same per
Resolution9 dated January 17, 2007.
In dismissing the complaint, the CA ruled that petitioners failed to establish
issues:
that Placido and Dominga owned the properties in dispute.10 The CA also
ruled that even assuming that Placido and Dominga previously owned the
properties, it still cannot be subject to reserva troncal as neither Exequiel
predeceased Placido and Dominga nor did Gregoria predecease Exequiel.
Now before the Court, petitioners argue that:
A.
THE HONORABLE [CA] GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
SUBJECT PROPERTIES ARE NOT RESERVABLE PROPERTIES,
COMING AS THEY DO FROM THE FAMILY LINE OF THE PETITIONERS
MENDOZAS.
B.
THE HONORABLE [CA] GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
PETITIONERS MENDOZAS DO NOT HAVE A RIGHT TO THE SUBJECT
PROPERTIES BY VIRTUE OF THE LAW ON RESERVA TRONCAL.12
Petitioners take exception to the ruling of the CA, contending that it is
sufficient that the properties came from the paternal line of Gregoria for it to
be subject to reserva troncal. They also claim the properties in
representation of their own predecessors, Antonio and Valentin, who were
the brothers of Exequiel.
Ruling of the Court
This petition is one for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. The general rule in this regard is that it should raise only questions of
law. There are, however, admitted exceptions to this rule, one of which is
when the CA's findings are contrary to those of the trial court.14 This being
the case in the petition at hand, the Court must now look into the differing
findings and conclusion of the RTC and the CA on the two issues that arise
one, whether the properties in dispute are reservable properties and two,
whether petitioners are entitled to a reservation of these properties.
Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva troncal
The principle of reserva troncal is provided in Article 891 of the Civil Code:
Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property
which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another
ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he
may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are
within the third degree and belong to the line from which said property came.
(Emphasis ours)
There are three (3) lines of transmission in reserva troncal. The first
transmission is by gratuitous title, whether by inheritance or donation, from
1. No, Article 891 is not applicable in this case as they are collateral relatives.
2. No, since they are first cousins and that is considered to be a fourth degree 55
relative. Thus, cannot be considered as reservees.
an ascendant/brother/sister to a descendant called the prepositus. The
second transmission is by operation of law from the prepositus to the other
ascendant or reservor, also called the reservista. The third and last
transmission is from the reservista to the reservees or reservatarios who
must be relatives within the third degree from which the property came.
The lineal character of the reservable property is reckoned from the
ascendant from whom the prepositus received the property by gratuitous title
Based on the circumstances of the present case, Article 891 on reserva
troncal is not applicable.
-----
The fallacy in the CA's resolution is that it proceeded from the erroneous
premise that Placido is the ascendant contemplated in Article 891 of the Civil
Code. From thence, it sought to trace the origin of the subject properties
back to Placido and Dominga, determine whether Exequiel predeceased
Placido and whether Gregoria predeceased Exequiel.
The persons involved in reserva troncal are:
(1) The ascendant or brother or sister from whom the property was received
by the descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title;
(2) The descendant or prepositus (propositus) who received the property;
(3) The reservor (reservista), the other ascendant who obtained the property
from the prepositus by operation of law; and
(4) The reservee (reservatario) who is within the third degree from the
prepositus and who belongs to the (linea o tronco) from which the property
came and for whom the property should be reserved by the reservor.
It should be pointed out that the ownership of the properties should be
reckoned only from Exequiel's as he is the ascendant from where the first
transmission occurred, or from whom Gregoria inherited the properties in
dispute. The law does not go farther than such ascendant/brother/sister in
determining the lineal character of the property.17 It was also immaterial for
the CA to determine whether Exequiel predeceased Placido and Dominga or
whether Gregoria predeceased Exequiel. What is pertinent is that Exequiel
owned the properties and he is the ascendant from whom the properties in
dispute originally came. Gregoria, on the other hand, is the descendant who
received the properties from Exequiel by gratuitous title.
Moreover, Article 891 simply requires that the property should have been
acquired by the descendant or prepositus from an ascendant by gratuitous
or lucrative title. A transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous title when the
recipient does not give anything in return.18 At risk of being repetitious, what
was clearly established in this case is that the properties in dispute were
owned by Exequiel (ascendant). After his death, Gregoria
(descendant/prepositus) acquired the properties as inheritance.
Ascendants, descendants and collateral relatives under Article 964 of the
Civil Code
Article 891 provides that the person obliged to reserve the property should
be an ascendant (also known as the reservor/reservista) of the
descendant/prepositus. Julia, however, is not Gregoria's ascendant; rather,
she is Gregoria's collateral relative.
Article 964 of the Civil Code provides for the series of degrees among
ascendants and descendants, and those who are not ascendants and
descendants but come from a common ancestor, viz:
56
 Art. 964. A series of degrees forms a line, which may be either direct or
collateral. A direct line is that constituted by the series of degrees among
ascendants and descendants.
A collateral line is that constituted by the series of degrees among persons
who are not ascendants and descendants, but who come from a common
ancestor. (Emphasis and italics ours)
Gregoria's ascendants are her parents, Exequiel and Leonor, her
grandparents, great-grandparents and so on. On the other hand, Gregoria's
descendants, if she had one, would be her children, grandchildren and
great-grandchildren. Not being Gregoria's ascendants, both petitioners and
Julia, therefore, are her collateral relatives. In determining the collateral line
of relationship, ascent is made to the common ancestor and then descent to
the relative from whom the computation is made. In the case of Julia's
collateral relationship with Gregoria, ascent is to be made from Gregoria to
her mother Leonor (one line/degree), then to the common ancestor, that is,
*
Julia and Leonor's parents (second line/degree), and then descent to Julia,
her aunt (third line/degree). Thus, Julia is Gregoria's collateral relative within
the third degree and not her ascendant.
First cousins of the descendant/prepositus are fourth degree relatives and
cannot be considered reservees/reservatarios
Moreover, petitioners cannot be considered reservees/reservatarios as they
are not relatives within the third degree of Gregoria from whom the
properties came. The person from whom the degree should be reckoned is
the descendant/prepositus?the one at the end of the line from which the
property came and upon whom the property last revolved by descent.19 It is
Gregoria in this case. Petitioners are Gregoria's fourth degree relatives,
being her first cousins. First cousins of the prepositus are fourth degree
relatives and are not reservees or reservatarios.20
They cannot even claim representation of their predecessors Antonio and
Valentin as Article 891 grants a personal right of reservation only to the
relatives up to the third degree from whom the reservable properties came.
The only recognized exemption is in the case of nephews and nieces of the
prepositus, who have the right to represent their ascendants (fathers and
mothers) who are the brothers/sisters of the prepositus and relatives within
the third degree.21 In Florentino v. Florentino,22 the Court stated:
Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession, when there
are relatives of the descendant within the third degree, the right of the
nearest relative, called reservatario, over the property which the reservista
(person holding it subject to reservation) should return to him, excludes that
of the one more remote. The right of representation cannot be alleged when
the one claiming same as a reservatario of the reservable property is not
among the relatives within the third degree belong to the line from which
such property came, inasmuch as the right granted by the Civil Code in
Article 811 now Article 891 is in the highest degree personal and for the
exclusive benefit of the designated persons who are the relatives, within the
third degree, of the person from whom the reservable property came.
Therefore, relatives of the fourth and the succeeding degrees can never be
considered as reservatarios, since the law does not recognize them as such.
x x x Nevertheless there is right of representation on the part of
reservatarios who are within the third degree mentioned by law, as in the
case of nephews of the deceased person from whom the reservable
property came. x x x.23 (Emphasis and underscoring ours)
The conclusion, therefore, is that while it may appear that the properties are
reservable in character, petitioners cannot benefit from reserva troncal. First,
because Julia, who now holds the properties in dispute, is not the other
ascendant within the purview of Article 891 of the Civil Code and second,
because petitioners are not Gregoria's relatives within the third degree.
Hence, the CA's disposition that the complaint filed with the RTC should be
57
dismissed, only on this point, is correct. If at all, what should apply in the
distribution of Gregoria's estate are Articles 1003 and 1009 of the Civil
Code, which provide:
Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a
surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of
the deceased in accordance with the following articles.
Art. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of
brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among
them by reason of relationship by the whole blood.
Nevertheless, the Court is not in the proper position to determine the proper
distribution of Gregoria's estate at this point as the cause of action relied
upon by petitioners in their complaint filed with the RTC is based solely on
reserva troncal. Further, any determination would necessarily entail
reception of evidence on Gregoria's entire estate and the heirs entitled
thereto, which is best accomplished in an action filed specifically for that
purpose.
A reservista acquires ownership of the reservable property until the
reservation takes place or is extinguished
Before concluding, the Court takes note of a palpable error in the RTC's
disposition of the case. In upholding the right of petitioners over the
properties, the RTC ordered the reconveyance of the properties to
petitioners and the transfer of the titles in their names. What the RTC should
have done, assuming for argument's sake that reserva troncal is applicable,
is have the reservable nature of the property registered on respondent's
titles. In fact, respondent, as reservista, has the duty to reserve and to
annotate the reservable character of the property on the title.24 In reserva
troncal, the reservista who inherits from a prepositus, whether by the latter's
wish or by operation of law, acquires the inheritance by virtue of a title
perfectly transferring absolute ownership. All the attributes of ownership
belong to him exclusively.
The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but
subject to the resolutory condition that such title is extinguished if the
reservor predeceased the reservee. The reservor is a usufructuary of the
reservable property. He may alienate it subject to the reservation. The
transferee gets the revocable and conditional ownership of the reservor. The
transferee's rights are revoked upon the survival of the reservees at the time
of the death of the reservor but become indefeasible when the reservees
predecease the reservor.26 (Citations omitted)
It is when the reservation takes place or is extinguished,27 that a
reservatario becomes, by operation of law, the owner of the reservable
property.28 In any event, the foregoing discussion does not detract from the
fact that petitioners are not entitled to a reservation of the properties in
dispute.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 16,
2006 and Resolution dated January 17, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 77694 insofar as it dismissed the Third Amended Complaint in
Civil Case No. 609-M-92 are AFFIRMED. This Decision is without prejudice
to any civil action that the heirs of Gregoria
Mendoza may file for the settlement of her estate or for the determination of
ownership of the properties in question.
SO ORDERED.
58
G.R. No. L-28032 September 24, 1986
FRANCISCA TIOCO DE PAPA, MANUEL TIOCO, NICOLAS TIOCO and
JANUARIO PAPA, vs. DALISAY TONGKO CAMACHO, PRIMO TONGKO
and GODOFREDO CAMACHO
NARVASA, J.:
This case, which involves the application of Article 891 of the Civil Code on
reserva troncal, was submitted for judgment in the lower court by all the
parties on the following "Stipulation of Facts and Partial Compromise":
1. They stipulate that the defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho and the
plaintiffs, Francisco Tioco de Papa, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco, are
legitimate relatives, plaintiffs being said defendant's grandaunt and
granduncles.
2. They stipulate that plaintiffs and defendant Dalisay D. Tongo-Camacho
have as a common ancestor the late Balbino Tioco (who had a sister by the
name of Romana Tioco), father of plaintiffs and great grandfather of
defendant. The family relationship of the parties is as shown in the chart
attached hereto as Annex 'A' and made an integral part of this stipulation.
3. They stipulate that Romana Tioco during her lifetime gratuitously donated
four (4) parcels of land to her niece Toribia Tioco (legitimate sister of
plaintiffs), which parcels of land are presently covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. A-64165, 64166 and 64167 of the Registry of
Deeds of Manila, copies of which are attached to this stipulation as Annexes
'B', 'B-l', and 'B-2'.
4. They stipulate that Toribia Tioco died intestate in l9l5, survived by her
husband, Eustacio Dizon, and their two legitimate children, Faustino Dizon
and Trinidad Dizon (mother of defendant Dalisay D, Tongko-Camacho) and
leaving the afore-mentioned four (4) parcels of land as the inheritance of her
said two children in equal pro-indiviso shares.
5. They stipulate that in 1928, Balbino Tioco died intestate, survived by his
legitimate children by his wife Marciana Felix (among them plaintiffs) and
legitimate grandchildren Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon. In the partition
of his estate, three (3) parcels of land now covered by Transfer Certificates
of Title Nos. 16545 and 16554 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila, copies of
which are attached hereto as Annexes 'C' and 'C-l', were adjudicated as the
inheritance of the late Toribia Tioco, but as she had predeceased her father,
Balbino Tioco, the said three (3) parcels of land devolved upon her two
legitimate children Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon in equal pro-indiviso
shares.
6. They stipulate that in 1937, Faustino Dizon died intestate, single and
without issue, leaving his one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso share in the seven (7)
parcels of land above-mentioned to his father, Eustacio Dizon, as his sole
intestate heir, who received the said property subject to a reserva troncal
which was subsequently annotated on the Transfer Certificates of Title
Annexes 'B', 'B-l', 'B-2', 'C' and 'C-l'.
7. They stipulate that in 1939 Trinidad Dizon-Tongko died intestate, and her
rights and interests in the parcels of land abovementioned were inherited by
her only legitimate child, defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho, subject to
the usufructuary right of her surviving husband, defendant Primo Tongko.
8. They stipulate that on June 14, 1965, Eustacio Dizon died intestate,
survived his only legitimate descendant, defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-
Camacho.
9. The parties agree that defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho now owns
one-half (1/2) of all the seven (7) parcels of land abovementioned as her
inheritance from her mother, Trinidad Dizon-Tongko.
59
Whether all nearest relatives of descendant Faustino (
praepositus
) within the thirddegree in the appropriate line succeed without
distinction to the reservable property upondeath of the inheriting
ascendant (
10. Defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho also claims, upon legal advice,
the other half of the said seven (7) parcels of land abovementioned by virtue
of the reserva troncal imposed thereon upon the death of Faustino Dizon
and under the laws on intestate succession; but the plaintiffs, also upon
legal advice, oppose her said claim because they claim three-fourths (3/4) of
the one-half pro-indiviso interest in said parcel of land, which interest was
inherited by Eustacio Dizon from Faustino Dizon, or three-eights (3/8) of the
said parcels of land, by virtue of their being also third degree relatives of
Faustino Dizon.
11. The parties hereby agree to submit for judicial determination in this case
the legal issue of whether defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho is entitled
to the whole of the seven (7) parcels of land in question, or whether the
plaintiffs, as third degree relatives of Faustino Dizon are reservatarios
(together with said defendant) of the one-half pro-indiviso share therein
which was inherited by Eustacio Dizon from his son Faustino Dizon, and
entitled to three-fourths (3/4) of said one-half pro-indiviso share, or three
eights (3/8) of said seven (7) parcels of land, and, therefore, to three-eights
(3/8) of the rentals collected and to be collected by defendant Dalisay P.
Tongko Camacho from the tenants of said parcels of land, minus the
expenses and/or real estate taxes corresponding to plaintiffs' share in the
rentals.
12. In view of the fact that the parties are close blood relatives and have
acted upon legal advice in pursuing their respective claims, and in order to
restore and preserve harmony in their family relations, they hereby waive all
their claims against each other for damages (other than legal interest on
plaintiffs' sore in the rentals which this Honorable Court may deem proper to
award), attorney's fees and expenses of litigation which shall be borne by
the respective parties. 1
On the basis thereof, the lower Court declared the plaintiffs Francisco Tioco,
Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco, as well as the defendant Dalisay Tongko-
Whether all nearest relatives of descendant Faustino (praepositus) within the third degree in the appropriate
line succeed without distinction to the reservable property upon death of the inheriting ascendant (reservista)
by the rules on intestate succession— NO.
Camacho, entitled, as reservatarios, to one-half of the seven parcels of land
in dispute, in equal proportions, rendering judgment as follows:
... . Resolving, therefore, the legal question submitted by the parties, the
court holds that plaintiffs Francisca Tioco, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco
are entitled to three-fourths (3/4) of one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso shares or
three-eights (3/8) of the seven (7) parcels of land involved in this action.
Consequently, they are, likewise, entitled to three-eights (3/8) of the rentals
collected and to be collected by the defendant Dalisay D. Tioco-Camacho
from the tenants of the said parcels of land, minus the expenses and/or real
estate taxes corresponding to plaintiffs' share in the rentals.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, and inasmuch as the parties expressly
waived all their claims against each other for damages including attorney's
fees and expenses of litigation other than the legal interests on plaintiffs'
share in the rentals, the court renders judgment adjudging the plaintiffs
entitled to three-eights (3/8) of the seven (7) parcels of land described in
Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-64165, T-64166, T-64167, T-16546 and
T-16554 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila. The defendant Dalisay D.
Tioco-Camacho is hereby ordered to make an accounting of all rents
received by her on the properties involved in this action for the purpose of
determining the legal interests which should be paid to the plaintiffs on their
shares in the rentals of the property in question.
SO ORDERED. 2
Not satisfied, the defendant appealed to this Court.
The issue raised is whether, as contended by the plaintiffs-appellees and
ruled by the lower Court, all relatives of the praepositus within the third
degree in the appropriate line succeed without distinction to the reservable
property upon the death of the reservista, as seems to be implicit in Art. 891
of the Civil Code, which reads:
60
Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property
which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another
ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he
may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are
within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said property
came. (811), or, as asserted by the defendant-appellant, the rights of said
relatives are subject to, and should be determined by, the rules on intestate
succession.
That question has already been answered in Padura vs. Baldovino, 3 where
the reservatario was survived by eleven nephews and nieces of the
praepositus in the line of origin, four of whole blood and seven of half blood,
and the claim was also made that all eleven were entitled to the reversionary
property in equal shares. This Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L.
Reyes, declared the principles of intestacy to be controlling, and ruled that
the nephews and nieces of whole blood were each entitled to a share double
that of each of the nephews and nieces of half blood in accordance with
Article 1006 of the Civil Code. Said the Court:
The issue in this appeal may be formulated as follows: In a case of reserva
troncal, where the only reservatarios (reservees) surviving the reservista,
and belonging to the fine of origin, are nephews of the descendant
(prepositus), but some are nephews of the half blood and the others are
nephews of the whole blood, should the reserved properties be apportioned
among them equally, or should the nephews of the whole blood take a share
twice as large as that of the nephews of the half blood?
xxx xxx xx
The case is one of first impression and has divided the Spanish
commentators on the subject. After mature reflection, we have concluded
that the position of the appellants is correct. The reserva troncal is a special
rule designed primarily to assure the return of the reservable property to the
third degree relatives belonging to the line from which the property originally
came, and avoid its being dissipated into and by the relatives of the
inheriting ascendant (reservista).
xxx xxx xxx
The stated purpose of the reserva is accomplished once the property has
devolved to the specified relatives of the line of origin. But from this time on,
there is no further occasion for its application. In the relations between one
reservatario and another of the same degree there is no call for applying Art.
891 any longer; wherefore, the respective share of each in the reversionary
property should be governed by the ordinary rules of intestate succession. In
this spirit the jurisprudence of this Court and that of Spain has resolved that
upon the death of the ascendant reservista, the reservable property should
pass, not to all the reservatarios as a class but only to those nearest in
degree to the descendant (prepositus), excluding those reservatarios of
more remote degree (Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 489-490; T.S. 8 Nov.
1894; Dir. Gen. de los Registros, Resol. 20 March 1905). And within the
third degree of relationship from the descendant (prepositus), the right of
representation operates in favor of nephews (Florentino vs. Florentino,
supra).
Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession when there
are relatives of the descendant within the third degree, the right of the
nearest relative, called reservatarios over the property which the reservista
(person holding it subject to reservation) should return to him, excludes that
of the one more remote. The right of representation cannot be alleged when
the one claiming same as a reservatario of the reservable property is not
among the relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which
such property came, inasmuch as the right granted by the Civil Code in
Article 811 is in the highest degree personal and for the exclusive benefit of
designated persons who are within the third degree of the person from
whom the reservable property came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and
61
the succeeding degrees can never be considered as reservatarios, since the
law does not recognize them as such.
In spite of what has been said relative to the right of representation on the
part of one alleging his right as reservatario who is not within the third
degree of relationship, nevertheless there is right of representation on the
part of reservatarios who are within the third degree mentioned by law, as in
the case of nephews of the deceased person from whom the reservable
property came. ... . (Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480, 489-490)
(Emphasis supplied) See also Nieva and Alcala vs. Alcala and de Ocampo,
41 Phil. 915)
Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic principles of
ordinary intestate succession; so is the rule that whole blood brothers and
nephews are entitled to a share double that of brothers and nephews of half
blood. If in determining the rights of the reservatarios inter se, proximity of
degree and the right of representation of nephews are made to apply, the
rule of double share for immediate collaterals of the whole blood should be
likewise operative.
In other words, the reserva troncal merely determines the group of relatives
reservatarios to whom the property should be returned; but within that group,
the individual right to the property should be decided by the applicable rules
of ordinary intestate succession, since Art. 891 does not specify otherwise.
This conclusion is strengthened by the circumstance that the reserva being
an exceptional case, its application should be limited to what is strictly
needed to accomplish the purpose of the law. As expressed by Manresa in
his Commentaries (Vol. 6, 6th Ed., p. 250):
... creandose un verdadero estado excepcional del derecho, no debe
ampliarse, sino mas bien restringirse, el alcance del precepto, manteniendo
la excepcion mientras fuere necesaria y estuviese realmente contenida en la
disposicion, y aplicando las reglas generales y fundamentales del Codigo en
materia de sucesi6n, en aquehos extremes no resueltos de un modo
expreso, y que quedan fuera de la propia esfera de accion de la reserva que
se crea.
The restrictive interpretation is the more imperative in view of the new Civil
Code's hostility to successional reservas and reversions, as exemplified by
the suppression of the reserva viudal and the reversion legal of the Code of
1889 (Art. 812 and 968-980).
Reversion of the reservable property being governed by the rules on
intestate succession, the plaintiffs-appellees must be held without any right
thereto because, as aunt and uncles, respectively, of Faustino Dizon (the
praepositus), they are excluded from the succession by his niece, the
defendant-appellant, although they are related to him within the same
degree as the latter. To this effect is Abellana vs. Ferraris4 where Arts.
1001, 1004, 1005 and 1009 of the Civil Code were cited and applied:
Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that, in case of
intestacy nephews and nieces of the de cujus exclude all other collaterals
(aunts and uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the succession. This is readily
apparent from Articles 1001, 1004, 1005 and 1009 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, that provide as follows:
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the
widow or widower, the latter shall be entitle to one-half of the inheritance and
the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.
Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood,
they shall inherit in equal shares.
Art. 1005. Should brothers and sisters survive together with nephews and
nieces who are the children of the decedent's brothers and sisters of the full
blood, the former shall inherit per capita, and the latter per stirpes.
62
Art. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of
brothers and sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the
estate.
Under the last article (1009), the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and
nieces of the decedent is a precondition to the other collaterals (uncles,
cousins, etc.) being called to the succession. This was also and more clearly
the case under the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, that immediately preceded
the Civil Code now in force (R.A. 386). Thus, Articles 952 and 954 of the
Code of 1889 prescribed as follows:
Art. 952. In the absence of brothers or sisters and of nephews or nieces,
children of the former, whether of the whole blood or not, the surviving
spouse, if not separated by a final decree of divorce shall succeed to the
entire estate of the deceased.
Art. 954. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of
brothers or sisters, nor a surviving spouse, the other collateral relatives shall
succeed to the estate of deceased.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among
them by reason of the whole blood.
It will be seen that under the preceding articles, brothers and sisters and
nephews and nieces inherited ab intestato ahead of the surviving spouse,
while other collaterals succeeded only after the widower or widow. The
present Civil Code of the Philippines merely placed the spouse on a par with
the nephews and nieces and brothers and sisters of the deceased, but
without altering the preferred position of the latter vis a vis the other
collaterals.
xxx xxx xxx
We, therefore, hold, and so rule, that under our laws of succession, a
decedent's uncles and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long as
nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and qualified to
succeed. ...
This conclusion is fortified by the observation, also made in Padura, supra,
that as to the reservable property, the reservatarios do not inherit from the
reservista, but from the descendant praepositus:
... . It is likewise clear that the reservable property is no part of the estate of
the reservista, who may not dispose of it by will, as long as there are
reservatarios existing (Arroyo vs. Gerona, 58 Phil. 237). The latter,
therefore, do not inherit from the reservista, but from the descendant
prepositus, of whom the reservatarios are the heirs mortis causa, subject to
the condition that they must survive the reservista. (Sanchez Roman, Vol.
VI, Tomo 2, p. 286; Manresa, Commentaries, Vol. 6, 6th Ed., pp. 274, 310)
... .
To the same effect is Cano vs, Director of Lands 5, where it was ruled that
intestacy proceedings to determine the right of a reservatario are not
necessary where the final decree of the land court ordering issuance of title
in the name of the reservista over property subject to reserva troncal
Identifies the reservatario and there are no other claimants to the latter's
rights as such:
The contention that an intestacy proceeding is still necessary rests upon the
assumption that the reservatario win succeed in, or inherit, the reservable
property from the reservista. This is not true. The reservatario is not the
reservista's successor mortis causa nor is the reservable property part of the
reservista's estate; the reservatario receives the property as a conditional
heir of the descendant (prepositus), said property merely reverting to the line
of origin from which it had temporarily and accidentally strayed during the
reservista's lifetime. The authorities are all agreed that there being
63
reservatarios that survive the reservista, the matter must be deemed to have
enjoyed no more than a life interest in the reservable property.

It is a consequence of these principles that upon the death of the reservista,

the reservatario nearest to the prepositus (the appellee in this case)
becomes, automatically and by operation of law, the owner of the reservable
property. As already stated, that property is no part of the estate of the
reservista, and does not even answer for the debts of the latter. ... .

Had the reversionary property passed directly from the praepositus, there is
no doubt that the plaintiffs-appellees would have been excluded by the
defendant-appellant under the rules of intestate succession. There is no
reason why a different result should obtain simply because "the transmission
of the property was delayed by the interregnum of the reserva;" 6 i.e., the
property took a "detour" through an ascendant-thereby giving rise to the
reservation before its transmission to the reservatario.

Upon the stipulated facts, and by virtue of the rulings already cited, the
defendant-appellant Dalisay Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the entirety of
the reversionary property to the exclusion of the plaintiffs-appellees.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the lower Court is reversed and

set aside and the complaint is dismissed, with costs against the plaintiffs-
appellants. SO ORDERED.

64
G.R. No. 192828 : November 28, 2011
RAMON S. CHING AND PO WING PROPERTIES, INC., v. HON. JANSEN
R. RODRIGUEZ.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
The assailed Resolution denied the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.
The Factual Antecedents
Sometime between November 25, 2002 and December 3, 2002,5red the
respondents filed a Complaint6red against the petitioners and Stronghold
Insurance Company, Global Business Bank, Inc. (formerly PhilBank), Elena
Tiu Del Pilar, Asia Atlantic Resources Ventures, Inc., Registers of Deeds of
Manila and Malabon, and all persons claiming rights or titles from Ramon
Ching (Ramon) and his successors-in-interest.
The Complaint, captioned as one for " Disinheritance, Declaration of Nullity
of Agreement and Waiver, Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement, Deed of
Absolute Sale, Transfer Certificates of Title with Prayer for [the] Issuance of
[a] Temporary Restraining Order and [a] Writ of Preliminary Injunction, " was
docketed as Civil Case No. 02-105251 and raffled to Branch 8 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC).
In the Complaint, the respondents alleged the following as causes of action:
First Cause of Action. They are the heirs of Lim San, also known as Antonio
Ching / Tiong Cheng / Ching Cheng Suy (Antonio). Respondents Joseph
Cheng (Joseph) and Jaime Cheng (Jaime) are allegedly the children of
Antonio with his common-law wife, respondent Mercedes Igne (Mercedes).
Respondent Lucina Santos (Lucina) claimed that she was also a common-
law wife of Antonio. The respondents averred that Ramon misrepresent
edhimself as Antonio's and Lucina's son when in truth and in fact, he was
adopted and his birth certificate was merely simulated. On July 18, 1996,
Antonio died of a stab wound. Police investigators identified Ramon as the
prime suspect and he now stands as the lone accused in a criminal case for
murder filed against him. Warrants of arrest issued against him have remain
edunserved as he is at large. From the foregoing circumstances and upon
the authority of Article 9197red of the New Civil Code (NCC), the
respondents concluded that Ramon can be legally disinherited, hence,
prohibited from receiving any share from the estate of Antonio.
Second Cause of Action. On August 26, 1996, prior to the conclusion of the
police investigations tagging Ramon as the prime suspect in the murder of
Antonio, the former made an inventory of the latter's estate. Ramon
misrepresented that there were only six real estate properties left by
Antonio. The respondents alleged that Ramon had illegally transferred to his
name the titles to the said properties. Further, there are two other parcels of
land, cash and jewelries, plus properties in Hongkong, which were in
Ramon's possession.
Third Cause of Action. Mercedes, being of low educational attainment, was
sweet-talked by Ramon into surrendering to him a Global Business Bank,
Inc. (Global Bank) Certificate of Time Deposit of P4,000,000.00 in the name
of Antonio, and the certificates of title covering two condominium units in
Binondo which were purchased by Antonio using his own money but which
were registered in Ramon's name. Ramon also fraudulently misrepresented
to Joseph, Jaime and Mercedes that they will promptly receive their
complete shares, exclusive of the stocks in Po Wing Properties, Inc. (Po
Wing), from the estate of Antonio. Exerting undue influence, Ramon had
convinced them to execute an Agreement8red and a Waiver9red on August
20, 1996. The terms and conditions stipulated in the Agreement and Waiver,
specifically, on the payment by Ramon to Joseph, Jaime and Mercedes of
65
the amount of P22,000,000.00, were not complied with. Further, Lucina was
not informed of the execution of the said instruments and had not received
any amount from Ramon. Hence, the instruments are null and void.
Fourth Cause of Action. Antonio's 40,000 shares in Po Wing, which
constitute 60% of the latter's total capitalstock, were illegally transferred by
Ramon to his own name through a forged document of sale executed after
Antonio died. Po Wing owns a ten-storey building in Binondo. Ramon's claim
that he bought the stocks from Antonio before the latter died is baseless.
Further, Lucina's shares in Po Wing had also banished into thin air through
Ramon's machinations.
Fifth Cause of Action. On October 29, 1996, Ramon executed an Affidavit of
Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate10red adjudicating solely to himself
Antonio's entire estate to the prejudice of the respondents. By virtue of the
said instrument, new Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) covering eight real
properties owned by Antonio were issued in Ramon's name. Relative to the
Po Wing shares, the Register of Deeds of Manila had required Ramon to
post a Surety Bond conditioned to answer for whatever claims which may
eventually surface in connection with the said stocks. Co-defendant
Stronghold Insurance Company issued the bond in Ramon's behalf.
Sixth Cause of Action . Ramon sold Antonio's two parcels of land in Navotas
to co-defendant Asia Atlantic Business Ventures, Inc. Another parcel of land,
which was part of Antonio's estate, was sold by Ramon to co-defendant
Elena Tiu Del Pilar at an unreasonably low price. By reason of Ramon's lack
of authority to dispose of any part of Antonio's estate, the conveyances are
null and void ab initio.
Since Ramon is at large, his wife, Belen Dy Tan Ching, now manages
Antonio's estate. She has no intent to convey to the respondents their
shares in the estate of Antonio.
The respondents thus prayed for the following in their Complaint:
1. x x x a temporary restraining order be issued restraining the defendant
RAMON CHING and/or his attorney-in-fact Belen Dy Tan Ching from
disposing, selling or alienating any property that belongs to the estate of the
deceased ANTONIO CHING;
xxx
4. x x x
a.) Declaring that the defendant RAMON CHING who murdered his father
ANTONIO CHING disqualified as heir and from inheriting to (sic) the estate
of his father;
b.) Declaring the nullity of the defendant RAMON CHING transfer (sic) of the
six [6] parcels of land from the name of his father ANTONIO CHING to his
name covered by TCT No. x x x;
c.) Declaring the nullity of the AGREEMENT and WAIVER executed by
plaintiffs x x x in favor of x x x RAMON CHING for being patently immoral,
invalid, illegal, simulated and (sic) sham;
d.) Declaring the nullity of the transfer of the shares of stocks at (sic) PO
WING from the names of ANTONIO CHING and LUCINA SANTOS to the
defendant ANTONIO CHING's name for having been illegally procured
through the falsification of their signatures in the document purporting the
transfer thereof;
e.) Declaring the nullity and to have no force and effect the AFFIDAVIT OF
SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE executed by x x x RAMON CHING for being
contrary to law and existing jurisprudence;
66
f.) Declaring the nullity of the DEED OF SALES (sic) executed by x x x
RAMON CHING (i) over two (2) parcels of land x x x to defendant ASIA
ATLANTIC BUSINESS VENTURES, Inc.; and (ii) one (1) parcel of land x x x
sold to x x x ELENA TIU DEL PILAR for having illegally procured the
ownership and titles of the above properties;
x x x.11
The petitioners filed with the RTC a Motion to Dismiss12red alleging forum
shopping, litis pendentia, res judicata and the respondents as not being the
real parties in interest.
On July 30, 2004, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order13red denying the
petitioners' Motion to Dismiss.
The respondents filed an Amended Complaint14red dated April 7, 2005
impleading Metrobank as the successor-in-interest of co-defendant Global
Bank. The Amended Complaint also added a seventh cause of action
relative to the existence of a Certificate of Premium Plus Acquisition (CPPA)
in the amount of P4,000,000.00 originally issued by PhilBank to Antonio.
The respondents prayed that they be declared as the rightful owners of the
CPPA and that it be immediately released to them. Alternatively, the
respondents prayed for the issuance of a hold order relative to the CPPA to
preserve it during the pendency of the case.
On April 22, 2005, the petitioners filed their Consolidated Answer with
Counterclaim.15red
On October 28, 2005, the RTC issued an Order16red admitting the
respondents' Amended Complaint. The RTC stressed that Metrobank had
already filed Manifestations admitting that as successor-in-interest of Global
Bank, it now possesses custody of Antonio's deposits. Metrobank expressed
willingness to abide by any court order as regards the disposition of
Antonio's deposits. The petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration filed to assail
the aforecited Order was denied by the RTC on May 3, 2006.
On May 29, 2006, the petitioners filed their Consolidated Answer with
Counterclaim to the respondents' Amended Complaint.
On August 11, 2006, the RTC issued a pre-trial order.17red
On January 18, 2007, the petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss18red the
respondents' Amended Complaint on the alleged ground of the RTC's lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the Complaint. The petitioners
argued that since the Amended Complaint sought the release of the CPPA
to the respondents, the latter's declaration as heirs of Antonio, and the
propriety of Ramon's disinheritance, the suit partakes of the nature of a
special proceeding and not an ordinary action for declaration of nullity.
Hence, jurisdiction pertains to a probate or intestate court and not to the
RTC acting as an ordinary court.
On March 15, 2007, the RTC issued an Order19red denying the petitioners'
Motion to Dismiss on grounds:
In the case at bar , an examination of the Complaint would disclose that the
action delves mainly on the question of ownership of the properties
described in the Complaint which can be properly settled in an ordinary civil
action. And as pointed out by the defendants, the action seeks to declare the
nullity of the Agreement, Waiver, Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement, Deed
of Absolute Sale, Transfer Certificates of Title, which were all allegedly
executed by defendant Ramon Ching to defraud the plaintiffs. The relief of
establishing the status of the plaintiffs which could have translated this
action into a special proceeding was nowhere stated in the Amended
Complaint. With regard [to] the prayer to declare the plaintiffs as the rightful
owner[s] of the CPPA and that the same be immediately released to them, in
itself poses an issue of ownership which must be proved by plaintiffs by
67
substantial evidence. And as emphasized by the plaintiffs, the Amended
Complaint was intended to implead Metrobank as a co-defendant.
As regards the issue of disinheritance, the court notes that during the Pre-
trial of this case, one of the issues raised by the defendants Ramon Ching
and Po Wing Properties is: Whether or not there can be disinheritance in
intestate succession? Whether or not defendant Ramon Ching can be
legally disinherited from the estate of his father? To the mind of the Court ,
the issue of disinheritance, which is one of the causes of action in the
Complaint, can be fully settled after a trial on the merits. And at this stage, it
has not been sufficiently established whether or not there is a will.20red
(Emphasis supplied.)
The above Order, and a subsequent Order dated May 16, 2007 denying the
petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration, became the subjects of a petition for
certiorari filed with the CA. The petition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
99856, raised the issue of whether or not the RTC gravely abused its
discretion when it denied the petitioners' Motion to Dismiss despite the fact
that the Amended Complaint sought to establish the status or rights of the
respondents which subjects are within the ambit of a special proceeding.
On December 14, 2009, the CA rendered the now assailed Decision21red
denying the petition for certiorari on grounds:
Our in-depth assessment of the condensed allegations supporting the
causes of action of the amended complaint induced us to infer that nothing
in the said complaint shows that the action of the private respondents should
be threshed out in a special proceeding, it appearing that their allegations
were substantially for the enforcement of their rights against the alleged
fraudulent acts committed by the petitioner Ramon Ching. The private
respondents also instituted the said amended complaint in order to protect
them from the consequence of the fraudulent acts of Ramon Ching by
seeking to disqualify Ramon Ching from inheriting from Antonio Ching as
well as to enjoin him from disposing or alienating the subject properties,
including the P4 Million deposit with Metrobank. The intestate or probate
court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such issues, which must be submitted
to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction as a regional trial court.
Furthermore, we agree with the trial court that the probate court could not
take cognizance of the prayer to disinherit Ramon Ching, given the
undisputed fact that there was no will to be contested in a probate court.
The petition at bench apparently cavils the subject amended complaint and
complicates the issue of jurisdiction by reiterating the grounds or defenses
set up in the petitioners' earlier pleadings. Notwithstanding, the jurisdiction of
the court over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the
complaint without regard to whether or not the private respondents
(plaintiffs) are entitled to recover upon all or some of the causes of action
asserted therein. In this regard, the jurisdiction of the court does not depend
upon the defenses pleaded in the answer or in the motion to dismiss, lest
the question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the petitioners
(defendants).22red Hence, we focus our resolution on the issue of
jurisdiction on the allegations in the amended complaint and not on the
defenses pleaded in the motion to dismiss or in the subsequent pleadings of
the petitioners.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no
compelling reason to still subject the action of the petitioners in a special
proceeding since the nullification of the subject documents could be
achieved in the civil case, the lower court should proceed to evaluate the
evidence of the parties and render a decision thereon upon the issues that it
defined during the pre-trial in Civil Case No. 02-105251.23red (Emphasis
supplied)
The petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the CA through a
Resolution24red issued on July 8, 2010.
68
 Issues: 1. WON there can be disinheritance in intestate succession
2. WON defendant Ramon Ching can be legally disinherited from the estate of his father
The Issue
The instant Petition for Review on Certiorari25red is anchored on the issue
of:
Whether or not the RTC should have granted the Motion to Dismiss filed by
the PETITIONERS on the alleged ground of the RTC's lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the Amended Complaint, to wit, (a) filiations with
Antonio of Ramon, Jaime and Joseph; (b) rights of common-law wives,
Lucina and Mercedes, to be considered as heirs of Antonio; (c)
determination of the extent of Antonio's estate; and (d) other matters which
can only be resolved in a special proceeding and not in an ordinary civil
action.
The petitioners argue that only a probate court has the authority to
determine (a) who are the heirs of a decedent; (b) the validity of a waiver of
hereditary rights; (c) the status of each heir; and (d) whether the property in
the inventory is conjugal or the exclusive property of the deceased
spouse.26red Further, the extent of Antonio's estate, the status of the
contending parties and the respondents' alleged entitlement as heirs to
receive the proceeds of Antonio's CPPA now in Metrobank's custody are
matters which are more appropriately the subjects of a special proceeding
and not of an ordinary civil action.
The respondents opposed27red the instant petition claiming that the
petitioners are engaged in forum shopping. Specifically, G.R. Nos.
17550728red and 183840,29red both involving the contending parties in the
instant petition were filed by the petitioners and are currently pending before
this Court. Further, in Mendoza v. Hon. Teh,30red the SC declared that
whether a particular matter should be resolved by the RTC in the exercise of
its general jurisdiction or its limited probate jurisdiction, is not a jurisdictional
issue but a mere question of procedure. Besides, the petitioners, having
validly submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the RTC and having
actively participated in the trial of the case, are already estopped from
challenging the RTC's jurisdiction over the respondents' Complaint and
Amended Complaint.31red
The Court's Ruling
We resolve to deny the instant petition.
The petitioners failed to comply with a lawful order of this Court directing
them to file their reply to the respondents' Comment/Opposition to the
instant Petition. While the prescribed period to comply expired on March 15,
2011, the petitioners filed their Manifestation that they will no longer file a
reply only on October 10, 2011 or after the lapse of almost seven months.
Further, no reversible errors were committed by the RTC and the CA when
they both ruled that the denial of the petitioners' second motion to dismiss
Civil Case No. 02-105251 was proper.
Even without delving into the procedural allegations of the respondents that
the petitioners engaged in forum shopping and are already estopped from
questioning the RTC's jurisdiction after having validly submitted to it when
the latter participated in the proceedings, the denial of the instant Petition is
still in order.Although the respondents' Complaint and Amended Complaint
sought, among others, the disinheritance of Ramon and the release in favor
of the respondents of the CPPA now under Metrobank's custody, Civil Case
No. 02-105251 remains to be an ordinary civil action, and not a special
proceeding pertaining to a settlement court.
An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil
action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased
person such as advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of
the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the
application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.32red A
69
special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status,
a right, or a particular fact.33red It is distinguished from an ordinary civil
action where a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a
right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.34red To initiate a special
proceeding, a petition and not a complaint should be filed.
Under Article 916 of the NCC, disinheritance can be effected only through a
will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. This Court agrees
with the RTC and the CA that while the respondents in their Complaint and
Amended Complaint sought the disinheritance of Ramon, no will or any
instrument supposedly effecting the disposition of Antonio's estate was ever
mentioned. Hence, despite the prayer for Ramon's disinheritance, Civil Case
No. 02-105251 does not partake of the nature of a special proceeding and
does not call for the probate court's exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
The petitioners also argue that the prayers in the Amended Complaint,
seeking the release in favor of the respondents of the CPPA under
Metrobank's custody and the nullification of the instruments subject of the
complaint, necessarily require the determination of the respondents' status
as Antonio's heirs.
It bears stressing that what the respondents prayed for was that they be
declared as the rightful owners of the CPPA which was in Mercedes'
possession prior to the execution of the Agreement and Waiver. The
respondents also prayed for the alternative relief of securing the issuance by
the RTC of a hold order relative to the CPPA to preserve Antonio's deposits
with Metrobank during the pendency of the case. It can thus be said that the
respondents' prayer relative to the CPPA was premised on Mercedes' prior
possession of and their alleged collective ownership of the same, and not on
the declaration of their status as Antonio's heirs. Further, it also has to be
emphasized that the respondents were parties to the execution of the
Agreement35red and Waiver36red prayed to be nullified.
Hence, even without the necessity of being declared as heirs of Antonio, the
respondents have the standing to seek for the nullification of the instruments
in the light of their claims that there was no consideration for their execution,
and that Ramon exercised undue influence and committed fraud against
them. Consequently, the respondents then claimed that the Affidavit of
Extra-Judicial Settlement of Antonio’s estate executed by Ramon, and the
TCTs issued upon the authority of the said affidavit, are null and void as
well. Ramon's averment that a resolution of the issues raised shall first
require a declaration of the respondents' status as heirs is a mere defense
which is not determinative of which court shall properly exercise jurisdiction.
In Marjorie Cadimas v. Marites Carrion and Gemma Hugo,37red the Court
declared: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
It is an elementary rule of procedural law that jurisdiction of the court over
the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or
some of the claims asserted therein. As a necessary consequence, the
jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up
in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the question of
jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the defendant. What
determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as
appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The averments in the
complaint and the character of the relief sought are the matters to be
consulted.
In sum, this Court agrees with the CA that the nullification of the documents
subject of Civil Case No. 02-105251 could be achieved in an ordinary civil
action, which in this specific case was instituted to protect the respondents
from the supposedly fraudulent acts of Ramon . In the event that the RTC
will find grounds to grant the reliefs prayed for by the respondents, the only
70
consequence will be the reversion of the properties subject of the dispute to
the estate of Antonio. Civil Case No. 02-105251 was not instituted to
conclusively resolve the issues relating to the administration, liquidation and
distribution of Antonio's estate, hence, not the proper subject of a special
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person under
Rules 73-91 of the Rules of Court.

The respondents' resort to an ordinary civil action before the RTC may not
be strategically sound, because a settlement proceeding should thereafter
still follow, if their intent is to recover from Ramon the properties alleged to
have been illegally transferred in his name. Be that as it may, the RTC, in
the exercise of its general jurisdiction, cannot be restrained from taking
cognizance of respondents' Complaint and Amended Complaint as the
issues raised and the prayers indicated therein are matters which need not
be threshed out in a special proceeding.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The petitioners' (a)

Opposition to the respondents' Motion to Admit Substitution of Party; and (b)
Manifestation39red through counsel that they will no longer file a reply to the
respondents' Comment/Opposition to the instant petition are NOTED. SO
ORDERED.

71
G.R. No. 7890 September 29, 1914
FILOMENA PECSON, as administratix of the last will and testament of
Florencio Pecson, et al vs. ROSARIO MEDIAVILLO
JOHNSON, J.:
It appears from the record that some time prior to the 17th day of
September, 1910, the last will and testament of Florencio Pecson was
presented to the Court of First Instance of the Province of Albay for probate.
Mr. Tomas Lorayes, an attorney at law, opposed the legislation of the will on
the ground that it had not been authorized nor signed by the deceased, in
accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. After hearing
the respective parties, the Honorable Percy M. Moir, judge, found that the
will had been signed and executed in accordance with the provisions of law,
and denied the opposition on the 17th day of September, 1910.
On the 18th day of September, 1910, the said Tomas Lorayes, representing
Basiliso Mediavillo and Rosario Mediavillo, presented a motion in the words
following:
1. That Rosario Mediavillo is and Joaquin Mediavillo was a legitimate child of
the deceased Teresa Pecson, who also was a daughter of the testator,
Florencio Pecson, and therefore the first mentioned is and the second was a
grandchild of the latter.
2. That the said granddaughter, Rosario Mediavillo y Pecson, was
disinherited by her grandfather, the testator Florencio Pecson, according to
clause 3 of the will, because she failed to show him due respect and on a
certain occasion raised her hand against him.
3. That the interested party did not commit such an act, and if perhaps she
did, it was due to the derangement of her mental faculties which occurred a
long time ago and from which she now suffers in periodical attacks.
By reason of all the foregoing and because the disinheriting clause 3 of the
will is unfounded, the undersigned prays the court to annul the said clause
and to make the testator's died without succession, but is represented now
by his father, Basiliso Mediavillo), participants in the estate left by their
grandfather; and, finally, that the court grant such other relief as it may deem
just and equitable.
After a consideration of the question presented by said motion, the lower
court, on the 22d day of September, 1911, rendered the following decision:
This case has come up to-day for a hearing on the declaration of heirs of the
decease Florencio Pecson, who died in Daraga, about the year 1910.
From the evidence it appears that the deceased had eight children by his
wife Nicolasa Manjares, likewise deceased, which children are those named
Emerenciano, Teresa, Filomena, Asunsion, Rufino, Zoila, Emiliano, and
Perfecto, all surnamed Pecson. It also appears that Rufino Pecson absented
himself from these Islands twenty-five years ago, going to Australia, and that
nothing has been heard of him for the past twenty years. The said Rufino
Pecson left no children in the Philippines and was unmarried when he
emigrated. As nothing has been heard of him for twenty years, it is
presumed that he died and it is held that the part of this estate to which he
was entitled must be divided among the other heirs.
It also appears from the evidence that Teresa Pecson married Basiliso
Mediavillo, by whom she had two children, Joaquin and Rosario Mediavillo.
Teresa also died, leaving these two children and her husband, Basiliso
Mediavillo. Her son Joaquin died, unmarried and childless, before the death
of the testator, Florencio Pecson. Rosario is the only living daughter of
Teresa and the latter's husband, Basiliso Mediavillo, is also living.
The evidence shows that this girl Rosario became insane in 1895, when she
went to Nueva Caceres to study in college, and it has been proved that it
72
was previous to this date that she disobeyed her grandfather and raised her
hand against him, and, as the testator states in the third paragraph of his
will, he disinherited her. This court understands that this Rosario, who was
then 14 years of age, and who shortly afterwards became insane, was not
responsible for her acts and should not have been disinherited by her
grandfather.
The court therefore decrees that this part of the will is contrary to law and
sets it aside as being of no force or value whatever. The court further holds
that Rosario Mediavillo, the daughter of Teresa Pecson, is the heiress of the
one-half of the share of this estate pertaining to the said Teresa, and that
her father, as the heir of his son Joaquin, also Teresa's son, is the heris of
the other one-half of the said share pertaining to Teresa — that is, of the
one-seventh of this estate that pertains to the latter. Moreover, the court
decrees that, besides the two heirs just above mentioned, Emerciano,
Filomena, Asuncion, Zoila, Emiliano, and Perfecto, surnamed Pecson, and
the children of Teresa, are also heirs of the estate of Florencio Pecson.
From the decision the plaintiff appealed to this court and made the following
assignments of error:
FIRST ERROR
The lower court erred in finding that the part of the will which disinherits
Rosario Mediavillo is contrary to law, and in setting it aside as being of no
force or value whatever.
SECOND ERROR
The lower court erred by decreeing that Basaliso Mediavillo, the father of
Joaquin Mediavillo, is the heir by representation of the one-half of the one
seventh of this estate pertaining to Joaquin Mediavillo.
With reference to the first assignment of error it may be said that from the
record it appears that during the lifetime of Florencio Pecson he had been
married to Nicolasa Manjares, with whom he had eight children, named
Filomena, Asuncion, Zoila, Emerenciano, Emiliano, Perfecto, Rufino and
Teresa Pecson; that before the death of Florencio Pecson he executed and
delivered the will in question. The will made no provision for the said Rufino
Pecson, neither was there any provision in the will for the said Teresa. All of
the other children were named as heirs in said will. It appears that Teresa
had been married with one Basiliso Mediavillo, and that some time before
the making of the will in question she died, leaving her husband and two
children, Joaquin Mediavillo and Rosario Mediavillo, as her heirs. It also
appears from the record that Joaquin Mediavillo died without heirs, leaving
as the only heirs of the said Teresa Pecson, her husband, Basilio Mediavillo
and the said Rosario Mediavillo. The said Joaquin Mediavillo died before his
grandfather, Florencio Pecson, and probably before the will in question was
made.
Paragraph 3 of the will disinherited Rosario Mediavillo in the following
language:
I declare that one of my daughters, named Teresa, now deceased, left a
legitimate daughter named Rosario Mediavillo. I also declare that I disinherit
my granddaughter, the said Rosario Mediavillo, because she was grossly
disrespectful to me and because on one occasion, when it was I do not
remember, she raised her hand against me. Therefore, it is my will that the
said Rosario Mediavillo shall have no share in my property.
The defendant, Rosario Mediavillo, in the motion which she presented and
which is copied above, alleges that she was disinherited without case. Upon
a consideration of that question, the lower court found that she had been
disinherited without cause and annulled said paragraph 3 of the will. That
order of the lower court constitutes the error complained of by the appellant
in her first assignment of error.
73
By reference to said paragraph 3 above quoted, it will be seen that Florencio
Pecson disinherited the said Rosario Mediavillo "because she was grossly
disrespectful to me and because on one occasion, when it was I do not
remember, she raised her hand against me. Therefore it is my will that she,
the said Rosario Mediavillo, shall have no share in my property."
The lower court admitted proof the question of the responsibility of the said
Rosario Mediavillo at the time she offered the offense to her grandfather,
Florencio Pecson. After hearing the proof, the lower court reached the
following conclusion:
The evidence shows that this girl Rosario became insane in 1895, when she
went to Nueva Caceres to study in college, and it has been proved that it
was previous to this date that she disobeyed her grandfather and raised her
hand against him, and, as the testator states in the third paragraph of his
will, he disinherited her. This court understands that this Rosario, who was
then 14 years of age, and who shortly afterwards became insane, was not
responsible for her acts and should not have been disinherited by her
grandfather.
issue: yes
The first assignment of error presents the question whether or not the
courts, when a parent disinherits his children, may inquire into the cause of
the disinheritance and decide that there was or was not ground for such
disinheritance. The Civil Code (art. 848) provides that disinheritance shall
only take place for one of the causes expressly fixed by law. In accordance
with the provisions of that article (848) we find that articles 756 and 853
provide the cases or causes for disinheritance; or, in other words, the cases
or causes in which the ancestors may by will disinherit their heirs. Article 849
of the Civil Code provides that the disinheritance can only be effected by the
testament, in which shall be mentioned the legal grounds or causes for such
disinheritance.
If it is true that heirs can be disinherited only by will, and for causes
mentioned in the Civil Code, it would seen to follow that the courts might
properly inquire whether the disinheritance has been made properly and for
the causes provided for by law. The right of the courts to inquire into the
causes and whether there was sufficient cause for the disinheritance or not,
seems to be supported by express provisions of the Civil Code. Article 850
provides that "the proof of the truthfulness of the reason for disinheritance
shall be established by the heirs of the testator, should the disinherited
person deny it." It would appear then that if the person disinherited should
deny the truthfulness of the cause of disinheritance, he might be permitted to
support his allegation by proof. The right of the court to inquire whether or
not the disinheritance was made for just cause is also sustained by the
provisions of article 851, which in part provides that:
Disinheritance made without statement of the reason, or for a cause the
truth of which, if contradicted, should not be proven . . . shall annul the
designation of heirship, in so far as it prejudices the person disinherited.
It seems clear from the above-quoted provisions, that the courts may inquire
into the justice of a disinheritance such as was attempted in the present
case, and if they find that the disinheritance was without cause, that part of
the testament or will may be pronounced null and void. It remains, however,
to be seen whether the evidence adduced during the trial of the present
cause was sufficient to show that the disinheritance made in paragraph 3 of
the will was made for just cause.
It appears from the record that when Rosario Mediavillo was about 14 years
of age, she had received some attentions from a young man — that she had
received a letter from him — and that her grandfather, Florencio Pecson,
took occasion to talk to her about the relations between her and the said
young man; that it was upon that occasion when, it is alleged, the
disobedience and disrespect were shown to her grandfather, and that was
the cause for her disinheritance by her grandfather. The record shows that
74
very soon after said event she lost the use of her mental powers and that
she has never regained them, except for very brief periods, up to the present
time. The lower court, taking into consideration her tender years, and the
fact that she very soon thereafter lost the use of her mental faculties,
reached the conclusion that she was probably not responsible for the
disrespect and disobedience shown to her grandfather in the year 1894 or
1895.
After a careful consideration of the record, we are inclined to believe that the
same supports the conclusions of the lower court and that the same
supports the conclusions of the lower court that he did not commit the error
complained of in the first assignment of error.
With reference to the second assignment of error, it will be remembered that
Teresa Pecson, the mother of Rosario Mediavillo, at the time of her death
left two children, Rosario and Joaquin, and her husband Basiliso Mediavillo,
and that said Joaquin Mediavillo died without heirs. The lower court gave
one-half of the inheritance of the said Teresa Pecson to Rosario Mediavillo
and the share that would have gone to Joaquin Mediavillo, and the share
that would have gone to Joaquin Mediavillo, to his father Basiliso Mediavillo.
In that conclusion of the lower court we think error was committed. The
appellant relies upon the provisions of article 925 of the Civil Code, in his
contention that the lower court committed an error. Article 925 provides that:
The right of representation shall always take place in the direct descending
line, but never in the ascending. In collateral lines, it shall take place only in
favor of the children of brothers or sisters, whether they be of the whole or
half blood.
The appellee, in support of the conclusions of the lower court, cites articles
935 and 936 of the Civil Code. Article 935 provides that:
In the absence of legitimate children and descendants of the deceased, his
ascendants shall inherit from him, to the exclusion of collaterals.
Article 936 provides that:
The father and mother, if living shall inherits share and share alike. If one of
them only survive, he or she shall succeed to the son's entire estate.
It will be remembered that the whole argument of the appellants with
reference to the first assignment of error was that Rosario Mediavillo had
been disinherited and the court evidently believed that there were no
"legitimate children, descendants of the deceased, surviving," and that
therefore the father or mother of said legitimate children would inherit as
ascendants. Inasmuch, however, as there was a descendant in the direct
line, surviving, the inheritance could not ascend, and for the reason the
lower court committed an error in declaring that Basiliso Mediavillo was
entitled to inherit that share of the estate that would have belonged to
Joaquin Mediavillo, had he been living.
Therefore, and for all the foregoing, that part of the judgment of the lower
court nullifying and setting aside paragraph 3 of the will is hereby affirmed,
and that art of said judgment which decrees to Basiliso Mediavillo one-half of
the estate of Florencio Pecson, belonging to Teresa Pecson and which
would have been given to Joaquin Mediavillo, had he been surviving, is
hereby revoked. And without any findings as to costs, it is hereby ordered
that the cause be remanded to the lower court, with direction that judgment
be entered in accordance herewith, and that such further proceedings be
had as the interested parties may deem necessary, for the purpose of
disposing of that part of the inheritance of Teresa Pecson would have
belonged to Joaquin Mediavillo, had he been surviving.
75
G.R. No. 108581 December 8, 1999
LOURDES L. DOROTHEO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
May a last will and testament admitted to probate but declared intrinsically
void in an order that has become final and executory still be given effect?
This is the issue that arose from the following antecedents:
Private respondents were the legitimate children of Alejandro Dorotheo and
Aniceta Reyes. The latter died in 1969 without her estate being settled.
Alejandro died thereafter. Sometime in 1977, after Alejandro's death,
petitioner, who claims to have taken care of Alejandro before he died, filed a
special proceeding for the probate of the latter's last will and testament. In
1981, the court issued an order admitting Alejandro's will to probate. Private
respondents did not appeal from said order. In 1983, they filed a "Motion To
Declare The Will Intrinsically Void." The trial court granted the motion and
issued an order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Order is hereby issued declaring
Lourdes Legaspi not the wife of the late Alejandro Dorotheo, the provisions
of the last will and testament of Alejandro Dorotheo as intrinsically void, and
declaring the oppositors Vicente Dorotheo, Jose Dorotheo and Nilda
Dorotheo Quintana as the only heirs of the late spouses Alejandro Dorotheo
and Aniceta Reyes, whose respective estates shall be liquidated and
distributed according to the laws on intestacy upon payment of estate and
other taxes due to the government.1
Petitioner moved for reconsideration arguing that she is entitled to some
compensation since she took care of Alejandro prior to his death although
she admitted that they were not married to each other. Upon denial of her
motion for reconsideration, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, but
the same was dismissed for failure to file appellant's brief within the
extended period
granted.2 This dismissal became final and executory on February 3, 1989
and a corresponding entry of judgment was forthwith issued by the Court of
Appeals on May 16, 1989. A writ of execution was issued by the lower court
to implement the final and executory Order. Consequently, private
respondents filed several motions including a motion to compel petitioner to
surrender to them the Transfer Certificates of Titles (TCT) covering the
properties of the late Alejandro. When petitioner refused to surrender the
TCT's, private respondents filed a motion for cancellation of said titles and
for issuance of new titles in their names. Petitioner opposed the motion.
An Order was issued on November 29, 1990 by Judge Zain B. Angas setting
aside the final and executory Order dated January 30, 1986, as well as the
Order directing the issuance of the writ of execution, on the ground that the
order was merely "interlocutory", hence not final in character. The court
added that the dispositive portion of the said Order even directs the
distribution of the estate of the deceased spouses. Private respondents filed
a motion for reconsideration which was denied in an Order dated February
1, 1991. Thus, private respondents filed a petition before the Court of
Appeals, which nullified the two assailed Orders dated November 29, 1990
and February 1, 1991.
Aggrieved, petitioner instituted a petition for review arguing that the case
filed by private respondents before the Court of Appeals was a petition
under Rule 65 on the ground of grave abuse of discretion or lack of
jurisdiction. Petitioner contends that in issuing the two assailed orders,
Judge Angas cannot be said to have no jurisdiction because he was
particularly designated to hear the case. Petitioner likewise assails the Order
of the Court of Appeals upholding the validity of the January 30, 1986 Order
which declared the intrinsic invalidity of Alejandro's will that was earlier
admitted to probate.
76
 ISSUE: WON a last will and testament admitted to probate but declared intrinsically void in an order
that has become final and executory be still given an effect. NO
Petitioner also filed a motion to reinstate her as executrix of the estate of the
late Alejandro and to maintain the status quo or lease of the premises
thereon to third parties.3 Private respondents opposed the motion on the
ground that petitioner has no interest in the estate since she is not the lawful
wife of the late Alejandro.
The petition is without merit. A final and executory decision or order can no
longer be disturbed or reopened no matter how erroneous it may be. In
setting aside the January 30, 1986 Order that has attained finality, the trial
court in effect nullified the entry of judgment made by the Court of Appeals.
It is well settled that a lower court cannot reverse or set aside decisions or
orders of a superior court, for to do so would be to negate the hierarchy of
courts and nullify the essence of review. It has been ruled that a final
judgment on probated will, albeit erroneous, is binding on the whole world. 4
It has been consistently held that if no appeal is taken in due time from a
judgment or order of the trial court, the same attains finality by mere lapse of
time. Thus, the order allowing the will became final and the question
determined by the court in such order can no longer be raised anew, either
in the same proceedings or in a different motion. The matters of due
execution of the will and the capacity of the testator acquired the character
of res judicata and cannot again be brought into question, all juridical
questions in connection therewith being for once and forever closed.5 Such
final order makes the will conclusive against the whole world as to its
extrinsic validity and due execution.6
It should be noted that probate proceedings deals generally with the
extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated,7 particularly on three
aspects:
1. whether the will submitted is indeed, the decedent's last will and
testament;
2. compliance with the prescribed formalities for the execution of wills;
3. the testamentary capacity of the testator;
4. and the due execution of the last will and testament.9
Under the Civil Code, due execution includes a determination of whether the
testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time of its execution, that he
had freely executed the will and was not acting under duress, fraud, menace
or undue influence and that the will is genuine and not a forgery, 10 that he
was of the proper testamentary age and that he is a person not expressly
prohibited by law from making a will. 11
The intrinsic validity is another matter and questions regarding the same
may still be raised even after the will has been authenticated. 12 Thus, it
does not necessarily follow that an extrinsically valid last will and testament
is always intrinsically valid. Even if the will was validly executed, if the
testator provides for dispositions that deprives or impairs the lawful heirs of
their legitime or rightful inheritance according to the laws on succession, 13
the unlawful provisions/dispositions thereof cannot be given effect. This is
specially so when the courts had already determined in a final and executory
decision that the will is intrinsically void. Such determination having attained
that character of finality is binding on this Court which will no longer be
disturbed. Not that this Court finds the will to be intrinsically valid, but that a
final and executory decision of which the party had the opportunity to
challenge before the higher tribunals must stand and should no longer be
reevaluated.
Failure to avail of the remedies provided by law constitutes waiver. And if the
party does not avail of other remedies despite its belief that it was aggrieved
by a decision or court action, then it is deemed to have fully agreed and is
satisfied with the decision or order. As early as 1918, it has been declared
that public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional
errors, judgments of courts must at some point of time fixed by law 14
become final otherwise there will be no end to litigation. Interes rei publicae
ut finis sit litium — the very object of which the courts were constituted was
77
to put an end to controversies. 15 To fulfill this purpose and to do so
speedily, certain time limits, more or less arbitrary, have to be set up to spur
on the slothful. 16 The only instance where a party interested in a probate
proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by
reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or
inadvertence not imputable to negligence, 17 which circumstances do not
concur herein.
Petitioner was privy to the suit calling for the declaration of the intrinsic
invalidity of the will, as she precisely appealed from an unfavorable order
therefrom. Although the final and executory Order of January 30, 1986
wherein private respondents were declared as the only heirs do not bind
those who are not parties thereto such as the alleged illegitimate son of the
testator, the same constitutes res judicata with respect to those who were
parties to the probate proceedings. Petitioner cannot again raise those
matters anew for relitigation otherwise that would amount to forum-shopping.
It should be remembered that forum shopping also occurs when the same
issue had already been resolved adversely by some other court. 18 It is
clear from the executory order that the estates of Alejandro and his spouse
should be distributed according to the laws of intestate succession.
Petitioner posits that the January 30, 1986 Order is merely interlocutory,
hence it can still be set aside by the trial court. In support thereof, petitioner
argues that "an order merely declaring who are heirs and the shares to
which set of heirs is entitled cannot be the basis of execution to require
delivery of shares from one person to another particularly when no project of
partition has been filed." 19 The trial court declared in the January 30, 1986
Order that petitioner is not the legal wife of Alejandro, whose only heirs are
his three legitimate children (petitioners herein), and at the same time it
nullified the will. But it should be noted that in the same Order, the trial court
also said that the estate of the late spouses be distributed according to the
laws of intestacy. Accordingly, it has no option but to implement that order of
intestate distribution and not to reopen and again re-examine the intrinsic
provisions of the same will.
It can be clearly inferred from Article 960 of the Civil Code, on the law of
successional rights that testacy is preferred to intestacy. 20 But before there
could be testate distribution, the will must pass the scrutinizing test and
safeguards provided by law considering that the deceased testator is no
longer available to prove the voluntariness of his actions, aside from the fact
that the transfer of the estate is usually onerous in nature and that no one is
presumed to give — Nemo praesumitur donare. 21 No intestate distribution
of the estate can be done until and unless the will had failed to pass both its
extrinsic and intrinsic validity. If the will is extrinsically void, the rules of
intestacy apply regardless of the intrinsic validity thereof. If it is extrinsically
valid, the next test is to determine its intrinsic validity — that is whether the
provisions of the will are valid according to the laws of succession. In this
case, the court had ruled that the will of Alejandro was extrinsically valid but
the intrinsic provisions thereof were void. Thus, the rules of intestacy apply
as correctly held by the trial court.
Furthermore, Alejandro's disposition in his will of the alleged share in the
conjugal properties of his late spouse, whom he described as his "only
beloved wife", is not a valid reason to reverse a final and executory order.
Testamentary dispositions of properties not belonging exclusively to the
testator or properties which are part of the conjugal regime cannot be given
effect. Matters with respect to who owns the properties that were disposed
of by Alejandro in the void will may still be properly ventilated and
determined in the intestate proceedings for the settlement of his and that of
his late spouse's estate.
Petitioner's motion for appointment as administratrix is rendered moot
considering that she was not married to the late Alejandro and, therefore, is
not an heir. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision
appealed from is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
78
G.R. No. 116775 January 22, 1998
HEIRS OF PASCASIO URIARTE vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
BENEDICTO ESTRADA
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the Court of
Appeals, reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, of
Tandag, Surigao del Sur, as well as the appellate court's resolution denying
petitioners' motion for reconsideration. At issue is the right of the parties to a
2.7 hectare piece of land in Sungkit, Madrid, Surigao del Sur, which Justa
Arnaldo-Sering left upon her death on March 31, 1989.
The parties and their relationship to Justa Arnaldo-Sering are as follows:
Private respondent Benedicto Estrada is the son of Agatonica Arreza, whose
parents were Pedro Arreza and Ursula Tubil. Upon the death of Pedro
Arreza, Ursula married Juan Arnaldo by whom she had another daughter,
the decedent Justa.2 Private respondent Benedicto Estrada is thus the
nephew of Justa by her half sister Agatonica.
Petitioners, referred to in this case as the heirs of Pascasio Uriarte, are the
widow and daughters of Pascasio Uriarte. Pascasio was one of the sons of
Primitiva Arnaldo and Conrado Uriarte. His mother, Primitiva Uriarte, was
the daughter of Domingo Arnaldo and Catalina Azarcon. Domingo Arnaldo
and Justa's father, Juan Arnaldo, were brothers.3 Petitioners are thus
grandchildren, the relatives within the fifth degree of consanguinity, of Justa
by her cousin Primitiva Arnaldo Uriarte.
The other petitioners are the children of Primitiva and those of her brother
Gregorio.4 The children of Primitiva by Conrado Uriarte, aside from
Pascasio, are Josefina, Gaudencio, Simplicio, Domingo and Virgilio, all
surnamed Uriarte. The children of Gregorio Arnaldo, Primitiva's brother, by
Julieta Ilogon, are Jorencio, Enecia, Nicolas, Lupecino and Felisa. These
other petitioners are thus grandchildren and relatives within the fifth degree
of consanguinity of Justa by her cousins Gregorio Arnaldo and Primitiva
Arnaldo.
Private respondent Benedicto Estrada brought this case in the Regional Trial
Court for the partition of the land left by Justa Arnaldo-Sering. The land,
consisting of 2.7 hectares, had been acquired by Justa as follows: 0.5
hectare by inheritance from her parents Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil, and
2.2 hectares by purchase.5 Private respondent claimed to be the sole
surviving heir of Justa, on the ground that the latter died without issue. He
complained that Pascasio Uriarte who, he claimed, worked the land as
Justa's tenant, refused to give him (private respondent) his share of the
harvest. 6 He contended that Pascasio had no right to the entire land of
Justa but could claim only one-half of the 0.5 hectare land which Justa had
inherited from her parents Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil.7
Pascasio died during the pendency of the case and was substituted by his
heirs. 8 In their answer, the heirs denied they were mere tenants of Justa9
but the latter's heirs entitled to her entire land.
They claimed that the entire land, subject of the case, was originally owned
by Ambrocio Arnaldo, 10 their great granduncle. It was allegedly bequeathed
to Domingo and Juan Arnaldo, Ambrocio's nephews, in a holographic will
executed by Ambrocio in 1908. 11 Domingo was to receive two-thirds of the
land and Juan, one-third. 12 The heirs claimed that the land had always
been in their possession and that in her lifetime Justa never asserted
exclusive right over the property but only received her share of the harvest
from it. 13 They alleged that private respondent did not have any right to the
property because he was not an heir of Ambrocio Arnaldo, 14 the original
owner of the property.
79
The trial court sustained petitioners' contention. In its decision rendered on
November 8, 1991 it ruled:
As earlier stated, the land of Ambrosio Arnaldo which he left to his two
nephews, Domingo and Juan Arnaldo, was only .5481 hectares, divided as
follows: two-thirds or 3,654 square meters to Domingo, and one-third or
1,827 square meters to Juan. The area increased to 2.7588 hectares from
.5481 hectares because the adjacent lot of about two hectares was acquired
by Justa Arnaldo Sering, daughter of Juan Arnaldo, after the latter's death.
The entire 2.7588 hectares was covered by tax declaration in the name of
Justa Arnaldo Sering. The latter however died intestate and without issue.
Her nearest surviving relatives are the children of her uncle Domingo
Arnaldo, to whom her entire estate passed on after her death by operation of
law, to the exclusion of all other relatives. Thus, the rights to the succession
are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent (Art. 277, Civil
Code).15
Accordingly, the court ordered:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendants and
the intervenors [herein petitioners] and against the plaintiff [private
respondent], declaring the defendants and the intervenors, together with the
other heirs of the late Domingo Arnaldo, as entitled to the entire parcel of
land described in Tax Declaration No. 124 and subsequent revising tax
declarations in the name of Justa Arnaldo Sering. No cost.
SO ORDERED. 16
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed. Contrary to the trial court's
finding, the appellate court found that the 0.5 hectares had been acquired by
Justa's parents, Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil, during their marriage. As the
nephew of Justa by her half-sister Agatonica, private respondent was held to
be entitled to share in the estate of Justa. In the dispositive portion of its
decision the appellate court ordered:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby REVERSED and
another is hereby entered —
Ordering the partition of the property described in the second amended
complaint in the following manner:
(1) .2500 hectare as the share of defendants-intervenors, and
(2) 2.58 hectare as the share of the plaintiff.
For this purpose, the court a quo is hereby directed to proceed with the
partition in accordance with the procedure laid down in Rule 69 of the Rules
of Court.
SO ORDERED.17
Hence, this petition by the heirs of Pascasio Uriarte, the heirs of Primitiva
Uriarte, and the heirs of Gregorio Arnaldo. Petitioners allege:
I — THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK AND/OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF IS THE SON OF
AGATONA ARREZA, THE HALF SISTER OF JUSTA ARNALDO SERING;
II — THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS PREFERRED
TECHNICALITY OVER SUBSTANTIALITY WHEN IT GRAVELY ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL LEFT BY
THE DECEASED AMBROCIO ARNALDO CANNOT PASS REAL OR
PERSONAL PROPERTY;
III — THE PRAYERS FOR RESTRAINING ORDER AND/OR WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND DAMAGES IS MERITORIOUS;
80
IV — AND THE INSTANT PETITION IS IMPRESSED WITH MERIT AND
SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED.18
After due consideration of the petition, we find it to be without merit. As
already stated, Justa left a piece of land consisting 2.7 hectares. Half of this
land (0.5 hectares), as the Court of Appeals found, formerly was conjugal
property of her parents, Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil. The rest, consisting
of 2.2 hectares, was acquired by Justa after the death of her parents.
Accordingly, the division of Justa's property should be as follows as private
respondent contends:
A — The first 1/2 hectare should be divided into two parts, the share of Juan
Arnaldo which will accrue to petitioners and the second half which pertains
to Ursula Tubil, which will accrue to private respondent.
B — As to the second portion of the area of the land in question which as
already stated was consolidated with the 1/2 hectare originally belonging to
the conjugal partnership of Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil, the same shall
accrue to private respondent, who is the son of Agatonica Arreza, and who
is only three degrees from Justa Arnaldo, whereas petitioners who are the
children of Primitiva Arnaldo and Gregorio Arnaldo, are five degrees
removed from Justa Arnaldo.19
The issue in this case is who among the petitioners and the private
respondent is entitled to Justa's estate as her nearest relatives within the
meaning of Art. 962 of the Civil Code.
As a preliminary matter, petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals
gravely abused its discretion in holding that private respondent is the son of
Agatonica Arreza, who was the half-sister of Justa Arnaldo. Petitioners are
raising this issue only now. It is well-settled, however, that questions not
taken up during the trial of a case cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal. With more reason, therefore, should such a question be disallowed
when raised for the first time on appeal to this Court. 20
It is noteworthy that, in their brief before the Court of Appeals, 21 petitioners
admitted that private respondent is Justa's nephew, his mother, Agatonica,
being Justa's half-sister. Apparently they are now questioning private
respondent's filiation because, as explained by the Court of Appeals, private
respondent is the nearest relative of Justa and, therefore, the only one
entitled to her estate.
Indeed, given the fact that 0.5 hectares of the land in question belonged to
the conjugal partnership of Justa's parents, Justa was entitled to 0.125
hectares of the half hectare land as her father's (Juan Arnaldo's) share in the
conjugal property, while petitioners are entitled to the other 0.125 hectares.
In addition, Justa inherited her mother's (Ursula Tubil's) share consisting of
0.25 hectares. Plus the 2.2 hectares which belonged to her in her own right,
Justa owned a total of 2.575 or 2.58 hectares of the 2.7 — hectare land.
This 2.58-hectare land was inherited by private respondent Benedicto
Estrada as Justa's nearest surviving relative. As the Court of Appeals held:
According to Article 962 of the Civil Code, In every inheritance, the relative
nearest in degree excludes the more distant ones, saving the right of
representation when it properly takes place.
Relatives in the same degree shall inherit in equal shares, subject to the
provisions of Article 1006 with respect to relatives of the full and half blood,
and of Article 987, paragraph 2, concerning division between paternal and
maternal lines.
The manner of determining the proximity of relationship are provided by
Articles 963 — 966 of the Civil Code. They provide:
81
Art. 963. Proximity of relationship is determined by the number of
generations. Each generation forms a degree.
Art. 964. A series of degrees forms a line, which may be either direct or
collateral.
A direct line is that constituted by the series of degrees among ascendants
and descendants.
A collateral line is that constituted by the series of degrees among persons
who are not ascendants and descendants, but who come from a common
ancestor.
Art. 965. The direct line is either descending or ascending.
The former unites the head of the family with those who descend from him.
The latter binds a person with those from whom he descends.
Art. 966. In the line, as many degrees are counted as there are generations
or persons, excluding the progenitor.
In the direct line, ascent is made to the common ancestor. Thus the child is
one degree removed from the parent, two from the grandfather, and three
from the great-grandparent.
In the collateral line, ascent is made to the common ancestor and then
descent is made to the person with whom the computation is to be made.
Thus, a person is two degrees removed from his brother, three from his
uncle, who is the brother of his father, four from his first cousin, and so forth.
In this case, plaintiff is the son of Agatonica, the half-sister of Justa. He is
thus a third degree relative of Justa.
On the other hand, defendants and intervenors are the sons and daughters
of Justa's cousin. They are thus fifth degree relatives of Justa.
Applying the principle that the nearest excludes the farthest, then plaintiff is
the lawful heir of Justa. The fact that his mother is only a half-sister of Justa
is of no moment. 22
Nevertheless, petitioners make much of the fact that private respondent is
not an Arnaldo, his mother being Ursula's daughter not by Juan Arnaldo but
by Pedro Arreza. They claim that this being the case, private respondent is
not an heir of Justa and thus not qualified to share in her estate.
Petitioners misappreciate the relationship between Justa and private
respondent. As already stated, private respondent is the son of Justa's half-
sister Agatonica. He is therefore Justa's nephew. A nephew is considered a
collateral relative who may inherit if no descendant, ascendant, or spouse
survive the decedent. 23 That private respondent is only a half-blood relative
is immaterial. This alone does not disqualify him from being his aunt's heir.
As the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, "The determination of whether
the relationship is of the full or half blood is important only to determine the
extent of the share of the survivors."24
Because of the conclusion we have thus reached, the third and fourth
grounds of the petition for review must fail.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The temporary restraining order
issued by this Court is LIFTED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
82
G.R. No. 208928 July 8, 2015
ANDY ANG, vs. SEVERINO PACUNIO
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
The Facts
The instant case arose from a Complaint5 dated March I 9, 2003 for
Declaration of Nullity of Sale, Reconveyance, and Damages filed by Pedrito
N. PaGunio, Editha P. Yaba, and herein respondents Severino Pacunio,
Teresita P. Torralba, Susana Loberanes, Christopher N. Pacunio, and
Pedrito P. Azaron (respondents) against petitioner before the RTC involving
a 98,851 square meter (sq. m.) parcel of land originally registered in
Udiaan's name as evidenced by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. T-
35936 (subject land). In their Complaint, respondents alleged that they are
the grandchildren and successors-in-interest of Udiaan who died7 on
December 15, 1972 in Cagayan de Oro City and left the subject land as
inheritance to her heirs. However, on July 12, 1993, an impostor falsely
representing herself as Udiaan sold the subject land to petitioner, as
evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale8 of even date (Questioned Deed of
Absolute Sale). Consequently, OCT No. T-3593 was cancelled and Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-790519 was issued in the latter's name. In
1997, petitioner entered the subject land and used the same in his livestock
business. Respondents then informed petitioner that he did not validly
acquire the subject land, and thereafter, demanded for its return, but to no
avail.10 Hence, they filed the aforesaid complaint, essentially contending
that Udiaan could not have validly sold the subject land to petitioner
considering that she was already dead for more than 20 years when the sale
occurred.11
In his Answer,12 petitioner denied respondents' allegations and countered
that: (a) at first, he bought the subject land from a person representing
herself as Udiaan who showed a community tax certificate as proof of
identity, has in her possession OCT No. T-3593, knew the location of the
subject land, and was not afraid to face the notary public when they
executed the Questioned Deed of Absolute Sale; ( b) he was initially
prevented from entering the subject land since it was being occupied by the
Heirs of Alfredo Gaccion (Heirs of Gaccion); (c) in order to buy peace, he
had to "buy" the subject land anew from the Heirs of Gaccion; (d) he was a
buyer in good faith, for value, and was without any knowledge or
participation in the alleged defects of the title thereof; and ( e) respondents
were never in possession of the subject land and they never paid real
property taxes over the same. Ultimately, petitioner claimed that he was
duped and swindled into buying the subject land twice.13
After the pre-trial conference, the parties submitted the case for summary
judgment on the basis of the documents and pleadings already
filed.1awp++i1 The RTC then ordered the parties to simultaneously submit
their memoranda in support of their respective positions.14
The RTC Ruling
In a Summary Judgment15 dated September 12, 2006, the RTC ruled in
petitioner's favor and accordingly, dismissed the case for lack of merit.16 It
found that while respondents claimed to be Udiaan's successors-in-interest
over the subject land, there is dearth of evidence proving their successional
rights to Udiaan's estate, specifically, over the subject land. As such, the
RTC concluded that respondents are not the real parties in interest to
institute an action against petitioner, warranting the dismissal of their
complaint.17
Dissatisfied, respondents appealed18 to the CA.
83
The CA Ruling
In a Decision19 dated September 28, 2012, the CA affirmed with
modification the RTC ruling in that: (a) it nullified the Questioned Deed of
Absolute Sale; (b) declared valid the deed of absolute sale between
petitioner and the Heirs of Gaccion over a 3,502-sq. m. portion of the subject
land; and ( c) distributed portions of the subject land to the Heirs of Gaccion
and to the children of Udiaan.20
It agreed with the RTC's finding that respondents are not real parties in
interest to the instant case, considering that, as mere grandchildren of
Udiaan, they have no successional rights to Udiaan's estate. In this regard,
the CA ratiocinated that respondents could only succeed from said estate by
right of representation if their mother, who is one of Udiaan's children,21
predeceased Udiaan. However, such fact was not established.22
This notwithstanding, the CA nullified the Questioned Deed of Absolute Sale
because it was clearly executed by a person other than Udiaan, who died
more than 20 years before such sale occurred.23 Considering, however,
that some of Udiaan's heirs had already sold a 9,900-sq. m. portion of the
subject land to the Heirs of Gaccion, who in turn, sold a 3,502-sq. m. portion
to petitioner, the CA apportioned the subject land as follows: (a) 3,502 sq. m.
to petitioner; (b) 6,398 sq. m. to the Heirs of Gaccion; and (c) the remainder
of the subject land to Udiaan's children.24
Aggrieved, petitioner moved for reconsideration,25 but was denied in a
Resolution26 dated August 13, 2013; hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly
declared the nullity of the Questioned Deed of Absolute Sale and distributed
portions of the subject land to different parties, among others, despite ruling
that respondents are not real parties in interest to the instant case.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court lays down the definition of a real
party in interest as follows:
SEC. 2. Parties in interest. - A real party in interest is the party who stands
to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to
the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise provided by law or these Rules,
every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in
interest.
The rule on real parties in interest has two (2) requirements, namely: (a) to
institute an action, the plaintiff must be the real party in interest; and (b) the
action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. Interest
within the meaning of the Rules of Court means material interest or an
interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as
distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved. One having
no material interest cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as the plaintiff
in an action. When the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, the case is
dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action.27 In Spouses Oco v.
Limbaring,28 the Court expounded on the purpose of this rule, to wit:
Necessarily, the purposes of this provision are 1) to prevent the prosecution
of actions by persons without any right, title or interest in the case; 2) to
require that the actual party entitled to legal relief be the one to prosecute
the action; 3) to avoid multiplicity of suits; and 4) discourage litigation and
keep it within certain bounds, pursuant to public policy.29
84
In the instant case, respondents claim to be the successors-in-interest of the In sum, the CA transgressed prevailing law and jurisprudence in resolving
subject land just because they are Udiaan's grandchildren.1âwphi1 Under the substantive issues of the instant case despite the fact that respondents
the law, however, respondents will only be deemed to have a material are not real parties in interest to the same. Necessarily, a reinstatement of
interest over the subject land - and the rest of Udiaan' s estate for that the R TC ruling is in order.
matter - if the right of representation provided under Article 970,30 in relation
to Article 982,31 of the Civil Code is available to them. In this situation, WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated
representatives will be called to the succession by the law and not by the September 28, 2012 and the Resolution dated August 13, 2013 of the Court
person represented; and the representative does not succeed the person of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 00992-MIN are hereby REVERSED and SET
represented but the one whom the person represented would have ASIDE. Accordingly, the Summary Judgment dated September 12, 2006 of
succeeded.32 the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 38 in Civil Case
No. 2003-115 is REINSTATED. SO ORDERED.
For such right to be available to respondents, they would have to show first
that their mother: (a) predeceased Udiaan; (b) is incapacitated to inherit; or
(c) was disinherited, if Udiaan died testate.33 However, as correctly pointed
out by the CA, nothing in the records would show that the right of
representation is available to respondents. Hence, the RTC and the CA
correctly found that respondents are not real parties in interest to the instant
case. It is well-settled that factual findings of the RTC, when affirmed by the
CA, are entitled to great weight and respect by the Court and are deemed
final and conclusive when supported by the evidence on record,34 as in this
case.

Having established that respondents are not the real parties in interest to the
instant suit, the proper course of action was for the CA to merely affirm the
RTC's dismissal of their complaint. It therefore erred in proceeding to
resolve the other substantive issues of the case and granting one of the
principal reliefs sought by respondents, which is the declaration of the nullity
of the Questioned Deed of Absolute Sale.35 In the same vein, the CA erred
in awarding portions of the subject land to various non-parties to the case,
such as the Heirs of Gaccion and Udiaan's children. Basic is the rule that no
relief can be extended in a judgment to a stranger or one who is not a party
to a case.36

85
[ G.R. No. 230103, August 27, 2020 ]
MARTIN ROBERTO G. TIROL, VS. SOL NOLASCOD E C I S I O N
CAGUIOA, J:
The Facts and Antecedent Proceedings
The CA Decision narrates the factual antecedents as follows:
On October 10, 1991, Gloria Tirol [(Gloria) died testate]. She was survived
by her husband Roberto Tirol, Sr. [(Roberto Sr.)] and their six children
namely: Ruth Tirol-Jarantilla [(Ruth)], Cecilia Tirol-Javelosa [(Cecilia)], [Ma.
Lourdes] Tirol [(Marilou)], Ciriaco Tirol [(Ciriaco)], Anna Maria Tirol [(Anna)]
and Roberto Tirol, Jr. [(Roberto Jr.)]. On April 16, 1995, Roberto Jr. died
intestate, and was survived by his four children from his marriage with
Cecilia Geronimo, namely [petitioner] Martin, Zharina,7 Francis and Daniel.
At the time of his death, Roberto Jr.'s marriage with his wife had been
annulled.
On January 8, 2002, Roberto Sr. died testate and was survived by his
remaining children Ruth, Cecilia, Marilou, Ciriaco and Anna and his four
grandchildren from Roberto Jr.
On April 2, 2002, [petitioner] Martin, Cecilia and Ciriaco x x x filed before x x
x [RTC-218 a petition to probate the wills of Gloria and Roberto Sr. x x x
Ruth and [Marilou] later joined as intervenors. x x x [RTC-218 admitted to
probate the respective wills of Gloria and Roberto Sr. and designated
[petitioner] Martin as the Administrator of their estate[s].
On February 25, 2011, [respondent Sol] filed a [Motion for Intervention]
stating that she has a legal interest in the estate of Gloria and Roberto Sr.
because she is the surviving spouse of Roberto Jr. having married him on
July 15, 1994. [Respondent Sol] alleged that the late Roberto Jr., being one
of the children of Gloria and Roberto Sr., is entitled to at least 1/7 of the
estate of his late mother and as the surviving spouse, she is entitled to that
portion belonging to Roberto Jr. which is equivalent to the legitime of the
legitimate children of the decedent. According to [her], she is considered a
compulsory heir pursuant to Article 887 of the Civil Code and has an interest
or claim in the estate of her late husband.
[Petitioner] Martin, the son of the late Roberto Jr., who was appointed as the
Administrator, opposed [respondent Sol's] motion for intervention and so did
[Anna, Marilou, Ruth and Cecilia]. [The oppositors] mainly argued that
[respondent Sol] has no legal interest in the probate of the wills of Gloria and
Roberto Sr. and could not represent Roberto Jr., not being a blood relative.
[The oppositors] also refused to recognize [respondent Sol] as the legal wife
of Roberto Jr
[On March 15, 2011, respondent Sol filed a motion for intervention8 in the
intestate settlement of Roberto Jr.'s estate proceedings ("In the Matter of the
Intestate Estate of Roberto Lorca Tirol, Ma. Zharina Rita Geronimo Tirol,
petitioner" docketed as Spec. Proc. No. Q-95-25497) pending before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 101 (RTC-101). x x x RTC-101
granted the motion to intervene filed by respondent Sol in its Order9 dated
May 8, 2012. Apparently, Zharina has been appointed as Administratrix in
the intestate estate of Roberto Jr.10
On June 27, 2013, x x x [RTC-218 issued the x x x Omnibus [Resolution]
denying, among others, the motion to intervene filed by [respondent Sol], x x
x [RTC-218 stated that [respondent Sol] has no legal interest in the case.
[The pertinent dispositive portion of the said Omnibus Resolution states:
WHEREFORE, the court hereby resolves to: x x x x
7) DENY the Motion for Intervention and to Admit Attached Claim-in-
Intervention;
86
xxxx
SO ORDERED.11
[Respondent Sol] filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied in the
other x x x Order dated October 27, 2013.12
Respondent Sol filed with the CA a petition for certiorari questioning the
Omnibus Resolution dated June 27, 2013 of RTC-218, which denied her
motion for intervention, and the Order dated October 27, 2013, which denied
her motion for reconsideration. Petitioner Martin filed an opposition.
Ruling of the CA
The CA, in its Decision dated April 27, 2016, found respondent Sol's
certiorari petition to be meritorious.13 The CA stated that respondent Sol
should be allowed to intervene because she is the widow of Roberto Jr. and
has an interest or claim in her husband's estate, which consists, in part, of
the latter's share in the estate of his deceased mother Gloria, and the extent
or value of the share of Roberto Jr. has not yet been determined.14 The CA
clarified that respondent Sol does not anchor her motion for intervention on
her status as daughter-in-law but rather as an heir of Roberto Jr.15 The
dispositive portion of the CA Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions dated
June 27, 2013 and October 27, 2013, issued by Branch 218 of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Said
Court is ORDERED to GRANT Petitioner's [(respondent Sol's)] Motion for
Intervention and to Admit Claim-in-Intervention.
SO ORDERED.16
Petitioner Martin filed a motion for reconsideration wherein he argued,
among others, that the intervention sought by respondent Sol should not be
granted because any interest she may allegedly have in the estate of her
alleged husband, Roberto Jr., can be fully ventilated in Spec. Proc. No. Q-
95-25497, which involves the judicial settlement of Roberto Jr.'s estate, and
her motion for intervention therein has been granted by RTC-101.17 The CA
denied petitioner Martin's motion for reconsideration in its Resolution dated
February 23, 2017. The CA, however, did not traverse the said argument of
petitioner Martin.
Hence the present Petition. Respondent Sol filed her
Comment/Opposition18 dated June 28, 2018.
The Issues
The Petition states the following issues19 to be resolved:
1 Whether the CA erred in finding merit to respondent Sol's argument that,
as widow of Roberto Jr., she is a compulsory heir of Gloria and Roberto Sr.
under Article 887 of the Civil Code.
2 Whether the CA erred in failing to consider whether respondent Sol's
alleged rights and interests over the estate of Roberto Jr. may be fully
protected in Spec. Proc. No. Q-95-25497, which directly involves said
estate.
3 Whether the CA erred in not giving due consideration that respondent
Sol's intervention in Spec. Proc. No. Q-02-46559 will undo 14 years' worth of
resolved incidents in said case and further delay the proceedings therein.
4 Whether the CA erred in applying Alfelor v. Halasan20 and Uy v. Court of
Appeals.21
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
87
The Court will resolve the second issue ahead of the others. A resolution by
the Court that respondent Sol's right or interest, if any, in the estate of
Roberto Jr. is fully protected in Spec. Proc. No. Q-95-25497 will render the
resolution of the other issues irrelevant.Ꮮαwρhi৷
Petitioner Martin argues that respondent Sol's rights and interests, if any,
can be fully protected in Spec. Proc. No. Q-95-25497 pending before RTC-
101 (settlement of Roberto Jr.'s estate proceeding), which directly involves
the settlement of Roberto Jr.'s intestate estate, and it is in that proceeding
where she can directly litigate her claims as the alleged heir of Roberto Jr.22
Thus, her intervention in Sp. Proc. No. Q-02-46559 pending before RTC-218
(probate proceeding), which involves the wills of Gloria and Roberto Sr., is
completely unnecessary and superfluous.23
It appears that petitioner Martin has been appointed as Administrator of the
testate estates of Gloria and Roberto Sr. in the probate proceeding24 and
Zharina has been designated as Administratrix of the intestate estate of
Roberto Jr
The CA allowed respondent Sol's intervention in the probate proceeding
"because she is the widow of Roberto Jr. and, therefore, has an interest or
claim in the estate of her husband[, which,] consists, in part, of the latter's
share in the estate of his deceased mother, Gloria, and since the extent or
value of the share of Roberto Jr. has not yet been determined, [respondent
Sol] should be allowed to participate in the proceedings."26
It will be recalled that Roberto Jr. died on April 16, 1995, or after his
mother's death on October 10, 1991, but before his father's death on
January 8, 2002.27 When Gloria died, Roberto Jr. would have inherited from
her as a compulsory heir by virtue of Article 887(1) of the Civil Code, which
states:
ART. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate
parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with
respect to their legitimate children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287. x x x x (807a).
As far as respondent Sol is concerned, she would inherit from Roberto Jr.
pursuant to Article 887(3) and part of his estate would be his share in the
estate of her mother, Gloria. Respondent Sol could not inherit from the
estate of Roberto Sr. because Roberto Jr. predeceased Roberto Sr., his
father, and the children of Roberto Jr. would succeed by right of
representation from their grandfather pursuant to Article 972 of the Civil
Code, which provides, in part: "The right of representation takes place in the
direct descending line, but never in the ascending [line]." Moreover,
respondent Sol is not related by blood, but only by affinity, to Roberto Sr.
It should also be noted that the claim of respondent Sol as surviving spouse
of Roberto Jr. is disputed. The validity of respondent Sol's marriage to
Roberto Jr. is in issue. In her Claim-in-Intervention, respondent Sol attached
a Certificate of Marriage28 between her and Roberto Jr. which was
celebrated in La Castellana, Negros Occidental on July 15, 1994. On the
other hand, petitioner Martin, in his Opposition to respondent Sol's Motion
for Intervention, questioned the validity of the marriage of respondent Sol to
his father, Roberto Jr., on the ground that it is bigamous because of
respondent Sol's pre-existing marriage to another man, which had not been
nullified before her marriage to Roberto Jr. on July 15, 1994, and as proof
thereof, petitioner Martin attached a Marriage Certificate showing that on
88
May 15, 1985 respondent Sol married a certain Raul I. Cimagla at a civil
wedding in Branch 3, Municipal Trial Court of Davao City.29
Given the pendency of these two special proceedings and the presence of
an issue on the validity of her claim as an heir of Roberto Jr., is the
intervention of respondent Sol in the probate proceeding proper?
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Amended Rules of Civil Procedure30 provides:
Section 1. Who may intervene. - A person who has a legal interest in the
matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest
against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or
other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer
thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The
court shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or
prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or
not the intervenor's rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.
(1)
The Court in Ongco v. Dalisay31 described intervention as a remedy, as
follows:
Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in
the proceedings, becomes a litigant therein for a certain purpose: to enable
the third party to protect or preserve a right or interest that may be affected
by those proceedings. This remedy, however, is not a right. The rules on
intervention are set forth clearly in Rule 19 of the Rules of Court xxx.
xxxx
It can be readily seen that intervention is not a matter of right, but is left to
the trial court's sound discretion. The trial court must not only determine if
the requisite legal interest is present, but also take into consideration the
delay and the consequent prejudice to the original parties that the
intervention will cause. Both requirements must concur, as the first
requirement on legal interest is not more important than the second
requirement that no delay and prejudice should result. To help ensure that
delay does not result from the granting of a motion to intervene, the Rules
also explicitly say that intervention may be allowed only before rendition of
judgment by the trial court.32
Given the existence of the settlement of Roberto Jr.'s estate proceeding, the
question has to be resolved in the negative.
In the settlement of a deceased's estate, Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of
Court provides: "The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the
estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
courts."
Given the exclusivity of jurisdiction granted to the court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of a decedent's estate, RTC-101 has the
exclusive jurisdiction over the intestate estate of Roberto Jr. while RTC-218
has exclusive jurisdiction over the testate estates of Gloria and Roberto Sr.
Thus, only RTC-101, the court where the settlement of Roberto Jr.'s estate
proceeding is pending, has jurisdiction to determine who the heirs of
Roberto Jr. are.
Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court provides when and to whom the
residue of the decedent's estate is distributed, and how a controversy as to
who are the lawful heirs of the decedent is resolved, to wit:
Section 1. When order for distribution of residue made. - When the debts,
funeral charges, and expenses of administration, the allowance to the
widow, and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance
with law, have been paid, the court, on the application of the executor or
administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and after hearing upon
notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the
89
same, naming them and the proportions, or parts, to which each is entitled,
and such persons may demand and recover their respective shares from the
executor or administrator, or any other person having the same in his
possession. If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the
lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which
each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and
decided as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above-
mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of
them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the
payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs.
The court which has jurisdiction to hear and decide any controversy as to
who are the lawful heirs of Roberto Jr. or as to the distributive shares to
which each is entitled under the law is undoubtedly RTC-101 because it is
the court which has first taken cognizance of the settlement of the intestate
estate of Roberto Jr.
RTC-218, where the probate proceeding is pending, cannot rule on the issue
of who are the heirs of Roberto Jr. even if the share of Roberto Jr. in the
estates of Gloria and Roberto Sr. is to be determined therein. The probate
court must yield to the determination by the Roberto Jr.'s estate settlement
court of the latter's heirs. This is to avoid confusing and conflicting
dispositions of a decedent's estate by co-equal courts.33
As to protection and preservation of the share of Roberto Jr.'s share in the
testate estates of Gloria and Roberto Sr., the same is now the look out of the
administrator of his estate and it appears, as noted above, that Zharina has
been designated as the Administratrix of Roberto Jr.'s estate by RTC-101.
Section 2, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court provides: "For the recovery or
protection of the property or rights of the deceased, an executor or
administrator may bring or defend, in the right of the deceased, actions for
causes which survive." Thus, the intervention of respondent Sol in the
probate proceeding will be superfluous because she has an available
remedy in the settlement of Roberto Jr.'s estate proceeding to question any
action of the administrator therein which is detrimental to the said estate.
Since intervention is not a matter of right but depends on the sound
discretion of the court, respondent Sol's intervention in the probate
proceeding is unnecessary because her right or interest in the estate of
Roberto Jr. can be fully protected in a separate proceeding - namely, the
settlement of Roberto Jr.'s estate proceeding pending before RTC-101. The
second parameter to be considered in granting of intervention under Section
1, Rule 19 - whether the intervenor's right may not be fully protected in a
separate proceeding — is wanting in the instant case.
Another reason in disallowing the intervention of respondent Sol in the
probate proceeding is the legal precept that an independent controversy
cannot be injected into a suit by intervention, viz.:
x x x In general, an independent controversy cannot be injected into a suit
by intervention, hence, such intervention will not be allowed where it would
enlarge the issues in the action and expand the scope of the
remedies.Ꮮαwρhi৷ It is not proper where there are certain facts giving the
intervenor's case an aspect peculiar to himself and differentiating it clearly
from that of the original parties; the proper course is for the would-be
intervenor to litigate his claim in a separate suit. Intervention is not intended
to change the nature and character of the action itself, or to stop or delay the
placid operation of the machinery of the trial. The remedy of intervention is
not proper where it will have the effect of retarding the principal suit or
delaying the trial of the action.34
The issue as to whether respondent Sol is a lawful heir of Roberto Jr. will
definitely enlarge the issues in the probate proceeding and involve
determination of facts peculiar only to her, which have nothing to do with the
90
original parties. The other heirs of Gloria and Roberto Sr. are not interested
in who are the lawful heirs of Roberto Jr. The respective shares of such
other heirs in the estates of Gloria and Roberto Sr. will in no way be affected
by who are declared as the lawful heirs of Roberto Jr. in the proceeding for
the settlement of his estate.

With this extraneous issue being injected into the probate proceeding, the
first parameter that has to be considered whether to allow an intervention
under Section 1, Rule 19 - no undue delay or prejudice in the adjudication of
the rights of the original parties - is not met. Thus, the intervention of
respondent Sol in the probate proceeding should be denied.

Given the foregoing, the resolution of the other issues becomes surplusage.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision

dated April 27, 2016 and Resolution dated February 23, 2017 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 133784 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Motion for Intervention and Claim-in-Intervention of respondent Sol Nolasco
in Sp. Proc. No. Q-02-46559 pending before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 218 are DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

91