Digital technology and

socioeconomic issues

T
his first part, composed of nine chapters,
analyzes the strengths and weaknesses
CHAPTERS :
of digital technology with reference to so-
ciety. Each chapter deals with a specific 1 : Decent Work
theme, essential for the construction of a
world in line with the objectives of sustainable de-
2 : Economic Growth
velopment. The theme of privacy (and private life) 3 : Education
in the digital era is addressed across the different 4 : Innovation
chapters of this first part and in the thirteenth chap-
ter of the second section of the booklet (Digital and 5 : Poverty and Inequalities
Environmental Issues). 6 : Hunger and Farming
In most cases, digital technology is proving to be a 7 : Health and Well-being
valuable tool for solving lots of problems, or at least, 8 : Gender Equality
it has the potential to do so. However, it is rare that
it solves the underlying problems on its own. It is up 9 : Peace, Justice and Democracy.
to you to judge.

PAGE 5
 1.
Work
Decent
© Enough Project-CC BY-NC-ND 2.0
 DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY and
SOCIOECONOMIC ISSUES

RELATED GOAL OF THE UN AGENDA 2030

FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT:

CHaPTeR 1 : Decent Work

- see the BOX below for more details on Fairphone
Why is it important? ("fair and equitable phone"). Usually, traditional
Most modern societies are based on a "social contract"
companies in the industry know only a fraction of
related to work. Individuals work to enable society as a the subcontractors in the entire production chain.
whole to progress. In return, they are entitled to receive Therefore, they have almost no idea of the origin of
a wage that corresponds to the work they do. When work the metals used (Cash Investigation 2015).
is lacking or does not allow them to live a decent life,
individuals sink into poverty (UN 2016). As a result, the
social contract itself is called into question and social Etap
tensions increase (UN 2016).
A job is considered decent if it is "adequately remunerated,
with secure working conditions, social protection for the
family" and if it gives "individuals the opportunity to realize
themselves and integrate into society" (UN 2016).
In 2018, the global unemployment rate was 5 percent, the
lowest level since the 2008 financial crisis (World Bank
2019b). In the European Union, the unemployment rate
rose to a record high of 11% in 2013, felling below 7% in
2019 (All Europe 2019) to rise again up to 8.4% in 2020
due to the Covid-19 pandemic (Eurostat; 2021). Add to
this the percentage of working poor that was c.a. 9% of (assemb
the total European workforce in 2014-2019 (Eurostat 2018
and 2019), meaning that work is not available to all and/or
does not provide a decent income to all.
"Non-decent" work is still widespread in different
parts of the world. For example, an estimated 24.9 million
people were engaged in "forced labor" in 2016 (Walk Free
Foundation 2018). Child labor, on the other hand, is in
steep decline. However, in 2017, there were still 152 million
young workers under the age of 18, half of whom were
under the age of 12 (UNWTO 2019).

Labor conditions in the digital economy

A long manufacturing process

Electronic devices, which include digital items, have
a very long and complicated supply chain. First, it
Steps in the manufacturing of a cell phone
relies on many materials from mines around the (As based on Fairphone 2019a, p.4)
world. In fact, most of the 62 metallic elements in © CND - CC-BY-NC-ND 2.0
One min

the periodic table are found in digital devices (Rathi

et al. 2013). Then, these materials are processed in
different factories, often in different states, until the
final product is obtained.
It is important to know that large digital brands have
little first-hand involvement in the process of ma-
nufacturing and assembling their products. In fact,
they usually purchase their finished products from
subcontractors, who, in turn, have done only some
of the assembly work, and so on until they get back
to the raw materials extracted from the mines (Cash
Investigation 2015). It is reasonable to assume that,
for example, for a smartphone several hundred com-
panies are involved in the production. Nearly 300
companies operate in the smelting and refining of
gold, tungsten, tin, and tantalum parts essential to
produce a Fairphone 2 (Fairphone 2019a) cell phone
Working conditions in mining
Several recent reports and surveys have revealed
serious problems associated with mining. It is dif-
ficult to reconstruct a comprehensive country-by-
country view with the precise role played by the digi-
tal sector. Therefore, we will only illustrate the case
of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC*), which
is the most documented. This country holds a key
importance for the production of digital objects, as
it is one of the main suppliers of several precious
metals of electronic devices, such as cobalt and tan-
talum (Cash Investigation 2015; TDI and Fairphone
2017b).

* Word or acronym defined at the end of the document PAGE 7

 1. Decent Work
Metals extraction in Congo.
© Responsible Sourcing Network-BY-NC 2.0
DRC's miners are called "diggers." They would be
500,000 in the province of Katanga alone (Milieude-
fensie, SOMO e Good Electronics 2015).
They suffer from difficult working conditions under
many regards, and that term is an understatement.
Miners usually work on their own digging tunnels
by hand or with rudimentary tools. Workdays last at
least 12 hours for the price of 6 euros approx. (Cash
Investigation 2015). Some of this money ends
up in the pockets of corrupt government officials
(Amnesty International 2015). Because the work is
done informally and yields little, rest days are not
even taken into account.
Child labor is widespread in DRC's mines. Some be-
gin at the age of six (Kara 2018). Amnesty Interna-
tional (2015) reports the story of 14-year-old Paul,
who must dig through tunnels for 24 hours straight,
every time. However, children usually stay on the
surface to filter water or stand guard (Kara 2018).
They are paid even less than adults, sometimes less
than one euro per day (Kara 2018).
One million children work in Earth’s mines.
© Julien Harneis - CC BY-SA 2.0
Excavated tunnels can be up to 80 to 100 meters
deep (Milieudefensie, SOMO, and GoodElectronics
2015; Schipper and de Haan 2015). Because the
tunnels are not secured, landslides are frequent,
sometimes with deadly effects. A Congolese mi-
ner interviewed by Cash Investigation (2015) des-
cribes several deadly landslides in his mine during
the months leading up to the report, one of which
claimed 175 lives. For its part, Amnesty International
(2015) reports several landslides in the same year
with 80 final fatalities, according to official data sus-
pected of being underreported.
PAGE 8
Given the informal and often illegal nature of these
mining sites, it is impossible to determine the num-
ber of landslide deaths in Congo. However, it is rea-
sonable to estimate a range of several hundred to
thousands per year.
Landslides are not the only causes of death. The-
refore, because these mining operations are gene-
rally illegal, it happens that the police (and/or mili-
tary) randomly shoot miners (Scheele et al. 2016).
In addition, contact with some mined metals, inclu-
ding cobalt, can cause dermatitis, severe respiratory
problems, and cancer (Amnesty International 2015;
Kara 2018; Crawford 2017). Diggers do not have
equipment to protect themselves.
In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), mining
is associated with wars. The latest, still ongoing
(Reuters 2019; Mu- longoFinkelstein 2018) is dead-
lier than World War II (Cash Investigation 2015),
having caused 6 million deaths between 1998 and
2014 (Valmir 2014). One of the main reasons for this
long conflict is the struggle for sovereignty over mi-
neral resources (Valmir 2014). Indeed, some mines,
especially in the eastern part of the country, are ope-
rated by armed groups that finance themselves with
the proceeds of mining activities. In 2015, Jaillon et
al. (2016) visited 1615 mines in this African country
and observed the presence of armed groups in 56%
of them. It is safe to assume that in the absence of
mining activities, conflicts would be less frequent
in these areas. Metals associated with war are so-
metimes called "blood minerals"; these are: tin,
tungsten, tantalum, and gold (ten Kate 2016).
The above is not unique to DRC and/or the digital
economy. In 2017, 40.5 million people worldwide
worked in artisanal mines (IISD 2018), performing
difficult, poorly mechanized physical labor (Gunson
and Jian 2002). This number has increased more
than sixfold in 25 years (IISD 2018). They include
at least one million child miners (Smith and Raphael
2016): Child labor is present in 26 countries for gold
mining alone (Schipper and de Haan 2015). Moreo-
ver, conflict financing through minerals is not limited
to the DRC. For example, copper is mined in eleven
countries where violent conflicts rage (ten Kate
2016).
Although much remains to be done, the situation
regarding artisanal mining in the DRC seems to be
improving lately (Julienne 2019). This is, in part, the
result of Directives issued by the United States and
the European Union that oblige multinationals to
know the origin of the metals used by their products,
to assess whether or not they should continue to
use certain suppliers (Amnesty International 2015;
European Commission 2017). Regarding child labor
in the DRC, the situation appears to be moving in the
right direction (Amnesty International 2017a). In
2017, Amnesty International studied improvements
in cobalt procurement in the DRC by multinational
battery manufacturers in order to prevent child la-
bor. It appeared that the "good students" in this area
of the globe were Apple and Samsung; the worst,
Huawei, Lenovo, or Microsoft (Amnesty Internatio-
nal 2017b).

Working conditions in enterprises

An example of a worker anti-suicide network

installed in factories.
© UCLy Université Catholique de Lyon-CC BY 2.0

Many products that are extremely hazardous to hu-

man health are used in these factories (Chan et al.
Women's work in a Chinese factory: the production conditions of our 2016; Smith and Raphael 2016). Because workers
digital tools are very difficult.
© Chris-BY-NC 2.0 are not provided with protective equipment neces-
sary to work safely (ILRF and BHRE 2018), rates of
cancer, miscarriage, or congenital abnormalities
are higher here than in other demographic groups
The production phase of electronic parts takes place
(Smith and Raphael 2016). In addition, many female
mainly in Asia. Working conditions are not much
workers are not even aware of the inherent danger
better than in the mines. The pace of work in these
of handling these electronic components (Tuncak et
factories is hellish. Sociologist Jenny Chan inter-
al. 2018).
viewed employees of Foxconn, the largest electro-
nics manufacturing company. These young people Among other bad practices encountered, ILRF and
testify to a dehumanizing experience, where human BHRE (2018) mention verbal and physical abuse,
beings are alienated from the machines they work non-payment of overtime, difficulty in resigning, or
for and the imperatives (and rhythms) of producti- lack of freedom of association to demand better
vity. They are isolated, exhausted, and suffer from working conditions.
loneliness and sometimes depression (Chan et al.
Countries involved in electronic devices are actually
2015). Some have even gone so far as to commit
reluctant to improve labor laws, as companies may
suicide, which drew international media attention in
decide to relocate to other countries (ILRF and BHRE
2010/2011 (Chan et al. 2017). Instead of improving
2018).
working conditions (in response to the scandal) Fox-
conn allegedly wanted to force employees to sign a Finally, other types of poor working conditions and
no-suicide clause. In the face of general outrage, huge health risks are associated with the end of life
the company eventually decided to install anti-sui- of digital devices (Tuncak 2018; Salvoch and Pirot
cide grills on the roofs and windows of the factories, 2019) - see Chapter 13.
eventually turning them into prisons (Richard 2016).
Because small, agile hands are needed and given a
preference for more vulnerable groups, women and Conclusions
children make up the majority workforce in the elec-
Our electronic devices are most likely associated, in
tronics industry in many countries around the world
one way or another, with violence and undignified
(Van der Velden 2019 and Cash Investigation, 2015).
work. The Walk Free Foundation (2018) finds that
Cash Investigation infiltrated an electronics facto-
the digital economy is by far the manufacturing sec-
ry in Nanchang, China. Half of the staff are under
tor most involved in modern forms of slavery, and
sixteen years old; some are as old as twelve. The re-
that nearly every major digital company is involved.
porters tell the story of thirteen-year-old Jiajia, who
In fact, it seems impossible for a digital company to
works 13 hours a day, 28 days a month, every other
ensure that labor is decent in each of its direct or
month at night. She earns 160 euros per month, a
indirect subcontractors, given the large number of
starvation wage.
companies involved.
Even students who need to make up points and re-
On the other hand, this situation suits digital compa-
fugees are forced to work in some factories if they
nies well: they can hide behind their subcontractors
want to graduate or get their passports back (Hodal
and, thus, avoid being directly accused and affected
and Bengtsen 2017; Pattison 2016). These situa-
by scandals. In short, electronic and digital compa-
tions embody modern slavery.
nies turn a blind eye to these issues in order to re-
duce production costs (Cash Investigation 2015).

PAGE 9
 1. Decent Work
Fairphone is a smartphone manufacturer that aims to
be as ethical as possible. First of all, it tries to get to know
the different suppliers involved in the production of its
phones - the company doesn't know them all yet.
Secondly, independent checks are carried out on a
large percentage of known subcontractors in order to en-
sure decent working conditions, as well as the absence of
child labor and conflict financing. At the same time, Fair-
phone is in contact with several subcontractors to improve
working conditions and offer a fair price per product sold to
pay workers in a decent way (Fairphone 2019b).
Finally, the company is transparent. A mass of informa-
tion is available on their website, such as the names of sup-
pliers known to the company (Sourcemap 2018; Fairphone
2019a), the materials used in their smartphones (TDI and
Fairphone 2017a), or the main social and environmental
risks associated with these materials (TDI and Fairphone
2017b).
Fairphone, a more ethical alternative.
© Fairphone - CC BY-SA 2.0
Transformation of the labor market
New digital technologies have and will continue to
have many consequences on human work. Some
even speak of a "fourth industrial revolution" to un-
derscore the magnitude of the changes taking place
(Schwab 2017).
Loss of jobs
Digital objects are increasingly able to perform tasks
previously done by humans. Sometimes they can
accomplish them faster, more efficiently and at a
lower cost. It is therefore not surprising that humans
are being replaced by machines in the workplace.
According to large-scale studies, the technologies
being developed have the potential to automate* half
of the actual job positions in the Northern countries
(Frey e Os- a carico del 2017; Bowles 2014; Manyika
et al.). Most of the time, only certain tasks within a
trade or profession will be changed or reset, yet this
will lead to job losses.
However, this does not mean that half of all jobs will
disappear - because corporate and policy decisions
will also be important - nor does it mean that auto-
PAGE 10
mation will be for tomorrow. According to consulting
firm McKinsey, about 15% of jobs will be automated
between 2016 and 2030, and this figure would rise
to between 20 and 25% for Northern countries. In
other words, automation is expected to cause the
loss of about 400 million jobs worldwide over this
period (Manyika et al. 2017, pp.2-3).
No economic field will be spared from automation,
not even the highest paid (Mahdawi 2017). Some
will be more affected than others. These include the
broader administrative sector (accounting, human
resource management, banking, secretarial work,
law, etc.), the transportation and logistics sector,
the sales sector (especially for occupations requi-
ring little social intelligence), and the manufacturing
sector (Frey and Osborne 2017). For the latter, job
losses are due to industrial transformation.
Mechanization, Mass production,
1 water power,
steam power
2 assembly line,
electricity
Computer
3 4
Cyber Physical
and Systems
automation
Visual description of the four industrial revolutions
(adapted from the image of Christoph Roser on AllAboutLean.com)
© Christoph Roser at AllAboutLean.com - CC BY-SA 4.0
Industry 4.0, as it is called, uses new digital tech-
nologies such as robots*, AI (Artificial Intelligence)
* or 3D printers* to increase labor productivity. In
particular, it uses a large amount of data collected
in factories thanks to the Internet of Things*. Data
about workers is also collected: see Kone's example
below (Degryse, 2016).
This mass of diverse pieces of information makes it
possible, among other things, to perform tasks more
quickly and efficiently or to increase synchroniza-
tion between different stages of production - see
Cotteleer and Sniderman (2017) for more details.
Nowadays, most routine tasks can be performed by
robots. For example, in the factories of electronics
leader Foxconn, hundreds of thousands of people
have been replaced by robots created by the com-
pany in recent years (Chan 2017). Humans where
they are still needed are increasingly helped by ma-
chines, see the examples shown below.
On the other hand, there are three types of occupa-
tions where, at the moment, humans are resistant
to automation. The first concerns jobs that require
true creativity, as in research or the arts. The se-
cond involves occupations that must build complex
relationships with individuals, as in health care or
education. The third includes jobs in which multiple
and unpredictable tasks are envisaged (Mahdawi
2017; Brynjolfsson et McAfee 2015).
How many and what types of jobs for the future?
An uncertain future ... ... © CC0 - Public Domain
Some authors fear that the wave of automation will
cause a jobless world (Ford 2015). Most specialists
simply predict change, with new jobs also created to
compensate for losses (World Bank 2019a). Rather,
several studies show that the first effects of the cur-
rent phase of automation are positive in terms of
employment (Balsmeier and Woerter 2019; Arntz et
al. 2018).
Thus, we may simply be witnessing the destruction
of some sectors of the economy and the creation
of new ones - this process is called "creative des-
truction" (Schumpeter 1942). Moreover, historically,
increased productivity due to the new technologies
has allowed people to increase their purchasing
power, and thus consume more, thus contributing to
the creation of new jobs (Devlin 2017). However, it is
uncertain whether further increases in consumption
are possible or desirable in the long run in a world
where some environmental limits have already been
reached (Jackson 2017).
At the same time, even if the automation wave does
not cause mass unemployment, it will necessarily
have strong consequences social consequences.
Indeed, on the one hand, automated jobs will be low-
skilled and low-paying while, on the other hand, the
jobs created will be high-skilled and well-paying
(Frey and Osborne 2017; Balsmeier and Woerter
2019). As a result, the poorest and lowest-skilled will
be hardest hit, likely increasing inequality.
Many people will need to train to acquire the quali-
fications essential to finding a new job. Therefore,
priority should be given to education and training,
especially of digital skills. The European Union is
also adopting policies in this direction (European
Commission; 2018). However, providing relevant
and quality education and training may not be
enough. More concretely: will those affected be able
to train the required skills? Will older people be wil-
ling to upgrade to find a job in the digital world? As
a result, some segments of the population may find
themselves totally excluded from the world of work
(Valsamis et al. 2015).
Other job-related risks
The consequences of digitization on labor go far
beyond the above theses. In some Southern coun-
tries, the loss of jobs will likely cause a drastic dete-
rioration in working conditions with the resurgence
of modern forms of slavery. Verisk Maplecroft (2018)
predicts an increase in modern slavery in several
Asian countries that will be hard hit by digitization.
According to this study, women are most at risk (see
Chapter 9 for more information.).
On the other hand, a large portion of the jobs left
standing after automation will likely limit the hu-
man to the role of machine executor (Head 2014).
For example, within the large retail company Lidl, a
machine dictates orders to preparers via an audio
headset describing to them the actions to be perfor-
med in the warehouse (Le Gall et al. 2017). At Air-
bus, employees visualize the tasks to be performed
thanks to special glasses (Accenture 2019). These
practices have several negative consequences such
as dehumanizing work (Chan 2017) or increasing
the pace and/or having to compete with a machine
(Le Gall et al. 2017; Malet 2019).
.
Does the machine direct
human beings?
© CND - CC-BY-NC-ND
2.0
The data collected on workers also raises questions.
And so, repairmen at the elevator company Kone
are equipped with digital boxes that suggest what
repairs need to be done and allow the company to
know the person's location, the speed of the repair,
the exact working hours or duration and location
of the break. Employees undergo constant perfor-
mance evaluations and are supervised (Degryse
2016; Yeginsu 2018).
PAGE 11
 1. Decent Work
Uberization and delocalization
Protest against working conditions at Deliveroo food
delivery service in Berlin
© Leonhard Lenz - CC0
Uberization, which is the process of transforming
the economy through which certain services are
available on digital platforms such as Uber, Airbnb,
Deliveroo, Etsy or TaskRabbit, also contributes to
disrupting the world of work, the labor market. In-
deed, in this type of economy usually workers are
not framed as employees, but as self-employed.
Thus, platforms do not pay social security contri-
butions, do not provide minimum wages, and do not
care about working conditions. In Uber, for example,
drivers are poorly paid (Rushe 2019). If this model
were to spread, the social norms underpinning so-
ciety would worsen (Degryse 2016).
Some platforms are experimenting with new labor
offshoring. Upwork, for example, connects compa-
nies with individuals around the world who are wil-
ling to perform certain tasks. Thus, a European com-
pany can, through Upwork, ask an Indian to do its
bookkeeping at a much lower cost than in its home
country. E-commerce allows many tasks to be
performed in-house in countries where labor costs
are low. This type of practice causes job losses in
northern countries. In fact, any activity that does not
necessarily require a local anchor runs the risk of
being relocated (Degryse 2016).
Reforming the System
To counteract the risks evoked above, some are
considering innovative solutions, such as reducing
working hours (Stiegler 2016; Sachs 2018), imple-
menting a corporate tax for every robot that replaces
a human (Gates 2017), or creation of free income
and/or basic universal social coverage (Straubhaar
2017). Maintaining the status quo is not the solu-
tion if you want to avoid a major social crisis.
In short.
• Abominable working conditions accompany
the entire production cycle of digital objects:
dangerous and dehumanizing jobs, deadly
landslides in mines, serious health problems,
PAGE 12
child labor, financing of armed conflicts and/or
modern forms of slavery.
• Poor working conditions are associated with
both the mineral extraction phase, the metal
processing phase, and the factories that as-
semble the components of digital devices.
• It seems difficult to find a "good student" among
large digital companies.
• Digital technology will cause a very significant
wave of job loss. There is a real risk of mass
unemployment, increased inequality, and the
downgrading of an entire population that is
unable to find a job.
• The use of digital technology in businesses in-
creases productivity, but it also causes the pace
of work to accelerate and dehumanize it.
• Uberization debases social norms and in-
creases the offshoring of labor.
• All these adverse consequences make us fore-
see a new vision of the "social contract" so far
linked to work, in the future who knows!
Related classroom resources
Educational Pathway n. 3 : “What does digital tech-
nology bring to my life, to our lives?”
• Activity 4 "The Philosophical debate".
• Activity 5 "I put myself in the place of...".
Training Modules:
2 (U.A. 2.1.), 3 (U.A. 3.1., 3.2., 3.3.) and 5 (U.A. 5.1.)
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• Gunson, A. et Jian, Y. 2002. Artisanal Mining in The People’s Republic of • Van der Velden, M. 2019. March 8 – Women’s Health, Decent Work and
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• Head, S. 2014. Mindless: why smarter machines are making dumber Responsible Trade).
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toyable [Online].
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• child-mined gold by the electronics sector. SOMO (Centre for Research
on Multinational Corporations).

PAGE 13
 eCoNoMiC
2. GRoWTH

© Public Domain - CC0

PAGE 14
 DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY and
SOCIOECONOMIC ISSUES

RELATED GOAL OF THE UN AGENDA 2030

FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT:

CHaPTeR 2: eCoNoMiC GRoWTH

Why is it important? Croissance économique due au numérique ?
Economic growth refers to the positive change in the
number of goods and services produced in an economy Digital technology contributes to the growth of the
over the course of a year. It allows for an increase in the world economy in many ways.
wealth of the economic system. In other words, it increases
the size of the pie to be shared in society. Growth is said
to be "inclusive" if it allows all individuals to benefit from
it, while the same is said to be "sustainable" if it allows the
environment to regenerate in the long run (UNDP 2017).
If growth is inclusive and sustainable, we create the
conditions to raise the standard of living for all individuals
without threatening that of future generations. In short,
growth must connect to the concept of sustainable
development (Brundtland, 1987).
While global economic growth per capita has recovered
from the 2008 financial crisis and is slowly recovering
from the Covid-19 pandemic, it still remains at fairly low
levels, primarily in countries of the global north. The global
trend is structurally toward declining growth, so that some The current digital revolution, toward automation, is
economists envision a "post-growth" economy, with little increasing labor productivity.
or no growth, in the future (Jackson 2018). © Public Domain - CC0
It appears that global economic growth in recent decades
has been neither inclusive nor sustainable. It has not been First, the current digital revolution, leading to auto-
inclusive because the poorest social groups in the world mation (see Chapter 3), increases labor productivity.
and the middle classes in northern countries have received
almost nothing from this growth (Harvard University Press According to the consulting firm McKinsey, automa-
2016). In addition, wealth inequality has largely increased, tion will increase global labor productivity by 0.8-
with large fortunes increasing (Piketty 2013). Furthermore, 1.4% per year over the next 50 years, if every per-
growth has not been sustainable as it has led to increased
global environmental impacts, being a major cause of the son who lost a job during the automation process
current climate and environmental crisis (Jackson and finds another one (Manyika et al. 2017). Thus, more
Webster 2016; Kallis 2017; Ben Ytzhak 2015). wealth will be created in the same unit of work time,
These findings lead some economists to question the and, thus, economic growth. At the same time, di-
dominant economic model and propose others, including gital technology reduces production costs, lowering
the civil economy and degrowth. (CFR. BOX below).
them by a lot in some cases (Rifkin 2014).
Second, innovation has traditionally been conside-
red an engine of economic growth (Schumpeter,
1942). And digital technology has strong innovative,
"disruptive," breakthrough technology with strong
Civil economy is a new way of looking at economics. transformative potential (Manyika et al. 2013) - al-
Its adherents start from the observation that financial capi- though it is not so clear whether digital technology
talism has eroded the moral aspect of commerce by putting actually promotes innovation (see Chapter 4).
profit above all else. For them, the values of responsibi-
lity, reciprocity, and redistribution must be reinstituted into
economic exchange. Based on the tradition of Italian hu-
manism, civil economy aims to build an economy that fo-
regrounds well-being, virtue, and the common good (Bruni
and Zamagni 2017; Becchetti et al. 2015).
Degrowth is a movement based on the assumption
that economic growth can only lead to an environmental
and climate crisis, without necessarily leading to increased
well-being. In order to allow current and future generations
to thrive, adherents of this movement seek to build a less
productivist and consumerist society in order to refocus it
on basic human needs (Kallis et al. 2018; Latouche 2019).
The e-commerce has enabled the globalization of the exchanges
between businesses and consumers.
© Public Domain - CC0

* Word or acronym defined at the end of the document PAGE 15

 2. eCoNoMiC GRoWTH
In recent times, digital technology has enabled the
rise of e-commerce, online commerce. Buyers are
now connected to sellers from the four cantons of
the world. In addition, stronger competition has re-
sulted, forcing sellers to reduce production costs to
remain competitive. These two factors promote
consumption and, consequently, economic growth
(Azevedo 2017).
The current economic
growth induces greater
inequalities, itself
detrimental to Growth.
© jdegheets
However, economic growth induced by the digital
economy is not necessarily inclusive. The digital
sector can even reinforce inequality (see Chapter
5). However, it is a fact that too much inequality is a
drag on economic growth itself (Cingano 2014).
It would seem that economic growth driven by the
digital sector is not sustainable, as it causes in-
creased energy consumption, the extraction of
non-renewable materials, and serious environmen-
tal problems (see Part II). These three factors have a
negative impact on the global economy, reducing
short- and long-term economic growth (Stern 2006).
Current impacts of digital growth have severe social
and environmental by-effects.
© Responsible Sourcing Network -BY-NC 2.0
Furthermore, it is uncertain whether digital tech-
nology will have a significant impact on economic
growth in the years and decades to come. According
to Cowen (2011), current digital technologies, such
as AI* and big data*, will only bring a slight boost to
economic growth, in no way
comparable to the gains from previous technolo-
PAGE 16
gies. Cowen uses the metaphor of the fruit tree,
from which we would already have picked the most
accessible fruit, and on which only a few hard-to-
access fruits would remain. The situation in recent
years, with low growth despite the rise of digital
technology, seems to lend weight to this argument.
Financial inclusion
Many people, residing in countries of the global sou-
th, still do not have access to financial services such
as a bank account, credit, loans, or insurance. Howe-
ver, these services support inclusive growth, as they
directly support the economic growth of disadvan-
taged people and businesses (IMF 2017; FAO* 2018,
p.16). Financial inclusion, defined as access to and
use of these financial services, is therefore an im-
portant factor in inclusive growth.
Financial inclusion is aided by digital technology.
For example, banking services can be accessed with
a cell phone and only a basic mobile connection. The
M-Pesa system is based on telecommunications
credit, which actually acts as a virtual currency (Sa-
faricom 2019). This type of system is widely used in
some African and Asian countries (Mutiga and Flood
2016; The Economist 2015). According to a study by
The Economist (2015), the incomes of rural Kenyans
who adopted the system had increased by 5 to 30
percent more than other residents. M-Pesa also
participated in the creation of new businesses in the
Kenyan capital, and thus in the creation of new jobs
and wealth in the country.
Phone credit, which serves as currency, must be purchased at
vending machines or phone stores.
© WorldRemit Comms-CC BY-SA 2.0
Other digital initiatives enable financial inclusion.
The Kiva platform is a particularly successful exa-
mple (Kiva 2019). The latter connects poor small
business owners seeking financing for their project
with individuals willing to provide them with micro-
credit, i.e., the lending of a small amount of money
(Yunus 2017).
.
 lity and the limits to growth. Centre for the Understanding of Sustainable
In short. Prosperity. Disponible à : https://www.cusp.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/
WP-12-The-Post-Growth-Challenge-1.2MB.pdf [Consulté le : 19 juin 2019].
• Digital technology contributes to economic • Kallis, G. 2017. In Defense of Degrowth: Opinions and Manifestos.
growth, particularly by increasing labor produc- Uneven Earth Press.
• Kallis, G. et al. 2018. Research on Degrowth. Annual Review of Environ-
tivity. ment and Resources 43(1), pp.291-316.
• It is uncertain whether digitally induced econo- • Kiva. 2019. About us [En ligne]. Disponible à : https://www.kiva.org/
about [Consulté le : 22 mai 2019].
mic growth is significant. • Latouche, S. 2019. La décroissance. Paris : Que sais-je ?
• Digitally induced economic growth is not ne- • Manyika, J. et al. 2013. Disruptives technologies: advances that will
transform life, business, and the global economy. Washington : McKinsey
cessarily inclusive or sustainable, which affects Global Institute. Disponible à : https://www.mckinsey.com/business-func-
tions/digital-mckinsey/our-insights/disruptive-technologies [Consulté le :
growth itself in the short and long term. 20 juin 2019].
• Digital technology increases the financial inclu- • Manyika, J. 2017. et al. A future that works : automation, employment,
and productivity. Washington : McKinsey Global Institute. Disponible à
sion of disadvantaged populations. : https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/featured%20insights/
Digital%20Disruption/Harnessing%20automation%20for%20a%20fu-
ture%20that%20works/MGI-A-future-that-works-Executive-summary.ashx
[Consulté le : 20 juin 2019].
• Mutiga, M. et Flood, Z. 2016. Africa calling: mobile phone revolu-
tion to transform democracies[Enligne]. The Guardian. Disponible à :
Related classroom resources https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/08/africa-calling-mo-
bile-phone-broadband-revolution-transform-democracies [Consulté le : 20
mai 2019].
Educational Pathway n. 3 : “What does digital tech- • Piketty, T. 2013. Le capital au XXIe siècle. Paris : Seuil.
• PNUD (Programme des Nations unies pour le développement). 2017.
nology bring to my life, to our lives?” UNDP’s strategy for inclusive and sustainable growth. New York. Dispo-
nible à : https://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/Poverty%20
• Activity N. 4 "The Philosophical debate". Reduction/UNDPs%20Inclusive%20and%20Sustainable%20Growth-final.
pdf [Consulté le : 19 juin 2019].
• Activity 5 "I put myself in the place of...". • Rifkin, J. 2014. La nouvelle société du coût marginal zéro : l’internet des
objets, l’émergence des communaux collaboratifs et l’éclipse du capita-
lisme. Paris : Les liens qui libèrent.
Training Modules: • Safaricom. 2019. Using M-PESA [En ligne]. Disponible à : https://www.
safaricom.co.ke/personal/m-pesa/getting-started/using-m-pesa [Consulté
3 (U.A. 3.1.), 4 (4.1. and 4.2.), 6 (U.A. 6.1., 6.3 and 6.4) le : 20 mai 2019].
• Schumpeter J. 1942. Capitalism, socialism and democracy. London :
Routledge.
Bibliography • Stern, N. 2006. Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change.
Londres : HM Treasury. Disponible à : https://webarchive.nationalar-
chives.gov.uk/+/http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/sternreview_index.htm
• Azevedo, R. 2017. The Role of ICTs in Facilitating Trade for Sustainable [Consulté le : 20 juin 2019].
Development. Dans : Biggs, P. ed. Fast-forward progress Leveraging • The Economist. 2015. Why does Kenya lead the world in mobile money?
tech to achieve the global goals. Genève : Union internationale des [En ligne]. Disponible à : https://www.economist.com/the-economist-ex-
télécommunications, pp.59-63. Disponible à : https://www.itu.int/en/sus- plains/2015/03/02/why-does-kenya-lead-the-world-in-mobile-money
tainable-world/Documents/Fast-forward_progress_report_414709%20 [Consulté le : 21 mai 2019].
FINAL.pdf [Consulté le : 20 juin 2019]. • Yunus, M. 2017. Technology: Unleashing the Power of Technology to
• Becchetti, L. et al. 2015. Human values, civil economy and subjective Liberate All People. Dans : A World of Three Zeroes: the new economics of
well-being. Dans : Helliwell, J. et al. eds. World Happiness Report 2015. zero poverty, zero unemployment, and zero carbon emissions. New York :
New York : Sustainable Development Solutions Network, pp.132-151. PublicAffairs
Disponible à : https://s3.amazonaws.com/happiness-report/2015/
WHR15_Sep15.pdf [Consulté le : 20 juin 2019].
• Ben Ytzhak, L. 2015. La croissance, une affaire d’énergie [En ligne]. Dis-
ponible à : https://lejournal.cnrs.fr/articles/la-croissance-une-affaire-de-
nergie [Consulté le : 4 juin 2016].
• Brundtland, G. 1987. Report of the World Commission on Environment
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Nations unies. Disponible à : http://www.un-documents.net/wced-ocf.htm
[Consulté le 19 juin 2019].
• Bruni, L. et Zamagni, S. 2017. Civil Economy: Another Idea of the Mar-
ket. Newcastle : Agenda Publishing.
• Cingano, F. 2014. Trends in Income Inequality and its Impact on Econo-
mic Growth. Documents de travail de l’OCDE sur les questions sociales,
l’emploi et les migrations 163. Paris : OCDE.
• Cowen, T. 2011. The great stagnation: how America ate all the low-han-
ging fruit of modern history, got sick, and will (eventually) feel better. New
York : Dutton.
• FAO (Organisation des Nations unies pour l’alimentation et l’agricultu-
re). 2018. Tackling poverty and hunger through digital innovation. Rome.
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nève : Union internationale des télécommunications, pp.66-67. Disponible
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progress_report_414709%20FINAL.pdf [Consulté le : 20 juin 2019].
• Harvard University Press. 2016. The Elephant Chart in the EU Room
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• Jackson, T. 2018. The post-growth challenge: Secular stagnation, inequa-

PAGE 17
 3.
education

Ben.Timney - CC BY-NC-ND 2.0

 DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY
CHaPTeR 3: education
Why is it important?
Education is seen as the key to achieving sustainable
development (UN 2016). It enables people to lift themselves
out of poverty, reduce inequalities of all kinds, open their
minds, and live healthier lives. More broadly, education
provides the key skills to be able to develop innovative
solutions to current and future problems (UN 2016).
The percentage of children attending school worldwide has
increased significantly since 2000. The elementary school
enrollment rate was 91% in 2013, and the United Nations'
goal is to reach 100% in 2030. However, it is estimated that
1 in 3 children still leave school without knowing how to
read and perform simple arithmetic operations. This is
especially true in conflict areas and sub-Saharan Africa.
Some groups have more difficult access to education,
particularly women (UN 2016).
The European Union (EU) has defined the eight key
competencies in education (European Parliament and
Council of the European Union 2006 and 2018), one of
which is precisely the digital competence.
However, in the EU, despite an increasingly educated
population, the percentage of young people with low
achievement in reading, math, and science does not seem
to be decreasing since 2000 (Eurostat 2018, p.86).
Is digital technology meaningful for school
education?
Digital devices, ranging from interactive whiteboards
to computers and student tablets, are increasingly
present in classrooms. They may become ubiqui-
tous in the future. It is therefore important to verify
whether they bring any real benefit to teaching.
First, it should be made clear that there is current-
ly no single answer to this question. However, it
seems that digital technology has not yet been able
to fulfill its promises in this area. The OECD (2015a;
2015b) studied in detail the link between the use of
digital technology in education and certain skills
of 15-year-old students in the 2012 PISA test. The
results were that moderate use of digital technolo-
gy, particularly for work at home or Internet use at
school, is beneficial when not exceeding a few hours
per month, a threshold beyond which students' skills
would deteriorate.
First, it is important to remember that these findings
do not necessarily reflect a causal link between pro-
longed use of digital technology in education and a
decline in pupils' skills. However, a number of such
hypotheses have been put forward. These include
the fact that a child's brain develops less when too
much digital technology is used. Instead of thinking
for themselves, children would become passive di-
gital users (Spitzer 2012). Digital technology as
* Word or acronym defined at the end of the document
and
SOCIOECONOMIC ISSUES
RELATED GOAL OF THE UN AGENDA 2030
FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT:
it is currently used could also reduce the ability to
concentrate (Spitzer 2012).
Andreas Schleicher (2015, p.2), Director of the
OECD's Education and Skills Directorate, proposes
to explain these findings by the reduction - due to
the extensive use of digital technology - of intense
interactions between teachers and students, a va-
luable human activity necessary for the development
of conceptual understanding and deep reflection.
In general, unthoughtful use of digital technology
tends to diminish the manual and sensory social in-
teractions that are nonetheless essential in a child's
education (Castaignède 2018).
The first concrete findings on the link between the
use of digital technologies globally, and thus prima-
rily outside of school, and the decline in children's
cognitive development are also available. Thus, on
average, each additional hour spent in front of a
screen at age 2 would cause a 0.7 point decrease
in IQ at age 3. Similarly, each additional hour at age
3 would lead to a 0.5-point decrease in IQ at age 5
(Ramus 2019). To our knowledge, there is no such
serious study of older children yet. Knowing that the
average IQ is around 100 and that high potentials
are above 130, the difference in digital use would not
be negligible.
Based on this evidence, some defend the idea that
digital devices should not be used in school before
age 15 (Bihouix and Mauvilly 2016, p.215). The de-
trimental effects of digital technology on health and
well-being, particularly the risks of addiction and
reduced sleep, are cited as additional reasons why
school may become a place of disconnection, espe-
cially when we consider the increasing use of digital
technology outside of school walls (see Chapter 2
for more explanation on this topic). Some parents
active in Silicon Valley, the temple of digital par ex-
cellence, have adopted this way of thinking and sent
their children to Steiner-Waldorf network schools, in
which digital technology is prohibited until the age
of 14. (Castaignède 2018, 36:25 à 39:12).
So, no digital technology at school?
Although there are reasons to question their effec-
tiveness, also considering the risks in using them in
schools, digital technologies are important in seve-
ral cases.
First, digital technologies appear to be highly effec-
PAGE 19
 3. education
tive in improving the education of people with disa-
bilities or learning disabilities (Amadieu and Tricot
2014; Stanberry and Raskind 2009). However, to
date, few tools have been put in place for these indi-
viduals (Amadieu et Tricot 2014, p.68).
Second, digital education devices for distance lear-
ning are very useful when quality education is not
available. For example, in Bangladesh, the JAAGO
foundation allows students in remote areas of the
country, where there are few qualified teachers, to
take free online courses taught by teachers living in
the capital city (Bolkova and Lake 2017). This type
of education is on the rise and can become crucial
to educate in poor areas and for marginalized popu-
lations.
Finally, just because digital technology has so far
failed to considerably improve the education system
does not mean that it will not do so in the future.
Adapting teaching to the new digital tools will take
time. New technologies must be used where they
can truly bring a plus, without replacing the human
being (Taddei 2018; Castaignède 2018). Moreover,
their use should aim to improve pedagogical content
and not be an end in itself (Bihouix and Mauvilly
2016). Teachers must also be well prepared for the
use of digital technology in the classroom. The Eu-
ropean Union has also established a framework to
develop the digital skills of adult educators, Dig-
CompEdu (Redecker et Punie 2017).
Put your tablet away
or I confiscate it
Singaporean school, one of the best in the world,
uses digital sparingly (Castaignède 2018).
© Screenshot - Arte : Demain L’école- Les innovations dans le monde 2018
On the other hand, digital technologies are promising
in terms of personalizing instruction to each student
- a factor considered very important for quality edu-
cation (Robinson 2018) - and making children and
adolescents make meaning in their learning (Taddei
2018). The California-based AltSchool, founded by
a former Google executive, attempts to provide an
education tailored to each student through cut-
ting-edge digital technologies (Castaignède 2018,
40:15 - 45:12). The results do not yet seem to live up
to expectations, but this type of initiative advances
thinking. Furthermore, advances in neuroscience,
aided by digital technology, will surely improve edu-
cation, with or without digital technology, in the de-
cades to come. (Dworczak 2015).
PAGE 20
More digital technology in school and less
outside?
Thus, an alternative position to that set out at the
end of the previous section might be this: since it ap-
pears that digital technology slows down the cogni-
tive development of children and perhaps even ado-
lescents, it would be crucial to reduce its use outside
the school sphere. At the same time, its use by the
school education system might increase. Indeed,
schools might be able to use digital services in ways
that promote student learning and development,
based on scientific and pedagogical knowledge. We
could then find ourselves in another world, where the
disconnection of pupils would take place outside the
school framework, digital technologies being very
present within the school walls.
Preparing students for tomorrow’s world
Regardless of what the use of digital in education is,
there is a need to provide digital education. Indeed,
given its ubiquity, young people find themselves ex-
posed to it. They must therefore be helped to learn
how to make the best use of new digital devices,
while avoiding "misuse." Note that much of the di-
gital education in school can be done without digital
devices (Bihouix et Mauvilly 2016, pp.216-218).
In general, we are moving toward an uncertain wor-
ld, primarily for two reasons. First, digital technolo-
gy, and especially artificial intelligence, will gradual-
ly replace some tasks currently performed entirely
by humans (see Chapter 3). Some tasks learned in
school will become obsolete while others, still uni-
maginable today, will become essential. Second,
environmental, social, and health crises will likely
cause radical transformations in human societies,
and major new crises (Servigne and Stevens 2015).
Who can imagine the world in 10, 20, or 50 years?
Thus, one must educate young people to live in an
uncertain world in which crises may follow one ano-
ther.
To achieve this goal, it seems essential to teach po-
lyvalence by following a multidisciplinary approach.
Indeed, machines are already undoubtedly replacing
humans in many specialized tasks, but the same ma-
chine is still far from being able to perform different
tasks simultaneously and/or consecutively (Chama-
raux 2019). Therefore, teaching values such as crea-
tivity, resilience, autonomy, benevolence, coopera-
tive spirit, or even empathy would give young people
the foundation to develop innovative solutions to
future problems (Dion et al. Laurent 2015; Castai-
gnède 2018; Chamaraux 2019; Taddei 2015). In fact,
at least for the moment, machines perform poorly in
these task areas (Bernstein and Raman 2015).
Finally, because an infinite amount of information
is now available almost instantaneously, students
must develop skills and attitudes of analysis rather
than capitalizing on knowledge. In a sense, then,
we must learn to learn (Chamaraux 2019), without
forgetting some essential skills (Morin 1999). The
Finnish public education system promotes these
different values by providing a type of education that
allows students to perform very well on PISA tests
(in mathematics, language and writing, science...) in
the face of a very limited number of class hours per
day (Castagnède 2018). It would therefore seem ap-
propriate to move in this direction.
Teaching subjects related to digital technologies seems
essential as more and more jobs will be related to the di-
gital economy. However, these subjects are not always ap-
preciated by students and do not always provide the skills
required at the end of their apprenticeship. The STEAM
(science, technology, engineering, arts and mathematics)
pedagogy attempts to remedy this problem by making the
learning of these subjects more creative and transversal by
giving them the dual role of trait-d'union, connecting ele-
ment, between the sciences and the arts and, at the same
time, a new language. Several examples of the practical ap-
plication of this pedagogy are available on the EuroSTEAM
website (2019).
In short.
• The application of new digital technologies has
not yet led to the desired results in schools. Pe-
dagogy could, however, benefit from the contri-
bution of digital tools if they are used in a way
that truly improves pupils' abilities.
• Digital technology can especially improve the
education of people with disabilities and lear-
ning difficulties, as well as those living in disad-
vantaged regions.
• The world of tomorrow is very uncertain, espe-
cially because of artificial intelligence: public
education systems must prepare for this.
Related classroom resources
Educational Pathway n. 5 : How can we act?
• Activity N. 3 "Acting at school..."
Training Modules:
3 (U.A. 3.5. and 3.6.)
Bibliography
• Amadieu, F. et Tricot, A. 2014. Apprendre avec le numérique. Mythes et
réalités. Retz.
• Bernstein, A. et Raman, A. 2015. The Great Decoupling: An Interview
with Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee. Harvard Business Review.
https://hbr.org/2015/06/the-great-decoupling [Accessed May 7,o 2019].
• Bihouix, P. et Mauvilly, K. 2016. Le désastre de l’école numérique : plai-
doyer pour une école sans écrans. Paris : Seuil.
• Bolkova, I. et Lake, A. 2017. Quality education. In: Biggs, P. ed. Fast-
forward progress Leveraging tech to achieve the global goals. Genève:
ITU, pp.32-39. https://www.itu.int/en/sustainable-world/ Documents/
Fast-forward_progress_report_414709%20FINAL.pdf [Accessed April 25,
2019].
• Castaignède, F. 2018. Demain, l’école. Un tour du monde des meilleures
pratiques pédagogiques. Paris : Arte France.
• Chamaraux, F. 2019. Un monde modelé par les IA : nouveaux enjeux
pour l’enseignement ? Éduquer 144, pp.20-23. https:// ligue-enseigne-
ment.be/un-monde-modele-par-les-ia-nouveaux-enjeux- pour-lenseigne-
ment/ [Accessed April 25, 2019].
• Dion, C. et Laurent, M. 2015. Demain. France : Movemovie, 103:15 à
113:10.
• Dworczak, F. 2015. Comment les neurosciences peuvent améliorer l’édu-
cation. The Conversation. https://theconversation. com/comment-les-neu-
rosciences-peuvent-ameliorer-leducation-49400 [Accessed May 27, 2019].
• Eurostat. 2018. Sustainable development in the European Union: Mo-
nitoring report on progress towards the SDGs in an EU context. Luxem-
bourg. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/docu- ments/3217494/9237449/
KS-01-18-656-EN-N.pdf/2b2a096b-3bd6-4939- 8ef3-11cfc14b9329
[Accessed April 24, 2019].
• EuroSTEAM. 2019. EuroSTEAM project overview. http://www.euros-
teamproject.eu/project.html [Accessed June 17 2019].
• OECD. 2015a. Connectés pour apprendre ? Les élèves et les nouvelles
technologies : Principaux résultats. Paris. http://www. oecd.org/fr/educa-
tion/scolaire/Connectes-pour-apprendre-les-ele-
• ves-et-les-nouvelles-technologies-principaux-resultats.pdf [Accessed
April 24, 2019].
• OECD. 2015b. Students, computers and learning : making the connec-
tion. Paris. https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/education/students-compu-
ters-and-learning_9789264239555-en#page1 [Accessed June 17, 2019].
• UN. 2016. Éducation de qualité : pourquoi est-ce important ? https://
www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/fr/wp- content/uploads/
sites/4/2016/10/Why_it_matters_Goal_4_French.pdf [Accessed April 24,
2019].
• Recommendation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18
December 2006 on key competences for lifelong learning (2006/962/CE).
Brussels. Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ES/TXT/?u-
ri=CELEX%3A32006H0962 [Accessed April 24, 2019].
• Council Recommendation of 22 May 2018 on key competences for
lifelong learning (text with EEA relevance): https://eur-lex.europa.
eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32018H0604%2801%29&q
id=1629200686335
• Ramus, F. 2019. Les écrans ont-ils un effet causal sur le développement
cognitif des enfants?
• Redecker, C. et Punie, Y. 2017. European Framework for the Digital Com-
petence of Educators: DigCompEdu. Luxembourg : JRC Science Hub, CE.
https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/digcompedu [Accessed April 25, 2019].
• Robinson, K. 2018. Dans : Castaignède, F. Demain, l’école. Un tour du
monde des meilleures pratiques pédagogiques. Paris : Arte France, 34:52
-36:07 ; 39:31-40:35.
• Schleicher, A. 2015. Avant-propos. Dans : OECD. Connectés pour ap-
prendre ? Les élèves et les nouvelles technologies : Principaux résultats.
Paris.
• Servigne, P. et Stevens, R. 2015. Comment tout peut s’effondrer : petit
manuel de collapsologie à l’usage des générations présentes. Paris : Seuil.
• Stanberry, K. et Raskind, M. 2009. Assistive Technology for Kids with
Learning Disabilities: An Overview. http://www. readingrockets.org/
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April 26, 2019].
• Spitzer, M. 2012. Digitale Demenz. Wie wir uns und unsere Kinder um
den Verstand bringen. Munich : Droemer Knaur.
• Taddei, F. 2015. In: Poulain, H. et al. 2015. 2 degrés avant la fin du
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[Accessed April 25, 2019].
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des meilleures pratiques pédagogiques. Paris : Arte France, 50:49 -51:39.
PAGE 21
 4.
innovation

© Laurent Neyssensas - CC-BY 2.0

 DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY and
SOCIOECONOMIC ISSUES

RELATED GOAL OF THE UN AGENDA 2030

FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT:

CHaPTeR 4: innovation
Why is it important?
An innovation is a new or improved product or process
that differs significantly from previously available versions
(OECD 2018, p.20). Innovations are essential because they
allow, among other things, to respond to the problems of
today's and tomorrow's society (UN 2016). Innovation also
generates new jobs (OECD 2018) and is therefore important
to enable social security and social protection systems,
based on labor income, to be sustainable. Innovation is Mozilla1, Wikipédia2 and Linux3, three galaxies of innovation, the first
a very fashionable topic and one of the priorities of the and the second free © CC BY-Wikimedia Foundation e lewing3
European Union (European Commission 2019). @isc.tamu.edu Larry Ewing and The GIMP

In this chapter, we will attempt to answer the fol-
lowing question: does digital technology foster in-
novation?
Advantages offered by digital technology
Digital technology offers immense possibilities for
innovation. Digital devices, such as computer pro-
grams of all kinds, drones, robots or even 3D prin-
ters, are innovations that open up new possibilities
for innovation. In 2017, one-third of new patent ap-
plications in the European Union related to IT (EPO
2019). The innovation provided by digital technolo-
gy is useful not only in business, but, for example,
also in the social and civic dimensions. Innovation is
fostered if the tools used are accessible and provi-
de individuals with a greater capacity for autonomy
(Zoellick and Bisht 2018). So-called "free" software
and services meet these conditions because they
can be modified and used without paying royalties
(Lessig 2004; Zoellick and Bisht 2018). Iconic exa-
mples include the Mozilla Firefox search engine, the
free encyclopedia Wikipedia, and the Linux operating
system. Social innovations induced by digital tech-
nology that aim to meet the social needs of the po-
pulation also fall into this category (Millard and Car-
penter 2014). Many examples are cited in this guide.
Many digital tools, such as the Internet and social
networks, are also accessible to all, though free only
in appearance.
They, in fact, allow people to be creative, for example
on YouTube. However, it should be kept in mind that
these tools are controlled by large companies that
use each user's personal data to influence how they
interact with the platform, making profits by selling
the data to marketing firms. As the saying goes, "If
it's free, then you're the product."
Disadvantages of digital technology
Lack of accessibility
First, innovation is not accessible to everyone.
Beyond the obvious limitations that exist for people
who do not have access to basic services such as
housing or electricity, several other conditions must
be met in order to innovate using digital technolo-
gies. First, a great deal of computer knowledge and
skills are usually required that are not easily learned
and/or accessed by everyone. Second, it is essen-
tial to have both physical and financial knowledge
of the digital technologies needed to launch an in-
novative project. Some digital components are quite
accessible, this is the case of the Internet and social
networks, although only 51.2% of the world's po-
pulation used the Internet at the end of 2018 (ITU *
2019). Others are very expensive and, therefore, not
very accessible. In short, although digital technology
enables innovation, only a small number of people
are in a position to use them to innovate. This is one
of the reasons why a few (large) digital companies
grab a very large share of the innovation in this area
(Allen 2017).
© Boegh-CC BY-SA 2.0

* Word or acronym defined at the end of the document PAGE 23

 4. innovation
Innovation for innovation’s sake
Next, it is important to ask whether current innova-
tion, whether in the digital field or elsewhere, is hel-
ping society move forward, finding solutions to the
challenges of today and tomorrow. It seems that our
societies are in a race to innovate (Sibley 2014), so
much so that "innovation for innovation's sake" is
now commonplace (IHEST 2014). This is partly ex-
plained by the fact that companies, which are taking
an increasingly important role in innovation (Euros-
tat 2018, p. 170), innovate with the goal of making
a profit (Schumpeter 1934) before trying to help
society move forward (IHEST 2014). It is also very
interesting to note that even though the majority of
current innovations are the work of the private sec-
tor, the investment capital is often public, especially
if it has required high-risk investments.
Most of the technological advances of the past
few decades - to name a few, the Internet, GPS,
touchscreens, or even voice control applications
such as Siri - have been funded by governments
(Mazzucato 2014). Democratic institutions also
have an essential role to play in counterbalancing
corporate mercantile interests, with the goal of de-
fending and developing the common good. Innova-
tion is therefore not, and should not be, the exclusive
domain of businesses, and also involve universities,
through research and start-ups, and civil society and
social bodies through bottom-up multi-partnership
projects (Mazzucato 2018).
Creativity
Finally, to be creative, which is a necessary condition
for innovation (Amabile and Pratt 2016), one must
take the time to think, to explore an idea, to imagine
(Cole 2018). However, the daily use of digital tech-
nology does not facilitate these tasks. In fact, we
are constantly flooded with a mass of information
that we do not really take the time to analyze before
moving on to the next (Lehrer 2010). Therefore, it is
likely that, in the end, digital technology will reduce
the creativity.
In short.
• On the one hand, digital technology represents
much of the global innovation. Some digital
tools, such as the Internet, social networks, and
free software, allow for the proliferation of crea-
tive ideas and innovations.
• On the other hand, digital innovation is far from
being accessible to everyone and does not
always seem truly useful to society.
• And the use of digital technology may even
prevent everyone's creative sense from expres-
sing itself…
PAGE 24
Related classroom resources
Educational Pathway n. 3 : “What does digital tech-
nology bring to my life, to our lives?”
• Activity N. 1 "Digital technology, a short history?"
Educational Pathway n. 4 : What Rebound Effects?
• •Activity N. 1 "Everyday rebound effects?"
Educational Pathway n. 6 : A future with or without
digital technology?
• Activity N. 1 "Controversial futures?"
• Activity N. 2 "A letter to the future"
Training Modules:
1 (U.A. (1.6.), 2 (U.A. 2.1.), 4 (U.A. 4.1. and 4.2.), 6
(U.A. 6.1., 6.2., 6.3.)
Bibliography
• Allen, J. 2017. Technology and Inequality: Concentrated Wealth in a
• Digital World. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
• Amabile, T. et Pratt, M. 2016. The dynamic componential model of crea-
tivity and innovation in organizations: Making progress, making meaning.
Research in Organizational Behavior 36, pp.157-183.
• Cole, N. 2018. How Technology Is Both Maximizing and Destroying Pro-
ductivity and Creative Thinking. https://me- dium.com/@nicolascole77/
how-technology-is-both-maximizing-and-des- troying-productivity-and-
creative-thinking-281a9747fc77 [Accessed May 10, 2019].
• EC. 2019. Research and Innovation funding 2014-2020 https://ec.euro-
pa.eu/research/fp7/index_en.cfm [Accessed May 27, 2019].
• EPO (European Patent Office). 2019. Information and Communi- cations
Technology patents at the EPO https:// www.epo.org/news-issues/issues/
ict/about-ict.html [Accessed May 7, 2019].
• Eurostat. 2018. Sustainable development in the European Union: Mo-
nitoring report on progress towards the SDGs in an EU context. Luxem-
bourg. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/docu- ments/3217494/9237449/
KS-01-18-656-EN-N.pdf/2b2a096b-3bd6-4939- 8ef3-11cfc14b9329
[Consultato il 10 maggio 2019].
• IHEST (Institut des Hautes Etudes pour la Science et la Technologie).
2014. Quelle est la perception sociale de l’innovation? https://www.ihest.
fr/la-mediatheque/dossiers-123/innova- tion-reperes/quelle-est-la-per-
ception-sociale [Accessed May 13, 2019].
• Hurwitz, L. et Schmitt, K. 2020. Can children benefit from early internet
exposure? Short- and long-term links between internet use, digital skill,
and academic performance. Computers & Education 146.
• Lehrer, J. 2010. Our Cluttered Minds. New York Times. https://www.
nytimes.com/2010/06/06/books/review/Lehrer-t. html [Accessed May 13,
2019].
• Lessig, L. 2004. The Creative Commons. Montana Law Review 65(1),
pp. 1-13. https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/cgi/viewcontent. cgi?ar-
ticle=2304&context=mlr [Accessed May 10, 2019].
• Malamud, O. et al. 2019. Do children benefit from internet access?
Experimental evidence from Peru. Journal of Development Economics 138,
pp.41-56
• Mazzucato, M. 2014. The Entrepreneurial State: Debunking Public vs.
Private Sector Myths. Londres et New York : Anthem Press.
• Mazzucato, M. 2014. Mission oriented innovation policies: Challen-
ges and opportunities. https://www.researchgate.net/publica-
tion/329760183_Mission-oriented_innovation_policies_Challenges_and_
opportunities
• Millard, J. et Carpenter, G. 2014. Digital technology in social innovation:
a synopsis. TEPSIE. http://www.transitsocialinnovation. eu/content/
original/Book%20covers/Local%20PDFs/124%20TEPSIE%20 synopsis%20
digital%20technology%20in%20SI.pdf [Accessed May 7, 2019].
• OECD. 2018. Oslo Manual 2018: Guidelines for Collecting, Reporting and
Using Data on Innovation. 4th edition. Paris.
• UN. 2016. Industrie, innovation et infrastructures : pourquoi est-ce im-
portant ? https://www.un.org/sustainable- development/fr/wp-content/
uploads/sites/4/2016/10/Why_it_matters_ Goal_9_French.pdf [Accessed
May 3, 2019].
• Sibley, A. 2014. Il faut freiner la course à l’innovation. https://www.
lemonde.fr/idees/article/2014/02/17/il-faut-freiner- la-course-a-l-innova-
tion_4367851_3232.html [Accessed May 13, 2019].
• Schumpeter, J. 1934. The theory of economic development: an inquiry
into profits, capital, credit, interest, and the business cycle. New Jersey:
Transaction Books. Tradotto da Redvers, O. from the original version
dated 1911, Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung.
• ITU. 2019. Statistics. https://www.itu.int/en/ ITU-D/Statistics/Pages/
stat/default.aspx [Accessed May 10, 2019]
• Zoellick, J. et Bisht, A. 2018. It’s not (all) about efficiency: Powering and
organizing technology from a degrowth perspective. Journal of Cleaner
Production 197, pp.1787-1799
 PoVeRTy aND
5. iNeQuaLiTieS
DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY and
CHaPTeR 5: PoVeRTy aND iNeQuaLiTieS
Why is it important?
These two issues, poverty and inequality, are intimately
linked because poverty is often the result of inequalities,
whether economic or based on gender, age, disability,
sexual orientation, cultural-ethnicity, social class, ethnic
origin, or religion.
First and foremost, poverty and gross inequality pose an
ethical question: how can we be satisfied with a world in
which some people live in abundance while others cannot
live a decent life? This is why poverty undermines self-
reliance, causes exclusion (RTS 2018), hunger, health
problems, and even environmental degradation (UN 2016).
Poverty and large inequalities also cause social tensions,
which can sometimes lead to migration and war (UN 2016).
In 2015, about 10% of the world's population was
considered "extremely poor" because they lived on an
average of less than $1.90 per day (UN 2016). This rate
has decreased, halving since 2000. This is related to
the fact that income inequality between countries has
decreased dramatically since 1990 (Bourguignon 2016). In
the European Union, although extreme poverty is not very
present, poverty does exist. For example, in 2016, 8.7% of
the European population was unable to heat their homes
sufficiently, while 1.9% did not have sufficient facilities
to wash themselves (Eurostat 2018, p.35). In addition,
approximately 410,000 people sleep on European streets
every night (Home EU 2016).
Unlike income inequality across countries, income
inequality within countries continues to increase
(Bourguignon 2016). Between 1980 and 2017, in European
countries, the wealthier sections of the population
"pocketed" most of the growth, leaving only minority shares
for the middle classes and poorer social groups (Blanchet
et al. 2019, pp. .29-36). Similarly, since 1980, economic
inequality has risen sharply (Piketty 2013), leading to an
increase in large fortunes. Thus, in 2018, 26 people owned
as much wealth as half of humanity (Oxfam 2019). This
increase in inequality within countries is often interpreted
as a consequence of economic reforms over the past 40
years (Piketty 2013).
First, digitization will bring significant changes to
the workplace (see Chapters 1 and 2 for details) and
these will inevitably impact inequality and poverty.
Potential for improvement
Digital technologies can provide new solutions to
combat poverty and inequality. They can help pro-
vide health care in hard-to-reach areas (see Chapter
7), enable the education of disadvantaged people
(see Chapter 3), enable the economic inclusion of
people in poor countries (see Chapter 2), or promote
the consideration of the views of marginalized indi-
viduals in policy decisions (see Chapter 9). There are
other examples of digital applications that enable
poverty and inequality reduction.
PAGE 26
SOCIOECONOMIC ISSUES
RELATED GOAL OF THE UN AGENDA 2030
FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT:
Helping the poor
There are a large number of digital initiatives aimed
at helping people in need.
The Homeless Plus mobile app allows, with the
consent of homeless people, to refer to them on the
app and indicate some details about their situation
and needs (Schlienger et al. 2016). The app is par-
ticularly useful for organizations that help homeless
people, as this makes it easier for them to find them
and provide them with the most appropriate assis-
tance (Homeless Plus 2017).
Khabrona.info is a website and Facebook page that
provides Syrian refugees in camps in Jordan with
reliable and trustworthy information about the ad-
ministrative and legal aspects of their refugee sta-
tus (Prichard 2018). Therefore, Khabrona.info offers
valuable assistance to these people as they arrive
in a country they are unfamiliar with. This initiative
has proven particularly useful for women (EQUALS
2018).
Digital technology can also be of great help in crisis
situations. Artificial intelligence* (AI) stood out, for
example, during the outbreak caused by the Ebo-
la virus. One such system, which analyzed large
amounts of data from social networks, blogs, or go-
vernment sites, was able to predict the start of the
epidemic before it was declared (Sciences et Future
2014). Another AI has analyzed population move-
ments with the goal of predicting the spread of the
epidemic (Wall 2014). These two digital applications
can therefore make it possible to prevent the onset
and spread of epidemics, and to preventively install
health centers at the points of greatest affluence
and/or junction.
Improving social protection systems
Social protection systems are recognized as a consi-
derable lever to reduce poverty and inequality (FAO
2018). Digital technology makes these systems more
efficient, less expensive, more accessible and of bet-
ter quality (FAO 2018, p.17). Many initiatives have
already been activated and have borne fruit. (Com-
missione Europea 2013; Misuraca et al. 2017).
Digital technology does not solve problems
in itself
On closer inspection, digital technology often repro-
duces the inequalities present in the rest of society.
In some cases, it may even accentuate them, cer-
* Word or acronym defined at the end of the document
tainly not reduce them. judges to keep African American inmates who were
unlikely to reoffend in favor of "white" inmates with
personal histories indicating high rates of recidivism
Inequalities of access
(Angwin et al. 2016; Villani et al. 2018). COMPAS
The most disadvantaged people are often those thus perpetuated the racism that exists in U.S. so-
who have the least access to the potential offered ciety.
by digital technologies. First, they have less access
to it. For example, in 2018, while 80.9% of the po-
pulation in northern countries used the Internet, this
rate was only 45.3% in southern countries and 19.5%
in less developed countries (ITU * 2019a). Thus, in
terms of economic inequality, Hilbert (2014) showed
that prior to 2010, access to digital technology was
more unequal than the income inequalities present
globally. However, the trend seems to reverse after
2010.
In addition, there are 200 million fewer women online
The applications of the Artificial Intelligence (AI, AI) reproduce the
(Gettu 2017). In both Southern and Northern coun- social discriminations of the past.
tries, a person with a disability (Scholz et al. 2017), © Nadir Burney - CC BY-NC-ND 2.0 - Flirck
living in rural areas (ITU 2019b), or from a disadvan-
taged ethnic background (File 2013) will be less li-
kely to have access to digital. Other examples of AI bias have already been iden-
tified and may multiply in the future given the in-
Second, even when access to digitally connected
creasingly important place of algorithms* in our
devices is guaranteed, inequalities persist. For exa-
societies. It is important to remember, however, that
mple, the most active people in digital initiatives
research is currently underway to develop tech-
that promote citizen participation are men, college
niques to reduce AI bias (Friedler et al. 2018). This
graduates, and affluent people (World Bank 2016,
work is very complicated, however, because today it
p.16). Similarly, a study of 1,100 Dutch people found
is nearly impossible to understand the internal logic
that the most educated and wealthiest people de-
of these machines - see the black box phenomenon
rive the greatest economic and social benefits from
explained in Chapter 7.
the Internet. In contrast, people with disabilities, the
elderly, and the unemployed benefit the least (Van
Deursen and Helsper 2015).
Catalyst of economic inequalities
Over the past 40 years, the rich, and especially the
very rich, have increased their wealth by far more
than the rest of the population (Piketty 2013). It
Bias of the Artificial Intelligence (AI)*
seems that the reforms of the world economy du-
Artificial intelligence can perpetuate the inequalities ring this period were not the only reasons for this
that are already present in our societies. In fact, they increase in inequality: the advent of digital techno-
usually base their results on data that may itself be logies would also have played an important role in
discriminatory. For example, when an artificial in- this regard.
telligence application bases its results on a huge
First, because digital technology enables items and
amount of text from the Internet, it will associate
services to be available anywhere in the world, it of-
men more with work and math and women more
ten causes a few "superstars" to take over the majo-
with family and the arts (Caliskan et al. 2017). In this
rity of market share. For example, digital allows
case, we say that the AI has implemented bias (sys-
shoppers around the world to compare all the televi-
tematic distortion of a database due to an under-
sions available on the market, and they will focus on
lying assumption flawed by social or cultural errors
a few models and become bestsellers worldwide.
and/or biases, and/or faulty data processing).
There you have it, the so-called "superstar effect"
Therefore, when an AI is put in a decision-making (Brynjolfsson et al. 2010). Moreover, digital techno-
position and bases its results on discriminatory logy, e.g. through automation*, enables companies
data, it risks perpetuating these inequalities and to produce goods and services at a lower cost than
causing discrimination. Concrete examples have before (Rifkin 2014; Allen 2017). Putting these two
already been observed. The most egregious of these phenomena together, we understand that digital
involves the U.S. Justice's use of the COMPAS AI to technologies have enabled the emergence of a few
assess a prisoner's risk of recidivism. Apparently, extremely wealthy and powerful companies, and
COMPAS, which bases its results on past data that thus entrepreneurs and managers who are wealthier
generally discriminates against African Americans, than ever before. These phenomena are particularly
tends to overestimate an African American's present in the digital sector, and explain why only a
chances of recidivism compared to a non-African few companies, the GAFAMs (Google, Apple, Face-
American. As a result, the machine prompted some book, Amazon, Microsoft) in the lead, dominate

PAGE 27
 5. PoVeRTy aND iNeQuaLiTieS
these sectors and are extremely powerful (Allen
2017).
...In the meantime… Tax havens have never been in crisis…
© CND-CC BY 2.0
Second, multinationals in the digital economy are
very effective at avoiding taxes. On the borderline
between illegality and illegitimacy, they general-
ly pay less tax than companies in other industries
(Kim 2015; European Commission 2017; Griffith et
al. 2014). Most U.S. corporations, for example, have
moved to Dublin to pay much less tax on European
soil (Art 2019). Establishing tax headquarters in Du-
blin is sometimes just a facade to send money to tax
havens and still be taxed less, see the example of
Google explained in Feuerstein (2016).
Therefore, digital companies participate little in the
redistribution of wealth between rich and poor, thus
leading to the reinforcement of global inequalities.
Third, over the past 40 years the world economy has
become increasingly based on capital and financial
assets rather than labor and production. This is re-
ferred to as the "financialization of the economy"
(Allen 2017). This phenomenon is critical in allowing
shareholders to recoup a greater share of corporate
profits in the form of dividends. Digital technolo-
gy has participated in the rise of this financializa-
tion (Allen 2017; Ryder, p.56), particularly through
high-frequency trading (Lazonick 2013), allowing
the wealth of the world's leading investors and
already highly affluent individuals to increase even
further.
In short.
• Some digital tools have been created and can
be used to help poor and disadvantaged people.
• However, upon closer examination, digital tech-
nology perpetuates inequality.
◊ Disadvantaged people have less access to di-
gital devices, as well as the potential offered
by new technologies.
◊ Artificial intelligences can reproduce inequa-
lities and discrimination present in society by
operating with Bias.
PAGE 28
◊ The advent of digital technology goes hand
in hand with the increase in wealth inequality
over.
Related classroom resources
Educational Pathway n. 1 : “What would sustainable
technology mean?”
• • Activity N. 2 "What are the SDGs?"
Educational Pathway n. 3 : “What does digital tech-
nology bring to my life, to our lives?”
• Activity N. 4 "The Philosophical debate".
• Activity N. 3 "Acting like a seller!"
• Activity 5 "I put myself in the place of...".
Training Modules:
1 (U.A. (1.6.), 2 (U.A. 2.1.), 4 (U.A. 4.1. and 4.2.), 6
(U.A. 6.1., 6.2., 6.3.)
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PAGE 29
 HuNGeR aND
6. aGRiCuLTuRe

© AMISOM Public Information-CC0 1.0

 DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY
CHaPTeR 6: HuNGeR aND aGRiCuLTuRe
Why is it important?
According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of
the United Nations (FAO), about 1 in 9 people still suffer
from malnutrition worldwide (FAO 2018a). They are mainly
found in southern countries, especially in Africa and Asia.
In Europe, although the problems are less important, a part
of the population is worried about not being able to eat
their fill all year round. This phenomenon is strongly linked
to economic poverty (Wilde 2011), which was 17.6% in the
European Union in 2016 (Eurostat 2018, p.31). On the other
hand, the number of people suffering from overweight and
obesity is strongly and continuously increasing worldwide
(WHO 2019).
Undernutrition and malnutrition-the latter of which can
involve both malnutrition and overweight and obesity-are
highly detrimental to health. They can cause hypertension,
type II diabetes, cardiovascular disease, depression,
cancer, and overall poor health (Vozoris et al. 2003;
WHO 2018). Malnutrition in children also causes growth
retardation, slowing mental development and increasing
the risk of disease in the future (WHO 2014).
While the problems of world hunger are not yet solved,
two additional challenges will complicate the situation
in the future. First, the world's population is expected
to continue to grow throughout the century (UN 2017).
Second, environmental degradation and climate change,
by increasing the number of extreme weather events such
as droughts and storms, will reduce global agricultural
productivity (FAO 2016; FAO 2018a).
Agricultural transformation
Digital technologies in agriculture are grouped un-
der the name "smart farming". They can take many
forms, of which we will give some examples.
«BoniRob», example of autonomous terrestrial robot developed by
Amazonen © Sven Kleinewoerdemann, Amazone GmbH & Co. KG
* Word or acronym defined at the end of the document
and
SOCIOECONOMIC ISSUES
RELATED GOAL OF THE UN AGENDA 2030
FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT:
In Francia, l’IRSTEA (Istituto di ricerca in Scienze e
Tecnologie per l’Ambiente e l’Agricoltura) ha svilup-
pato un robot che, dotato di sensori e telecamera,
passa tra i filari dei campi di barbabietole, rileva le
piante malate e le polverizza (France 2 2019). Per-
tanto, vengono utilizzati meno In France, IRSTEA
(Research Institute in Sciences and Technologies
for the Environment and Agriculture) has developed
a robot that, equipped with sensors and a camera,
passes between the rows of beet fields, detects di-
seased plants and pulverizes them (France 2 2019).
Therefore, less pesticides are used than traditional
spreading over the entire field and no more people
are needed to carry out the spreading activity. The-
refore, beet production is less expensive if the cost
of the robot is not taken into account. Finally, beets
could be cheaper for consumers and more health
and environmentally friendly. This type of futuristic
agricultural robot is called Agribot.
There is also a computer program* that takes into
account a large number of factors that influence
productivity and then determines, thanks in particu-
lar to big data* and artificial intelligence*, the opti-
mal way to manage crops and livestock at any given
time. Such software provides, for example, advice on
when, how much and where to plant, when to use
water, fertilizers and pesticides, etc. Such software
already exists and can take into account soil type,
salinity, slope, irrigation techniques used, financial
costs, and weather conditions (rain, temperature,
radiation).
Therefore, this type of software allows for more to
be produced at a lower cost while reducing the im-
pact of agriculture on the environment (La Première
2018). If digital is able to reduce environmental de-
gradation through these types of initiatives, then it
will also help reduce the supposed decrease in agri-
cultural productivity. The digitization of agriculture
seems to limit agricultural environmental impacts
by emitting fewer greenhouse gases (Balafoutis
et al., 2017) and moderating the use of products
that are not naturally present in different territories
(Busse et al., 2017) al., 2015). However, it should
not be forgotten that digital objects themselves in-
fluence global consumption and have an ecological
footprint. These topics are discussed in more detail
in the second environmental section of the booklet
(chapters 10-13).
It is difficult to quantify the true benefits of smart
farming technologies. A study by the innovation re-
search organization Nesta attempted to calculate
the reduction in operating costs that using five digi-
PAGE 31
 6. HuNGeR aND aGRiCuLTuRe
tal technologies could bring to a medium-sized En-
glish farm in mixed operations (growing wheat with
grazing livestock). The result is a cost reduction of
18% (Norris and Bland 2015). As for farm yield, a
study by the American Farm Bureau, which surveyed
American farmers, suggests a 13% increase (Digital
Wallonia 2017).
Another example, the mobile app "Nuru," allows
people to detect the presence of harmful caterpil-
lars in corn fields directly through their smartphones
(FAO 2018c). Several of these digital tools have been
developed by the FAO and are available for free (FAO
2018b).
In addition to agriculture, the "Too good to go" mo-
bile app contributes in its own way to reducing world
hunger. It allows consumers to connect with mer-
chants who have unsold food. The principle is to pay
a low price to receive a box full of unsold food pro-
ducts. This initiative can reduce the amount of was-
ted food, which amounts to 15% at the level of sel-
lers and consumers in northern countries (FAO
2019).
Facilitation of the sale from producer to consumer.
© Agri.durable - Flirck
Is digital technology useful to reduce hunger
in the world?
Smart agriculture technologies are primarily used to
increase agricultural productivity. However, while all
of this is necessary due to the increasing world po-
pulation, it does not appear that lack of productivity
is the cause of undernutrition at this time.
Root causes
First, humanity produces more than enough to
feed everyone. In fact, the food available for global
consumption is 20% more than human needs (FAO
2018d). This figure has continued to rise over the
past fifty years, as Olivier De Schutter (2014), for-
mer Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food at the
United Nations Human Rights Council, explains.
This excess food is either thrown away or used to
overfeed some people, causing overweight and obe-
sity. So, first of all, there is a poor distribution of food
in the world.
PAGE 32
Surplus production = 20 %
Total world food
requirements
Total world food
production
The current production exceeds the needs of the Humanity
Données FAO (2018d)
In addition, 60% of the undernourished are the food
producers themselves (De Schutter 2009). These
people, often living in rural settings, cannot afford to
integrate into global markets - because they are too
far away from them and/or they do not have enough
money to travel there - and must make do with their
own production. Thus, one of the causes of under-
nutrition is that these people are left behind by the
global agricultural system, which in the past has
primarily benefited multinational agribusinesses
and the wealthiest groups in society rather than the
most vulnerable individuals (De Shutter 2009; 2014).
Another reason why global hunger continues to exist
is related to livestock farming. In fact, the latter uses
69% of the available land in the world, while food
from livestock only accounts for 15% of the calories
produced in the world and 25% of the protein (FAO
2012). Therefore, reducing the consumption of these
products would allow to recover space for other
crops, which would significantly increase the world
production using the same space. A number of sce-
narios have been foreshadowed to feed the world's
population in 2050 while reducing the environmental
impact of agriculture (Muller et al.2017).
Scenario 2050 :
Organic 9 billion people
Agriculture fed
+ +
Meat consumption Greenhouse gas
Waste Pollution
Infographic based on the scenario forecast by Muller et al. (2017)
So, the problem is not so much the lack of agri-
cultural productivity, but rather the misallocation
of foodstuffs and the abandonment of land by the
poorest and most marginalized populations, mostly
farmers. This problem was highlighted and theorized
by Amartya Sen (1981), who studied several famines
in India during the 20th century. The Nobel laureate
in economics noted that the poor distribution of food
was generally not due to a lack of food compared to
previous years, but to social and economic causes,
such as falling wages or rising food prices.
Could digital technology help to solve these
problems?
To remedy these problems, Amartya Sen (1981) re-
commends empowering farmers and consumers.
One way to do this is to build a social protection
system. Several studies (FAO 2015; Richards et al.
2016) show that establishing an effective social pro-
tection system can, in most cases, reduce malnutri-
tion. These results are easily understood because if
those most in need receive structural help, they will
have the means to purchase food or produce it.
In general, digital technology provides a range of
tools that can be used for different purposes: for
example, to improve social protection systems, to
reduce poverty (see Chapter 5), or to enable small-
scale farmers to thrive (FAO 2018b). However, new
technologies can also further reduce the autonomy
of farmers and consumers, neglecting the most di-
sadvantaged.
In fact, for example: what can a farmer do if the
technology company decides to increase the price
of the digital service subscription? How can a poor
farmer, with no access to electricity, not connec-
ted to the Internet, or insufficiently trained, be able
to compete with the prices charged by large farms
using agribots and other smart farming tools? What
will they be able to do if the maintenance of a digi-
tal tool, such as an agribot, can only be done by the
manufacturing company? And what will farmers and
consumers be able to do if, thanks to their digital
data collection tools, the manufacturing company
can calculate a farm's production in advance, and
use that information for its own sales interests?
Such problems of loss of range have already occur-
red. For example, the John Deere company requires
an exclusive maintenance contract for its linked
combines sold in the United States. In addition, U.S.
farmers have complained that their know-how, col-
lected in the form of data, was being resold to com-
petitors (Canal + 2017).
Therefore, digital can do the trick, depending on how
it is used. However, at the moment, it does not ap-
pear that the majority use of digital technology in
agriculture is going in the direction recommended
in this chapter. In fact, most of the digital tech-
nologies applied to the agricultural sector-and in
other sectors-are developed by large private com-
panies, which, oriented towards profit rather than
the common good, have no interest in transferring
some of their decision-making power to producers
and consumers. Therefore, if this situation does not
change, it will be difficult to argue that digital tech-
nologies have or will have a real positive impact in
helping to eradicate world hunger. To make up for
the lack of autonomy, agricultural practices related
to agroecology and permaculture have developed
in recent decades, as well as different movements
such as Slow Food, for food sovereignty or the right
to food. They also emphasize respect for the envi-
ronment and health.
Slow Food is a movement launched in Italy in 1989 that
encourages agriculture based on both innovative methods
and traditional knowledge to create and promote food pro-
duction that is respectful of ecosystems, good for health,
tasty, and fair to small and medium-sized producers. This
movement is present in 160 countries and brings together
academics, chefs, producers, and artisans (Slow Food 2019).
Agroecology is a set of agricultural processes aimed at
creating self-sustaining ecosystems by combining different
natural elements. It is considered extremely promising envi-
ronmentally and socially, as well as for its excellent agricul-
tural yields (De Schutter 2011). Aquaponics is an example of
an agroecological process that combines fish farming and
plant cultivation on the same farm. This technique, already
used by the Aztecs, produced a self-sustaining system: in
short, fish water irrigates plants, soil bacteria turn fish
droppings into plant food, and fish feed on small roots or
insect larvae. Sensors can be used to maintain the fragile
balance within the system (Southern and King 2017). On
the other hand, does the addition of digital technologies
not hinder farmer autonomy, going in the opposite direc-
tion of Amartya Sen's recommendations?
In short.
• Digital technology has the potential to increase
agricultural production, reduce production
costs, and limit environmental impact-although
the ecological footprint of the technology itself
must be carefully calculated rather than neglec-
ted (see Part II).
• However, world hunger is not the result of a lack
of productivity, but rather of poor food distribu-
tion, neglect of the most deprived, and a lack of
appreciation for the importance of consumption
choices.
• In order to alleviate world hunger, a radical trans-
formation of the global agricultural system is
recommended, shifting decision-making power
from large-scale producers to small-scale far-
mers and consumers in order to increase their
autonomy. In recent years, several agricultural
movements and practices have developed in
this direction.
• Digital technology can increase the autonomy
of farmers and consumers, but currently it does
not seem to be used primarily for this purpose.
PAGE 33
 6. HuNGeR aND aGRiCuLTuRe

int/gho/ncd/risk_factors/overweight/en/ [Accessed March 5, 2019].

Related classroom resources • Richards, C. et al. 2016. Food security in welfare capitalism: Comparing
social entitlements to food in Australia and Norway. Journal of Rural
Studies 43, pp.61-70.
Educational Pathway n. 3 : “What does digital tech- • Sen, A. 1981. Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Depri
nology bring to my life, to our lives?” vation. Oxford, New York: Clarendon Press, Oxford University Press.
• Slow Food. 2019. About us [In Internet]. https://www. slowfood.com/
• Activity 5 "I put myself in the place of...". about-us/ [Accessed June 21st, 2019].
• Southern, A et King, W. 2017. The Aquaponic Farmer: A Complete Guide
to Building and Operating a Commercial Aquaponic System. Canada : New
Society Publishers.
• Vozoris, N. et al. 2003. Household Food Insufficiency Is Associated with
Training Modules: Poorer Health. The Journal of Nutrition 133(1), pp.120-127.
• Wilde, P. 2011. Food Security Policy in Developed Countries. In: Jason, L.
5 (U.A. 5.1.), 6 (U.A. 6.4.). et al. eds. The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Food Consumption
and Policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.321-343.

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[Accessed February 28, 2019].
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culture-de-demain?id=10019182.
• Muller, A. et al. 2017. Strategies for feeding the world more sustainably
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PAGE 34
 7.
WeLL-BeiNG
HeaLTH aND

© Philips Communications-CC BY-NC-ND 2.0

 DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY
CHaPTeR 7: HeaLTH aND WeLL-BeiNG
Why is it important?
According to the Constitution of the World Health
Organization WHO* (1946), health is "a state of complete
physical, mental and social well-being, and does not
consist merely of the absence of disease or infirmity (WHO
1946). Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights states that "everyone has the right to a standard of
living adequate for his health and well-being and for that
of his family" (UN 1948). Significant progress has been
made in all regions of the world, as evidenced by growth in
life expectancy and healthy life expectancy (Roser 2019).
However, there is still work to be done. For example, 6
million children still die before their fifth birthday each year
(UN 2016).
Worldwide, there are many causes of disease: malnutrition,
obesity, smoking, poor hygiene, alcohol consumption, lack
of physical activity and, in the case of countries in the
global North, population aging (OECD/European Union
2016). In addition to these, environmental factors, mainly
air and water pollution, are believed to cause a quarter of
premature deaths on Earth (United Nations Environment
Programme 2019).
Inequalities in health care are still strong. Thus, the gap in
life expectancy between high- and low-income countries
was still 17.5 years in 2016 (World Bank 2019). At the
same time, there are inequalities within countries. In the
European Union, the risks of having unmet health needs
are 4.5 times higher for low-income people than for high-
income people (Eurostat 2018).
Finally, enjoying good health is not enough to live a quality
and happy life, or to achieve inner contentment. Striving
toward societies with a high level of well-being must be a
goal because it is a sine qua non for human development,
and thus for sustainable development (Helliwell et al.
2015). It is difficult to define what wellbeing really is.
There are different approaches, some based more on self-
assessment of one's well-being and happiness, taking into
account individuals' perceptions, emotions and opinions
about the meaning of their lives (eudemonia) considered
indicators of individuals' well-being -- this is referred to
as subjective well-being, while others are based on factual
characteristics -- environmental, medical/physiological,
etc. that determine the context in which people live -- this
is referred to as objective well-being (OECD 2016, Morrison
2019).
Enabling access to health services in remote
areas
First and foremost, digital technology allows access
to healthcare without being in physical contact with a
physician. This is especially relevant when specialists
are not available, such as in remote areas, countries
in the global south, or in the event of an emergency or
disaster. The transportation of medical kits via drone*
is one example (McCall 2019). Digital technology also
enables remote medicine, for example via telephone
or video conferencing. In this case, it is referred to as
telemedicine. Since 96% of the world's population has
access to mobile and 90% to 3G (ITU 2018), telemedi-
PAGE 36
and
SOCIOECONOMIC ISSUES
RELATED GOAL OF THE UN AGENDA 2030
FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT:
cine is seen by both academics (Bell et al. 2017) and
institutions (Chan and IAEA 2016) as a substantial aid
in providing quality health care to all. It also proved
very useful during the Covid-19 outbreak, particularly
in reducing the risk of infection (Calton 2020). Howe-
ver, it is worth asking whether it is normal that, in some
regions, the share of the population with access to cell
phones is greater than the share with access to clean
water and electricity (WHO 2017, p.2). Aren't the posi-
tive impacts that these two resources have on health
and well-being greater than those of digital devices?
Example of drone for medical transportation services.©
Public Domain - Pxhere
Transforming the medical science: the
Artificial Intelligence (AI) case
Digital technologies have applications in many
health-related fields. These include prostheses pro-
duced by 3D printers* (Birrell 2017), robots* assisting
the elderly (Barruyer 2017), and/or those used in sur-
gery (Piesing 2014). In this chapter, we will focus on the
arrival of artificial intelligence* (AI) in medicine.
AI, from its dazzling development in recent years, is ex-
pected to have a major impact on two areas of medi-
cine: diagnosis and medical decision making.
Automated diagnoses
Image, text, and sound recognition systems are increa-
singly sophisticated and can sometimes outperform
humans (He et al. 2015; Wu et al. 2016). Such systems
can be used to determine whether or not a person
has a disease. AIs are starting to get results. In fact,
in 2017, a scientific study pitted a Google AI against
a panel of dermatologists to determine whether a skin
cancer was malignant or, conversely, harmless. In that
case, the AI performed better than the dermatologists
(Esteva et al. 2017). This study caused a stir because it
was the first time it was possible to scientifically prove
that AIs could be better than doctors in their own field.
Other studies have shown promising results of ap-
plying AIs in other fields, such as for diagnosis in ra-
* Word or acronym defined at the end of the document

diology (Salathé et al. 2018) and psychiatry (Corcoran
et al. 2018).
Medical decision
Nowadays, AIs are performant enough to be able to de-
tect the information contained in a text, which may
seem obvious to a human, but much less so to a ma-
chine. Armed with this faculty, as well as their compu-
tational and memory powers, AIs are able to store far
more information than any human in any domain.
Based on this observation, the company IBM launched
the program "Watson Health" based on artificial intelli-
gence "Watson". Engineers have placed in the memory
of this AI a huge amount of health-related resources:
scientific publications, clinical trials, drug leaflets, pa-
tient data directly or indirectly related to health, etc.
Watson Health therefore "knows", a priori, much more
information than any doctor and can therefore help
him/her decide on the optimal treatment for each pa-
tient (Chenavaz et al. 2018). The system is actually not
yet fully developed (Strickland 2019). In any case,
"doped" by the arrival of the immense amount of data
collected on our bodies by the connected objects of the
" quantified self " (Béjean et al. 2015), AIs should be
able to prove their usefulness in this domain in a few
years or decades. This technology will prove beneficial
to society if it can overcome several major challenges
and risks, such as the ability to structure billions of
data from various sources, store them, protect them,
etc. Several of these are explored later in this chapter.
A very early prototype of Watson in Yorktown Heights, NY.
The cognitive computing system was originally of the size of
a room in 2011.
© BY-SA 3.0 - Clockready
The « quantified self » is the use in our daily lives of
connected objects to collect data about our body (heart rate,
temperature, amount of oxygen in the blood), our activities
(number of steps, diet, sleep duration) or our mood (brain
activity, facial expressions). The companies producing the mo-
bile devices and data analytics claim as their goal to improve
our physical, cognitive and emotional performance or even
prevent or monitor disease progression. Using a mobile app
such as Apple Health Kit or Withings, this data is transmitted
to the user, usually interpreted by the app. The patient-user
can, of course, show the data to their physician (Béjean et
al. 2015; Wilson 2012). It remains to be seen whether and
how much the quantified self has real utility for the patient's
health and well-being. Currently, there is a lack of studies on
this topic, although early findings on the impact on health and
well-being seem to be quite positive (Stiglbauer et al. 2019). In
addition, there are questions to be asked about the challenges
and risks associated with their use. For example, one should
ask whether these technologies do not encourage a lifelong
search for optimal performance, thus raising philosophical and
health issues. Therefore, caution regarding the contribution of
this technology is in order.
A ring connected to an application (App) to monitor vital signs
© Marco Verch-CC-BY 2.0
A good potential
It is clear that the arrival of AI in medicine could im-
prove both the physician's diagnosis and decision
making on what treatment to prescribe to patients. AI
therefore has the potential to save a large number of
lives. Some people, some of whom are at the top of the
digital world, even work to improve humans by adding
technological objects (Statt 2017), or dream of ensu-
ring immortality through technology (Alexandre 2013;
Lecomte 2013). These people are part of the transhu-
manist movement: transhumanism itself brings with it
a number of questions and risks (de Malherbe 2017).
Moreover, these technologies are quite accessible to
those who are able to connect to the Internet. Google's
image recognition system could be usable directly
from smartphones, and for Watson Health one enters
via an Internet platform. Of course, the cost associated
with their use remains to be analyzed.
Connected risks
• Private life
It has been shown that an AI is more efficient the more
and better data it processes (Salathé et al. 2018). The-
refore, in order to improve AIs active in medicine, they
should have access to as much health and personal
patient data as possible. However, this is extremely
sensitive data that no one would want to be used
for non-legitimate purposes or to fall into the wrong
hands, for example through hacking.
In Europe, the General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR 2016/679), which came into force in 2018,
prohibits the collection, storage, use or even trans-
mission of personal data that identifies individuals
without their informed and explicit consent. However,
research is one of the exceptions to this rule, and public
and private research organizations active in AI, inclu-
ding large digital companies, may have access to our
PAGE 37
 7. HeaLTH aND WeLL-BeiNG
personal data. However, the data used must be ano-
nymized. In concrete terms, this means deleting data
that can identify the individual. However, in reality, it is
almost impossible to ensure anonymity without remo-
ving much of the information from the database (de
Montjoye 2018), which in itself could have been useful
for AI in medicine.
In addition, it is difficult to create a line between perso-
nal data and impersonal data. For example, the number
of steps taken each day by an individual is not neces-
sarily data that identifies someone, and therefore would
not be subject to the prohibitions of the GDPR. This in-
formation could be passed on a priori to insurers, who
could then adjust their insurance offers based on your
physical activity. This practice is illegal in the European
Union, but difficult to control. Some other data not ne-
cessarily considered personal could influence whether
you get a loan, housing, or employment (Villani et al.
2018, pp. 148-149).
A dilemma emerges: on the one hand, AIs need data to
be successful; on the other hand, the risks of using or
disclosing our data cannot be excluded.
• Black box
It is important to know that today the best AIs are
those with the most complicated internal mechanisms
(Kulma 2017). In general. it is not possible, even for
the best specialists, to understand how AIs achieved
their results. These machines are called "black boxes."
Many problems arise from this very characteristic of
them, especially in medicine. How can we trust them
if we cannot understand how they come to certain
conclusions (INSERM 2018)? It is not impossible that
the results obtained by the machine are totally wrong
and that these errors are passed on to the patients.
Moreover, it will not even be possible for a human to
understand why the machine made these errors, and
therefore will not be able to modify it accordingly (Price
2015; Villani et al. 2018).
The "black box" nature of AI is not a priori inevitable,
and researchers are working to reduce this phenome-
non (Kulma 2017).
• Accessibility
While applications of AI in medicine might be physi-
cally accessible, as explained above, they will not ne-
cessarily be affordable. Philosopher Eric Sadin (2018,
min. 62-70) worries that large digital companies may
bundle their healthcare services into one package for
a fee and in the form of a subscription. However, it is
too early to draw conclusions, as these digital services
could be made affordable if reimbursed by Social Se-
curity or health insurance.
PAGE 38
• The place of the human being
Physician or machines? A society choice.
© Björn Engqvist-CC BY-NC-ND 2.0
The rise of AI in medicine raises the question of the
role of humans in the medicine of the future. On the
one hand, if machines were shown to be better than
humans in this field, it would be difficult to defend
ourselves from continuing to leave decisions about
our health in the hands of doctors. On the other hand,
wouldn't we want the human being, so "fallible," to
maintain centrality in all decisions about medicine and
health (Villani 2018, p.152)? A real social debate opens
up. Among other questions to be answered: what will
be the freedom of choice for the patient and the doc-
tor? Who will be responsible for the decision in case of
failure or error?
Impacts of every day’s use digital devices
Digital technologies of all kinds have entered our lives
and thus impact our health and well-being.
• Advantages, but...
The daily use of digital technology has some health
and wellness benefits. Being able to communicate re-
motely with loved ones is certainly one of the greatest
benefits, as family and friend contact is an important
factor in a happy (Veenhoven 2012) and healthy life
(House et al. 1988). Social networks connect people
and groups with the same interests. Digital technology
can also allow people to avoid activities that are consi-
dered strenuous or unexciting. For example, it is no
longer necessary to buy groceries; just order them on
the Internet and have them delivered. In general, tech-
nological tools increase the comfort of life.
However, upon closer inspection, we need to question
the real contribution of digital to our lives. Many inno-
vations, digital and otherwise, actually do little for our
well-being; in fact, they are gimmicks. These tools and
services are generally developed to meet the econo-
mic needs of businesses rather than to actually im-
prove people's quality of life - see Chapter 4. Moreo-
ver, following Tim Jackson's (2017) reasoning, once
basic needs are met, an increase in material comfort
increases well-being less and less.
 NEGATIVE GLOBAL EFFECT POSITIVE GLOBAL EFFECT

A pursuit of consumption will

Welfare

participate less and less in a

rise in well-being.

The consumption of basic

necessities makes it possible to
meet basic needs, and thus greatly
increases well-being.

Consumption
Graph illustrating the principle of diminishing marginal utility of
well-being.
Inspired by Tim Jackson's study "Prosperity Without Growth: the funda-
mentals of tomorrow's economy (2011 - 2017)."
• Risks for health and well-being
Although digital technology is likely to increase our
well-being, it also has negative effects. For example,
facilitating the remote performance of many actions of
daily living reduces individuals' physical activity, thus
contributing to obesity and diabetes. The use of these
devices also reduces time spent in nature, an aspect
that has positive effects on mental health and well-
being (White et al. 2019; IEEP and FoE Europe 2017).
Digital technology is also partly responsible for cur-
rent environmental problems (see Part II), which in turn
cause health problems. In general, digital technologies
tend to push individuals towards more consumption in
today's society (see Chapter 11 for more explanations),
they thus participate in a certain way in the construc-
tion of a "having" society rather than a society based
on human relationships that are a source of well-being
(Becchetti et al. 2015, pp. 141-143; Bartolini 2013;
Veenhoven 2012). Is this the advent of the "homo œco-
nomicus", a self-centered economic man, quite indivi-
dualistic or even selfish?
Staring at digital screens also causes visual fatigue,
damages the eyes, originates stress, increases the risk
of myopia, and reduces sleep by disrupting the internal
clock (INRS 2017; INSERM 2017; Bihouix and Mauvilly
2016, Chapter 4; Carter et al. 2016; Gujar et al. 2011).
The use of digital technology is also changing the way
the brain is used, altering those of children, which can
lead to cases of dementia (Ryall 2013; Spitzer 2012).
On the other hand, although digital technologies pro-
mise an easier and more efficient life, they amplify the
acceleration of life rhythms: thus, we are constantly in
a hurry, while simultaneously perceiving that we have
less and less time than before (Wajcman 2015).
Health and well-being effects found in 2017 by the Royal
Society for Public Health, British public health research
association with a survey of 1,500 British young people aged
14-24 years.
The impacts of social media are also contradictory. The
Royal Society for Public Health (2017), a British public
health research association, surveyed a large number
of British youth ages 14-24 and asked them to rate the
effects of the five most popular social networks (Face-
book, Snapchat, YouTube, Twitter, and Instagram) on
characteristics that have known effects, both positive
and negative, on health and well-being. The study
found that only YouTube had an overall positive effect
on these young people, while Snapchat and Instagram
appeared to be particularly harmful.
In addition, these social networks increase the risks of
anxiety, depression, loneliness, reduce sleep, alter self-
image, cause harassment or even fear of exclusion. As
a result, some studies associate this type of Internet
use with reduced well-being in adolescents (Twenge et
al. 2017).
• Health effects of electromagnetic waves
An antenna relay.
© Tony Webster - CC-BY-2.0
The health impact of electromagnetic waves emitted
by cell phones, radios, Wi-Fi, 3G, and others is get-
ting a lot of attention from the general public and the
media. To help us see this more clearly, there is a vast
scientific literature that has been built up over the past
four decades. More than 25,000 scientific articles have
been published and, as pointed out by the WHO (2020),
knowledge in this area is now more extensive than for
most chemicals.
Regarding short-term effects of exposure to electro-
magnetic waves, such as nausea and headaches, no

PAGE 39
 7. HeaLTH aND WeLL-BeiNG
results have been able to demonstrate harmful effects.
Other studies (WHO 2005; Rubin et al. 2006; Kurzge-
sagt 2019; Eltiti et al. 2018) have shown, however, that
people who claim to be "hypersensitive" to electro-
magnetic waves experience symptoms that are not re-
lated to wave exposure, but to other factors. The WHO
(2005; 2020) as well as other health reference organi-
zations (Vijayalaxmi and Scarfi 2014), are quite cate-
gorical about this aspect.
Regarding the long-term effects of electromagnetic
wave exposure, some studies have found that they in-
crease the risks of some cancers (Nyberg and Hardell
2017; Ayrapetyan et al. 2015). However, these studies
need to consolidate their analysis methodology. Fur-
thermore, they represent only a small percentage of
studies on the topic to state that there would be si-
gnificant effects (Kurzgesagt 2019). The WHO (2005;
2014) has repeatedly stated that there is no evidence
of long-term effects.
However, the precautionary principle, enshrined in
the UN since the 1992 Rio de Janeiro Conference on
Environment and Development, insta to maintain vi-
gilance and caution, as there are still gray areas (UN
1992; WHO 2020; Vijayalaxmi and Scarfi 2014). It is for
this reason, for example, that WHO continues to clas-
sify electromagnetic waves as potentially carcinoge-
nic. Second, the previous conclusions apply in cases
where wave exposure is below a certain defined level.
However, it is possible that the arrival of 5G will cause
this threshold to be exceeded in some places (Nyberg
and Hardell 2017). Third, it is possible that children are
more sensitive to these waves, although these findings
are not yet established (Vijayalaxmi and Scarfi 2014).
In addition, court decisions have been seen in recent
years as evidence of wave-related health problems
(The Express 2019).
On this issue, there is a troubling perception gap
between the general public and the scientific commu-
nity (Vijayalaxmi and Scarfi 2014), the number of legal
cases on this topic shows that the issue is socially
acute.
• Surutilisation et dépendance
The risk of developing an addiction is real.
© Public Domain- CC-0
Tous ces problèmes sont exacerbés par le temps très
important passé sur les appareils numériques - environ
PAGE 40
4 heures par jour en France (eMarketer 2016) et en Italie
(Parsi et Campanella 2017), 6 heures aux États-Unis (eMar-
keter 2018), soit plus de la moitié du temps passé sur
un écran chaque jour. Cela s’expliquerait en partie par
des phénomènes de dépendance au numérique. Ainsi,
l’OMS a reconnu le "trouble du jeu vidéo" comme une
maladie (Pontes et al. 2019). De même, une étude néerlan-
daise a montré que 5% des adolescent·e·s souffrent
d’addiction aux réseaux sociaux (Jenner 2015) – même
si d’autres parlent juste d’utilisation excessive. Le
monde académique est encore quelque peu incertain
sur la nature addictive des jeux vidéo (Aarseth et al. 2017),
mais les doutes sont de moins en moins permis. Les
algorithmes* de suggestions de vidéos ou films, qui in-
citent les utilisateurs/trices à rester le plus longtemps
possible sur des plateformes comme YouTube ou Net-
flix, ne vont pas dans la bonne direction parce qu’ils
conduisent à un visionnage boulimique, aussi appelé «
binge-watching » (ICA 2015).
En conclusion, étant donné que le numérique dans son
usage quotidien peut aider ou être un frein au bien-être,
il convient de réfléchir à comment et en quelle propor-
tion l’utiliser pour en retirer du positif et ainsi l'utiliser
de manière optimale. Il ne faut en tout cas certaine-
ment pas utiliser ces appareils sans se soucier de leurs
impacts sur la santé et le bien-être.
Pour terminer, le numérique peut impacter la santé et le
bien-être de nombreuses autres façons. Par exemple,
les conditions de travail associées à la fabrication et à
la fin de vie des appareils numériques portent atteinte
à la santé de nombreuses personnes - cf. Chapitres 1
et 11 pour plus de détails.
In short.
• Digital technology has the potential to make
healthcare more accessible, especially in remote
areas.
• Digital technology is and will continue to improve
medicine, particularly through artificial intelli-
gence and its applications in medical diagnosis
and decision-making.
• The arrival of artificial intelligence in medicine
carries many risks.
◊ First, AIs are "black boxes" of which it is almost
impossible to understand how they arrived at
their results. So, it is very difficult to trust them.
◊ Second, the risk of our personal data being
used or disclosed is real.
◊ Third, these advances may not be financially
accessible to everyone.
◊ Last, humans may "lose control" in medicine to
machines.
• The everyday services offered by digital devices
often increase comfort but not necessarily well-
being.
Related classroom resources
Educational Pathway n. 3 : “What does digital tech-
nology bring to my life, to our lives?”
• Activity N. 4 "The Philosophical debate".
• Activity 4 "The Philosophical debate".
• Activity 5 "I put myself in the place of...".
Training Modules:
3 (U.A. 3.1., 3.2., 3.3., 3.4., 3.5., 3.6.), 5 (U.A. 5.1.), 6
(U.A. 6.4.).
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• Jenner, F. 2015. At least 5 % of young people suffer symptoms of social media
addiction [In Internet].
• Kulma, K. 2017. Interpretable Machine Learning Using LIME Framework [In
Internet].
• Lecomte, E. 2013. Avec Calico, Google s’attaque à l’immortalité [In Internet].
• McCall, B. 2019. Sub-Saharan Africa leads the way in medical drones. The
Lancet 393(10166), pp.17-18.
•
• Morrison, P.S. 2019. Subjective and Objective well-being. Victoria University of
Wellington in Il Mulino riviste web, online a: https://www.wgtn.ac.nz/__data/
assets/pdf_file/0005/1797035/morrison-subjective-and-objective-wellbeing.
pdf
• Nyberg, R. et Hardell, L. 2017. Scientists warn of potential serious health
effects of 5G [In Internet].
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• Cycle. Paris.
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 7. HeaLTH aND WeLL-BeiNG

• WHO (World Health Organization). 1946. Constitution [In Internet].

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ponent/9789264307278-9-en
• WHO (World Health Organization). 2014. Electromagnetic fields and public
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gap between human and machine translation. arXiv:1609.08144.

PAGE 42
 8. Gender
equality
© Robert Scoble - CC BY 2.0
 DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY
CHaPTeR 8: Gender equality
Why is it important?
First and foremost, gender equality is a fundamental right.
Different forms of discrimination and violence against
women and girls must be eradicated. Reducing gender
inequality means building a more peaceful, less unequal,
more prosperous, and healthier society (UN 2016).
Progress has been made in recent years. Girls' access to
education continues to increase around the world, and
some forms of violence against women are on the decline
(UN 2016). However, there are still many problems. For
example, according to the United Nations (2016), only 52%
of married and cohabiting women freely make decisions
about their sex lives, contraceptive use, and health care.
More than 200 million girls and women still alive have
undergone some form of genital mutilation or ablation
(WHO * 2018). Access to contraception and abortion is
decreasing in some countries in the global north or, at the
very least, has been called into question (Le Monde 2019;
François 2017).
In 2017, in the European Union, a woman still earned, on
average, 16.2% less than a man for every hour worked.
Moreover, compared to men, women still have an incentive
to reduce their working hours to take care of their children
and home (Eurostat 2018, pp. 103-104).
Hopes for the emancipation of women
Much hope for reducing gender inequality lies in di-
gital technology: the UN (2015, p.20) considers it to
be a crucial factor in women's empowerment.
In particular, new technologies can assist quality
education for the most vulnerable social groups, in-
cluding women (see Chapters 1 and 3). Moreover, as
Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka (2017), Executive Direc-
tor of the UN Women Program, explains, the number
of jobs in the digital sector will continue to grow in
the years and decades to come, and if women have
these skills, then they can have access to these often
well-paid and, therefore, empowering professions.
A street demonstration promoted by the #MeToo Movement – March
© Lynn Friedman-CC BY-NC-ND 2.0
PAGE 44
and
SOCIOECONOMIC ISSUES
RELATED GOAL OF THE UN AGENDA 2030
FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT:
In addition, the Internet, Web, and social networks
provide a space of expression for activists and
marginalized groups, including women. Mass cam-
paigns geared toward changing behavior can be
launched. A globally extensive movement, such as
#MeToo, also called #BalanceTonPorc in France, de-
nouncing sexual harassment and violence against
women, could not have emerged without digital me-
dia (Heimans 2019; Jouët et al. 2017)
Digital technologies do not solve
fundamental problems alone
However, upon closer inspection, the same inequa-
lities and discriminations are present in the digital
universe as in the rest of society.
First, women make up the majority workforce in the
electronic manufacturing industry. In these facto-
ries, female workers are often subjected to deplo-
rable working conditions, as well as being exposed
to toxic products that are very dangerous to their
health (Van der Velden 2019) (see Chapter 1).
Female-dominated digital device manufacturing
factory.
© Robert Scoble - CC BY 2.0
In addition, women experience insults and harass-
ment on the web and social networks (Pinto 2017).
The worlds of video games and pornography are
also extremely sexist and often offer a degrading
image of women (Lignon 2015; Sarkeesian 2012;
Poulain et al. 2019).
Finally, women have less access to the potential of-
fered by digital technology than men. In fact, women
worldwide are about 12% less likely to use the web
than men (Mlambo-Ngcuka 2017) and 14% less li-
kely to own a cell phone (Bolkova and Lake 2017).
Second, according to current estimates, women will
be most affected by job losses due to digitization.
Thus, in the United States, for 7 men in jobs at very
high risk of disappearing in the future, 10 women are
in the same situation (Hegewisch et al. 2019). Last-
ly, women are vastly outnumbered within the digital
economy representing just 20% of the workforce,
* Word or acronym defined at the end of the document
even fewer in high-wage positions (André and Bona
2018; Sax et al 2017). One of the main reasons for
this is the presence of gender stereotypes. These
unconsciously lead businesses and women them-
selves to think that these professions are reserved
for men (Mlambo-Ngcuka 2017; Bian et al 2017).
Although their work hasn't always been recognized,
some women have been pioneers and made their mark in
the digital industry.
A computer with the revolutionary Colossus Mark
2 code developed by Dorothy Du Boisson (left) and
Elsie Booker (right), 1943. This device played a
key-role during World War II.
© Public Domain - CC0
In conclusion, it is hard to believe that digital has
the potential to empower women and girls. On the
contrary, it seems that the best way to reduce ine-
quality is to change ways of thinking and behaving...
And these changes can be promoted through digital
networks.
In short.
• Digital technologies are seen by some as vec-
tors for women's empowerment that, as such,
can also help break down prejudices and
change behaviors.
• However, digital technology seems to reflect,
and sometimes even accentuate, gender ste-
reotypes.
Related classroom resources
Educational Pathway n. 3 : “What does digital tech-
nology bring to my life, to our lives?”
• Activity 4 "The Philosophical debate".
• Activity 5 "I put myself in the place of...".
Training Modules: “What does digital technology bring
to my life, to our lives?” (all Learning Units).
Bibliography
• André, C. et Bona, M. 2018. The ICT sector is booming. But are women
missing out? European Data Journalism Network. https://www.european-
datajournalism.eu/eng/News/Data-news/The-ICT- sector-is-booming.-But-
are-women-missing-out [Accessed May 21, 2019].
• Bian, L. et al. 2017. Gender stereotypes about intellectual ability emerge
early and influence children’s interests. Science 355(6323), pp.389-391.
• Bolkova, I. et Lake, A. 2017. Quality education. In: Biggs, P. ed. Fast-
forward progress Leveraging tech to achieve the global goals. Genève
• : Union International des Télécommunications, pp.32-39. https://www.
itu.int/en/sustainable-world/Documents/Fast-forward_pro- gress_re-
port_414709%20FINAL.pdf [Accessed May 22, 2019].
• Eurostat. 2018. Sustainable development in the European Union: Mo-
nitoring report on progress towards the SDGs in an EU context. Luxem-
bourg. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/docu- ments/3217494/9237449/KS-
01-18-656-EN-N.pdf/2b2a096b-3bd6-4939- 8ef3-11cfc14b9329 [Accessed
April 30, 2019].
• François, J. 2017. Avortement, le conseil de l’Europe s’inquiète d’un
recul des droits des femmes. https://www.la-croix.com/ Sciences-et-
ethique/Ethique/Avortement-conseil-lEurope-sinquiete-dun- recul-droits-
femmes-2017-12-05-1200897200 [Accessed June 19, 2019].
• Hegewisch, A. et al. 2019. Women, Automation, and the Future of Work
. Institute for Women’s Policy Research. https:// iwpr.org/publications/wo-
men-automation-future-work-exec-summary/ [Accessed May 2, 2019].
• Heimans, J. 2019. Jeremy Heimans: How Can We Harness Technology To
Fuel Social Change? National Public Radio.
• : https://www.npr.org/2019/04/12/711195968/jeremy-heimans-how-
can-we-harness-technology-to-fuel-social-change?t=1556786728772
[Accessed May 2, 2019].
• Jouët, J. et al. 2017. Faire des vagues : Les mobilisations féministes en
ligne. Réseaux 201(1), pp.21-57. https://www.cairn.info/ revue-reseaux-
2017-1-page-21.htm?contenu=article [Accessed May 2, 2019].
• Lignon, F. 2015. Genre et jeux vidéo. Toulouse : Presses universitaires du
Midi.
• Le Monde. 2019. Avortement : le danger du recul américain. https://
www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2019/05/21/avorte- ment-le-danger-du-
recul-americain_5464908_3232.html [Accessed June 19, 2019].
• Mlambo-Ngcuka, P. 2017. Reshaping the future: Women, Girls, ICTs
and the SDGs. In: Biggs, P. ed. Fast-forward progress Leveraging tech
to achieve the global goals. Geneva: ITU, pp. 40-44. https:// www.
itu.int/en/sustainable-world/Documents/Fast-forward_progress_re-
port_414709%20FINAL.pdf [Accessed May 2, 2019].
• OMS. 2018. Mutilations sexuelles féminines. https://www.who.int/fr/
news-room/fact-sheets/detail/female-geni- tal-mutilation [Accessed May
28, 2019].
• ONU. 2015. Transformer notre monde : le Programme de développe-
ment durable à l’horizon 2030. New York: Assemblé Générale. https://
undocs.org/fr/A/RES/70/1 [Accessed May 2, 2019].
• ONU. 2016. Égalité des sexes : pourquoi est-ce important ? https://
www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/fr/wp- content/uploads/
sites/4/2016/10/Why_it_matters_Goal_5_French.pdf [Accessed April 30,
2019].
• Pinto, S. 2017. What is online violence and abuse against women?
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/cam-paigns/2017/11/what-is-online-
violence-and-abuse-against-women/ [Accessed May 2, 2019].
• Poulain, H. et al. 2019. Datagaule et clitodonnées : le plaisir à la chaîne
#DATAGUEULE 85. https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=CowmAzQo2IE
[Accessed June 19, 2019].
• Sarkeesian, A. 2012. Anita Sarkeesian at TEDxWomen 2012. TEDx Talks.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GZAxws- g9J9Q [Accessed May 2,
2019].
• Sax, L. et al. 2017. Anatomy of an Enduring Gender Gap: The Evolution
of Women’s Participation in Computer Science. The Journal of Higher
Education 88(2), pp.258–293.
• Van der Velden, M. 2019. March 8 – Women’s Health, Decent Work
and the Electronics Industry. SMART (Sustainable Market Actors for
Responsible Trade). https://www.smart.uio.no/blog/march- 8-wo-
men%E2%80%99s-health-decent-work-and-the-elect.html [Accessed
May 2019].
PAGE 45
9. Peace, Justice
and Democracy.

© CC0 Public Domain

 DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY
CHaPTeR 9: Peace, Justice and Democracy.
Why is it important?
Peace, justice, and democracy are sine qua non conditions
for sustainable development (Fedotov and Gettu 2017).
In fact, wars, trafficking, corruption, and all other forms
of violence and injustice are associated with economic,
social, and environmental regressions. Furthermore, as
the UN (2017) explains, "all citizens of the world have the
right to live free from fear of all forms of violence and to
feel safe."
Since the end of World War II, significant progress has been
made in the number of deaths in conflict (Roser 2019).
Likewise, the number of homicides is generally declining
in the European Union (Eurostat 2018, p.299). However, the
situation is again unstable in recent years. The number of
conflicts had never been so high in 25 years while deaths
in hostilities peaked in 2015; the UN Refugee Agency
(2017; 2018) had never recorded so many people forced
to migrate. In addition, the rise of authoritarian figures
in influential nations in Europe and around the world
undermines press freedom (Reporters Without Borders
2018) and justice, such as in Turkey (Renard 2017).
What's more, 123 of the 180 countries assessed by
Transparency International (2018) are believed to have
serious corruption problems. The European Union is no
exception to the lack of transparency, especially in the area
of lobbying within institutions (Mulcahy 2016).
These problems are compounded by the fact that 1.5 billion
people have no way to be identified by a state (Fedotov and
Gettu 2017). These people may therefore be denied access
to basic services such as justice, education, or the right to
vote. They are also exposed to human trafficking (Fedotov
and Gettu 2017).
Digitization can bring real added value but also
brings its share of dangers.
Impact of digital technology on justice and
democracy
Positive inputs
Digital technologies can make institutions more
efficient, more transparent, more participatory, or
even more inclusive (Fedotov and Gettu 2017, pp.
129-130). The example of the Barcelona municipa-
lity is significant. Through the Decidim Barcelona
platform, citizens can propose ideas for the city and
discuss them. Thus, 70% of the city's political agen-
da was decided by 40,000 Barcelonians (Bria 2018,
39:05 to 42:45; Decidim Barcelona 2019).
* Word or acronym defined at the end of the document
and
SOCIOECONOMIC ISSUES
RELATED GOAL OF THE UN AGENDA 2030
FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT:
Presentation of the platform “Decidim Barcelona”
© Ajuntament Barcelona-CC BY-ND 2.0 - Flirck
The blockchain* is a technology with the potential to
dramatically limit corruption in all its forms. It allows
information to be securely stored and transmitted
without having to be certified by a regulatory body.
For example, to prove that you own your home,
you no longer need a government certification, the
blockchain provides this proof directly, and it is
virtually foolproof (Balva 2017; Maitre 2017). So,
no contract, no information, could be manipulated
anymore even if the regulatory body was corrupt.
The application possibilities are limitless, several
examples are cited in Chapron (2017). However,
this technology will not completely remove corrup-
tion and has several problems (Balva 2017, 9:10 to
13:02). Chief among them is the enormous energy
consumption required, which makes blockchain har-
mful to the environment (Digiconomist 2019), espe-
cially if its use becomes widespread (see Chapters
10 and 11).
The Internet makes it easier to report injustice or
violence than before. As an example, Malala You-
safzai, Nobel Peace Prize winner in 2014, was able
to report on the violence perpetrated by the Taliban
in her region of Pakistan through the BBC Urdu blog
(BBC 2009; BBC 2017). In another log, the WikiLeaks
website allows for the anonymous publication of
confidential documents about violence, espionage,
corruption, or even tax evasion (WikiLeaks 2017). It
is therefore a safe space for whistleblowers.
Dangers
Fake news on the Internet has influenced election
results in recent years. Thus, during the campaign
for the referendum on the United Kingdom's exit
from the European Union, false information circu-
lated on social networks and some Internet adverti-
sements that the United Kingdom would pay £350
million each week to the European Union (Reuben
2016; Simon 2016). Three years later, half of Britons
PAGE 47
 9. Peace, Justice and Democracy.
still believe this false information (C à vous 2019).
Thus, while it is impossible to determine whether the
Brexit would have happened without this fake news,
we fully understand the impact it may have had.
Photomontage showing mass control in China.
© CC0 - Public Domain - Montage CND
Digital technology can also be used for mass sur-
veillance to better control people or certain mino-
rities. In China, the Uighur people, who are Turki-
sh-speaking and Islamic, are under constant state
surveillance, including through facial recognition
(Seibt 2017). In addition, the Chinese Communist
Party is considering the establishment of a compre-
hensive social credit system to define "good" and
"bad" citizens (Suquian 2019) (see BOX). There are
also facial recognition identification projects in Eu-
rope, in France in particular (Saviana 2019). Overall,
there are many risks of restrictions on freedoms and
privacy concerns (Cadwalladr and Graham-Harrison
2018).
China's social credit system aims to evaluate each
citizen's actions. Good actions are rewarded with points
added to the total, while bad actions take away points. For
example, not paying bills on time or spreading fake news
are bad actions that lead to a drop in your total score (Ma
2018). Having too few points on your meter can prevent
you from accessing certain services, for example. So despite
the fact that the project is still in the testing phase, millions
of people have already been denied airline tickets or the
ability to enroll their children in the best schools (Ma 2018).
This system is somewhat reminiscent of the Nosedive epi-
sode of the dystopian series Black Mirror (Schur and Jones
2016).
Finally, new digital technologies will undoubtedly
bring about profound changes in law and the exer-
cise of justice. For example, algorithms* could be
used to write law texts or to recommend the number
of years a prisoner can be imprisoned. Such uses
of algorithms are beginning to spread, raising many
questions (Grapon and Lassègue 2018; Piana 2018)
- see Chapter 5.
PAGE 48
Impact of digital technology on peace and
violence
Positive inputs
According to research based on a large sample of
individuals from 57 countries around the world stu-
died between 2004 and 2008, it appears that the
use of the Internet has led to greater openness and
tolerance around the world in the vast majority of
countries studied. The explanation would be that
the Internet allows people to have access to a wide
variety of information and communicate with people
of all types (Weyand 2014, pp. 114-150). However,
this may have changed in recent years due to so-
cial media and recommendation algorithms that
lock people into "their own thought bubble" (Pariser
2011).
Dangers
Digital technology enables the perpetration of va-
rious forms of violence.
First, the manufacture of digital technologies gene-
rally takes place under deplorable working condi-
tions and is sometimes used to enrich dictatorships,
criminal groups, and even to finance wars (see
Chapter 3).
Congolese soldiers in 2001, during the Second Congo War, a conflict
also provoked by the struggle for coltan deposits.
© CC0 - Public Domain - Frank Wolf
Second, it appears that the Internet and social
networks give rise to violent or criminal acts, inclu-
ding cyberstalking (Connected Generations 2019a)
and child pornography (Connected Generations
2019b). They allow an outlet for violence by people
hidden behind their screens. They also allow groups
to purchase weapons, organize criminal actions or
attacks (Bartlett 2014). These activities are usual-
ly organized on the dark web*, which is a set of
networks within the Internet that allows each user to
be anonymous (Stambolijska 2017).
Finally, if nothing is done to prevent it, it will certainly
be possible within a few years to build automated le-
thal weapons, i.e. machines capable of killing without
being controlled by human beings. These weapons
will pose enormous risks to world peace (FLI 2019)
and have prompted the famous physicist Stephen
Hawking to declare that artificial intelligence *could
lead to the end of humanity (Cellan-Jones 2014).

In short.
• Digital technology has the potential to bring
progress for peace, justice, and democracy.
However, it can also be extremely harmful. It
is therefore necessary to reflect and act, both
individually and collectively, to ensure that new
digital technologies are used to achieve peace,
justice, and democracy.
Related classroom resources
Educational Pathway n. 3 : “What does digital tech-
nology bring to my life, to our lives?”
• Activity 4 "The Philosophical debate".
• Activity 5 "I put myself in the place of...".
Educational Pathway n. 6 : A future with or without
digital technology?
• • Activity N. 1 "Controversial futures?"
for NHS? BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/
• uk-politics-eu-referendum-36040060 [Accessed April 8, 2019].
• Roser, M. 2019. War and Peace. OurWorldInData. https://ourworldinda-
ta.org/war-and-peace [Accessed April 3, 2019].
• Saviana, A. 2019. Lancement de la reconnaissance faciale en France :
mais qu'allons-nous faire dans cette galère ? Marianne. www.marianne.
net/societe/lancement-de-la-reconnaissance- faciale-en-france-mais-qu-
allons-nous-faire-dans-cette-galere [Accessed January 9, 2020].
• Simon, D. 2016. Le Royaume Uni paye-t-il 350 millions de livres chaque
semaine à Bruxelles ? France Inter. https://www. franceinter.fr/emissions/
le-vrai-faux-de-l-europe/le-vrai-faux-de-l-europe- 24-juin-2016 [Accessed
April 8, 2019].
• Schur, M. et Jones, R. 2016. Nosedive. In: Brooker, C. Black Mirror. Los
Gatos : Netflix.
• Seibt, S. 2017. Comment Pékin organise la surveillance
2.0 des Ouïghours . France 24. https://www.france24. com/
fr/20190218-chine-ouighour-surveillance-xinjiang-reconnais- sance-fa-
ciale-qr-code-musulman [Accessed April 19, 2019].
• Suquian, J. 2019. China’s “social credit” scheme involves cajolery
and sanctions. The Economist. https://www.econo- mist.com/chi-
na/2019/03/28/chinas-social-credit-scheme-involves-cajole- ry-and-sanc-
tions [Accessed April 15, 2019].
• Stamboliyska, R. 2017. La face cachée d'internet. Paris : Larousse.
• Transparency International. 2018. Corruption perception index 2018.
https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018 [Accessed April 3, 2019].
• Weyand, C. 2014. Can the Internet Empower People? Empirical Studies
on Transparency, Accountability, and Open-Mindedness. Tesi di dottorato,
Université de Cologne. https://kups.ub.uni-koeln. de/5616/1/Diss.pdf
[Accessed April 8, 2019].
• WikiLeaks. 2017. WikiLeaks Ten Year Anniversary: https://wikileaks.
org/10years/ [Accessed April 8, 2019].

Training Modules:
1 (1.5.), 5 (U.A. 5.1.), 6 (6.1., 6.2., 6.3.).

Bibliography
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• Cellan-Jones, R. 2014. Stephen Hawking warns artificial intelligence
could end mankind https://www.bbc.com/news/ technology-30290540
[Accessed April 7, 2019].
• Chapron, G. 2017. The environment needs cryptogovernance. Nature
545(7655), pp. 403-405. https://www.nature.com/polo- poly_fs/1.22023!/
menu/main/topColumns/topLeftColumn/pdf/545403a. pdf [Accessed
April 8, 2019].
• Decidim Barcelona. 2019. Preguntas frecuentes https://www.decidim.
barcelona/pages/more-information?locale=es
• UN. 2017. Paix, justice et institutions efficaces : pourquoi sont-elles
importantes ? https://www.un.org/sustainable- development/fr/wp-
content/uploads/sites/4/2017/01/Why-it-matters- Goal-16_FR.pdf
[Accessed April 9, 2019].
• Pariser, E. 2011. The Filter Bubble: What the Internet Is Hiding from You.
New York : Penguin Press.
• Piana, D. 2018. Predicting justice: what if algorithms entered the cour-
thouse? The Conversation. https://thecon- versation.com/predicting-jus-
tice-what-if-algorithms-entered-the-cour- thouse-91692 [Accessed April
9, 2019].
• Renard, C. 2017. Justice, presse, détention provisoire... l’autoritarisme
bat son plein en Turquie. https://www.france- culture.fr/geopolitique/jus-
tice-presse-detention-provisoire-lautorita- risme-bat-son-plein-en-turquie
[Accessed April 9, 2019].
• Reporters sans frontières. 2018. RSF Index 2018: Hatred of journalism
threatens democracies https://rsf.org/en/rsf-in- dex-2018-hatred-journa-
lism-threatens-democracies [Accessed April 3, 2019].
• Reuben, A. 2016. Reality Check: Would Brexit mean extra £350m a week

PAGE 49
 Numérique et enjeux
environnementaux

T
his second section of the booklet, ac- Often perceived as "virtual", dematerialized and "clean",
counts for four chapters and is organized digital economy plays an important role in the current de-
in a way to bring knowledge about the en- gradation of ecosystems. From the digital destroyer to the
vironmental impacts of digital technology, formidable tool of ecological transition, the step is short: the
technologies. final result will depend a lot on the positions we will be able
to take, both on an individual level, as consumers, and col-
Chapter 10 is the most technical of the entire
lectively, as citizens belonging to cOMMunities. It is up to
booklet, as it composes a "directory" of known infor-
you to judge.
mation on current GHG emissions associated with
the manufacture and use of digital equipment. It also
provides some guidance on how to reduce individual
emissions. Chapter 11 reports a more societal and
CHAPTERS :
collective view of the environmental impacts of digi-
tal. It elaborates on the notion of planned obsoles- 10 : Climate Change
cence, the role of digital in metal depletion, and the
concept of rebound effects. The latter is of central 11 : Responsible Consumption and Production
importance to understanding the environmental im- 12 : Ecosystems
pacts of the digital sector. Chapter 12 focuses on
the potential for conservation and ecological res-
13 : Sustainable Cities and Communities
toration of ecosystems by new digital technologies,
comparing it to the many natural disasters caused
by appliance manufacturing and toxic WEEE waste.
Chapter 13 details the concept of "smart cities" or
"intelligent cities" by assessing their potential in ma-
king them sustainable.

PAGE 50
 10.
CHaNGe
CLiMaTe

© Public Domain -CC.0

 DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY
CHaPTeR 10: CLiMaTe CHaNGe
Why is it important?
Climate change is changes in climate, locally and globally,
caused primarily by humanity and its greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions into the atmosphere. The climate is not
just warming, it is changing. For example, the number of
extreme weather events such as droughts and storms has
increased significantly (Guilyardi et al. 2019).
GHG emissions are estimated to account for 60% of
humanity's total ecological footprint (Earth Overshoot Day
2019). Thus, climate change is already causing profound
changes in the environment; among them: the near total
disappearance of Arctic sea ice (permafrost) and coral
reefs (Guilyardi et al. 2019), the drying up of major rivers
(Giraud 2019), the raising of water levels by about 1 meter
by 2100 compared to the 19th century (IPCC 2019), the
disappearance of many forests due to rising temperatures
(Steffen et al. 2018), and the destruction of ecosystems
(Guilyardi et al. 2019).
These changes in the environment have, and will have
even more in the future, negative impacts on human
societies. These include declining agricultural yields
(WMO et al. 2019), declining water resources (Hofste et
al. 2019; Giraud 2019), or even flooding: more than 700
million people live in flood-prone areas (IPCC 2019). In
addition, some areas may become too hot to support
human life (Pal and Eltahir 2016). The risks of new
pandemics caused by melting frozen soils containing old
viruses stored in soils are also increasing (Grasset 2019).
Europe will not be spared: in 2050, the hottest month of
the year in most major European cities could be between
4 and 8 °C above current temperatures (Bastin et al.
2019a).
These different events will cause great distress to many
people. They could force the displacement of tens or even
hundreds of millions of people. They are also likely to
result in major conflicts (Dunlop and Spratt 2017). Some
wars in recent years, including the Syrian conflict, are
already very partial and indirect consequences of climate
change (Ünker et al. 2018; Dunlop and Spratt 2017).
Scientists believe that an estimated threshold of +1.5
to +2°C of warming relative to the period 1850-1900
should not be exceeded, because otherwise a series of
cascading events would result in subsequent warming,
and this is under the assumption of no new human GHG
emissions (Steffen et al. 2018; Dunlop and Spratt 2018).
If this threshold were instead exceeded, it could lead to a
total warming of +4°C (Dunlop and Spratt 2018; WMO et
al. 2019). This would cause events so catastrophic that
the end of organized human life would not be ruled out
(Anderson 2011; World Bank 2012). Some IPCC (2014)
scenarios exceed the +4°C bar.
Time is running out. In fact, global warming is already
+1.1°C above 1850-1900 (WMO et al. 2019). To have a
50% chance of staying below 1.5°C and a 66% chance of
staying below 2°C, it would be necessary to halve human
GHG emissions during each decade between 2020 and
2050 (Rockström et al. 2017).
To avert disaster, states committed in the Paris
Agreement to limit global warming to well below 2°C by
2100 (Saversi 2016). However, the agreement in no way
binds states to meet their commitments, and thus simply
relies on the goodwill of heads of state and governments
(Saversi 2016). In addition, the UN considers that, in 2019,
states' commitments in this regard, worldwide, were 3-5
times less than what would be needed to contain global
PAGE 52
and
ENJEUX ENVIRONNEMENTAUX
RELATED GOAL OF THE UN AGENDA 2030
FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT:
warming below +1.5°C (UN 2019a) Current commitments
would lead to total warming of + 2.9°C/+ 3.4°C, and this is
without accounting for the cascading events mentioned
above (WMO et al. 2019). In 2018, GHG emissions
increased by another 2% (WMO et al. 2019). All of these
different elements lead some to believe that the goals to
be achieved are not achievable (Anderson 2016), and that
the partial or total collapse of our societies is inevitable
(Servigne and Stevens 2015).
Action to avoid such catastrophic consequences is
essential. Business groups and states are making
ambitious commitments (UN 2019b): it is to be hoped
that these efforts will become widespread and materialize
into concrete actions. The climate protests and strikes
of recent years, promoted by young - and not so young
- people, are helping to move in this direction, putting
pressure on politicians and the rest of society (UN 2019c;
FridaysForFuture 2019).
Finally, the European Union plays an important role in
the climate crisis, both because of its responsibility as a
historical gas producer and because it is one of the areas
of the Planet that are most reducing GHG emissions
within its borders.
Finally, European citizens are among the most concerned
about trends in climate and environmental issues
(European Commission 2019).
Actual GHG emissions GES caused by
technological devices
Digital technology* is a major contributor to green-
house gas emissions. In 2019, this sector accounted
for between 2.6% (Bordage 2019a) and 4% (The Shift
Project 2018) of total anthropogenic emissions: the
range between the two percentages stems from me-
thodological differences in existing studies. It should
be noted that the above result does not take into
account emissions related to the end-of-life of ap-
pliances, given the limited data available in this regard
(see Chapter 12). In comparison, the share of emis-
sions attributed to air traffic is between 4% and 8%. In
this case, the wide margin between the minimum and
maximum threshold is due to the lack of information
on the warming potential of some substances emitted
in flight (European Parliament 2017) - while the share
of greenhouse gases emitted by light vehicles, less
than three and a half tons, is estimated at 8% (The Shift
Project 2018). Thus, digital technology accounts for as
many emissions as the manufacture/use of one-third/
half of the Earth's light vehicles.
In Western Europe, a citizen emits, on average, about
474 kilograms of CO2e (CO2 equivalents) - the unit
of measure for GHGs - for their digital consumption
(The Shift Project 2018, p.60). To get an idea of what
this amount represents, Table 1 shows the emissions
caused by certain actions [1]. Thus, an inhabitant of
the European Union emits about 9,100 kg of CO2e
* Word or acronym defined at the end of the document
each year, 5.2% of which is due to digital consumption, World 217
3.8% for a French person (Citizen's Climate Conven-
Table 2. GHG emissions caused by the digital sector, by
tion 2019, p. 23; Bordage et al. (2020, pp. 8-9). This
geographic region (2016)
corresponds to about a quarter of the GHG emissions
per person recommended in 2050 to stay below 2°C
for global warming. In addition, some Europeans, teens and young
adults, have high consumption of digital services*
(Smart Generation 2016), generally higher than
Emissions
people of older ages. Therefore, they/they spend
Actions
(kg CO�e)
more time on the Internet* (Statista 2019), are more
present on social networks (Ofcom 2019), consume
Average consumption of a European 9. 100 a year more online videos (Westcott et al. 2018; Blattberg
GHG emissions per person recOM- 2015) and Internet-connected video games (Ofcom
Mended in 2050 to stay below + 2 °C 2.100 a year 2018). For example, in France they spend more than
temperature increase a quarter of their waking time connected (Bordage,
2019), so the digital emissions of an average Euro-
London-New York route (one way) 1.600
pean youth are, without a doubt, very important.
Travel 1,000 km by car (medium capacity
250
model)
Consume 1 kg of beef 36
Switch from an omnivorous to a vegan
- 800 a year
diet
Wash clothes with cold water - 250 a year
Recycle waste correctly - 210 a year
Hang wet clothes instead of drying them
- 210 a year The new generations, hyper-connected, therefore
using electricity very much greenhouse gas emitters.
© CC- hackNY.org - BY-SA 2.0
Insulate the walls of your home - 180 a year
Eat organic, local, seasonal food - 80 a year Sources of emissions
Reduce packaging and disposable plas-
- 40 a year
tic wrap It is important to understand the sources of GHG
Tableau 1. GHG emissions caused by different types of actions. emissions associated with digital technology. Cate-
Figures shown refer to consumption per individual. gories can be created. The data cited in this sec-
tion-and throughout the chapter-are approximate,
Data sources: Wynes et Nicholas (2017); Ravijen (2018); Écoconso because the calculations to be performed are very
(2019a) ; Ademe (2017). complex, change from year to year, depend on the
limits defined from year to year, etc. They must, the-
refore, be considered more as orders of magnitude
than as absolute truths.
All and everyone equally responsible?
Breakdown by type of equipment
Individuals are not equal when it comes to digital Digital emissions come from a variety of devices,
GHG emissions. Therefore, according to The Shift each emitting different amounts of GHGs during
Project (2018, p.60), in 2016, an average Western production and use. The digital universe consists of
European emitted more digital-related GHGs than three categories.
those living in other parts of the world, excluding the
United States and Japan, as shown in Table 2. • User Terminals

GHG Emissions per inhabitant

Geographic Region
(kg CO2e)
United States 1027
Western Europe 474
Japan 486
China 291
Three "terminals" to which a multitude of
Global South (ex- other connected objects are added.
64 © CC0 - Public Domain - Frank Wolf
cluding China)

PAGE 53
 10. CLiMaTe CHaNGe

A first category includes user terminals, which are not • Datacenters

limited to computers, tablets, smartphones and prin-
ters. Connected objects*, such as televisions, watches,
thermostats, drones, speakers, and a thousand others,
also fall into this category. In 2019, there were 19 billion
connected objects in use worldwide, of which "traditio-
nal" user terminals made up a minority portion (Bor-
dage 2019a).
GHG emissions related to user terminals account for
about 60-65% of the total in the digital sector (Bordage
2019a; The Shift Project 2018) and are increasing (Bor- Tens of millions of servers make up the data centers.
© CC0 - Public Domain
dage 2015). In this category of objects, emissions oc-
cur primarily during the manufacturing phase, not the
use phase. For example, in the case of a smartphone, A second category involves data centers, also called
only 6% of the energy consumed comes from use, in data centers* and/or computer centers, which store
the form of charging the device. This figure is 11% for about 20% of the world's data* and are, in part, as-
computers and 33% for connected televisions - smart sociated with cloud-like services* (The Shift Project
TVs (The Shift Project 2018). 2018). In 2019, data centers corresponded to 67 mil-
Table 3 shows the CO2e emissions related to the ma- lion servers and a similar number of other computing
nufacturing of some digital devices. Thus, as an exa- devices (Bordage 2019a). In this case, the energy used
mple, the purchase of a connected speaker required is predominantly associated with their use and not with
the emission of 176 kg of CO2e to be manufactured, the manufacturing phase of the equipment (Bordage
about 2% of the average emissions of a European for 2019a),and corresponds to the cooling of the servers
a single device! The GHGs emitted are also equivalent (Bihouix and Mauvilly 2016). About 15-20% of digital
to those "saved" if you decide to eat organic, local and GHG emissions are attributable to data centers (Bor-
seasonal for about 2 years. dage 2019a; The Shift Project 2018).

• Computer networks
GHG Emissions in the
Electronic device manufacturing phase
(kg CO�e)
Desktop computer with screen
1000
(Dell)
Laptop, mid-range (Apple, Dell)
300-500
Connected television (smart
441
TV), 55 inch (Samsung) Cables, one of the many infrastructures (ADSL/Fiber boxes, anten-
nae-relays, satellites...) necessary for network connections.
Tablet (Apple) 80-200 © CC0 - Public Domain
Laser printer 191
The third category concerns the computer network*
Connected speaker (Apple) 176 required to connect all points on the network, all ter-
Modem (high frequency fiber) 115 minals, to each other. In 2019, it was composed of 1.1
Salon video console 102 billion boxes/routers/modems to connect to the Inter-
net, 10 million relay antennas (from 2 to 5G), millions
Smartphone (Mid Range) 61 of kilometers of terrestrial and submarine cables - the
Connected watch (Apple) 30-50 latter numbering 1.2 million, the longest being 20,000
Table 3. GHG emissions from different digital devices.
km. (TeleGeography 2019) - to connect equipment, sa-
Variations between items are significant.
tellites, and about 200 million other devices (Bordage
Data sources: The Shift Project (2018, p.29); Dell (2019); Apple (2019),
2019a ; Bihouix and Mauvilly 2016). As with data cen-
Ademe (2018) .
ters, the impact of this category is largely due to the
use of the network rather than the production of its
elements (Bordage 2019a). In addition, the vast majo-
rity of consumption occurs in the last few miles of the
link, close to homes, i.e. at local repeater antennas and
Internet boxes/routers/modens (Bordage 2017). Ener-
gy is mainly used to produce electromagnetic waves
that will enable data transfer * (Bihouix and Mauvilly
2016). Approximately 15-20% of digital emissions are
associated with equipment in this category (Bordage
2019a; The Shift Project 2018).

PAGE 54
 Terminals
Data centers
Networks
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Breakdown of CO2 emissions of digital infrastructure
Breakdown by production phase: manufacturing
versus usage
Au total, environ 45% des émissions mondiales de GES
du numérique proviennent de la fabrication des équi-
pements, tandis que les 55% restants proviennent de
l’utilisation de ces équipements (Bordage 2019a ; The Shift
Project 2018). La part de la fin de vie n’est pas prise en
compte, par manque de données fiables.
USAGE MANU-
55% FACTURING
GHG Emissions
GHG emissions are directly related to the energy consumed in the
manufacturing (production) and usage phases.
En France, la partie fabrication représente envi-
ron 83% des émissions de GES, contre 17% pour la
partie utilisation (Bordage et al. 2020). Cette diffé-
rence entre le cas français et le cas mondial est sans
doute en grande partie due au fait que l’électricité y
est pro- duite à partir de l’énergie nucléaire, moins
émettrice de GES – pour plus d’informations à ce
sujet, voir le Tableau 4 et la note [2].
• Manufacturing
Emissions related to the manufacturing of digital
devices come mainly from the mining phase of the
ore and their processing into electronic components
(Bordage 2019a). The latter also implies enormous
pressure on ecosystems (see ch. 12) and workers
(see ch. 1).
In the "Manufacturing" category, data from 2018
and 2019 show that 35% of energy was consumed
to produce computers. Smartphones and connec-
ted televisions each had a 20 to 25 percent share.
The rest of the energy was used to produce other
equipment, including network equipment (6-7%) and
data centers (2%) and other user terminals, primarily
tablets and other connected items (The Shift Project
2019a; Bordage 2019a). These figures refer to ener-
gy consumption, not GHG emissions, but still provi-
de an order of magnitude.
NETWORKS
(cables, antennae, satellites…)
Tablet and other 6-7% Data centers
connected objects 2%
≥ 10%
... %
Smart
Computer Smart TV
phones
35% 20-25%
20-25%
Energy consumption in the manufacturing
phase of digital devices
MANUFACTURING45%
• Usage
GHG emissions related to the use of digital technolo-
gy come from the electrical energy used by all digital
devices. This electricity is used, on the one hand, for
transferring device data (The Shift Project 2019a), and
on the other hand, for using software * running offline.
The distribution of impacts between the two catego-
ries is not known precisely, we do however have some
information.
For data transfer, The Shift Project calculated that GHG
emissions associated with online video were 305 MT
CO2e in 2018, or about 0.57% of total global GHG emis-
sions that year (OMM et al. 2019), or between 25 and
40% of GHG emissions related to digital technology
use, depending on whether the estimate is based on
The Shift Project (2018; 2019a) or Bordage (2019a).
Additionally, online video accounts for 80% of global
data traffic and there is a link between the amount of
data transmitted and GHG emissions. However, it is not
necessarily true that transferring large amounts of data
generates proportional GHG emissions. Some low data
transfer activities may prove to be very GHG emitters.
Offline software use is about using electricity to power
devices (computers, tablets, ...) allowing you to run the
programs * and computer software in use around the
world, some of which perform calculations that require
enormous power. This type of digital use occurs pri-
marily in professional settings. Strubell et al. (2019),
taking the exampleof a certain type of particularly en-
ergy-intensive artificial intelligence*, calculated that it
is necessary to emit more than 600 tons of GHG just to
make it ready for use. So, considering the huge amount
of computer programs and software used around the
world, we can consider that this category represents a
significant burden. Hard to be more precise.
PAGE 55
 10. CLiMaTe CHaNGe

2020). The "IPTV" category encompasses services

25 - 40% ? that illegally deliver television programming from
around the world via the Internet rather than terres-
OTHER TYPES of trial cable - see Mouv' (2018) for a brief explanation.
ONLINE USAGE of
TRASFERS of OFFLINE This category is growing rapidly (Sandvine 2019).
VIDEOS ONLINE DATA PROGRAMS

GHG Emissions in
the USAGE phase

USAGE 55%

Online video games are a significant part of global greenhouse gas

(GHG) emissions of the digital sector.
Note: 55% is the global average of electricity mix with majority of © CC- hackNY.org - BY-SA 2.0
fossil sources (coal, natural gas and oil).
Good practices to reduce emissions

It is possible, from individual digital utilizers, to reduce

Global data traffic scenario
The amount of data transferred is far from propor-
tional to the amount of GHGs emitted, yet it reveals
the trends. The figure below reconstructs a fairly ac-
curate picture of global data traffic in 2018-2019.
The "VOD" category refers to platforms that host ge-
nerally long streaming videos*, while "Tube" refers to
those that host generally short videos, including
YouTube and TikTok. Perhaps the most surprising
figure is the traffic associated with watching strea-
ming pornographic videos. In fact, such platforms
are among the most visited websites in the world,
with 4 of them in the top 20 in 2020 (SimilarWeb
GHG emissions: this section recommends some use-
ful practices in this regard. Non-professional daily
consumption has been considered. In general, it is
good to clarify that there is no miraculous action ca-
pable of drastically reducing our emissions. In fact, a
significant reduction can only be achieved by com-
bining several actions.
It is important to pay close attention to the figures men-
tioned in this section, as well as others from different
sources because the difficult research on these issues
is still in its infancy stage. However, these calculations
are still approximations, based on global or national

Number of bytes transferred using online services

SOCIAL SHARING CRYPTO-

VOD PORNO TUBE GAMING IPTV NETWORKS of DATA CURRENCY
20% 16% 13% 10-15% 7% 6% 4, 2% 3%
DOWNLOAD of
Jeux en
PROGRAMS
YouTube ligne (SOFTWARE)
Netflix 13%
8,7% 8,7%
16% 2, 6%

TikTok Bitcoin,
Amazon Prime Twitch Facebook BitTorrent
2% Ethereum
Video 2,6% DailyMotion 2,5% 3,7% 2,4%
1,6%
Openload 1,4% 0,8% Illegal Instagram
internet TV 1,6%
Global Internet data traffic by service and provider company. Sources : The Shift Project (2018, 2019a); Sandvine (2018); Sandvine
(2019); Digiconomist (2019a, 2019b); Stoll et al. 2019).

PAGE 56
averages, which are unsuitable to individual cases and
are therefore open to criticism and improvement.
In fact, many parameters influence GHG emissions
caused by the transmission of data over the Internet:
the time of day, the country of residence, the compa-
nies involved in the transfer and the techniques they
used, the energy sources drawn on, the distance the
data traveled in the network, the operator and type of
Internet connection, and the type of terminal used.
This section should also not make us forget that indivi-
duals alone cannot do everything: there are economic,
social, and political barriers to changing our behaviors
(Keucheyan 2019; Citizens Climate Convention 2019,
p.33). An individual has little decision-making power
over policies and companies that seek to encourage
consumption - see Chapter 11. Collective struggles
and advocacy to act to reduce the environmental im-
pact of digital also play a very important role.
Collective mobilizations, a way of acting to
evolve society and eco-citizen behavior
© CC - Rastrelli - BY -NC-SA 2.0
In the following two subsections, the recommended
good practices cover both the manufacturing and use
phases of digital devices.
Manufacturing - production
• Extending the life of terminals
If the lifespan of all digital devices were extended by
30% by 2025, global digital GHG emissions would
be 18% lower than projected at that date (Bordage
2019a). For example, extending the life of your lap-
top from 4 to 6 years would save more than 100 kg
of CO2e, which is about as much as reducing pac-
kaging and single-use plastics for 2.5 years - see
Table 1 at the beginning of the chapter for further
comparisons.
Unfortunately, digital equipment is often designed
in such a way that it needs to be replaced regularly
(see Chapter 11). However, there are many tips for
extending the life of devices, such as reusing, repai-
ring, and choosing brands that promote durability
and repairability (see Chapter 11). For more detailed
advice, there are many sites on the net.
We suggest: www.produitsdurables.fr. And https://
www.stopobsolescence.org/
Repair, a way to extend the lifespan of our digital devices.
© CC0 - Public Domain
It is important to adopt this kind of thinking for each
of the devices used (ADEME 2020). Indeed, the pur-
chase of a new smartphone represents only about
0.7% of a European's annual GHG emissions, but
everyone owns many digital devices. For example,
French people aged 15-70 have an average of 15 de-
vices (Bordage et al. 2020). Thus, the opportunities
for emissions reductions are multiplied. According
to the data in Table 3 of this chapter, it seems wor-
thwhile to focus one's efforts on large devices, such
as connected televisions, desktop, or laptop compu-
ters, or even connected speakers.
• Replacing the connected TV with a
projector
As explained in Table 3 on the third page of this
chapter, manufacturing a mid-range connected te-
levision (smart TV) emits between 400 and 500 kg
of CO2e. Manufacturing a video projector emits at
least 12 times less GHG (Bordage 2019b). This cor-
responds to a saving of about 400 kg of GHG, or a
gain equivalent to about half a year of vegan food
compared to an omnivorous diet (see Table 1, on the
second page of the chapter).
Usage
• Choosing a “green” electricity supplier
The GHG emissions of this phase come largely from
the electricity consumed by the user. However, this
electricity will emit different amounts of GHGs de-
pending on the method of energy production - see
Table 4. It is crucial to choose an electricity supplier
that prioritizes sustainable energy sources and pro-
duction methods. There are specialized websites
that help to choose the best possible supplier based
on this criterion. For example, Greenpeace Belgium,
France and the UK (2020), consumer associations
and the Luce-gas.it website for Italy, rank suppliers.
Carbon intensity of en-
Sources of Energy ergy consumed (CO2e/
Kwh)
Carbon 820
Fioul 778
Diesel 778
PAGE 57
 10. CLiMaTe CHaNGe
Natural Gas 490
Solar 45
Geothermic 38
Hydroelectric 24
Sea Waves 17
Nuclear 12
Wind 11
Table 4. GHG emission for the same amount of energy
produced according to the different sources. These results take
into account all stages of the production cycle, from extraction
to waste treatment.
Sources: Gagnon et al. (2002). For fuel oil and diesel data;
GIEC (2014, p.1335).
• Avoiding 3, 4 and 5G
3, 4, 5G, big energy sink...
© CC-Karlie Dambrans-BY-2.0
Data transfer does not emit the same amount of
GHG depending on the transfer mode: Wi-Fi, 3G, 4G,
or 5G. Using 4G requires about 4 times more elec-
tricity than Wi-Fi (Kamiya 2020). The figures are
slightly lower for 3G (Bordage 2019b, p.169) and
could be higher for 5G. Indeed, the latter requires a
large amount of infrastructure, including a large nu-
mber of relay antennas (Grijpink et al. 2018).
Therefore, the use of 3, 4, and 5G should be avoided
as much as possible. Unfortunately, the advent of
connected objects, often used outside of Wi-Fi, as
well as low-cost mobile data subscriptions, tend to
increase their use. If you absolutely want to transfer
data - to work on a document hosted in the cloud,
to watch a streaming movie or listen to music - wi-
thout having Wi-Fi available, it's best to remember
to download it first, via Wi -Fi. It's also best to turn
off mobile data to make sure you don't mistakenly
transfer data through this.
• Storing locally instead of in the cloud
Transferring data between the data center and the
user's terminal (PC, smartphone, etc.) requires en-
ergy, so it emits GHG. On an annual basis, transfer-
ring data to the cloud* emits, on average, twice as
much as the corresponding local storage, on hard
drive, external memory, etc. (Bordage 2019b, p.169),
as cloud use multiplies its impact due to continuous
data movement.
With unchanged connectivity (i.e., without swit-
PAGE 58
ching, for example, from Wi-Fi to 4G or 5G), watching
a video will require, on average, the same amount of
energy, whether it takes place locally, or whether it is
streamed, if the video, instead of being downloaded
from the web directly to the local medium is instead
first downloaded from the web to the cloud and then
from the cloud to the local medium: in this case, the
same amount of information is transferred as if one
were to watch it directly online.
• Watching fewer onine videos
for others:
Watching videos online (on the Internet) is one of the most greenhouse
gas-emitting activities of Europeans
© CC0 - Public Domain
Video accounts for a significant percentage of GHG
emissions related to the use of digital technology by
individuals. It is therefore one of the levers of indivi-
dual action to reduce GHG emissions. As explained
above, the figures depend on many parameters, so
we can only provide averages.
The Netflix case
Watching one hour of streaming video on the Net-
flix platform over Wi-Fi in HD quality on a laptop will
emit 30 grams of GHG in Belgium, 8 in France, 50 in
Italy, and 80 worldwide (Kamiya 2020) - the diffe-
rence between these cases comes from the type of
energy produced [2]. If an Italian watches 3 hours of
Netflix videos per day in HD over Wi-Fi for a year, the
shows will be about 54 kg on a laptop and 87 on a
50-inch smart TV. The latter case represents nearly
1% of a European's GHG emissions. Other examples
are listed in Table 5 below. There are significant
differences depending on device type, video defini-
tion, and connection type.
What about outside of Netflix?
However, these results only apply to Netflix, which
has implemented systems to limit the GHG emis-
sions of its videos (Kamiya 2020). The Shift Project
(2020), which attempted a similar model based on
aggregate data - and thus not specific to Netflix -
found that watching HD video would, on average,
have 4-7 times the impact of Kamiya's (2020) re-
sults for Netflix. There are fundamental differences
between the two models, and it's difficult to compare
them. It's impossible to say whether the Shift Project
numbers are exaggerated: that's the opinion of some,
including Kamiya (2020) and Nicolle (2019). Howe-
ver, watching a video, all other settings being equal,
on a site that has not optimized power consumption
is likely to emit significantly more GHGs than Netflix. analog TV where possible, thus reducing, as much
as possible, greenhouse gas emissions (Preist and
Considering overall data from the Shift Project
Schien 2018; Bordage 2019). In addition, it is desi-
(2020), watching one hour of streaming video would
rable to listen to music through audio files, or, fai-
emit, on average, about 400 grams of GHG world-
ling that, always try to minimize the quality of music
wide, about 226 in the European Union (IEA 2020). It
videos on YouTube. In fact, audio files require the
is difficult to estimate the average daily time spent
transfer of much less data. It has been calculated
by a European watching online videos, because sta-
that if, in 2016, half of the music videos on YouTube
tistical bodies generally do not take into account all
were listened to using audio files alone, the decrease
categories - "VoD"," Pornography "," Pipes "," Games
in total GHG emissions would have been 586 KT,
"," IPTV "," Social networks ", etc. It appears from
or about 6% of the total YouTube shows that year
existing data that European adolescents spend 2-5
(Preist et al. 2019).
hours per day watching online videos [3]. Therefore,
the average online video consumption of a European
teenager emits between 165 and 412 kg of CO2e per
In general, lowering the quality of videos is always
year, equivalent to driving 660 to 1,650 kilometers in
a good measure. In fact, the higher resolution of a
a mid-range car (see Table 1 at the beginning of the
video results in more data to be transferred, what
chapter). Therefore, it is of paramount importance
affects GHG emissions (Kamiya 2020; The Shift Pro-
to limit the impacts of video viewing and thus avoid
ject 2019). For example, watching an hour of Netflix
dangerous future escalations.
video from a laptop connected via Wi-Fi will emit 6
Instead of watching one's favorite series online, to 7 times less GHG in SD (low resolution) than in 4K.
one may choose to watch it offline on "traditional"

Total Emissions in kg of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e)

The Netflix case
per 1 year-vision at 3 hours a day
Type of Quality of Type of
in France in Italy in Belgium In the World
device videos connection
Laptop SD
(standard Wi-Fi 2,7 18,3 11,9 29
definition)
Laptop HD 4G 28,2 173,8 113,4 275,1
Smartphone HD Wi-Fi 7,7 47,7 31,1 75,4
Smartphone 4K 4G 63,1 389 253,7 615,6
Smart TV (su
4K Wi-Fi 24,3 150 97,8 237,4
Internet)
Table 4. A few examples of GHG emissions after one year of watching Netflix programs (at 3 hours per day) in France, Italy, Belgium,
and the World.

Everyone can calculate their own emissions on the International Energy Agency website (AIE): www.aie.org/
cOMMentaries/the-carbon-footprint-of-streaming-video-fact-checking-the-headlines.

Screenshot of the GHG emission simulator from watching programs on Netflix designed by Kamiya (2020).

PAGE 59
 10. CLiMaTe CHaNGe
Finally, to reduce video consumption, it is useful to
remove automatic playback - also called autoplay -
a tool that starts a new video a few seconds after the
end of the previous one, as well as viewing history
(The Shift Project 2019). These actions are possible
on Netflix and YouTube, for example.
• Encouraging the use of smaller devices
A smartphone, tablet, laptop, or smart TV does not
consume the same amount of power; therefore, it
will not emit the same amount of GHG. Therefore,
the same HD video watched on Netflix over Wi-Fi will
emit about twice as much GHG on a connected 50-
inch TV as on a smartphone (Kamiya 2020).
• Turning off Internet modems, routers and
boxes
Boxes should be turned off...
© CC0 - Public Domain
These devices consume electricity even when not in
use. Turning them off when you are not at home and/
or at night saves between 30 and 65 kg of CO2e per
year (Bordage 2019b, p.168; The Shift Project 2018).
This figure corresponds to eating organic, local, and
seasonal for about six months (see Table 1 at the
beginning of the chapter).
Do we really need this digital device or service?
As digital technology emits large amounts of GHGs, it
is important to ask whether certain consumption should
not be reduced, if not eliminated. As the saying goes, "The
cleanest energy is the energy you don't consume." Each
use and/or each new purchase should involve the following
question: do I really need it? Does it really improve my life?
If the answer is no, perhaps, it is best to reduce use or not
purchase.
For example, is it really necessary to buy a new tablet
when the one you have is still working, and/or when the
smartphone you are using provides more or less the same
services? Is it necessary to purchase the latest fashionable
connected item? Is it so important to watch several hours of
online video a day? Similarly, is Internet anytime, anywhere
- in 3, 4 or 5G - essential?
PAGE 60
Low-impact practices
There are actions, disseminated by the media, that,
in reality, do not have a decisive impact. The imple-
mentation of the following suggestions is recom-
mended, knowing that they do not weigh much on
the total greenhouse gas emissions related to digi-
tal.
• Deleting e-mails
Storing an email in the cloud for a year requires half
the energy of the initial mailing. Therefore, removing
1 GB of email is equivalent to a reduction of 0.04 kg
of CO2e per year (Bordage 2016). A drop of water in
the sea.
• Unsubscribing from newsletters
Unsubscribing from 50 newsletters, each sending a
1 MB email per week, saves about 9 kg of CO2e per
year in Europe (The Shift Project 2018, p.32). This
action is therefore not superfluous, although not
very significant.
• Changing search engine
Search engines like Ecosia or Lilo - which are real-
ly just embellishments of existing browsers - offer
to donate part of the advertising revenue they ge-
nerate. By offering alternatives to the browsers of
the digital giants, while having ethically responsible
approaches, these search engines can provide im-
portant social benefits. From a global warming
perspective, the benefits are less clear. Each search
launched on Ecosia generates more direct GHG
emissions than a search launched on a traditional
search engine. Yet by taking tree planting into ac-
count, the net amount of GHG in the atmosphere will
be reduced. In fact, according to our calculations
based on various studies, the details of which are
specified in footnote [4], it is very likely that planting
trees not only compensates for the GHG emission of
the search performed, but also helps remove GHG
from the atmosphere. However, planting forests is
a solution to combat global warming with implicit
limitations. Some researchers have calculated that
planting forests on all of the Planet's untapped land
would be equivalent to a reduction in atmospheric
GHGs equivalent to 4 years of current human emis-
sions (Bastin et al. 2019b). When all the trees are
planted, what other means will we have to combat
global warming? Clearly, offsetting emissions is not
a long-term solution.
Growing impact of digital technology on
climate and climate change
The share of global GHG emissions caused by the
digital universe is growing steadily. It is difficult to
make precise predictions, however digital's share is
projected to be between 6.1% (Bordage 2019a) and
9% (The Shift Project 2018) of total global GHG
emissions in 2025. with the dramatic increase of big data* analyzed
with artificial intelligence (AI) systems based on in-
creasingly complex algorithms* (Strubell et al. 2019;
Emissions 2019 2,6 % 4% Villani 2018).
Second, the trend of decreasing energy consump-
Emissions 2025 6,1 % to 9 % tion by virtue of energy efficiency enabled by digital
technology (Koomey 2016), is expected to continue
into the future (Aebischer and Hilty 2015).
0 2 4 6 8 10 ... %
As a result, if demand for digital goods/services
continues to grow rapidly and energy efficiency ins-
Estimates of the share of global GHG emissions (in CO2e)
tead stagnates, global GHG emissions could explode
caused by digital activities.
in the medium to long term. If this is the case, the
goals of containing temperatures and other effects
of climate change described at the beginning of the
This increase is linked to two factors. First, the de-
chapter would not be met, and Humanity could face
mand for digital services is expected to continue to
the catastrophe that was foretold.
grow rapidly in the coming years (see subsection
"conclusions" in Chapter 11). For example, GHG
emissions related to offline use of programs (sof-
tware) are likely to grow significantly in the future

A few orders of magnitude

I reduce my greenhouse
Is it as if you
gases (GHG) emissions
My changes in behavior * ... Per:
of, in average, (in kg
were driving
along…
CO2e)
If I buy a video projector instead of a smart TV (Internet TV) 1 action 400 1 600 km
If I keep my laptop 6 years instead of 4 years 2 years 150-250 600-1,000 km
If I turn off my modems/routers and TV boxes every night 1 year 30-65 120-260 km
If I don't buy a new speaker connected to the Internet 1 action 176 704 km
Keep my smartphone 4 years instead of 2 years 2 years 61 244km
ITA 111 444 km
If I watch 2 hours less HD video per day on my smartphone
BE 1 year 72 290 km
with 4G connectivity
FR 18 72 km
If I unsubscribe from 50 newsletters each sending a 1 Mb email per week 1 year 9 36 km

If I stop storing 1 GB of email and delete thousands of them 1 year 0,04 0,16 km

The values in the table come from different sources cited in the chapter, depend on a large number of parameters, and represent
averages of usage. The figures must, therefore, be considered as orders of magnitude and not as exact numbers. In addition,
the impacts considered refer only to greenhouse gas emissions (expressed in CO2 equivalent) and not to other impacts such as
consumption of water, soil, waste, pollution, and/or social and psychological impacts.

* The reductions in GHG emissions shown in this table are not immediate because to produce tangible im-
pacts, as they require the ripple effect of many people deciding to change behavior in the same unit of time.
For example: not taking the plane does not cause an immediate reduction in emissions because the plane
will fly anyway in the very short term, reducing online video consumption has a smaller immediate impact as
long as the same web infrastructure (cloud, platforms, data centers) remains in place and/or new ones are
created if no consumers reduce their use thus helping to reduce emissions in the near future. So, by consu-
ming less data today, I am participating in less infrastructure in the future, and therefore lower greenhouse
gas emissions

PAGE 61
 10. CLiMaTe CHaNGe
Is the digital universe compatible with a low-
carbon world?
Beyond direct impacts, the digital economy is cau-
sing changes in production and consumption in
other business sectors. Contrary to expectations,
digital technology does not seem to contribute to
reducing GHG emissions worldwide, but rather the
opposite (Lange et al. 2020; see Chapter 11), espe-
cially as a result of the rebound effect, which will be
the subject of Chapter 11. Given the disasters fo-
reshadowed by scientists regarding the effects of
climate change in the event that Humanity fails to
drastically reduce GHG emissions, the conclusion of
this chapter might be that it is necessary to limit the
use of digital technology as much as possible. This
position, however, is not defensible.
First of all, one should not forget the potential be-
nefits of digital technologies in the many areas il-
lustrated in the different chapters of this book. In
the specific case of climate change itself, digital
technology itself provides invaluable contributions.
Climate research, like most other fields of research,
would not be what it is today without the use of digi-
tal technology. Many climate change studies today
use big data analytics and artificial intelligence (AI).
Several papers cited in this chapter, such as Bastin
et al. (2019a), have used AI*. In addition, research
helps minimize the impact of climate crises by,
among other things, predicting the most upstream
and/or extreme weather events (WMO 2017).
And then, digital technology can be used to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions in certain sectors (see
Chapters 11 and 13). The digital universe itself can
reduce its ecological footprint, particularly through
ecodesign. In other words, digital devices are de-
signed in such a way as to minimize their environ-
mental impact during all phases of the life cycle
(Bordage 2019b, pp. 72-74). Beware, however, that
increased energy efficiency does not lead to in-
creased consumption and, consequently, new emis-
sions. This is the phenomenon of the rebound effect
(see Chapters 11 and 13), which, however, can be
reduced by implementing appropriate policies and
changing attitudes within society (see Ch. 11).
In conclusion, it is necessary to adopt a nuanced po-
sition regarding digital. Perhaps we should no lon-
ger speak of digital in general, but of digital services,
and learn to choose the most sustainable ones in the
right quantities. Not everything is black and white.
Some uses of digital services are probably wor-
thwhile, even if they emit a certain amount of green-
house gases. Other practices, which do not provide
sufficient individual and/or collective benefits, could
instead be restricted, replaced by others that are
less emitting (Bihouix 2014), or even banned alto-
gether. A societal debate would be needed to define
which practices should be retained, which should be
limited, and which should be banned, given current
PAGE 62
planetary ecological limits (Keucheyan 2019)
?
In short.
• The digital sector accounted for an estimated
2.6 to 4 percent of global greenhouse gas emis-
sions in 2019. This percentage rises to about
5% in the case of the European Union. Moreover,
emissions from this sector are growing rapidly
and could reach 6-9% in 2025 on a global scale.
• Just under half of the world's digital emissions
come from equipment manufacturing and just
over half from equipment use.
◊ Approximately 80% of the energy used to pro-
duce digital devices is for computers, connec-
ted TVs and smartphones.
◊ Use-phase emissions are partly due to the
electricity required to transfer data from one
device to another, particularly for watching
online videos, as well as the electricity re-
quired by terminals for calculations perfor-
med offline by computer programs (software).
• Global data traffic is dominated by video-on-
demand, tube services, pornography, gaming,
IPTV services, and social networking.
• There are many ways to reduce digital emis-
sions at the individual level. These include
increasing the life of equipment by encoura-
ging reuse, repair and recycling, avoiding the
use of 3, 4 and 5G, choosing a "green" electri-
city provider, watching less video online, using
"smaller devices," reducing the definition of
video and/or turning off modems or routers to
connect to the Internet and TV boxes.
• Actions such as deleting emails or unsubscri-
bing from newsletters, on the other hand, do
not result in very significant reductions in
emissions.
• One should avoid falling for rhetoric such as
"everything is bad about digital," because new
technologies also bring important benefits to
society. However, some uses should be seve-
rely restricted if they do not provide sufficient
individual and collective benefits in the face of
the amount of greenhouse gases emitted.
Related classroom resources
Educational Pathway n. 2 : What do you say, is it
ecological?
• Activity N. 2 - "In search of information!
• Activity N. 3 - The digital quiz"
Educational Pathway n. 6 : A future with or without
digital technology?
• Activity N. 1 "Controversial future scenarios?"
Training Modules:
1 (U.A. 1.2., 1.3., 1.4.,1.6.), 2 (U.A. 2.1.), 3 (U.A. 3.1.,
3.5.), 6 (U.A. 6.4.).
Notes
[1] The figure presented in the first row of Table 1 is an adaptation
from two Eurostat data sets (2020a and 2020b). The first set of
concerns production related CO2e emissions, which is 8,700 kg per
capita per year. The second, adjusts the first, based on the EU's
import-export balance. Since the EU is, predominantly, an importer,
its consumption-related GHG emissions are greater than its pro-
duction-related emissions. This adjustment increases the total by
400 kg per capita per year, resulting in a final figure of 9,100 kg.
[2] The amount of GHG emitted differs by energy source - see Table
4 - whose figures depend on many parameters, some of which
are difficult to quantify, as in the case of nuclear energy (Sovacool
2008). In France, energy is largely produced with nuclear techno-
logies quantified by the International Energy Agency, which are low
emitters of GHGs: it follows that the digital use phase emits less
GHGs in France than elsewhere. However, nuclear energy generates
serious environmental and social problems are not addressed in
this chapter, which is limited to analyzing GHG emissions from the
digital sector.
3] An American aged 12-17 spent about 5:30' in spring 2018
watching "VoD" and "Tubes" content (Marketing Charts 2018). An
English 12- to 15-year-old spent about 2 hours a day playing online
video games in 2018 - 3 hours for boys, 1 hour for girls (Ofcom
2018). In addition, English teens spent 1 hour per day on YouTube
in 2018 (Sky News 2018). Young people in these two countries are
certainly greater consumers of video than the European average.
4 Each browser search emits at most a few grams of CO2e - emis-
sions on Ecosia are in addition to those of the original search en-
gine. Ecosia (2019) plants one tree for every 50 searches. For a new
forest, each tree would represent an uptake of 6 to 60 kg of CO2e
per year (Wynes and Nicholas 2017). However, the tree will not cap-
ture CO2e indefinitely and, during its end of life, will actually re-emit
all of the CO2e it has absorbed (Jancovici 2007). This is not to say
that planting trees has no impact since, in a healthy forest, a dying
tree is replaced by a new tree, which in turn absorbs CO2e. Consi-
dering that each tree in the new forest is replaced by a new one and
that a tree absorbs CO2e for several decades, the GHG emissions
from Ecosia research are largely negative.
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11. ReSPoNSiBLe
CoNSuMPTioN aND
PRoDuCTioN

© Joakim Jardenberg-CC BY 2.0

 DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY and
ENJEUX ENVIRONNEMENTAUX

RELATED GOAL OF THE UN AGENDA 2030

FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT:

CHaPTeR 11:
consommation et
production responsableS
to public authorities, in helping consumers reduce their
Why is it important? carbon footprint (Citizen's Climate Convention 2019,
p.33).
DIn order to perpetuate human societies and safeguard
ecosystems, it is essential to produce and consume Businesses also have a role to play if they choose to take
in such a way that the environment can regenerate. action to create a truly sustainable world (UN 2019b).
However, we currently produce more than the planet Ecodesign of products (Van der Ryn and Cowan 2007;
can sustain in the long term. In fact, in 2019, Humanity Bordage 2019, pp. 72-74) and sharing best practices
needed the equivalent of 1.7 times what the Earth was (NEXT 2019) are two ways to move in the right direction.
able to provide (Global Footprint Network 2019). Human
societies are living "on credit": they are already suffering
the consequences today and will suffer even more in the
future.
To understand the unsustainable nature of global
Planned obsolescence
production and consumption, one needs to know that
several non-renewable natural resources are used so A first important aspect related to sustainable produc-
much - today a person in a rich country consumes about
27 tons of raw materials per year (UN * 2019a) - that it tion and consumption concerns the very rapid repla-
is very likely that some of them will be depleted in a few cement of digital objects. Thus, in 2016, a smartphone
decades. Thus, if global energy production continues had been used, on average, for just under 2 years (Je-
at the current rate, the combined reserves of coal, oil,
nuclear, and natural gas will be depleted in 91 years. nik 2017) and a computer for about 5 years in 2018
However, energy production continues to increase (BP (Bordage 2018). This phenomenon is the result of ob-
2019). In addition, a dozen metals will be depleted in solescence, which is very present in the digital eco-
one or two generations if the same level of extraction
is maintained (USGS 2019), and this number will rise to nomy. We define it as the loss of value of a product,
twenty if production of these metals continues at today's which eventually leads to its replacement even if all or
rate (Geldron 2018, p.9). most of its components are still fully functional.
In fact, humans have changed the environment so
much that geologists believe the Earth has entered a
new geological era, called the Anthropocene. This era
is sometimes called the Capitalocene or Technocene in 2 years
reference to the determinative roles played by capitalism
or technologies in the transformation of Nature (Hamilton
2019).
To minimize the long-term impact on people, production
and consumption must be reduced to levels that allow the
Earth to regenerate. Three interrelated levers (Kallis 2019) 5 years
are generally considered to achieve this goal (O'Neill et Average
al. 2004). The first involves techniques, which affect the
number of resources needed to perform an action - we lifespan
speak here of change in effectiveness or efficiency. The
second lever is global consumption. The third concerns
the number of human beings on the planet, which Obsolescence is important to digital businesses. In-
continues to increase (UN 2019c). deed, without it, they would no longer be able to sell
Sustainable production and consumption are defined as many products and would no longer necessarily be
as the production and use of goods and services that economically viable, according to the parameters of
meet basic needs and lead to a better quality of life, while
minimizing the use of natural resources, toxic materials, their business model. In a sense, the current economic
and emissions of waste and pollutants throughout the system also depends on obsolescence as it is linked
life cycle, so as not to compromise the needs of future to economic growth and, therefore, the consumption
generations (Symposium on Sustainable Consumption
1994). of goods and services (EcoInfo 2013; Jackson 2017).
More generally, every human being is a consumer and The phenomenon of obsolescence is partly the conse-
has the power, through his or her decision to purchase or quence of very rapid technological advances in this
not purchase a particular good or service, to participate in field. The number of device features increases, as does
societal change. Informed consumption choices that are
conscious of environmental, social, ethical, and economic their performance. Buying a new device can therefore
impacts can have a positive impact. Moreover, people be beneficial (Remy and Huang 2015), and the old one
are increasingly careful about what they buy (Veneto becomes "obsolete." However, when the technical im-
Region 2011; Ipsos 2016). They are then transformed into
"consumer-actors" (emarketing 2019). Initiatives such provements made by new devices are not sufficient
as "Saturdays for future" in Italy tend towards this type of to entice people to purchase, manufacturers may be
practice (ASviS 2019). tempted by planned obsolescence.

However, we must not forget the essential role that the

community can and should play, with specific reference

* Word or acronym defined at the end of the document PAGE 67

 11. ReSPoNSiBLe CoNSuMPTioN aND PRoDuCTioN
Technical obsolescence
There are several types of obsolescence. These include
technical or functional obsolescence. These are me-
thods designed to make repair difficult, very expensive,
or even impossible. When faced with the task at hand
or the cost required, individuals are then tempted to
purchase a new device.
Technical obsolescence materializes in several ways.
First, the manufacturer may ensure that parts do not
have a long service life. Next, he may make it difficult
or impossible to replace parts or provide an inefficient
and expensive parts replacement service. Finally, he
may make it impossible (for the customer) to use an
independent repairer, who might provide more efficient,
faster, and/or cheaper service (EcoInfo 2013; Cash In-
vestigation 2012).
An example that summarizes many of the points above
is that of batteries in digital devices. They are one of the
most common components that malfunction (Maliver-
ney 2018). However, manufacturers produce devices
whose batteries are difficult, if not impossible, to re-
place. This practice was introduced by Apple in the first
version of the iPod, which had an estimated battery life
of 18 months, despite not being replaceable (EcoInfo
2013). This practice has become so widespread that,
out of 13 smartphones tested by Greenpeace (2017,
p.9), the battery was easily replaced for only 2 of them.
A non-removable exhausted battery is an
example of technical obsolescence
Some manufacturers have taken it a step further in re-
cent years. To avoid having to use independent repair-
men, they have installed a chip in their new equipment.
This will first identify if a different battery is being used
than the manufacturer's, usually half the cost. In that
case, the chip prevents charging. The item is then ren-
dered unusable (Maliverney 2018).
Software obsolescence
Manufacturers can also play with updates to schedule
obsolescence, commonly referred to as "software or
program obsolescence." In fact, updates of all kinds are
increasingly gluttonous in the face of devices that have
not improved their performance. This practice slows
down devices to the point where they become unu-
sable and result in replacement (Bordage 2018). Sof-
tware developers do not necessarily try to make sof-
tware less bulky (Roussilhe 2018). Moreover, updates
are usually strongly recommended by manufacturers,
sometimes made mandatory, and some are even per-
formed without the consent of the user customer (Bin-
ding 2018). On the other hand, failure to perform an
PAGE 68
update leads to premature obsolescence of the equip-
ment as the user is exposed to malfunctions and secu-
rity breaches.
Mise à jour
Digital tool speed of performance decrease after an
update is an example of software obsolescence
An extreme example is that of the operating system
update on the Samsung Galaxy Note 4, which forced
users to "migrate" to a much more demanding version.
The slowdown caused was such that the devices were
unusable for many people (Bordage 2018). Similarly,
Apple made an operating system update in late 2017
that intentionally reduced the performance of earlier
versions of the iPhone, making them very slow. Af-
ter the discovery (by the public) of the maneuver, the
company confessed and apologized, claiming that the
purpose of the measure was to extend battery life. This
case is known under the name "BatteryGate" (Brown
2017).
Another example of software obsolescence invol-
ves Microsoft and the discontinuation of upgrades
to its older Windows operating systems to force cus-
tomer-users to "migrate" to newer versions that are
more demanding and difficult for "older" computers to
support. The deadline for upgrades to Windows 7 was
January 2020. Microsoft (2019) stated, "While you can
continue to use your PC with Windows 7, without recei-
ving continuous software and security updates it will
be more vulnerable to viruses and malicious software.
The best way to stay safe in the future is with Windows
10. The best experience with Windows 10 is with a new
PC. While it is possible to install Windows 10 on your
old device, it is not recommended." Microsoft, with this
measure, is therefore pushing the purchase of a new
computer even when the old one is still perfectly func-
tional.
What does it mean “End of supply assistance”?
From January, 14th 2020 onwards Windows 7 will continue
to work; nevertheless, Microsoft will not guarantee the opera-
tion of the following services:
• Any kind of technical support
• Software updates
• Security updates.
You may continue to use Windows 7 without receiving up-
dates, even if your PC will be more vulnerable than before to
virus attacks.
The best Windows 10 performance is appreciable with a new
PC, and it is not recOMMended to install Windows 10 in your
old PC.
Text extracted from the Microsoft web site (2019).
"The best experiences with Windows 10 are with a new PC".
Psychological obsolescence
Many devices are replaced while they are still perfectly
usable and have not experienced any of the forms of
obsolescence described above. For smartphones, this
accounts for more than half of all cases (Mitchell 2017).
Often the new purchase is to satisfy a desire for novelty
or to increase one's social status (Jackson 2017, pp.
148-152; see Chapter 7). Manufacturers have realized
this and are implementing marketing techniques to en-
tice users to purchase new devices (EcoInfo 2013).
Among these practices we can mention those of te-
lephone operators who offer a new device at a very low
price-often 1 euro-against a long-term re-commit-
ment with them (Bordage 2019b).
n!
Be fashio
NEW!
COOLER!
More power ful!
The marketing: a way to induce people to
buy new models digital tools.
Manufacturers and retailers, with this "biais" (percep-
tion based on erroneous or false data), try to give indi-
viduals the impression that they need the new device
or feature even when the gain does not result in lasting
forms of satisfaction (Keucheyan 2019). This leads to
continuous gadget buying and consumerism, a pheno-
menon that is very present in our societies (Jackson
2017; Keucheyan 2019). Let's ask ourselves if it is real-
ly useful to change smartphones while it is still wor-
king. Manufacturers-sellers will try to convince us in
this regard.
How to behave?
Since planned obsolescence pushes towards unne-
cessary consumption, in the presence of increasing
environmental problems due to this, it does not contri-
bute at all to making production and consumption
sustainable and responsible, going against what is re-
quired by goal #12 of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development. Therefore, it is crucial to reduce this
phenomenon as much as possible. For example, a 30%
increase in the lifespan of devices in use would reduce
the digital sector's energy consumption by 17%, water
consumption by 24%, and the potential for resource
depletion by 21% (Bordage 2019b, p.33). To this end,
several levers of action can be used.
• Political leverage
The first concerns political powers, the ultimate hol-
ders of legislative power. Increasing the minimum
warranty period, forcing manufacturers to differentiate
updates according to their needs, providing quality af-
ter-sales service, and phones with easily replaceable
parts are measures that would dramatically reduce
technical obsolescence. Encouraging manufacturers
not to provide overly demanding updates could reduce
software obsolescence. Limiting overly incentivized or
mystifying advertising or marketing practices could
reduce psychological obsolescence (Meunier 2018;
Anastasio 2019). Fifty policy measures, for example,
have been proposed by Halte à l'Obsolescence Pro-
grammée (Vasseur et al. 2019).
Sanctioning manufacturers who practice planned ob-
solescence is another way to reduce it. Proving that a
manufacturer has planned obsolescence intentionally
is a very difficult task. For example, in the case of sof-
tware obsolescence in Windows 7, Microsoft is trying
to cut costs, and it is difficult to prove that the company
consciously tried to cause computers to be replaced.
However, it is not impossible to convict companies of
acts of planned obsolescence. In 2018, the Italian Com-
petition Authority condemned Apple and Samsung for
the phone slowdown cases mentioned above (Bordage
2018). Prosecutions have been initiated in other coun-
tries and could also lead to convictions (Vasseur 2018).
• Individual leverage
The second lever acts at the level of individuals, whose
informed and responsible consumption choices in-
fluence the durability and usability of devices and can
push manufacturers to produce more durable, sustai-
nable, and responsible digital devices and services.
Encouraging repairs instead of buying a new device is
part of sustainable and responsible practices (Bordage
2019a). Free repair guides are available on the Internet
(iFixit 2019). Buying refurbished devices is another best
practice (ADEME 2020). Another sustainable behavior
is to not perform all evolutionary updates, i.e., those not
related to security. If it is necessary to purchase a new
device, it is better to prefer one that is easily repairable
(see BOX). In general, the question to ask is always the
same: is the purchase of a new device necessary or
does it simply satisfy a momentary desire, an artificial
need?
Citizens can also gather in consumer associations to
share information, best practices and services (legal
and otherwise), as well as to make their voice heard,
lobbying the legislature, promoting new bills, or exer-
cising their constitutionally enshrined referendum
powers. For example, the association Halte à l'Ob-
solescence Programmée (HOP) operates in France,
bringing together 35,000 citizens in 2018 (Vasseur
2018). It organizes legal actions against manufactu-
PAGE 69
 11. ReSPoNSiBLe CoNSuMPTioN aND PRoDuCTioN
rers and provides advice on the sustainable purchase
and use of digital technology (HOP 2019).
Several companies have developed devices whose
parts are easily replaceable, even for individuals. We can
mention the smartphones Fairphone (Fairphone 2019) and
Shiftphone (Galán Herranz 2017), as well as the computers
Why! (why! 2019).
Fairphone, a more ethical alternative.
© Fairphone - CC BY-SA 2.0
“Digital promises”
Since its inception, digital technology has been seen
as a means to reduce the environmental footprint of
human activities as it would increase efficiency. For
example, digital technology would allow people to print
less paper, travel less for work, retrieve information, or
make purchases (Bihouix and Mauvilly 2016).
This perception of digital as helping to reduce our
environmental footprint is still prevalent. According
to GeSi, a European lobby representing the interests
of digital businesses, massive digitization would, by
2030, reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 20%, fuel
consumption by 15%, and water and food waste by
20%, while more effectively preserving terrestrial and
marine ecosystems (GeSI and Accenture 2017). Al-
though these figures have been seriously questioned
as being based on simplistic, if not optimistic, assump-
tions (Bieser and Hilty 2018), many institutional actors
emphasize the possibilities offered by digital techno-
logy (European Parliament 2010; Figueres 2015; Biggs
2017).
Several digital technologies actually have great po-
tential. Basically, it involves using digital technology
to collect, via sensors*, a large amount of information.
This is then processed by big data* analytics systems,
sometimes using artificial intelligence* (AI), with the
aim of optimizing the amount of resources needed to
perform an action, and thus increasing efficiency.
This process can be applied to more or less all aspects
of life. Actions performed using this practice are called
"smart." Thus, smart agriculture (smart farming) ap-
plies this principle in agriculture (see Chapter 6), smart
mobility and smart logistics apply it in the transport
of people and goods, and the smart building or smart
home uses it to reduce consumption and resource use
PAGE 70
of buildings (see Chapter 13). The following paragraphs
describe two promising digital applications in terms of
sustainable production and consumption: smart ener-
gy and smart manufacturing. However, there are many
more (Rolnick et al. 2019).
• Smart energy
Even today, it is very difficult to store electricity. So, if
you produce it all at once, some of it will be wasted
(Slaughter 2015). In addition, during peaks in demand
for electricity, it is sometimes necessary to rely on
additional power plants that are very often polluting,
especially if they are powered by fossil fuels. These
plants need to be kept constantly running to be ready
in case of increased demand, which results in signifi-
cant additional energy expenditure. It is therefore es-
sential to match electricity production with demand as
closely as possible. However, this action is extremely
complicated because it is difficult to predict electricity
demand over a 24-hour period each day. The installa-
tion of "smart" electricity meters, or smart meters, can
partially solve this problem.
First, since the latter sends consumption information
once an hour to the grid operator, it is easier to pre-
dict demand (European Commission 2019). Second,
this type of system could help raise the price of electri-
city during pre-detected (and, therefore, subsequently
predictable with reasonable certainty) demand peaks,
prompting users to consume significantly less in ex-
pensive time slots while making it unnecessary to
keep the more polluting back-up power plants running.
Third, the arrival of connected devices inside homes
could further refine demand forecasts if consumption
data * are sent to the grid operator.
However, this type of measure raises questions about
data protection (IEA and OECD 2017) and social justice
if poor people or those with forced choices cannot
avoid having to consume electricity at peak times.
A smart meter.
© CC BY-SA 3.0 - EVB Energy
In addition, it is extremely difficult to manage the
power grid. There are numerous production sites, in-
cluding home solar panels, as well as billions of po-
tential sources of consumption. Not to mention that
each means of production, distribution and storage
has a different environmental impact. So managing the
grid overall with the goal of reducing energy losses as
much as possible is a pharaonic task. Digital can help.
In fact, AI*, endowed with computational power and
memories far superior to human ones could facilitate
optimal grid management. Energy grids managed with
information and communication technologies (ICTs)
are referred to as "smart." They are also referred to as
smart grids (GeSI and Accenture 2015). Note that this
type of system can also be adopted for gas and wa-
ter distribution (European Commission 2019; GeSI and
Accenture 2017).
It is estimated that the use of all smart energy tech-
nologies could reduce electricity production (and
consumption) by 9% for the same demand (European
Commission 2019).
The smart grid can also facilitate the shift to renewable
energies, which emit fewer greenhouse gases, even
if their emissions are not zero (Jancovici 2019), in
the first instance due to the use of metals in their in-
frastructure (see "Metal depletion" section); this is
especially true for first-generation wind and solar PV.
In addition, the production of this type of energy (still)
depends on weather conditions: if wind and light are
weak, wind turbines and solar panels produce almost
no electricity. It is, therefore, sometimes necessary
to rely on supplementary power plants that generate
significant environmental impacts elsewhere in the
power grid (Luoma 2009). And if their arrival makes the
management of electricity grids more complex, on the
other hand, the systematic adoption of smart grids has
the potential to solve this problem through the timely
monitoring of a myriad of data, cascading increased
adoption of renewable energy grid points (IEA and
OECD 2017, pp. 93-94).
Smart manufacturing :
The concept of smart manufacturing is very similar
to that of Industry 4.0 (see Chapter 1), except that the
emphasis is on reducing environmental impact. The
various components of the enterprise - machines, em-
ployees, etc. - are equipped with sensors that collect
data, sent through the Internet of Things* and interpre-
ted through big data analytics* (very voluminous data
that requires artificial intelligence systems to analyze).
It is possible to avoid failures and breakage of parts,
better coordinate the actions of various departments
in the company or better organize human-machine in-
teraction (Accenture 2015). Other digital technologies
can also be used. It is hoped, although not necessa-
rily empirically verified (Lifset 2017), that 3D printers
can reduce resource waste during manufacturing and
make products lighter (IEA and OECD 2017).
In all, GeSI and Accenture (2015, p.131) predict a 50%
reduction in greenhouse gas emissions for a com-
pany adopting these practices. While this figure seems
exaggerated, the potential to reduce environmental im-
pact is indeed high.
Effets rebonds
Thanks to technological advances, in the digital eco-
nomy as in other sectors, fewer and fewer resources
are needed to perform the same action (Gossart 2015;
Jackson 2017, p.121). However, despite these gains,
the total amount of energy and raw materials used has
been increasing worldwide for over a century (The Shift
Project 2019; Geldron 2018, p.6). This counterintui-
tive phenomenon is related to the rebound effect, also
known as Jevons' paradox.
A rebound effect is that phenomenon whereby the de-
crease in the amount of energy or a natural resource
required to perform an action is partially or fully off-
set by the increase in demand for that same resource
caused by adaptive behaviors of firms (Villani 2018). In
other words, the decrease in the amount of resources
needed would be offset, at least in part, by changes in
individual and collective behaviors.
Direct and Indirect rebound effects
There are several types of rebound effects. The first is
the direct effect, where the increase in efficiency causes
an increase in the use of the same good or service. The
second is the indirect effect, which is about increasing
the consumption of other goods or services (Gossart
2015). To illustrate this, let's take the example of the
smart grid, which by increasing energy efficiency, at the
same time, drastically reduces electricity prices. In this
way, people save money that they can decide to spend,
either by consuming more electricity (direct rebound
effect), or by purchasing and using other goods and
services that in turn require energy (indirect rebound
effect). For example, people may decide to go on va-
cation to distant places by taking a plane. Saving also
consumes energy because the bank will still reinvest
the money deposited in the account into the economy,
even if there are more ethical and sustainable invest-
ments (Financité 2020).
In fact, any resource gain will be at least partially offset.
In the case of energy, which is the most studied, the di-
rect and indirect rebound effects are, according to stu-
dies, on the order of 41-78%, depending on the scope
(Chitnis and Sorrell 2015). Thus, in the worst case, the
assumed energy gains are almost completely offset by
these two levels of rebound effects.
In summary, digital technology causes direct and indi-
rect rebound effects because it allows the same acti-
vity to be performed at a lower cost. In fact, watching a
movie or listening to music has become less expensive
with streaming platforms*. The Internet allows you to
collect a wealth of information for free, Airbnb makes it
possible to reduce the price of renting a place to stay,
PAGE 71
 11. ReSPoNSiBLe CoNSuMPTioN aND PRoDuCTioN

the cloud* can lower the cost of storing information,

and so on. This saved money will then be reinvested, Hey! Have you Well, I really need
generating environmental effects and costs (Santarius seen the last to watch it
2017). episode of tonight...
Warrior ?
Here it is! It’s a great
A fish,
deal, twice as cheap,
please! Yeah, it is much
today!
Here it is! It’s a great
A fish, too cool! Bla bla
deal, twice as cheap,
please!
today!
Ah! So, I’m bying 2
of them! SYSTEMIC Rebound Effect:
Ah! So, I’m bying 2 transformation of social norms
of them!
DIRECT Rebound effect • Rebound effect “Activities acceleration”Hé ! Bonne nouvelle !
prévu mais ça m’a
Second, technologies allow actions to be performed
DIRECT Rebound effect much faster. For example, shopping, listening to mu-
Here it is! It’s a great
A fish, sic, ordering a cab, or sharing information are perfor-
deal, twice as cheap,
please! med much faster with digital technologies (Santarius
today!
A fish,
Here it is! It’s a great 2017). The time saved then allows for other activities to
please!
deal, twice as cheap, be performed, which in turn will have an environmen-
Awesome! today! tal impact (Gossart 2015; Wallenborn 2018). It is even
So, I’m buying stickers suspected that digital technology has a tendency to
for my collection too!
Awesome! speed up the pace of life (see Chapter 7), which could
So, I’m buying stickers further increase this rebound effect.
for my collection too!

INDIRECT Rebound Effect .

Super! With this new program, I go
INDIRECT Rebound Effect 10 times faster!

Wow! In this way I And tonight, I’ll

Macroeconomic rebound effects
There is a third type of rebound effects: macroecono-
mic or structural rebound effects (Wallenborn 2018;
Gossart 2015). While the first two types described
above concern changes in individual behavior, the ones
analyzed in this section pertain to collective changes
triggered by efficiency gains. There are several types of
macroeconomic rebound effects: we will analyze four
of them, each related to the other three. This list is not
exhaustive. Indeed, it is extremely difficult to list all po-
tential rebound effects, and it is even more difficult to
quantify them (Wallenborn 2018).
• Rebound effect "trasformation of social
rules systems"
First, new technologies allow for such an increase in
comfort (see Chapter 8), that societal expectations in
this regard are gradually expanding in a virtually ir-
reversible way (Shove 2003). Consumer behavior is
adapting to the new standards. When it comes to di-
gital technology, it has become very difficult to do wi-
thout it since so much of life happens in contact with
it. If you haven't watched the latest Netflix series or if
you are not on social, it will be harder to participate in
social life. Because of this, the risks of exclusion have
increased. If you don't have computer skills, it's harder
to find a job. The list goes on.
can increase my have the time to
work load. pay a visit to my
friend Carla!
SYSTEMIC Rebound Effect :
"Accelerator of activity"
• Rebound effect “Cascade of technological
innovations”
Third, a technological innovation allows new technolo-
gical advances to occur. It may reduce production
costs, increase performance quality, or even increase
output. These different characteristics can make cer-
tain previously impossible innovations possible or fea-
sible. Cascading innovations have the potential to radi-
cally transform society. As an illustration, without the
invention of the steam engine in the 18th century, to-
day's society, with its environmental impacts, would
not have been possible (Wallenborn 2018). In terms of
digital technology, advancements have allowed for the
implementation of artificial intelligence, connected ob-
jects, and even the transmission of an increasing
amount of information. However, the latter activity has

PAGE 72
a large environmental impact (see Chapters 10 and 13). effects, yet some studies have tried their hand at it. For
the case of energy, Lange et al. (2020) created a model
to account for systemic rebound effects, concluding
And And search that digital technology had a rebound effect of over
Here is and Linux!
Minitel! engine 100%. This case, known as "blowback," is such that
IBM!
Yahoo! the initial benefit is more than offset. Therefore, digital
technology as a whole has, to date, resulted in an in-
crease, not a decrease, in overall energy consumption.
These findings are entirely contrary to the claims of di-
gital lobbies such as GeSI and Accenture (2017), whose
analyses largely underestimate rebound effects.
And a And And And…
And Another attempt to consider systemic rebound effects
mobile Wifi! Wikipedia! YouTube! all the
was made by Magee and Devezas (2017) who created
phone! World! an economic model that includes potential rebound ef-
SYSTEMIC Rebound Effect: fects. By analyzing data from the past fifty years, they
"Cascade of technological innovations" realized that technological advances had not led to a
decrease, but, rather, an increase in the total amount of
energy used, resulting in a rebound effect of over 100%.
In addition, the two scholars analyzed rebound effects
• Rebound effect "Production acceleration" on some fifty materials and concluded that, in most
cases, the increased efficiency caused the increased
Fourth, increasing efficiency simultaneously increases
consumption that more than offset the initial gains.
productivity because less work is required to perform
Therefore, "backfiring" would be the norm. This study
the same action (Wallenborn 2018). However, producti-
does not focus specifically on digital technology, but
vity itself is, in general, a source of economic growth
on technological progress in general. However, since
(see Chapter 2). The latter is linked, studies and histori-
digital is a major part of innovation in recent decades
cal trends in hand, to greater environmental impacts.
(see Chapter 4), the conclusions should apply to it as
Indeed, it has never been possible to grow economical-
well.
ly while reducing global environmental impacts in a
sustainable way. There are many reasons to believe The facts point to the fact that digital technology so
that this will not change in the future (Parrique et al. far has not led to the dematerialization of our societies.
2019). Finally, some early research indicates a close First, contrary to popular belief about the immaterial
link between digitization, economic growth, and energy nature of digital, a large amount of material is used in
consumption (Lange 2017). this area. Thus, in 2020, French digital consumption
predicted the excavation of 197 kg of soil per day per
Courage! I’ll have user (Bordage et al. 2020, p. 9). Second, there are many
the kiddies pool materials rebound effects in the digital world, thus
in two days! outside the domain of energy. As an example, in the
2000s it was hoped that the advent of these technolo-
gies would cause a drastic drop in paper consumption.
For example, "zero paper" goals were implemented in
France. However, due to many rebound effects, such
Great! In one-hour-time it will as the arrival of home printers or increased access to
be ready! Onward to the next information, digital technology caused an impercep-
building site! tible drop in paper consumption, only 1.3% between
2000 and 2010, remaining far from the "zero paper"
dematerialization goal (Bihouix and Mauvilly 2016) -
SYSTEMIC Rebound Effect:
The situation seems to have improved in recent years
"Accelerator of production" within businesses (Bordage 2020). Globally, the num-
ber of printed books is not decreasing while e-book
consumption and Internet book reading has exploded
• What about the peculiar case of digital (Lange et al. 2020).
technology? Consequently, digital technology would be no stranger
to the possible depletion of some materials in a few de-
As explained above, digital technology increases effi-
cades, as it tends to cause an increase, not a decrease,
ciency, and more, in energy. For example, there is no
in their use. It would also cause increased pressure on
longer a need for stores to sell products or books to
ecosystems (see Chapter 12).
find information, let alone too many resources, thanks
to smart manufacturing and smart agriculture, etc. We
are talking about the potential of digital dematerializa- • Future prospects
tion (Magee and Devezas 2017). As analyzed in previous sections, digital technology
It is very difficult to take into account all the rebound has so far increased, not decreased, Humanity's envi-

PAGE 73
 11. ReSPoNSiBLe CoNSuMPTioN aND PRoDuCTioN

ronmental impacts. Unless this course is reversed, im- Metals depletion

pacts will be increasingly important in the future. The
possible worldwide deployment of 5G will require new
heavy infrastructure (Grijpink et al. 2018) resulting in a Most of the more than sixty metals on the Periodic
large increase in data traffic (Cisco 2018), and pur- Table are used in digital devices, usually in minute
chase of a plethora of new connected objects. There amounts. In a smartphone, for example, there are 200
were already 19 billion of them in 2019 and their num- to 300 mg of silver, 10 mg of palladium and even 2 mg
ber could reach 48 billion by 2025 (Bordage 2019b). In of platinum, among other elements.
particular, 5G would require many satellites to be put
into orbit. SpaceX and Amazon's Project Kuiper plan to
deploy approximately 50,000 satellites, while, at the Minerals, metals, and other elements of an iPhone
Materials used to produce an Iphone 6 (model of 16 GB)
moment, there are only 8,000 objects sent into space Sources of data: 911 Metallurgist (Vice.com)
since the beginning of the space age (Lucchese 2020).
The next few years could also see the massive advent Aluminium 31,15 g Hydrogen 5,52 g
of cryptocurrencies* and blockchain*, whose environ- Carbon 19,85 g Chromium 4,94 g
mental impact will be considerable, according to pre- Total
weight:
18,71 g Nickel 2,72 g
dictions (Digiconomist 2019), although there are some Oxygen 129 grams

blockchain techniques that consume less energy Iron 18,63 g Value of the Lithium 0,87 g

(Jospe 2019). Silicon 8,14 g

elements: 1,03$
Zinc 0,69 g
Copper 7,84 g

Cobalt 6,59 g

But were are we Magnesium, Tin, Calcium, Sulfur, Potassium, Manganese, Titanium, Phosphorous, Lead.

going??? Wouldn’t be the

time to slow ?
Do we actually
need all this? The quantities are slightly higher in tablets and com-
Given all the
puters (Bihouix and Mauvilly 2016). However, given the
damages ...
huge demand for digital objects - for example, 258 mil-
Are we really
lion computers (Gartner 2019) and 1.45 billion smart-
happier? phones were produced in 2018 (TrendForce 2019) - the
share of digital in the consumption of some metals is
very high (see Table 1).
The future, however, is not hopeless. Rebound effects
are not necessarily immutable and are also the conse-
quence of political and social decisions. Research is Part of the electronics in
Metal
underway to determine under what circumstances they the World production
occur and how to reduce them (Van den Bergh 2011; Copper 6%
Santarius et al. 2018). Some solutions have been pro- Gold 10%
posed, such as slowing down the construction of new Palladium 10%
infrastructure that risks causing new rebound effects Silver 20%
or reducing inequalities in power or even decreasing Tin 35%
competition at all levels (Wallenborn 2018). Policies Cobalt 35%
geared toward more sober and responsible consump- Tantalum 60%
tion are also likely to generate positive effects (Gossart Indium 80%
2015; Hilty 2008, p.72; Bordage 2019b).
Ruthenium 80%
Gallium 90%
Yet, one should not believe that technologies are neces- Germanium 30-50%
sarily harmful to the environment (Hilty and Aebischer
2015). It is up to businesses and individuals to make
choices that lead to the use of technologies to reduce Table 1. Percentages of global consumption of metals from the
environmental impact. However, without a change in electronics sector, of which the digital economy is a primary
social, political, and economic direction, it is likely that component.
digital technology will continue to be a hindrance and Source : Bihouix et Mauvilly (2016).
not an asset in building sustainable societies.

However, as discussed in the "Why does it matter?"

section at the beginning of the chapter, many decisive
metals for the digital sector would be close to depletion
(see Table 2).

PAGE 74
 Short-term exhaustion Medium-term exhaustion
(less than 30 year) (less than 50 years)
Antimony Manganese
Tin Nickel
Silver Copper
Cobalt Selenium
Gold Niobium
Zinc Molybdenum
Lead Lithium
Bismuth
Chromium
Indium
Germanium
Tantalum
Table 2. Estimated date of depletion of important metals in the
digital world if production rates continue at the rate of recent
decades. Not all of the reserves considered are profitable, and
therefore not necessarily exploitable at this time.
(USGS 2019, p.195-196).
Data sources: data crossing from Bihouix (2015), Geldron
(2018, p.9), Halloy (2018, p.40-41) et USGS (2019).
Metal reserves are variable; in fact, they can be ex-
panded if new reserves are discovered or if new mining
techniques are applied (Bihouix 2015, p.9).
However, as explained above, increasing reserves
would imply new rebound effects.
Magee and Devezas (2017) suggest that "blowback"
was largely material-related in the past, so paradoxi-
cally, the number of years until reserves are depleted
could decrease if new reserves are discovered or are
technically accessible.
In addition, we must keep in mind that different me-
tals are generally produced by mining a single ore. For
example, tantalum may be associated with niobium,
lithium, tin, zirconium, titanium, cesium, and beryllium
in its deposits (L'élementarium 2020). Thus, if a metal
is near depletion, it can still be mined (and used) be-
cause other metals with which it is associated are nee-
ded (Geldron 2018).
Therefore, stopping or slowing the production of a
nearly depleted metal is much more complicated than
one might think.
Additionally, recycling most metals is extremely diffi-
cult. First, recycled materials often decline in quality
such that they can no longer be used in the industries
that require them (Bihouix 2018, 12:14-13:21). Second,
they are often used in very small quantities, both in the
digital economy and in other sectors. Thus, the finan-
cial and energy costs of recycling become prohibitive
(Bihouix 2018). According to the United Nations Envi-
ronment Programme (2011), in 2011 less than 1% of
34 of the more than 60 metals in the Periodic Table
were being recycled in the form of a metal or metal
alloy, retaining the same initial chemical and physical
properties - this is referred to as functional recycling.
Eighteen of the sixty metals, on the other hand, had
a rate greater than 50%. Most of the metals listed in
Table 2 have a functional recycling rate above 50%, but
their non-recyclable output continues to increase (Gel-
dron 2018). This is, again, a partial consequence of the
rebound effect. Therefore, even if companies strive to
maximize material recycling, the savings will most li-
kely be partially or fully offset by rebound effects.
In addition to calling into question the sustainability of
our lifestyles, metal depletion poses real problems with
regard to the transition to renewable energy. Indeed,
many metals important to the digital economy that are
close to depletion are used to produce renewable ener-
gy (World Bank 2017, p.75), and many of them have
characteristics that make them difficult to replace (Bi-
houix 2015, p.13). It is likely that, in a decade or two, we
will have to make the choice between more digital for
energy use and more digital for other uses.
Between mining metals for digital services and mining metals for
renewable energy, which one to choose?
© CC0 - Public Domain
The depletion of metals, in addition to questioning the
sustainability of our lifestyles, poses real problems
with regard to the transition to renewable energies. In-
deed, many important metals in the digital world and
close to exhaustion are used in renewable energies
(World Bank 2017, p.75), and several of them have cha-
racteristics that make them difficult to replace ( Bihouix
2015, p.13). It is likely that, in a decade or two, we will
have to make the choice between "more digital" and
"more renewable energy" .
In short.
• Planned obsolescence induces the consump-
tion of new devices instead of increasing the
usability of old ones. It therefore makes pro-
duction and consumption very unresponsible
and sustainable. Both public authorities and
individuals have important levers of action to
reduce these practices as much as possible.
• The digital industry promises a reduction in
environmental impact, particularly through so-
called "smart" technologies.
• The benefits from technologies, and particu-
larly digital technology, will be partially or fully
offset by changes in individual and collective
behavior. These are the rebound effects. Em-
pirical models show us that digital technology
tends to increase humanity's total environmen-
tal impact.
• Rebound effects are not immutable. We must,
PAGE 75
 11. ReSPoNSiBLe CoNSuMPTioN aND PRoDuCTioN
individually and collectively, think about how
to reduce them. This will undoubtedly require
major political and social changes.
• The digital sector is very greedy for metals.
Therefore, it contributes to the depletion of
many of them. In a few decades, it may no
longer be possible to produce and consume
so many digital services. Many of the metals
used in digital are also important for energy
production, renewables in the lead. Global di-
gital consumption and production is therefore
unsustainable and irresponsible.
Related classroom resources
Educational Pathway n. 2 : What do you say, is it
ecological?
• Activity N. 1 - "The lifecycle of a smartphone"
• Activity N. 2 - "In search of information!”
• Activity N. 3 - The digital quiz"
Educational Pathway n. 3 : “What does digital tech-
nology bring to my life, to our lives?”
• Activity N. 1 "In the skin of a seller"
• Activity 4 "The Philosophical debate".
Educational Pathway n. 4 : What Rebound Effects?
• Activité 1 "Daily rebound effects?"
Educational Pathway n. 5 : How can we act?
• Activity N. 1 "In search of solutions!"
• Activity N. 2 "Law makers"
• Activity N. 3 "Digital sobriety at my school"
Educational Pathway n. 6 : A future with or without
digital technology?
• Activity N. 1 "Controversial future scenarios?"
Training Modules:
2 (U.A. 2.1.), 3 (U.A. 3.5, 3.6.), 4 (U.A. 4.1., 4.2.), 5
(U.A. 5.1.), 6 (U.A. 6.3. et 6.4.).
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PAGE 77
 12.
ecosytems

© CC IPBES - Denis Zhitnik - Shutterstock.com

 DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY
CHaPTeR 12: ecosytems
Why is it important?
An ecosystem is defined as a living whole formed by
a grouping of different interrelated species, among
themselves and with their environment. It is therefore
not a static element, but a system resulting from the
co-evolution between different living beings and their
habitats (Aufray and Rovillé).
Humanity in fact lives in constant interaction with its
environment and the ecosystems that compose it,
drawing great benefits from ecosystems that allow,
among other things, to purify air and water, to feed us,
to protect us from natural disasters, to cure us or delay
the most harmful consequences of climate change.
Thus, ecosystems are essential for the survival of human
communities and future generations (Lambertini 2017).
On the other hand, the conservation of ecosystems can
be seen as a moral duty, recognizing that each of its
components - some of which feel pain, while others are
endowed with subjective experiences - has, by certain
margins of tolerance, the right to exist, to live, to maintain
and regenerate (Singer 1975).
A large part of ecosystems, however, is in danger. About
13 million hectares of forests are lost each year, about
three times the area of Belgium. However, forests are
home to more than 80% of animal, plant and insect
species (UN 2019). As for coral reefs, on which about a
third of known marine species depend (Lim 2017), about
20% of them have already been completely destroyed and
50% are at high risk (UN 2016).
Global warming of 2 degrees would reduce the total area
of coral reefs by 99% (IPCC 2018). Equally alarming, 60%
of the world's wild vertebrate populations - mammals,
fish, birds, reptiles and amphibians - disappeared
between 1970 and 2014 (WWF 2018). In Europe,
flying insect populations were reportedly reduced by
80% between 1989 and 2016 (Hallmann et al. 2017).
The degradation of ecosystems can go as far as the
disappearance of some species. Thus, about 7% have
already disappeared due to the human species (Régnier
et al. 2015) and up to 1 million of the 8 million animal
and plant species recorded on Earth are threatened with
extinction (IPBES 2019). If the current rate of extinction
is confirmed, we could be at the beginning of the "sixth
mass extinction" on the planet (AFP 2019). Ecosystem
collapse could occur suddenly in the coming decades,
particularly due to climate change (Trisos et al. 2020).
Human activity is responsible for the degradation
of ecosystems. Causes include climate change, soil
and air pollution, deforestation, water consumption,
environmental transformation, land grabbing, waste
accumulation, poaching, and overfishing.
In 2019, human consumption required the production of
the equivalent of 1.7 times what the Earth can provide. For
Europe, this figure rises to 2.8 planets (Global Footprint
Network 2019).
* Word or acronym defined at the end of the document
and
ENJEUX ENVIRONNEMENTAUX
RELATED GOAL OF THE UN AGENDA 2030
FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT:
Digital technology as hope for ecosystem
protection
Limiting resource consumption
First, there are digital services* designed with the
goal of reducing the consumption of human re-
sources, particularly in the areas of agriculture (see
ch. 6), transportation and housing (see ch. 13), or
business (see ch. 11). Because these techniques
aim to reduce environmental and ecosystem degra-
dation caused by human activities, digital techno-
logy* can be seen as hopeful. However, it has been
widely observed and studied that technologies not
infrequently result in additional consumption of re-
sources, partially or wholly offsetting the initial be-
nefits. For example, it is possible that the application
of new technologies in the transportation and hou-
sing sectors will cause more cars to be purchased
and/or used per inhabitant, replacing them more
often and/or even causing the temperature of buil-
dings to rise (see ch.13). This is the phenomenon of
the rebound effect, explained in Chapter 11.
Conservation and restoration of ecosystems
Second, digital technology has the potential to im-
prove the conservation and restoration of ecosystems
(Arts et al. 2015). The arrival of these new technolo-
gies applied to the environment has been met with en-
thusiasm (Arts et al. 2015) and is generating a whole
range of initiatives.
Using sensors*, cameras, drones*, and even satellites,
they are able to gather new information about the en-
vironment and ecosystems. This information can be
more frequent, over a wider space, with a higher re-
solution, being able, moreover, to reach previously
inaccessible places (Blumstein et al. 2011). Two exa-
mples of platforms that bring together such data* are
Global Forest Watch (2020) and InfoAmazonia (2020),
which provide the public with the latest maps of the
world's forest cover, density, deforestation, fires, etc.
(Blumstein et al. 2011). Another innovative way to
gather information about ecosystems is through ro-
bots. These robots, designed to resemble species,
are able to camouflage themselves in the natural en-
vironment, thus collecting data that is unaffected by
the presence of an external agent outside the context
(Arts et al. 2015).
PAGE 79
 12. ecosytems
An example of digital modeling of the world's threatened aquatic and
terrestrial species.
© UNEP-WCMC
The data thus collected can be used and interpreted
by scientists or artificial intelligences* (AIs) (Lamba et
al. 2019; Lambertini 2017) to help restore or conserve
ecosystems. For example, they can help better ma-
nage forests, count the number of species, or better
understand their movements. For example, this in-
formation can be used to prevent overfishing or boat
passage in certain locations (Lim 2017; Lambertini
2017), to establish smart barriers to divert wildlife to
conserve them (Villani 2018), to plan for moving waste
into the ocean to recover it (Ocean Cleanup 2020), or
to assess the socioeconomic benefits of ecosystems
so that policymakers take them into account by giving
them the right value (Natural Capital Project 2020).
Citizens’ participation
Digital technology also allows citizens to be involved
in conservation. The term "citizen science" ("citizen
science") refers to the participation of the general pu-
blic in scientific research (Andrachuk et al. 2019). Ap-
plications such as eBird (2020) and iNaturalist (2020)
allow citizens to report the presence of animal or plant
species and their geographic location. Another illus-
tration of citizen science, the Let's Do It (2020) initia-
tive collected images from users to infer-thanks to
AI image analysis systems-the places that contain
the most waste to be collected (Fing and Transition2
2019). The main advantage of citizen science is that it
allows a large amount of information to be collected in
a short time and without too much effort on the part
of scientists (Andrachuk et al. 2019). In some cases,
local communities are involved in the design of the
innovation, with the goal of making it more useful for
the conservation of their environment (Andrachuk et
al. 2019).
Digital technology facilitates citizen participation in science
© CC0 - Public Domain
PAGE 80
Fight against poaching and trafficking of species
Digital technologies are helping in the fight against
poaching and trade in protected and/or endangered
species. Using drones, radars, GPS trackers, thermal
imaging cameras, shot detectors sometimes aided
by Big data* and AI analytics, poachers can be more
easily monitored and stopped. Marco Lambertini
(2017), director general of WWF International,
explains that the use of such technologies in Kenya's
Masai Mara National Reserve has increased the
effectiveness of patrols by 60%. It is also hoped that
blockchain* can prevent illegal trafficking. In fact, this
technology can be used to fulfill contracts without
tampering. If it is applied, it will become impossible
to misrepresent on a particular merchandise or
shipment (Chapron 2017; Howson 2020).
Advantages and opportunities, but also risks
and limits
These examples represent just a few activities and
areas where digital technology is assisting in preser-
ving and restoring ecosystems. Another example is
the use of drones to plant forests faster (Peters 2019;
Villani 2018). These new techniques raise hopes for
better, faster, and lower cost results while being more
accessible to citizens than traditional conservation
techniques (Arts et al. 2015). Certain uses of these
technologies do indeed lead to real advances (Petto-
relli et al. 2014), but not everything is as rosy as in the
initial promises. There are, in fact, many unknowns and
problems with them (Arts et al. 2015; Andrachuk et al.
2019). Their practical implementation is usually more
difficult than expected and does not always bring the
expected results (Joppa 2015). In addition, ecosys-
tems can be negatively affected, see noise caused by
drones (Lambertini 2017). And again, data collected
through citizen science often includes biased errors
that end up distorting research results (Andrachuk et
al. 2019). Some of the techniques mentioned above
can end up in the hands of enemies of ecosystem
conservation, in particular, poachers (Arts et al. 2015;
Lambertini 2017) or industrial fishing fleets that can
use AI to find shoals of fish more easily, thus, conti-
nuing to empty the oceans. Finally, digital technology
itself has a significant impact on the environment.
Chapters 10, 11, and 13 explore this issue.
Digital technology’s role in ecosystem
degradation
Despite the potential for safeguarding ecosystems, the
use of digitized tools has its share of negative conse-
quences. From here on, the chapter offers an exami-
nation of the problems associated with the production
of metals in digital devices and the resulting electrical
and electronic waste (WEEE). However, they are not the
only harmful impacts of technology on ecosystems; in
a sense, they represent the tip of the iceberg. Their visi-
bility is inherent in the fact that they materialize locally
or regionally in the short to medium term. Other much
less visible damaging effects on ecosystems occur in
the long term, on other continents or even across the
Planet (McGranahan 2006): climate change is one of
the most damaging. For more on the impacts of digi-
tal technology on climate change, see Chapter 10. For
a complete view of the impacts on the environment,
we recommend reading the entire second part of the
booklet (chapters 10,11, 12, 13).
Metals production
Most of the more than sixty natural metals of the pe-
riodic table of metals and nonmetals are used in digital
equipment (Rathi et al. 2013; IDDRI et al. 2018). They
must be extracted from the ground in the form of ore to
be recovered, following various operations, mechanical
and chemical. For this reason, the metal mining and
production sector is among the most polluting in the
world (Bihouix and Mauvilly 2016).
First, in order to extract the minerals, one has to frag-
ment, clean over and over again, build roads, railways
or port facilities. These activities are carried out at the
expense of forests, agricultural or coastal areas (Bi-
houix and Mauvilly 2016). Ecosystems still suffer im-
pacts. In several cases, extraction takes place within
protected nature reserves. One example for all is that
of the Lower Kando region, in the Katanga province of
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), where mi-
ning concessions have been granted within the nature
reserve. Until the early 2000s, this protected area in-
cluded many endangered species, which have disap-
peared or significantly declined since mining activities
began. For example, the hippo population dropped
from 400 to 50 in less than 15 years (Milieudefensie,
SOMO, and GoodElectronics 2015)..
Deforestation due to informal gold mining in a nature reserve in Peru.
This type of mining typically uses toxic products that are discharged
directly into nature, such as cyanide and mercury, causing degradation
of ecosystems and the health of inhabitants (Byrne et Hudson-Edwards)
© CC BY-SA 4.0 -Planet Labs
Mining produces the displacement of large amounts of
land from which to extract minerals. As an example, in
2020, the digital consumption of a single French citizen
caused each person to excavate 197 kg of land per year
(Bordage et al. 2020, p. 9). The production of an iPhone
6 is estimated to require the displacement of about 30
kg of soil. Weighing only 129 g, data in hand, it would
produce a (ecosystem) impact on the soil about 230
times greater than its mass (Merchant 2017). The Shift
Project (2018) calculated the land displaced by mining,
taking into account only six of the many metals used in
digital devices. According to their results, 7 kg of land
must be removed to produce a laptop computer, which
becomes 200 kg in the case of an Internet-connected
TV (smart TV). A 2002 study calculated that 32 kg of
raw materials were needed to build a 2 g microchip
(Williams et al. 2002). In total, the amount of waste
from global metal production, of which digital is only a
part, is between 6 and 7 billion tons per year, about one
ton per person (Bihouix and Mauvilly 2016).
The production of the metals found in digital devices
requires a large amount of fresh water, equivalent to 3.6
billion showers in 2019, or about 0.2% of global water
consumption that year (Bordage 2019). These figures
are much larger in the case of France, the only country
on which information could be found. Thus, a French
person would consume approximately 9 liters of fresh
water per day through their digital activities (Bordage
et al. 2020, p.9), or the equivalent of over 6% of their
household water consumption (SDES 2019). Howe-
ver, 88% of that water consumption occurs during the
manufacturing phase and thus has an overwhelming
impact on the states in which minerals are extracted
(Bordage et al. 2020, pp. 9-10). Therefore, the ma-
nufacture of a connected television would require an
average of 26,000 liters of freshwater (Bordage et al.
2020). As a result, the consumption and production
of digital devices disrupt water cycles contributing to
drinking water shortages in some regions of the Planet,
harming ecosystems and humans (WWF 2020).
Mining in Katanga, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
© CC BY NC 2.0 - Dave Dyet
Des méthodes diverses et variées ont été mises en
place pour l’extraction de minerais et la récupération
des métaux, celles-ci utilisant dans de nombreux cas
des produits dangereux pour l’environnement – pour
n’en mentionner que quelques-uns, mercure, cya-
nure, acide sulfurique et plusieurs solvants (Bihouix
et Mauvilly 2016). En plus des métaux recherchés, ces
procédés li- bèrent d’autres métaux présents dans le
minerai dans des concentrations pouvant les rendre
dangereux. Tous ces produits, qui se retrouvent gé-
néralement sous formes d’eaux ou de boues conta-
minées mais aussi sous forme de poussières, sont
appelés des « résidus miniers ». Les réglementations
environnemen- tales obligent généralement l’industrie
à filtrer et neu- traliser au maximum ces résidus pour
qu’ils impactent le moins possible l’environnement et
la santé. Une par- tie des résidus est récupérée pour
PAGE 81
 12. ecosytems
être réutilisée. Une autre est stockée dans des bassins,
appelés « bassins de décantation » (Bihouix et Mauvilly
2016).
Ces mesures n’empêchent pas pour autant une dé-
gradation des écosystèmes. En premier lieu, les lé-
gislations ne sont pas suffisantes pour éviter tous les
risques. Nous sOMMes loin du risque zéro, surtout eu
égard à la quantité de métaux produits chaque an-
née. Il est ainsi très difficile d’éviter la propagation de
poussières des mines. Une surveillance constante des
bassins pendant des dizaines ou des centaines d’an-
nées est par ailleurs nécessaire pour éviter des ruis-
sèlements d’eaux toxiques en dehors des bassins de
décantation, ce qui n’empêche pas que des fuites se
produisent parfois (Bihouix et Mauvilly 2016). En deu-
xième lieu, ces règles ne sont pas appliquées par tous.
Il existe des pays où les législations sont plus permis-
sives. En troisième lieu, la loi n’est pas toujours respec-
tée. La production informelle de métaux – un secteur
étant considéré cOMMe informel s’il n’est ni imposé ni
surveillé par aucune forme de gouvernement – ne suit
que rarement les contraintes législatives. La produc-
tion industrielle, censée être contrôlée, ne les suit pas
toujours non plus.
Ces différentes raisons peuvent donc mener à de
graves dégradations de l’environnement et des éco-
systèmes. Ainsi, bien que les impacts soient bien diffé-
rents d’une mine à l’autre, d’un type de production à un
autre, d’un métal à un autre, il n’existe ni mine durable,
ni production de métal durable (Bihouix et Mauvilly
2016).
Lithium production in Salar de Uyuni, Chile. This site has a peculiar
ecosystem, which has been protected until now.
© CC-BY-SA-3.0 IGO - European Space Agency
• Some examples of ecosystem degradation
This subsection describes the degradation potential
of the metallurgical industry through some (non-ex-
haustive) examples. It is important to note that the
electronics-digital industry, while being one of the
"customers" of metallurgy, is not the only one, and,
therefore, not solely responsible for the environmental
damage illustrated. Finally, it is impossible to know, at
present, the origin of the metals in electronic and digital
devices (see Chapter 1). The digital industry covers a
part of the total global demand for metals - see Table 1,
Chapter 11 to reconstruct the percentages of the global
consumption of some metals.
Although it is difficult if not impossible to establish with
PAGE 82
precision the impact of the digital sector in terms of
ecosystem degradation, it should be noted that most
of the proposed examples concern precisely metals
that are widely used by the digital industry, such as rare
earths - tantalum, palladium, copper or even tin - and
other metals with high environmental impact, such as
silicon (EcoInfo 2010), lithium (EcoInfo 2011), indium
(EcoInfo 2012) and silver (Marhart et. al. 2016). The link
between the chosen examples and digital technology
is, therefore, sufficiently relevant.
It can happen that some tailings ponds, designed in
the form of dams, break. Such events, forty in the de-
cade 2000-2010 (Byrne and Hudson-Edwards 2018),
are extremely dangerous to ecosystems and also pose
risks to residents, who may be contaminated by toxic
sludge, or lose their lives by ending up buried under-
neath them. Some of these collapses have been ma-
naged to dramatically reduce their environmental and
social damage (Byrne et al. 2018), others not so much.
In Brazil, two disastrous incidents have occurred in the
past six years. The first, the break of the Mariana Dam
in 2015, claimed the lives of 19 people and dumped
an estimated 33 million cubic meters - the equivalent
of 23,000 Olympic-sized swimming pools - of fer-
rous waste into the Rio Doce, traveling 650 km until it
reached the Atlantic Ocean seventeen days later (Byrne
and Hudson-Edwards 2018). The breaching of the Bru-
madinho Dam in 2019 was even more tragic in human
terms, resulting in the deaths of 270 people (Pearson
et al. 2019).
Landscape of desolation following the bursting of the Mariana Dam,
Brazil, in 2015.
© CC-BY 2.0 - Senado Federal
Aerial view a few days after the Brumadinho Dam
broke in 2019.
© BY-SA 2.0 - Ibama
A large portion-about 60% in 2019 (USGS 2020a)-
of rare earths, a group of 17 metals particularly used
by the digital industry, are produced around the city
of Baotou, China. Mining these metals is difficult and
polluting because it involves the use of sulfuric and
hydrofluoric acid, with large amounts of toxic mining most polluted in the world (Blacksmith Institute and
waste being released (Byrne and Edwards 2018). Near Green Cross Switzerland 2013). The snow is black, the
Baotou, an artificial lake several hundred meters long air smells of sulfur, and the life expectancy of workers
was constructed to collect toxic sludge. The lands- is 10 years lower than the Russian average (Blacksmith
capes around the lake have become apocalyptic: gray Institute and Green Cross Switzerland 2013).
and lifeless, with dozens of pipelines constantly trans-
porting the sludge. Radioactivity levels near the lake
also became 3 to 4 times higher than normal (Maughan
2015; Cash Investigation 2015).

Discharge towers in Norilsk.

© BY-SA 2.0 - ONU - Peter Prokosch

The Indonesian islands Bangka and Belitung provide

about a quarter of the world's tin production (USGS
The Baotou toxic sludge lake in China.
© GoogleEarth MaxarTechnologies 2020 2020b; Franceinfo 2015). They have fragile coastal
ecosystems composed of corals, seagrasses, and
mangroves (Milieudefensie and GoodElectronics 2016)
Another example of ecosystem degradation, for which
that are severely degraded, in part due to tin mining in
the digital sector is partially responsible, is that of the
coastal areas. In these places, sand is vacuumed by
Kafubu Valley in the Democratic Republic of Congo
moonlighting workers, then examined on a small raft or
(DRC). What used to be a verse valley where the inha-
dumped on the nearby beach to pulverize the precious
bitants lived on agriculture and artisanal fishing has
metal. The residue is then dumped directly into the sea,
progressively deteriorated following the installation of
causing fish to die and corals and algae to suffocate
a series of cobalt mines from 2005 onwards. Today, it
(Milieudefensie and GoodElectronics 2016; Franceinfo
is no longer possible to produce fruits and vegetables,
2015). In addition, sand vacuuming is extremely dan-
fish are dying from lack of oxygen in the river waters
gerous, causing the death of many workers (Franceinfo
and the water in the area is no longer drinkable. Mi-
2015).
ning companies are accused of illegally dumping toxic
mining waste into the river (Milieudefensie, SOMO
and Good Electronics 2015; Scheele et al. 2016). Then
again, in the DRC, pollutions caused by the mining in-
dustry are frequent. Indeed, the minerals extracted
there contain, in addition to the metals initially sought,
rather high concentrations of heavy and radioactive
metals (Manhart et al. 2016). Their dust is dispersed
into the environment during the extraction and trans-
port of the minerals (Scheele et al. 2016; Bihouix and
Mauvilly 2016). The problem in the DRC is not limited
Tin research on Bangka Island, Indonesia.
to the case of cobalt: tantalum mining produces waste © CC BY-NC-ND 4.0- Milieudefensie et GoodElectronics
containing high concentrations of uranium and tho-
rium, both of which are extremely radioactive (Manhart
et al. 2016). Some research has proven that Congolese Digital waste
living near mines have much higher concentrations of
cobalt, lead, cadmium, and uranium in their urine than • Growing quantitities
an average American, forty-three, five, and four times
higher, respectively (Scheele et al. 2016). Pollution Another issue of great concern for ecosystems relates
from these toxic metals is therefore ubiquitous, and to digital waste. The amount of digital waste produced
both ecosystems and humans are affected. each year is not known precisely, as data on it is very
scarce. The amount of waste electrical and electronic
The Norilsk region in the far north of Russia supplies equipment (WEEE), which includes both digital waste,
most of the world's palladium production, as well as and others, such as light bulbs, refrigerators, washing
copper and nickel, three metals used in the electronics machines, toasters, etc. - on the other hand, is known.
and digital industries. The problem here stems pri- It stood at 44.7 billion kg in 2016, the equivalent of
marily from operations performed on the ores, which about 6.1 kg per person. Estimates for 2021 are 52 bil-
cause the release of huge amounts of heavy metals lion kg. In Europe, the number of such wastes was 16.6
and sulfur dioxide (Manhart et al. 2016). The region kg per capita in 2016 (Baldé et al. 2017). WEEE waste
was listed in both 2006 and 2013 as one of the ten is classified into six categories, one of which mainly

PAGE 83
 12. ecosytems
concerns digital devices, and three others touch it par-
tially (Baldé et al. 2017). Based on these figures, we can
estimate that, in 2016, digital waste amounted to ap-
proximately 5-10 billion tons, about 1 kg (on average)
per person. This figure is likely to increase in the years
to come, given the explosion in the number of digital
devices - from 15 to 34 billion between 2010 and 2019,
with a projection of 69 billion in 2025 (Bordage 2019,
p.21). The lack of reliable data on digital waste means
that only WEEE waste can be analyzed.
• Partial recycling do not prevent from
ecosystem degration
WEEE waste includes products that are hazardous to
health and the environment - see EcoInfo (2014, Table
3.9), given the hazardous substances in digital ap-
pliances. For this reason, they should be collected, dis-
posed of, and their parts reused and recycled as much
as possible. Yet, worldwide, only 20% of WEEE waste
was collected and recycled properly in 2016; in Europe,
almost twice as much: 35%. This share has been the
same since 2009 (Baldé et al. 2017, p.72).
The recycling rate is very low.
© CC BY-SA 3.0-Volker Thies
Collection and recycling do not mean the absence of
environmental and health consequences. First, the dis-
mantling of some parts, even if supervised, can result
in the release of toxic dust into the air (Böni et al. 2015).
Second, it is currently not possible to recycle all parts;
usually, only some parts can be recycled, e.g., circuit
boards and batteries (Böni et al. 2015).
Miniaturization and assembly of multiple components
pose serious challenges.
© CC0- Public Domain
Other parts are simply not recyclable or are priced too
high because they contain amounts of material too
small to be separated from each other (Bihouix and
Mauvilly 2016). In addition, the devices were not de-
signed to be easily disassembled (see Chapter 11).
PAGE 84
Thus, in total, about fifteen to twenty metals in our
digital devices are recycled for reuse (Bihouix and
Mauvilly 2016; Charbuillet 2017; IDDRI et al. 2018).
However, some digital equipment contains the majo-
rity of the more than sixty metals found on Earth (Rathi
et al. 2013). And then, some parts will be incinerated,
causing severe air pollution (Böni et al. 2015). Incine-
ration residues, called "bottom ash," often end up in
landfills, are used as road pavement, or end up within
construction materials, even though they contain toxic
products, such as heavy metals (Bihouix and Mauvilly
2016). Non-incinerated parts also go to landfills (Sal-
voch and Pirot 2019). A 2001 study showed that, at the
time, 70% of heavy metals in U.S. landfills came from
WEEE waste (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
2001). All of these residues pose serious risks of long-
term contamination of soils and groundwater.
It is extremely difficult to know the fate of the 80% of
WEEE waste that is not properly collected and recycled.
Approximately 4% of the total would be waste from
high-income countries that would be discarded with
other household waste. Without further action, this
waste will be incinerated or sent to landfills, where it
will slowly pollute the environment. The remaining 76%
ends up under the radar, and it is arduous to know its
fate (Baldé et al. 2017).
• Passing through mafia networks and
sending to Southern countries
It seems that some of the waste that is not properly re-
cycled is collected by traffickers along the streets when
residents leave it on bulky item collection days (Sal-
voch and Pirot 2019). Some of it is stolen from waste
and recycling centers. Another part is sent directly to
nearby scrap dealers, members of some mafia and/or
criminal network that traffics them. The appliances are
dismantled without any decontamination. The remai-
ning parts are sent to landfills or abandoned in the wild.
These completely illegal, often criminal, practices are
believed to be very common (Salvoch and Pirot 2019).
In other cases, the waste travels a long way, passing
through major European ports (Hamburg, Antwerp,
Rotterdam) bound for some southern countries, where
other traffickers take it over (Salvoch and Pirot 2019).
This traffic is very profitable: a 28-ton container of
WEEE waste can be worth between 10,000 and 15,000
euros (Odeyingbo 2019). Later, the waste will be resold,
for example away from the Computer Village in Ike-
ja, near Lagos in Nigeria. Once in the hands of these
dealers, the equipment is deboned in order to recover
its noble parts, which will in turn be resold. The unsa-
lable parts are burned, causing very serious pollution,
particularly from plastics (Salvoch and Pirot 2019).
The precious metals to be mined will not suffer a more
enviable fate. One of the most widely used techniques
to recover some of them is to burn certain components
(Böni et al. 2015). In many cases, toxic chemicals are
used. The products resulting from these operations
will contaminate soils and air (Böni et al. 2015). A re-
view of the literature on emissions caused by recycling
activities in the informal economy in India and China
leads to the identification of high concentrations of
lead, polybrominated diphenyl ether, dioxin, and furan,
all highly toxic chemicals, in both soil and air, water, and
river sediments (Sepùlveda et al. 2010). The practice
of recovering metals such as copper, iron, and alu-
minum by burning cables containing PVC insulation
has been identified as a major source of dioxin (Basel
Convention Secretariat 2011). In addition, it appears
that increasing levels of brominated flame retardants
- hazardous chemicals increasingly removed from
electronic equipment - are found in the breast milk of
people living near illegal recycling sites (Manhart et al.
2011). Workers in this industry, very often marginalized
groups (Böni et al. 2015), endanger the environment,
their own health, and that of other inhabitants in return
for starvation incomes. Among them, there are also
children (Salvoch and Pirot 2019) - see Chapter 1 for
more details on working conditions in the digital sector.
Thus, there are known to be dumpsites (and workers)
for the undeclared recycling of WEEE waste in Agboblo-
shie (Ghana), Lagos (Nigeria), Bangalore (India), Ka-
rachi (Pakistan), and Guiyu (China; Bihouix and Mauvil-
ly 2016; Böni et al.2015; Salvoch and Pirot 2019). The
best known of all is, without a doubt, that of Agbog-
bloshie, on the outskirts of Accra, Ghana. Twenty years
ago, this place still consisted of grasslands and wet-
lands where inhabitants came to fish and bathe.
Today it is one of the ten most polluted areas in the
world (Blacksmith Institute and Green Cross Switzer-
land 2013). About 40,000 people, including many child-
ren, work there using stones,
iron bars and hammers. Once the interesting pieces
have been isolated, they are burned to recover some of
the metals they contain. Among the substances found
in dangerous quantities are cadmium, lead, mercury
and rare earths. With each rain, an oil spill flows out
into the Atlantic Ocean, spreading and polluting the en-
tire Planet (Salvoch and Pirot 2019).
Ghanaians burning electrical wires in Agbogbloshie, Gha-
na, in September 2019.
© CC BY-SA 4.0 - Muntaka Chasant
Open-air landfill in Agbobloshie, Ghana.
©CC BY-SA 2.0-Agbogbloshie Makerspace Platform
Digital waste from around the world is found in these
dumps. Computers from the prestigious King's College
School in London and the University Hospital of Gro-
ningen in the Netherlands are examples of devices that
have been found in Agbogbloshie (Salvoch and Pirot
2019). In total, about 3.5% of European WEEE waste
ends up in countries in the global south. This figure
corresponds to 350,000 tons of hazardous waste per
year (Puckett et al. 2019). The case of the United States
of America is much more troubling, as as much as 40%
of North American WEEE waste makes its way to these
illegal underground recycling sites (Puckett et al. 2019).
This traffic, both within and outside the EU, is illegal,
undeclared, and criminal, and therefore extremely dif-
ficult to control. In practice, due to a decrease in en-
forcement personnel in Europe, few efforts have been
made to stop this trafficking, (Kuerch 2019). In addi-
tion, some countries are blocking the implementation
of stricter international regulations (Salvoch and Pirot
2019).
Conclusions
This chapter has described the positive and negative
potential of digital technology. On the one hand, it helps
save ecosystems; on the other, it causes their degrada-
tion. The following formula applies well to the situation:
"Technology is neither good nor bad, without necessa-
rily having a neutral impact" (Kranzberg 1986). There-
fore, new technologies can generate impacts, both po-
sitive and negative. It is up to us, both individually and
collectively, to use digital tools in such a way as to reap
the benefits while avoiding the deleterious impacts. In
this case, ideally, we should retain only those digital
services that are most useful to people - particularly
those that help protect ecosystems - while minimizing
the impacts that cause environmental degradation. In
chapters 10 and 11, some concrete measures to re-
duce the environmental impact of the digital sector in
the manufacturing and usage phases have been men-
tioned; certainly, recycling devices in a proper way, deli-
vering them to legally mandated territorial sorting cen-
ters, is of crucial importance andrepresents a specific
additional measure.
In short.
• Digital technologies can be used to protect and
conserve ecosystems. They embody the hope
that surveillance, monitoring, restoration...
operations can be carried out more efficiently,
quickly, cheaply, and widely.
• Yet, data and studies show that the digital sec-
tor contributes to ecosystem degradation:
◊ The production of metals needed for digital
equipment has a very heavy impact on eco-
systems in different regions of the Planet and
is responsible for many ecological disasters.
◊ One French person's digital consumption
PAGE 85
 12. ecosytems
causes the displacement of 197 kilograms of
soil each year and accounts for more than 6%
of his or her domestic freshwater consump-
tion.
◊ Digital waste is rarely collected and recycled
properly. It is found in mafia networks, within
which the operation of recovering a few me-
tals comes at a high price to the environment..
Related classroom resources
Educational Pathway n. 1 : What does sustainable
digital technology really means?
• Activity N. 1: "The ecological footprint?"What
does sustainable digital technology really
means?
Educational Pathway n. 2 : What do you think, is it
ecological?
• Activity N.1 "The life cycle of a smartphone"
• Activity N. 2 "In search of information!"
Educational Pathway n. 3 : “What does digital tech-
nology bring to my life, to our lives?”
• Activity 4 "The Philosophical debate".
Educational Pathway n. 4 : “What are the rebound
effects?”
• Activity N. 1 "Everyday rebound effects?"
Educational Pathway n. 5 : How can we act?
• Activity N. 1 "In search of solutions!"
Educational Pathway n. 6 : A future with or without
digital technology?
• Activity N. 1 "Future controversial scenarios?"
Training Modules:
1 (1.1., 1.2., 1.3., 1.4., 1.5., 1.6.), 2 (U.A. 2.1.), 3 (U.A.
3.4.), 4 (U.A. 4.1., 4.2.), 5 (U.A. 5.1.), 6 (U.A. 6.2., 6.3.,
6.4.).
PAGE 86
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PAGE 87
 Sustainable
13. cities and
communities

© CC 0 - PxSphere
 DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY and
ENJEUX ENVIRONNEMENTAUX

RELATED GOAL OF THE UN AGENDA 2030

FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT:

CHaPTeR 13: sustainable cities and

communities
Why is it important?
Cities are home to about half of the world's population
(UN 2016) and three-quarters of Europe's (Eurostat
2018). These figures are expected to reach 70% and
80% respectively in 2050 (Clos 2017; Eurostat 2018).
Urban centers are also catalysts for ideas, business,
occupations, culture, science, and social development
(UN 2016). They are likewise an indispensable context of
action for the implementation of measures that provide
solutions to major environmental problems (Ostrom
2009). In short, urban realities are extremely important to
human societies.
However, cities are associated with many problems
and challenges: although they represent only 3 to 4% of
the earth's surface, they generate about 70% of global
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Air pollution causes
premature deaths estimated at between 400,000 (Eurostat
2018) and 800,000 (Carrington 2019) people per year in
Europe, 15-30 times more than road accidents (Eurostat
2018). About 90% of global city dwellers breathed
unhealthy air in 2016 (UN 2016), compared to 74% in
Europe (Eurostat 2018). Noise, which is very present in
urban centers, is also the cause of 16,600 premature
deaths each year in Europe (Eurostat 2018). These
problems are compounded by poor and/or substandard
housing, degraded infrastructure, numerous traffic jams,
and high rates of crime and vandalism (UN 2016; Eurostat
2018).
Therefore, it is imperative to adapt, transform, and
reframe urban realities so that everyone can live a
fulfilling life there without harming the environment or
future generations.
Smart city
tools and services in urban environments. Thus, sen-
sors are used to detect areas of high pollution, which
is essential for coordinated action to reduce it (Woetzel
et al. 2018a). In Cascais, Portugal, a mobile application
allows citizens to photograph and report incidents and
problems to relevant municipal services (Eggers and
Skowron 2018). The city of Boston in the United States
created a mobile application that, when downloaded,
uses smartphone sensors to detect potholes within the
city (Eggers and Skowron 2018).
In Exeter, UK, a system based on sensors and satellite
imagery was implemented to improve the efficiency of
the waste collection service. Time was saved with bet-
ter organized collection, meaning more was done with
less, without having to buy new trucks or hire new staff.
For an initial investment of £240,000, the city estimates
it has saved more than £800,000 since introduction
(Eurisy 2019).
Similar examples exist for water conveyance systems
or public lighting (Eggers and Skowron 2018). Futuris-
tic cities filled with digital city services have even been
built or are under construction, such as Songdo in Sou-
th Korea or Masdar City in the United Arab Emirates.
There are several broad areas of smart city application:
mobility, housing, security, economy and business,
energy and natural resources, and governance (Höjer
and Wangel 2015; Eggers and Skowron 2018). The first
three cases will be described in detail below. The last
three are addressed in Chapters 3, 12, and 10, respec-
tively.

In the last two decades, the concept of "smart city", or

"intelligent city" in Italian, has emerged. It is a rather
vague and difficult to define expression (Van den
Buuse and Kolk 2019), mainly because it was created
with the marketing goal of attracting attention (Höjer
and Wangel 2015). The smart city generally refers to
the massive application of digital services * within ci-
ties (European Union 2014; Fing and Transition2 2019),
containing in particular: sensors, multiple objects
connected * to the Internet of Things (IoT)* and even
artificial intelligence (AI)* systems. These technologies
enable the collection of information that, when inter- The notion of “smart city” entails several fields of digital
preted, can make urban processes more efficient. application.
© CC - CND (photo PxSphere)
Official smart city goals are to improve the quality of
life for residents and visitors, increase economic com-
petitiveness to attract new talent and businesses, and
make cities environmentally sustainable (Eggers and
Skowron 2018; Ferro de Guimarães et al. 2020).
There are many examples of the application of digital

* Word or acronym defined at the end of the document PAGE 89

 13. Sustainable cities and communities
Digital promises
Mobility and/or “smart mobility”
The term "smart mobility" characterizes the use of digi-
tal services* in the field of mobility. It is assumed that
mobility will benefit greatly from the deployment of di-
gital technologies.
The notion of “smart city” entails several
fields of digital application.
© CC - CND (photo PxSphere)
• Smoothing road traffic
Some digital services would allow traffic to flow more
smoothly. The Waze mobile app is a driving assistant
that, using information about the service user's loca-
tion, adapts to traffic delays and road problems to en-
sure the fastest route at all times (Fing and Transition2
2019).
Digital services can detect or even prevent road in-
frastructure problems more quickly, such as, for exa-
mple, a sign failure. They may include "smart parking"
systems, aimed at providing information about the
location of available parking spaces to avoid endless
and unnecessary trips around the city (Woetzel et al.
2018b).
"Smart" traffic sign panels are currently being tested,
which would adapt to traffic at any given time and keep
it flowing. Such signs could, for example, allow people
to reduce the speed limit during periods of heavy traffic
or drive in the bus lane when buses are not present.
These various innovations are likely to reduce average
travel time by nearly 10%, if taken all together and used
to their full potential (Woetzel et al. 2018b).
• Reducing pollution and greenhouse gas
emissions
Some digital services would reduce the environmental
impact of the transportation sector (Axsen and Sova-
cool 2019). These innovations are generally part of the
concept of "shared mobility" which, as the name sug-
gests, is characterized by the way of moving around
using different shared means of transport (car sharing,
bike sharing, scooter sharing, but also carpooling).
Shared bicycle, scooter, or car systems have appeared
and promote the use of shared transportation (Fing
and Transition2 2019). Platforms such as Uber, Lyft
PAGE 90
or BlaBlaCar also allow people to share a car ride with
other people. Although this is not their main motiva-
tion, they increase the occupancy rate of vehicles, thus
reducing pollution and GHG emissions (Fing and Tran-
sition2 2019).
• Autonomous cars
Within a few years or decades, mobility could be ra-
dically transformed by the arrival of self-driving cars
once again. Capable of driving without human as-
sistance, they could avoid many accidents as well as
greatly fluidify traffic (Axsen and Sovacool 2019). Au-
tonomous cars could then be programmed to always
stay at a predefined distance from the car in front, thus
avoiding many slowdowns. In addition, if autonomous
cars were used on a shared basis, they could drastical-
ly reduce transportation-related greenhouse gas emis-
sions (Wadud et al. 2016).
Habitat – “smart home” or “smart building”
The terms "smart home" and "smart building" in the
English language designate a habitat in which digital
technology has made an appearance "big time."
Among a wide range of objects in this category, we can
mention connected thermostats (to the Internet),
connected lamps, computer security systems, robot
vacuum cleaners or personal assistants such as Alexa,
Siri or Google Assistant. The most advanced stage of
habitat "intelligence", not yet achieved today, will be to
create fully automated buildings that predict and adapt
to the needs of their occupants in all circumstances
and that are integrated into a larger network, at the level
of neighborhood, city, region, country (Sovacool and
Furszyfer Del Rio 2020).
The "smart Home" promises numerous evolutions in our
towns.
© CC 0- PxSphere
• Optimizing energy and resource use
Some smart home objects are simply intended to im-
prove living comfort, entertain, or even elevate the so-
cial status of their users (Sovacool and Furszyfer Del
Rio 2020). Others have the potential to reduce resource
consumption, including energy. Thus, a connected
thermostat (or "smart meter") enables remote tempe-
rature reduction. It can also anticipate occupant beha-
vior and rely on weather data* to predict heating needs
at certain times of day, thus preventing overuse (IEA
and OECD 2017). Connected lights may turn off if no
one is in the room.
The same functions apply to other items such as the
oven or TV on standby. This type of service can be es-
pecially useful in office buildings, where more people
tend to forget to turn off the heat at night and/or leave
computers on standby. In total, it is estimated that
these technologies could reduce energy use in homes
by up to 10% by 2040 (IEA and OECD 2017).
• Optimizing space
In addition, digital technology helps optimize the use
of space, particularly through platforms such as Airbnb
or CouchSurfing. In this way, it could help reduce the
construction of new buildings (Fing and Transition2
2019).
Security
In addition to camera surveillance, there are numerous
applications for everyday security.
© CC 0- PxSphere
Using the innovations already mentioned, the smart
city would be able to decrease the number of traffic ac-
cidents (Woetzel et al. 2018b), send an alert if an elder-
ly person forgets to turn off the stove, or even contact
the fire department when a connected object detects
smoke inside. At the same time, security and alarm
systems are becoming more sophisticated through di-
gital innovation (Sovacool and Furszyfer Del Rio 2020).
Technology can assist law enforcement in curbing
crime and preventing criminal events. For example,
some software* can detect gunshots. Thus, if a mi-
crophone connected to the police network detects a
gunshot thanks to such software, patrols will be able
to get to the crime scene much faster (Woetzel et al.
2018b). Another example relates to crime prevention,
including through the use of artificial intelligence. A
few years ago, the city of Santa Cruz, California, began
applying data-driven algorithms on city crime with the
goal of predicting the exact location and time of bur-
glaries and other crime events, thus being able to de-
ploy police officers in a preventive manner. In the first
six months of this program, burglaries decreased by
14% and auto theft by 4% (Woetzel et al. 2018b).
In a city like New York City, it has been estimated that
the efficient, maximum-potential implementation of
these technologies could reduce crime rates by more
than 10% (Woetzel et al. 2018b).
Critical remarks
Smart city actors readily and enthusiastically promise
that their services will make cities more satisfying and
sustainable (Fing and Transition2 2019). However, the
figures and scenarios generally cited are often overly
optimistic. In fact, the estimates are based on an "idea-
lized" use of new technologies by the population. Ins-
tead of following realistic scenarios, smart city advo-
cates imagine how the population should react in order
to achieve the expected goals (Axsen and Sovacool
2019). As a result, research often tends to overestimate
the benefits of implementing new digital systems. In
addition, the independence of existing research and
data has been strongly questioned, as much of it co-
mes from the same actors offering these smart city
services (Axsen and Sovacool 2019) [1].
Environmental gains from the smart city?
The phenomenon of the rebound effects
The rebound effect is a phenomenon whereby the de-
crease in the amount of energy and/or natural resource
needed to perform an activity is partially or fully offset
as a result of adjustments in the behavior of the indivi-
dual and/or society (and the economy) as a whole (Vil-
lani 2018). In other words, the decrease in the quantity
of resources needed would be offset, at least in part, by
changes in individual and collective behavior. There are
several types of rebound effects, six of which are ex-
plained in detail in Chapter 11. This phenomenon is
most prevalent in the mobility and habitat sectors.
• In mobility
If, as promised by its proponents, the smart city will
indeed make city traffic smoother, then it is likely that
the population will adapt to it, using their cars more
(Gossart 2015). In the long run, if commute time de-
creases, the population may choose to move out of the
city, eventually increasing overall traffic on the roads,
pollution, and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.
In addition, smart mobility is able to lower travel costs,
such as by taking an Uber rather than a traditional
cab, using Waze to decrease the amount of gasoline
consumed, splitting transportation costs, sharing your
car through the use of carpooling platforms, such as
BlaBlaCar. It is very likely that the money saved will be
reinvested in some way. So, perhaps, it will be used to
go more on airplane vacations or to buy a new connec-
ted item. The environmental gain on the one hand
could thus be partially or fully offset.
In total, Coulombel et al. (2019) estimated that the re-
bound effect in "smart mobility" would be between 68
and 77 percent for GHG emissions and somewhat less
PAGE 91
 13. Sustainable cities and communities
for traffic and pollution. In other words, the reduction
is 3 to 4 times less than what smart city proponents
promise. Yet, this study only takes into account certain
types of rebound effects. It is also likely that some digi-
tal services reinforce the social model of "automobility,"
that is, the model of the automobile as the dominant
mode of transportation (Axsen and Sovacool 2019). By
incorporating uncounted rebound effects, the initially
promised environmental gain could be largely offset if
not, in fact, zeroed out if the rebound effect is 100%, or,
worse yet, could cause unseen environmental damage.
• In the housing sector
The phenomenon of the rebound effect is also present
in the housing sector. Therefore, you will usually save
money by renting accommodation on the Airbnb plat-
form instead of a hotel room, or by consuming less
heat or electricity through connected thermostats and
lamps. The money reinvested elsewhere will trigger a
rebound effect.
It appears that the rebound effect in the home environ-
ment is on the order of 60% (Walzberg et al. 2020). This
study, however, was only able to quantify the effect at
the individual level. Several collective and systemic
rebound effects are likely. For example, the ubiquity of
Airbnb-like platforms could tend to transform society
by pushing many people to go on more vacations. The
use of "eco-responsible" connected items in the home
could at the same time encourage the purchase of
other digital items that provide no environmental be-
nefit (Santarius 2017). Once again, the rebound effect
YES !
in real estate could offset some or all of the initially pro-
mised gains.
NO !
• The disregarded environmental impact of
digital technologies
MAYBE ! IF...
Most studies tend not to take into account the environ-
mental impact of the digital technology itself (Sovacool
and Furszyfer Del Rio 2019). As explained in Chapters
10 and 11, this is a crucial point. In addition, since de-
vices that are part of the digital universe generally have
a very short lifespan, particularly due to planned ob-
solescence (see Chapter 11), it is likely that they will
need to be replaced on a regular basis, thereby increa-
sing their environmental impact.
Security problems and privacy
Although the smart city has the potential to increase
security within the city, other unknowns, fears and
concerns arise. First, connected objects can be
hacked. The "smarter" the city, the more susceptible it
is to cybersecurity breaches (Sovacool and Furszyfer
Del Rio 2020). Thus, a simple connected toaster could
be a gateway to hacking all the connected objects in
the smart home (Sovacool and Furszyfer Del Rio 2020).
The problems are similar in the area of mobility: what
happens if smart street signs are hacked or, in the fu-
ture, if an autonomous car is hacked?
Furthermore, because digital objects generally collect
PAGE 92
a lot of data, people and organizations in possession
of that data can use it for illicit, harmful and/or mali-
cious purposes. Data interpretation tools have beco-
me so powerful that they can better understand our
intentions, our innermost nature, with the help of see-
mingly innocuous data. Renowned intellectual Yuval
Harari (2019, 37:15 to 38:45) believes that algorithms
can already understand us better than we understand
ourselves. As an example, he says he believes that if he
had been a teenager in our time, some artificial intelli-
gence from Google, Facebook or Amazon would have
noticed his homosexuality before him. What happens if
the algorithm transmits this information, not to the per-
son, but to the advertiser or power in operation? This
kind of tool can be used in particular by states for un-
democratic purposes (see Chapter 10). The very broad
topic of privacy in the digital age is also discussed in
Chapters 4 and 10.
Other social issues
Smart city digital services open up social questions.
Many digital companies, especially Uber, are criti-
cized for the working conditions of their employees
(see chapter 3). In addition, the smart city is not ac-
cessible to everyone, for example if services are paid
for (Sovacool and Furszyfer Del Rio 2020). In addition,
some social groups such as the elderly and margina-
lized or vulnerable people find it more difficult to use
these services, which, therefore, can amplify inequa-
lities, expanding the sense of isolation and exclusion
in urban environments (Sovacool and Furszyfer Del
Rio 2020; Van Eeckhout and Legros 2018). The social
aspects, both positive and negative, associated with
digital technology are discussed in more detail in the
first socioeconomic section of the booklet, primarily in
Chapters 5 and 9.
Conclusions
YES !
NO !
MAYBE ! IF...
It seems that the smart city so far has failed to deli-
ver on its initial promises of reducing environmental
impact and increasing people's quality of life. Moreo-
ver, although field trials have shown that some of the
promised improvements have materialized, it is worth
asking whether this is the best strategy for achieving
sustainable cities and communities. It is possible that
focusing on policies to redevelop housing, promote
public transportation... will prove much more effective
(Sovacool and Furszyfer Del Rio 2020).
One of the main reasons why the smart city so far
seems to be failing to deliver on its promises is that
it is not designed to improve quality of life and make
cities truly more sustainable. Smart city innovations
have primarily economic (Bertossi 2016) and tech-
nological (Eggers and Skowron 2018) motivations. In
reality, the implementation of technologies in cities is
often an end in itself. In fact, environmental and social
goals are largely secondary (Bertossi 2016) - this is not
the case everywhere, especially in Grenoble (Fing and
Transition2 2019). However, smart city innovations are
unlikely to lead toward truly positive social and envi-
ronmental outcomes, at least until they have been truly
designed to do so (Fing and Transition2 2019; Zheng
et al. 2020).
Related classroom resources
Educational Pathway n. 1 : What does sustainable
digital technology really means?
• Activity N. 1: "The ecological footprint?"What
does sustainable digital technology really
means?
Educational Pathway n. 2 : What do you think, is it
ecological?
• Activity N. 2 - "In search of information!”
• Activity N. 3 - The digital quiz"

However, we should not be left with the feeling of failure Educational Pathway n. 3 : “What does digital tech-
and give in to a certain pessimism about digital tech- nology bring to my life, to our lives?”
nologies. Indeed, they still have the potential to make • Activity 4 "The Philosophical debate".
cities more rewarding and sustainable. For example,
it is believed that the autonomous car, depending on Educational Pathway n. 6 : A future with or without
how it is applied, could result in halving or doubling the digital technology?
greenhouse gas emissions of road transport (Wadud • Activity N. 1 "Controversial future scenarios?"
et al. 2016).
• Activity N. 2 "A letter to the future!"
In reality, digital is only a useful tool to achieve goals on
which it cannot proceed autonomously. In fact, it must
be accompanied and coordinated by policies focused
on social and environmental objectives, verified with Training Modules:
independent thematic research (Sovacool and Furs- 1 (U.A. 1.5.), 6 (U.A. 6.3. and 6.4.).
zyfer Del Rio 2020; Sperling 2018; Axsen and Sovacool
2019). In this way, the smart city can begin to achieve
some of the goals promised by its advocates.

In short.
• The "smart city" characterizes the massive
deployment of digital technology in cities that
is radically transforming in many areas, inclu-
Note
ding: mobility, housing and security.
[1] In the "Digital Promises" section, we meant to include only
• Advocates of the smart city promise that it will
studies and articles with serious methodologies. The references
improve the quality of life for citizens while
"Woetzel et al. (2018)" and "Eggers and Skowron (2018)" relate to
making it more sustainable.
the work of consulting firms McKinsey & Company and Deloitte.
• So far, these promises do not seem to have Even if firms are not digital lobbies, it is still in their interest to pro-
been fulfilled in practice. mote the use of digital technologies. In fact, with palatable figures,
• The phenomenon of the rebound effect seems governments will tend to implement smart city tools, and then hire
to be very prominent in urban areas, largely these firms as consultants.
suppressing the environmental benefits an-
nounced at the outset.
• One of the reasons for this failure is that the
smart city was created first and foremost to
meet economic and technological goals, and
not social and environmental ones.
• To make cities and communities truly sus-
tainable, digital technology will need to be
accompanied by policies that are informed by
independent scientific research.

PAGE 93
 13. Sustainable cities and communities

• Zheng, C. et al. 2020. From digital to sustainable: A scientometric review

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duction, 120689.
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Cooperation and Development). 2017. Digitalisation and Energy : Techno-
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PAGE 94
 epilogue

D
uring the writing of this awareness booklet we have often wondered whether or not the digital
economy is conducive to sustainable development. In agreement with the definitions of "digital"
and "sustainable development", we have qualified "sustainable digital" as: "that set of electronic
devices, including their material components and software capable of manipulating binary data,
which is capable of meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future
generations to meet their needs."
Digital technology has positive and negative aspects. On the positive side, it solves numerous societal
problems. For example, it makes it possible to provide quality education and other social and economic
services in isolated regions, and/or to marginalized populations, prevent food waste, foster innovation,
improve democracies, or even reduce the amount of resources needed to perform a certain activity. Tele-
commuting and telemedicine helped prevent numerous infections during the Covid-19 pandemic. On the
negative side, digital technology reinforces some existing problems and/or creates new ones: for example,
it has been observed that it has favored the growth of inequalities, provoked consumption and produc-
tion that are unsustainable, becoming a key factor in global warming and the degradation of ecosystems,
thanks also to the phenomenon of rebound effects, another important element of the booklet.
Moreover, new technologies are associated with violent and undemocratic practices, cause addiction and
health problems, where working conditions in digital production chains are often indecent, not decent at
all. As a result, it is difficult to define whether digital technology has an overall positive or negative impact
on sustainable development and society.
Our reflections made evident the first law of technology formulated by the American historian Melvin
Kranzberg, for whom: "technology is neither good nor bad, without having a neutral impact." Digital tech-
nologies can be thought of, developed, implemented, deployed and used in very different ways. Therefore,
they are "political tools", in the sense that their impact can only be studied in relation to the society in which
they are embedded, with the social, cultural, political and economic characteristics that qualify it. From this
point of view, technologies in general do not really change the face of a society, even if they can contribute
to giving new impulses. In other words, digital will not "save" us from our current problems: as part of a
world that has not yet made the transition to sustainability, it is not surprising that it has not yet managed
to be truly sustainable.
But there is hope for the future. It is entirely feasible that digital technology will facilitate Humanity's
growth by reducing its ecological footprint. However, this will not happen without significant changes in
the way people, businesses and governments think. It is clear that the increase in the use of digital objects
and services cannot be infinite, and so sobriety practices must be promoted. In a world with limits, limiting
use is really just common sense. Some digital services that are not truly useful or even socially destructive
should be drastically reduced to make room for those that make a real contribution.
If these evolutions are implemented, then digital technology can become a formidable tool for building a
better, socially just and ecologically sustainable world. It is only in this context that its immense potential
can develop. We hope that this work, like the other creations of the "Sustainable Digital Consciousness"
project, will motivate you to act in this direction.

PAGE 95

glossary
NOTICE:
The following definitions have been taken and/or
adapted to our scopes from several sources and au-
thors such as: Wikipedia, Universalis, Frédéric Bor-
dage (Green IT), Larousse, and others.
Artificial Intelligence (AI)
All the theories and techniques implemented for the
purpose of building computer programs engaged in
tasks that are generally considered "intelligent". By
extension, any program or software that fulfills this
function is, in common parlance, called artificial in-
telligence. There are two main types of artificial in-
telligence. The first relies on algorithms designed in
advance, with no dependence on the data fed to it.
The second is based on programs designed to adapt
to the data they receive, with the aim of performing
the required task in the best possible way. This se-
cond branch of artificial intelligence, called "machine
learning," has developed strongly in recent years.
Most artificial intelligence methods were designed
several decades ago, but its recent application has
been amplified by the increase in computing power
of computers and the arrival of big data, big data.
Algorithm
A finite sequence of elementary rules and opera-
tions on a finite number of data that solves a class
of problems. An algorithm is usually translated into
a computer program by means of a programming
language.
Big data
Data sets that have become so large that they ex-
ceed human intuition and analytical capabilities, as
well as those of traditional IT database management
tools. By extension, this term refers to, both the data
and the techniques used to analyze it, although the
latter are usually part of the artificial intelligence re-
search domain.
Blockchain
A set of techniques that allow the construction of re-
gisters of information that are stored, not in a central
storage unit, but in a decentralized manner. "Blocks"
of information are gradually added to the registry,
what gives the appearance of a "blockchain". The
nature of this ledger makes it very difficult to falsify
and allows you to avoid possession of the data in
the ledger by a central body, such as a state, bank,
etc.
PAGE 96
The most well-known applications of the blockchain
are cryptocurrencies, which are virtual currencies
based on the principle of the blockchain. The best
known of these is Bitcoin.
Cloud
An IT organization model that enables the conti-
nuous circulation of data, via the Internet, between
digital devices and servers (the cloud), the latter
usually being part of data centers.
Computer Program
Representation in computer language of one or more
algorithms that is intended to be executed by digital
equipment. A program is therefore the concretiza-
tion of an algorithm, which is abstract.
Connected objects
Object capable, in addition to their primary function,
of sending or receiving information through a tele-
communications network. In a more specific sense,
it designates objects just connected to the Internet,
thus being part of the Internet of Things (IoT in En-
glish). The object itself is therefore included in the
digital universe.
Data centers (or IT centers)
Server and data storage facilities. The former are
large, screenless computers that perform proces-
sing: they calculate, for example, your bank account
balance and create the web page displayed on your
browser. The latter consist of a multitude of hard
drives where data is stored. Data centers are one of
the three structural elements of the digital universe;
the other two are computer networks and user ter-
minals.
Data
Representation in the form of a number of informa-
tion to be manipulated with digital equipment.
Digital
The word “Digital” refers to a manner of representing
the information in the form of data. It can therefore
be manipulated by computer programs.
By extension, "digital" refers to the digital world,
consisting of electronic equipment-and everything
in it, both at the hardware (electrical and electro-
nic components; other infrastructure) and software
(computer programs)-that manipulates binary data
and is, in general, connected to the Internet.
Digital equipment is sometimes referred to as "in-
formation and communications technology" (ICT),
although it does not necessarily cover all elements
of the digital world.
Drone
An unmanned aerial transportation that is automati-
cally piloted or remotely controlled. Drones are part Airbnb", etc.
of the digital universe.
Software
3D-Printing
Representation in computer language of one or more
A technique for the automated and reproducible algorithms that is intended to be executed by digital
production of three-dimensional objects in different equipment. A program is therefore the concretiza-
materials such as plastic, polymer resin or metal. tion of an algorithm, which is abstract.
The principle of operation is quite similar to that of
2D printing and volume is created by stacking suc- Streaming
cessive layers. 3D printers are part of the digital uni-
Special transmission technique via data internet
verse.
data from a datacenter to a user's terminal as they
are consumed. It is to be put in opposition with the
Internet
download, which requires the transmission of the
Global network of computer networks and acces- entire data before being able to be consumed. Plat-
sible to the general public. Among its best-known forms like YouTube or Netflix use this principle.
applications are instant messaging and the World
Wide Web. An increasing number of devices can be
connected to the Internet, this evolution is called the
Internet of Things.

Internet of things (IoT)

Computer network formed by the addition to the In-
ternet of things that historically were not connected
to it - these are then called connected objects. This
evolution has been made possible by the arrival of
new technologies, sensors such as RFID chips or
faster mobile connections. The Internet of Things
makes it possible to add new masses of data - big
data - to the network and thus new knowledge and
forms of knowledge.

IT Networks
A set of computer equipment connected to ex-
change information. The connection between the
different equipment in the network is generally made
using wired (low-speed public switched telephone
network, ADSL, fiber to the home) or wireless (Wi-Fi,
satellite, 3G, 4G or 5G) connections. The network is
one of three main infrastructure of the digital uni-
verse, along with data centers and user terminals.

RFID Micro-processor (also named RFID chip)

Small object for remote data storage and retrieval. It
can take the form of a self-adhesive label and/or can
be glued or embedded into an object or even a living
organism. This technology is essential for connec-
ting objects to the Internet of Things.

Robot
Mechatronic device, combining mechanics, electro-
nics, and computer science, designed to automa-
tically perform specific tasks. They are part of the
digital universe.

Digital Services
Services consisting of various digital equipment and
software that, when used together, make it possible
to perform an everyday life action such as: "watching
a movie on streaming", "booking accommodation on

PAGE 97
 our partners
Financial supporters
The development and dissemination of the project's productions require financial resources. Europe is the
first supporter of the project with the Program "Erasmus +", ADEME has provided a second co-financing.
Alongside them are other entities that, by supporting our usual activities, have allowed the realization of the
project. Without them, CND would not have taken place. To all of them our sincere thanks.

This project has been funded with support from the European Commission. The positions reported in this document are the sole res-
ponsibility of the authors. The Commission is in no way responsible for any use that may be made of the information contained therein.

our scientific and pedagogical partners

Depending on the territories and expertise of each, different entities provided scientific supervision to the
chapters of the awareness booklet, the information of which is an integral part of all CND productions. Other
partners participated, enriching the more pedagogical aspects. To all of them goes our most sincere thanks
for their valuable contributions.

CoLLÈGe iT TeCNoLoGiCo aTHÉNÉe RoyaL CoLLÈGe

JEAN-PAPON LiCeo SCieNTiFiCo JEAN ABSIL NICOL AS CONTÉ
La Pacaudière - France BIAGIO PASCAL Etterbeek - Belgique Régny - France
Rome- Italie

LyCÉe CoLLÈGe - LyCÉe iT TuRiSMo - LiCeo SCIENTIFICO

DACHSBECK ALBERT-THOMAS CHARLES DARWIN
Bruxelles - Belgique Roanne - France Rome- Italie

The elaborated contents bind only the authors of the productions. Any interpretation, position or
recommendation contained therein can in no way be attributed to the educational partners and/or those who
have carried out tasks of proofreading the texts and/or scientific supervision and validation.

PAGE 98
A
cknowledgements:

The work carried out by our three entities has benefited from the support of numerous facilities and individuals
who have agreed to give us their time, thus enriching our work.
Our special thanks go to: Frédéric Bordage (Green IT), Maxime Effoui-Hess and Laurie Marrauld (The Shift
Project), Mathilde JAY and her staff (ADEME), Brigitte Demeure (Electronics Watch), Perrine Douhéret (DANE
of Lyon), Jacques Faverjon (DSDEN Loire), Patay Maud (Collège de la Pacaudière), Alexandre Ballaré (Collège
de Régny), Leonardo Becchetti (NEXT, ASVIS) Professor of Political economy at the University of Rome 2 -
Tor Vergata, Federico Baleani (IT expert and president of Access Point), Chiara Medini, Press agent of NEXT
Nuova Economia per tutti, Jaime Antonio García Ruíz (Senior trainer in IT & audiovisual matters, Attività di
pensiero and UPTER), Roland D'Hoop e Patrick Veillard of Oxfam-Magasins du monde, the Abelli staff (Belgian
association for the promotion of free software), Federica Tommasi (Chemical engineer at the Italian Health
Higher Institute - ISS), Pierpaolo Lacquaniti (Environmental & Land engineer; founding member of DEKA
progetti, Board Member of Agri Island and PAINGEA), Juliette Bossé and Nathalie Masure (LEEP), Anthony
Roux (Ligue de l'Enseignement 42).

All content is deposited under license CC-BY-NC-SA

2020 © Conscience Numérique Durable
Consult and download freely all educational and informative materials
of the project and others on the website: www. conscience-numérique-durable.org

PAGE 99
 D igital sustainable consciousness is a European educational project whose aim is to
animate reflections on the digital issues in our societies, crossing social and environmental
problems, on a local and global scale. This information booklet is part of a larger set of tools
and resources aimed at enabling education and teaching professionals to develop educational
activities on the issues addressed based on reliable and scientifically sound educational resources.
Each chapter of the booklet aims to assess the positive and negative consequences, as well as the
potential and risks for the future in relation to the goals of sustainable development of the 2030
Agenda. The booklet has been conceived in such a way as to provide pluralistic views, based on
facts and data referenced in recent scientific studies, without any claim to exhaustiveness
or absolute truth. Each reader will be able to find in it material for reflection useful for
forming his or her own opinion.

All of our educational resources are downloadable from our website:

www.conscience-numerique-durable.org.

With the backing and participation of:

The partnership is presented in the preceding pages.

This project has been funded with support from the European Commission. The positions reported in this document are the sole responsibility PAGE 100
of the authors. The Commission is in no way responsible for any use that may be made of the information contained therein.