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Articles

Assessing the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapon

programme
Tahir Mahmood Azad  & Karl Dewey
Pages 123-145 | Published online: 27 Feb 2023

 Cite this article  https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2023.2178069

 Full Article  Figures & data  Citations  Metrics  Licensing  Reprints & Permissions

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ABSTRACT

Although the broad outlines of Pakistan's nuclear weapons' programme are well documented,
significant gaps remain in the understanding of the country's nuclear security regime. Nuclear security
remains a highly politicised topic, with little robust information available regarding the steps taken to
secure the country's nuclear assets. To help “fill the gaps”, this paper places official Pakistani documents,
statements, and other open source information, into an analytical framework based on international
standards of physical security. Although gaps in understanding remain, this paper finds that, in general,
Pakistan has enacted robust security measures to protect its nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapons
related infrastructure. Nonetheless, the prevailing perception of Pakistan's nuclear security remains
dominated by embarrassing episodes that emphasise the importance of effective nuclear security
culture. Based on its findings, this paper also offers policy recommendations which may offer additional
confidence about the rigours of the country's nuclear security regime.

 KEYWORDS: Nuclear weapons nuclear security regime IAEA’s nuclear security series 13 Pakistan

In this article 
  Previous article View issue table of contents Next article 
Introduction

Since its first nuclear test on 28 May 1998, Pakistan’s nuclear programmes have faced intense
international scrutiny. Much of this has focused on Pakistan’s nuclear command, control, and
communications (NC3) arrangements, and when nuclear weapons would be used. However, persistent
concerns of non-state actors mean significant questions have also been raised about Pakistan’s ability to
defend its nuclear assets against attack, theft, and/or sabotage against internal and external
adversaries. Nonetheless, assessing Pakistan’s nuclear security regime is difficult – on one hand,
Pakistani officials have sought to reassure the international community that the country has codified its
NC3 arrangements and improved its nuclear security record. These reforms have been both broad-
based, as well addressing specific threats, such as human reliability. As a result, Pakistani officials often
issue high-level assurances that the country’s nuclear assets are safe and secure, and assert that
national security plans are “fool proof.”1 However, on the other hand, Pakistan’s limited transparency
means that few details are provided to support such claims, whilst the general incentive for counties to
portray themselves as responsible nuclear powers means “official statements by governments [in the
area of nuclear security] are often dubious if not outright duplicitous.”2

Navigating the two positions is difficult: large knowledge gaps remain, whilst new analysis is
compounded by the relative lack of authoritative sources and shallow discussion. Indeed, writing in
2014, Smith noted that although

[p]arts of Pakistan’s nuclear management system, like its command element, have been
reasonably transparent; other parts, like the physical security and surety [i.e. human
reliability] elements, have been at best translucent … In many areas, there are only bald
assertions that programs and methods have been put into place, with very few details
provided.3

Such observations remain true today.

To overcome the scholarly dichotomy, this paper revisits Pakistan’s nuclear security regime, as applied
to its nuclear weapons’ programme. The paper reviews the existing literature, placing it within a new
methodology based on the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Series (NSS) 13 document – Nuclear Security
Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities
(INFCIRC/225/Revision 5).4 Although the guidance outlined in NSS 13 is aimed at civilian facilities, the
adapted framework nonetheless allows for a systematic analysis of Pakistani nuclear security efforts
and “fill the gaps” in understanding.
After outlining the broad contours of “known” and “unknown” Pakistani security arrangements, this
paper uses its NSS 13-derrived methodology to review described Pakistani nuclear measures
systematically. Overall, Pakistan has enacted robust security measures to protect its nuclear weapons,
and nuclear-weapons related infrastructure, however, various episodes show that vigilance must be
maintained. Based on its findings, this paper also offers policy recommendations which may offer ways
to strengthen Pakistan’s nuclear security regime and give confidence about the rigours of the regime.

Methodology

Interest in Pakistani nuclear security is not new and there have been numerous notable efforts in this
field. Authors such as Khan,5 Lavoy,6 Salik,7 Smith,8 and Tertrais,9 have been highly influential. Indeed,
their collective analysis provides the basis of contemporary understanding of a broad range of
Pakistan’s nuclear affairs, including the country’s evolving doctrine, nuclear command-and-control
measures, efforts to improve the country’s physical security measures, and efforts to improve nuclear
surety. In contrast, measures such as the NTI’s Nuclear Security Index adopt a much broader framework
using 22 variables to produce its security rating.10

Both quantitative and qualitative approaches have strengths and weaknesses. For example, qualitative
analysis of Pakistan’s nuclear security regime focuses on the evolution and drivers of change within the
regime, and thus is often limited in its scope and, by necessity, rather descriptive. Quantitative
approaches such as the NTI Nuclear Security Index are more comprehensive and allow for cross-country
comparison, but there is little transparency on how its ratings are awarded.

Instead, this paper seeks to strike a balance between the two approaches, drawing upon a novel
methodology derived from standards outlined by the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Series (NSS) to “fill the
gaps” in understanding. Several NSS documents relate explicitly to national security regimes including
NSS 20 “Objective and Essential Elements of a State’s Nuclear Security Regime,”11 and NSS 13 “Nuclear
Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities.” The
authors chose NSS 13 as the basis of their comparative approach because it is an established
publication directly related to physical protection, and because of its extensive promotion by the IAEA.
Although the document is aimed at civilian facilities, such a methodology allows for greater insight than
previous scholarly approaches for several reasons.

Firstly, because the NSS offers high-level guidance that individual states can interpret and implement
according to their local circumstances, the Fundamental Principles articulated by NSS 13 can be applied
to facilities, regardless of a civilian or military role. Secondly, as per Pakistan’s 2010 National Command
Authority Act, the National Command Authority (NCA) has the “sole authority” to control all of the
country’s nuclear and strategic activities.12 This includes both civil and military activities, thus through
the NCA’s secretariat – the Strategic Plans Division (SPD)13—there is an institutional link between civilian
facilities and military facilities. Thus, as a conduit of knowledge, it is reasonable to assume that the
Directorate seeks to simplify its internal standards and carry over best practices, regardless of the
civilian-military divide. Lastly, using a comprehensive framework allows for Pakistan’s security regime to
be reviewed systematically and wholistically, and avoid undue focus on individual examples of poor
practice.

Assessing Pakistan’s nuclear security

In assessing Pakistan’s nuclear security regime, this paper considers four scenarios, namely the security
of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, the risk of the unauthorised removal of nuclear material “with the intent
to construct a nuclear explosive device,” the risk of unauthorised access to material “which could lead to
subsequent dispersal,” and the risk of sabotage.14 To protect against the latter three risks, NSS 13
outlines four key elements that a nuclear security regime must incorporate including (i) the protection
against unauthorised removal; (ii) the location and recovery of missing nuclear material; (iii) the
protection against sabotage; and, (iv) the mitigation and minimisation of any effects of sabotage.15 To
achieve these four objectives, the IAEA recommend nine elements which, when used in combination,
contribute towards an effective security regime. These include:

State responsibility

International transport

Assignment of physical protection responsibilities

Legislative and regulatory framework

International cooperation and assistance

Identification and assessment of threats

Risk based physical protection systems and measures

Sustaining the physical protection regime

Planning and preparedness for and response to nuclear security events.

State responsibility

As with civilian requirements, the bedrock of a state’s security regime is the central role of the state in
establishing a security regime. Herein, IAEA Fundamental Principle A requires the state to have sole
responsibility for the “establishment, implementation and maintenance of a physical protection regime.”
16
In the nuclear weapons context, this principle can be extended to include sites related to the
production of nuclear weapons and to nuclear weapons themselves, such that weapons, material and
information are always under lawful state control. For this, the authors examine two scenarios:
Measures to ensure effective NC3;17 and measures to ensure the security of weapons and ensure that
they can never when they are not supposed to. Measures to protect sensitive nuclear material and
sensitive nuclear information are discussed below.

Command, control, and communications

Although NC3 systems vary from state to state, in essence they are “the medium by which the use of
nuclear weapons can enter into military operations.”18 In almost all nuclear-weapon states, NC3 systems
are comprised of civil and military leadership, with a robust NC3 system having three traditional
characteristics:19

Tight and exclusive civilian control.

Respond exclusively to a highly centralised hierarchy.

Nuclear weapons must include physical protection against unauthorised assembly, or detonation.

Since “going nuclear” in 1998, Pakistan’s NC3 has undergone considerable development, transforming
from a largely ad hoc system to one of centralised control. This has had the benefit of both exerting
leadership control over the country’s nuclear weapons and reducing the autonomy of Pakistan’s
strategic organisations. This restructuring began on 2 February 2000, when Pakistan instigated its
comprehensive nuclear command and control system, also known as, “Strategic Command Organisation
(SCO).” Pakistan’s SCO has three tiers consisting of the National Command Authority (NCA); the Strategic
Plans Division (SPD); and the Strategic Forces Commands (SFC) which are embedded within the various
service arms and are responsible for the operation of the country’s nuclear capabilities. This
arrangement was later formalised by the 2010 NCA Act, wherein the NCA was formally vested as the
“sole authority” to control the country’s nuclear and strategic assets Figure 1.

Figure 1. NCA structure.

Display full size

The NCA’s leadership includes top civil and military leadership, with the NCA’s Employment Control
Committee (ECC) having the mandate to direct nuclear policy and decision-making. Should the decision
be required, the ECC would be responsible for ordering the use of nuclear weapons.20 Here, ECC orders
and authorisation codes (see below) would be directed to the relevant SFCs, via dedicated NC3 channels
embedded within the SPD.

Pakistan has been relatively transparent and its command structure is well understood. However,
relevant here is whether effective state control would be asserted at all times, and whether there are
conditions where weapons could be used without due authorisation? As noted, an effective NC3 system to
prevent unauthorised use has three core elements and it is evident that Pakistan meets at least two of
the three criteria – i.e. the country has as clear and centralised command system, and measures in place
(discussed below) to prevent the unauthorised use of weapons. However, it is less clear whether
Pakistan meets the condition of “tight and exclusive civilian control.” This stems from the ambiguity
surrounding Pakistani procedures. For example, the ECC is comprised of 10 individuals, including the
Prime Minister as Chair. As noted by Tertrais, the ECC has agreed on the principle of unanimity since
2003, although in practice the ECC may only require a “consensus” amongst its members.21 The
difference is significant because in the event of a tied vote, “it is not unreasonable to conclude that the
military would [have the casting vote and] be the de facto decision maker.”22 In theory, this means the
military could overrule Pakistan’s elected government although additional systems may be in place to
ensure that the military remains subordinate to civilian commanders – significant given the military's
history of political intervention. For example, the authoritative Pakistani commentator Feroz Khan notes
that, “several sources refer to a system of two separate codes – one civilian, the other military –
amounting to a dual key system.”23 This remains unconfirmed, but should this be the case, it appears
Pakistan has made considerable efforts to ensure that the country’s nuclear remain under lawful state
control.
Weapons security

Regarding effective state control, the second area considered here is weapons security and the
measures taken to ensure that weapons cannot detonate outside of authorised and intended use. Such
measures include “positive” controls (i.e. the features and procedures that restrict the release of nuclear
forces only when properly authorised) and “negative controls” (i.e. features that inhibit the release or
use of nuclear weapons outside of authorised control). During peacetime, examples of negative control
include the fact that Pakistan’s land – and air-based nuclear weapons are both de-mated from their
delivery systems and are kept in disassembled form. This minimises the chance that an intact weapon
could be stolen, as well as forming part of the country’s peacetime nuclear force posture.24 However,
little information is available for the naval leg of Pakistan’s deterrent, currently based on the Babur-3
submarine-launched cruise missile. First test fired in 2017 and described by Pakistan’s Inter-Services
Public Relations (ISPR) as a “second strike capability,”25 because of its naval requirements the Babur-3 is
assumed to be pre-mated and contained within a vertical launch system, or similar cannisterised device.
Should assembly of its land – or air-based weapons be required, the county appears to have developed
numerous systems that represent significant advances from 1998 and its early weapons. Very little is
publicly available about the specific aspects of Pakistan’s military safety and security measures,
however, senior Pakistani officials occasionally refer to such measures. For example, according to Dr
Samar Mubarakmand, a leading Pakistani nuclear scientist, “Pakistan has applied the best nuclear safety
and security parameters with indigenously developed advanced safety and security mechanisms to
secure its nuclear assets,”26 and that these mechanisms are similar to those practiced by other nuclear-
weapon states.27 These mechanisms appear to refer to Permissive Action Links (PALs), which were
confirmed in 2008 by Retired Brigadier General Naeem Salik, when he noted that the country “has
developed its own PAL systems which obviously ensures that even if an unauthorised person gets hold
of a weapon, he cannot activate it unless he also has access to electronic codes.”28 Codes form part of
the weapon manufacturing process and codes for use are issued just before use, and inserted via a
computerised system.29 For land-based systems, Pakistan employs a “two-man rule,” even possibly
requiring a “three-man rule” on occasion. Although this usually refers to the minimum size of personnel
to prevent individuals from being alone on-site, the two/three-man rule here refers to the number of
individuals to whom a launch code is divided between such that no-single person had the whole code.30
Similarly, pilots receive their authentication codes when in-flight.31 However, as noted, far less
information regarding the technical and procedural controls on Pakistan’s sea-based assets are
available. This is unfortunate because such systems are likely to be pre-mated and have higher reliance
on procedural controls.

For its air – and land-based systems at least, according to Samar, Pakistan’s safety and security
parameters were applied after several successful tests and are seen as further enhancing the reliability
and credibility of the country’s nuclear management system.32 In addition to these physical systems,
Pakistan undertakes numerous procedural systems – such as the “two-man” rule – in combination with
human reliability programmes to reduce the likelihood of theft and use by external actors and insiders
alike, and ensure the state control of nuclear weapon assets. Although details remain scarce, the
security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons appears to have tacit endorsement of senior US officials, who are
confident that the country’s nuclear weapons are safe and secure.33

There are other scenarios where nuclear weapons may detonate unintentionally, including accidentally.
Although international standards vary, in the US at least, safety standard for nuclear weapons were
codified in 1968, by Dr Carl Walske the assistant to the secretary of defense for atomic energy.34 This
codified the probability of a premature nuclear detonation “in the absence of any input except for
specified signals (e.g. monitoring and control)” shall not exceed the probability of 1 × 109 in “normal
storage and operational environments” and 1 × 106 for “abnormal environments.” As part of this,

Walske also stipulated that all nuclear weapons in the stockpile must be “one-point safe”; that
is, the weapon must have a probability of less than one in one million of producing a nuclear
detonation if a detonation of the high explosives originates from a single point (as would
likely happen in a crash or fire).35

De-mated and disassembled air – and land-based weapons reduces the risk of accidental detonation,
although measures taken for sea-based systems are unknown.

Although it may not be possible to match US technical safety and surety standards, especially the
process of one-point safety, Pakistan has nonetheless engaged in limited co-operation with the US on
best safety and surety practices. This co-operation appears to have begun under the George W Bush
administration (2001–08), although it is unclear if co-operation continued after 2011 when US-Pakistani
relations took a downward trend. Further clarification on any further steps such as efforts to make their
weapons one-point safe, or the presence of Safeing, Arming, Firing, and Fusing (SAFF) procedures which
require a weapon “to undergo a specific sequence of changes in altitude, acceleration, or other
parameters” before it can be armed, would give greater confidence in this area.

International transport
Part of any nuclear programme requires the transportation of nuclear material and assets, thus IAEA
Fundamental Principle B notes that national security regimes must also extend when transporting
nuclear material internationally. Clearly Pakistan does not seek to transport its nuclear material or
assets internationally although – similar to other nuclear-armed states – the country will need to
transport material and equipment internally.

Little information of these operations is available although the prevailing impression is that when
transporting by road, Pakistan seeks to mitigate risk by “hiding in plain sight” and that, as a precaution,
the Pakistani military “maintain[s] strict secrecy over the location of storage sites and to transport and
deploy weapons clandestinely rather than in convoys that have a stronger, highly visible security
profile.”36 The rationale for this is appears to be that “[t]hese security precautions produce fewer visible
signs of movements, thereby lowering the risks associated with possible theft of, or attack on, weapons
at their most vulnerable point, in transit.”37 Though such tactics have been criticised for inviting
additional risk, it is clear that when transporting material there is more than meets the eye. For
example, security requirements for the transportation of civilian nuclear materials are outlined by
Pakistan’s “Regulations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Installations (PAK/925),”
which applies “to all aspects of physical protection of nuclear installations and nuclear material in use,
storage and during transport.”38 Before shipments take place, consignors must enact Transport Security
Plans, which include considerations of potential threats via the Design Basis Threat (DBT) process
(discussed below).39 Given that the SPD is responsible for both military and civilian facilities, though not
detailed, the authors consider it reasonable to assume that such steps also inform the movement of
military-related material.

Moreover, road transportation remains a pragmatic solution to the need to move material and Pakistan
is not alone in transporting nuclear material by road, indeed the use of non-descript trucks appears
similar to US practice. Here, transportation of nuclear weapon components and material is performed
by the Office of Secure Transportation (OST), part of the US Department of Energy.40

Assignment of physical protection responsibilities

A further requirement of the IAEA’s physical protection regime is the clear delineation of responsibility.
Accordingly, “[t]he state should openly define and assign physical protection responsibilities within all
levels of involved” and that “Clear lines of responsibility should be established and recorded between
the relevant entities especially where the entity responsible for the armed response is separate from the
operator.”41

In accordance with international standards, Pakistan’s evaluation of physical protection standards is

informed by its DBT assessment, wherein the capabilities and motivations of non-state actors are
considered. The DBT is discussed in more detail below, but at civilian facilities licensees are responsible
for developing “capabilities to detect, delay and respond to neutralize threats up to and including the
Design Basis Threat.”42 Given that the SPD is responsible for security operations at both civilian and
military nuclear sites, it is reasonable to assume that a common set of security assessments and
standards to both particularly because since 2000, Pakistan has operated a strongly centralised
organisational structure that, from a security perspective, only distinguishes between civilian and
military organisations at the SPD Security Directorate level. This is distinct from national nuclear fuel
cycle operations which, despite some overlap in infrastructure (namely fuel fabrication), largely keep
civilian and military roles separate.

As noted, Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division (SPD) is the NCA’s secretariat, located at Joint Services
Headquarters. Since its establishment, the Division has become a powerful organ that systematically
controls all of Pakistan’s designated strategic organisations Figure 2.43

Figure 2. Organisations under SPD control (authors).

Display full size

In addition to implementing NCA decisions, the Division formulates Pakistan’s nuclear weapons’
strategies and controls the country’s NC3 system; as well as engaging in day-to-day activities such as
training, education, and briefings on nuclear-related matters. In effect, Pakistan has a centralised
administration that controls both military and civilian elements of the country’s nuclear enterprise. One
benefit of having a single entity responsible for protecting both military and civilian sites is
administrative coherence and procedural standardisation between sites. It also provides a pathway for
transferring international best practice from the civilian sphere, into the military sphere. Indeed, in
speaking with the authors, Brigadier (R) Dr Naeem Salik, now Senior Research fellow at the Centre for
International Strategic Studies (CISS), confirmed that although the Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority
(PNRA) has no direct access to classified programmes or weapons-related facilities, the PNRA forwards a
checklist of guidelines to the SPD. These are then reviewed by the SPD along with relevant organisations
such as Kahuta Research Laboratories (KRL) or the PAEC Figure 3.44

Figure 3. Organisational structure of SPD. Credit: F. Khan, Easting Grass.

Display full size

The SPD is a large organisation and within it, responsibilities for overseeing the security of designated
strategic organisations are overseen by the SPD’s Security Division, which is headed by a dedicated Two-
Star General. Physical security of each designated strategic organisation falls to the Security Division’s
various Security Directorates, with responsibility for civilian and military-related sites appearing to be
divided at the Directorate level.45

In this context, Tertrais and Lavoy both visualise Pakistani sites having three “rings” of security. The first
is within each facility itself with SPD personnel responsible for physical searches, NMAC protocols, etc.;
while the second ring is formed of physical means (Limited Access Areas, physical barriers, etc.).46
Outside of each site, the third ring of security is provided by a wider intelligence effort. Here, and also
contained within the Security Division, are other Directorates responsible for other tasks such as
counter-intelligence, and personnel reliability.47 The Counter Intelligence Directorate “essentially
coordinates with all intelligence agencies about any external threats.”48 This includes the Pakistan’s
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate which effectively “forms the outermost ring of security and
works closely with the security division.”49 In this sense, there is a clear delineation of responsibility for
roles and responsibilities.

Current force numbers are unavailable although in 2013 the SPD’s Security Directorates collectively
deployed an estimated 20,000 personnel, with a projected future strength of 28,000 personnel.50 This
includes a “Special Response Force (SRF) which has a rapid air lift capability based on dedicated aviation
resources.”51

The division between legal and operational responsibilities is similar to other countries such as the UK
where operators are legally responsible for PPS provision, but where operational responsibility for civil
nuclear sites is ascribed to the Civil Nuclear Constabulary. Here, there is a potential tension between the
two entities, and overcoming this depends on a co-operative relationship between the two. Authoritative
Pakistani sources note that the two organisations “coordinate closely” and that the two “complement
each other by sharing best practices.”52

Legislative and regulatory framework

As part of their security regime requirements, states are responsible for “establishing and maintaining a
legislative and regulatory framework to govern physical protection.”53 This should include an
independent competent authority, as well as a system of evaluation and licencing. On the civilian side,
Pakistan’s competent authority is the PNRA. Here, standards of physical protection outlined via
regulations PAK/925, which are publicly available and show alignment with international standards such
as NSS 13.

Although Pakistan has made its civilian legislative and regulatory framework available, little information
is publicly available on the military side. Pakistani officials frequently assert that their security regime
conforms with international standards, with its 2020 Nuclear Security Regime document noting that
Pakistan “has established a comprehensive and effective national nuclear security regime which is at par
with international standards and guidelines.”54 This can be validated with civilian regulation and given
international cooperation with the US (see below) and the centralised nature of the country’s nuclear
organisation, it is highly likely that international standards and concepts have diffused across the SPD
regardless of whether they are applied to military or civilian sites.

However, whereas civilian facilities are regulated by the PNRA no equivalent department within the SPD
has been identified. One possibility is that the SPD’s Evaluation and Analysis Directorate, within the
Security Division may fulfil this role. However, this remains unconfirmed, as does the presence as an
independent “regulator” for military-related sites. Should one exist, good practice calls for a separation
of reporting lines to remove conflicts of interest, i.e. that it is based outside of the SPD, similar to how
Pakistan’s Strategic Export Control Division (SECDIV) reports to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA).
Increased transparency over the SPD’s internal inspection and regulatory regime would help give
greater confidence that standards are being adhered to.

International cooperation and assistance

Unlike civilian nuclear technology, where states are encouraged to co-operate and assist each other,
nuclear weapons’ states face an opprobrium on nuclear proliferation. Pakistan has a chequered
proliferation history, with AQ Khan both stealing sensitive information from the Physical Dynamics
Research Laboratory, a subcontractor to the URENCO enrichment consortium, and then going on to sell
indigenised versions of that technology to North Korea, Iran, and Libya.55 The 2004 revelation of Khan’s
nuclear smuggling was a source of national embarrassment to Pakistan, which has since undertaken
numerous measures to prevent similar occurrences. Perhaps the most effective measure has been the
rationalisation of the country’s strategic organisations under the NCA, although this predates the 2004
revelation. Previously organisations such as KRL and the PAEC were encouraged to compete against
each other to drive forward Pakistan’s national weapon programme and, as such, were given
considerable autonomy by successive leaders.56 This autonomy was a key factor in AQ Khan’s activities
thus the subordination of strategic organisations under the NCA effectively reasserts centralised control
over the country’s nuclear organisations.

In addition, Pakistan has tightened industry controls, promulgating the Export Control Act on Goods,
Technologies, Material and Equipment related to Nuclear and Biological Weapons and their Delivery
Systems (Strategic Export Control Act) on 23 September 2004. This strengthened export controls on
sensitive and dual use goods/technologies. Additionally, pursuant to the 2004 Act, the Strategic Export
Control Division licencing authority was established in 2007 at the MFA. Headed by a Director General, it
is organised into three directorates each related to policy, licensing, regulations, and enforcement,
including investigations and prosecutions.57

On the other side of the coin, Pakistan has been offered technologies to help enhance the security of its
nuclear weapons. According to Feroz Khan, in 2001, then US Secretary of State Colin Powell offered
nuclear security assistance in the form of training and technology transfer, seemingly of safety and
security mechanisms such as PALs. According to Khan, “[t]he SPD carefully examined the offer and
accepted training but declined technology transfers, which they perceived as intrusive, or likely to
compromise program secrecy.”58 Following this, Pakistan has developed its own system of PALs,59 while
Khan also notes that “[s]ince then, Pakistan has benefited from advanced-level training from U.S.
national laboratories and has improved its best practices in accordance with its own security culture.”60
Although the details of the Pakistan’s safety and security measures for its nuclear weapons programme
are largely missing from the open sources, aspects of Pakistan’s engagement until at least 2011 in
improving its nuclear management and safety and security matters appears to have been acknowledged
by US government officials.61

Identification and assessment of threats

IAEA Fundamental Principle G notes that “the State’s physical protection should be based on the State’s
current evaluation of the threat.”62 In practice, this necessitates states to regularly produce a national
risk assessment that, in turn, informs the Design Basis Threat. The DBT “describes the capabilities of
potential insider and external adversaries who might attempt unauthorized removal of nuclear and
other radioactive material or sabotage,” and forms the criteria against which an operator’s Physical
Protection Systems (PPS) are designed and evaluated against.63 No single security system is designed to
defeat the threat outlined by the DBT, instead security systems have specific Concepts of Operations
such as enabling the detection of intruders, providing delay to allow for an effective response. For
example, fences are designed to help delay intruders and work in conjunction with other detection
measures. If a fence is scaled, but intruders are detected, and sufficiently delayed in the process, that
fence has still met its intended purpose – despite being scaled. When various security systems are
brought together, they should collectively be able to defeat the threat represented by the DBT. Not all
threats are covered by the DBT process, and the state (rather than the operator) is responsible for
defeating threats “beyond the DBT.” According to the Pakistani Foreign Ministry, Pakistani PPS has been
designed for a 5-D mission, where Pakistani PPS and response forces will deter, detect, delay, defend,
and destroy adversaries.64 Moreover, Pakistani officials also note that the country has comprehensively
applied DBT approaches to all “nuclear and radiation facilities and for [the] transportation of nuclear
and radioactive material.”65

In examining the security of Pakistani nuclear sites, many analysts emphasise the country’s trouble with
domestic terrorism.66 Indeed, beginning in the early-2000s Pakistan suffered a wave of terrorism, that
saw numerous large scale and high-profile attacks across the country, including at least six attacks
involving sites related to the production or basing of nuclear weapons and their personnel:

A November 2007 suicide attack killed seven PAF staff travelling between Mushaf Mir Airbase and
the Central Ammunition Depot, Sargodha.67 Both sites have been associated with Pakistan’s nuclear
programme.68,69

A double bombing in August 2008 killed 64 people in Wah cantonment.70 One explosion took place
outside the Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF), which is believed to house the Gadwal Enrichment
Plant.71

In July 2009, a bus carrying KRL workers was attacked by a suicide bomber at Choor Chowk,
Peshawar Road.72

In October 2009, the Minhas air force base in Kamra was attacked.73 The site is widely assessed to
host Pakistani nuclear weapons, although the attacker is reported to have detonated a bomb at “a
checkpoint on a road leading to the complex,” rather than the base itself.74 Pakistani officials deny
that the site hosts nuclear weapons.

In December 2010, militants attacked a Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC) school bus, in Kamra.
75 PAC has also been associated with the country’s nuclear programme.76
 In August 2012, the Minhas air force base was attacked again. This time attackers gained access to
the air base, damaging one aircraft, but did not reach the hangars.77

Although unsettling, it should be noted that of the six attacks, only one appears to have involved the
penetration of a site’s secure perimeter, with the remaining five attacks focusing on “soft targets”
including site perimeters, but also staff and families when travelling. Furthermore, although Pakistan’s
PPS may have failed in its deterrence mission, it succeeded in its detect, delay, and defend missions.
Despite the high human cost of these attacks, this still protected people and the environment from
unacceptable radiological consequences, and/or the theft of nuclear technology, thus was arguably
successful in this regard.

Motivating factors also form part of the DBT assessment and it is important to recognise the context
and timings of attacks. For example, although Pakistan has long experienced terrorism, attacks
escalated significantly between 2008 and 2014. Here, an estimated 11,500 attacks took place across the
country, including numerous military and government sites.78 These were primarily in retaliation to the
counter-terror operations being conducted in Pakistan’s then Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA,
now merged with the Pakistani province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and in the borderlands of Afghanistan.
However, the turning point came in 2014 after the Pakistani Taliban – also known as the Tehrik-e-Taliban
Pakistan (TTP) – attacked the Peshawar Army Public School, killing more than 130 schoolchildren.79 This
prompted Pakistani authorities to launch Operation Zarb-e-Azb – a comprehensive National Action Plan
named after the sword of The Prophet Muhammad – against terrorism and extremist ideology in the
country’s Tribal Areas.80 Since 2014, the numbers of terrorist attacks within Pakistan have fallen
significantly,81 although as noted by the Brookings Institution, terrorism in Pakistan may have declined
“but the underlying roots of extremism remain.”82 As such, Pakistani authorities must remain alert to
large scale and high-profile attacks by well organised and equipped adversaries, and continually adapt
their DBTs in light of new evidence.

Despite the apparent successes against domestic terrorism, attacks against Pakistan’s nuclear sites and
personnel do suggest an area of potential weakness in Pakistan’s security arrangements; particularly as
the ability to identify either travel patterns and/or areas where nuclear-related staff congregate could be
exploited for coercive means. If staff can be identified for attack, they may also be coerced into
becoming “insiders.” Wider intelligence efforts, fall outside of the SPD’s “protective rings,” instead being
the responsibility of other intelligence agencies such as the ISI.83

Insiders have been a real concern to Pakistani authorities. For example, the close relationship between
Umma-Tameer-e-Nau (UTN) and al Qaeda and the Taliban raised concerns of a “WMD for hire” network,
that would sell nuclear technology to extremist non-state actors.84 Ostensibly founded for relief and
reconstruction activities in Afghanistan, UTN was founded by Pakistani nuclear scientist Sultan
Bashiruddin Mahmood. However, in October 2001 Mahmood and Chaudhry Abdul Majeed (a fellow
nuclear scientist and UTN founding member) were arrested by Pakistani authorities.85 It was later
revealed that they had discussed nuclear weapons with Osama bin Laden.86 To prevent insiders, today,
in Pakistan applicants undergo vetting procedures before joining sensitive organisations staff,
undertaking either the Personnel Reliability Programme (PRP) for military roles, or the Human Reliability
Programme (HRP) for civilian roles. Screening involves four of Pakistan’s intelligence agencies and,
according to Tertrais, “Unsurprisingly, checks are said to focus on finances and religious beliefs.”87
Screening is repeated every two years. These programmes have had some impacts – for example, in
2015 Retired Brig Tahir Raza Naqvi noted that staff had been removed as a result of failing PRP
requirements.88 These were presented as examples of successes, rather than failure through the
presence of insider threats.

Nonetheless, PRP is not fool-proof. For example, in May 2019 two army officers and one civil officer
from a strategic organisation were convicted for spying. This includes engineer Wasim Akram who at the
time was employed by NESCOM, where he had a role in developing the Shaheen-II and Shaheen-III
missiles.89 After being investigated for unexplained wealth, Akram went onto implicate Lieutenant
General (retired) Javed Iqbal and Brigadier (retired) Raja Rizwan who received 14 years’ imprisonment
and the death penalty, respectively.90 This raises questions about the efficacy of Pakistan’s vetting
programme, and whether Pakistan’s periodic security assessments would benefit from additional
measures, such as improved nuclear security culture wherein employees (rather than security
professionals) form the first level of defence through reporting suspicious activity.

As noted by Sarah Mullen’s pioneering work on nuclear security, “clearance cannot be expected to
provide full assurance of future trustworthiness because any number of factors can impair employee
stability and reliability after hire.” Instead, “Behavioural observation appears to pick up where screening
leaves off by providing a post-employment means of recognizing and dealing with instability or aberrant
behaviour in employees.”91 Such behaviours are only observable within the system of cultural norms
and it is likely that only those belonging to the Pakistani culture would accurately identify the difference
between a pious individual and one with radical streaks. It is unclear if Pakistani authorities make use of
behavioural observation specialist teams. If not, it is most likely that fellow employees will be the first to
notice if a fellow employee is acting suspiciously – for example through unexplained wealth – or if there
are changes to an individual’s dress code, appearance, vocabulary, social practices, or changes in
lifestyle that would indicate a change in social attitudes. As such, to better counter “insiders,” assessing
and improving a site’s nuclear security culture will further strengthen these reliability programmes. See
Sustaining the physical protection regime section below.

Risk based physical protection systems and measures

As noted, at a minimum, physical protection has three main concepts of operations, namely the
detection and delay of intruders, and the aiding of an appropriate response. Each protection function
should use a graded approach that “tak[es] into account the current evaluation of the threat, the relative
attractiveness, the nature of the nuclear material and potential consequences associated with the
unauthorized removal of nuclear material and with the sabotage against nuclear material or nuclear
facilities”;92 and “Defence in Depth” which includes “a designed mixture of hardware (security devices),
procedures (including the organization of guards and the performance of their duties) and facility design
(including layout)” to achieve this graded approach.93

Pakistan’s 5-D mission includes

response to, [and] equipment and procedures intended to prevent, detect and extend delay
and appropriate response to neutralise a malicious act. This includes installation of intrusion
detection systems, access control systems, delay barriers and search systems and Central
Alarm Station[s].94

Indeed, although specific details are not discussed, satellite imagery analysis of Pakistani nuclear
facilities frequently depicts the security measures in place.95 In conjunction with its 5-D mission,
Pakistan has enacted Nuclear Material Accounting and Control (NMAC) systems since 2003/4, supported
by regular and surprise inspections to ensure accountability and verification.96 These steps are
considered holistic and effective by Pakistani authorities, with the MFA describing the national approach
as having a “complete methodology encircling physical security, safety, accountability and verification.”
(Sustaining The Physical Protection Regime)

After establishing a physical protection regime, states should take steps to ensure that systems are
sustainable and effective over time. Sustainability includes four main strands, including culture, quality
assurance, confidentiality, and sustainability programmes.

Regarding culture, it is apparent that states may establish robust physical protection measures, but if
they are not properly maintained they will become ineffectual. Such issues were key factors at the 2012
break-in of the Y-12 nuclear facility by three elderly anti-nuclear protestors in the United States.97 To this
end, Pakistani officials assert that “a robust security culture” has evolved in Pakistan, which “helps in
strengthening and sustaining the national nuclear security regime.”98 Little official information about
Pakistani nuclear security culture has been published, although in 2009 Feroz Khan described the
transition from a security culture that emphasised protection from external threats, and was “originally
designed to protect the autonomy of the scientists so that their work could continue unhindered” to
greater awareness of security culture after 11 September 2001.99 According to Khan, after the 9/11
attacks Pakistan instigated personnel reliability programmes, systems for NMAC, increased safety and
security procedures for weapons and began a Nuclear Security Action Plan (NSAP), overseen by the
PNRA.100 When elaborating on NSAP in 2016, former SPD Head Khalid Kidwai stated that, Pakistan had
implemented its NSAP “to manage radioactive sources, secure orphan sources, detect radiation, and
prepare for emergencies.”101

Although noteworthy, nuclear security culture encompasses more than legislative, regulatory and
procedural changes and instead reflects a workforce’s attitudes and approaches towards nuclear
security. Nuclear security culture is namely “[t]he assembly of characteristics, attitudes and behaviour of
individuals, organizations and institutions which serves as a means to support and enhance nuclear
security.”102 As with other states, awareness and curation of this interpretation of nuclear security
culture appears to be relatively new in Pakistan, and Feroz Khan’s description of security culture reflects
a now-outdated understanding of the term. In accordance with IAEA Fundamental Principle F, “[a]ll
organizations involved in implementing physical protection should give due priority to the security
culture, to its development and maintenance necessary to ensure its effective implementation in the
entire organization.”103 Indeed, efforts to increase awareness of nuclear security culture have been
undertaken in Pakistan’s civilian programme – for example, in April 2018, the PNRA hosted an
“International Workshop on Nuclear Security Culture in Practice.”104 Amongst other objectives, this
sought “to highlight the importance of nuclear security culture to ensure an effective nuclear security”
and “enhance basic understanding and [sic] concept of the nuclear security culture.”105 In addition,
efforts have been undertaken to sensitise students at an early stage of their career, such as on the
Pakistan Institute of Engineering and Applied Sciences’ (PIAS’s) Master of Science in Nuclear Engineering
Program.106

Though further efforts will likely be undertaken, at present the available evidence suggests that curation
of nuclear security culture is an under-developed area in Pakistan, as do reviews of websites of key
civilian organisations. Although Pak/225 requires that licensees “shall give due priority to the security
culture, its development and maintenance necessary to ensure its effective implementation in the entire
organization,”107 there is little public evidence that this has been the case. For example, a review of the
PNRA website made few references to culture, mainly in the context of safety culture. A similar result
was seen on the PAEC website where a search of the term “culture” saw few returns, with those
references also pertaining to safety or quality culture.

In addition, Fundamental Principle J notes that states should establish “a quality assurance policy and
quality assurance programmes … with a view to providing confidence that specified requirements for all
activities important to physical protection are satisfied.”108 Here, regulations within PAK/225, requires a
“quality assurance policy and quality assurance programme shall be established and implemented with
a view to provide confidence that specified requirements for all activities important to physical
protection are satisfied.”109

To help sustain and build its human technical capacity, in 2014 Pakistan announced the creation of its
Pakistan’s Centre of Excellence (CoE) in Nuclear Security. The Center consists of three affiliated
organisations, but which remain subordinate to various bodies within the SCO. These organisations
include:

Pakistan Centre of Excellence for Nuclear Security (PCENS: subordinate to NCA);

National Institute of Safety and Security (NISAS: subordinate to the PNRA); and

Pakistan Institute of Engineering and Applied Sciences (PIEAS: subordinate to the PAEC).

The COE is regarded by Pakistan as “an exceptional” development and as a further demonstration of the
country’s commitment to augmenting nuclear safety and security.110

In addition to establishing training schools, Pakistan has established several specialised laboratories to
design and test its security measures. Since 2012, PCENS has hosted specialised laboratories such as the
Physical Protection Exterior Laboratory (PPEL – established April 2016) and the Physical Protection
Systems Laboratory (PPSL);111 while NISAS hosts the Physical Protection Interior Laboratory (PPIL), as
well as the Radiation Detection Equipment Lab, Interior Intrusion Detection Sensors Lab and an Access
Control Systems Lab.112,113

To ensure the viability of any security regime, security concepts must extend to information security,
and the non-disclosure of information that could compromise physical protection measures. According
to the IAEA’s Fundamental Principle L: Confidentiality, “The State should establish requirements for
protecting the confidentiality of information, the unauthorized disclosure of which could compromise
the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities.”114 As noted, Islamabad has severely
restricted the autonomy of its strategic organisations – rationalising the traditional PAEC and KRL rivalry,
and subordinating both to the SPD. Moreover, like other nuclear-armed countries, Pakistani nuclear
scientists are restricted from travelling abroad, and even within Pakistan, and require formal approval
before talking about their work.

Lastly, the IAEA recommends that states should “establish a sustainability programme to ensure that its
physical protection regime is sustained and effective in the long term by committing the necessary
resources.”115 Within Pakistan considerable effort has gone into such programmes, through the
establishment of individual training schools, then their consolidation into the COE. These include efforts
to induct new entrants to the nuclear field, while at least one – NISAS – conducts refresher courses for
existing staff.

Planning and preparedness

IAEA Fundamental Principle K notes the need for contingency plans “to respond to unauthorized
removal of nuclear material or sabotage of nuclear facilities or nuclear material, or attempts thereof.”116
In the first instance, Pakistani authorities view prevention of theft as the first barrier, and nuclear sites
have featured NMAC controls since 2003/4. Additionally, state authorities conduct regular and surprise
inspections “to tally material production and waste in order to maintain transparency and
accountability,” and, according to Feroz Khan, “special theft – and tamper-proof vehicles and containers
are also used,” while both the SPD and PNRA operate radiational detection portal monitors at nuclear
sites.117 These measures all form part of Tertrais and Lavoy’s first security ring.

Though the theft of a nuclear weapon is highly unlikely, and contingency plans for the theft of a nuclear
weapon are unknown, the planning and preparation for Pakistan’s civilian programme suggests the
country takes contingency planning very seriously. For example, Pakistan’s civilian Regulation 925 notes
the requirements for contingency plans for malicious acts such as theft, sabotage, or the release or theft
of material. In addition to the likely recovery efforts led by the SPD’s Special Response Force, or wider ISI
intelligence operations, the country also engages in routine efforts to further limit the possibility of
nuclear or radiological MORC. Within Pakistan, a National Nuclear Detection Architecture (NNDA)
regulates authorised imports and exports, as well as serving to help prevent illicit nuclear or radiological
trafficking.118 This reflects a wider “cradle to grave” approach, wherein bodies such as the PNRA have
helped develop capabilities for the detection of radiological material. Responsibility for the detection
and protection against MORC falls to the PNRA’s Directorate of Physical Protection and Nuclear Security
which – according to the IAEA’s 2014 IRRS report – “has its own resources including trained manpower,
infra-structure equipped with necessary equipment (including protective equipment and containers),
labs, mobile-labs, etc.”119

Moreover, since 2008 Pakistan has operated a Nuclear Security Emergency Coordination Centre
(NuSECC). Based in Islamabad, NuSECC was established under the NSAP and has regional offices in
major cities and six emergency-response mobile laboratories to help track any illicit material.120 For
events that may involve a public health risk, Pakistan has established a National Radiation Emergency
Coordination Centre (NRECC), which “coordinates for the response to nuclear accidents or radiological
emergencies, both nationally and abroad.”121 According the 2007 PNRA report, the NRECC

centre is equipped with necessary communication channels at national and international

levels and is available round the clock to receive emergency notifications. NRECC also has its
 own Mobile Radiological Monitoring Laboratory (MRML) which is equipped with radiation
monitoring equipment, personnel safety equipment and a system of communication with
PNRA and other relevant organizations. NRECC and MRML regularly conduct drills and
exercises to test their own preparedness and efficiency.122

Conclusion

After almost 20 years of sincere commitments and efforts, Pakistani officials confidently state that the
country has a stout NC3 system and that the country has addressed its nuclear security concerns.
Indeed, a systematic review of Pakistan’s nuclear security efforts show that since its early days, the
county has moved towards an effective NC3 system, while also reorganising its strategic industries to
prevent another AQ Khan-style proliferation network. Moreover, increasing concerns since 2001 have
led to a greater emphasis on human reliability, the security of nuclear weapons as well as the sites that
support their production and deployment. Nonetheless, several notable gaps in understanding remain
including how Pakistan seeks to maintain negative control of its naval nuclear weapons, how standards
are audited and assessed within the SPD, and how the country has sought to embed an effective nuclear
security culture across all elements of its nuclear estate and related industries.

Perhaps most pressing is the apparent under-development of nuclear security culture in Pakistan.
Nuclear security culture has become an increasingly recognised component of nuclear management
internationally although available information suggests that Pakistani efforts to improve its overall
nuclear security culture are in their initial phases. This will likely increase and mature, particularly as the
country’s civilian sector increasingly engages with the concept. However, nuclear security culture goes
beyond technical upgrades and security hardware and relies on the support of all stakeholders. There
are four major components to enhance nuclear security culture in the country: The government which
must define national standards and expectations; Leadership and management of Strategic
Organisations that implement and maintain high-standards; Competent Authorities that regulate the
nuclear state; and civil society that must hold all to account.

In Pakistan, there is a perception that only strategic organisations are responsible for an effective
nuclear security culture, but, in reality, it is achievable only through mutual co-ordination of all factors;
the government, strategic organisations, regulatory bodies, and civil society. There are various roles and
responsibilities of these components which they perform during different times and situations. A strong
nuclear security culture will provide a better chance to all stakeholders to participate with their
constructive roles in national nuclear security policy and decision-making according to the global
security environment.
Certainly, on the civilian side, as shown by the PNRA efforts on this are being made. This should be
encouraged, and any results used to co-ordinate effective response by site leaderships. Publication of
any self-assessment surveys will improve transparency and will add further confidence that an effective
nuclear security culture is developing within Pakistan. Although a military equivalent will be harder, the
authors encourage the SPD to make similar assessments and to continue its engagement with limited
transparency because the image of Pakistan’s nuclear security remains heavily tarnished by its
embarrassing episodes that continue to inform the prevailing negative perceptions of the country’s
overall nuclear security regime.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information
Notes on contributors

Tahir Mahmood Azad

Dr. Tahir Mahmood Azad is a Visiting Research Fellow at the Centre for Science and
Security Studies (CSSS) which is based in the School of Security Studies at King's College
London.

Karl Dewey

Karl Dewey is a Research Associate at the Centre for Science and Security Studies (CSSS),
which is based in the School of Security Studies at King's College London.

Notes

1 Khalid Kidwai, cited in Simon Cameron-Moore, ‘Pakistan Seeks to Allay Fears on Nuclear Security,’
Reuters (Online) 2008, https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-pakistan-nuclear-idUKISL6654620080126.
2 David O. Smith, ‘The Management of Pakistan's Nuclear Arsenal’, The Nonproliferation Review 21, no. 3–
4 (2014): 276, https://dxoi.org/10.1080/10736700.2014.1072992.

3 Ibid, 276.

4 IAEA, Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities
(INFCIRC/225/Revision 5), vol. 13, IAEA Nuclear Security Series, (Vienna: INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY
AGENCY, 2011). https://www.iaea.org/publications/8629/nuclear-security-recommendations-on-physical-
protection-of-nuclear-material-and-nuclear-facilities-infcirc/225/revision-5.

5 Feroz Hassan Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb (Stanford, California: Stanford
Security Studies an Imprint of Standford University Press, 2012).

6 Peter R. Lavoy, ‘Islamabad’s Nuclear Posture: Its Premises and Implementation’, in Worries Beyond War,
ed. Henry D Sokolski (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2008).

7 Naeem Salik, Learning to Live with the Bomb: Pakistan: 1998–2016 (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2017).

8 Smith, ‘The Management of Pakistan's Nuclear Arsenal.’

9 Bruno Tertrais, Pakistan’s Nuclear Programme: A Net Assessment, Fondation pour la recherche
stratégique (Paris, 2012),
https://www.frstrategie.org/sites/default/files/documents/publications/recherches-et-
documents/2012/201204.pdf.

10 ‘The NTI Nuclear Security Index,’ NTI, 2021, accessed March, 2021, https://www.ntiindex.org/.

11 For example, see IAEA, Objective and Essential Elements of a State's Nuclear Security Regime, Nuclear
Security Series, (Vienna: INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, 2013).
https://www.iaea.org/publications/10353/objective-and-essential-elements-of-a-states-nuclear-security-
regime.

12 Government of Pakistan, National Command Authority (NCA) Act, M – 302 / L. – 7646 (Gazette of
Pakistan 2010).

13 Mazari Shireen M., ‘Understanding Pakistan's Nuclear Doctrine’, Strategic Studies 24, no. 3 (2004),
https://dxoi.org/10.2307/45242536, http://www.jstor.org/stable/45242536.

14 IAEA, Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities
(INFCIRC/225/Revision 5), 13, 3.
15 Ibid.

16 Fundamental Principle A, in Ibid, 5.

17 For greater discussion see Sébastien Miraglia, ‘Deadly or Impotent? Nuclear Command and Control in
Pakistan’, Journal of Strategic Studies 36, no. 6 (December 2013),
https://dxoi.org/10.1080/01402390.2013.805126.

18 Hans Born, National Governance of Nuclear Weapons: Opportunities and Constraints, Geneva Centre for
the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) (Geneva, 2007), 15,
https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/PP15_Born.pdf.

19 Miraglia, ‘Deadly or Impotent? Nuclear Command and Control in Pakistan.’

20 Ghulam Mujaddid, ‘The Next Decade of Nuclear Unlearning: Command and Control and Management
of Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons’, in Nuclear Leaning in South Asia: Next Decade, ed. Ryan Jacobs and Emily
Burke, Feroz Hassan Khan (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2014).

21 Bruno Tertrais, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear and WMD Programmes: Status, Evolution and Risks’, Non-
Proliferation Papers, 19 (July 2012), https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/EUNPC_no-19.pdf.

22 Tertrais, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear and WMD Programmes: Status, Evolution and Risks.’

23 Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb, 331.

24 Ibid.

25 Dawn, ‘Pakistan Attains ‘Second Strike Capability’ with Test-Fire of Submarine-Launched Cruise
Missile’, Dawn (Online), 9 January 2017, https://www.dawn.com/news/1307384.

26 Samar Mubarakmand, ‘Interview,’ 6 August, 2014.

27 Ibid.

28 Gordon Corera, ‘How Secure is Pakistan's Bomb?’ BBC News (Online), February 4, 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/7225175.stm.

29 Samar Mubarakmand, ‘Interview with Samar Mubarakmand,’ interview by Geo TV, 5 March, 2004.
cited in Tertais (2012)

30 Mahmud Ali Durrani, Pakistan’s Strategic Thinking and the Role of Nuclear Weapons, Sandia National
Laboratories (United States: Sandia National Laboratories, July 2004),
https://www.sandia.gov/cooperative-monitoring-center/_assets/documents/sand2004-3375p.pdf.

31 Durrani, Pakistan’s Strategic Thinking and the Role of Nuclear Weapons.

32 Mubarakmand, interview.

33 Kathryn Schultz, ‘Interview with Kathryn Schultz, Regional Affairs, Department of State, USA,
Washington DC,’ interview by Tahir Mahmood Azad, May 14, 2014.

34 Jason Weaver, ‘One in a Million Given the Accident: Assuring Nuclear Weapon Safety’, Center for
Strategic and International Studies (August 2015): 6, https://www.osti.gov/biblio/1426902.

35 Weaver, ‘One in a Million Given the Accident: Assuring Nuclear Weapon Safety’, 6.

36 Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, ‘Nuclear Security in Pakistan: Reducing the Risks of Nuclear Terrorism’, Arms
Control Today (Online), July 1, 2009, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/nuclear-security-pakistan-
reducing-risks-nuclear-terrorism.

37 Mowatt-Larssen, ‘Nuclear Security in Pakistan: Reducing the Risks of Nuclear Terrorism.’

38 PNRA, Regulations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Installations (PAK/925),
(2019).

39 Government of Pakistan, Pakistan's Nuclear Security Regime, (2020).

40 Adam Weinstein, ‘Nuclear Weapons on a Highway Near You’, Mother Jones, February 15, 2012,
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/02/nuclear-truckers/.

41 IAEA, Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities
(INFCIRC/225/Revision 5), 13, 7.

42 Regulation.8(5). PNRA, Short Regulations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear
Installations (PAK/925).

43 Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb.

44 Brigadier (R) Dr. Naeem Salik, ‘Interview with Brigadier (R) Dr. Naeem Salik,’ interview by Tahir
Mahmood Azad, August 4, 2021.

45 See org chart in Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb, 331.

46 Tertrais, Pakistan’s Nuclear Programme: A Net Assessment.

47 Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb.

48 Lavoy, ‘Islamabad’s Nuclear Posture: Its Premises and Implementation,’ 152.

49 Ibid.

50 ‘Challenges for Pakistan’s Nuclear Security,’ Arms Control today, Arms Control Association, 2013,
https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2013_03/Challenges-for-Pakistans-Nuclear-Security (accessed
December 17, 2020).

51 Muhammad Naeem, ‘The Pakistani National Perspective on Nuclear Non-proliferation’ (paper

presented at the International Cooperation for Enhancing Nuclear Safety, Security, Safeguards and Non-
proliferation, Cham, 8 April 2020).

52 ‘Nuclear Security in Pakistan: Separating Myth From Reality,’ Arms Control Today, Arms Control
Association, 2009, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009-07/features/nuclear-security-pakistan-
separating-myth-reality.

53 IAEA, Developing Regulations and Associated Administrative Measures for Nuclear Security (Vienna:
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, 2018), 13.
https://www.iaea.org/publications/11169/developing-regulations-and-associated-administrative-
measures-for-nuclear-security.

54 Government of Pakistan, Pakistan's Nuclear Security Regime.

55 David Albright, Peddling Peril: How the Secret Nuclear Trade Arms America's Enemies, 1st Free Press
hardcover ed. (New York: Free Press, 2010).

56 Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb.

57 ‘Strategic Export Control Division (Secdiv) (Website),’ 2021, http://www.secdiv.gov.pk/ (accessed March
3, 2021).

58 Khan, ‘Nuclear Security in Pakistan: Separating Myth From Reality.’

59 Corera, ‘How Secure is Pakistan's Bomb?.’

60 Khan, ‘Nuclear Security in Pakistan: Separating Myth From Reality.’

61 Schultz, interview.
62 Fundamental Principle G. IAEA, Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear
Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Revision 5), 13, 12.

63 ‘Design Basis Threat (DBT),’ Undated, https://www.iaea.org/topics/security-of-nuclear-and-other-

radioactive-material/design-basis-threat (accessed September 1, 2020, )

64 Government of Pakistan, Short Pakistan's Nuclear Security Regime, 8. Government of Pakistan,

Pakistan's Nuclear Security Regime, 8

65 Ibid.

66 For examples, see Chaim Braun, ‘Security Issues Related to Pakistan’s Future Nuclear Power
Program’, in Worries Beyond War, ed. Henry D Sokolski (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2008).
Christopher Clary, Thinking about Pakistan’s Nuclear Security in Peacetime, Crisis and War, Institute for
Defence Studies and Analyses (New Delhi, 2010),
https://idsa.in/system/files/OP_PakistansNuclearSecurity.pdf. Henry Sokolski, Pakistan’s Nuclear Future
Reining in the Risk (New Delhi: Manas Publications, 2011).

67 ‘Al Qaeda, Taliban targeting Pakistani nuclear sites,’ FDD’s Long War Journal, 2007,
https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/12/al_qaeda_taliban_tar.php (accessed December 17,
2020).

68 ‘PAF Base Mushaf,’ Facilities, Nuclear Threat Initiative, updated September 27, 2011,
https://www.nti.org/learn/facilities/642/.

69 ‘Sargodha Air Base,’ updated March 15, 2000,

https://fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/facility/sargodha.htm (accessed September 1, 2020).

70 Jane Perlez, ‘64 in Pakistan Die in Bombing at Arms Plant’, The New York Times (New York), August 21,
2008, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/22/world/asia/22pstan.html.

71 ‘Pakistan’s Growing Uranium Enrichment Program,’ Institute for Science and International Security,
updated May 30, 2018, https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/pakistans-growing-uranium-enrichment-
program/12#images (accessed September 1, 2000).

72 Dawn, ‘Suicide Bomber Strikes KRL Bus; 40 Injured,’ Dawn (Online) 2009,
https://www.dawn.com/news/848435.

73 Declan Walsh, ‘Taliban Bombs in Pakistan Strike Air Base, Restaurant and Wedding Party’, The
Guardian (Online), October 23, 2009, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/oct/23/suicide-bomb-
pakistan.
74 ‘Blasts at Pakistan Air Base, Wedding Bus Kill 24,’ Herald Net, updated October 23, 2009,
https://www.heraldnet.com/news/blasts-at-pakistan-air-base-wedding-bus-kill-24/ (accessed September
2, 2020).

75 ‘Suicide attack at Pakistani nuclear weapons complex,’ FDD’s Long War Journal, updated December
10, 2007, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/12/suicide_attack_at_pa.php (accessed
September 2020).

76 ‘Kamra, Air Weapon Complex (AWC) / Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC),’ Federation of American
Scientists, updated June 4, 2000, https://fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/facility/kamra.htm (accessed
December 17, 2020).

77 ‘Gunmen Storm Military Air Base in Pakistan,’ BBC News, updated August 16, 2012,
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-19278302 (accessed Septemer 2020).

78 ‘Datasheet – Pakistan,’ South Asia Terrorism Portal, 2021, https://www.satp.org/datasheet-terrorist-

attack/fatalities/pakistan (accessed March 24, 2021).

79 ‘Terrorism in Pakistan has Declined, but the Underlying Roots of Extremism Remain,’ Brookings
Institute, 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/01/15/terrorism-in-pakistan-
has-declined-but-the-underlying-roots-of-extremism-remain/ (accessed July 22, 2022).

80 Shuja Nawaz, Countering Militancy and Terrorism in Pakistan: The Civil-Military Nexus, United States
Institute of Peace (Online, October 2016), https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR393-Countering-
Militancy-and-Terrorism-in-Pakistan-The-Civil-Military-Nexus.pdf.

81 South Asia Terrorism Portal, ‘Datasheet – Pakistan.’

82 Afzal, ‘Terrorism in Pakistan has Declined, but the Underlying Roots of Extremism Remain.’

83 For conceptualisation of Pakistan’s wider nuclear security, see Tertrais, Pakistan’s Nuclear Programme:
A Net Assessment.

84 Mowatt-Larssen, ‘Nuclear Security in Pakistan: Reducing the Risks of Nuclear Terrorism.’

85 BBC, ‘Pakistan holds nuclear scientists,’ BBC News (Online) 2001,

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/1619252.stm.

86 Mowatt-Larssen, ‘Nuclear Security in Pakistan: Reducing the Risks of Nuclear Terrorism.’

87 Tertrais, Pakistan’s Nuclear Programme: A Net Assessment, 18.

88 Baqir Sajjad Syed, ‘Some People Sacked to Keep N-Programme Safe,’ Dawn (Online), March 19, 2015,
https://www.dawn.com/news/1170533.

89 Abhijit Iyer-Mitra, ‘Pakistan’s Spy Arrests: Brigadier’s Kids Studied in US, Engineer Bought Home in his
Own Name,’ The Print (Online), November 27, 2019, https://theprint.in/opinion/pakistans-spy-arrests-
brigadier-kids-studied-in-us-doctor-bought-home-in-his-own-name/326871/.

90 Anon, ‘Officers Sentenced by FGCM Handed to Civil Jail Authorities: ISPR,’ The News (Online), June 2,
2019, https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/479275-officers-sentenced-by-fgcm-handed-to-civil-jail-
authorities-ispr.

91 Sarah Mullen, ‘Generic Adversary Characteristics and the Potential Threat to Licensed Nuclear
Activities from Insiders’ (paper presented at the Sixth Annual Symposium on the Role of Behavioral
Science in Physical Security, Springfield, Virginia, June 3-4, 1981), 104.

92 Fundamental Principle H. IAEA, Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear

Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Revision 5), 13.

93 Fundamental Principle I, Ibid.

94 Government of Pakistan, Pakistan's Nuclear Security Regime, 8.

95 For examples of this see various publications at ‘Pakistan: Reports with Imagery,’ Institute for Science
and International Security, accessed July, 2022, https://isis-online.org/isis-
reports/imagery/category/pakistan.

96 Khan, ‘Nuclear Security in Pakistan: Separating Myth From Reality,’ 17.

97 U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Inspector General, and Office of Audits and Inspections, Special
Report: Inquiry into the Security Breach at the National Nuclear Security Administration's Y-12 National
Security Complex, DOE/IG-0868 (Online: U.S. Department of Energy, 2012).

98 Government of Pakistan, Pakistan's Nuclear Security Regime, 1.

99 Khan, ‘Nuclear Security in Pakistan: Separating Myth From Reality.’

100 Ibid.

101 Khalid Ahmed Kidwai, Pakistan’s Role in Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) Process, Institute of Strategic
Studies Islamabad, (Online: Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad, March 25, 2016),
http://issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Inaugural-statement-by-Lt-Gen-Khalid-Ahmed-
Kidwai.pdf.
102 IAEA, Nuclear Security Culture (Vienna: INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, 2008), 3.
https://www.iaea.org/publications/7977/nuclear-security-culture.

103 Fundamental Principle F. IAEA, Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear
Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Revision 5), 13, 15.

104 ‘Holding of International Workshop on Nuclear Security Culture in Practice from April 23-26, 2018 at
PNRA HQs, Islamabad,’ Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority, 2018,
https://www.pnra.org/NSCP%202018.html

105 PNRA, ‘Holding of International Workshop on Nuclear Security Culture in Practice from April 23-26,
2018 at PNRA HQs, Islamabad.’

106 Tariq Majeed and Inam ul Haq, ‘Enhancement of Nuclear Security Culture with Implementation of
Nuclear Security Education at PIEA,’ in International Conference on Nuclear Security (Vienna: IAEA,
February 10-14, 2020). https://conferences.iaea.org/event/181/contributions/15340/.

107 PNRA, Regulations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Installations (PAK/925).

108 Fundamental Principle J. IAEA, Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear
Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Revision 5), 13, 16.

109 Paragraph 9, point 6. PNRA, Short Regulations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and
Nuclear Installations (PAK/925).

110 ‘Pakistan’s National Statement in Nuclear Security Summit 2014 at Hague, Netherlands,’ Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, 2014, accessed March 22, 2015,
http://mofa.gov.pk/pakistana%C2%A2a%C2%ACa%C2%A2s-national-statement-nuclear-security-summit-
the-hague-24-to-25-march-2014/.

111 A Dixit, Pakistan’s National Centre of Excellence Contributes to Sustaining Nuclear Security, IAEA (Vienna,
2016),
https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/magazines/bulletin/bull/bull574_nuclearsecurity.pdf.

112 Noreen Iftakhar and Sitara Noor, ‘Nuclear Security Education and Training in Pakistan’, International
Journal of Nuclear Security 3 (2017), https://dxoi.org/10.7290/ijns030108,
https://trace.tennessee.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1037&context=ijns.

113 Tariq Majeed and Inam ul Haq, ‘Physical Protection Systems Education at PIEAS: Current Status,
Lessons Learned, and Future Prospects’ (International Conference of Physical Protection of Nuclear
Materials and Facilities, Vienna, IAEA, November 13-17, 2017).
114 Fundamental Principle L. IAEA, Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear
Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Revision 5), 13, 16.

115 IAEA, Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear
Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Revision 5), 13, 17.

116 Fundamental Principle K, in Ibid, 18.

117 Khan, ‘Nuclear Security in Pakistan: Separating Myth From Reality.’

118 Government of Pakistan, Short Pakistan's Nuclear Security Regime, 8.

119 IAEA, Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) Mission to Pakistan, Department of Nuclear Safety and
Security, IAEA (Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 2014), 13.

120 Khan, ‘Nuclear Security in Pakistan: Separating Myth From Reality.’

121 Government of Pakistan, Pakistan's Nuclear Security Regime.

122 PNRA, Report, Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (Islamabad, 2007),

https://www.pnra.org/upload/pnrarpt/PNRA%20Report-2007.pdf.

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