G.R. No.

L-61388 April 20, 1983

GARCIA-PADILLA VS. JUAN PONCE ENRILE

FACTS

1. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus and mandamus is filed by petitioners.

2. Three (3) teams of the PC/INP conducted a raid at the residence of Dra. Aurora Parong.

3. Apprehended during the said raid were Dra. Aurora Parong, Benjamin Pineda, Sabino Padilla, Francisco
Divinagracia, Zenaida Mallari, Letty Ballogan, Norberto Portuguese, and Mariano Soriano.

4. Imelda de los Santos, Eufronio Ortiz, Jr., Juanita Granada, and Bienvenida Garcia, were arrested on the following
day, July 7, 1982 by the same PC teams.

5. On July 15, 1982, Tom Vasquez was arrested, and his Volkswagen car, was seized by the PC authorities.

6. The fourteen (14) detainees were all detained at the PC/INP Command Headquarters, Bayombong, Nueva
Vizcaya from July 6, 1982 until their transfer on the morning of August 10, 1982 to an undisclosed place reportedly
to Camp Crame, Quezon City, to Echague, Isabela, and to Tuguegarao, Cagayan.

7. Hence, this petition for the writ of habeas corpus and mandamus filed by Josefina Garcia-Padilla, mother of
detained petitioner Sabino G. Padilla, Jr.

ISSUE

1. Whether or not petitioners' detention is legal.

2. Whether or not the issuance of a Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) has provided the legal basis of the
detention of herein detainees following their arrest for Proclamation No. 2045 covered offenses

RULING

1. YES.

Petitioners have not been illegally deprived of their constitutional right to liberty, neither in the manner of their arrest,
nor by their continued detention, and that the circumstances attendant in the herein case do not warrant their
release on a writ of habeas corpus.

At the time of the arrest of the nine (9) of the fourteen (14) detainees herein on July 6, 1982, records reveal that they
were then having conference in the dining room of Dra. Parong's residence from 10:00 a.m. of that same day.

Prior thereto, all the fourteen (14) detainees were under surveillance as they were then Identified as members of the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) engaging in subversive activities and using the house of detainee Dra.
Aurora Parong as their headquarters.

Caught in flagrante delicto, the nine (9) detainees mentioned scampered towards different directions leaving in top
of their conference table numerous subversive documents, periodicals, pamphlets, books, correspondence,
stationaries, and other papers, including a plan on how they would infiltrate the youth and student sector (code-
named YORK).

Also found were one (1) .38 cal. revolver with eight (8) live bullets, nineteen (19) rounds of ammunition for M16
armalite, eighteen thousand six hundred fifty pesos (P18,650.00) cash believed to be CPP/NPA funds, assorted
medicine packed and ready for distribution, as sizeable quantity of printing paraphernalia, which were then seized.

The arrest of the detainees fall under a situation where arrest is lawful even without a judicial warrant as specifically
provided for under Section 6(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court and allowed under existing jurisprudence on the
matter. As provided therein, a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when the
person to be arrested has committed or actually committing, or is about to commit an offense in his presence.
The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and other crimes
and offenses committed in the furtherance on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith
under Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of continuing offenses which set them apart from the
common offenses, aside from their essentially involving a massive conspiracy of nationwide magnitude. Clearly
then, the arrest of the herein detainees was well within the bounds of the law and existing jurisprudence in our
jurisdiction.

2. YES

The function of the PCO is to validate, on constitutional ground, the detention of a person for any of the offenses
covered by Proclamation No. 2045 which continues in force the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, if the arrest has been made initially without any warrant, its legal effect is to render the writ unavailing as a
means of judicially inquiring into the legality of the detention in view of the suspension of the privilege of the writ.
The grant of the power to suspend the said privilege provides the basis for continuing with perfect legality the
detention as long as the invasion or rebellion has not been repelled or quelled, and the need therefor in the interest
of public safety continues.

The significance of the conferment of this power, constitutionally upon the President as Commander-in-Chief, is that
the exercise thereof is not subject to judicial inquiry, with a view to determining its legality in the light of the bill of
rights guarantee to individual freedom. This must be so because the suspension of the privilege is a military
measure the necessity of which the President alone may determine as an incident of his grave responsibility as the
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, of protecting not only public safety but the very life of the State, the
government and duly constituted authorities. This should be clear beyond doubt in the case of "invasion," along
which "rebellion" or "insurrection" is mentioned by the Constitution, which contingency does not present a legal
question on whether there is a violation of the right to personal liberty when any member of the invading force is
captured and detained.

The presidential responsibility is one attended with all urgency when so grave a peril to the life of the Nation besets
the country in times of the aforementioned contingencies. In the discharge of this awesome and sacred
responsibility, the President should be free from interference. The existence of warlike conditions as are created by
invasion, rebellion or insurrection, the direst of all emergencies that can possibly confront a nation, argues, beyond
dispute, against subjecting his actions in this regard to judicial inquiry or interference from whatever source. If
freedom from judicial review is conceded in the exercise of his peacetime powers as that of appointment and of
granting pardon, denominated as political powers of the President, it should incontestably be more so with his
wartime power, as it were, to adopt any measure in dealing with situations calling for military action as in case of
invasion, rebellion or insurrection.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is one such measure. To be effective, the occasion for
its application on specific individuals should be left to the exclusive and sound judgment of the President, at least
while the exigencies of invasion, rebellion or insurrection persist, and the public safety requires it, a matter, likewise,
which should be left for the sole determination of the President as Commander-in-Chief of the Nation's armed
forces. The need for a unified command in such contingencies is imperative-even axiomatic-as a basic military
concept in the art of warfare.

We further hold that under LOI 1211, a Presidential Commitment Order, the issuance of which is the exclusive
prerogative of the President under the Constitution, may not be declared void by the courts, under the doctrine of
"political question," as has been applied in the Baker and Castaneda cases, on any ground, let alone its supposed
violation of the provision of LOI 1211, thus diluting, if not abandoning the doctrine of the Lansang case. The
supreme mandate received by the President from the people and his oath to do justice to every man should be
sufficient guarantee, without need of judicial overseeing, against commission by him of an act of arbitrariness in the
discharge particularly of those duties imposed upon him for the protection of public safety which in itself includes the
protection of life, liberty and property. This Court is not possessed with the attribute of infallibility that when it review s
the acts of the President in the exercise of his exclusive power, for possible fault of arbitrariness, it would not itself
go so far as to commit the self-same fault.

Finally, We hold that upon the issuance of the Presidential Commitment Order against herein petitioners, their
continued detention is rendered valid and legal, and their right to be released even after the filing of charges against
them in court, to depend on the President, who may order the release of a detainee or his being placed under house
arrest, as he has done in meritorious cases.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition should be, as it is hereby dismissed.

SO ORDERED.