CRITIQUE OF J. S.

MILL’S UTILITARIANISM

Paul Gerard Horrigan, Ph.D., 2021.

The Utilitarianism of John Stuart Mill. Although Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) had
already promoted Utilitarianism before the arrival of the two Mills upon the philosophical scene,
with John Stuart Mill (1806-1873),1 son of Bentham disciple James Mill (1773-1836), altruistic

1
Studies on John Stuart Mill: A. BAIN, John Stuart Mill: A Criticism, with Personal Recollections, Longmans,
London, 1882 ; G. TAROZZI, J. S. Mill, 2 vols., Athena, Milan, 1929-1931 ; R. P. ANSCHUTZ, The Philosophy of
J. S. Mill, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1953 ; M. S. J. PACKE, The Life of John Stuart Mill, Secker and Warburg,
London, London, 1954 ; I. MUELLER, John Stuart Mill and French Thought, University of Illinois Press, Urbana,
IL, 1956 ; F. RESTAINO, J. Stuart Mill e la cultura filosofica brittanica, La Nuova Italia, Florence, 1968 ; J. B.
SCHNEEWIND (ed.), Mill: A Collection of Critical Essays, Doubleday & Co., Garden City, NY, 1968 ; J. M.
ROBSON, The Improvement of Mankind: The Social and Political Thought of John Stuart Mill, Toronto University
Press, Toronto, 1968 ; K. BRITTON, John Stuart Mill, Dover, New York, 1969 ; A. RYAN, J. S. Mill, Routledge &
Kegan Paul, London, 1974 ; B. MAZLISH, James and John Stuart Mill: Father and Son in the Nineteenth Century,
Basic Books, New York, 1975 ; D. F. THOMPSON, John Stuart Mill and Representative Government, Princeton
University Press, Princeton, 1976 ; F W. GARFORTH, John Stuart Mill’s Theory of Education, Barnes and Noble,
New York, 1979 ; G. GENCHI, Unità della ragione e controllo sociale: saggi su John Stuart Mill, Laterza, Bari,
1980 ; W. REMMELT DE JONG, The Semantics of John Stuart Mill, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1982 ; F. R. BERGER,
Happiness, Justice and Freedom: The Moral and Political Philosophy of John Stuart Mill, University of California
Press, Berkeley, 1984 ; W. THOMAS, Mill, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1985 ; J. RYAN, The Philosophy of
John Stuart Mill, Humanity Books, New York, 1987 ; J. SKORUPSKI, John Stuart Mill, Routledge, London, 1989 ;
G. SCARRE, Logic and Reality in the Philosophy of John Stuart Mill, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht,
1989 ; F. WILSON, Psychological Analysis and the Philosophy of John Stuart Mill, Toronto University Press,
Toronto, 1990 ; G. HIMMELFARB, On Liberty and Liberalism: The Case of John Stuart Mill, ICS Press, San
Francisco, 1990 ; J. CARLISLE, John Stuart Mill and the Writing of Character, University of Georgia Press,
Athens, GA, 1991 ; W. DONNER, The Liberal Self: John Stuart Mill’s Moral and Political Philosophy, Cornell
University Press, Ithaca, 1991 ; D. LYONS, Rights, Welfare and Mill’s Moral Theory, Clarendon Press, Oxford,
1994 ; J. SKORUPSKI (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Mill, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998 ; J.
HAMBURGER, John Stuart Mill on Liberty and Control, Yale University Press, New Haven, 2000 ; L. C.
RAEDER, John Stuart Mill and the Religion of Humanity, University of Missouri Press, Columbia, 2002 ; N.
URBINATI, Mill on Democracy: From the Athenian Polis to Representative Government, University of Chicago
Press, Chicago, 2002 ; N. CAPALDI, John Stuart Mill: A Biography, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004
; M. LEVIN, J. S. Mill on Civilization and Barbarism, Routledge, London, 2004 ; C. HEYDT, Rethinking Mill’s
Ethics: Character and Aesthetic Education, Continuum Press, London, 2006 ; J. SKORUPSKI, Why Read Mill
Today?, Routledge, London and New York, 2006 ; R. REEVES, John Stuart Mill. Victorian Firebrand, Atlantic
Books, London, 2007 ; G. SCARRE, Mill’s On Liberty, Continuum, London, 2007 ; B. KINZER, J. S. Mill
Revisited: Biographical and Political Explorations, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2007 ; C. L. TEN (ed.),
Mill’s On Liberty: A Critical Guide, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008 ; D. MILLER, J. S. Mill, Polity
Press, Cambridge, 2010 ; B. EGGLESTON, D. E. MILLER and D. WEINSTEIN (eds.), John Stuart Mill and the
Art of Life, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011 ; D. BRINK, Mill’s Progressive Principles, Oxford University
Press, Oxford, 2013 ; F. ROSEN, Mill, The Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2013 ; M. LOIZIDES (ed.), Mill’s System of
Logic: Critical Appraisals, Routledge, London, 2014 ; G. VAROUXAKIS and P. KELLY (eds.), John Stuart Mill –
Thought and Influence: The Saint of Rationalism, Routledge, New York, 2014 ; D. F. THOMPSON, John Stuart
Mill and Representative Government, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2015 ; J. RILEY, The Routledge
Philosophy Guidebook to Mill’s On Liberty, Routledge, New York, 2015 ; M. W. DOYLE, The Question of
Intervention: John Stuart Mill and the Responsibility to Protect, Yale University Press, New Haven, 2015 ; J.
PERSKY, The Political Economy of Progress: John Stuart Mill and Modern Radicalism, Oxford University Press,
Oxford, 2016 ; C. MACLEOD and D. MILLER (eds.), A Companion to John Stuart Mill, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford,
2017 ; L. HOULGATE, Understanding John Stuart Mill: The Smart Student’s Guide to Utilitarianism and On
Liberty, Houlgate Books, 2018 ; J. M. EISENBERG, John Stuart Mill on History: Human Nature, Progress, and the

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Utilitarianism reaches its full development. In the first chapter of his Introduction to the
Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789), Bentham had written: “Nature has placed mankind
under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point
out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard
of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They
govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think; every effort we can make to throw off our
subjection, will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it…The principle of utility recognizes the
subjection, and assumes it for the foundation of that system, the object of which is to rear the
fabric of felicity by the hands of reason and law.”2 J. S. Mill’s Utilitarianism has strong roots in
Bentham’s hedonism and Mill writes in his book Utilitarianism (first published as a series of
magazine articles in 1861 and in book form in 1863): “The creed which accepts as the foundation
of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion
as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By
happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation

Stationary State, Lexington Books, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, MD, 2018 ; T. LARSEN, John Stuart Mill: A
Secular Life, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2018 ; J. L. HILL, The Prophet of Modern Constitutional
Liberalism: John Stuart Mill and the Supreme Court, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2021.
Studies on Utilitarianism: D. LYONS, The Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism, The Clarendon Press, Oxford,
1965 ; S. GOROVITZ (ed.), John Stuart Mill: Utilitarianism, with Critical Essays, The Bobbs-Merrill Company,
Indianapolis, 1971 ; J. J. C. SMART and B. WILLIAMS, Utilitarianism: For and Against, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, 1973 ; D. H. REGAN, Utilitarianism and Co-operation, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1980 ; A. SEN
and B. WILLIAMS (eds.), Utilitarianism and Beyond, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982 ; H. B.
MILLER and W. H. WILLIAMS (eds.), The Limits of Utilitarianism, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis,
1982 ; J. RILEY, Liberal Utilitarianism. Social Choice and J. S. Mill’s Philosophy, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 1988 ; D. HOLBROOK, Qualitative Utilitarianism, University Press of America, Lanham, MD, 1988 ;
J. GLOVER (ed.), Utilitarianism and Its Critics, Collier Macmillan, London, 1990 ; P. J. KELLY, Utilitarianism
and Distributive Justice: Jeremy Bentham and the Civil Law, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990 ; J. E. CRIMMINS,
Secular Utilitarianism: Social Science and the Critique of Religion in the Thought of Jeremy Bentham, Clarendon
Press, Oxford, 1990 ; R. E. GOODIN, Utilitarianism as a Public Policy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
1995 ; G. SCARRE, Utilitarianism, Routledge, London, 1996 ; R. CRISP, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Mill
on Utilitarianism, Routledge, London, 1997 ; D. LYONS (ed.), Mill’s Utilitarianism: Critical Essays, Rowman and
Littlefield, Totowa, N.J., 1997 ; W. H. SHAW, Contemporary Ethics: Taking Account of Utilitarianism, Blackwell,
Oxford, 1999 ; F. ROSEN, Classical Utilitarianism from Hume to Mill, Routledge, London and New York, 2003 ;
H. R. WEST, An Intoduction to Mill’s Utilitarian Ethics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004 ; D.
BRAYBROOKE, Utilitarianism: Restorations; Repairs; Renovations, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2004 ;
B. SCHULTZ and G. VAROUXAKIS (eds.), Utilitarianism and Empire, Lexington Books, Rowman & Littlefield,
Lanham MD, 2005 ; H. R. WEST (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Mill’s Utilitarianism, Blackwell, Oxford, 2006 ; T.
MULGAN, Understanding Utilitarianism, Acumen, Stocksfield, 2007 ; H. R. WEST, Mill’s Utilitarianism: A
Reader’s Guide, Continuum, London and New York, 2007 ; K. BYKVIST, Utilitarianism: A Guide for the
Perplexed, Continuum, London, 2010 ; B. EGGLESTON and D. E. MILLER (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to
Utilitarianism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014 ; W. H. SHAW, Utilitarianism and the Ethics of War,
Routledge, London and New York, 2016 ; J. E. CRIMMINS (ed.), The Bloomsbury Encyclopedia of Utilitarianism,
Bloomsbury Academic, London and New York, 2017 ; L. O. EBENSTEIN, The Greatest Happiness Principle: An
Examination of Utilitarianism, Routledge, London and New York, 2017 ; B. SCHULTZ, The Happiness
Philosophers: The Lives and Works of the Great Utilitarians, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2017 ; A. T.
FORCEHIMES and L. SEMRAU, Thinking Through Utilitarianism: A Guide to Contemporary Arguments, Hackett
Publishing Co., Indianapolis, IN, 2919 ; T. MULGAN, Utilitarianism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
2020 ; L. NARENS and B. SKYRMS, The Pursuit of Happiness: Philosophical and Psychological Foundations of
Utility, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2020 ; C. BARRELL, History and Historiography in Classical
Utilitarianism, 1800-1865, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2021.
2
J. BENTHAM, Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, ch. 1.

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of pleasure.”3 But, whereas Bentham “insisted upon quantitative hedonism, the theory that
pleasures are of one kind only, namely, physical or sensual, the only difference among pleasures
being one of quantity measurable by the hedonistic calculus,”4 J. S. Mill recognized qualitative
differences in pleasure aside from the quantitative differences, that there are in fact higher and
lower pleasures: “It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be a
Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.”5 “Mill contended that pleasures differ in kind as well
as in amount; qualitative distinctions among pleasures could make slight amounts of high-quality
pleasures much more valuable than large amounts of qualitatively inferior pleasures. Mill’s
ethical theory of qualitative hedonism is contrasted with Bentham’s quantitative hedonism.”6
“Bentham, in the ‘hedonistic calculus’ he tried to construct for computing the relative value of a
pleasure, had not taken into account of the quality of the pleasure under consideration. He had
simply judged it in relation to its intensity, presence, duration and the like. Mill, however,
insisted that some pleasures are preferable simply because they are higher. Intellectual pleasures,
for instance, are intrinsically better than sensual pleasures. No intelligent man would sacrifice his
intelligence, even if he were assured that if he were more stupid he would be more contented.

“Again, whereas Bentham sought to reduce our altruistic feelings to self-interest, Mill
recognizes the primitive character of social impulses and founds the social character of the good
– the greatest happiness of the greatest number of people – on the gregarious instinct. We are
naturally altruistic and self-sacrificing. We naturally find our individual happiness indirectly by
directly promoting the happiness of the group.”7

For Mill, a human existence as free from pain and as rich in qualitative and quantitative
pleasures as possible, to be acquired for all mankind (“the aggregate of all persons”), is the end
of human action and the norm of morality. For Utilitarianism “the end of human conduct is seen
to be ‘felicity’ or ‘happiness,’ and happiness consists in the maintenance of pleasure and the
diminution of pain. ‘Utility’ is the power of human action to produce, sustain, and promote
pleasure; whence the term ‘utilitarianism.’…The ‘greatest happiness principle’ in terms of
pleasure for the greatest number of men is the norm of morality: what contributes toward this
happiness is morally good, and what detracts from it is morally evil.”8 J. S. Mill is an altruistic
utilitarian, not an egoistic or individualistic hedonist. “In his Utilitarianism, he agrees with
Bentham that happiness, or the greatest good of the greatest number, is the summum bonum and
the criterion of morality. He differs from his haster, however, on several important points.
According to Bentham, the value of pleasure is to be measured by their intensity, duration,
certainty or uncertainty, propinquity or remoteness, fecundity, purity, and extent (the number of
persons affected by them). No difference is to be made in quality; other things being equal,
‘push-pin is as good as poetry.’ Mill, on the other hand, teaches that pleasures also differ in
quality, that those which go with the exercise of intellectual capacities are higher, better, than
sensuous pleasures, and that persons who have experienced both prefer the higher pleasures. ‘No
intelligent person would consent to be a fool; no instructed person would be an ignoramus’; no
3
J. S. MILL, Utilitarianism, chapter II.
4
W. S. SAHAKIAN, History of Philosophy, Barnes & Noble, New York, 1968, pp. 219.
5
J. S. MILL, Utilitarianism, chapter II.
6
W. S. SAHAKIAN, op. cit., pp. 219-220.
7
B. A. G. FULLER, A History of Philosophy, Part II (Modern Philosophy), Henry Holt and Co., New York, 1957, p.
402
8
C. BITTLE, Man and Morals: Ethics, Bruce, Milwaukee, 1953, pp. 169.

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person of feeling or conscience would consent to be selfish or base. You would not exchange
your lot for that of a fool, dunce, or rascal, even if you were convinced that a fool, dunce, or
rascal is better satisfied with his lot than you are with yours. ‘It is better to be a human being
dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.’ The fool
and the pig may think otherwise, but that is because ‘they only know their side of the question,’
the fool’s and the pig’s. Bentham and Mill also agree that we ought to strive for the greatest
happiness of the greatest number; but Bentham justifies this on the ground of self-interest, while
Mill bases it on the social feelings of mankind, the desire of unity with our fellow-creatures.”9

Critiques of Utilitarianism

Celestine Bittle, O.F.M., Cap.’s Critique of J. S. Mill’s Altruistic Utilitarianism: “James

Mill (1773-1836) was a faithful disciple of Bentham, but his son, John Stuart Mill (1806-1873),
revised Bentham’s doctrine by recognizing qualitative as well as quantitative differences in
pleasure. John Stuart Mill leaves no doubt as to his position. ‘The creed,’ he states,10 ‘which
accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that
actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce
the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by
unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure…It is quite compatible with the principle of
utility to recognize the fact, that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and valuable than
others. It would be absurd that while, in estimating all other things, quality is considered as well
as quantity, the estimation of pleasure should be supposed to depend on quantity alone…It is
better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than
a fool satisfied.’

“As a proof of the truth of ethical utilitarianism Mill advances the doctrine of
psychological hedonism. Ethical hedonism, of itself, merely claims that pleasure ‘ought to’ be
the only thing desired; psychological hedonism, however, claims that the only thing man ‘can
and does’ desire is pleasure. Here are Mill’s words11: ‘The only proof capable of being given that
an object is visible, is that people actually see it. The only proof that a sound is audible, is that
people hear it; and so of the other sources of our experience. In like manner, I apprehend, the
sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable, is that people do actually desire
it. If the end which the utilitarian doctrine proposes to itself were not, in theory and in practice,
acknowledged to be an end, nothing could ever convince any person that it was so. No reason
can be given why the general happiness is desirable except that each person, so far as he believes
it to be attainable, desires his own happiness. This, however, being a fact, we have not only all
the proof which the case admits of, but all which it is possible to require, that happiness is a
good: that each person’s happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore,
a good to the aggregate of all persons.’ In these words J. S. Mill believes that he has given the
proof that the happiness of the individual and of the race (‘the aggregate of all persons’) is the
supreme good of man and that pleasure-and-pain is the norm of morality.

9
F. THILLY and L. WOOD, A History of Philosophy, Henry Holt, New York, 1957, pp. 542-543.
10
J. S. MILL, Utilitarianism, ch. 2.
11
J. S. MILL, op. cit., ch. 4.

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 “Evaluation. There can be no question about the fact that social or altruistic utilitarianism
is a great improvement on the older system of egoistic hedonism. It at least makes a brave
attempt attempt to bring man’s social nature into the general field of ethical conduct.
Nevertheless, utilitarianism must be rejected as deficient and inadequate.

“First. John S. Mill admits that a distinction must be made between quantitative and
qualitative pleasures and that the latter are ‘preferable’ because they are ‘higher.’ On the mere
basis of ‘pleasure’ there are no such things as ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ pleasures, and Mill has no
right, from a utilitarian standpoint, of making such a distinction; pleasure is simply pleasure. By
making such a distinction, Mill surreptitiously introduces a ‘moral’ classification that has no
foundation in utilitarian principles. If there are ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ pleasures of ‘higher’ and
‘lower’ moral value (and we do not deny this), we admit some other criterion and norm as the
standard which measures the morality of actions, independently of their pleasurable and painful
effects, so as to know which pleasures are ‘higher’ and which ‘lower’ and why they are to be
adjudged in this manner. That, however, is a relinquishment of the fundamental position of
utilitarianism, and utilitarianism collapses as the true interpretation of moral conduct.

“Again. Mill is guilty of two serious logical fallacies in his proof of utilitarianism.
Something is ‘visible’ because people see it, and something ‘audible’ because people hear it.
From this he concludes that something is ‘desirable’ because people actually desire it. There is
an equivocation in the word ‘desirable,’ as used here by Mill. ‘Visible’ means ‘capable of being
seen’ and ‘audible’ means ‘capable of being heard’; hence, Mill should conclude that ‘desirable’
should here mean ‘capable of being desired,’ and that conclusion would be logically correct. But
that is not what Mill intends to infer. The word ‘desirable’ has a twofold meaning, namely,
‘capable of being desired’ and ‘ought to be desired.’ The first meaning represents a
psychological fact, the latter a moral fact, and the two meanings are obviously not identical. The
argument by analogy, which Mill here uses, merely establishes the first meaning; but Mill would
have us believe that it establishes the truth of the second meaning in the sense that ‘desirable’
means ‘ought to be desired.’ This is an illegitimate substitution of meanings. Mill is guilty of the
fallacy of figure of speech,12 and he does not prove his point that man ‘ought to’ desire general
happiness. The second fallacy consists in the manner in which he attempts to prove that ‘general
happiness is desirable (because) each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his
own happiness.’ Here he argues from the fact that each individual desires his own happiness to
the fact that each individual also desires, or should desire, the happiness of all. The fallacy is
patent. The fact that each individual desires his own happiness merely proves that each
individual in the entire aggregate of human beings desires his own happiness; it does not prove
that he ‘ought to,’ or actually does, desire the ‘general happiness of the aggregate of all persons’
as distinct from his own, and that is precisely the point in question so far as the truth of
utilitarianism is concerned. Due to this double fallacy, Mill has failed to prove that universal
happiness, in the sense of ‘earthly happiness through pleasure,’ is the supreme moral end of man.

“Finally. As a criterion and norm of morality the ‘greatest happiness principle’ is

valueless. Everybody without exception is bound by the law of morality. But how is the average
man to know what actions are conducive to the general happiness of all concerned? The interests
of the various individuals and groups and communities and nations are so different, depending so
12
Cf. C. BITTLE, The Science of Correct Thinking, ch. 21.

5
much on circumstances of time and place and social conditions, that even the wisest statesmen
often are not in a position to decide what course of action is best for the promotion of the general
welfare. The consequences of actions are as a rule so manifold and complex that ‘general
happiness’ as a norm of moral action is undeterminable and inapplicable and therefore useless.”13

Thomas Higgins, S.J.’s Critique of Utilitarianism: “Utilitarianism is correct in its

contention that an act is good if it leads to happiness but its notion of happiness is false. 1. Its
fundamental error is its misconception of man’s end. Utilitarianists either hold the ‘happiness
now’ theory or the theory that the individual or humanity is an end in itself. 2. Its second error is
confusion of useful, delectable, and perfective. Happiness is not merely the delectable: good and
useful are not adequately synonymous. 3. It establishes a norm which is inconstant and variable.
However, a standard whereby other things are measured should be unchanging to be reliable. A
variable standard is no standard. The modern heirs of utilitarianism readily admit this
acknowledging that moral values and standards are in a state of perpetual flux, but a relativistic,
ever-changing morality we shall show to be absurd.”14

Charles Miltner’s Critique of Utilitarianism: “In this theory the moral goodness or
badness of an act is derived solely from its utility. An act is right if it promotes utility, wrong if it
does not. Utility then means the power of an act to confer happiness or pleasure either upon the
individual or upon society as a whole, and since this happiness or pleasure means present
happiness or pleasure, it is to be sought in the possession of purely temporal goods in individual
or social prosperity. It is evident that this theory places man’s final end within the confines of the
present life.

“The theory has two general forms with many minor varieties. Individual utilitarianism,
or what is sometimes called hedonism or epicureanism, calls an act good if it produces pleasure
of a sensual nature to the individual, bad, if annoyance or pain. This is utilitarianism in its
crudest form…Social utilitarianism sets up social well-being or prosperity as the norm of right
conduct…

“Criticism. The point at issue here is not whether utility is a norm in judging of the
morality or the reasonableness of an act. On that score all agree. Nemo ad inutile tenetur is a
Scholastic aphorism. It is plain nonsense for a man to chase his shadow. The sole point in dispute
here is whether utility is the ultimate and exclusive reason why an act is good or bad. This we do
not admit, for: (a) Certain acts, as we have shown, are intrinsically good or bad, and that,
irrespective of their utility in procuring pleasure either to the individual or society as a whole. (b)
From this it follows that there is an objective, necessary, and hence universal norm of morality.
For intrinsic morality is based on the very essences of things, and essences are immutable. But
utilitarianism offers nothing but a relative and variable norm. For since the action viewed in
relation to the various dispositions of one and the same person, or to different persons, may
terminate quite differently so far as pleasure or pain, loss or gain, are concerned, the norm would
vary with each individual, and with the varying circumstances of each individual. It would, in
fact, be no final norm at all. Utility, therefore, cannot be accepted as the basis of objective

13
C. N. BITTLE, Man and Morals: Ethics, Bruce, Milwaukee, 1953, pp. 171-173.
14
T. HIGGINS, Man as Man, Bruce, Milwaukee, 1949, p. 53. For a detailed explanation of man’s ultimate end, see:
C. N. BITTLE, op. cit., pp. 99-142.

6
morality. Rules are not made for one, but for many. Moreover, they are fixed standards, not
swinging weather vanes. (c) Utility as the exclusive standard of moral conduct would allow of
actions, universally considered as atrocious crimes, becoming good and virtuous acts, provided
that they resulted in the increase of private or public utility or pleasure.”15

Joseph F. Sullivan, S.J.’s Critique of Utilitarianism: “Utilitarianism Must Be Rejected.

Utilitarianism under whatever form it may be proposed, is based on the two assumptions: 1) that
the final end of man consists in the attainment and possession of some finite good, and 2) that
human actions are good or bad morally, according as they contribute towards the attainment and
possession of that finite good.

“But these assumptions are false. Therefore.

“Minor: 1) proved in Theses 6 (pages 35-47) and 7 (pages 48-58).

“2) Follows as necessary consequence of 1) proved.

“Confirmation of Minor:

“a) Consciousness testifies that not every action which is conducive to the welfare either
of the individual or of the race is for that very reason morally good, and that not every action
which is opposed to individual or to common welfare is by that very fact morally bad:

“b) The common consent of mankind, too, testifies that neither the welfare of the self nor
that of society can be the test or standard of morality; for there are many actions which, though
they are beneficial to the temporal progress and welfare either of the self or of society, are in the
opinion of all morally bad and blameworthy, and on the other hand there are certain other actions
which, although they in no way contribute towards either private or public well-being, nay, are
even opposed to it, are nevertheless regarded by all as good and praiseworthy.

“The killing of the aged or incurables (euthanasia) could be considered as conducive to

the temporal welfare of the race and yet such actions are condemned as morally wrong by right
reason and the common consent of mankind.

“War is generally admitted as injurious to the temporal welfare of the race and yet it is
not impossible to conceive a just war.

“Celibacy practiced on a large scale would be injurious to the race and yet it cannot be
condemned as wrong for the individual.”16

Austin Fagothey, S.J.’s Critique of Altruistic Utilitarianism: “Altruistic pleasure, as

proposed by the utilitarians, though on a higher plane than egoistic, is also unsatisfactory. The
joy we feel in kindness, in giving gifts, in helping others, in relieving distress, in social uplift, in
works of charity and benevolence, is among the purest and best we can experience. The many

15
C. MILTNER, The Elements of Ethics, Macmillan, New York, 1949, pp. 97-98, 100-101.
16
J. F. SULLIVAN, General Ethics, Holy Cross College Press, Worcester, MA, 1931, pp. 83-84.

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who devote their lives to these activities are worthy of praise. But again they will not find here
their last end. Some have neither the time nor the means for such works. The joy that comes from
them is often marred by ingratitude and misunderstanding. Schemes for the betterment of
mankind are seldom fully successful, and often result only in bitterness and disillusionment. The
philanthropist is by all means to be encouraged, but he must not expect his efforts to bring him
undiluted happiness.

“Besides, there is something incoherent in the altruistic ideal. If bettering others is our
last end, what is the end of the men who are bettered? If we exist for the sake of other men, then
what are the other men for? If everybody exists for the sake of everybody else, then, when the
process is brought round to full circle, there is really no last end for the whole of humanity.

“These systems make man’s temporal welfare his last end. If there were no God and no
future life, the conclusion would be reasonable enough that man ought to get as much pleasure
and as little pain out of his brief span as possible. But if there is a God and a future life, no such
conclusion follows; man may provide for his temporal welfare to the fullest, yet miss his last end
and slide into eternal ruin. These philosophers were not all atheists or materialists, but this only
shows the inconsistency of their ethics; for the fact of God’s existence and the soul’s
immortality, if admitted as true, cannot be left out of a system of morals.”17

Michael Cronin’s Critique of John Stuart Mill’s Utilitarianism: “Mill’s Defence of

Hedonism. His Theory of Qualitative Distinctions Between Pleasures.

“One of the principal charges usually directed against the hedonistic criterion is that,
carried to its logical conclusions, it sanctions a low and brutal code of morality. To save it from
this charge Mill introduced into his hedonistic system the theory of a qualitative distinction
between pleasures.

“Pleasures, he contends, do not differ merely quantitatively—they differ also

qualitatively. We may get as much pleasure (quantitatively regarded) from murder as from
philanthropy, but the pleasures of philanthropy are of a far higher order than those of murder,
and, therefore, they should be rated much higher in the calculus. A man pays more for one suit of
clothes than for another,18 though the two have the same weight ; for one painting than another,
though they represent the same labour ; to hear one song rather than another, though the better
singer may not have so loud a voice. So with pleasures—one may be quantitatively greater than
another, and yet that other may be of a higher quality, so much higher as even to outbalance the
quantitative difference. Hedonism, therefore, does not mean a ‘low’ or a savage morality, since
when qualitative differences are allowed for, the balance of pleasure will always be on the side
of the higher act.

“We must carefully examine Mill’s contention, and for that purpose we shall ask two
questions:

17
A. FAGOTHEY, Right and Reason, Tan Books, Rockford, IL, 2000 (reprint of the 1959 C. V. Mosby second
edition), p. 74.
18
The illustrations are our own.

8
 “(a) Are there such things in pleasures as distinctions of quality?

“(b) If there are such distinctions can they be made the basis of a distinction of acts into
Ethically higher and lower?

“(a) Are there distinctions of quality between pleasures?

“Opponents of Hedonism, and of Mill in particular, have denied the existence of any such
distinctions. But we must, in fairness to Mill, admit that such distionctions exist. It should be
perfectly plain to any man who gives this subject his honest attention that our pleasures differ
very widely in quality. The pleasures of hearing, e.g., are not the same as those of taste. The
pleasures of smell are of various qualities, as various, indeed, as the odours themselves. In fact,
the pleasure got from the scent of the rose need differ from that given by the scent of roast meat
in one way only—that is, qualitatively ; in intensity they may be both the same. Again, we often
compare pleasures in respect of quality, and call one finer or more delicate than another, and,
therefore, we have the clear testimony of our consciousness that pleasures differ in quality.

“Some maintain that differences which are spoken of as qualitative differences in

pleasure are differences not in the pleasures themselves, properly speaking, but in the objects
which give the pleasure—that it is impossible pleasures could differ as pleasure, since pleasure
is the common element in all. Now, this theory seems to us to be founded on an ambiguity. There
can be no doubt that pleasures differ not only as regards their objects but also as subjective
states. But these subjective states differ not as pleasure, since pleasure is the common element in
them, but as pleasures, just as colours differ not as colour (since ‘colour’ is the common
underlying conception in all of them), but as colours. But the difference between pleasures is a
‘pleasure difference,’ not a difference of something other than pleasure.

“Hence, besides differences in objects of pleasure, there are also qualitative (pleasure)
differences between pleasures themselves.19

“(b) Our second question is—Are qualitatively distinct pleasures to be divided off into
higher and lower? By higher and lower we mean ethically, not aesthetically, higher and lower.
There is no difficulty in thinking of one pleasure as aesthetically more delicate and beautiful than
another. But are pleasures capable of being formed into a regular ethical series, beginning at the
lowest level of moral evil and rising up to the highest line of moral excellence? We will give an
example of this Ethical gradation of pleasures. If murder is bad, and if the pleasure I get from it
be intense, then it is plain that, on hedonistic lines, in order to make up for this excess in
quantity, the pleasure of murder must be low down qualitatively in the scale of pleasures, else
murder would be, not bad, but good. If there be no such series it will be useless to speak of
qualitative distinctions in pleasures as a means to distinguishing the moral qualities of actions.

“The first difficulty that we meet if we try to construct an Ethical series of pleasures is
that pleasures as pleasures cannot be divided off into good and bad. Pleasures as pleasures

19
Prof. Seth maintains that qualitative differences can be resolved into quantitative if we take into account the
nature of the person who experiences the pleasure. “For the higher nature,” he says, “the higher pleasure is also the
more intense pleasure” (“Ethical Principles,” page 125).

9
considered out of relation to anything else have no Ethical or moral character. No pleasure is bad
in itself—i.e., no pleasure is bad as pleasure. Some pleasures are bad because the acts of the will
to which they are attached are bad, and the reason why it is wrong to seek certain pleasures is not
because the pleasurable feeling is bad in itself, but because the pleasurable feeling is attendant on
an act which is bad.20 There would, therefore, be no difficulty whatsoever in constructing a scale
of pleasures arranged in order of Ethically higher and lower, in a system of Ethics which is not
hedonistic, for, having in such a system arranged the actions in an Ethical series, we might then
arrange the pleasures of these acts in a corresponding series. But how is the hedonist to arrange
his scale of pleasures? It is by the scale of pleasures that he must determine the morality of acts,
and, therefore, it is not open to him to arrange his pleasures in a scale which itself depends upon
the morality of acts. There is, therefore, nothing left for him but to arrange the scale of pleasures
by something in the pleasures themselves. But since pleasures as pleasures are morally neutral
this is impossible.

“Now, this proposition that pleasures as such, and without reference to anything else, are
morally indifferent will not be accepted by hedonists who hold that all pleasure is morally good,
and, therefore, we proceed to a second difficulty which we think the hedonists must recognise—
namely, that even if all pleasures are morally good, hedonists cannot point to anything which
those pleasures contain in themselves—that is, apart from the acts to which they are attached —
sufficient to grade the pleasures in an Ethical series of high and low.

“Two kinds of tests seem possible. One is to regard those pleasures as higher that belong
to the higher faculty, intellectual pleasures being higher than those of sense, the pleasures of the
so-called aesthetic senses, like those of sight and hearing, being higher than those of touch, &c.
The other is the criterion of human testimony.

“The first is suggested to us by Mill’s contention that one had rather be a man dissatisfied
than a pig satisfied, the reason being that a small intellectual satisfaction is much greater than a
great sense satisfaction. But this method of gradation we cannot accept, because pleasures of
intellect are often much worse morally than those of sense, and those of sense worse than those
of the vegetative faculties,21 as the following examples will make clear. To rejoice at the
downfall of one’s neighbour is a purely intellectual pleasure, whilst to feel the warmth of a
summer breeze is sensuous. But surely this latter pleasure is better than the pleasure of hatred.
On the other hand, to look upon obscenity is an act of the senses, whilst to eat is an act of the
vegetative faculty, and surely the latter is the better of the two. An act, therefore, is not better
because it proceeds from the higher faculty, and consequently the pleasures of the higher faculty
are not necessarily better than those of the lower.

“The second test is explicitly proposed by Mill himself. When men, he says, prefer
certain pleasures to certain others as a rule, that is a sign that these latter pleasures are ethically
lower. This seems to be the ultimate test according to Mill—the testimony of ‘those that know.’
On this test of gradation in pleasure we would make three remarks. First, Mill maintains that it is

20
ARISTOTLE, “Nich. Eth.,” X., 5, 6.
21
We might for Ethical purposes, as we have already shown, regard intellect as of more importance in the organism
than sense, and sense than the vegetative faculty, and we might make use of this comparison in determining
morality; but they are not in themselves morally better or worse the one than the other.

10
only those that have experience of differences in quantity and quality of pleasure that are capable
of judging in this matter. But, granting for the moment that experience can tell a man which of
two acts will bring him the greater pleasure, still we maintain that experience cannot tell him
which of these two pleasures, the greater or the lesser, is the higher. There is only one way by
which even the initiated and experienced can tell what pleasures are higher, and that way is by
having a fixed standard of higher and lower with which to compare the pleasures as they come.
But that is the very standard for which we are looking, and until it can be provided Hedonism
must fail as an ethical criterion. Secondly, if those who are capable of judging do actually
distinguish between the higher and the lower, it is not directly in reference to pleasures that such
distinctions are made, but rather in reference to the acts to which those pleasures are attached.
Men know that pleasures of benevolence are higher than those of drinking beer, because they
know that acts of benevolence are higher than the act of drinking beer. If, then, men do prefer
some courses to others it is because they are persuaded that certain acts are bad and others good,
and the pleasures of the first class of acts they regard as bad and the pleasures of the other as
good, and in the same degree as the acts to which the pleasures are attached are bad and good.
Thirdly, who, on Mill’s theory, are the experienced and they that know? for it is important that
we should be informed who are the appointed judges of what is good or bad for us. Mill himself
tells us that as men grow older they become more selfish, and that consequently it is to youth we
must look for these moral preferences on which to frame the moral law. But why should the
practice of the old and selfish be put aside, and that of the young and spirited be made the moral
standard except that already the selfish has been made the lower pleasure and the spirited and
generous the higher? But spirited generosity is not the hedonistic basis of morals. On the other
hand, if the old are included amongst the judges, their principal qualification as judges will be
their experience, and if experience is a qualification in the construction of the pleasure scale, the
best judges must be the gourmands and the gouty who have tried and compared all pleasures in
quantity and in quality and found some wanting and others commendable. The best judge of a
road is, ceteris paribus, the man who has walked over it ; and in the same way the best judge of
what is pleasant should be the man who, in the matter of pleasure, has taken nothing on faith, but
conscientiously tried all pleasures in turn. This means making the opinion of bad men the proper
standard of ‘good’ and ‘evil,’ which would be most objectionable in practice. Again, in this
matter we must, as ethicians, be prepared to reckon with those who like to judge for themselves
about right and wrong ; and it would be a hard thing if we should say to them—‘Thus have your
fathers judged. It was for them to taste pleasures and examine them. It is for you to submit to
their decision.’ Indeed, if pleasure be the moral criterion, then it is certain that most people will
like to taste and judge for themselves; and we do not know on what principle of Hedonism one
could rationally prevent them. But if we do allow them to taste and judge for themselves we are
certainly making crime a necessary condition of virtue.

“In conclusion, therefore, we summarise our position by saying that pleasures may differ
qualitatively, but that to divide them into ethically higher and lower we need a theory of Ethics
other than the hedonistic.22

22
To the arguments stated above we may add a consideration of some importance, that the law that would bind us
always to follow the higher pleasure in preference to the lower is an extravagant law. Most men are bound to no
more than the good ethically; that is, no man is bound to the highest or the best. On Mill’s theory every man would
be bound to follow the higher pleasure in the presence of a lower. He would, consequently, be always bound to the
best.

11
 “Critique of John Stuart Mill’s Utilitarianism. (a) Definition. Utilitarianism or
Universalistic Hedonism may be defined as the theory that the happiness23 of mankind at large
constitutes the ultimate end of the individual man, and that consequently those actions are to be
regarded as right and good which promote that happiness, and those actions as wrong and bad
which tend to produce the opposite effect. We adopt this definition because it represents the
commonest form of the theory of Utilitarianism.

“We are not unaware that some modern utilitarians make the well-being of society, not its
happiness, the end of the individual. In other words, there are utilitarians who are not hedonists.
Although these are technically outside our definition we draw the reader’s attention to them
here,24 first, for completeness; secondly, because their system is confuted by the argument which
we draw in the present chapter from the fact that the individual is not wholly subordinate to
society, which is one of our two main objections to Utilitarianism in general, whether hedonistic
or otherwise. Our other chief objection to Utilitarianism—that it makes pleasure our sole natural
end—can, of course, refer to hedonistic Utilitarianism alone.

“Moreover, we have grouped together in the present chapter all theories of hedonistic
Utilitarianism, although they are many and of great diversity—for instance, Bentham’s and
Mill’s theory that that act is good which gives the greatest pleasure to the greatest number of
sentient beings; Cumberland’s theory that the pleasure of human Society is the only end;
Comte’s and Fichte’s theory of pure altruism that the end of the individual is the happiness of all
other men exclusive of his own regard to one’s self being considered in this system, if not bad, at
least un-moral. We even include in our account that very modified form of altruism advocated by
Shaftesbury that ‘the natural predominance of benevolence is good and the subjection of
selfishness is virtue.’ Of these different forms of Utilitarianism it would be impossible for us to
take separate account. Nor is it necessary that we should do so; for, if we shall succeed in
showing that the end of man is not the happiness or well-being of society, we shall have removed
what is fundamental in every form of Utilitarianism, and then these separate systems fall of
themselves.

“(b) Utilitarianism – How Far True. Like most false ethical theories, Utilitarianism is not
all wrong. It is wrong in so far as it makes the general happiness the sole end of man, thereby
completely subordinating the individual to society. Now, that the sole end of man is not his own
happiness we have shown in the preceding chapter; and almost all the arguments there used
might be applied equally well here to prove that our end as individuals cannot be the happiness
of the race. But, in the present chapter, we must supplement those arguments by others that are
proper to the theory of Utilitarianism. That man is not wholly subordinated to society it will be
our business also to establish.

“But Utilitarianism asserts many things that are true, and amongst these are two salient
doctrines that are of paramount importance in Ethics. One is that man has a very special duty of

23
The present chapter goes to show that the good of society is not the end of the individual, whether that good be in
the nature of pleasure or happiness or general well-being. We may therefore be allowed to dispense for the present
with the technical distinction between pleasure and happiness already explained and to use these words as roughly
equivalents of each other.
24
Green’s is, perhaps, the most prominent example in recent times of non-hedonistic utilitarian systems.

12
benevolence towards his fellowmen, a duty which is certainly as important as many of his special
duties towards himself. Another is that the general welfare is in some sense a genuine criterion of
moral good. A word on each of these.

“‘Man,’ says St. Thomas Aquinas, ‘is not wholly political’ or social. But neither is man
wholly individual. We are by nature a part of society. Without society we could not develop, and
development is a natural need of man. Hence, society is a natural necessity, and we have a
natural duty to promote its welfare. What that duty is, and how far it extends, we shall see in the
second portion of this work. At present we may say that our duty to our fellow-man occupies a
very large portion of our moral life, but it is not the whole of that life.

“The second truth of Utilitarianism is also of importance in a Science of Ethics—namely,

that the general good is a genuine criterion of the morality of human acts. It will be remembered
that amongst our secondary criteria of morality, that on which we laid the greatest stress, had
reference, like the utilitarian theory, to the happiness or misery of society. We showed that an act
is good if, on being raised to a general rule of conduct, it benefits—bad, if it injures—the human
race; and though these racial effects are not the primary criterion of morals, they afford us a
genuine secondary criterion, and one much used in practical life.

“These are the principal elements of truth in Utilitarianism. But Utilitarianism does not
stop at these. It represents the common good not merely as one end for the individual, but as the
sole and all-embracing end. It makes man wholly subject to society. Also, it represents the
general happiness, not as a secondary criterion of morality, but as the only or the fundamental
criterion.

“In the two following sections we hope to disprove these two assumptions by showing,
first, that the general happiness of society is not the final end of the individual; secondly, that the
general happiness cannot be the sole or even the primary criterion of good action.

“(c) Disproof of the Theory of Utilitarianism that the General Happiness is Man’s Final
End. (1) Our first argument is that happiness is not our final end—neither the happiness of the
individual nor the happiness of the race. This has been abundantly proved already in our chapter
on Hedonism; for of those arguments which we quoted from St. Thomas to disprove Hedonism
many are proofs that happiness (not the happiness of the individual, but happiness simply) is not
our final end, which arguments, therefore, tell equally well against Utilitarianism as against
Hedonism. They need not be repeated here.

“(2) Our second argument in proof of the proposition that neither the happiness nor the
well-being of society can be the final end of the individual is that which we have already
proved—that all men are ordained to a common end other than mere society,25 an end which is
25
This argument is given by St. Thomas Aquinas in answer to an objection: “Ultimus finis cujuslibet rei,” he
objects, “est in suo opere perfecto, unde pars est propter totum sicut propter finem. Sed tota universitas creaturarum .
. . comparatur ad hominem . . . sicut perfectum ad imperfectum: ergo beatitudo (in sense of final end) hominis
consistit in tota universitate creaturarum.” To which he replies: “Si totum aliquod non sit ultimus finis sed ordinetur
ad finem ulteriorem, ultimus finis partis non est ipsum totum sed aliquid aliud: universitas autem creaturarum, ad
quam comparatur homo ut pars ad totum, non est finis ultimus, sed ordinatur in Deum sicut in ultimum finem; unde
bonum universi non est ultimus finis hominis, sed ipse Deus” (“S. Theol.,” I-II., q. 2, a. 8).

13
above us all and above society—namely, the Infinite Good. It may not be out of place to repeat
here our proof of this proposition. The final natural end of anything is the highest end which is
attainable by its highest capacity, or the adequate object of its highest capacity. Thus, the final
natural end of a tree cannot be mere growth, because the tree has other higher capacities than
growth—for instance, the capacities of bearing fruit and flower and seed. The highest act of a
tree will be its final end. Now, applying this principle to man (the principle, namely, that the
final end of anything is that end which answers to its highest capacity), we find that no finite
thing can be our final end, for no finite thing can satisfy our highest appetite —that is, our will,
which is capable of desiring the perfect or Infinite Good. The Infinite Good, therefore, is the
final end of all men, and of the society of men. Society and the happiness of society are finite
things, and, therefore, the happiness of society or its welfare cannot be our final end.

“But though society and its happiness or welfare are not man’s final end, still we may
repeat that man is to some extent subordinate to society, and that he has important duties towards
society, duties of promoting the happiness of society. In other words, the happiness of society,
though it is not man’s final end, is yet an end, and a necessary end, which each individual man is
under an obligation to promote according to his opportunities and his position in society.

“(3) That which is naturally destined to attain or promote any end is means to that end.
But a free person could not be mere means to that end in reference to which he is free; and as
man is free in reference to society he cannot be regarded as mere means to society, and hence
society is not his final end.

“(4) The natural well-being of anything depends upon the attaining of its ultimate end.
But the individual well-being is to a large extent independent of the race; for even if the rest of
the race were perfectly happy, still the individual, even though he were to devote himself to
promoting the social well-being, might, from a variety of natural causes, be very miserable and
imperfect, and therefore his end must be something other than the mere good of the race.

“(5) Another argument which, like that just given, depends upon a former argument,26 but
which yet emphasises a distinct quality in natural morality, is the following: The natural end of a
man’s actions consists in something that must of necessity he actually attained if the proper
means be taken. A tree, for instance, will reach its final end—viz., it will come to leaf and flower
if all the natural means be taken to that effect, and all the natural and necessary conditions be
fulfilled—e.g., if it get air enough, light enough, moisture enough, &c. But no action of men
towards one another, or towards society at large, will ever make society perfectly happy, since
there will always be something to be desired by society other than the good will or good services
of men. If no finite good can satisfy the individual, a fortiori no finite good can satisfy society.
No means, therefore, that individuals can take will secure the final happiness of society.
Therefore, the happiness of society cannot be our natural end.

26
We think it only fair to call the attention of the reader to the fact that, if thoroughly examined, arguments 3, 4, and
5 will be found to throw us logically back on the argument that all men and all society are ordained to a common
end beyond society—namely, the infinite good. (This is given in 2 above.)

14
 “(6) If the happiness of society be our end, then our final end is to be attained here
below. We have shown that this is impossible28—that every condition or distinguishing mark of
27

the final end is wanting here below. First, the goods of this life cannot fill up the capacity of our
will (quietare appetitum). Secondly, they cannot be enjoyed without much accompanying evil.
Thirdly, once possessed we are not sure of retaining them. They may go from us at any moment.
For these reasons no good of this world can be our final end, for no good of this world can fill up
the measure of our natural capacities, and give that absolute rest (quies) to our appetites which is
essential to the last end. But the happiness of society is an earthly thing; it is finite, and leaves
much still to be desired by our wills—that is, leaves our capacities unfilled; it is subject to evil,
for on this earth there will always be evil; also, it is uncertain and unstable. It cannot, therefore,
be our final end.

“(7) There seems to be a strong belief even amongst utilitarians that it would be illogical
to accept the view that our end is the general happiness unless there be some proof that this is our
end. ‘It is important to observe,’ writes Sidgwick,29 ‘that the principle of aiming at universal
happiness is more genuinely felt to require some proof, or at least (as Mill puts it) some
considerations determining the mind to accept it, than the principle of aiming at one’s own
happiness.’ If the individual man is free, if he is to a large extent independent of society, if he is
capable of desiring much more, and can only be satisfied with much more than society is ever
capable of giving him, if the happiness of society cannot satisfy him, if, finally, society, whilst it
accepts his services, will not bear any of the burden of his, perhaps, undeserved miseries, then it
seems rational that the individual man should have a right to ask what proof there is that the good
of society is his sole final end, and what proof that he is bound to make such personal sacrifices
for society as this doctrine of Utilitarianism entails. Now, we submit that this theory has not been
proved. And in support of our contention we shall, in the second portion of this chapter,30 set
forth and examine the chief arguments advanced by Utilitarians in defence of their theories.
Meanwhile, we shall examine the utilitarian theory from a second point of view—that, namely,
of its criterion and its practicability as a science of right living.

“(d) Utilitarianism an Impracticable and Impossible Criterion of Morality. Having seen

that the happiness or welfare of society is not our final end, we now go on to show that, even if
the happiness of society were our end, we could not determine with any degree of accuracy what
acts would lead thereto, and that, therefore, Utilitarianism is not a practical or possible criterion
of right and wrong. This argument need not be drawn out to any length, since we have already
prepared the way for it in our chapter on Hedonism.

“The difficulty of applying the utilitarian criterion to actual practice turns principally on
the fact that on the utilitarian theory we have to determine quantity of pleasure or of welfare
before we can judge of the morality of actions; and this proposition that the utilitarian must
determine quantity of pain or pleasure is inferred from another proposition—viz., that an ethical
27
Hedonists sometimes claim that a man’s end lies in the ‘hereafter,’ but utilitarians make no such claim. According
to utilitarians, our end is to be attained on earth. Society, of course, may continue to be a human necessity in heaven,
but utilitarians generally do not contemplate such a thing. For the utilitarian, society means the society of men here
below.
28
Chapter 3.
29
“Methods,” page 418.
30
Section (e).

15
theory that judges by effects merely must determine such quantity.31 Now, in a theory that
determines morality by consequences the necessity of quantitatively determining effects must
always arise, because our acts have often most opposed consequences, some pleasant, some
painful, which it is necessary to compare and reduce to a resultant in order to know on which
side the balance is—on that of pleasure or that of pain, of welfare or of injury. The great
difficulty of the utilitarian theory is the difficulty of determining these consequences.

“Concerning this difficulty of determining the consequences of action we have already

spoken in our chapter on Hedonism, We there showed the impossibility of calculating the
pleasures and the pains which actions bring to the doer of the action, or of comparing these
pleasures and pains with one another, so as to obtain the resultant feeling in case we did succeed
in summing them separately. The difficulties arising are many. If the method followed be the a
posteriori method of experience and common sense then there is (1) the difficulty of measuring
any feeling except the most intense, (2) the difficulty of knowing all the feelings which result
from actions, (3) of balancing pleasures against pains, (4) of comparing pleasures with one
another so as to obtain a sum of pleasures, (5) of examining present pleasures or fully recalling
remembered ones, (6) of saying how far into our lives the influence of our early acts extends and
consequently of determining all the pleasures and pains these acts produce, (7) of determining
how far our pleasures and our pains depend on our humours and character, and (8) on the
accidents of life.

“On the other hand, if the method followed be a priori, or what we have called the
scientific method—the method, that is, of deducing the pleasure and pain-results from some
theory of the cause or law of pleasure, then we have the insuperable difficulty already referred to
of determining the cause of pleasure, and of knowing, even if we should succeed in determining
the cause of pleasure, when and in what cases this cause is realised.

“Now, if all these are difficulties against the possibility of calculating the pleasures and
pains experienced by the individual man, the difficulties of determining the pleasures and pains
which actions produce in society at large must be very much greater. To examine our own
feelings is difficult, but to examine the feelings of other people is more difficult still. Equally
difficult is the task of comparing the pleasures which an act produces in some with the pains
which it brings to others, and of determining the resultant of these pleasures and pains. If, then,
Hedonism fails as a criterion of conduct, Utilitarianism fails still more signally. Indeed, it is only
when we take up for consideration some particular action, and try to determine practically its
consequences on society, that we really come to understand the utter impossibility of using the
utilitarian criterion in the drawing up of a moral code.

“But, as in the case of Hedonism so also in the case of Utilitarianism, there are some who
claim that the difficulty of determining the consequences of action is imaginary, since it depends
on the false supposition that it is necessary to predict the effect of an action taken in individuo et
in concreto, whereas it is only necessary to determine the tendency of a line of action in general,
and apart from individual circumstances, or, which is the same thing, to determine what would
actually happen if such a line of action were allowed in general. This theory is defended by
Whewell, Paley, and many other utilitarians.
31
That Utilitarianism judges morality by effects merely is evident from the very definition of Utilitarianism.

16
 “Now, we showed in our chapter on Hedonism that a theory that regards the goodness
and badness of acts as constituted by the consequences of these acts cannot logically ignore the
effects of the particular act. And since, according to Utilitarianism, moral good and evil are
constituted by the consequences of acts, Utilitarianism must take account of the particular as well
as the general consequences—that is, of the actual effect of this individual act on society in a
particular case, and not merely the general tendency of such acts to affect society well or ill, or
the effects that would follow if an act were generally allowed. Consequently, the difficulty of
predicting the effects of individual acts applies in the case of Utilitarianism, and hence we cannot
regard the criterion of Utilitarianism as a practical or reliable criterion of the morality of acts.32

“But, now, let us for the moment suppose that the difficulty of determining the
consequences, whether particular or general, has been overcome, and that we can predict these
consequences with absolute precision. There will still remain one (to our mind) insuperable
difficulty in regard to the use of the utilitarian criterion—namely, the difficulty of its consistent
application to moral cases, where the particular and the general consequences are opposed. We
shall explain this difficulty by an example. Let us suppose a case of murder, which, on account
of the individual circumstances, is certain to bring a surplusage of happiness to the race at large
(the supposition is quite possible in the case of persons suffering from certain contagious
diseases, whose death, therefore, would relieve society of much apprehension and much evil of
every kind). Now, we take it that no utilitarian would regard such an act as lawful or good, and
his plea for not allowing it is that, in judging the morality of an act, we should take account not
of the particular but of the general effects—that is, not the effects of this particular act in these
particular circumstances, but the general tendency of such acts in regard to society. And we shall
allow this argumentation to stand for the moment. But if this be the law of procedure with regard
to the case of contagious diseases, the utilitarian must adopt the very same law of procedure with
regard to every other kind of evil. Now, lying, all would admit, tends in general to bring evil
consequences to the race. But let us suppose that a statesman by telling a lie could save the world

32
Some curious results will be obtained by the consistent utilitarian who logically works out particular cases by
actual results to society, not by general rules. For instance, granted, as proved above, that a consistent utilitarian
must judge in particular cases by actual results, not by general rules or tendencies, what, following the utilitarian
theory, is a man to do who feels that he can steal from another without making society unhappy? The owner will, of
course, suffer some unhappiness in the loss of his money, but the robber gains equally in happiness by acquiring the
money, and if he be a poor man his gain in happiness will more than counterbalance the actual pain experienced by
the rightful owner. Is the act of stealing lawful in this case? If an act be lawful or unlawful because of the pleasure or
pain it brings to society, then since in this case the happiness that is lost in one part of society is gained in another, it
would seem that the effect on society as a whole is nil, and that, so, the act is neither good nor bad but indifferent,
and therefore morally allowable.
This consideration (we do not call it an argument, for, as we said before, we do not regard it as either a proof or a
disproof of any theory of morals to show that it is consistent or inconsistent with our code) may be answered by the
utilitarian saying that the general good could not possibly be promoted unless there existed a law of distribution of
happiness, and the first requisite of proper distribution is that each man be given and allowed to enjoy ‘his own’
(Cuique suum), and that therefore, though the case of moral jugglery we have just given raises difficulties for a
Utilitarianism of our own making, it raises none for a genuine theory of Utilitarianism which postulates such a law.
Still we submit that this utilitarian reply is not altogether satisfactory. For we grant that on the utilitarian theory there
should be a general law of distribution—a law to give each his own, if the general good is to be forwarded. But,
nevertheless, we conceive a case of some individual coming to the utilitarian in the quiet of his study and claiming
to be allowed in this particular case to increase the sum of general happiness by stealing from his rich master, and
on utilitarian principles we do not know how such a man can be prevented from stealing.
On this same problem the reader might refer to our account of Spencer’s theory, page 420.

17
from all the horrors of an international war, is he on the Utilitarian theory free morally to tell a
lie and save the world from certain universal unhappiness? A consistent utilitarian should answer
‘No,’ since in the case of leprosy and murder it was the general and not the particular
consequences that determined the morality of the act, and, as in these cases, so also in the case of
lying, the general consequences are hurtful to society. We believe, however, that utilitarians
generally would in this case of lying judge by the particular consequences only, and would not
only allow the lie, but even regard it as morally necessary. But what, then, about the general
tendency of lying? Is not the ‘general tendency’ in this case thrown to the winds, and are not the
actual effects of the act in the circumstances made the binding rule of conduct? But this act is an
exception, it will be said. So, we answer, was the other act an exception, and so is every act an
exception in which the general tendency is negatived by the actual circumstances of the case.
And if we are bound to judge by the actual effects in this case, so must we judge in every case if
we would be consistent utilitarians.

“This difficulty of consistency in the application of the criterion of Utilitarianism seems

to us to be inseparable from the theory of Utilitarianism, and is by itself alone convincing proof
of the all-round unworkability of Utilitarianism as an ethical system.”33

“(e) Consideration of the Arguments for the Utilitarian Theory that the Final End of the
Individual is the Happiness or Welfare of Society.

“In a previous section we showed that the happiness or well-being of society is not man’s
final natural end; and we promised, towards the close of that section, to take up for
consideration, later on in the present chapter, the opposing arguments of the utilitarians. This
promise we now propose to fulfil.

“The arguments of the utilitarians may be divided as follows: First, that derived from
Psychology, that in man there are original benevolent impulses; secondly, the argument drawn
from Hedonism, that the law of seeking our own good includes the law of seeking the good of
all; thirdly, the argument drawn from the fact that the moral law is ‘categorical and objective,’
and, therefore, that it concerns the good of the whole race, not a mere part; fourthly, the
argument drawn from the common conception of Morals, which, it is contended, identifies
‘good’ with ‘universal happiness’; fifthly, the argument drawn from Pragmatism, that
Utilitarianism as a moral theory is found to work…

“(1) Argument drawn from Psychology that in man there are natural benevolent
impulses.

“This argument is essentially a theory that there are in us original impulses which have
for their object the good of others, not the good of determined persons merely, but of all men.
Being original, or given to man by nature, the claims which these benevolent impulses make
upon us, it is asserted, should be observed in all our acts, and, therefore, they make it our duty in
every act to seek the general good. It is not, indeed, asserted that these impulses comprise our
whole appetitive nature as men, for it is agreed that we have in us selfish impulses as well.
Shaftesbury, for instance, considered that the benevolent impulses should even be tempered by
33
M. CRONIN, The Science of Ethics, vol. 1 (General Ethics), Benziger Brothers, New York, 1930, pp. 311-330.

18
the selfish, and an equilibrium of impulse be secured thereby. But utilitarians generally infer
from the presence of these benevolent impulses a duty in all our actions to seek the good of all—
the individual himself counting as only one amongst the total number of men.

“Reply—We have to consider two points — (a) Granted these impulses, what is the
ethical conclusion they necessitate? (b) Are our benevolent impulses original, or are they
derivatives from the impulse for our own happiness? —for if they are offshoots or derivatives
from the impulse for our own happiness, then the impulse to our own happiness will be more
fundamental than the impulse of benevolence, and the final end of man will be not the good of
society but a man’s own good.34

“(a) We maintain that even if we have in us original benevolent impulses, the largest duty
that these impulses could give rise to would be a particular duty of benevolence. They could not
determine the whole moral law for us. If we have selfish impulses as well, then these should also
determine part of our duty. Hence, even if we have benevolent impulses, our sole final end
would not be necessarily the general happiness or welfare. But, it will be said, the benevolent
impulses relate to the good of all and the selfish to the good of one man only, and two such
impulses would not be properly balanced unless we sought our own good as a part merely of the
general happiness. Our reply is that this contention might be allowed did not the impulse for our
own good outweigh all the other impulses. And that it does outweigh all others is evident from
the fact that in every act we must wish our own good, whereas it is rarely that the benevolent
impulses assert themselves within us. Our benevolent impulses have no part, for instance, in
inducing us to eat or drink or study mathematics. Hence, the impulse for our own good is of
more importance in the constitution of man than that of benevolence,35 and, therefore, the
presence of benevolent impulses in us does not prove that the general happiness is our final end.

“(b) But now we shall show by another argument that our benevolent impulses are
naturally far outweighed by that for our own good. Our argument is that our benevolent impulses
are not original and underived, but are merely a natural offshoot from our desire for our own
good. There is in the will but one original natural impulse—viz., the impulse of the will to the
attainment of its natural object—our own good. On this love of our own good is based every
other impulse of our will. We may, if we like, call this desire selfish in the sense that it is always
a desire for our own good. But whether we regard it as selfish or not, on it is based every other
desire of the will. Now, this law that we must desire our own good is by no means to be
interpreted as meaning that we cannot desire the good of others. On the contrary, ‘our own good’
may be sought in another person. Our own good may consist in seeking the good of another, not
in the sense that we may make another’s happiness a means to our own, but in the sense that we
can come to regard another’s happiness as our own, and this power of regarding the happiness of
another person as our own is the root and principle of benevolence. How the love of one’s own
good comes to take the form of benevolence is one of the most interesting problems in
philosophy. It has been fully treated by St. Thomas Aquinas, following Aristotle.

34
We must keep before the reader that we still admit a large and important duty of benevolence.
35
The importance of this desire for our own good is brought out by St. Thomas Aquinas in Summa Theologiae, II-II,
q. 26, a. 6, where he says, speaking of the love of other men, that we should love more intensely those who are near
to us than those who are near to God – a remarkable admission from St. Thomas Aquinas.

19
 “A man, according to St. Thomas, may love others with either of two kinds of love—
either the amor concupiscentiae36 or the amor amicitiae. In amor concupiscentiae we love a
thing or a person on account of some advantage accruing to ourselves; for instance, we may love
a ruler because he is kind to us. In amor amicitiae we love a person for his own sake alone.
Plainly, benevolence is the love of the second kind, and it is with this amor amicitiae and
benevolence that we are now concerned in this present section. On what is this love of
benevolence based? ‘A man,’ writes St. Thomas, ‘is never said to be friendly towards himself.
He is related to himself by something deeper than friendship. By friendship we effect a union
with other people. But a man’s relation to himself is something deeper than union—it is a
relation of unity itself, and unity is deeper than union — it is even the principle of union. And as
unity is the principle of union,37 so is the love of one’s self the principle and root of friendship. A
man is said to be friendly to others, just in so far forth as his attitude towards them is the same as
his attitude to himself. As Aristotle says in 9° Ethic, ‘things appertaining to others—that is, to
friendship—are grounded on that which appertains to the love of one’s self’ (Summa Theologiae,
II-II, XXV). The love, therefore, of one’s own good is, according to St. Thomas and Aristotle,
the root of benevolence, as it is of every other human impulse.

“But we certainly cannot stop at this. We must go farther and explain how benevolence
can be grounded in the love of one’s own good, how from self-love as root we may obtain the
flower—benevolence. The question can be put in the form of a difficulty thus: In every act we
must seek our own good; how, then, can we seek the good of others for their own sakes alone,
and in particular how can this second desire be grounded on the first? Now, there would be no
difficulty in explaining this if, instead of benevolence, we had to deal with the amor
concupiscentiae merely—that is, loving a man because he is good to us, for in the love of self is
contained the love of others as they minister to one’s self. But it seems hard to get from the love
of one’s own good to benevolence, which is the love of some one for his own sake (or, which is
the same thing, the wishing of good to another for his own sake) alone. Still, the transition is
possible, and as effected by St. Thomas, following Aristotle, it is highly interesting and worthy
of St. Thomas.38 It is made to depend upon the fundamental natural principle of union between
one man and another—viz., our common human nature. We are all, according to St. Thomas, like
one another in our human nature — we are one in human nature, and we differ only in
individual characteristics. On that account we are able mentally to put another man in our own
place and wish him good as we would wish it to ourselves. This is the root of benevolence. In
benevolence I do not love another as another, because for that it would be necessary to keep my
neighbour apart mentally from me, to regard his good as quite a distinct thing from mine. Rather
I put him in my own place on account of his likeness to me, make of him an alter ego, regard
him as one with myself, and wish him well accordingly. Again, we quote from St. Thomas

36
The expression is technical. It must not be supposed to imply necessarily a sensual element in desire.
37
Sidgwick writes: “Love is not merely a desire to do good to the object beloved, although it always involves such a
desire. It is primarily a pleasurable emotion, which seems to depend on a certain sense of union with another person”
(Methods, 244). Sidgwick finds great difficulty in saying whether intense love for an individual is a moral
excellence in sense of a benevolent motive, but he inclines to the negative view. Whether he is right in this we shall
not now inquire, but the fact is, these very intense loves are very often not examples of amor amicitiae but of amor
concupiscentiae, and that is why they are often not benevolent.
38
It is not a doctrine for shallow minds. They will be sure to misunderstand it.

20
(Summa Theologiae, I-II, XXVII, 3) —‘All benevolence is grounded in likeness.39 Two men that
have the same form are one in that form, and all men are one in their humanity. A man’s love,
therefore, goes out to another, in so far as that other is one with himself, and he will
consequently wish good to that other, in the same way as he wishes it to himself.’

“Likeness to ourselves, therefore, is the root of friendship (‘omne amans amat sibi
simile’)—of friendship in its best sense—that is, as benevolence. Benevolence is the wishing of
good to another for his own sake, not for mine, and this wish I can entertain in spite of the fact
that benevolence begins in the love of my own good. For, as we have said, in benevolence I put
another in my place for the moment, who then becomes my alter ego; and consequently I can
wish him good in the same way as I wish it to myself. In benevolence, therefore, the love of self
is not extinguished—it is rather made to expand, so as to embrace all persons, whom, therefore,
we treat as we would treat ourselves. This is the highest love possible—to treat another as we
would treat ourselves. It is not egoistic, for through it we desire another’s pleasure, not our own
personal pleasure. It is not the amor concupiscentiae, for by it we wish another well, not for our
own sake, but for his. It is pure benevolence. In amor concupiscentiae I wish another good as
means to myself, and, therefore, as distinct from myself. In benevolence I put another man in my
own place and make his ‘good’ mine. In the first the ‘thine’ is distinct from the ‘mine’: in the
second the ‘thine’ is the ‘mine.’

“From all this we draw an important conclusion—the only one, indeed, that has any
bearing on our present enquiry—viz., that benevolence is not an original impulse in man. On the
contrary, benevolence is a derivative from self-love in the sense of the love of one’s own good. It
is, indeed, different from self-love, but it could no more exist without self-love than the fruit
could grow without the tree. Consequently, the impulse to our own good is, in the order of
nature, more fundamental than that to the good of the race, and, therefore, the good of the race
cannot be our final natural end.

“And what we say of benevolence we say also of pity —pity is also based on self-love.
Pity is benevolence towards those in sorrow, and, again, its root is likeness to ourselves. ‘Pity,’
writes St. Thomas, ‘is compassion for the misery of another, and arises from the fact that we are
pained or sorrowful at another’s pain. But inasmuch as sorrow relates (properly) only to (the loss
of) our own good, so a man can be sorrowful at another’s misery only in so far as he regards that
other’s misery as his own.’ (Summa Theologiae, II-II, XXX, 2).

“A superficial view of these doctrines of St. Thomas about benevolence and pity might
induce one to think that in grounding them on self-love he had lowered the standard both of
friendship and of pity. Maturer thought, however, will reveal the opposite. There is no higher
friendship than that which makes me regard my friend as an alter ego; there is no deeper pity
than that which makes me regard another’s sorrow as my own.

“Pity, then, like benevolence, is not original; it is a derivative (but a natural derivative)
from the love of one’s own good. Hence, we see—if we may be allowed to carry this question a

39
It should be remembered that that which benevolence loves in another must be something which a man esteems.
Else the benevolent lazy man could love only lazy men, and benevolent bad men only bad people (see ARISTOTLE,
Nich. Eth., IX, 4 [4]).

21
little outside the region of Ethics—how wrong Martineau is when he tells us that sympathy with
suffering is so grounded in our nature — i.e., is so original and underived in our constitution —
that ‘in it we find an impressive proof that pain and sorrow are not mere uncontemplated
anomalies, arising by way of disorder outside the idea and scheme of things, but are embraced
within a plan of human life and distinctly provided for in human nature.’ ‘That our constitution,’
he adds, ‘is furnished with this medicine of ill indicates a system constructed, so to speak, on a
theory of sorrow, and assigning to it a deliberate place as a perpetual element of discipline, as
natural and not unnatural.’ (Types, Vol. XL). In this passage Martineau takes it for granted that
nature furnishes every man originally with a special impulse of pity or sympathy, from which he
draws the conclusion that sorrow, and therefore evil, are a necessary part of the original scheme
of nature. But we have shown that there is in us originally and fundamentally no such medicine
of ill. Pity, like benevolence, is a derived impulse, naturally derived, but yet derived. In the will
there is but one original underived impulse—namely, our love for our own good.

“(2) Argument drawn from Hedonism.

“Utilitarians argue from Ethical Hedonism—that is, from happiness—as the supposed
end of man. They extend this theory from the happiness of the individual to the happiness of all
men, which latter happiness then becomes the natural end of the individual. They offer two
proofs drawn from Hedonism for their theory of the happiness of all men as the Ethical end of
the individual. The first proof is Mill’s rather obsolete argument, that if each man’s happiness is
the end of each, then all men’s happiness is the end of all, and, therefore, all men’s happiness is
the end of each. His words are—‘each person’s happiness is a good to that person; and the
general happiness, therefore (is), a good to the aggregate of all persons,’ which latter proposition
Mill henceforth treats as equal to—the general happiness is a good to each person. The second is
the argument used by Sidgwick, Rashdall, and others, that if ‘his own’ pleasure be not only an
end to every man but the right end for every man, an end that he ought to pursue, then pleasure
gets a value on its own account objectively, and would be approved of by an Impartial Reason—
that, therefore, the words ‘his own’ could no longer be considered necessary in the statement that
pleasure is the end, that we are thus led to the conclusion that ‘pleasure (not ‘his own’ pleasure)
is the end’—and that having in this way got rid of the limitation implied in the words ‘his own,’
the law of morals naturally announces itself thus—seek pleasure, and as much of it as can be
had, or, seek all men’s pleasure.

“We shall now examine these two arguments.

“Mill’s Argument.—The argument used by Mill is a plain sophism which it will not be
necessary to consider at any length here. It simply uses the collective sense of the word ‘every’
(that is, ‘all together’) as equivalent to, and, therefore, interchangeable with, the distributive
sense (i.e., each one separately). Mill’s first proposition is that each man’s happiness is the end
of each, which means that ‘his own’ happiness is the end of each. His second proposition (which
he regards as a consequence40 of the first) is that ‘all men’s happiness is the end of all.’ This
means that the whole body of men in their collective capacity (i.e., society) should seek the
general happiness. The third proposition, which is supposed to result from the second, or to be
the equivalent of the second, is that each member of society ought to seek tke general good or the
40
The first inference might very well be questioned, but for our present purpose it is not necessary to do so.

22
good of all collectively. Now, to infer this third proposition from the second, or to regard them as
identical, is plainly an example of the fallacy of Composition, of which we could give many
instances exactly similar in form to Mill’s argument. Such a similar instance is the argument that
if a hundred men have a hundred heads, therefore each man of the hundred has a hundred heads,
an inference the validity of which it will not be necessary to disprove.

“The second (Sidgwick’s argument) requires requires a somewhat closer examination, not
because it is less sophistic than Mill’s, but because it has been so strangely stated that it is hard to
find the sequence of it and to show wherein its fallaciousness consists. We shall first quote the
argument as given by Sidgwick and Professor Rashdall, and then attempt to set it forth clearly in
our own words. Sidgwick writes41: ‘When, however, the Egoist puts forward implicitly or
explicitly the proposition that his happiness or pleasure is good not only for him, but from the
point of view of the Universe —as, e.g., by saying that nature designed him to seek his own
happiness—it then becomes relevant to point out to him that his happiness cannot be a more
important part of Good taken universally than the equal happiness of any other person. And thus
starting with his own principle he may be brought to accept Universal happiness or pleasure as
that which is absolutely and without qualification Good or Desirable: as an end therefore to
which the action of a reasonable agent as such ought to be directed.’

“And Professor Rashdall writes42: ‘He (the Egoist) declares not merely that pleasure is
his43 object, but that pleasure is the only reasonable object of desire, that every reasonable man
must agree with him in thinking that his own pleasure is to each the only proper object of pursuit,
that anyone who pursues any other aim is unreasonable and makes a mistake. And when that
attitude is adopted it becomes possible to urge that he is implicitly appealing to a universal
standard which must be the same for all men.44 The pursuit of pleasure45 is approved, not merely
because it chances to be the end that he prefers, but because it is in some sense the true end, the
end that ought to be pursued. The champion of pleasure may indeed contend that the Universal
Rule which Reason approves is not that pleasure in general ought to be pursued, but that each
man should pursue his own pleasure.46 But an Egoistic Hedonist of this type is liable to be asked

41
Methods, page 420. In the last chapter of his Methods, Sidgwick himself seems to us to express a want of
confidence in the above line of argument, for he insinuates that it does not amount to what is properly a “proof” of
Utilitarianism. Yet, in an earlier chapter, he seems confident enough about its validity.
42
Theory of Good and Evil, vol. 1, p. 44.
43
All the italics in the above quotation are ours, except the first, which is Prof. Rashdall’s own. We have italicized
those phrases which seem to us to be the turning points in the argument – i.e., the points of transition from Egoism
to Universalism.
44
This sentence has no connection with what goes before (it is meant to be a conclusion from what goes before),
unless it means — all men agree that “his own” pleasure is the proper end for each man, and to that universal
opinion we appeal for our theory that each man must seek his own happiness only—and to pursue any other aim, as
is said above, is unreasonable.
45
Here Prof. Rashdall has let drop the words “his own” before “pleasure.” He should not have done so if the
sequence of the argument is to be maintained. Of course Prof. Rashdall must mean “his own pleasure” at this point,
but it would be better to say so on account of the nature of the matter in dispute.
46
The logician, whether a champion of pleasure or not, does not say so; he merely says that if there is to be sequence
in the argument then “pleasure” cannot be used as equivalent exactly to “his own pleasure,” and that we should not
let drop “his own” without saying why. Up to this the only “pleasure” that preserves the logical sequence is “his own
pleasure.” If Prof. Rashdall lets drop the words “his own” without giving reasons, he has abandoned his line of
argument, and has begun merely to make disconnected assertions.

23
on what ground an impartial or impersonal Reason should take up this position.47 He may be
asked whether when he condemns the pursuit of ends other than pleasure48 he does not imply that
the claims of this end49 are dependent not upon the individual’s chance likings but upon
something in pleasure itself,50 something which Reason discerns in it, and which every Reason
that really is Reason must likewise discern in it. And if that is so, he may further be asked why
Reason should attach more importance to one man’s pleasure than to another’s.51 If it is pleasure
that is the end it cannot matter, it may be urged, whose pleasure it is that is promoted.52 The
greatest pleasure53 must always be preferable to the less pleasure, even though the promotion of
the greatest pleasure on the whole should demand that this or that individual should sacrifice
some of his private pleasure. From this point of view it will seem impossible that Reason should
approve the universal rule that each should pursue his private pleasure with the result of losing
pleasure on the whole. The rational rule of conduct will appear to be that each individual should
aim at the greatest pleasure on the whole,54 and that when a greater pleasure for the whole can be
procured by the sacrifice of an individual’s private pleasure, the sacrifice should be made. The
Egoists’ appeal to Reason55 —the setting up of Egoism56 as an objectively rational rule of
conduct, the condemnation as irrational of those who pursue any other end57—seems therefore to
react against his own position.58 The logic of the egoistic Hedonist’s position carries him away
from egoistic Hedonism and forces him into the adoption of a Universalistic Hedonism.’59

47
Because this was the point reached in the argument above, and beyond this we did not get—“every reasonable
man must agree with him in thinking that his own pleasure is to each,” &c.
48
The Egoistic Hedonist admits only one pleasure, i.e., “his own” pleasure. This must be understood in the text
above if the sequence of the argument is to be maintained.
49
i.e., “his own pleasure.”
50
The Egoist did not assert that “pleasure” was the end, but that “his own” pleasure was the end; and on Prof.
Rashdall’s own confession, all men are agreed, or the Universal Reason is persuaded, that that is the only and proper
end. The Hedonist, therefore, is only logically bound to admit that it is “something in one’s own pleasure” itself, &c.
51
For the purposes of valid reasoning, that is all. Prof. Rashdall has undertaken to prove Utilitarianism. It is of
importance, therefore, that he should give the full term each time a term occurs. The question is not whether one
man’s happiness is more important than another’s, but whether, in the course of the argument, we have as yet got
away logically from that annoying particle “his own.” If the present argument is not to be regarded as a logical proof
of Utilitarianism, if the Hedonist is simply being asked to prove something himself—namely, to prove his theory, or
to give reasons why one man’s happiness is more important than another’s, it would be better to say so; but Prof.
Rashdall has evidently undertaken to prove the Universalistic theory, granted the Egoistic, and we expect him to
keep up the logical sequence of his argument.
52
This may be quite true, but, if the above argument has any weight, it matters much that when “his own pleasure”
is stated to be the only reasonable end for the individual, “his own” should not be let fall out without our being told
why.
53
i.e., the greatest amount of “his own” pleasure, if “his own” pleasure be the only reasonable end.
54
i.e., “his own” greatest pleasure on the whole, if, we repeat, “his own” pleasure be the only reasonable end.
55
As above, an appeal to Reason to declare “one’s own pleasure” the only reasonable end, a declaration which, as
Prof. Rashdall himself admits, Reason makes.
56
Egoism in sense of “one’s own pleasure.”
57
“Than their own pleasure” – i.e., to each “his own” pleasure.
58
How?
59
Not as long as the Hedonist emphasises that annoying particle “his own.” The reader must not consider that in
following the argument almost word by word we have taken a narrow view of it, or have sacrificed the spirit of the
argument to the letter We have called attention to the details of the argument because it was necessary to do so in
order to guard against a subtle fallacy which could only creep in under cover of words.

24
 “Now, both these writers are here attempting to build a bridge between egoistic and
universalistic Hedonism. The points of transition from the Individual happiness to the happiness
of all are clearly shown in the words of Professor Sidgwick, italicised by us (‘but from the point
of view of the Universe’), and also in the italicised passages in Professor Rashdall’s statement.
The aim of the transition in both cases is to get rid of the element ‘his own’ in that principle of
the Egoist—‘to each his own happiness is an end,’ and, as a means to this elimination of ‘his
own,’ each writer appeals to the fact that ‘his own pleasure’ being a good and right end to the
individual, an end that he ought to pursue, it is as a consequence an end which would be
approved by ‘the whole world’ or the ‘Universal Reason’ or an ‘impartial Reason,’ and in that
way, since an impartial Reason cannot be more interested in me than in others, pleasure becomes
an end with a purely objective value — i.e., it gains a value apart from its relation to the
individual altogether; and, therefore, having a value distinct from the individual, it ought to be
pursued irrespectively of its being owned by any person in particular. On this theory, as long as
an end is approved of by the individual alone (for example, sweets or fruits or other such ends),
as long as the goodness of these things consists in the fact that it is only I who wish them, so long
the Universal or Impartial Reason has nothing to say to these ends, and so long they have merely
a subjective value (a value for me) not an objective value. But when the Impartial Reason
approves of an end (and the Impartial Reason will approve of an end whenever the value of that
end consists in something other than the mere fact of its being desired by me—for instance,
when it consists in the fact that a certain end is necessary to me, or that nature has given me an
impulse to it) then, since, as we have said, an impartial Reason has no special interest in any
individual, that end comes to be of value on its own account, as disassociated from ‘me’ and then
the element ‘his own’ can be allowed to drop out. For utilitarians of this school, therefore,
‘pleasure’ and not ‘one’s own pleasure’ becomes the end, and our highest end must, accordingly,
be the greatest quantity of pleasure, or the pleasure of all men.

“We think this as fair a statement of the argument as can be given. But with a plain
statement of it the sophism it contains stands out as plainly as in Mill’s argument. In the present
argument the transition from the happiness of the individual to the happiness of all is effected
either (a) through the assertion that the universal or Impartial Reason approves of the end, or (b)
through the proposition that the end has a value in and for itself. (a) The consequence in the first
of these assertions may be illustrated by an analogy—the analogy of a sick man and his
medicine. The doctor orders medicine for the sick man (‘his own’ medicine —i.e., a medicine
specially compounded for this patient). This medicine is prescribed not because the patient has
taken a liking to it—our point is that it is prescribed because it is necessary for him, and that,
therefore, it is an end which an Impartial or Universal Reason would quite approve of. Yet, this
medicine does not thereby acquire a value which is purely objective, a value in and for itself
without reference to the individual. The element ‘his own’ does not cease to have its proper
value in consequence of this Universal approval, nor does the law henceforth become for the
patient—seek, not ‘your own’ medicine, but all men’s medicines and your own as just one
amongst the number. The expression ‘his own’ can never become detached from that
prescription. It is as his own that the medicine is prescribed for him, and it is as ‘his own’ that the
Impartial Reason approves of it, and only as ‘his own’ is it desirable and to be given to him. This
analogy may not be perfect — omnis comparatio claudicat—but it will help to bring out our
meaning. If the law of Egoistic Hedonism be—‘seek your own pleasure’; or—‘your own
pleasure is a good,’ and if Reason approves of what is an end to me by a law of nature — viz.,

25
‘my own pleasure’—then nothing can remove these qualifications indicated in the expression
‘my own,’ whether the approving Reason be partial or impartial, particular or universal. The
Utilitarian might, indeed, find other arguments to show that the impartial Reason approves of the
general happiness. But he cannot establish it from Egoism. Beginning with Egoism, then, there is
simply no way open to ‘the general happiness as end of the individual,’ for, from the very start,
the qualification ‘his own’ attaches to the pleasure, and makes impossible the transition to
Universalism. (b) Again, if we take as the point of transition the words ‘of value in and for
itself,’ we have once more the same evident fallacy. If ‘my own pleasure’ is a natural end of
action, if it is the end which we ought to pursue (as Rashdall himself confesses), then it is ‘my
own pleasure,’ and not ‘pleasure in the abstract,’ that gets a ‘value in and for itself,’ and no
amount of shuffling of the cards can get rid of this condition which Egoistic Hedonism affixes
from the very start, and which reappears at every turn—the condition of ‘personal reference’
expressed in the words ‘one’s own’ pleasure. If we do not begin with that we are not beginning
with Egoistic Hedonism, and then Professor Rashdall’s words are meaningless. If we do begin
with that, the condition ‘my own’ remains to the end, and then Universalistic Hedonism is in
very terms excluded.60

“Having thus shown the weakness of the Utilitarian inference from Egoism to
Universalism, it remains to point out that our criticism of this argument does not affect
Aristotle’s reasoning, which builds not Utilitarianism, indeed, but, at least, benevolence on the
fact that every man desires his own good. For Aristotle’s argument differs toto coelo from that of
Sidgwick and Professor Rashdall, and the difference lies not in the result of the arguments
merely, the one leading to a duty of benevolence, the other to Utilitarianism, but in the logical
value of the respective arguments. For, whereas Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas recognise that
any end that I may wish is ‘my’ good both before and after the transition to benevolence (the
‘my’ never disappearing, but simply expanding so as to embrace all men through their union
with me), the other two writers seek to get away from this reference to the individual’s pleasure
altogether, or to represent it as only one amongst a million pleasures, other people’s pleasures
being distinct from mine, and equal to mine. That, we have shown to be impossible. From
Egoism to benevolence there is, we believe, but one way open —that indicated in St. Thomas’
argument, which bases benevolence on the likeness men bear to one another in their nature, and
their being one in that nature.

“Before concluding this section it may be well to point out that the same fallacy that we
have just exposed in Sidgwick’s argument is found also in other forms of the Utilitarian
argument—for instance, in the argument that as pleasure is our natural end, our highest end must
be the sum of all pleasures — i.e., the maximum pleasure of all. Our reply is—If ‘his own’
pleasure be the natural and constant end of the individual (and there is no other constant
pleasure-end) his highest end will be the maximum of ‘his own’ pleasure, not that of other

60
Prof Rashdall puts the argument from Egoistic Hedonism in many other ways without, to our mind, increasing its
force. He writes, for instance (page 46)—“The very principle upon which (men’s) own preference of pleasure to all
other objects of desire rests seems to put them under the necessity of approving a similar end for other people. How,
then, can they condemn in themselves an impulse which tends towards the realisation of that end for others?” We
answer, we don’t condemn such an impulse, but we deny that the natural desire which each man has for his own
pleasure leads of necessity to his making other people’s pleasure an end to be striven for by himself. It does lead to
our recognising that other people’s pleasure is an end to them and to be striven for by them, as mine is an end to me,
and to be striven for by me.

26
men—just as, if my aim be my own bodily exercise, my highest aim will be the best bodily
exercise that I can get, not the best or greatest exercise of other people.

“We have drawn this argument out at length because of the importance it has assumed in
recent utilitarian literature.

“(3) Argument drawn from the moral good as categorical and objective.

“Many modern writers (particularly the German ethicians) seek to prove that the good of
humanity is the only moral end, and is, therefore, the final end of the individual, by reasoning
from (a) the categorical and absolute nature of the moral law, the only absolute value in nature
being, according to these writers, the good of humanity as a whole, the good of the individual
being conditional only—that is, referrable to the good of the whole; or, on the other hand, by
reasoning from (b) the ‘objective’ value of the moral good—the mere individual good is, in this
theory, of value only for the individual man, and therefore (as we shall presently explain) it is not
objective because not universal.

“Reply – (a) This theory is met by principles established by us in our second chapter—the
principles, namely, that the Infinite Good is the natural final end of the individual man, and that
this end is of value on its own account (absolutely), and not merely as a means to something else
(conditionally). The end of the individual man is, therefore, a categorical good. Consequently, it
is not true that the only absolute and categorical good is the good of humanity as a whole.

“Again, this theory is built on the supposition that the individual is a mere part of society.
Now, we admit that if the individual man were nothing more than a portion of society, and if he
had no end apart from society, then society would be the only thing of absolute value to him. We
might, then, like these Ethicians whom we are now considering, compare the individual to the
human arm, the value of which is conditional — that is, its value depends upon its being part of
the whole body. But the individual man is not a mere part of society, and independently of
society he has his own ends, and particularly his own final end.61 Society is not his final end.
And, therefore, the final good of the individual, though an individual good, can be yet a good of
absolute value.

“(b) Our principles regarding the ends of our natural faculties dispose of the second
argument above—that the objectivity of the moral good lies in its being the good of all men. For
we have shown that the natural ends of all natural faculties are real and objective. We showed
especially that the end of our wills—the perfect or infinite Good—is real; and on this infinite
Good as our final end, and on the other natural objects of our faculties, is based the reality or
objectivity of the moral law. It is not true, then, that the only objective good is the good of all
men.

“Moreover, there is nothing (either moral good or anything else) whose ‘reality’ or
‘objectivity’ consists in being ‘valued’ by all men. The theory that places the reality or

61
As St. Thomas writes: “If the whole of which anything is a part, is not (its own) final end, but is referred to some
still further end, then the ultimate end of the part will be that other thing (to which the whole system is referred), and
not the whole of which it is a part.” (Summa Theologiae, I-II., q. 2., a. 8).

27
objectivity of moral good, in its being valued by all men, is based on the Kantian doctrine that
‘Objectivity’ and ‘Universality’ (or the fact that a thing is an object for all men) are one. This
doctrine we cannot accept. A thing might be objectively real even though I alone perceived it,
and a thing might be of objective value even though I alone desired it. Universality, then, and
objectivity are not one either in the theoretical or in the practical sphere. An object might, we
say, exist, though I alone perceived it. An end may be objective even though I alone desire it;
and, therefore, the individual good may be objective and a moral good. The good of the
individual, therefore, may be as categorically necessary and as objective as the good of the race,
and hence the moral law is not grounded necessarily upon the idea of the racial good.

“(4) Argument drawn from the common conception of morals.

“This argument is two-fold in form.

“(a) Bain writes: ‘By far the greater part of the morality’ (he means moral laws and
institutions and opinions) ‘of every age and country has reference to the welfare of society. Even
in the most superstitious, sentimental, and capricious despotisms a very large share of the
enactments, political and moral, consist in . . . securing justice between man and man. ... Of the
ten commandments four pertain to Religious worship, six are Utilitarian—that is, have no end
except to ward off evils and to further the good of mankind.’62 The drift of this argument is that
since most of men’s thought about morals is taken up with the good of society, the good of
society must be the essential element in morals.

“(b) Gizycki63 adopts the same argument, but he modifies it by adding to it the idea of
development in moral ideas. The following is a short statement of his theory on this point: Moral
ideas have developed, and development brings with it greater truth. But development in human
action has been wholly in the direction of a greater and greater sympathy with the world at large.
Hence the truth lies in the direction of Universalism. In the beginning an act was considered
morally valuable which promoted the happiness of the family or the tribe. Today we tend to
include all men in our sympathies, and regard that alone as good which promotes the sum of
human happiness in general.

“Reply. – We shall deal with the second (Gizycki’s) form of the argument only, as it is
the more modern form, and includes Bain’s. First, we deny that men now tend to identify the
moral good with that which brings happiness to the race. The only people who do so are the
utilitarian ethicians, and they do so only in their books. In common life, every man, even the
ethician, will assert his rights as against society, and he will assert certain of these rights, and
regard himself as justified in so doing, no matter what be the amount of general pleasure that he
feels he spoils by clinging to his rights. Secondly, even granted that we are becoming (as perhaps
we are) more benevolent, this does not mean that the content of our moral ideas is changing, that
we tend to identify all goodness with benevolence, but only that, on the one hand, we now
exercise greater carefulness in discharging this very important duty of benevolence than hitherto,
and, on the other, that whereas we were formerly brought into contact with but a few men whom

62
Moral Science, p. 442.
63
Introduction to the Study of Ethics, page 5. We have already said that the “end,” according to Gizycki, consists in
holiness of will or peace of conscience, but this end, he declares, is promoted by action for the good of others.

28
it was possible for us to benefit, our modern system has brought all the nations under each
other’s influence, and made it possible for and incumbent upon us to widen our sympathies
more. We are, in other words, now more one family than we were. But that does not mean that
the good of others has become our sole end. A father knows that he has a duty of benevolence
towards his own family, and as the family grows the demands upon his benevolence may become
correspondingly greater. These increasing demands thus made on his liberality, and his
correspondence with these increasing demands, do not imply that he has altered his ideas of
benevolence or that he has tended moie to identify all morality with benevolence. It is so with the
race at large. Our sympathies may widen — still our idea of the final end remains the same.
Thirdly, when we admit that men’s sympathies may have widened with time, we mean, not so
much that the individual mind has grown more benevolent (though it has, perhaps, grown to
some extent), as that the public mind or interest in the general affairs of State has grown—has
developed—and that it expresses itself more than was formerly the case. The political education
of the masses as a result of modern political conditions is a subject of which we have heard
much, and it needs no discussion here beyond indicating that it has had some influence in
helping the ordinary citizen to understand the nature of the public interests—such as interests of
the State. But we must not forget that however appreciation of public interests is developed,
private interest will not, therefore, urge its claims on the individual with diminished force,
although the pursuit of it must naturally be always less prominent and receive less notice than
matters of State in public records. It is not easy, therefore, to see how any growth of interest in
the public good strengthens the case for that development in moral ideas spoken of by
utilitarians. Growth of interest in the public good is explained not by development of our ideas as
to the natural end of man but by the ‘political education of the masses,’ who now share in
framing the laws of the State and in the procuring of the public good. Fourthly, Gizycki has
argued as if men were becoming more social — i.e., as if from the beginning the social interest
were developing and the individual interest gradually disappearing. But we would ask the reader
to compare with Gizycki’s account the following quotation from M. Lévy-Bruhl’s work on
‘Moral Science’ (M. Lévy-Bruhl is no opponent of Utilitarianism) – a work in which he teaches
the exactly the opposite of Gizycki’s view, and regards the history of the human race as a history
of the gradual emancipation of the individual from the social body of which, according to Lévy-
Bruhl’s theory, he was at first a mere part without any end of his own: ‘Nous pouvons admettre
avec une vraisemblance proche de la certitude que dans les groupes humaines (i.e., pre-
Australian groups) qui différaient autant des Sociétés Australiennes que nous différons d’elles,
l’individu n’existait guère mentalment pour lui-même, n’avait guère conscience, si l’on ose dire,
de sa conscience individuelle, et que sa vie psychique était de nature presque purement
collective.’ Here, then, it is the individual that is represented as coming forward – society as
falling back. In such a variety of conflicting views among the Utilitarians it is hard to regard the
argument drawn from history as a decisive proof either of Utilitarianism or of any other ethical
theory.

“In summing up our criticism of the arguments in favour of Utilitarianism drawn from the
‘common conception of Morals’ we say, first, that men have indicated no tendency so to change
their moral ideas as to identify the moral good with the general happiness. Secondly, if we
assume, what is really very doubtful, that there has been a considerable growth in charity in
modern times, we cannot thence infer that men are developing a belief in the ‘general happiness’

29
as the natural ethical end of the individual. It proves at most that men do now more frequently
and extensively what they always knew to be one of their principal duties.

“(5) The argument from Pragmatism.

“Pragmatism is the theory that that is true which works. Applied to the question of Moral
theory it means that a theory of conduct is true which yields the most acceptable and workable
code of human morals. Utilitarianism, we are told by its advocates, is found to work. It does not,
according to the Utilitarians, like Hedonism, debase mankind. Its moral code is a high one. The
world has been working on it for centuries (‘by far the greater part of the morality of every age
and country has reference to the welfare of Society,’ writes Bain64). Utilitarianism, it is asserted,
is the expression of a law the observance of which holds society together, of a law which would,
if adopted generally by mankind, prevent war and injustice and cruelty and the antagonisms of
classes, and everything else which brings misery to men. Utilitarianism, then, works in the best
sense of the word. Consequently it must be true.

“Reply – On the general principle of Pragmatism, or the principle that what works is true,
we cannot speak now, for in this book we are concerned with Ethical theory only. We shall,
therefore, confine our attention to the Pragmatist argument as applied to Morals.

“Both the major and the minor premiss of this argument need to be examined—viz., that
‘a theory of conduct which works is true,’ and that ‘Utilitarianism is a workable theory of
conduct.’

“The major proposition could not be accepted without very great restrictions. Before
workability could be regarded as a test of the truth of a moral theory, the theory should be
workable in the sense and under the conditions that follow—(a) it should possess a workable
criterion—that is, a criterion which is certain and can be applied with certainty to conduct; (b) it
should lead to a workable moral code, a code which it is possible to accept; (c) it should be the
only workable moral theory, for a moral theory is supposed to assign the ultimate ground of
morals, and there can be only one ultimate ground of morals. Hence, there can be only one true
complete moral theory. With these restrictions we shall for the sake of argument65 accept the
major proposition of our opponents without further question, and in the light of these restrictions
we go on to the principal portion of our argument, which is the examination of the minor
proposition—that Utilitarianism works. We find that this minor premiss fails to fulfil any of the
three conditions under which alone we accepted the major proposition. (a) Utilitarianism has no
workable criterion; (b) it does not yield a workable code; (c) it excludes other theories which are
workable.

“(a) We have already seen that the Utilitarian criterion is quite unworkable in practice. Its
application to conduct is most difficult and uncertain, if not absolutely impossible.

64
Moral Science, p. 442.
65
We should explain to the reader that even with these conditions realised we would not feel compelled to accept
this theory that “a moral theory that is workable is true.” The above conditions are the least that we should require
before even considering the question whether “a moral theory that works is necessarily true.”

30
 “(b) We also saw that the code of morals to which this Utilitarian criterion leads when
rigidly and consistently applied is not such as mankind could possibly accept or has ever
accepted. For the essential feature of Utilitarianism is that it subordinates the individual wholly
to society, a condition of things which the individual will never allow and could not allow. Every
man claims the right to pursue his own end, due regard, of course, being had to the claims of
society. There is no man who will not consider that he has rights independently of society, and
that he can exercise these rights in spite of the fact that society may be deprived of much
pleasure thereby—of more pleasure than he gains in using his right. Thus, society has no right to
make a man profess a faith in which he does not believe, even though the profession of such faith
promoted the material interests of society. We claim, then, that the individual will always regard
himself as independent, to a large extent, of society, and that if society should at any time treat
the individual merely as a thing without rights on his own account, the individual will resolutely
resent any such action on the part of society. But society will not and cannot do this. It cannot
afford to ignore the individual right and individual independence. Therefore, the principle of
Utilitarianism is unworkable.66

“(c) Utilitarianism, even if it were a workable theory, is not the only workable theory.
Everything that is true in this theory is contained in the Aristotelian and Scholastic moral system,
and they are not Utilitarian. All the virtues—temperance, justice, fortitude, benevolence,
prudence, truth—were formulated before the introduction of the Utilitarian theory, and without
the aid of the Utilitarian principle.

“Utilitarianism, therefore, as a system is neither necessary nor workable, nor the only
workable theory; and, therefore, we cannot, on the ground of its supposed workability, postulate
its truth. There are, however, in the Utilitarian theory some principles which are both workable
and true, as we pointed out in the beginning of this chapter; but these principles do not justify us
in accepting the Utilitarian system as a whole.”67

Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P.’s Description and Critique of Epiric Ethics

(Hedonism, Utilitarianism): “Empiric ethics, which limits itself to that good which is
experienced as delightful (hedonism), or as useful and profitable (utilitarianism, individual or
social).

“Hedonism says that enjoyment is the motive and standard of human acts. Man is made to
do good and to avoid evil, along the lines of sense-enjoyment. Thus Aristippus among the
ancients, Fourier, a socialist, among the moderns. The latter describes the physical attractions of
the passions, as physicists speak of the attraction of the stars. This system tends to cynical
egoism, founded on identification of man with God, forgetting that God is, and man is not, the
supreme good.

“Utilitarianism. Individual utilitarianism says that man must renounce pleasure in favor
of tranquility and security…Among moderns we find Hobbes and Bentham, whose first moral
law is temporal peace. Stuart Mill and Spencer look on social utilitarianism as the evolutionary
goal of individual utilitarianism. Grotius and Puffendorff formulate the first ethical principle as

66
See also pp. 328-329.
67
M. CRONIN, op. cit., pp. 330-356.

31
follows: Man must worship and promote society. Comte…Society, notwithstanding its defects,
must be loved above all else, as if society were an evolving God. Obligation rests on human
legislation. A father’s right to educate his children, for example, is founded, not on nature, but on
the same human law which, in ancient Rome, gave to the father the right to kill his son. Thus the
Neo-Comtists, Lévy-Bruhl and Durkheim.

“Empiric ethics refuted. Three reflections may suffice.

“1. A virtual refutation lies in the philosophically established proof that, as there is an
essential distinction between intellective life and sense life, so likewise between good-in-itself
and good as pleasurable or useful.

“Sense life knows only sense-goods, pleasurable and useful. It does not know good-in-
itself, which is known only by reason. The evil of empiric ethics lies in its failure to recognize
good-in-itself (testimony to truth in the face of death, for example, as shown by Christ: ‘I am
come to give testimony to the truth’). Good-in-itself is the perfection of our rational activity, and
is good even if it is not followed by pleasure or utility.68

“2. Empiric ethics cannot explain the testimony of conscience which dictates, as a first
and evident principle, that, independently of consequences, good is to be done, evil to be
avoided. Empirics even contradict this principle. Denying moral obligation, men will not eschew
moral evil (secret theft, for example, or betrayal of country) if they find evil to be useful.

“3. Empiric ethics does not, and cannot, result in the happiness it promises. That it does
not was shown also by Spinoza and Kant. The man who lives without a genuine moral ideal is
unhappy. His passions (desire, anger, envy) are uncontrolled, often contrary one to the other. He
is self-centered in his egoism, a slave to passing events, a slave to other men, who can rob him of
the sense-goods wherein he hoped to find happiness.

“Further, this system, even at best, simply cannot give man happiness, because it cannot
satisfy his higher faculties, his aspirations toward moral goodness and beauty, toward peace in
himself and peace in society, and society is not perfect enough to be loved above all else.

“Lastly, the only way to harmonize private with public utility is to love good-in-itself. All
men, as St. Augustine says, can simultaneously possess good-in-itself, truth, for example, and
virtue, though they cannot so possess sense-goods, a house, for example, or a field. Matter
divides, spirit unites.”69

Régis Jolivet’s Critique of Hedonistic Theories: “Teorie edonistiche. Il principio delle

teorie edonistiche. - Il carattere comune delle teorie edonistiche è di porre il sommo bene
dell’uomo nel godimento o piacere e di fare, per conseguenza, del piacere il criterio del bene e
del male: è bene ciò che permette di godere; è male ciò che impedisce di godere e ciò che fa
soffrire.

68
Good is an analogous notion: primarily, it means ‘good-in-itself’ (bonum honestum), secondarily, it means ‘the
pleasurable’ (bonum delectabile), lastly, it means ‘the useful’ (bonum utile). Summa Theologiae, I, q. 5, a. 6.
69
R. GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE, Beatitude, B. Herder, St. Louis, 1956, pp. 20-22.

32
 “Le differenti teorie edonistiche.

“a) L’edonismo. Si chiama con questo nome la teoria del piacere allo stato puro.
Sostenuta da Gorgia, da Aristippo di Cirene e da altri, afferma che bisogna godere il piacere tutte
le volte che si offre a noi. Un piacere perduto non si ritrova più. La regola è dunque il godimento
immediato.

“b) L’epicureismo. Epicuro respinge questo sistema di godimento immediato. Egli

insegna che, proprio per meglio godere, bisogna scegliere tra i piaceri, secondo le seguenti
regole: cogliere i piaceri che non sono seguiti da alcuna pena, quelli che non rischiano di privarci
d’un piacere più grande, preferire i piaceri calmi ai piaceri violenti, eliminare ogni ricerca di
piaceri artificiali. Insomma, Epicuro mira ad attuare uno stato di tranquillità (atarassia), più che
un’attività di godimento.

“Epicuro, che adotta l’atomismo di Democrito, è risolutamente materialista. L’anima è

materia, infinitamente sottile, ma della stessa natura del mondo. Muore col corpo. Non vi sono
dunque che piaceri sensibili e la vita più felice sarà quella che comporterà la più grande somma
di piacere possibile. Tuttavia le regole della gerarchia dei piaceri conducono Epicuro a proporre
una delle morali più austere, implicante la pratica del coraggio, della temperanza; della giustizia
e di tutte le altre virtù, non per se stesse, ma come mezzi per arrivare a quello stato di tranquillità
o d’indifferenza che è, per Epicuro, il vertice della felicità (cfr. LANGE, Die Geschichte des
Materialismus und reine Bedeutung in der Gegenwart, 10a ed., 2 voll., Lipsia, 1921; Histoire du
materialisme, tr. fr., Parigi, 1910, p. 84-150; cfr. tr. it., Milano, 1932).

“c) L’utilitarismo. I rappresentanti principali nel XIX secolo sono Bentham e Stuart Mill.
Bentham vuol dare un carattere scientifico all’epicureismo e, ad un tempo, renderlo meno
austero: lo scopo della vita sta nell’ottenere la più grande somma possibile di piacere. Ma, per
giungervi, conviene stabilire una specie di aritmetica dei piaceri, che permetta di scegliere, tra i
piaceri che si presentano, quelli che sono superiori per intensità, certezza, prossimità, durata,
purezza, estensione e fecondità. A questa teoria è stato dato il nome di morale dell’interesse
personale (cfr. J. BENTHAM, Theories of Pains and Rewards, Londra, 1811).

“Stuart Mill fa propria la teoria di Bentham, ma con la precisazione che bisognerà tener
conto non solamente, come voleva Bentham, della quantità del piacere, ma anche della sua
qualità, e che, allorquando sorgerà un conflitto tra interesse generale e interesse particolare,
sarà sempre quest’ultimo che dovrà essere sacrificato. Di qui il nome di morale dell’interesse
generale dato a questa teoria. (cfr. J. S. MILL, Utilitarianism, Londra, 1863, tr. it., Torino,
1866).

“Discussione - Nessuna di queste teorie può presentarsi come una vera morale. Si deve
innanzi tutto osservare che la regola del piacere è sfornita di valore morale. Infatti il piacere,
immediato o differito, non può presentarsi come obbligatorio: il piacere sollecita coloro che vi
inclinano, ma non s’impone alla ragione come la legge suprema delle nostre attività. D’altra
parte, i piaceri, anche se saggiamente dosati, non ci danno la felicità. Sono, al contrario, sorgente
d’inquietudine, perché, essendo finiti in se stessi e nella loro durata, lasciano assai più una
sensazione di vuoto che un sentimento di pienezza. I piaceri, inoltre, come sottolinea con

33
insistenza Platone nel Filebo, si cambiano nei loro contrari: il piacere tende infatti, di per sé, ad
uno stato di esasperazione in cui si muta in dolore. Infine, se il piacere è la regola suprema, ogni
crimine è giustificato, per il fatto che è servito a procurare una certa soddisfazione a chi l’ha
compiuto, e il sacrificio della tranquillità, della fortuna, della salute e della vita per il bene altrui
diventa la suprema sciocchezza. Certamente gli edonisti, e specialmente Epicuro e gli utilitaristi,
ripudiano queste conseguenze; ma il peggior pericolo delle loro dottrine sta proprio nel
dissimulare quelle conseguenze che logicamente implicano.

“L’idea di piacere è chiara e semplice solo quando la si prende nella sua astratta
generalità. Concretamente, essa abbraccia un caos di tendenze accidentali che variano secondo i
caratteri ed i gusti individuali, secondo l’età, la situazione, l’umore del momento e secondo il
grado di sviluppo mentale. È impossibile indicare un piacere determinato come principio pratico
universale. Non ci si può più proporre come regola «ciascuno agisca, in ogni momento, in
maniera da procurarsi il più grande piacere possibile», perché ciò equivarrebbe ad una così
evidente rinuncia alla ragione che gli stessi edonisti più decisi hanno fatto marcia indietro
dinanzi ad un simile principio d’azione. Egesia di Cirene ne conclude che la vita, dal punto di
vista del piacere, non vale la pena d’essere vissuta, perché il desiderio del piacere o è del tutto
frustrato o, quando perviene al suo oggetto, si discopre ingannevole e doloroso.

“Invece di sforzarci di giungere al vero piacere, bisogna, aggiunge Egesia, sbarazzarci

della pena e, perciò, della vita stessa. La dialettica del piacere è dunque una dialettica di morte.

“a) Critica dell’epicureismo. Le regole per giudicare i piaceri, proposte da Epicuro e da

Bentham, non correggono il fondo dell’edonismo, dal momento che tengono per fermo il criterio
della supremazia del piacere. Il metodo preconizzato da queste teorie non comporta alcuna forza
obbligatoria: sono ricette per meglio godere, tali da non permettere di condannare colui che
preferisce godere immediatamente tutti i piaceri che si presentano. Quanto all’utilitarismo di
Bentham bisogna ancora osservare che l’aritmetica dei piaceri esigerebbe una contabilità ben
complicata. La ricerca del piacere sopprimerebbe il piacere! E come valutare in cifre ciò che è
essenzialmente qualità?

“b) Critica della teoria dell’interesse generale. La teoria di Stuart Mill non è più coerente
delle precedenti teorie morali. Essa esige che si tenga conto delle qualità dei piaceri: ma come
valutare queste qualità senza un principio morale distinto dal piacere? Mill afferma anche il
primato dell’interesse generale: ma con qual diritto? Se il piacere è la regola suprema, perché
dovrei sacrificare il mio piacere al bene della società? Non ne si vede una ragione.

“È dunque impossibile porre il piacere, sotto qualsiasi forma, come regola di vita. Il
piacere non è il bene e appare tale da dover essere giudicato secondo un principio superiore che
sia un principio morale.”70

Régis Jolivet’s Critique of Individualistic and Social Utilitarianism. “Il fondamento del
diritto. La questione del fondamento del diritto non è che un aspetto particolare del problema
generale dell’obbligazione morale. Si tratta infatti di sapere qual è la sorgente prima del diritto,

70
R. JOLIVET, Trattato di filosofia, vol. 5 (Morale), t. 1 (Morale generale), Morcelliana, Brescia, 1959, nos. 57-
60.

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di dove cioè il diritto tragga il suo valore obbligatorio. Abbiamo stabilito (95) che la legge
positiva obbliga e può obbligar soltanto in quanto deriva, direttamente o indirettamente, dalla
legge naturale e, dunque. dalla legge eterna: ma contro questa tesi insorgono quei filosofi che,
pur riconoscendo il valore assoluto e irriducibile della legge morale, pensano l’ordine giuridico
separato e indipendente dall’ordine morale (positivismo giuridico) e - a maggior ragione - quei
filosofi i quali pretendono che non vi sia un ordine morale realmente distinto dall'ordine
giuridico (positivismo morale).

“Dobbiamo ora studiare queste ultime teorie, che sono tutte di tipo empiristico e che
fanno dell’ordine morale e giuridico un risultato della forza, o del bisogno, dell’interesse
individuale o collettivo, della pressione sociale; per esse non vi è la possibilità di un ordine
morale propriamente detto, ma solamente un insieme di fatti giuridici che s’impongono all’uomo
dal di fuori, in virtù di convenzioni o di coazioni ai quali si riduce senza residui l’obbligazione o
il diritto. Ma il diritto così concepito conserva ancora un senso e un valore?

“L’interesse. Le teorie utilitaristiche. – Queste teorie possono essere ridotte a due forme
principali, a seconda che fondino il diritto sul bisogno, o interesse individuale, o sull’interesse
generale.

“a) La legge del bisogno. Hobbes pensa naturale all’uomo lo stato di guerra, in cui il
diritto di tutti a tutto è fondato dal bisogno e non è misurato che dalla forza di ciascuno (jus
omnium in omnia); ma gli uomini non tardarono ad accorgersi che questo stato di guerra, che fa
dell’uomo un lupo per l’uomo (homo homini lupus), non generava che mali, e allora decisero di
pattuire tra loro il modo di stabilire la pace. Occorse perciò inventare una tecnica della pace, il
cui principio fu questo: la rinuncia che ciascuno doveva effettuare al suo diritto a tutto sarebbe
avvenuta a favore di un corpo politico o stato, che sarebbe diventato il detentore del potere
illimitato che ciascuno possedeva fino allora. Così il diritto di tutti è stato trasferito a uno solo, il
Sovrano, dal quale derivano ormai assolutamente tutti i diritti.71

“Possono essere ridotte al sistema di Hobbes le teorie di Spinoza, di J. J. Rousseau, di

Helvétius e di Renouvier. Spinoza sembra, per i princìpi razionalistici della sua dottrina, il più
lontano da Hobbes, ma il suo panteismo lo conduce ad affermare che tutto ciò che esiste è a un
tempo divino e necessario, per cui il giusto e il necessario coincidono. Il diritto naturale, nella
sua essenza, non sarà nulla di più che l’insieme di «regole della natura di ciascun individuo,
seguendo le quali noi concepiamo ogni essere come determinato ad esistere e a comportarsi in
una certa maniera» (Tractatus teologico-politicus, in ed. crit. di Gebhardt, 4 voll., Heidelberg,
1925, cap. XVI; cfr. tr. it., Torino, 1950). Il diritto naturale di ciascun uomo sarà definito
pertanto non secondo la retta ragione, ma dal desiderio e dalla potenza e sarà proibito solo ciò
che non si desidera o non si può. È invece molto più utile per gli uomini vivere secondo le leggi
della ragione, le quali tendono a procurare ciò che agli uomini è realmente utile; noi desideriamo
vivere liberi dal timore, ma ciò non è possibile se non è la ragione a governare gli uomini. Per
questo gli uomini hanno convenuto nell’impegno etico di sottomettere tutto all’impero della
ragione, di dominare cioè i loro appetiti, affinché i diritti di ciascuno fossero rispettati: così s’è
formato un jus civile, o una società politica che, essendo gerente del bene comune, possiede il

71
Cfr. T. HOBBES, Leviathan, XIII-XVII: De Cive, I-VI in Hobbes’s Works. 16 voll.. Londra, 1839-45; cfr. tr. it.
Leviathan, 2 voll., Bari, 1911: Elementi filosofici sul cittadino, Torino. 1948.

35
diritto sovrano di comandare tutto ciò che vuole, dal momento che l’individuo le ha trasferito il
proprio diritto di vivere a suo talento e s’è ormai impegnato a vivere seguendo la regola comune
e a conservarsi nell’esistenza attraverso la sua protezione (ibidem, cap. XVI).

“Rousseau parte da «uno stato di natura» assai diverso da quello delineatoci da Hobbes,
poiché questo stato non comporta la guerra reciproca degli uomini e, al contrario, rappresenta per
ognuno la condizione di perfetta felicità. Anche Rousseau ammette che, di fatto, la società è
necessaria all’uomo, ancorché non gli sia naturale. La clausola essenziale del Contratto Sociale
con cui si vuoi dar forma alla società e sostituire la legge dell’interesse generale a quella
dell’interesse individuale, consiste nella «alienazione totale di ogni associato, con tutti i suoi
diritti, a tutta la comunità» (Contrat social, I, cap. VI). È proprio questa alienazione che, come
nel sistema di Hobbes, conferisce una sua propria realtà al corpo sociale e alla volontà generale
che ne è l’espressione. Con la vita sociale, rileva Rousseau, hanno inizio la moralità e il diritto,
perché non vi può essere né l’una né l’altro laddove non si riconoscano delle norme universali:
prima del contratto sociale e dello avvento della volontà generale non v’è né diritto né morale,
poiché ciascuno obbedisce solo alla sua volontà particolare, che è sovrana.

“Helvétius ha enucleato le argomentazioni tipiche di quelle teorie che fondano il diritto

sull’interesse individuale, cioè sul desiderio o la passione. Le passioni per Helvétius sono il
principio unico dei nostri atti; il piacere e il dolore ne sono gli effetti inevitabili, onde il fine di
tutta l’esistenza umana si può così formulare: ricercare il piacere, fuggire il dolore, questa è la
sola legge conforme all’umana natura, sia che cediamo ai movimenti irresistibili dell’istinto, sia
che ci lasciamo guidare dalla riflessione e dal calcolo. Ciò che si chiama vizio o virtù non è che
un’altra maniera di designare le qualità piacevoli o spiacevoli, utili o nocive delle cose; al di
fuori di ciò i termini vizio e virtù non hanno significato alcuno.

“In queste condizioni, com’è possibile il diritto? Esso nasce, dice Helvétius, dal
sentimento che l’interesse individuale di ciascuno dipende da quello di tutti. Il suo scopo
essenziale è di ottenere da ciascuno i sacrifici necessari affinché il suo interesse individuale,
così limitato, sia il più possibile rispettato dagli altri. L’ingiustizia nasce solamente dal fatto che
non sempre si vede in che cosa l’interesse personale si accordi con l’interesse generale; compito
del diritto è di attuare questo accordo e, come tale, il suo fondamento e la sua giustificazione non
possono trovarsi che nell’interesse individuale, che il diritto ha il fine di garantire contro
l’ignoranza e gli errori di ciascuno (cfr. Helvétius, De l'Esprit, III, cap. XVI, in Oeuvres
complètes de H., 4 voll., Parigi, 1795). Diritti privati e diritti politici non hanno nulla di naturale,
risultando da una convenzione arbitraria di individui, che decidono di accordare i loro interessi
personali per salvarli. Per lo stesso motivo lo Stato non ha altri diritti all’infuori di quelli che gli
sono riconosciuti dagl’individui, di cui esso è strumento e servitore e non padrone. Vi è solo
giustizia legale e contrattuale, sempre suscettibile di revisione, secondo gl’interessi
degl’individui, legge suprema dell’organizzazione giuridica.

“Renouvier, nella sua Science de la Morale, (Parigi, 1869), ha cercato di dare forma
sintetica alla tesi che riduce il diritto naturale ad una mera giustizia contrattuale risultante dalla
volontà dei contraenti: la giustizia non è nulla di più che l’effetto dell’associazione di due
individui in vista di un bene ad essi comune. «Due individui, per il fatto dell’associazione morale
in cui sono entrati, presuppongono una loro reciproca promessa o esplicita e positiva, o tacita e

36
naturale. In quanto riceve una promessa ognuno ha un credito, un diritto da rivendicare sugli
altri; in quanto la fa ognuno ha un debito da pagare nei confronti degli altri; e il credito dell’uno
fonda il debito dell’altro e reciprocamente. Questo diritto e questo dovere costituiscono ciò che si
chiama la giustizia» (La Science de la Morale, t. I, p. 79). In tal modo i contraenti si trovano
legati da un contratto universale e tacito che, per sua natura, rappresenta una infinità di altri
contratti taciti e possibili, ed in modo speciale il contratto sociale, senza il quale non avrebbero
garanzia i contratti individuali. Questo è per Renouvier il processo secondo il quale si costituisce
la «morale pura», che è propriamente la «morale dello stato di pace», dello stato in cui gli uomini
rispettano scrupolosamente i loro reciproci obblighi. Se guardiamo ai fatti, le cose stanno
diversamente: lo stato di pace è un ideale mentre lo stato di guerra, in cui i cattivi fanno
rispettare i loro diritti ma violano tutti i diritti altrui, ha una sua effettuale realtà; in questa
situazione se si applica la «morale pura» i buoni saranno, fatalmente e senz’alcun scampo,
vittime dei cattivi. Si deve ancora ricorrere ad una «morale applicata», il cui principio generale è
di creare uno «stato di difesa», e cioè da una parte il diritto di sospendere le obbligazioni al punto
preciso in cui cessa la reciprocità e, dall’altra parte, il diritto di rispondere alla violenza con la
violenza. Queste regole della morale applicata (infinitamente diversificate dal diritto positivo per
tener conto del più gran numero possibile di casi) non sono la morale pura o razionale, ma
solamente uno sforzo per avvicinarsi all'ideale che essa formula.

“b) La legge dell’interesse generale. Per i sistemi precedenti, che sono individualistici,
non v’è che un bene, quello dell’individuo; la società è puramente un mezzo, per di più artificiale
e convenzionale, al servizio dell’egoismo individuale. Comte disapprova questo individualismo
che, d’altra parte, ha per effetto necessario l’accrescimento dell’assolutismo statale, e pensa non
esservi un autentico diritto naturale che non sia quello della società. L’uomo è un essere
essenzialmente sociale: non esiste, non pensa, non desidera e non progredisce che per la società;
l’individuo non esiste, afferma Comte. L’uomo non avrà dunque, in quanto individuo, altri diritti
all’infuori di quelli che gli vengono dalla società e dallo Stato, e, per conseguenza, non c’è che
una giustizia legale e positiva. Lo Stato è la sorgente prima del diritto, perché l’individuo
tutt’intero è compreso nell’ambito dello Stato; il bene e il giusto sono fondamentalmente ciò che
è utile alla società. Il sistema di Comte parve talvolta ricollegarsi alle dottrine dello utilitarismo
individuale. Comte nota, infatti, nel Discours sur l'esprit positif, (Parigi, 1844, § 56), che nel
nuovo regime positivistico «non solamente l’attiva ricerca del bene pubblico sarà presentata
senza tregua come il modo più adatto ad assicurare comunemente la felicità dei singoli, ma
[che]... il più completo esercizio possibile delle tendenze generali diverrà la sorgente principale
della felicità personale, quando anche non dovesse procurare eccezionalmente altra ricompensa
che una ineludibile soddisfazione interiore». Comte aggiunge che «in questa vasta espansione
sociale, ciascuno ritroverà la soddisfazione normale di quella tendenza ad eternarsi, che
dapprima non poteva essere soddisfatta che per mezzo di illusioni ormai incompatibili con la
nostra evoluzione mentale». Questi per Comte sono tuttavia aspetti, per così dire, soltanto
apologetici, perché il motivo che fonda e giustifica ai suoi occhi l’insieme dell’organizzazione
giuridica e politica è unicamente il bene sociale o, se si preferisce, l’interesse dell’Umanità.

“Su questo punto Stuart Mill riprende le vedute di Comte e rovescia esattamente la
formula di Hobbes e di Rousseau. Questi non trovano altra giustificazione al diritto che di
procurare, in fin dei conti, il bene individuale. Stuart Mill afferma il contrario: «Se mi si
domanda perché la società deve garantire me [il mio diritto individuale], io non trovo una

37
ragione migliore di quella dell’interesse generale» (Utilitarianism, Londra, 1863, cfr. tr. it.,
Torino, 1866).

“Spencer sembra fondare il diritto sia sull’interesse individuale (cfr. Le basi della morale
evoluzionistica, cap. III), sia sulle leggi dell’altruismo (ibidem. c. XIII); ammette, infatti, che
egoismo e altruismo sono «coessenziali all’uomo» e che il diritto ha lo scopo di effettuare tra
l’uno e l’altro un compromesso, il cui principio sarà che «si conseguirà la felicità generale in
primo luogo se gl’individui cercano in modo conveniente il loro proprio bene e reciprocamente
la felicità degli individui sarà in parte conseguita se essi lavorano alla felicità generale».

“Critica – L’utilitarismo, in nessuna delle sue forme, individuale o generale, può render
conto del diritto, né conservare un contenuto proprio e distinto a questo termine.

“a) Il diritto presuppone il dovere. L’ipotesi dei contratti privati o del contratto sociale
che sarebbero all’origine del diritto, nel senso che avrebbero sostituito le leggi della giustizia a
quelle della forza o dell’egoismo individuale, non ha alcuna base storica. Per quanto lontano si
cerchi di risalire nella storia dell’umanità, noi constatiamo sempre che gli uomini vivono in
società e riconoscono delle comuni regole di giustizia, non in virtù di contrasti arbitrari, ma in
virtù di un ordine morale che s’impone a tutte le volontà e che domina la stessa società.

“Diversamente non si spiegherebbero le leggi e il diritto, non essendo comprensibile

come la moralità e il diritto possano risultare da patti privati o da contratto sociale, mentre ne
sono piuttosto la condizione: come gli individui sottomessi alla sola legge dell’egoismo
avrebbero messo a tacere il loro egoismo per legarsi ad un patto sociale, se non avessero avuto
già prima il sentimento dei loro doveri e dei loro diritti? Il diritto non è dunque spiegabile se non
risponde ad un sentimento di dovere verso gli altri e verso la società.

“b) L’uomo è essenzialmente sociale. Contrariamente a quello che immaginano i teorici

dell’utilitarismo individualistico, la società non è opera degl’individui, ma della natura stessa.
L’uomo è per essenza un animale sociale. Sottomesso fin dalla nascita alla società (famiglia,
clan, tribù, nazione), che gl’impone tutto un sistema di doveri e di diritti e subordina l’attività
alle condizioni del bene comune, pur non potendosi dire che l’uomo sia «in ceppi» perché
sottomesso alla società, è certo ch’egli non nasce libero come invece sostiene Rousseau. Il diritto
è naturale, come la società da cui emana, si deve dunque asserire.

“c) La legge dell’interesse si riduce alla legge della forza. L’utilitarismo generale
condanna l’individualismo e vuole l’individuo - il quale non esiste che per la società -
interamente sottomesso al corpo sociale. Questo punto di vista tuttavia non sfugge affatto alle
critiche che colpiscono l’utilitarismo, quali che siano le forme sotto le quali si presenti; infatti, se
il diritto si riduce all’utile, ha un valore contingente ed accidentale e coincide, in fin dei conti,
con la forza. L’utilità o l’interesse, in quanto tali, ignorano la giustizia; sono profondamente
egoisti e cedono solo alla forza.

“La spiegazione del diritto mediante l’interesse individuale o sociale mette capo alla
soppressione del diritto come realtà originale e non lascia sussistere che la forza. Non si riesce a
render conto del diritto senza ricorrere a un ordine superiore sia all’ordine fisico dei bisogni e

38
degl’istinti che allo stesso ordine sociale, senz’ammettere la realtà d’una norma assoluta e
universale del bene, di cui l’uomo come individuo e la società si riconoscano ugualmente
tributari.

“È bene afferrare il senso profondo di questa critica all’utilitarismo. Senza dubbio ogni
disciplina normativa è utile, ha il fine pratico di essere utile a qualcuno; la stessa regola morale
non può mancare d’essere utile, essendo stata fatta per il bene dell’individuo umano. Potremmo
dire pertanto, in un senso molto legittimo, che il diritto ha per fondamento ciò che è utile
all’uomo. Sennonché, di quale utilità si tratta? Questo è il nodo del problema. L’utilità e
l’interesse di cui si parla sono relativi al fine ultimo dell’uomo, cioè al sommo bene, subordinati
al bene oggettivo e da esso strettamente definiti. Nell’utilitarismo, invece, l’utile è il bene
materiale immediato, perché il solo fine riconosciuto valido è il godimento individuale o il bene
della società (definito in termini biologici e materialistici). L’interesse così concepito non ha,
evidentemente, niente di morale e richiama necessariamente la forza che lo regoli.”72

72
R. JOLIVET, op. cit., nos. 127, 130-135.

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