Safety/Loss

Prevention
J. THARAKAN, Suncor Energy Products,
Calgary, Alberta, Canada

Flare header failure: An investigation

A 60-in. flare header suffered three identical failures with
buckling and cracking at the circumferential weld at the bottom
of the pipe. The failures are believed to have originated during
hot reliefs.
The flare header handles liquid, vapor and gas intermittently
relieved from various process units. The flare header runs hori-
zontally for a length of 3 km and has a built slope of 1 in 500 for
free draining. The hottest relief is from the coker unit, which
could be at a maximum temperature of 815°F.
The flare header was designed to ASME B 31.3, non-severe
cyclic service with a design pressure of 50 psig at 815°F. It was
fabricated using 0.375-in. thick carbon steel plate with non-
post-weld-heat-treated welds. The header was also heat traced
and insulated.
FIG. 1 depicts the failure locations. All failures were with-
in about 60 ft on either side of the tie-in from the sulfur unit
(sulfur lateral).
FIG. 2 shows a typical buckling and cracking failure at the bot-
tom of the circumferential weld on the flare header.
be associated with a bending of the pipe in the vertical plane.
The pipe is designed to move in the horizontal plane during
thermal growth. Why should it move in the vertical plane?
Movement of the pipe in the vertical direction can result
if there is a temperature difference between the top and bot-
tom of the pipe. Therefore, it was suspected that there could be
some insulating deposit at the bottom of the flare header near
the sulfur lateral.
Onstream inspections. Gamma ray scanning ruled out the
presence of internal deposits in the flare header. Scanning re-
sults from the welds and the pipe near the sulfur lateral elimi-
nated environmental cracking and thinning.
Visual inspection of the 60-in. header revealed:
• The pipe developed an ovality due to a support reaction
at the vicinity of the saddle supports

Points to ponder. At the time of investigation, the failed areas

were enclosed with leak containment devices (LCDs) installed
to arrest leaks on a temporary basis. Therefore, closer observa-
tion of the failure wasn’t possible.
Buckling occurs due to compressive stress (or compressive
strain) and cracking is caused by tensile stress. Therefore, it ap-
peared strange how both could occur at the same location. An-
other boggling question was which occurred first, the buckling
or the cracking?
The welds are, in general, stronger than the pipe. Why would FIG. 2. Typical buckling and cracking failure at the bottom of the
the girth weld area buckle, as opposed to the pipe itself? circumferential weld on the flare header.
Why were all the failures occurring at the vicinity of the sul-
fur lateral? The buckling at the bottom section of the pipe could
Sulfur
Sliding Axial relief Vertical
support (typ.) restraint restraint Guide

110 ft
Failure-2

Failure-3
Failure-1

60-in. flare
header From coker
To flare unit
knockout pot

FIG. 1. Failure locations: All failures were within about 60 ft on either

side of the tie-in from the sulfur unit (sulfur lateral). FIG. 3. Evidence of vertical movement of the pipe.

Hydrocarbon Processing | MAY 2013105

 Facts At Your Fingertips
Process Hazard Identification Methods
Department Editor: Scott Jenkins
P
rocess hazards analyses
(PHAs) are structured reviews
during the engineering design
process intended to detect potential
hazards that were not addressed by
the design team. This one-page refer-
ence describes commonly employed
PHA methods.
PHA methods
PHAs are often conducted or moder-
ated by a specialist, with participation
by the design team, owner’s employ-
ees or experienced operators. Sev-
eral PHA methodologies exist, each
suitable for specific purposes and for
certain phases of project develop-
ment and plant lifecycle (Figure 1).
Consequence analysis. This meth-
od quantitatively assesses the con-
sequences of hazardous material re-
leases. Release rates are calculated
for the worst-case and alternative
scenarios. Toxic points are defined
and release duration is determined.
Hazard identification analysis (HAZ-
ID). HAZID is a preliminary study per-
formed in early project stages when
hazardous material, process informa-
tion, flow diagrams and plant location
are known. It is generally used later on
to design the preliminary piping and
instrumentation diagrams (P&IDs).
What-if. This is a brainstorming
method that uses questions starting
with “What if . . . ?,” such as “What if
the pump stops running?” or “What if
the operator opens or closes a certain
valve?” Participation by experienced
staff is important to foresee possible
failures and identify design alterna-
tives to avoid them.
Hazard and operability study
(HAZOP). This technique has been
a standard since the 1960s in the
chemical process industries. It is
based on the assumption that there
Studies
Visualization Conceptual
engineering
• Expert judgement • HAZID
• High level risk • What-if
identification • Consequence analysis
FIGURE 1. Typical hazards analyses that are used throughout a CPI project lifecycle
28
will be no hazard if the plant is oper-
ated within design parameters, and
analyzes deviations of the design vari-
ables that might lead to undesirable
consequences for people, equip-
ment, environment, plant operations
or company image. If a deviation
is plausible, its consequences and
probability of occurrence are then
studied by the HAZOP team. Usually,
an external company is hired to inter-
act with the operator company and
the engineering company performs
this study. Evaluating risk involves
multiplying the consequence level by
the frequency of occurrence.
Layer-of-protection analysis
(LOPA). This method analyzes the
probability of failure of indepen-
dent protection layers in the event
of a scenario previously studied in
a quantitative hazard evaluation like
HAZOP. It is used when a plant uses
instrumentation independent from
operation (safety instrumented sys-
tems to assure a certain safety integ-
rity level (SIL)). The study uses a fault
tree to study the probability of failure
on demand (PFD) and assigns a re-
quired SIL to a specific instrumen-
tation node. For example in petro-
leum refineries, most companies will
maintain a SIL equal to or less than
2 (average PFD ≥10−3 to <10−2), and
a nuclear plant will tolerate a SIL 4
(average PFD ≥10−5 to <10−4).
Fault-tree analysis. Fault-tree anal-
ysis is a deductive technique that
uses Boolean logic symbols (that is,
AND or OR gates) to break down
the causes of a top event into basic
equipment failures or human errors.
The immediate causes of the top
event are called “fault causes.” The
resulting fault-tree model displays
the logical relationship between the
underlying basic events and the se-
Scope definition Engineering, procurement & construction
Basic Detail Precomm.,
engineering engineering Construction comm & startup
• HAZOP • HAZOP • Inspections
• LOPA • Constructability • Materials and
• QRA review equipment tests
• FAT & SAT
• Hydrostatic tests
CHEMICAL ENGINEERING WWW.CHEMENGONLINE.COM
lected top event.
Quantitative risk assessment (QRA).
QRA is the systematic development
of numerical estimates of the ex-
pected frequency and consequence
of potential accidents based on engi-
neering evaluation and mathematical
techniques. The numerical estimates
can vary from simple values of prob-
ability or frequency of an event occur-
ring (based on relevant historical data),
to very detailed frequency modeling
techniques. The events studied are
the release of hazardous or toxic ma-
terials, explosions or boiling liquid ex-
panded vapor explosion (BLEVE). The
results of this study are usually shown
on top of the plot plan.
Failure mode and effects analysis
(FMEA). This method evaluates the
ways in which equipment fails and the
system’s response to the failure. The
focus of the FMEA is on single equip-
ment failures and system failures.
Timing
Methods have more impact in some
design phases than others. For ex-
ample, if a consequence analysis
is not performed in a conceptual or
pre-FEED (front-end engineering and
design) phase, important plot-plan
considerations can be missed. Oth-
ers, like HAZOP, cannot be devel-
oped without a control philosophy or
P&IDs, and are performed at the end
of FEED or detailed engineering (or
both) to define and validate pressure
safety valve locations and other pro-
cess controls and instrument safety
requirements. QRA or LOPA (or both)
are done after HAZOP to validate sit-
ing and define SIL levels and meet
the level required by the plant. n
Editor’s note: This column was adapted from the following article:
Giardinella, S., Baumeister A. and Marchetti, M. Engineering for Plant
Safety, Chem. Eng. August 2015, pp. 50–58.
Operations Decommissioning
• Preventive and corrective • HAZID
maintenance checks
• Periodically check instrument
and relief-valve calibration
• Periodic hazards analysis
FEBRUARY 2022
 Special Focus Valves, Pumps and Turbomachinery
J. S. KIM, J. LOPEZ, P. LI and R. HAINES,
Covestro LLC, Baytown, Texas
Use a simple vapor equation
for sizing two-phase pressure relief valves
Pressure relief valves (PRVs) protect process equipment from
the hazards of excessive over-pressure. A simple liquid equation
is widely used as a standard method for sizing incompressible
fluids. A simple vapor equation is also widely used when sizing
for ideal vapors. For non-ideal vapors, an isentropic expansion
coefficient typically evaluated at the relief conditions is used.
Alternatively, API 520 Part 1 suggests averaging the isentropic
expansion coefficients calculated at the upstream pressure and
the pressure in the throat of the valve nozzle.1 Using the average
isentropic expansion coefficient with a simple vapor equation
can result in undersized PRVs due to the assumption of an ideal
vapor in the simple vapor equation.
This article proposes an alternative solution for a constant
isentropic expansion coefficient. For two-phases, the Leung
Omega method—often referred to as a two-point method—is
widely used. In addition, the homogeneous direct integration
(HDI) method requires significant computational efforts but is
considered the most rigorous and accurate method.
No standardized PRV specification sheet is in use for non-
ideal vapors and two-phases because no simple unified meth-
odology exists for compressible fluids (non-ideal vapors and
two-phases). For two-phases, the mass flux and the basis for the
calculations are specified in accordance with the API 520 Part
1, Annex D.1 However, no guidelines are available for non-ideal
vapors. This article introduces a new method for sizing any com-
pressible fluid PRV using a simple vapor equation. The proposed
approach generates rigorous results validated against the exist-
ing rigorous HDI method. This method is applicable to vapors
and two-phases, including slightly subcooled liquids if the three-
point data is available from isentropic flash calculations. In addi-
tion, it significantly reduces the computational efforts necessary
for the numerical integration method. The new method using a
simple vapor equation will improve the communication between
the valve manufacturer and the relief system engineer for non-
ideal vapors and two-phases, including slightly subcooled liquids.
A simple vapor equation. For vapors, the critical flow
through a PRV is represented by Eq. 1, which assumes the va-
por behaves ideally when a compressible vapor expands across
a PRV nozzle. The simple vapor equation provides satisfactory
sizing results over a wide range of applications. However, to
ensure the appropriate sizing results, the vapor compressibility
factor should be no less than approximately 0.8 or greater than
approximately 1.1.1 Recently, API 520 Part 1 noted that the va-
lidity of Eq. 1 may diminish when the reduced volume of the
fluid is less than 2 at the valve inlet pressure:
(1) W T ×Z
A = ×
C × K d × P0 × K b × K c M
where,
A = the required discharge area of the device, in.2
W = the required flow through the device, lb/hr
C = a function of the ratio of the ideal gas-specific heats
at the inlet relieving temperature
Kd = the coefficient of discharge
P0 = the inlet relieving pressure, psia
Kb = the capacity correction factor due to backpressure
Kc = the combination correction factor for installations
with a rupture disk upstream of PRV
T = the relieving temperature of the inlet vapor, °R
Z = the compressibility factor at inlet relieving conditions
M = the molecular weight of the vapor at inlet relieving
conditions.
For real gases, API 520 Part 1 recommends using an isen-
tropic expansion coefficient evaluated at the relief conditions.
Note: A real gas-specific heat ratio does not provide a good
representation of the isentropic expansion coefficient.1 Alterna-
tively, an average isentropic expansion coefficient between the
upstream pressure and the pressure in the throat of the nozzle is
recommended.1 However, the isentropic expansion coefficient
is not used in the API 520 PRV specification sheets.
Numerical integration method. API 520 Part 1 contains the
most rigorous method for calculating the mass flux for PRVs.
The method applicable to all phases is known as the HDI meth-
od, evaluated numerically by direct summation over small pres-
sure intervals using an appropriate technique (e.g., Simpson’s
method).2 The HDI method can be used for any homogeneous
fluid provided fluid property data at constant entropy is avail-
able. The critical mass flux can be estimated by integrating (as
shown in Eq. 2) until the mass flux reaches a maximum mass
flux. If the fluid is subcritical, the subcritical mass flux can be
estimated by integrating until the actual backpressure on the
nozzle is reached, as shown in Eq. 3:
2
⎡ −2 × ∫ pp v × dp ⎤
G =⎢ 0
⎥ (2)
 c ⎢ v 2
⎥⎦max
⎣ t
Hydrocarbon Processing | JULY 2022 23
 Valves, Pumps and Turbomachinery

Kim, et al. proposed Eqs. 7–9, which are based on Eq. 6.3 A com-
⎡ −2 × ∫ pp v × dp ⎤
(3)
G2 = ⎢ 0
⎥ pressible fluid reaches a condition of maximum flow when the
2
⎣⎢ v t ⎦⎥ velocity at the nozzle reaches the speed of sound. The isentro-
pic maximum mass flux for Eq. 2 is given by Eq. 7. Eqs. 7 and 8
where, are in an identical derivative form.
G = the mass flux through the nozzle, lb/sec-ft2 An identical and simple equation form for both critical mass
P = the pressure of the fluid, psia flux and subcritical mass flux is preferred to simplify the calcula-
v = the specific volume of the fluid, ft3/lb tion method. This allows for an analytical solution for mass flux
t = the throat of the nozzle. calculations to make the numerical integration easier. Eqs. 2 and
The calculation precision associated with the HDI method 3 are in an identical integral form rather than derivative. The
is determined by the size of the pressure intervals, with small- integral form does not allow the analytical solution for mass flux
er pressure intervals providing better results. Some cases may calculations. Eq. 9 is derived from Eqs. 3 and 8, and has been
require many data sets for acceptable sizing results. The HDI upgraded here to handle slightly subcooled liquids. Eq. 9 sim-
method requires intensive computational efforts; however, the plifies the numerical integration and provides rigorous results.
numerical integral result can also be obtained accurately and Both Eqs. 7 and 8 provide the results of P-v equation-based in-
quickly if evaluated analytically with pressure-specific volume tegration. This new method is applicable to compressible fluids
(P-v) models or employed P-v models. (vapors and two-phases, including slightly subcooled liquids):
β +1
Reduced P-v models. The equation of state (EOS) typically ⎛ −∂P ⎞ pec−max
Gc = ⎜ ⎟ = 68.07 ×
involves four variables. Simpson presented a total of six reduced (7) ⎝ ∂v ⎠ s α × β × p0β × v0
P-v models involving only two variables.2 The reduced P-v
model is obtained by a few constant entropy flash calculations,
for which the specific volume reflects changes in the compress- (8) pecβ +1
G = 68.07 ×
ibility factor, pressure and temperature. The reduced P-v model α × β × p0β × v0
based on the homogeneous equilibrium model (HEM) well 1
−2
represents the pressure expansion processes in the PRV. ⎡ ⎡ β ⎤ ⎤ β +1
⎢ −2 × α × β × P × ⎢α ×
β ⎛ p ⎞ ⎥
This article evaluates two out of the six P-v models and a 0
⎜⎝ p ⎟⎠ − α + 1 ⎥ ×
conventional model in a simple vapor equation to select the ⎢ 0
⎢⎣ ⎥⎦ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
best P-v model for isentropic expansion flow. Eq. 4 is good Pec = ⎢⎛ β ⎥
⎞
for ideal vapors, but not suitable for flashing liquids. Eq. 5, the ⎢ ( p0 − psc ) + α × p0 × p1−β − p1−
( β
) + ⎟ ⎥
⎢ ⎜ 1− β
0
⎥
Omega method, is good for flashing liquids, but not so suitable (9)
⎢⎜⎜ ⎟ ⎥
⎣⎢⎝ (1− α ) × ( p − p0 )
for vapors. The two-point Omega method is most widely used ⎟⎠
for sizing two-phases. Eq. 6 is a combination of Eqs. 4 and 5, so ⎦⎥
it should be suitable for both vapors and two-phases. Simpson where,
noted that Eq. 6 is the only reduced P-v model that gave consis- ec–max = the critical pressure (Pc ), maximum
tently outstanding fits of the data. equivalent pressure
ec = the equivalent critical pressure at the calculated mass flux
1
⎛ p ⎞n
sc = the subcooled liquid.
v = v0 × ⎜ 0 ⎟
(4) Eq. 10 has been developed to determine if a subcooled liq-
⎝ p⎠ uid is compressible or incompressible. Eq. 10 is similar to the
API 520 Part 1 Equation (C.32), but easier to follow. If the sub-
v P
− 1 = ω × ⎡⎢ 0 − 1⎤⎥
(5) cooled pressure is greater than the calculated Pec–max , the fluid is
v0 ⎣P ⎦ incompressible; the fluid is not considered a slightly subcooled
β
liquid because there is no change in density during the expan-
 v − 1 = α × ⎡⎛ P0 ⎞ −1⎤ (6) sion process. In this case, the fluid should be sized using a liquid
⎢⎝ ⎠ ⎥
v0 ⎣ P ⎦ equation and the fluid chokes at the saturated pressure. If the
subcooled pressure is not greater than the calculated Pec–max , the
where, fluid is compressible. In this case, the fluid should be sized as a
n,ω,α,β = the P-v model constants. two-phase fluid:
For subcooled liquids, the initial pressure (P0 ) shall be at the p0
saturated pressure, ignoring subcooled conditions. Eq. 5, a two- Psc−max = p0 +
(10)
2×α ×β
point method, uses two data sets at initial pressure and typically
90% of the initial pressure. Eq. 6, a three-point method, uses For subcritical mass flux, use Eqs. 8 and 9. The Pec in Eq. 8 is
three data sets at initial pressure, a middle pressure and 50% of calculated using Eq. 9 at P (typically at backpressure) without
the initial pressure (not greater than the critical pressure). iteration. For critical mass flux, use Eqs. 7 and 9. The Pec–max in
Eq. 7 is also calculated using Eq. 9 at P (initially at backpressure)
Upgrading the numerical integration method. A new with iteration until Pec is equal to P. The calculated Pec replaces
approach to make the rigorous HDI method more convenient P in the next trial. The maximum Pec value (Pec–max ) is obtained
is discussed here. To reduce significant computational efforts, when Pec is equal to P.
24 JULY 2022 | HydrocarbonProcessing.com
 Valves, Pumps and Turbomachinery

Critical pressure can also be obtained from the following non-ideal vapors at the relief conditions is often used because
approximations (Eqs. 11 and 12) developed based on the it is readily available. A constant isentropic expansion coeffi-
Omega method. cient can be easily back-calculated using Eq. 14 if the C value
is known. Eq. 14 can be expressed in terms of two-parameters
pc = ncβ
(11)
−0.727144
× p0 + 1− ncβ(× p0 ×
−0.727144
) in a P-v model, critical pressure and initial relief pressure, as
shown in Eq. 15. The C value can be calculated by other meth-
⎛ p0 ods if the mass flux result is validated. Eq. 15 is recommended
1− 2 × α × β + × (1 + 2 × α × β ) × ⎞ as the calculation method of choice as a result of the reduced
⎜ psc ⎟
⎜ ⎟ P-v model evaluation.
⎜ ⎡ psc ⎛ 2 × α × β −1 ⎞ ⎤ ⎟ Cp
⎜ ⎢1− 1− × ⎜ ⎟ ⎥ ⎟ v ⎛ ∂p⎞
p0 ⎝ 2×α ×β ⎦ ⎠ n = −
(13) × ⎜ ⎟ ×
⎜ 1− ⎣ ⎟ P ⎝ ∂v ⎠ T C v
⎜ 1− 2 × α × β + (1 + 2 × α × β ) × ⎟
⎜ ⎟ n+1
⎜ ⎡ 1 ⎤ ⎟ 2 ⎞ n−1
⎜ ⎢1−
× α × β ⎥ ⎟ C = 520 × n × ⎛
(14)
⎜ ⎣ 2 ⎦ ⎟ ⎝ n +1 ⎠
⎝ ⎠
β +1
1 ⎛p ⎞
(
⎡1 + 1.0446 − 0.0093431 × α 0.5 × ⎤ ) ( −0.70356 +
0.014685 × ln α ) C = 520 ×
(15) α ×β
× ⎜ c ⎟
⎝ p0 ⎠
nc = ⎢ ⎥
(12)⎢⎣α −0.56261 ⎥⎦ Kim proposed Eqs. 15–17 at the API SCPRC Meeting.4
Eq. 15 is derived from Eqs. 1 and 7.
All values of nozzle pressure and Pec , along with mass flux, The polynomial Eqs. 16 and 17 are used to estimate the
are plotted in FIG. 1 to tangibly illustrate the relations among constant isentropic expansion coefficient for two different C
nozzle pressure, Pec , Pc and mass flux for API 520 Part 1, Ex- ranges. The C value is a result of the most rigorous calculation
ample B.3.3. The green line shows the subcritical mass flux method. This may be an outstanding solution for constant is-
calculations for a known backpressure (at P, greater than the entropic expansion coefficients. This approach allows a sim-
critical pressure). In subcritical flow, there is no iteration. Be- ple vapor equation to be extended to any compressible fluid,
cause Eq.9 provides a result of equivalent critical pressure at including slightly subcooled liquids because Eq. 1 is based on
the integrated mass flux from initial pressure to the backpres- Eq. 4. Therefore, a simple vapor equation can be applied to
sure, the calculated Pec is directly used for the mass flux calcu- any compressible fluid, not only to ideal vapors.
lation. The calculated Pec value shall be less than the known However, n should be a constant isentropic expansion coef-
backpressure (P). ficient obtained from Eq. 14 to be compatible with a simple
The red line shows the critical mass flux calculations for a vapor equation. The constant isentropic expansion coefficient
known backpressure (at initial P, the backpressure is not great- reflects the assumption of ideal vapor relationship in Eq. 14
er than the critical pressure). In critical flow, the calculations since it is simplified for ideal vapors with the ratio of the ideal
are repeated until the calculated Pec is equal to P. The mass gas-specific heats; therefore, the constant isentropic expansion
flux and Pec are maximized at the critical pressure (Pc ). In the coefficient is different from the average isentropic expansion
critical flow region, the maximum mass flux is taken at Pc be- coefficient. For a non-ideal vapor, an average isentropic expan-
cause a further decrease in nozzle pressure does not affect the sion coefficient can result in undersized PRVs. For an ideal va-
mass flux. The calculated Pec also decreases as the P is further por, an ideal gas-specific heat ratio at the relief inlet conditions
decreased below the critical pressure. can be used as a constant isentropic expansion coefficient.
The HDI method uses only one blue graph. The upgrad-
ed integration method uses two graphs (blue graph and gold
graph). The two graphs intersect at Pc . Using the two graphs
significantly improves obtaining the critical pressure point
quickly and accurately. Eq. 9 is used to calculate both the Pec
for subcritical mass flux and the Pec–max (Pc ) for critical mass
flux. The upgraded integration method quickly determines if
the flow is critical or subcritical. However, the HDI method
should complement the Eq. 2 calculations to determine if the
flow is critical or subcritical.

Isentropic expansion coefficient. Estimating the isen-

tropic expansion coefficient during the expansion process is
not simple because it is a function of pressure, volume and
the ratio of real gas-specific heats, as shown in Eq. 13. It also
varies throughout the expansion process, during which con-
FIG. 1. Plot of nozzle pressure, Pec and mass flux.
densation may occur. The isentropic expansion coefficient for
Hydrocarbon Processing | JULY 2022 25
 Valves, Pumps and Turbomachinery

For 12 < C ≤ 160: (not greater than the critical pressure)

n = 2.5343E-11 × C 4–8.3347E-10 × C 3 + 7.4632E-6 × • Higher P2 would improve the calculation accuracy
C 2–2.433E-6 × C + 3.3047E-5 (16) • P1 is the average pressure of P0 and P2
• Use a goal seek feature or a simple macro program.
For C > 160: 2. Calculate the C value in Eq. 15:
n = 3.8459E-13 × C 5 – 3.7986E-10 × C 4 + 1.7953E-7 × • For subcooled liquids, determine if the fluid
C 3–3.3542E-5 × C 2 + 4.6767E-3 × C – 2.1238E-1 (17) is compressible or incompressible using Eq. 10;
do not use this method for incompressible fluids
A new method for sizing compressible fluids. Sizing • Psc = P0 if the fluid is not subcooled
methods for significantly non-ideal vapors and two-phases— • Specify the Psc if the fluid is slightly subcooled
including slightly subcooled liquids—have not yet been stan- (Psc ≤ Psc–max )
dardized. However, many effective new methods have been • Calculate the Pc (Pec–max ) iteratively using Eq. 9
developed over the last few decades. A new method for sizing until the Pec is equal to P; alternatively, Eq. 11
compressible fluids using a simple vapor equation is proposed can be used to avoid iteration
here to be a standard sizing method. All equations required for • For a subcritical flow with conventional valves,
the new method are summarized here based on the standard calculate the Pec without iteration; use the
steps in a work procedure (Eqs. 1, 6, 9, 10, 15, 16 and 17 ): Pec instead of Pc (Pec–max ) and use Kb = 1, or calculate
the Pc (Pec–max ) using Eq. 9 until the Pec is equal
W T ×Z to P and use Kb = Cat Pec /Cat Pc
A = ×
(1)C × K d × P0 × K b × K c M • For a subcritical flow with balanced valves, use the
Pc (Pec–max ), and apply the backpressure correction
v ⎡⎛ P0 ⎞ β ⎤ factor (Kb ) supplied by valve manufacturers
v − 1 = α × ⎢⎝ ⎠ −1⎥ (6) • Use a goal seek feature or a simple macro program.
0 ⎣ P ⎦ 3. Calculate the n using Eqs. 16 and 17:
1 • n (constant isentropic expansion coefficient)
−2
⎡ ⎡ β ⎤ ⎤ β +1 is specified on the PRV specification sheet.
⎢ −2 × α × β × P × ⎢α ×
β ⎛ p ⎞ ⎥
0
⎜⎝ p ⎟⎠ − α + 1 ⎥ × 4. As usual , size PRVs using Eq. 1:
⎢ 0
⎢⎣ ⎥⎦ ⎥ • Eq. 1 can size vapors and two-phases, including
⎢ ⎥
Pec = ⎢⎛ β ⎥ slightly subcooled liquids.
⎞
⎢ ( p0 − psc ) + α × p0 × p1−β − p1−
( β
)+ ⎟ ⎥
⎢ ⎜ 1− β
0
⎥
(9) Validation of new method. This section is included to vali-
⎢⎜⎜ ⎟ ⎥
⎢⎣⎝ (1− α ) × ( p − p0 )
⎟⎠ date the proposed method by comparing it with the existing
⎥⎦
HDI and Omega methods using readily available example
p0 problems from API 520 Part 1—API 520 Part 1 does not
Psc−max = p0 +
(10) cite an example for slightly subcooled liquids. Case 1 is from
2×α ×β Simpson’s Example 1.2 TABLE 1 shows comparisons with differ-
β +1
ent sizing method results for the following four cases.
1 ⎛p ⎞
C = 520 × × ⎜ c ⎟ Case 1 : Simpson’s Example 1
(15) α ×β ⎝ p0 ⎠ Fluid: Subcooled water at 66 psia and 298°F (148°C),
saturated at 65 psi
For 12 < C ≤ 160: HDI: Used 12-point data at 0.2 psi constant
n = 2.5343E-11 × C 4–8.3347E-10 × C 3 + 7.4632E-6 × pressure intervals
C 2–2.433E-6 × C + 3.3047E-5 (16) Omega: Used two-point data at 65 psia (0.017433 ft3/lb)
For C > 160: and 58.5 psia (0.074177 ft3/lb)
New: Used three-point data at 65 psia (0.017433 ft3/lb),
n = 3.8459E-13 × C 5 – 3.7986E-10 × C 4 + 1.7953E-7 × 48 psia (0.205211 ft3/lb), and 32 psia (0.612741 ft3/lb)
C 3–3.3542E-5 × C 2 + 4.6767E-3 × C – 2.1238E-1 (17)
Case 2: API 520 Part 1, Example Problem C.2.1.2
Detailed standard steps in a work procedure. The follow- Fluid: Two-phase containing a significant amount of
ing procedure can be used for sizing compressible fluids (includ- hydrogen at 2,168.5 psia and 80.3°F (27°C)
ing slightly subcooled liquids) using a simple vapor equation: HDI: Used 14-point data at 86.7 psi constant
1. Calculate the two parameters, α and β, in Eq. 6 using pressure intervals
three pressure-specific volume data: Omega: Used two-point data at 2,168.5 psia (5.18 lb/ft3)
• Two flash calculations should be carried out and 1,908.3 psia (4.77 lb/ft3)
at constant entropy New: Used three-point data at 2,168.5 psia (5.18 lb/ft3),
• P0 is at the PRV inlet 1,648.1 psia (4.28 lb/ft3) and 1,040.9 psia (2.96 lb/ft3)
• P0 is at the saturated pressure for slightly subcooled
liquids; do not include the subcooled region Case 3: API 520 Part 1, Example Problem B.1.3
• P2 is at the backpressure or 50% of P0 Fluid: Supercritical ethylene at 797.7 psia and 80.33°F (27°C)

26 JULY 2022 | HydrocarbonProcessing.com

 Valves, Pumps and Turbomachinery

HDI: Used 44-point data at 7.8 psi constant

TABLE 1. Comparisons with different sizing method results
pressure intervals
Omega: Used two-point data at 797.7 psia (0.152 ft3/lb) HDI Omega New method
and 719.4 psia (0.165 ft3/lb) Case 1 Mass flux, lb/sec-ft2 751.76 748.25 751.87
New: Used three-point data at 797.7 psia (0.152 ft3/lb), Critical pressure, psia 63.4 63.21 63.33
625.4 psia (0.185 ft3/lb) and 445.3 psia (0.248 ft3/lb)
π or α/β N/A 29.294583 21.279825 /
Case 4: API 520 Part 1, Example Problem B.3.3 1.350907
Fluid: Low-pressure air at 114.7 psia and 80.33°F (27°C) C/n N/A N/A 94.1 / 0.0671
HDI: Used 60-point data at 1 psi constant pressure intervals Case 2 Mass flux, lb/sec-ft 2
4,830.8 4,960.50 4,852.1
Omega: Used two-point data at 114.7 psia (1.741 ft3/lb) Critical pressure, psia 1,214.4 1,183.8 1,227.1
and 103.7 psia (1.870 ft3/lb)
New: Used three-point data at 114.7 psia (1.741 ft3/lb), π or α/β N/A 0.630383 0.57015 /
1.143954
85.7 psia (2.141 ft3/lb) and 55.7 psia (2.907 ft3/lb)
C/n N/A N/A 349.7 / 1.3296
A simple vapor equation satisfactorily sizes PRVs for all
Case 3 Mass flux, lb/sec-ft2 3,201 3,199 3,184.8
four cases. Red color values in TABLE 1 represent the devia-
tion in mass flux of > 2% and the deviation in critical pres- Critical pressure, psia 468.8 458.7 463.6
sure more than the constant pressure interval from the HDI π or α/β N/A 0.785794 0.733619 /
method. The new method is in excellent agreement with the 1.065312
HDI method for all four cases. Blue color values in TABLE 1 rep- C/n N/A N/A 335.8 / 1.1863
resent calculated C values and constant isentropic expansion Case 4 Mass flux, lb/sec-ft2 379.1 369.9 379.2
coefficients for all four cases. Critical pressure, psia 60.7 64.2 60.4
For Case 1 (slightly subcooled water), a commercial pro-
cess simulator using the ASME steam property package pro- π or α/β N/A 0.698517 0.99802 /
0.710831
vides the average isentropic expansion coefficient of 0.0729.
The ASME steam specific volume data is in good agreement C/n N/A N/A 356.8 / 1.4091
with the Case 1 data. The new method predicts the constant
isentropic expansion coefficient of 0.0671. The average isen- standing approach. The new method is based on the classical
tropic expansion coefficient with a simple vapor equation re- homogeneous equilibrium model chosen by API 520 Part 1
sults in undersized PRVs. This fluid is compressible because and AIChE/DIERS for emergency pressure relief system de-
Psc , 66 psia ≤ calculated Psc–max , 66.13 psia. The C value and signs. Most pressure relief system engineers are familiar with
constant isentropic expansion coefficient are much less than the simple vapor equation.
the other cases. The new method predicts better critical pres- For non-ideal vapors, an average isentropic expansion coef-
sure than the HDI method because Simpson used specific vol- ficient does not give the corresponding correct mass flux be-
ume data from the same P-v model and numerically integrated cause Eq. 14 assumes ideal vapor. Generally, using the average
at a constant pressure interval of 0.2 psi. isentropic expansion coefficient with a simple vapor equation
For Case 2 (two-phase containing hydrogen), there is no can result in undersized PRVs. The new method provides the
composition information available to evaluate the constant is- most practical solution for a constant isentropic expansion co-
entropic expansion coefficient. efficient that is compatible with a simple vapor equation. For
For Case 3 (supercritical ethylene), a commercial process ideal vapors, an ideal gas-specific heat ratio at the relief inlet
simulator using the SRK (Soave-Redlich-Kwong) property conditions can be used as a constant isentropic expansion coef-
package provides the average isentropic expansion coefficient ficient. The proposed method allows a simple vapor equation
of 1.2424. The SRK specific volume data agrees well with the to size compressible fluids (vapors and two-phases including
Case 3 data. The new method predicts a constant isentropic slightly subcooled liquids) if the three-point data is available
expansion coefficient of 1.1863. The average isentropic ex- from isentropic flash calculations. This approach produces
pansion coefficient with a simple vapor equation results in rigorous results validated against the existing rigorous HDI
slightly undersized PRVs. method, while significantly reducing computational efforts
For Case 4 (low-pressure air), a commercial process simula- necessary for the numerical integration method.
tor using the SRK (Soave-Redlich-Kwong) property package Presently, there is no standardized PRV specification sheet
gives the average isentropic expansion coefficient of 1.4203. for non-ideal vapors and two-phases. The proposed method
The SRK specific volume data is in good agreement with the using a simple vapor equation will improve the communica-
Case 4 data. The new method predicts the constant isentro- tion between the valve manufacturer and the relief system de-
pic expansion coefficient of 1.4091. This is an acceptable dif- signer for non-ideal vapors and two-phases, including slightly
ference in two isentropic expansion coefficients for air. This subcooled liquids. The proposed method using a simple vapor
confirms that Eq. 14 is acceptable for ideal vapors or relatively equation is recommended as the standard sizing methodology
constant isentropic expansion coefficients. for compressible fluids, including slightly subcooled liquids.

Takeaways. The above proposed method for sizing com- LITERATURE CITED
pressible fluid PRVs using a simple vapor equation is an out- Complete literature cited available online at www.HydrocarbonProcessing.com.

Hydrocarbon Processing | JULY 2022 27

 Environment A. RASTOGI
and Safety Fluor Daniel India Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, India

Gas flaring: Necessary, or a waste of resources

and a source of greenhouse gases?
Flaring is the controlled burning of
hydrocarbons at oil refineries, gas pro-
cessing plants and petrochemical plants.
It is required for plant safety by burn-
ing all reliefs of the plant in emergency
condition—this is called “safety flaring.”
However, many upstream and down-
stream facilities use flaring to destroy
unwanted gases produced along with
the main product—such flaring is called
“routine flaring.” Typical examples are
oil refineries and petrochemical plants
(FIG. 1), gas processing plants and crude
oil production facilities. Both of these
methods of flaring involve the waste of
natural resources and produce harmful
emissions to the environment.
Routine flaring involves the burning FIG. 1. Routine flaring in refineries and petrochemical plants involves the burning of all unwanted
of all unwanted and uneconomical gases and uneconomical gases that cannot be sold to local markets or exported to wider markets.
that cannot be sold to local markets or
exported to wider markets. This flaring
generates maximum pollutants by waste- CO2 e emissions. The CH4 emissions It is a specialized compression
fully burning valuable natural resources resulting from the inefficiency of flare system to recover gases that would
and emitting large amounts of carbon di- combustion contribute significantly otherwise be burned during the
oxide (CO2 ), methane (CH4 ), black soot to global warming. This is particularly flaring process. This system utilizes
and other greenhouse gases (GHGs) that true in the short to medium term as, a liquid ring compressor and
significantly impact the environment. according to the Intergovernmental three-phase separator to capture
It is estimated that if even half of the Panel on Climate Change, CH4 is > 80 gases from the flare header. The
gas burned in routine flaring is used for times more powerful than CO2 as a recovered gases can be reused
power generation, it could provide ap- warming gas over a 20-yr period. On within the facility’s fuel gas
proximately 400 BkWh (billion kilowatt this basis, the annual CO2 e emissions system. An example of an FGRS
hours) of electricity. are increased by nearly 100 MMt.” is shown in FIG. 2.
• On-demand flaring—This
Zero flaring: An initiative from the To mitigate this global pollution issue, methodology utilizes a high-
World Bank. As per a World Bank report: the World Bank instituted an initiative in pressure ballistic ignition system
2015 to end routine flaring by 2030. to ignite the flame at the flare tip
“Thousands of gas flares at oil on an on-demand basis when
production sites worldwide Achieving zero flaring. A few techni- flammable gas is present. Emissions
burned approximately 142 Bm3 of cal solutions to reduce the extent of gases are minimized by eliminating
gas in 2020. Assuming a ‘typical’ to be flared are listed here. Some of them the need for continuous flaring
associated gas composition—a flare are already utilized by oil, gas and petro- operation, as it involves burning a
combustion efficiency of 98% and a chemical companies with the aim of zero predetermined minimum amount
global warming potential for CH4 of flaring by 2030: of fuel gas. This ignition system is
25—each cubic meter of associated • Flare gas recovery system used where flare gas is recovered
gas flared results in about 2.8 kg of (FGRS)—This is one of the and recycled, as with an FGRS.
CO2 equivalent (CO2 e) emissions, cleanest solutions to minimize or • Gas-powered electricity generation
resulting in more than 400 MMtpy of eliminate gas flaring in refineries. plants—These facilities utilize a
Hydrocarbon Processing | JULY 2022 17
 Environment and Safety
FIG. 2. A typical flare gas recovery system.
gas-turbine generator running on
the field gas to generate electricity.
LEADING
Electricity generated can be stored
and transmitted to other facilities to
TECHNOLOGY
meet their daily operational needs,
or it can be sold to other users and
FOR HYDROGEN to generate revenue. The amount
of gas to be flared is reduced, as
SOLUTIONS electricity is generated by using
site-produced gas that otherwise
would have been flared, resulting in
↘ PROCESS GAS GHG emissions reductions.
• Gas-powered e-frac fleets—
COMPRESSORS This system utilizes modular gas
turbine generators that run on
↘ HEAT EXCHANGERS site-produced gas rather than diesel
used in a conventional system.
↘ MEMBRANE Electricity generated is used to
power pressure pumps and other
TECHNOLOGY electrical items onsite.
• Gas-powered onsite equipment—
Some companies manufacture
heavy machines or equipment that
www.borsig.de utilize gas as fuel. They also offer
the service to modify the existing
BORSIG GmbH
Phone: + 49 (0)30 4301-01
machineries and heavy vehicles to
Fax: + 49 (0)30 4301-2236 run on gas against conventional fuel
E-mail: info@borsig.de diesel. Utilizing the site-produced
Egellsstrasse 21 gas in these machines can save fuel
13507 Berlin
Germany
costs and reduce gas flaring.
• Small-scale gas-to-liquid
conversion plants—This
18JULY 2022 | HydrocarbonProcessing.com
alternative can be economically
viable if unwanted gas is produced
at mass scale by a plant or by many
gas-producing facilities that are
in close vicinity. Unwanted gas
produced in all facilities can be
stored and cooled at a common
“gas-to-liquid conversion plant”
and then transported to other local
and international market for sale.
Takeaway. While these strategies will
not completely eliminate gas flaring,
they provide viable paths to reduce the
extent of gases to be flared and means to
utilize them more effectively. Compa-
nies should utilize flaring strictly for the
safety of plants in upset or emergency
conditions. Routine flaring should be
diminished progressively to zero flaring
by applying strict regulations. Govern-
ment and companies should collaborate
and support each other for effective
monetization of such hydrocarbon re-
sources and unwanted gases to eliminate
routine flaring.
ANUJ RASTOGI is a Mechanical
Engineer with Fluor Daniel India
Private Ltd. New Delhi and has been
with the company for 11 yr. He has
more than 16 yr of experience in
packaged equipment and holds a BE
degree in mechanical engineering.
 Environment
and Safety
D. CHAUDHURI, P. V. SINGH and V. S. KUMAR,
Fluor, New Delhi, India
Raising the alarm: Understanding the operator’s
perspective on refinery process alarms
As refineries and petrochemical complexes worldwide are
moving toward more automated operations, plant operators are
increasingly becoming dependent on process alarms for safe,
smooth and continuous operation. Process alarms also play an
important role in mitigating the risks during plant upsets.
During the early stages of a project, typically the front-end
engineering design (FEED) stage, the client’s operations team
and the design engineering contractor outline the preliminary
alarm requirements to assess the vital process parameters that
require significant monitoring during plant operations. The
definition of an alarm not only includes the proper setting of
the alarm, but also consists of defining the correct priority and
operator actions for the respective alarm. To confirm these pa-
rameters, an alarm management study is typically done in the
engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) phase of the
project. A proper study provides the operator with an appropri-
ate action plan after an alarm has been enunciated. This plan
includes steps to be taken, as alarm verification and safeguard-
ing actions, to mitigate the possibility of any subsequent hazard.
Various design practices are followed when determining
and defining process alarms for essential process parameters.
The guidelines outlined in these design practices explain the
steps involved in defining a process alarm. These design prac-
tices also provide the necessary documentation needed for de-
fining the alarms, and typically vary from project to project, as
defined by the client.
Once a process alarm goes off, it is the responsibility of the
operator to take corrective actions in a timely manner to miti-
gate a potential hazard. This requires a well-coordinated effort
between the panel operator and the field operator to address
an alarm successfully without tripping the plant. Therefore,
understanding an operator’s perspective is of utmost impor-
tance while developing alarm management documents during
the detailed engineering phase. It is beneficial to organize an
alarm management review meeting with plant operations per-
sonnel to understand the operational and maintenance aspects
of a particular process unit. Such meetings may be conducted
over a few weeks, depending upon the number of alarms in
that specific process unit.
The lifecycle of an alarm begins with a proper definition
of the alarm. In the case of a licensed unit, this definition is
provided by the licensor in the process design package. For an
70 APRIL 2022 | HydrocarbonProcessing.com
open art unit, the FEED package should clearly define the re-
quired alarms. Further additions or deletions of alarms typi-
cally happen during safety reviews, such as in a hazard and
operability (HAZOP) analysis. Finally, all the alarms defined
in the design phase are reviewed and verified for implementa-
tion in the design.
During the alarm review phase, the inputs provided by the
operators are of immense importance. The operator is expect-
ed to make an assessment and to verify all alarms to ensure that
the plant is operating within safe limits at all possible operating
conditions. This requires the operators to participate in alarm
management studies, and the outcome of these studies should
be documented. The final step in the design phase is to test
the alarms during the pre-commissioning stage of the project.
The following aspects are critical from an operator’s stand-
point during the discussion of process alarms in an alarm man-
agement review meeting.
Ownership of the process alarm. Since plant operations are
run by different teams in a refinery, it is essential to define the
scope of ownership for a particular process alarm. For routine
flow, pressure, level and temperature alarms, ownership is usu-
ally assigned to the refinery process team, which is responsible
for addressing the same. For the alarms associated with rotat-
ing equipment, along with their auxiliary systems and machine
monitoring systems, ownership is assigned to the mechanical
team. Interface alarms are usually the responsibility of the shift
supervisor, who should consult with the unit operators and
make an informed decision with the refinery leader to over-
come the challenges arising out of that alarm situation.
The following example is a unique case of an alarm on a pres-
sure transmitter. The pressure transmitter is located on the bat-
tery limit interface, and it measures the pressure of the incoming
acid gas feed to the sulfur recovery units (SRUs) from the up-
stream amine regeneration units (ARUs). The pressure trans-
mitter is a common instrument used for all trains of an SRU. It is
equipped with high and low alarms to notify of any abnormali-
ties in the overall system. Since the necessary and immediate
modifications in operation must be done at the SRU, this alarm
is owned by the SRU’s operating team, so that the plant load
may be varied accordingly to compensate for the fluctuations in
the upstream ARU (FIG. 1).

Avoidance of nuisance alarms. During the FEED stage,
the team develops the alarm documentation, considering every
single possibility where process alarms are needed to monitor
the behavior of a particular process unit. During the detailed
engineering phase, the client’s operations team may recom-
mend that nuisance alarms be removed from the list of process
alarms where they may be redundant or not significant for the
operator to monitor during plant operations. A typical example
would be a pressure alarm on the potable water line inside the
unit. Operations typically advises that the interconnecting
units should have alarms on their headers to avoid multiple
monitoring within the process unit, as well. The rationalization
of alarms should take place under the guidance of the client
operations team and streamlined to keep only those process
alarms that are vital for proper plant operation.
Prioritizing process alarms. Prioritizing a process alarm
means assessing a risk associated with a process alarm and ad-
vising the operator about the magnitude of impact on plant
operations—especially with respect to process safety—if the
alarm goes unattended. An emphasis should be placed on de-
fining the priority for an alarm. There can be cases where some
process alarms are initially labeled as high-priority alarms, but,
after a detailed analysis and discussion, the priority is lessened.
The same is true for low-priority alarms that can be upgrad-
ed to high-priority levels. Too much conservatism should be
avoided in defining the priorities for alarms. The number of
high-priority alarms should be optimized to ensure that the op-
erator is not overburdened in case of an emergency.
Alarms are typically categorized into high, medium and low
priority, although the exact nomenclature may vary as defined
by the specific design practice applicable for that project. The
Battery limit Pressure signal
Pressure signal
To SRU train 1
Pressure signal
To SRU – other trains
H
PC
L Acid gas
PT
Acid gas To SRU train 1
From ARU
Acid gas
To SRU – other trains
FIG. 1. Pressure alarm for acid gas to SRU.
PI
L
PT
Cooling water
From supply header
FIG. 2. Low-pressure alarm for cooling-water header.
Environment and Safety
following example of a typical low-pressure alarm on a cooling-
water main header in a process unit is used for explanation of
alarm priority (FIG. 2). Alarm priority for a low-pressure alarm
on a cooling-water header should be defined as high priority.
In the event this alarm goes off, it is very important for the op-
erator to acknowledge it and to take corrective action immedi-
ately by identifying the cause of the alarm. Low pressure would
result in a low flow, leading to starvation on the cooling-water
exchangers and to high temperatures inside the process units,
subsequently leading to an upset of the process unit. Therefore,
it is defined as a high-priority alarm that can notify the operator
about the severity of the upset.
Time for the operator to act on an alarm. This is an impor-
tant aspect that needs significant attention. The primary objective
of a process alarm is to alert the operator about a possible devia-
tion from the normal operating range. The alarm provides the op-
erator a chance to take predefined corrective actions to mitigate a
potential trip scenario. The emergency shutdown of a process unit
can lead to production losses and negatively impact the plant life
due to the sudden fluctuation in the operating conditions caused
by an abrupt shutdown. Importance should be given during the
design phase to ensure that sufficient response time is available
for the operator should an alarm go off. Alarms with very little
operator response time are seldom useful and contribute to the
overall alarm count without adding much value. Consideration
should be given to categorize such alarms with a lower priority.
Listen to
Hydrocarbon Processing’s
podcast for the latest
technologies in the
downstream industry.
SUBSCRIBE NOW!
HydrocarbonProcessing.com/Podcasts
Hydrocarbon Processing | APRIL 2022 71
 Environment and Safety
TI
H or equipment maintenance. Alarms with a suppression require-
L ment should be identified and documented to make the unit
TT
Feed heater
AI
AT
Feed + hydrogen
Hydrotreater Sulfur absorber
FIG. 3. Sulfur slippage from hydrodesulfurization reactors.
Mode-dependent alarms (alarms during normal opera-
tion, startup or shutdown). Mode dependency is another
vital aspect to be defined during the alarm management study.
The client’s operations team should advise to clearly define the
alarms that are mode dependent (i.e., to categorize based upon
startup, shutdown and normal operation). This provides a deep
insight to operators to understand the applicability of the alarm
during a particular phase of operation of a process unit.
Alarm verification. It is not uncommon to have spurious
alarms in a refinery. It is always useful if the alarm can be verified
with the help of another independent instrument reading. It is
advisable to consider a realistic alarm verification. For example,
a pressure alarm in a process stream should be verified against
another independent pressure instrument (such as a pressure
gauge), and an indirect verification (e.g., flowrate) should be
avoided. However, there may be certain instances where an indi-
rect verification cannot be avoided. The following example from
a hydrogen production unit explains the difference between a
direct and an indirect verification.
The hydrodesulfurization section of a hydrogen production
unit typically consists of a hydrotreater and a sulfur absorber.
The mixture of the hydrocarbon feed and hydrogen is heated to
the desired inlet temperature before entering the hydrotreater.
The sulfur compounds present in the hydrocarbon feed are con-
verted to hydrogen sulfide (H2S) in the hydrotreater and are sub-
sequently absorbed in the sulfur absorber. Inefficient operation
of the hydrodesulfurization section may cause sulfur slippage,
which can damage the steam reformer catalyst located down-
stream. For this purpose, an online analyzer with a high sulfur
alarm is usually provided at the outlet of the sulfur absorber to
alert the operator. A manual sampling station provided at the
same location is considered a reliable direct verification for the
high sulfur alarm; however, lab analysis may take some time be-
fore the results are made available. Since a low hydrotreater inlet
temperature causes sulfur slippage due to poor conversion, the
low-temperature alarm available at the inlet of the hydrotreater
may be considered a credible indirect verification that can be
verified instantly (FIG. 3).
Suppression of alarms. Provision for alarm suppression
may be required for some alarms, such as during unit startup
72 APRIL 2022 | HydrocarbonProcessing.com
operator aware of the suppression aspect of a process alarm.
The automation contractor should devise a methodology to
suppress alarms that will go off during a particular mode of op-
eration. For example, in a typical process unit, when the feed is
cut in, the low-level alarms will go off in most of the vessels in
the unit, especially in the feed knockout drum, leading to con-
H fusion during the startup. Such alarms are suppressed until a
steady-state operation is achieved. The operator can change the
status of such alarms from a suppressed state to a normal state
SS in the distributed control system once the unit is stabilized and
normal liquid levels are achieved.
Clearly defined operator actions. The corrective actions
to be performed by an operator in case of the activation of an
alarm should be clear, specific and realistic in nature. The ac-
tions for panel operators and for field operators should be seg-
regated and documented. If possible, actions may be outlined
in a sequential manner in order of importance. The response
time available for the operators is usually minimal; therefore, it
is important to avoid assigning any unnecessary and irrelevant
actions. Clearly defined actions provide a clear path forward
for the operators, allowing them to revive the process to avoid
a plant upset or trip. Obtaining a clear understanding and agree-
ment from operators is essential.
Takeaway. Alarms play an important role in normal plant opera-
tions, as well as during startup and shutdown scenarios. Proper
configuration and definition of alarms are of prime importance.
A prime concept that is often neglected involves considering the
inputs from the end users of these alarms, i.e., the plant operators.
During the design phase for alarm configurations, it is important
to consider the operators’ perspectives and provide the best pa-
rameters for configuring them as defined in this article. This also
ensures that the proper priorities and corrective actions are con-
sidered against each alarm. Therefore, it is important to configure
alarms by taking into consideration the operators’ perspectives
for a safe, continuous and optimum operation of the facility.
NOTE
The conclusions presented in this article are solely those of the authors and can-
not be ascribed to Fluor Corporation and/or any of its subsidiaries.
DEBOPAM CHAUDHURI is a Senior Process Engineer with Fluor
New Delhi. He has more than 20 yr of experience in petroleum
refining, petrochemicals and upstream projects. He earned Bch
degrees in chemistry and chemical engineering from the
University of Calcutta, India.
PRANAY VEER SINGH is a Process Engineer with Fluor New
Delhi. He has more than 12 yr of experience in petroleum
refining, petrochemicals and fertilizer projects. He earned an MS
degree in chemical engineering from the Indian Institute of
Technology in Kharagpur, India.
VENKATA SRAVAN KUMAR is a Process Engineer with Fluor
New Delhi. He has more than 14 yr of experience in petroleum
refining, petrochemicals and fertilizer projects. He earned a Bch
degree in chemical engineering from Jawaharlal Nehru
Technological University in India.
 Feature Report
Health, Safety and
Environmental Considerations
for Process Synthesis
Following this approach to assessing health, safety and environmental risks can steer engineers
to consider more inherently safe process options earlier in process synthesis
D
Thane Brown uring process synthesis in the
Proctor & Gamble (ret.) chemical process industries (CPI),
engineers make decisions that
determine the inherent health,
safety and environmental (HSE) risk level of
IN BRIEF a process. This article proposes a simple
WHAT IS PROCESS approach for identifying and assessing the
SYNTHESIS? major HSE hazards during synthesis.
Understanding the risk level during synthe-
HOW TO THINK ABOUT
sis enables the engineer to consider inher-
HSE
ently safer designs (ISD) while developing the
METHODOLOGY flow sheet. If risk levels are not considered
EXAMPLE
during synthesis, higher risk processes will
result, because decisions are hard to change
UNADDRESSED RISKS once the flow sheet has been finalized. Most
AND HAZARDS of the resistance to process design changes
CONCLUDING REMARKS comes from trying to avoid the need to re-
peat expensive research and development
work, as well as avoiding schedule delays.
To understand the value of ISD, consider
the Bhopal, India incident where, in 1984,
an accidental release of the chemical methyl
isocyanate (MIC) occurred at a facility for
manufacturing the insecticide Sevin. MIC, an
intermediate in the production process for
Sevin, is a highly toxic chemical. A National
Research Council (Washington, D.C.; www.
nationalacademies.org) study stated that
more than 40 tons of MIC were released, kill-
ing close to 3,800 people and seriously injur-
ing between 100,000 and 200,000 [1]. Had
there been an inherently safer process at the
Bhopal plant, the accident might have been
prevented, or its severity greatly reduced.
What is process synthesis?
Process synthesis is the creation of a pro-
cess for manufacturing a product that meets
customer-based quality specifications, has
an appropriate level of HSE risk, and meets
business and economic requirements [2].
When complete, process synthesis will have
defined the following:
• A block flow diagram of the process, show-
34 CHEMICAL ENGINEERING
ing all major process steps and flow streams
• Process operating conditions
• Material specifications for raw materials,
catalysts, solvents, processing aids, pack-
aging materials and so on
• Material and energy balances
• Required materials of construction
• Process design data, such as reaction ki-
netics and physical properties
• Scale-up criteria
• Major HSE hazards
How to think about HSE
HSE is a broad topic dealing with the safety
of plant employees, of the physical plant, of
the community and of the environment. Each
of these constituencies is affected in its own
way by a production process.
• Plant employees may be affected by
chemical exposure, fire, explosion, noise and
injuries
• The physical plant may be affected by fire,
explosion and overpressure situations
• The community may be affected by acci-
dental releases of substances, fires, explo-
sions, noise, pollution, landfills and the dis-
posal of hazardous chemicals
• The surrounding environment may be
affected by planned emissions and dis-
charges, toxic wastes, accidental releases
and fugitive emissions
In the previous definition of process syn-
thesis, the phrase “appropriate level of HSE
risk” requires further explanation. Generally,
risk is thought of as the following:
Risk = (Severity of Incident) × (Likelihood of
Occurrance)
or
Risk = (Human and/or Economic Loss
Potential) × (Probability of an Incident)
WWW.CHEMENGONLINE.COM JANUARY 2022
 The definition of acceptable risk
varies from company to company.
Each organization must define
what is appropriate for it, which is
a difficult task at best. If the ques-
tion were simply financial, such as
weighing the cost of risk reduction
against the monetary loss of an in-
cident, it would be fairly straightfor-
ward to answer. The difficulty arises
when one has to consider the loss
of life or personal injury. What is a life
or severe injury worth? What is an
acceptable fatality rate? These are
hard questions to answer.
In a recent article about COVID-19,
Alex Berezow discussed the value of
life [3]. Although he wrote the article
from a geopolitical perspective, his
remarks apply equally to HSE. He
states there are three ways to view
the value of life: morally/philosophi-
cally, economically and a blend of
the two.
“Many people say that one cannot
put a price tag on human life. This
is true from a moral or philosophi-
cal perspective. … In the eyes of an
economist, however, we are neither
equal nor invaluable.
“How does one begin to put a
price tag on a human life? A simple
thought experiment demonstrates
how easy it is. Pretend that you’re
the mayor of a small town. There’s
a dangerous intersection that results
in one car crash fatality every year.
A company approaches you with a
solution: By redesigning and rebuild-
ing the intersection, it can guarantee
no more car crashes. The only prob-
lem is that the infrastructure project
costs $100 million. Considering that
your small town’s budget is far less
than that, the city couldn’t afford it
without a massive tax increase. You
propose that tax increase to your
citizens, who reject it overwhelm-
ingly. The citizens have spoken: The
lives of those who will be killed in ac-
cidents at the intersection are not
worth $100 million.
“… For what it’s worth, various U.S.
government agencies value a life be-
tween $9 million and $10 million.
“The key is to remember that we
are talking about economic value
rather than moral value. There is al-
ways space for a moral consideration
in geopolitics, but it too must be con-
CHEMICAL ENGINEERING WWW.CHEMENGONLINE.COM
sidered along with TABLE 1*. TYPES OF CHEMICAL PLANT INCIDENTS
other factors.” Type of Probability Fatality Economic
When thinking incident potential loss potential
about risk, engi- Fire High Low Intermediate
neers should also Explosion Intermediate Intermediate High
consider the infor- Toxic release Low High Low
mation shown in *Adapted from Table 1-6 in Crowl and Louvar, Chemical Process Safety, 3rd ed. [9]
Tables 1 and 2, as
well as their own TABLE 2. COMPARATIVE FATALITY DATA
company’s data Fatality cause Deaths per 100,000
people
and practice.
Smokers who smoke ≥15/d ( 2005–2009)a 1,000
Methodology Car travel (2019) b 12
The methodology U.S. Manufacturing (2018) c 2.2
presented here will Chemical Manufacturing (2018) c 1.2
help to find and d
Being struck by lightning (2006-2019) 0.07
assess HSE haz-
Source data:
ards during pro- ª 2014 Surgeon General’s Report, Table 12.4, p. 660
cess synthesis. For b National Safety Council
hazards that could cd Bureau of Labor Statistics
National Weather Service
result in serious or
catastrophic incidents, the engi- ents. One needs to consider
neer should consider changing the health, flammability, instability
basic process to make it inherently and special hazards. An exam-
safer. Because synthesis is the time ple of a material having a special
when the process is being created, hazard is MIC, which reacts vio-
it is the ideal time to explore options lently with water. This is believed
for hazard elimination or mitigation. to be the initiating cause of the
During synthesis, one need not Bhopal incident mentioned pre-
work on routine safety issues, such viously. Usually, the National Fire
as pressure relief. Later on, detailed Protection Association (NFPA;
studies, such as HAZOP (hazard Quincy, Mass.; www.nfpa.org)
and operability analyses), will iden- or the U.S. Hazardous Materi-
tify these issues. als Identification System (HMIS)
The steps in the methodology are ratings are sufficient sources
the following: of information to determine the
• Identify the hazards hazard level of a chemical. Both
• Estimate the potential for loss systems have five rating levels.
• Estimate the probability of having Table 3 explains the NFPA levels.
an incident HMIS is similar.
• Identify the major risks • Process-related hazards. Some
• Consider inherently safer designs operating features and equip-
Step 1: Identify process hazards. ment in a process may be haz-
Begin by looking for toxic release, ex- ardous. The most common are
plosion and fire hazards, as follows: runaway reactions, high tem-
• Hazardous materials. For each peratures, high pressures (or
flow stream in the process, list vacuum) and large inventories of
the composition, materials and hazardous materials.
amounts of each stream. This ❍ Runaway reactions. Runaway
should include intermediates reactions are a fairly common
and impurities. Consider feed problem. High heats of reac-
streams, products, byproducts, tion and large reactor vol-
recycle streams, purge, cata- umes increase the probability
lysts and solvents, as well as of an incident. If a reaction
planned discharges to sewers, is exothermic, assess the
the atmosphere, landfills, recy- chances that it could get out
clers and waste disposal firms. of control. This usually occurs
For each substance, determine when there is a problem,
whether it is hazardous; and if
such as a cooling system
so, the degree of hazard it pres-
or power failure. An assess-
JANUARY 2022 35
 ment of the system requires could cause TABLE 4. HARDWARE RELATED TO INCIDENTS FOR THE REFINERY
knowing the reactor volume, an incident. AND PETROCHEMICAL INDUSTRIES, 1974–2019
the heat capacity of the reac- ❍ Hazardous Hardware % of Incidents
tion mix, the heat of reaction material
Piping, including valves 33
and the reaction rate. If the inventories.
The issue Towers 14
last three pieces of informa-
tion are unknown, the data here is the Reactors 12
can be obtained via reaction possibility Storage tanks 7
calorimetry experiments. of an ac- Unknown 4
❍ High-pressure or high-tem- cidental Instruments 3
perature operations. These release. The
Heat exchangers 3
are innately more hazardous larger the
Pumps 3
than lower-pressure and low- inventory of
hazardous Compressors 2
er-temperature operations.
High pressures increase the materials, Other 19
odds of having an equipment the higher Source data: Marsh, The 100 Largest Losses in the Hydrocarbon Industry 1974–2019,
or piping leak. When a pro- the chance www.marsh.com/us/insights/research/100-largest-losses-in-the-hydrocarbon-industry.html
cess stream is within or near of having a catastrophic are only useful during synthesis.
its flammability range, or near incident. Inventory was a They do not take the place of the
or above its flash or auto-ig- major contributor to the large exacting safety studies done later
nition temperature, leaks may number of deaths in Bho- during detailed design.
result in a fire or explosion. pal. Inventories include both Referring back to Table 1, note
The same is true of leaks in-storage and in-process that toxic releases and explosions
of flammable heat-transfer material. When considering have the greatest potential for fatali-
fluids. A special category of in-process inventory, keep in ties and economic loss. To estimate
high-temperature operations mind that batch reactors gen- each hazard’s potential for loss,
is furnaces. By their nature, erally have higher volumes place each into one of the following
furnaces are risky. If a furnace than continuous reactors, broad loss categories:
standard distillation columns • Catastrophic — Those resulting
is used to heat a process or a
heat transfer fluid that is flam- arranged in sequence contain in deaths or permanent disabilities,
major community damage, or major
mable, tube leaks could result more liquid than a divided-
plant damage
in a fire or explosion. Also, wall column does, and plate
• Major — Those resulting in hos-
high-temperature operation towers hold more liquid than
pitalizations, significant community
weakens the strength of the packed towers do. damage, or significant plant damage
tube materials increasing the Step 2: Estimate loss potential. • Moderate — Those resulting in
probability of leaks. Once the hazards in the process injuries needing medical treatment,
❍ Vacuum operation. While have been identified, engineers minor community damage, or mod-
vacuum operations are usu- should assess the potential for loss erate plant damage
ally safer than high-pressure for each hazard. Because there • Minor — Those resulting in minor
operations, air leaks into are few design details at this point, injuries, no community damage, or
a process stream that will these assessments will be “order- minor plant damage
oxidize or that is combustible of-magnitude” quality. As such, they When assessing the loss poten-
tial of materials, one can use NFPA
TABLE 3. THE NFPA RATING SYSTEM or HMIS ratings to define the sever-
Adapted from Figure 3-8 in Crowl and Louvar, Chemical Process Safety, 4th Ed. [5]
ity of health, flammability or instabil-
ity hazards. If these are not avail-
4 3 2 1 0
able, use the Materials Safety Data
Health rating Can be lethal Can cause Can cause Can cause Not Sheets (MSDS) for each substance
permanent or temporary in- significant hazardous
serious injury capacitation or irritation
or PubChem’s Compound Summary
residual injury database [4]. If a material has an
Flammability Rapidly Ignites easily at Ignites when Must be Will not NFPA or HMIS rating of 4, assign its
rating vaporizes and ambient moderately heated preheated to burn potential for loss as Catastrophic. A
burns at room temperatures ignite 3-rating should be assigned the loss
temperature category of Major, and so on. To il-
Instability May detonate Shock and heat Violent Unstable if Stable lustrate, MIC, the toxic intermediate
rating may detonate chemical change heated
at elevated
in the Bhopal Sevin process, has an
temperatures NFPA health rating of 4. Thus, its loss
Special hazards W: Violent reaction with water
potential would be Catastrophic. Its
OX: Oxidizer SA: Simple asphyxiant release was clearly that.
36 CHEMICAL ENGINEERING WWW.CHEMENGONLINE.COM JANUARY 2022
 For process hazards, TABLE 5. RISK RATING MATRIX FOR PROCESS SYNTHESIS
the guidelines are not as Event probability Very likely, Probable, Every Possible, Every Unlikely,
clear cut. The Marsh 100 Loss potential Every 0– 10 years 10– 30 years 30 – 100 years >100 years
Largest Losses Report Catastrophic:
provides perspective. • Deaths or permanent disabilities
Marsh, an insurance- •• Major community damage
Major plant damage
brokerage and risk-man-
Major:
agement firm, regularly • Hospitalizations
publishes global incident • Significant community damage
data. As this report only • Significant plant damage
reports the largest global Moderate:
losses, it represents only • Injuries needing medical treatment
the tip of the loss ice- • Minor community damage
• Moderate plant damage
berg. Property losses
follow a similar pattern Minor:
• Minor injuries
to deaths and injuries. • No community damage
Crowl and Louvar sug- • Minor plant damage
gest that for every 1 to
2 fatalities resulting from Fifty eight of those came from the toxic releases
an incident, there are 10 to 20 seri- petrochemical and petroleum re- • 39 (67%) began with an explosion
ous injuries, 100 to 200 minor inju- finery segments. These resulted in • 19 (33%) began with a fire
ries, and 1,000 to 2,000 near misses losses totaling $23 billion, as well as Table 4 summarizes the hardware
[5]. the following: and equipment associated with the
The March 2020 Marsh report • Losses averaged $500 million/yr 58 incidents from the petrochemical
covers the 46-year period from 1974 • The average cost of an incident and refining sectors.
to 2019. It describes the 100 largest was $397 million Step 3: Estimate the probability
global hydrocarbon industry losses. • Three incidents (5%) resulted in of an incident. As was the case

For details visit adlinks.chemengonline.com/82577-11 For details visit adlinks.chemengonline.com/82577-12

CHEMICAL ENGINEERING WWW.CHEMENGONLINE.COM JANUARY 2022 37

 with loss potential, it is impossible to
make detailed estimates, so order-
of-magnitude quality has to suffice at
this point. Assign each hazard to one
of four levels of probability, which are
the following:
• Very Likely — occurring every 0–10
years
• Probable — occurring every 10–30
years
• Possible— occurring every 30–100
years
• Unlikely — occurring once every
100 years or more
As previously mentioned, larger
losses occur less often; smaller
losses are much more frequent. The
synthesis engineer, when assigning
one of the four probability levels to
the hazards, should consult with ex-
perienced process safety experts and
refer to company incident history.
Step 4: Identifying major risks. Risk
is the combination of loss potential
and probability. When assessing risk
during synthesis, use the Risk Rating
Matrix (Table 5). First, enter the loss
potential and probability estimates
into the figure. If a material or other
hazard falls into one of the red cells,
it is important to work to eliminate, or
greatly reduce, risk by applying ISD.
Hazards falling into the yellow cells
are borderline candidates for ISD.
Step 5: Consider inherently safer
designs. The activities of hazard and
risk identification lead directly to the
question of what to do about high-
risk hazards. In general, there are
two options: use ISD principles or
add safeguards to the process. Of
the two, ISD is generally preferred
because it focuses on the elimina-
tion or lessening of the hazard. It
also delivers simpler, more straight-
forward designs. Kletz and Amyotte
state, “Traditional plant designs try to
reduce the risk by adding protective
equipment and following safe meth-
ods of working. Inherently safer and
friendlier plants remove or reduce the
hazards” [6]. Protective equipment
and safe practices will eventually re-
sult in an incident as equipment fails
or people make mistakes.
Three pillars of ISD apply to pro-
cess synthesis: substitution, minimi-
zation and attenuation. These pillars
involve elimination of hazardous ma-
terials, use of much smaller quanti-
38
ties of them, and use of less hazard-
ous operating conditions.
Substitution. This focuses on sub-
stituting non-hazardous or less-
hazardous materials for hazardous
ones. Consider the following:
• ­Using a reaction chain that doesn’t
use hazardous materials (raw
materials or catalysts) or that
doesn’t produce hazardous in-
termediates or byproducts
•­ Pretreating the feed to eliminate
impurities that react to form haz-
ardous materials
• Using materials with higher flash-
points, boiling points and other
properties that are well away
from the operating conditions of
the process
• Using different solvents, heat-
transfer fluids or refrigerants to
eliminate those that may be toxic
or flammable
Minimization (intensification). The
focus here is to minimize the amount
of hazardous material in the system.
Consider the following:
• Continuous or semi-batch sys-
tems, which usually hold smaller
volumes of material compared
to batch systems
• Changing reactor conditions —
catalyst, temperature, pressure
— to increase the reaction rate
and make the reactor smaller
• Using a column sequence that
minimizes the amount of hazard-
ous material held in the process
•­ Using equipment having less
holdup. A few examples are:
divided-wall distillation columns,
packed versus tray columns,
thermosiphon versus kettle re-
boilers, plate versus shell-and-
tube exchangers, and tubular
versus pot reactors
Attenuation (moderation). Attenu-
ation stresses the use of less haz-
ardous operating conditions when
handling hazardous materials and
situations. Consider the following:
•­ Processing flammable materials
well below their flash points and
boiling points
• ­Handling explosive dusts as slurries
•­ Reducing the risks of a runaway
reaction
• Using a smaller reactor (for exam-
ple, a continuous versus batch
reactor)
CHEMICAL ENGINEERING WWW.CHEMENGONLINE.COM
• Controlling the reaction rate via the
order of chemical addition or by
catalyst choices
• ­Adding inert materials to flamma-
ble mixtures
• Reducing process operating tem-
peratures to eliminate the need
for furnaces
Example
The following discussion about Bho-
pal and MIC illustrates substitution
and minimization.
With an NFPA health rating of 4,
MIC is very hazardous. As such, it
would be placed in one of the red
cells of the Risk Rating Matrix (Table
5). Thus, the reaction that produces
it would be a prime candidate for
ISD. As understood today, substitu-
tion is possible, because there are
two accepted routes for making car-
baryl (Sevin) [7]:
• The MIC route (used in Bhopal):
1. Methylamine + Phosgene ➔
MIC + 2 HCl
2. MIC + α-Naphthol ➔ Carbaryl
• The non-MIC route. This route uses
the same feedstocks, but reacts
them in a different order.
1. α-Naphthol + Phosgene ➔
Naphthol chloroformate + HCl
2. Naphthol chloroformate + Methyl-
amine ➔ Carbaryl + HCl
Had the non-MIC route been used
at the Bhopal, India facility, there
would have been no incident — no
deaths and no injuries. Even safer
routes might be possible if some-
thing less hazardous could be sub-
stituted for phosgene, which has an
NFPA Health rating of 4 [8].
There are also minimization op-
tions. Had the amount of MIC stored
been small, far fewer people would
have died or been injured. Recall,
over 40 tons of MIC were released.
It was this large release that caused
the high number of deaths and inju-
ries. Crowl and Louvar refer to a re-
designed process that could reduce
the MIC inventory to less than 20
lb [9]. In addition, the National Re-
search Council in their report “The
Use and Storage of Methyl Isocya-
nate (MIC) at Bayer CropScience,”
JANUARY 2022
refers to a process that produces gaseous MIC, which
is consumed immediately [10].

Unaddressed risks/hazards
If significant hazards/risks exist that are not dealt with,
they should be flagged so they will not be forgotten
in the future. This helps ensure someone will design
safeguards into the process to manage those risks
and mitigate outcomes. For example, one of the senior
chemical engineering design projects at the University
of Cincinnati involved designing a greener process for
making dimethyl carbonate [11]. The process uses a
catalyst (methyl iodide) with an NFPA health rating of
3. The Safety and Hazard Section of PubChem’s Com-
pound Summary for methyl iodide states that storing
amounts greater than or equal to 7,500 lb “presents a
potential for a catastrophic event …” [12]. This is the
type of item one would flag, because storage systems
are not dealt with during process synthesis.

Concluding remarks
The decisions made during synthesis set the HSE
features of a process. Thus, it is imperative HSE be
integrated into the process design. Especially with
chemical processes, it is the only way HSE risk can
be adequately dealt with. The approach in this article
enables the synthesis engineer to identify and man-
age the major HSE hazards and risks in a process. n
Edited by Scott Jenkins

References
1. National Research Council, The Use and Storage of Methyl Isocyanate (MIC) at Bayer Crop-
Science, Washington DC, 2012, p. 32.
2. Brown, T.R., Cost Engineering: Integrating Technology and Economics, Chem. Eng., December
1, 2017, pp. 35–36.
3. Berezow, Alex, Four Coronavirus Lessons That We Will (or Won’t) Learn, Geopolitical Futures,
May 1, 2020.
4. Cameo Chemicals MSDS, available at: https://cameochemicals.noaa.gov/chemical/1112.
5. Crowl, D.A. and Louvar, J.F., “Chemical Process Safety,” 4th Edition, Prentice Hall, 2019.
6. Kletz, T.A, and Amyotte, P., “Process Plants: A Handbook for Inherently Safer Design,” 2nd Edition,
CRC Press, 2010.
7. Crowl, D.A. and Louvar, J.F., “Chemical Process Safety,” 2nd Edition, Prentice Hall, 2002, p. 26.
8. Cameo Chemicals MSDS, https://cameochemicals.noaa.gov/chemical/4228.
9. Crowl, D.A. and Louvar, J.F., “Chemical Process Safety,” 3rd Edition, Prentice Hall, 2011.
10. National Research Council, The Use and Storage of Methyl Isocyanate (MIC) at Bayer Crop-
Science, Washington, D.C., 2012, p. 114.
11. An unpublished report by: Ballachino, K., Barr, C., Brown, N., Gunther, A., and Vennefron, Evalua-
tion of the Production of Dimethyl Carbonate (DMC) through a Catalytic Reaction, March 2020.
12. PubChem Compound Summary, available at: https://pubchem.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
compound/6328#section=NFPA-Hazard-Classification.

Author
Thane Brown (Email: trbnjb@earthlink.net) worked for more
than 36 years for Procter & Gamble in a variety of engineering
and manufacturing roles, primarily in the food-and-beverage
business and in health, safety and environmental engineering.
In his last position there, Brown was director of North Ameri-
can engineering. After retiring, he taught engineering eco-
nomics at the University of Cincinnati, and plant design at the
University of Dayton. Brown is presently a member of the
Chemical Engineering Advisory Committees at the University
of Dayton, at Miami University (Oxford, Ohio), at the University
of Louisville and at the University of Cincinnati. He also works as a SCORE coun-
selor, providing free assistance to small businesses in the Cincinnati area. Brown
authored the book “Engineering Economics and Economic Design for Process En-
gineers” [1], as well as a number of articles on engineering economics, batch pres-
sure filtration and heat transfer. He is a registered professional engineer in Ohio
(inactive), and holds a B.S.Ch.E. from Oregon State University.

CHEMICAL ENGINEERING WWW.CHEMENGONLINE.COM JANUARY 2022 39


Considerations for not providing
a dedicated spare pressure-relief device
P. K. NAMILAKONDA, Samsung Engineering, Houston, Texas
Pressure-relief devices (PRDs) play a critical role in the hy-
drocarbon processing industry. They act as the last line of de-
fense in protecting plant equipment from overpressure and are
mandated by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers
(ASME). This article provides some key factors that process
engineers and plant operators must consider to determine if an
installed spare PRD is necessary.
Like many other plant components, relief devices require
routine maintenance to ensure safe and reliable plant operation.
While most of the PRDs in hydrocarbon processing plants can
be taken out for maintenance during plant turnarounds, cer-
tain PRDs may require more frequent maintenance while the
plant is in operation (onstream). The term “onstream” refers to
the overall plant operation. Reasons for more frequent main-
tenance could include safety requirements or possibly because
the PRD is installed in a fluid service where fouling, corrosion
or plugging could potentially impact PRD operation.
Onstream maintenance of a specific PRD in the plant can
be achieved by one of the following options:
1. Providing an alternate and adequate relief
protection to the protected equipment
(e.g., a spare PRD, or an alternate and adequate
flow path to another PRD)
2. Isolating, draining and depressurizing the protected
equipment from all possible overpressure sources
(taking the equipment out of service)
3. Eliminating as many overpressure sources as feasible,
and implementing administrative controls
for monitoring the protected equipment
for the duration of the PRD maintenance.
Process engineers are required to review these options
during the front-end design development step, with input
from the plant operations team, to make an appropriate deci-
sion. PRDs requiring onstream maintenance are, in general,
provided with isolation valves on inlet and outlet (if appli-
cable) pipelines. ASME code requires administrative controls
to be in place for proper operation of the isolation valves in
the relief path so the equipment’s overpressure protection
is not compromised. These requirements include provid-
ing locks or car seals in addition to administrative controls
to prevent accidental closure (for more information, refer to
ASME BPVC Section XIII Non-Mandatory Appendix B).
Process engineers and plant operators must be familiar with
the ASME code requirements, and Appendix B provides valu-
able guidance and requirements for determining a need for
INFRASTRUCTURE & EQUIPMENT
installing a dedicated spare PRD. The following will review
the three options in further detail.
Option 1. Providing an installed spare PRD is generally the
preferred way to provide adequate overpressure protection
to the process equipment. While this option involves initial
capital expenditure for the PRD and associated piping, it also
provides the safest way to keep the protected equipment in
continuous operation for the duration of the maintenance.
Plant operators are required to follow stringent administrative
procedures for isolating the PRD requiring maintenance.
In the absence of an installed spare PRD, other creative
ways are available to achieve the same purpose. This includes
utilizing PRDs on nearby equipment to provide the necessary
protection by means of utilizing an existing pipe routing for
a temporary relief path. However, process engineers should
perform a thorough analysis to ensure that such a temporary
and alternate relief path is adequate in terms of hydraulic re-
quirements (inlet pipe pressure loss), PRD flow area and fluid
service compatibility.
Option 2. This option is best suited for equipment that can be
taken out of service while onstream plant production is main-
tained. A spare PRD may not be required if the entire pro-
tected system can be isolated during normal plant operation.
Equipment operating in intermittent service also may not re-
quire a spare PRD. For example, consider a hydrocarbon sys-
tem containing multiple catalyst bed vessels in parallel, where
at least one vessel is always isolated for catalyst regeneration
and is in standby mode for a prolonged duration. A spare PRD
may not be provided for protecting such vessels, as mainte-
nance can be performed when the vessel is in standby mode.
In such cases, the duration of the maintenance should be given
careful consideration, as the vessel cannot be returned to ser-
vice without code-compliant relief protection. Plant operators
generally rely on administrative procedures to open and close
several valves for placing equipment back in service. Failure
to properly follow these administrative procedures can com-
promise the overpressure protection mandated by the ASME
code. One such safety incident was the ruptured heat exchang-
er in June 2008 that killed one worker and injured six others at
the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. in Houston, Texas.1 One of
the root causes of this accident was failure to properly follow
the procedure of opening the PRD inlet piping isolation valve
before placing the heat exchanger into service.
Gas Processing & LNG | MAY/JUNE 2022 19
INFRASTRUCTURE & EQUIPMENT
PRDs requiring onstream
maintenance are, in general,
provided with isolation valves
on inlet and outlet (if applicable)
pipelines. ASME code requires
administrative controls to be in
place for proper operation of the
isolation valves in the relief path
so the equipment’s overpressure
protection is not compromised.
Option 3. This is the least preferred option, as it involves
operating the process equipment without overpressure pro-
tection under administrative controls. One of the first things
that the plant operator is required to do in this option is to
identify all potential overpressure sources beforehand and at-
tempt to eliminate or minimize the likelihood of overpressure
from such sources for the duration of the PRD maintenance.
In this option, assuming that isolation valves are in place, the
PRD must first be isolated by closing the inlet and outlet iso-
lation valves before the maintenance can begin. Closure of the
isolation valves would lead to blocking the relief path and to
operating the protected equipment with a risk of overpres-
sure. Plant operators are required to stay in compliance with
the ASME code for proper implementation of administrative
controls. ASME BPVC-XIII Appendix B-7(d) states:
“Procedures are in place to provide pressure relief
protection during the time when the system is
isolated from its pressure relief path. These procedures
should ensure that, when the system is isolated from
its pressure relief path, an authorized person should
continuously monitor the pressure conditions of the
vessel and should be capable of responding promptly
with documented, pre‐defined actions, either stopping
the source of overpressure or opening alternative
means of pressure relief. This authorized person
should be dedicated to this task and should have
no other duties when performing this task.”
Plant operators should consider several factors to safely
rely on administrative controls for monitoring unprotected
equipment. One such factor is the duration of maintenance.
Can the relief device be returned to service in a reasonable
amount of time? Another factor is training. What kind of
training would be required for authorized persons to respond
promptly in an event of pressure excursion in the process ser-
vice? If possible, process engineers and plant operators should
steer away from this option, as this involves several factors
that cannot be fully accounted for during the plant design.
Multiple overpressure scenarios. There can be more than
one overpressure scenario that is applicable for a PRD. Over-
20 MAY/JUNE 2022 | GasProcessingNews.com
pressure due to an external pool fire is a well-known scenario
that is applicable for process equipment at grade level. Ad-
ditional overpressure scenarios include blocked outlets and
auto-control failures, among others (see API 521 for more
information). The process engineer should review all appli-
cable overpressure scenarios when determining the need for
a spare PRD.
It is a generally accepted industry practice not to provide
spare PRDs in the following applications, as the PRD main-
tenance interval typically aligns with the protected system
maintenance interval:
• PRDs installed exclusively for protecting equipment from
external fire (fire-only PRD)
• PRDs installed in cooling water service exclusively
for protecting the equipment from thermal expansion
(cooling water thermal).
Multiple PRDs. Multiple PRDs are often provided when a
single PRD is inadequate to handle the required relief flowrate.
The ASME code allows staggering the PRD set pressures in
this case. For multiple PRDs:
• A single spare PRD may be installed with the basis
that administrative controls are in place to perform
maintenance on one PRD at a time. When a single spare
PRD is installed, performing maintenance on multiple
PRDs would result in inadequate relief protection,
which is a possible code violation.
• The spare PRD should have an orifice flow area
identical to the operating PRD with the largest area.
• When the spare PRD is put into operation, at least
one PRD should have a set pressure at 100% of the
maximum allowable working pressure.
Takeaway. The ASME code does not mandate installing a
spare PRD. However, in the absence of an alternate and ad-
equate relief path, the ASME code mandates the implemen-
tation of proper administrative controls for safe isolation and
subsequent monitoring of the protected system for the du-
ration of PRD maintenance. Administrative controls play a
critical role in the safe operation of any plant, and many plant
operators prefer to install a spare PRD to provide an adequate
and equivalent overpressure protection. Process engineers
and plant operators must be conversant with the applicable
regulatory requirements and must review all PRDs on a case-
by-case basis to determine whether an installed spare PRD is,
or is not, necessary.
LITERATURE CITED
1
U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, “Goodyear heat
exchanger rupture,” January 2011 (report released), online: https://www.csb.
gov/goodyear-heat-exchanger-rupture/
2
ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XIII-2021, “Rules for over-
pressure protection.”
PRANAY K. NAMILAKONDA is a Process Engineer with Samsung Engineering
America, a global EPC firm based in Houston, Texas. He is a licensed Professional
Engineer and has more than 15 yr of experience in front-end engineering
execution of various hydrocarbon projects. He also leads the process engineering
group, with an emphasis on engineering automation. Mr. Namilakonda earned
an MS degree in chemical engineering from Oklahoma State University, and a
BTech degree in chemical engineering from Osmania University, India.

Lessons learned to optimize flare gas recovery
systems in gas plant operations
A. H. AL-TIJANI, M. ALDAJANI, A. AL-SANAD and M. AL-MAHMOOD,
Saudi Aramco, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia
There are more than 100 flares spread
across many operating facilities in the
upstream and downstream oil and gas
processing plants of Saudi Aramco. Flare
systems are designed to provide the safe
disposal of hydrocarbons that are either
automatically vented or manually vented
from process units. Flare systems gather
vented gases and combust them to pre-
vent release directly to the atmosphere.
Since Saudi Arabia started produc-
ing oil, associated gas has been flared. In
the 1970s, the Kingdom recognized the
value of the associated gas produced with
crude oil. Major investments in building
a sizable master gas system resulted in
capturing and utilizing all the associated
gas instead of burning it in gas flares. As
a result, the Kingdom’s annual flaring has
been considerably reduced to facilities’
routine and emergency flaring only. The
environmental regulations from Saudi
Arabia’s Presidency of Meteorology and
Environment require controls for smoke-
less flaring only from industrial activities,
and there are no penalties for carbon di-
oxide (CO2 ) emissions.
These standards apply just to routine
emissions, and not to emergency, startup
or shutdown events. Most Saudi Aramco
facilities meet the environmental standard
for smokeless flaring. The corporate road-
map on flaring was initiated as a response
to the escalating cost of the new project
proposals to make flares smokeless for
routine operations in all of the company’s
facilities. The key element of this roadmap
is to minimize flaring by implementing
site-specific flaring minimization plans
(FMPs) and installing a flare gas recovery
system (FGRS) wherever feasible.
An FMP was initiated to reduce flaring
from all Saudi Aramco facilities over a de-
fined period by minimizing the frequency
and magnitude of flaring. A comprehen-
SPECIAL FOCUS: GREEN TECHNOLOGIES
sive engineering standard for real-time
measuring, monitoring, reporting and
minimizing flaring was developed. Part
of this minimization plan was to study
the leakage rate to the flare system and
to determine purge optimization. These
two analyses play major roles in reduc-
ing facility emissions. Furthermore, the
company’s Process and Control Systems
department issued design guidelines for
FGRSs to give clear direction for select-
ing and applying new FGRS projects in
all Saudi Aramco operating facilities. This
guideline is in line with the Saudi Aramco
corporate decarbonization strategy to re-
duce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.
The company has had several tech-
nologies in operation for a few years.
Therefore, Saudi Aramco has updated
its best practices with lessons learned
from the startup and commissioning of
compressor and ejector technologies at
its facilities. This compilation of informa-
tion provides additional insights that will
enhance designs and proactively address
common issues that can arise during the
startup and operation of FGRSs at Saudi
Aramco facilities.
FGRSs. Corporate management has rec-
ognized the need to approve a flaring
roadmap, which calls for considering an
FGRS if any facility is flaring more than
1 MMsft3d of gas after implementing all
flaring reduction measures. An FGRS will
eliminate flaring as required for plant safe-
ty, provide routine process reliefs and re-
turn gases back to the process to prevent
any leakages. Although FGRS technology
is proven in industry, it was not adopted
by the authors’ organization in the past
because, during that time, there were no
compliance requirements for CO2 emis-
sions and there was a very low price to pay
for sales gas. In recent years, however, the
situation has changed. In the current in-
dustry environment, the primary drivers
favoring FGRS projects include:
• Stricter global environmental
regulations governing the emissions
of GHGs, such as CO2
• Environmental impacts and health
effects of harmful emissions,
such as nitric oxide (NOx ), sulfur
oxide (SOx ) and volatile organic
compounds (VOCs)
• Improved economic returns in
recovered flared gas to the value
chain, thus saving on plant fuel gas
and steam consumption
• World Bank carbon credits for
uneconomic FGRS projects,
specifically for the elimination of
CO2 emissions, which can be traded
for monetary gains—thus helping
to improve returns on investment
(ROIs) for projects
• Increased raw gas production
costs, which makes FGRSs more
attractive, since these systems
recover flared gas and recycle it
back to the process
• Rising sales gas costs, making FGRS
recovery projects more viable
• Shortage of natural gas
in the country
• FGRSs improve the reliability
of main flare tips (important for
larger-diameter flares that are prone
to damage from operation at low
daily flaring rates), enabling the
main flare to stay in standby mode,
which improves its reliability and
life, and minimizes the recurring
cost of flare tip replacement.
Additionally, one of Saudi Aramco’s
key values is citizenship, where the orga-
nization has a positive influence in com-
munities and requires a demonstration
of social responsibility. An FRGS pro-
Gas Processing & LNG | MARCH/APRIL 2022 13
SPECIAL FOCUS: GREEN TECHNOLOGIES

vides an excellent platform to reflect this tween the knockout drum and the staging to move toward it and mix with motive
company image. device and pulls flare gas from the header fluid in the mixing chamber. The mixed
whenever flow is detected. Basically, the fluid will enter the diverging portion of
FGRS components. A flare gas recovery staging devices enable safe operation of the ejector, where its velocity energy is
installation at an existing plant will con- the entire system through sealing the el- converted into pressure energy (FIG. 2).
sist of four main components. Brief de- evated flares and providing backpressure The authors’ company has patented
scriptions of these component are below: in the flare header, allowing the flare gases this technology to be utilized in a flare
1. Compression technology is to be routed to the FGRS. system to recover the wasted gas for
designed to recover flare gases further treatment or to generate energy.
for reuse in the existing Types of compression equipment. The team conducted several feasibility
processing facilities. The choice of compression equipment studies that approved the applicability of
2. Staging devices safely divert will greatly influence the configuration this technology to recover flare gas either
routine flared gases to the of an FGRS. A detailed survey of existing by using a gas/gas or liquid/gas ejector.
FGRS, but not the emergency technologies revealed that the compres- This technology was applied in oil-pro-
or abnormal relief loads. FIG. 1 sor types widely used for FGRS applica- ducing facilities and refineries, and it has
illustrates the integration of an tions include: successfully been used in gas-operation
FGRS into the flare system. • Liquid-ring compressors with a facilities by using amine solution as a
3. A nitrogen-generation package is variety of service fluids (such as motive liquid. When gas at sufficient
included to supplement existing water or diesel) pressures is available onsite, gas-motive
nitrogen-generation capacity. • Multi-staged screw compressors. ejectors could be an economical com-
Nitrogen will be used as a purge gas The major advantages of these compres- pression solution. Eductors or liquid-
downstream of the staging device. sor types include: motive ejectors can also be considered
4. A control system within the • They can handle a wide range and may use a closed-loop liquid circula-
package interfaces with the plant’s of gases with varying molecular tion to provide the needed liquid-motive
distributed control system. weights, with no effect on their pressure. Eductors can also be used for
As shown in FIG. 1, the flare gas recov- performance. gas sweetening purposes.
ery unit ties into the flare gas header be- • They can handle flow from zero Recovering flare gas was not stopped
to full capacity with a robust by these compression types. The feasibil-
Flare gas Recovered gas to process recycling system. ity of flare gas recovery is considered the
• They can tolerate liquid in the feed process philosophy for each facility. For
Knockout drum
FGRS 6
vs. any other type of compressors. example, each facility can recover flare gas
MMscfd by using an atmospheric compressor. As
Ejectors. An ejector is a well-known a result, hydraulic analysis was required
technology for pressurizing gas by using to install a jump-over line from the flare
a high motive source. The operating prin- header to the compressor suction pipe.
N2 purge
ciple of the ejector is the pressure energy
in the motive fluid, which is converted to Challenges. Since Saudi Aramco started
Staging
device velocity energy by an adiabatic expansion recovering flare gas, there have been major
Existing flares in the converging/diverging nozzle. Due challenges. However, without these experi-
HP/ACID or
INLET to the pressure drop of the motive fluid, ences, the authors would not be able to list
it will create a low-pressure zone before all the lessons learned to overcome them.
FIG. 1. The integration of an FGRS into the the mixing chamber. Due to this low- One of the major challenges experi-
flare system. pressure zone, the suction fluid will start enced in FGRSs is the oxygen ingress
that resulted in the formation of solid
Nozzle Mixing chamber particulates. As a result, these solid par-
Diffuser Mixing fluid
ticulates blocked the suction strainers of
outlet the compressors. A sample was collected
and sent to the research and development
center for detailed analysis. It was discov-
ered that elemental sulfur composition
exceeded 99%.
Normally, elemental sulfur can be
found in natural gas processing plants
for two reasons: as part of the natural gas
Motive fluid mixture coming from the source reser-
voir, or because of sulfur compounds re-
Suction fluid acting with oxygen, resulting in sulfur in
its elemental form.
FIG. 2. An ejector schematic.
In natural gas, elemental sulfur is usu-
14MARCH/APRIL 2022 | GasProcessingNews.com
 SPECIAL FOCUS: GREEN TECHNOLOGIES
ally found in the vapor phase. Due to the
increased carrying capacity that hydro-
gen sulfide (H2S) provides to natural gas,
its presence in the transported gas mix-
ture helps with transporting elemental
sulfur. Compared to methane, H2S can
carry more sulfur by three or four more
orders of magnitude. Consequently, the
probability of sulfur deposition in oil and
gas processing facilities is increased.
The desublimation of elemental sulfur
at certain pressure and temperature con-
ditions is a major cause for deposition.
Usually, the low concentration of elemen-
tal sulfur—within the parts-per-billion
range—makes it more challenging to de-
tect. In some cases, elemental sulfur de-
sublimates intermittently at certain loca-
tions within the plant, causing difficulties
in tracking the root causes of the problem.
In addition to elemental sulfur solu-
bility, the oxidation of sulfur compounds
could also be a major cause for elemental
sulfur deposition. Testing of the demin-
eralized water (in a liquid-ring compres-
sor) indicates that the dissolved oxygen
is within the acceptable parts-per-million
range. Normally, oxidation of sulfur com-
pounds like H2S leads to the production
of sulfur in the elemental form at certain
pressure and temperature conditions.
However, the source of oxygen is not
limited to that in the demineralized wa-
ter, as it could be air entering the system
through leaks, or it could involve the
availability of oxygen within the gas mix-
ture transported to the FGRS. Operating
the purge gas below the minimum safety
requirements can be a major contributor
of exposing oxygen in the system.
Also, part of enhancing FGRS reliabil-
ity is to segregate flare headers with pow-
er operated emergency isolation valves
(ZVs) should any upset occur in the fa-
cility. The FGRS is designed to recover
the normal continued flaring; during an
upset, the FGRS will be interrupted, re-
sulting in a trip. Therefore, as part of reli-
ability enhancement, the team proposed
segregating feed ZV to the FGRS, along
with sending a signal to close it in case
the pressure in one of the flare headers
increases near to the tipping point.
Prior to any change in the flare and re-
lief systems, such as installing a flare gas
recovery package, a study of full flare and
relief systems should be carried out. In-
stalling a flare gas recovery system could
change the constant backpressure in the
headers, which would affect the limit on
PZVs allowable backpressures. Having
the FGRS could also develop new criti-
cal overpressure scenarios that would
need to be addressed. Further, in many
applications, processes are equipped
with continuous vent-to-flare systems,
either in the process equipment or in
the seal gas of the compression systems.
Even small changes in operating pres-
sures of the flare headers could lead to
process interruptions from these ser-
vices. Overall, any proposed changes in
flare and relief system operations should
be first assessed with appropriate studies
on these systems. GP
ABDULAZIZ H. AL-TIJANI is an
Engineering Specialist at Saudi
Aramco’s Process and Control
INSIDE
Systems Department in Dhahran,
Saudi Arabia. He supports company INTELLIGENCE
operations and project design,
mainly in flare and relief systems for the Downstream
and in flare gas recovery applications. Mr. Al-Tijani
also supports Saudi Aramco and JV oil and gas Industry
operational facilities, pipelines and process
simulations, as well as various phases of projects. He
earned a BS degree in chemical engineering from
King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals
SUBSCRIBE
(KFUPM), and an MS degree in oil and gas surface
facilities from KFUPM (in partnership with IFP).
TODAY
HydrocarbonProcessing.com
/Subscribe
MAHDI ALDAJANI is a Flare and
Relief Systems Engineer at Saudi
Aramco. He has 10 yr of experience
with Saudi Aramco, working in
several Saudi Aramco facilities in
support of operations and on
detailed design and construction
activities on several projects. Mr. Aldajani earned a BS
degree in chemical engineering from KFUPM.
ABDULLMAJEED AL-SANAD is a
Process Engineer at Saudi Aramco’s
Process and Control Systems
Department, within the Flare and
Relief Systems Group. He has 6 yr
of experience, which includes
HPI
company operations and project T
MARKE
DATA
support. Mr. Al-Sanad has also participated in a flaring
minimization program that included several aspects
2022
such as purge gas optimization studies and FGRS
evaluations. He earned a BS degree in chemical
engineering from KFUPM.
MOHAMMED AL-MAHMOOD
is a Process Engineer at Saudi
Aramco’s Process and Control
Systems Department, within the
Energy Transition Engineering
Group. He has 6 yr of experience
with Saudi Aramco, which includes Hydrocar
bonP roce
ssing .com
company operations and project support. Mr.
Al-Mahmood has also participated in the
commissioning and process stabilization of an FGRS
in one of the company’s gas operation facilities. He
has also helped to evaluate FGRS feasibility and
energy consumption to identify reliable FGRS
applications. Mr. Al-Mahmood earned a BS degree in
chemical engineering from Oklahoma State University.
Gas Processing & LNG | MARCH/APRIL 2022 15
 Special Focus Plant Safety and Environment
S.-G. LU, CTCI Corp., Taipei, Taiwan
Optimize flare gas recovery system design
to reduce emissions
Emissions from flares worsen air quality and produce waste
gas. A flare gas recovery system (FGRS) is designed to facilitate
CO2 reduction.
In a recent project, an engineering and construction compa-
ny optimized an FGRS design by utilizing a high-performance
ejector as a compressor, a three-phase separation tank, a self-
purification loop of sour water, a software simulationa of the
amine scrubber and a dynamic simulation of flare gas discharge.
Flaring regulation background. The flame of a continuously
combusting flare stack is an eye-catching but unwelcome signa-
ture of a refinery. The flare stack is also one of the main sources
of refinery odors and subsequent complaints from nearby resi-
dents. On February 1, 2011, Taiwan’s Environmental Protection
Agency amended its volatile organic compounds air pollution
control and emission standards. Article 4 of the amendment or-
dered, “Exhaust gases emitted under normal operation in public
and private premises shall not be treated with a flare stack.”
The amendment became effective on July 1, 2014, direct-
ing refineries to follow regulations and make suitable improve-
ments within a specified time frame. If improvements are not
made within this time frame, in severe cases, the refinery can
be shut down. In Taiwan’s refineries, the exhaust gas generated
under normal operating conditions is discharged to the ground
flare for treatment, and the excess exhaust gas generated dur-
ing abnormal operating conditions is discharged to the elevated
FIG. 1. Location of the FGRS in the refinery.
flare for treatment. The elevated flare does not meet the new
regulations and will require engineering improvements.
Before the exhaust gas enters the flare stack, exhaust gas re-
covery and compression equipment must be put into place to
recover the flare gas, which will be desulfurized and then intro-
duced into the fuel gas system for use in the process. After this
project is completed, it must meet statutory regulations that
prohibit the exhaust gas from being treated using the flare stack.
The law stipulates that the concentration of hydrogen sulfide
(H2S) in the recovered gas shall not exceed 80 ppmv to meet the
requirements of stack sulfur dioxide (SO2 ) emission control.
To meet the amended air pollution standards, flare gas dis-
charge must be minimized. A refinery sought to implement an
EPC project for an FGRS, as shown in FIG. 1, to minimize air
pollution from the refinery. The engineering project team pro-
posed an optimization to the design, which received positive
feedback and was subsequently selected as the best design.
Process scheme. The FGRS is located in Zones C and F of
the refinery. Two sets of flare gas recovery systems were de-
signed. The No. 2 and No. 3 flare stacks share one set, and the
No. 4 and No. 5 flares share the other. The throughput design of
each system is 9,600 Nm3/hr.
Setting up the FGSR required changes to the existing flare
gas system. The flare gas flow sequence consists of the flare gas
recovery system, a ground flare and an elevated flare, as shown
Hydrocarbon Processing | OCTOBER 2020 41
 Plant Safety and Environment
in FIG. 2. Considering that the flare stack is the last pollution-
controlling equipment in the refinery, the water-sealing height
of the flare gas system seal drum needed to be modified.
The engineering techniques adopted and the optimization
achieved with the project are discussed in the following sections.
Ejector as compressor. Advanced and highly durable flare gas
recovery and compression equipment (high-performance ejec-
tor) was used for the FGRS. The concept is to use high-pressure
water to drive the flare gas into the recovery system and process it.
In the past, most flare gas recovery systems used liquid ring
compressors. These compressors have disadvantages, such as
complicated maintenance procedures and high maintenance
costs, large equipment and relatively long delivery times. For
these reasons, a high-performance ejector was selected as the
flare gas recovery compression equipment instead of the con-
ventional method using complicated, large compressors (FIG. 3).
Rapid injection of high-pressure water is used in this equip-
ment to drive the flare gas through the ejector, after which it is
mixed with water and then enters the FGRS. The high-perfor-
mance ejector flare gas compression system is the most advanced
Hydrocarbon flare header
KOD
Sour flare header FI
KOD Ground flare
seal drum
Waste gas
Ejector
Three-phase
separator
Cooler
FIG. 2. Process flow diagram for the FGRS in the refinery.
FIG. 3. High-performance ejector for flare gas compression.
42OCTOBER 2020 | HydrocarbonProcessing.com
flare gas recovery and compression equipment on the market. It
has been used for more than 10 yr without maintenance. The
equipment also has the advantages of high stability, high durabil-
ity, simple construction and lower maintenance costs. It can also
handle aerosol-containing gases without affecting performance,
shortens the time from start to full load and has no lubricant
contamination problems.
Unlike other compressors, high-performance ejectors have
the following characteristics:
• Not sensitive to changes in the suction gas load
• Not sensitive to changes in the molecular weight
of the incoming gas
• Works with a closed suction gas valve, with a load ratio
of 0%–100%
• Controls the upstream side pressure with a suction
pressure control valve
• Easy to start and stop
• Only moving parts consist of the shaft and the impeller
of the centrifugal pump
• Only parts that require maintenance are the bearings
and seals of the centrifugal pump
• Zero-maintenance solution
• As an absorption tower, any particle in the feed gas
can be cleaned by a motive fluid
• Ability to handle feed gases containing solids, particles
or mists/liquids without compromising performance
• At low molecular weight, there is no loss of incoming
Ground gas capacity, unlike liquid ring compressors
flare • At high molecular weights, there is no cavitation
Hydrocarbon
flare problem, unlike liquid ring compressors that can cause
heavy loads and vibrations on the shaft and coupler
• Faster startup time to full load, unlike liquid ring
Fuel gas compressors
• Faster gas supply than all other compressors
Lean amine • No lubrication problems, unlike screw compressors
Rich amine • No moving parts inside the compression chamber
• No metal-to-metal contact.
Scrubber
Waste oil
Design of three-phase separation tank. The three-phase
separator tank functions as a separator of water, oil and gas, with
an internal diverter to disperse the gas-liquid and minimize the
impact on the gas-liquid separation tank. The calming baffle is
set to reduce level fluctuations. The double baffle is used for liq-
uid and gas three-phase separation, as shown in FIG. 4.
Ejector Waste gas
Three-phase
separator
Waste oil
FIG. 4. Process sketch for high-performance three-phase separation tank.
 Plant Safety and Environment

A gas demister is installed at the outlet to reduce the drop- water circulation loop.
lets brought out, and another tank is built with oil-water two- Sour water self-purification circulation has the following
phase liquid-level control functions. Oil-water separation uses advantages:
an oil-water-gas three-phase gas separation tank and an oil-water 1. Decreases the amount of blowdown/makeup
separation tank to accomplish a two-step separation procedure; water required. TABLE 1 shows that sour water
it separates oil and water effectively and reduces waste oil and self-purification circulation can remove approximately
wastewater at the outlet. 80%–90% of hydrocarbons, which significantly
enhances oil-water separation efficiency, improves
Self-purification sour water loop. A self-purification loop for the quality of process water and reduces the amount
sour water is incorporated to improve the circulating water qual- of blowdown/makeup water.
ity, thereby reducing wastewater discharge, as shown in FIG. 5. 2. Decreases H2S concentration, which reduces
The benefits of establishing a sour water self-purification loop corrosiveness and extends equipment service life
include reductions in emissions, supplemented water consump- 3. Increases the amount of recovered fuel gas
tion, H2S concentration and corrosion, as well as extending the 4. Reduces the impact of emulsion.
equipment life. It also increases fuel gas recovery and reduces Although the cost savings from water reduction (18 m3/hr)
the impact of emulsification caused by the recovery system. and fuel gas recovery are not significant, the benefits of decreas-
To maintain the quality of process water in a three-phase ing wastewater are great.
separator for the FGRS, the typical design includes discharging
part of the process water and adding the equivalent amount of Optimization of amine liquid dosage design. Proprietary
supplemented water, which maintains the overall quality of the software is used to simulate and control the temperature of the
process water. However, using sour water self-purification circu- exhaust gas into the amine washing tower, so that the volume
lation brings many advantages, such as a reduction in the amount concentration of H2S in the exhaust gas is less than 80 ppm. Ad-
of sour water blowdown/supplemented water, less corrosion, an ditionally, about 20% of the amount of amine liquid is saved, as
extension of equipment service life, an increase in fuel gas recov- shown in FIG. 7.
ery and a reduction in the impact of emulsion phenomenon. Amine liquid absorption tower design. The refinery re-
In the flare gas recovery system, the refinery’s requirement quires the installation of two sets of FGRSs. According to this
of recovered fuel gas pressure is a minimum of 4.5 kg/cm2g, requirement, the processing capacity of each set of recovery
and the separator’s operating pressure must be at least 6 kg/
cm2g in the front process. These operating conditions would
increase the water solubility of the hydrocarbon and reduce the
separation efficiency.
To maintain the quality of the process water, the typical de-
sign is to blow down part of the process water (approximately
1%–2%) and add the equivalent makeup water. Sour water self-
purification circulation (FIG. 6) would route a portion of the
sour water into a low-pressure flash drum. The water solubil-
ity of hydrocarbon decreases immediately due to a reduction in
pressure, and a portion of the sour water flashes into vapor. The
flash gas is then sent to the flare header, and the residual liquid
is sent to the separator by a circulation pump, creating a sour
FIG. 5. Process sketch for circulation of water self-purification loop.
TABLE 1. Sour water self-purification circulation benefits
Mass flow Stream 1, kg/hr Stream 2, kg/hr Removal % Flash gas
H2 0.00612 0.00075 87.8
Sour water flash drum
C1 0.19248 0.0313 83.74 OPI 0.2 kg/cm2g
C2 0.46093 0.08297 82 Flare gas header Flare gas
Three-phase separator
OPI 6 kg/cm2g
C3 0.4071 0.05901 85.51
iC4 0.10173 0.00974 90.42
Oil level
nC4 0.1655 0.02275 86.26 Sour water level
iC5 0.06229 0.00471 92.44 Makeup water Oil
nC5 0.05995 0.00547 90.87 1 2
Sour water
C6 0.05017 0.00275 94.51
Sour water
CO 0.04737 0.00588 87.58 circulation pump
CO2 1.3133 1.04683 20.29
H2S 1.8489 1.71026 7.5
Water 8,827.29 8,827.21 0 FIG. 6. Sour water self-purification circulation flow scheme.

Hydrocarbon Processing | OCTOBER 2020 43

 Plant Safety and Environment

equipment is 9,600 Nm3/hr. The treated exhaust gas must have
an H2S volume concentration below 80 ppm.
Each FGRS comprises two sets of amine liquid absorption
towers, and the H2S in the exhaust gas is removed by a 27 wt%
solution of diisopropanolamine (DIPA).
Thermodynamic mode and simulation tools. The soft-
warea used for simulating the amine liquid absorption tower has
a rigorous electrolyte mode and an accurate liquid phase-activ-
ity coefficient mode, which is suitable for amine liquid absorp-
tion systems. Other commercial process simulation software
programs, which use the amine thermodynamic model, consid-
er the electrolytic properties of the amine absorption system;
however, the basis is regression, not electrolyte calculation.
The amine liquid-absorption system contains a chemical re-
action of H2S and CO2 with amine. The reaction rate of H2S
with amines is very fast and can be considered as equilibrium,
while CO2 is not. If CO2 is present in the system, it will signifi-
cantly affect the absorption of H2S.
The software has a reaction kinetics model for CO2 to simu-
late selective absorption of H2S by amines in the presence of
CO2 and H2S. It calculates the lean and rich approaches for the
amine absorption tower, which engineers use to determine the
efficiency and space of the absorption tower. These approaches
are the two most important indicators for the absorption tower.
FIG. 7. Process sketch of amine scrubber.
Design considerations. The following items are considered as
parameters for the design of the amine liquid absorption tower:
• Amine liquid circulation flowrate
• Lean amine inlet temperature
• Absorption tower retention time
• Amine liquid circulation flow.
Using the software to simulate amine absorption, the lean
and rich approaches can be adopted to determine the closeness
of the operating state and the equilibrium state of the system.
Conceptually, the lean approach indicates the ratio of equilib-
rium H2S content to operation H2S content at the absorber
overhead, and the rich approach indicates the ratio of operation
amine loading to equilibrium amine loading at the bottom of
the absorption tower for the rich amine solution.
In an example of the lean approach, FIG. 8 shows the ratio
of H2S content of the sour gas when the amine/sour gas feed
reaches equilibrium (point B, Ye) to the H2S content of the
overhead gas under operation (Point A, Y1 ).
In an example of the rich approach, FIG. 9 shows the ratio of
H2S content of the bottom rich amine solution (Point A, X2 ) to
the H2S content of the rich amine/acid gas feed at equilibrium
(Point B, Xe ).
FIGS. 8 and 9 show that the slope of the operating curve is the
ratio of the circulating amount of amine liquid to the flowrate of
the acid gas. If the ratio of the circulation flowrate of amine liquid
to acid gas flowrate (L/V) decreases, then the appeal of the rich
approach increases. The value of the rich approach helps quickly
determine the appropriate amine circulation flow. As a rule of
thumb, the rich approach should be between 70% and 80%.
A rich approach above 80% indicates low volume circula-
tion; for a typical 15–20-tray absorption tower, the amine liquid
generally does not absorb a higher proportion of H2S. Under
abnormal conditions, such as an increase in the concentration
of H2S in the imported acid gas or a sudden increase in the
amount of imported acid gas, the concentration of H2S in the
outlet gas may be out of specification.
If the rich approach is less than 70%, it suggests excess circula-
tion; at this stage, even if the quantity of amine liquid is increased,
the concentration of H2S at the overhead gas outlet is low.
Dynamic simulation of flare gas discharge. A dynamic
simulation softwareb calculates the levels of exhaust gas emis-

Vapor phase H2S composition Vapor phase H2S composition

Absorber bottom Absorber bottom

Y2 Y2 Point A Point B
Operation line Operation line

Absorber top Lmax/V Absorber top Lmin /V

Equilibrium line Equilibrium line
Y1 Y1
Point A

Ye
Point B
Liquid phase H2S composition Liquid phase H2S composition
X1 X2 X1 X2 Xe
Lean approach = Ye/Y1 Rich approach = X2 / Xe

FIG. 8. The lean approach. FIG. 9. The rich approach.

44 OCTOBER 2020 | HydrocarbonProcessing.com


sions (FIG. 10) and helps determine the circulation pump start/
stop settings and the water seal isolation tank’s water sealing
height. The goal is to obtain the best control parameters and
reach the target of zero emissions.
Sour flare gas backflow prevention. Anti-backflow facili-
ties were added to prevent sour flare gas from flowing back into
the hydrocarbon flare header facility.
An exhaust gas recovery backflow prevention facility prevents
sour flare gas from flowing back into the hydrocarbon flare head-
er and discharging from the ground flare, causing air pollution.
This design also allows the exhaust gas recovery system to pri-
oritize the recovery of acid waste gas to clean the air near the re-
finery, thereby improving the value of investment in this system.
Low consumption for utility system. The temperature dif-
ference between the cooling water inlet and outlet is 13°C, and
the cooling water consumption is the most economical. As the
amount of exhaust gas recovery is ever-changing, the amount of
water supplement for the oil-water-gas three-phase separation
tank can be proportionally adjusted according to the quantity
of exhaust gas recovery needed to save water.
Since the energy consumption of the ejector circulation
water pumps is high, energy-saving designs have been incorpo-
rated. Four circulation water pumps—two BB3 high-efficiency
(80.2%) pumps and two BB2 pumps (efficiency 69.5%)—were
added in two trains in Section C of the refinery.
The two BB3 high-efficiency pumps are prioritized for ac-
tivation during operation, and when the demand is high, the
other two BB2 pumps are also activated to improve energy ef-
ficiency and reduce operating costs.
Optimization of plant plot arrangement. Due to the limit-
ed space in the existing plant, in addition to optimizing process
technology, the project optimized plant layout by symmetrical
arrangement to reduce the materials required, including pipe-
FIG. 10. Dynamic simulation for exhaust gas emissions from flare main header.
Plant Safety and Environment
lines, pipe racks, concrete and others. A three-in-one design
is used to integrate two liquid separation tanks and one amine
scrubber into one vessel to save space.
Equipment backup system. The two train systems are de-
signed for both Sections C and F. When the first train equip-
ment is under inspection or maintenance, the other train can
continue the flare gas recovery operation.
Multistage automatic start/stop. The process system safety
control design included multistage control start/stop for the flare
gas recovery unit to save power and improve efficiency. Comput-
er simulation software was used to calculate the best setpoint to
achieve the highest system efficiency, safety and reliability.
Finally, the dual-feeder power supply system is designed to
improve system stability and reliability.
Takeaway. After the completion of the project, the improve-
ment in overall environmental quality in the city is quantifiable.
Calculations show that each train in Sections C and F can re-
cover up to 9,600 m3/hr of flare gas. The flare gas recovered in
one day is equivalent to the amount of CO2 absorbed by Daan
Forest Park in Taiwan in an entire year.
The project was highly praised by the jury members in the
Golden Quality Award of the National Public Construction
Commission of Taiwan for technology innovation and opti-
mized design. This recycling technology should be promoted
to increase environmental protection.
NOTES
a
ProMax
b
DySime
SHIN-GEE LU is Assistant Chief Engineer for CTCI Corp. in Taipei, Taiwan, specializing
in process and system design. He has 31 yr of experience in petroleum refining,
petrochemical production and utilities/offsites, as well as basic and detailed design.
He holds a BS degree in chemical engineering from Chung Yuan University in Taiwan.
Hydrocarbon Processing | OCTOBER 2020 45
 Valves, Pumps and
Turbomachinery
J. YOUNAS, EFERT, Daharki, Pakistan

Aging pressure relief valves:

Are you managing history well?
The risks associated with the mal-
function or blockage of pressure safety
valves (PSVs) are significant, and oper-
ating facilities invest heavily in preven-
tive maintenance (PM) programs to
mitigate the risks and ensure that PSVs
are functioning exactly as per design re-
quirements. Significant resources are al-
located to isolate, remove and transport
PSVs to a workshop so that they can be
returned to service as soon as possible
after inspection, testing and overhauling.
All field activities are controlled under
strict PM programs; however, one thing
that is sometimes overlooked is the prep-
aration of traceable historical records,
which is important to continuously opti-
mize and improve the program.
Troubleshooting and finding solu-
tions to some notable challenges of PSV
data management will not only increase
confidence in maintaining the integrity
of PSVs, but will also help to reduce PM,
saving cost and efforts associated with
their testing program.
Collecting clean and reliable data.
During root cause analysis (RCA) and
frequency review exercises, important
observations and findings are often ei-
ther overlooked or not recorded proper-
ly. A report of a pressure vessel, piping or
a storage tank handling a non-critical ser-
vice is usually comprehensive (supported
by checklists and pictures) and approved
by the most-experienced site inspectors;
however, the report of a vacuum relief
valve installed on top of the same tank
may lack important observations and
might have been signed off by someone
less experienced in the group with insuf-
ficient training.
Therefore, it is vital to establish a ro-
bust mechanism onsite to ensure that
clean and reliable data is obtained from
inspection reports of PSVs. Regular au-
dits of records and proper training of
workers can help keep the system alive.
Extracting data from checklists
and forms. Large amounts of data
kept in printed or hand-written forms
require significant time and effort later
to visualize the data and observe trends.
Rather than writing reports by hand, it is
preferred that all reports and checklists
related to PSVs are filed directly into
the site digital database by each inter-
face involved, and printed certificates or
reports are generated through that par-
ticular database itself, if required. This
will assist later in retrieving, filtering
and analyzing the data frequently and
in making strong and accurate business
decisions based upon technical inputs to
reduce cost and risk.
Some sites manage such records in
centralized MS Access or Excel data
bases, while others are using different
inspection data management software
(IDMS) for this purpose. Other mainte-
nance applications like Maximo or SAP
may also have such databases designed
for PSVs.
FIG. 1. Sample process design data table for PRDs.
Inaccurate design and process
data. Maintaining accurate and updated
process and design data (FIG. 1) of all
assets—particularly PSVs—is the fore-
most requirement of any process safety
management (PSM) system. A central-
ized database link should be provided to
all involved in the PM of safety valves so
that information can be accessed readily.
This information should be always
kept updated. To ensure this is done, the
inspector for each PM incident should
be held responsible to verify this design
data and note remarks for action, if any.
If records cannot be updated immediate-
ly, then such recommendations should
be tracked by IDMS or any other suit-
able tracking mechanism used at the site.
Missing operating history and ven-
dor data. As per API-576 Section 6.2.4,
the operating history of each PSV since
its last inspection should be obtained
and should include pertinent informa-
tion. The following updated records are
important for proper PM execution and
to conduct studies related to reliability
or process safety:
• Vendor/manufacturer
maintenance manuals
• Spring range catalogues
• Information on upsets and their
Hydrocarbon Processing | DECEMBER 2021 73
 Valves, Pumps and Turbomachinery
FIG. 2. Typical bathtub curve for PSV internal component failures.
effect on the valve
• The extent of any leakage
while in service
• Any other evidence of
malfunctioning
• Whether any rupture disks under
the PSV have been replaced
• Management of Change
(MoC) records and current
status of actions
• Record of any frequency review
exercises (increase/decrease),
along with justification
• RCA related to PSVs
• Drawings of pressure relief
devices (PRDs)
• Historical records of failure/
popped or leaked in field
• Inspection recommendations
record/status
• Test certificates
• Repair record/parts replacement
record
• Spare parts list.
Initial visual inspection. Many types
of deposits or corrosion products in
a PSV may be loose and may drop out
during transportation of the valve to
the shop for inspection, testing, mainte-
nance and resetting. As soon as a valve
is removed from the system, a visual in-
spection should be made. Visual inspec-
tion of a PSV immediately after removal
from service provides important infor-
mation about operating conditions. To
minimize errors in the testing and han-
dling of a PSV, each PSV should carry at
least two identification marks to show
its company equipment, such as iden-
tifying tag, stencil on flanges, plate or
other means.
As per API-576, “Inlet and outlet pip-
ing should also be inspected for the pres-
74DECEMBER 2021 | HydrocarbonProcessing.com
ence of internal deposits, and records
should be kept of their condition and
cleaning. If necessary, piping should be
radiographed or dismantled for inspec-
tion and any cleaning to be performed.”
The type of deposits, degree of restric-
tion due to deposits, and the reason for
PSV removal should be recorded.
If such data is recorded properly with
evidence, it can help significantly in ad-
justing accurate inspection intervals.
As-received inspection of PSV in
workshop. After a PSV is removed from
service, a visual inspection is carried out
before cleaning and then it is usually tak-
en to the shop for inspection and repair.
An important phase of maintenance is
testing to determine the set pressure and
tightness of the valve. This testing is usu-
ally performed on a test block in facilities
for applying pressure to a valve and indi-
cating the pressure applied. This activity
is termed as “as-received” inspection.
It has been observed at multiple sites
that experienced inspectors are involved
only in the final test of the PSV, while
as-received inspection activity is left for
valve shop technicians who are not fully
aware or trained. A qualified inspector
must attend the as-received inspection
event—this is the heart of an efficient
and cost-effective PM program. This
inspection activity provides clues about
the actual PSV performance during op-
eration and suggests what actions or
steps should be taken to improve its per-
formance in the future.
Intervals between PSV testing should
be determined by the performance of
the valves in the particular service. If
the as-received test results are erratic
or vary significantly from the cold dif-
ferential test pressure (CDTP), the in-
spection interval should be decreased
or suitable modifications made to im-
prove the performance. If the PSV is
dismantled, then all internals should be
checked as per vendor guidelines. PSV
internal component failures follow the
typical bathtub curve pattern shown in
FIG. 2. A sudden increase in failure rates
can help the inspector determine the
equipment’s useful life.
The precise recording and reporting
format in a PSV testing program depends
on each individual company’s methodol-
ogies; however, as a guideline, key points
mentioned in FIG. 2 and API-576 should
be recorded clearly in the test certificate.
Final testing, test results review
and record update. Before sending
the PSV to the plant or warehouse, a fi-
nal test should be conducted. Refer to
API-576 for key points to be recorded
during this final test.
The improper shipment and trans-
portation of PSVs can have detrimental
effects on device operation. Refer to
API-576 for detailed guidelines regard-
ing transportation.
Once inspections are completed, the
results should be updated in the site
inspection management software and
approved by the inspection supervisor.
Any pending actions should be recorded
and tracked until implementation. Risk
assessment should be carried out by a
team if critical recommendations cannot
be implemented immediately. The du-
ties and responsibilities for all involved
in an inspection and testing program for
PSVs should be clearly defined.
Takeaway. The inspection of PSVs pro-
vides data that can be evaluated to deter-
mine a safe and economical frequency
of scheduled inspections. Historical re-
cords reflecting periodic test results and
service experiences for each relief device
should be recorded in full details, as
these are valuable leading indicators of
asset integrity.
JABRAN YOUNAS is the Senior
Inspection Supervisor at EFERT.
He has more than 17 yr of hands-on
experience in the field of non-
destructive testing and inspection
of plant static equipment. He holds
various API , ASNT and NCNDT
certifications and has worked in different fertilizer and
petrochemical units in Pakistan and the Middle East
as a Senior Inspection Supervisor.

Understand API and ASME standards
to prevent oversizing PSVs
If you have ever sized or selected a
pressure safety relief valve (PSV) us-
ing vendor sizing programs or hand cal-
culations, you have probably run into a
strange anomaly: Why does a PSV orifice
size change between American Petroleum
Institute (API) and American Society of
Mechanical Engineers (ASME) datas-
ets? What is an “effective” orifice area?
How can you know which standard to use
when selecting a PSV?
Usually, this issue is one of curiosity
and does not affect the result of which
valve is chosen. Common practice is to
default to API sizing equations and pa-
rameters, and use only ASME datasets
for situations outside of API letter des-
ignations. However, this approach is
likely causing you to oversize some of
your PSVs and their respective piping
systems. Standards referenced in this ar-
ticlea include:
• ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel
Code (BPVC), Section VIII
• API Recommended Practice
(RP) 520
• API Recommended Practice
(RP) 526.
ASME and API standards for PSVs:
To size or not to size? Most of the
time, simply using API datasets is ad-
equate. Note: This is a conservative ap-
proach, so you will not make a mistake
in doing this. Did you know, however,
that PSVs are certified to ASME capaci-
ties—not API? Did you also know that
those ASME capacities are nearly always
higher than the API capacities? Very few
available resources speak to this topic. It
is common for engineers to understand
API 520 quite well, but they often have
Fluid Flow and
Rotating Equipment
B. TAYLOR, Anvil Corp., Bellingham, Washington
a limited working knowledge of how the
ASME BPVC comes into play.
The main roles that API and ASME
play on this subject must be clarified first,
along with how the standards are intend-
ed to be used:
1. API 526 provides basic design
criteria for PSVs, and is aimed at
manufacturers
2. API 520 provides detailed
methods to determine specific
required relief loads and to select
preliminary, generic valve sizes
3. ASME BPVC governs testing and
certification of valves.
Too often, we leave the third part out
of the process and simply calculate relief
loads and select valves using API tech-
niques, without ever checking our selec-
tion against certified ASME data. Proper
application of these standards is the first
key point of this article: Initial sizing and
valve selection is done using API equa-
tions, and final valve selection and certifi-
cation is done using ASME-certified coef-
ficients and capacities.
When sizing a PSV, the sizing equations
are always API 520. When a PSV is certi-
fied, it is always certified to ASME BPVC,
regardless of whether ASME certification
is selected. It is important to remember
that the ASME BPVC is the “code,” the
standard to which we must design. API
520 and API 526 are “recommended prac-
tices” developed to give engineers a tool
to meet the ASME requirements. Another
way to look at it: ASME BPVC sets the
goal, API 520/API 526 provide the in-
structions and ASME has the final say.
ASME BPVC: What are the rules?
The BPVC is an enormous code, and is
not reviewed in detail here. With regard
to PSVs, BPVC basically says that a PSV
must be capable of relieving the required
load, and it must be tested in a specific
manner to be certified to do so. If a valve
is tested per the specific directions in the
BPVC, it will be ASME-certified and re-
ceive an ASME Pressure Vessel Pressure
Relief Valves (ASME UV) stamp.
Note: When specifying a PSV for a
pressure vessel, it is important to always
specify that the UV stamp is required. A
non-code PSV is acceptable in certain
instances, but that is outside the scope of
this article.
API 526: Standardized valve design.
API first attempts to standardize physical
PSV sizes and design, and it does so with
API RP 526, which is targeted at PSV
manufacturers. API provides predefined
valve sizes, with letter designations
D through T (API 526). It also defines
other details directed toward valve man-
ufacturers, such as temperature ratings.
These specifications are intended as min-
imum design standards, and manufactur-
ers are free to exceed these parameters.
API 520: PSV sizing equations. The
second thing API does is provide stan-
dardized equations and parameters for
discerning what size of PSV is needed
for a specific scenario. The equations ac-
count for design parameters that ASME
does not address, such as specific fluid
properties, backpressures, critical flow,
two-phase flow and other aspects of fluid
dynamics that affect the ability of a valve
to relieve a required load.
API sizing equations are by nature the-
oretical and standardized, and use default
Hydrocarbon Processing | NOVEMBER 2018 79
 Fluid Flow and Rotating Equipment
TABLE 1. Example scenario API vs. ASME values
API N-orifice
API calculated required area
ASME calculated required area
ASME certification for brand X* 4N6
*Note: This data is from a real case; the specific PSV make/model is omitted.
or “dummy” values for several sizing pa-
rameters that may or may not reflect the
actual values for a specific valve.
API RP 520 addresses these theo-
retical parameters and emphasizes that
the intended use of equations is to de-
termine a preliminary valve size, which
should be verified with actual data. PSV
sizing is a two-step process in API RP
520, but this is not obvious if the full
standard is not read, or if vendor sizing
software that hides the iteration is used.
See API 520, Part 1, Section 5.2 for fur-
ther explanation.
Pressure vessel PRVs. When valves
are built, they are built to the API RP
526 standard; however, as one might
imagine, when valves are tested and
certified, the results do not match up
identically to the theoretical values that
were calculated. This is where API and
ASME intersect; we switch from calcu-
lations (API) that were used as a basis
to design the valve, to actual empirical
data (ASME) to certify the valve. When
a valve manufacturer obtains the UV
code stamp that certifies the valve orifice
size and capacity, it is based on actual
test results, not on API sizing standards.
ASME, which came first, does not have
tiered letter designations. The typical
D, E, F, etc. sizes are strictly an API tool,
and ASME’s capacity certifications are
completely independent of them.
An example scenario explaining this
conundrum is as follows: ABC Valve Co.
builds a valve, aiming at the design specs
for an API N-orifice, which API says is an
effective area of 4.34 in.2 The company
tests the final product according to ASME
BPVC, and achieves a result that equates
to an effective orifice area of 4.9 in.2—i.e.,
its ASME effective area. A third-party en-
gineer (you), trying to select a PSV, runs
a sizing calculation using API 520 equa-
tions on ABC Valve Co.’s sizing software,
gets a result that requires 4.66 in.2 to re-
lieve the load, and is now thoroughly con-
fused on what size valve to select.
80 NOVEMBER 2018 | HydrocarbonProcessing.com
4.34 in.2
4.667 in.2
4.624 in.2
4.9 in.2
If one selects the API dataset on the
sizing software in this example, it will
automatically eliminate N-orifice valves
as an option and bump up the user to a
P-orifice. However, if one simply selects
the ASME dataset, then the N-orifice
valve suddenly reappears as an option.
How can this be? Will the N-orifice
work, or not? The short answer is yes,
because it is certified to an actual area of
4.90 in.2 Therefore, the N-orifice for this
specific PSV will work, and is certified
to do so, in this application. Remember:
Use API to get close, and use ASME to
confirm the final answer.
Digest that for a moment. If you have
sized and purchased more than a dozen
PSVs, chances are that you have inadver-
tently selected a PSV a full size larger than
you needed to, in a situation much like
our example, simply because you chose
a PSV based on its API “rating” rather
than its real, certified, stamped ASME
rating. If it was a small valve, the impact
was probably insignificant—but what if
this happened on a valve that resulted in
selecting an 8 × 10 PSV when a 6 × 8 PSV
could have been used?
That answer may not be very satisfy-
ing. How can you simply hit a button on
the sizing program and make a different
size of valve suddenly acceptable? The
key lies in how the main coefficient of dis-
charge, Kd, is handled, and how capacities
are determined. Several K values are used
in API calculations. All these values have
generic values defined in API 520 that can
be used for preliminary sizing. These are
the numbers used in initial sizing calcu-
lations to get us close, and then replaced
with the actual/tested/empirical/ASME
values when a certified valve is obtained.
Remember: Anytime you hear “certified”
or “stamped,” think ASME.
Let us consider the numbers from the
example above, which came from an at-
tempt to size a valve for liquid relief. API
says to use a value of Kd = 0.65 for liq-
uid relief. If one uses the API dataset on
the vendor software, then the calculation
stops here and a required area of 4.66 in.2
is obtained. When selecting a valve, that
number is compared to the API effec-
tive (actual) area of an N-orifice of 4.34
in.2—this is too small, and logically re-
quires a step up to a P-orifice. However,
it is important to remember that the API
N-orifice area is just the benchmark, a
minimum requirement, and likely does
not reflect the actual area of a real PSV.
Once a valve is selected, all K values and
capacities should be replaced with ac-
tual ASME-certified K values, also de-
termined by testing, that are specific to
each valve model, and the calculations
should be performed again.
Normally, ASME-certified K-values
are smaller than the API dummy values,
driving up the required orifice area. This
means that valve manufacturers must
over-design their valves to make up for
this discrepancy, resulting in ASME-cer-
tified areas and capacities that typically
exceed the benchmark API ones. The
result is that the ASME-certified capacity
of any given valve will nearly always ex-
ceed its API capacity.
All this boils down to one sneaky sen-
tence in the ASME BPVC that mandates
a 10% safety factor on the empirically de-
termined Kd that “de-rates” the valve (see
ASME BPVC Section VIII, UG-131.e.2).
This little-known fact is key to correct
PSV sizing and selection; as engineers,
we often pile safety factors upon each
other and oversize our equipment. By se-
lecting an ASME dataset at the final itera-
tion of valve selection, a 10% safety factor
is automatically included in your design.
As mentioned, ASME K values are
nearly always lower than API values, due
to this 10% de-rating. The PSV in the ex-
ample scenario has a determined Kd of
0.73, which is adjusted by 10% for a final
AMSE Kd of 0.66, slightly higher than
the dummy API value. The discrepancy
means that the flow on this valve can do
approximately 11% better than the mini-
mum theoretical flow calculated by API
when it was tested. For the valve in ques-
tion, the required ASME area is slightly
less than the API area. This is atypical
(but not unheard of), and points to the
importance of checking the ASME rat-
ings of any valve selected and comparing
it against API benchmarks.
For our example, the net effect of the
ASME Kd is basically nothing; therefore,
how is the ASME capacity higher? This
 Fluid Flow and Rotating Equipment

brings us to the last key concept: When the
ASME data is used for a specific valve, it is
not just the Kd sizing factor that changes;
the actual orifice area and, therefore, the
capacity of the valve also adjusts to em-
pirical, certified values. Both values can be
generally expected to increase over the API
values. The simple reason is that any given
real-world valve is usually over-designed
so that it will meet and exceed the required
minimum capacity of its corresponding
API size. This is a simple concept, but one
that is often overlooked by engineers.
Back to our example scenario: Even
though the ASME Kd (and, therefore, the
required area) adjustment had a negligi-
ble effect, the actual ASME orifice area
(and, therefore, capacity) is significantly
higher than the listed API area and capac-
ity for an N-orifice. TABLE 1 shows a sum-
mary of these calculations.
With this adjusted orifice area, we
can compare to the ASME certified area
(which will always be larger than the API
area), and we have our final answer for the
valve size. Often, this will not result in a
different choice of valve, but sometimes,
as in the example case, it will allow use of
a valve with an API letter designation that
did not appear large enough based on its
API effective area. This can save time
and money by preventing over-sizing of
valves, leading to smaller piping systems
to support them. Remember: The ASME
values are empirical and have a 10% safe-
ty factor built in, so we do not need to
worry about cutting the design too close;
the conservatism is already built in to the
method. We can choose the Brand X N-
orifice valve and sleep well at night.
Recommendations. Avoid simply de-
faulting to the API dataset for the final
“rating” or datasheet when selecting a
PSV. Use API sizing calculations as they
are intended—for preliminary valve se-
lection. Then, switch to the ASME datas-
et. This will often (but not always) result
in two differences:
1. An actual orifice area greater than
the standard API letter-designated
orifice area. This means that the
PSV selected performs slightly
better, or is slightly larger, than
the minimum design conditions
for its API letter designation.
2. A required orifice area that is
greater than the one calculated
by API. This is usually due to
the 10% de-rating on Kd that
ASME requires.
PSV sizing and selection is a wide
topic, and this article addresses only one
issue. Specific code references and quota-
tions have been omitted to create a gen-
eral guideline that is useful for most engi-
neers, rather than an interpretation of the
codes. Anytime you are selecting a PSV
that is near its API capacity limits, a flag
should go off in your head: Remember to
check the ASME capacity!
NOTES
a
This article is written for an audience that is familiar
with PSVs, PSV sizing, and API and ASME standards
at a basic level.
BENJAMIN TAYLOR is Project Manager at Anvil
Corporation in Bellingham, Washington. His
background is in control systems and instrumentation.
He holds a BS degree in chemical engineering from
Montana State University in Bozeman, Montana, and a
PE in control systems engineering in Washington state.

Statement of Ownership, Management and Circulation (Required by 39 U.S.C.).

1. Title of publication: HYDROCARBON PROCESSING
2. Publication number: ISSN 0018-8190
3. Filing date: October 1, 2018
4. Issue frequency: Monthly
5. Number of issues published annually: 12
6. Annual subscription price: $399.00
7. Complete mailing address of known office of publication:
Gulf Publishing Company, P. O. Box 2608 (2 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1020,
77046), Houston, Harris County, Texas 77252-2608.
8. Complete mailing address of the headquarters or general business offices
of the publishers: Gulf Publishing Company, P. O. Box 2608 (2 Greenway
Plaza, Suite 1020, 77046), Houston, Texas 77252-2608, Contact person:
Suzanne McGehee; Telephone (713) 520-4473.
9. Names and complete addresses of publisher, editor and managing editor:
Publisher—Catherine Watkins, 2 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1020, Houston,
Texas 77046; Editor—Lee Nichols, 2 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1020,
Houston, Texas 77046; Executive Editor—Adrienne Blume, 2 Greenway
Plaza, Suite 1020, Houston, Texas 77046.
10. Owner: Gulf Publishing Holdings LLC, 2 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1020,
Houston, Texas 77046.
11. Known bondholders, mortgagees and other security holders owning
or holding 1 percent or more of total amount of bonds, mortgages
or other securities: Gulf Publishing Holdings LLC, 2 Greenway Plaza,
Suite 1020, Houston, Texas 77046.
12. Tax Status has not changed
13. Publication title: Hydrocarbon Processing
14. Issue date for circulation data below: September 2018
15. Extent and nature of circulation: Average, Actual
A. Total number of copies (net press run): 21,011, 21,198
B. Legitimate paid and/or requested distribution:
1. Outside County Paid/Requested Mail Subscriptons stated
on PS Form 3541—10,609, 11,274
2. In-County Paid/Requested Mail Subscriptions stated
on PS Form 3541—0, 0
3. Sales through dealers and carriers, street vendors,
and counter sales, and other paid or requested distribution
outside USPS—8,843, 8,146
4. Requested Copies distributed by other mail classes through
the USPS—19, 23
C. Total paid and/or requested circulation (sum of 15B1,2,3 and 4):
19,471, 19,443
D. Nonrequested distribution (by mail and outside the Mail):
1. Outside County nonrequested Copies Stated on PS Form 3541—
0, 0
2. In-County Nonrequested copies Stated on PS Form 3541—0, 0
3. Nonrequested copies distributed through the USPS by
Other Classes of Mail—0, 0
4. Nonrequested Copies Distributed Outside the Mail—902, 1,135
E. Total Nonrequested Distribution (sum of 15d): 902, 1,135
F. Total distribution (sum of 15C and E): 20,373, 20,578
G. Copies not distributed: 638, 620
H. Total (sum 15F and G): 21,011, 21,198
I. Percent paid and/or requested circulation (15C/F x 100):
95.6%, 94.5%
16. Electronic Copy Circulation: Average, Actual
A. Requested and Paid Electronic Copies: 12,211, 12,112
B. Total Requested and Paid Print Copies (Line 15c) +
Requested/Paid Electronic Copies: 31,682, 31,555
C. Total Requested Copy Distribution (Line 15f) +
Requested/Paid Electronic Copies: 32,584, 32,690
D. Percent Paid and/or Requested Circulation: 97.23%, 96.53%
17. This statement of ownership will be printed in the November 2018
issue of this publication. Publication required.
18. Signature and Title of Editor, Publisher, Business Manager, or Owner
I certify that the statements made by me above are correct and complete.
/s/ Catherine Watkins, Publisher

Hydrocarbon Processing | NOVEMBER 2018 81

 Safety/Loss Prevention

• The pipe was not touching one of the bottom supports (1-
in. gap), due to a permanent deformation in the vertical plane
• The lone Y- stop that prevented upward movement of the
line was forced open (see FIG. 3)
• There was no ovalization at the long radius bends
• There was no sign of excessive axial or lateral movement
• There were no fretting marks on supports, that could be
associated with vibration.
The first three observations led to the conclusion that the
flare header must have undergone thermal movement in the
vertical plane.
0.07000
Design observations. Several design features were observed
during the investigation. The saddle support for the 60-in. flare
header had an angle of contact of 72°. This is less than the mini-
mum angle of contact of 120° for saddles for horizontal pressure
vessels. The flare header was not designed for hydro-fill condi-
tions. Some pipe spans that exceeded 40 ft, coupled with defi-
ciency in saddle design, caused high local stress and ovalization
of the pipe near supports, as confirmed with stress analysis.
The pipe thickness (t) was too thin for its outside diameter
(D), i.e., it had a large D/t ratio of 160, as against the industry
norm of ≤120. In FIG. 4, it can be seen that when the D/t ratio
increases, the allowable strain limit decreases.

0.06000 Strain limit. When a pipe is bent by the application of an ex-

0.05000
ternal moment, it tends to develop changes in cross-section.
The outer radius develops flattening and inner radius kinks
0.04000 inward (buckling).
0.03000 Strain limit is often used to assess the bending capability of
Єc

pipe. As shown in FIG. 4, the strain limit decreases with an increase

0.02000 in the D/t ratio. The strain referred to here is the mechanical
0.01000 strain that produces stresses. Free thermal expansion produces
thermal strain without stressing the material. In a piping system,
0.00000
restraints always limit free thermal expansion; therefore, some
-0.01000 mechanical strain is also induced during thermal expansion.
0 50 100 150 200
D/t ratio Gresnigt’s equations are the basis of FIG. 4.1
Єc = 0.5 ⫻ t/(D-t) – 0.0025 for (D-t)/t < 120
FIG. 4. D/t ratio vs. strain limit, Єc. Єc= 0.2 ⫻ t/(D-t) for a (D-t)/t ≥ 120

AIM MOVE OVER GC

HIGHER
HIT YOUR FURNACE COMBUSTION
THE FUTURE OF ON LINE GAS ANALYSIS IS HERE

TARGETS WITH THE SERVOTOUGH LASERSP

EFFECTIVE COMBUSTION CONTROL IS CRITICAL The NEW SERVOTOUGH SpectraScan

TO EFFICIENT ETHYLENE PRODUCTION.
With fast response TDLS technology that monitors
closer to the burn, the SERVOTOUGH LaserSP’s
unique flue gas analysis solution reduces fuels costs
and CO2 emissions. You can’t get a faster response.
The SERVOTOUGH SpectraScan is a breakthrough in
measurement speed for light hydrocarbons C1-C5+.
A stand-alone solution with superior technology
and benefits, the SpectraScan changes everything.

FIND OUT HOW YOU COULD IMPROVE THE LEARN MORE ABOUT THE REVOLUTION
EFFICIENCY OF ETHYLENE PRODUCTION IN HYDROCARBON GAS ANALYSIS
DOWNLOAD THE WHITE PAPER FROM: DOWNLOAD THE WHITE PAPER FROM:

SERVOMEX.COM/LASERSP SERVOMEX.COM/SPECTRASCAN
OR TO REQUEST ONE, EMAIL: LASERSP@SERVOMEX.COM OR TO REQUEST ONE, EMAIL: SPECTRASCAN@SERVOMEX.COM

S E RVO M E X .CO M A MEASURABLE ADVANTAGE

Select 175 at www.HydrocarbonProcessing.com/RS

106MAY 2013 | HydrocarbonProcessing.com
 Safety/Loss Prevention

D/t is not the lone parameter limiting the bending capacity
of pipe. The other factors are:
• Nonhomogeneity or the presence of imperfections in the
material
• Initial out-of-roundness
• Loading conditions
• Residual stress
• Strength of the material in the longitudinal and circum-
ferential directions
• Shape of the stress–strain diagram.
Thermal bowing. The flare header is designed for flexibil-
ity at 815°F. As per the design, it is expected to move only in
the horizontal plane while undergoing thermal expansion. A
movement in the vertical plane has to counter the gravity loads;
however, the several conditions have led to thermal bowing of
the flare header in the vertical plane:
The cracking occurred after the buckling damage. For crack-
ing, tensile stress is required, and this must have resulted dur-
ing straightening of the pipe when thermal gradients receded
or when reversed.
About 150 ft on either side of the sulfur lateral was deemed
as the only area where all the following conditions required for
local buckling co-existed:
• High temperature due to downstream coker unit relief
• Restraints that opposed thermal bowing
• Large D/t ratio
• Pre-existing ovality due to large local stresses near saddle
supports.
Repairs carried out. After thorough evaluation, repair strat-
egy improvement began. Key improvements included:

restraint
Vertical
• Occasional temperature difference between the top and
bottom half of the horizontal flare header
Cold side–tensile stress
• Ovalization of the pipe, which reduced the stiffness of the
pipe in the vertical direction, compared to the horizontal direction
• To accommodate growth, the pipe tends to bend in the di-
rection of least stiffness.
Hot side–compressive stress
The reason for the circumferential thermal gradient is not
well understood. Within the horizontal flare header, there could Sliding support
be a two-phase flow of hot fluid, with the film-heat transfer co-
efficient being different for the liquid flow and the vapor flow. FIG. 5. Thermal bowing of pipe due to circumferential thermal gradient.
This difference can cause a temperature gradient between the
bottom and top of the pipe. Another possibility is the intermit-
tent and partial flow of liquid, hotter or colder than the mean line
temperature; it could create a circumferential thermal gradient.
FIG. 5 shows thermal bowing of a pipe due to circumferential
thermal gradient. The pipe will bend with outer curvature at
the hotter region. The nature and extent of stresses generated
is dependent on the boundary condition. In this example, the
vertical restraint opposes free thermal bowing. The region of
the pipe where actual displacement is less than needed for free
thermal expansion would be in compression and if reversed,
in tension. Therefore, the hotter half of the pipe will be under
compression and the colder half in tension.

Initial conclusions. The preliminary investigation conclud-

ed that the failure was initiated by local buckling at zones of
compressive strain when thermal bowing occurred in the flare
header. The vertical restraint amplified the stresses at the re-
gion of Failure 1. At failure locations 2 and 3, the sulfur lateral
restrained the rotation and lifting of the 60-in. header, thereby
increasing the stresses.
The large pipe D/t ratio is the root cause of local buckling.
From FIG. 4, the strain limit = 0.00126 for the flare header with
a D/t ratio of 160. This translates to a stress of 35.3 ksi (1 ksi
= 1,000 psi), which is lower than a yield stress of 38 ksi. Imper-
fections and residual stress at the circumferential weld lower
the strain limit, thus explaining how all three failures occurred
at the circumferential welds.
Hoop tensile stress opposes inward buckling of the pipe.
The flare header operating pressure does not exceed 10 psig
and this low value added negligible hoop tensile stress to
counter buckling.
Select 173 at www.HydrocarbonProcessing.com/RS
107
 Safety/Loss Prevention

• A 300-ft section encompassing the failure was replaced

with a thicker pipe
• The D/t ratio for the replacement section was 96
• The saddle supports for the replaced section were rede-
signed with an angle of contact of 120°
• The vertical restraint was modified to a sliding support
• Skin thermocouples were installed at the top and bottom
of the pipe
• The new welds were post-weld-heat-treated to reduce re-
sidual stress and to safeguard against environmental cracking.

Metallurgical examination. A close inspection of the flare

FIG. 6. Failed section of 60-in. flare header.
header section removed for metallurgical inspection is shown
in FIG. 6. Metallurgical observations included:
• Metallurgy of the pipe and weld were verified and found
to match with the original design specification
• No weld defects were detected; two of the failures were
on shop welds and one was on a field weld
• No sign of fatigue or environmental cracking was found
on the specimens examined
• The bottom portion of the pipe, at the weld, buckled in-
ward and the cracks originated at the buckled area
• The cracking was due to ductile overload
• The crack originated at the toe of the weld from the OD
surface of the pipe at the buckled region.
Skin temperature readings taken from the top and bottom
of the pipe after replacement revealed a circumferential ther-

GAS DESULPHURISATION
WITH THIOPAQ O&G:
STABLE & COST EFFECTIVE
Award winning technology for sulphur removal
and sulphur recovery from gas streams. Take the
quick scan at www.paqell.com/scan and receive
instant feedback about how THIOPAQ O&G technology
matches with your desulphurisation requirements!

www.paqell.com

015-0047 Adv Hydrocabon 180x125mmn 13112012 v4 def.indd

Select
1
174 at www.HydrocarbonProcessing.com/RS 13-11-12 16:48
108 MAY 2013 | HydrocarbonProcessing.com
 Safety/Loss Prevention

mal gradient of 150°F. In general, the pipe is hotter at the bot-
tom; however, in some instances, the temperature gradient is
reversed, with the top of the pipe being hotter.
Discussions. Vertical movement of the pipe causing lift-off
from support will add gravity loads to the pipe. Thermal bow-
ing will negate the free draining capability of the line, leading to
localized liquid pooling and associated issues. Thermal bowing
is not common with process plant piping, and when it occurs,
it is a difficult problem to correct. Most failures due to thermal
bowing are fatigue cracking at the circumferential welds. Buck-
ling due to thermal bowing is extremely rare due to installing
pipes with favorable D/t ratio. The 60-in. flare header had both
a very large D/t ratio and a loading/displacement condition
that increased vulnerability to buckling.
When large lateral displacements are imposed on piping,
failure generally manifests as localized buckling. Buckling is
a failure due to instability and it causes process of achieving
equilibrium between external loads, internal resistance and
boundary restraint. Strain-based design is typically adopted for
displacement controlled designs. Examples are subsea piping
or buried lines with large ground movements.
In a piping flexibility analysis, the displacement stress range
is compared with the allowable stress range. This is essentially
a check against potential fatigue failure due to cyclic tensile
stress. Compressive stress or strain limit checks are not part
of a piping flexibility analysis. Piping stress analysis softwares
treat pipe as a beam and cannot predict local buckling of the
shell elements.
Large D/t ratio also increases susceptibility to failures due
to acoustic induced vibration (AIV). AIV is caused by high
sound pressure levels inside flare headers during significant
relief scenarios. AIV failures typically develop at small bore tie-
ins to the flare header.
Findings. If the D/t ratio of the pipe exceeds 100, these pre-
cautions apply:
• When the pipeline is subjected to large bending mo-
ments, external pressure or axial compression, strain-based de-
sign/buckling assessment using finite element analysis (FEA)
should be performed
• Equations for stress intensity factors given in ASME
B31.3 are valid only for D/t ≤ 100
• During flexibility analysis, corrected stress intensity fac-
tors estimated through FEA should be used
• Flare headers should be designed with a dead load that
includes one quarter full of liquid
• Saddle supports for piping with a large D/t ratio require
design considerations like pressure vessel saddles (Zick analysis)
• The D/t ratio for flare headers should be less than 120.
LITERATURE CITED
1
Gresnigt, A. M. and R. J. Van Foeken, “Local buckling of UOE and seamless steel
pipes,” 11th International Offshore and Polar Engineering Conference, Stavanger,
Norway, June 2011.

JULY 30–31, 2013

Norris Conference Centers – CityCentre Houston, Texas

GulfPub.com/GTL

Hydrocarbon Processing Introduces the Inaugural

Gas-to-Liquids Technology Forum
Gulf Publishing Company’s inaugural Gas-to-Liquids (GTL) Technology Forum will investigate the technology and
trends at work as GTL usage and projects become increasingly popular. The two-day technology conference will
feature industry keynotes and presentations from GTL technology experts.
GTL is poised to become an increasingly important part of the North American energy industry. As the natural
gas boom in North America continues and new technologies emerge to reduce costs, company interest is
increasing—and so is investment. Project announcements and planning from industry innovators like Sasol, Shell
and BP are beginning to ramp up in this energy niche.
GTL Technology Forum is your chance to connect with top operators and technology leaders from across the
global hydrocarbon processing industry. Sponsorship at this event will benefit the following types of companies
active in the GTL sector: GTL technology providers, GTL engineering companies, major and independent
operators, catalyst companies, specialized equipment manufacturers, turbine specialists and others.
For more information, contact your local Hydrocarbon Processing sales representative or Bret Ronk,
publisher, at +1 (713) 520-4421 or Bret.Ronk@GulfPub.com.
Hydrocarbon Processing | MAY 2013109