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The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Aesthetics Marcos Nadal Ebook Full Chapter
The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Aesthetics Marcos Nadal Ebook Full Chapter
E M P I R IC A L
A E ST H E T IC S
OXFOR D LIBR A RY OF PS YCHOLOG Y
EMPIRICAL
AESTHETICS
Edited by
MARCOS NADAL
OSHIN VARTANIAN
Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP,
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A dva n c e P r a i s e
A must-have for those interested in the psychology of aesthetics, the arts, and subjective
experiences that in the past have defied empirical investigation.
Robert J. Sternberg,
Professor of Psychology,
Cornell University, USA
How do we respond to and evaluate works of art? How is our response shaped by biology,
culture, and/or personality? What methods are used to answer such questions empiric-
ally? For all researchers in the field of empirical aesthetics, and for readers outside the
field interested in art and the mind, this handbook is an essential resource.
Ellen Winner
Professor Emerita of Psychology, Boston College, USA
Senior Research Associate, Project Zero, Harvard Graduate School of Education, USA
Author of How Art Works: A Psychological Exploration (OUP, 2019)
Filled to the brim with chapters on every imaginable aspect of the exciting and
expanding field of empirical aesthetics. Overseen by masterful editors, this book is
required reading for any scholar of the arts.
James C. Kaufman,
Professor of Educational Psychology,
University of Connecticut, USA
Preface
The Madonna des Bürgermeisters Jacob Meyer zum Hasen, painted by Hans Holbein the
Younger in 1526, sold for about $75 million on July 12, 2011, becoming Germany’s most
expensive artwork at the time (Gropp, 2011). Not only is it regarded among the greatest
German Renaissance paintings, the Madonna sparked one of the fiercest and most con-
sequential controversies in art history, and motivated Gustav Theodor Fechner to use
empirical methods to study the appreciation of art. In doing so, he founded empirical
aesthetics.
In 1743, the Dresden Gemäldegalerie acquired Hans Holbein’s Madonna des
Bürgermeisters Jacob Meyer zum Hasen. This was no small addition to its collection for,
at the time, it was considered the greatest painting in German art, equal to Raphael’s
Sistine Madonna. It must have come as a shock when, in 1821, a second version surfaced
in a private collection in Darmstadt. The question of which version was the authentic
Holbein, and which the copy, quickly became a national controversy. What began as a
dispute among academics soon flared into a full-blown political affair, entangled with
ideological passions (Bader, 2018b). Artists and academic art historians competed for
the authority to decide on the works’ authenticity. Each side rolled out countless essays
and pamphlets, printed and distributed reproductions of the paintings accompanied by
analyses, arguments, and counterarguments, and spoke at conferences and exhibitions.
Fechner had been interested in the Holbein Madonna controversy at least since
shortly after publishing his Elements of Psychophysics (Fechner, 1860). He compiled,
presented, and discussed the history of the conflict and the two sides to it (Fechner,
1871a), and he plunged into it himself with several iconographic analyses (Fechner,
1866a-b, 1868, 1870a-b). In his opinion, both were authentic paintings by Holbein, but
they expressed two different meanings. He thought that Holbein painted the Darmstadt
version first, and intended it for a chapel, and the Dresden version later, and intended it
for the family home (Fechner, 1870a). Fechner concluded that the Dresden version was
a votive work, and that the sick-looking infant was an amalgamation of the Christ Child
and the donor’s ill child (Fechner, 1866b). Later, he speculated that the oldest woman in
the painting was Meyer’s deceased first wife, and that the figure of the Madonna was the
portrait of one of Meyer’s deceased daughters carrying her sick son (Fechner, 1868).
viii Preface
The way to settle the conflict, it was finally agreed, was to exhibit the two paintings to-
gether. So, in 1869, the plans began for a Holbein retrospective exhibition that would fea-
ture, for the first time ever, both versions of the Madonna side by side. The exhibition had
to be postponed, however, because of the Franco-Prussian war (July 19, 1870 –January
28, 1871). The exhibition had been on Fechner’s mind while writing his monograph
On Experimental Aesthetics, published in early 1871. Fechner (1871b) devoted much of
it to arguing for the use of empirical methods in the study of aesthetics. He made his
point mainly in reference to the pleasure of simple forms. But he also believed that the
methods of empirical aesthetics could be used to study art, especially in the case of com-
parable artworks that have led to unresolved disputes among connoisseurs. He explicitly
mentioned the two versions of Holbein’s Madonna as the sort of case to which his new
methods could be applied. He expected that the joint exhibition would add fuel to the
conflict about authenticity without necessarily settling it. His experimental aesthetics,
however, could answer a different, more fertile, question: which of the two versions is
more preferred aesthetically by people in general, or by experts vs. laypeople, or by men
vs. women? (Fechner, 1871b).
Finally, the peace treaty was signed in May 1871, and the plans for the exhibition
moved forward. It took place from August 15 to October 15, 1871, in Dresden’s recently
built Prinzen Pavillion. By the time’s standards, it was massive. On display were over
500 items, including paintings, woodcuts, drawings, and photographs, lent from over
60 museums, galleries, and private collections from over 40 European cities. It was the
first time masterpieces had been transported across frontiers for an exhibition on such
a scale; the first time an art exhibition had been promoted by art history academics,
and not aristocrats, nobility, governments, or artist associations (Haskell, 2000); and
the first time the paintings were seen side by side. Alfred Richard Diether, artist and
teacher at the School of Arts and Crafts, captured the interest of the exhibition’s visitors
for the Madonnas in the pencil and watercolor image on the cover of this book. The ex-
hibition catalogue included a bibliography of over 70 publications on the controversy
compiled by Fechner (Bader, 2018b), showing just how absorbed in the controversy he
had become.
The exhibition committee allowed Fechner to conduct the research on the visitors’
preferences he had been planning for a year. In the hall where the two paintings were
exhibited, he placed an announcement of his study, a table and necessary writing
materials, the instructions for participants, and a booklet with space for the visitors
to write their answers. The scene, sketched by the renowned German painter Adolph
Menzel in his pocketbook, as “Plebiscite table” (Figure 1), was certainly an unusual one
to see at a museum. The art historians at the exhibition dismissed Fechner’s study, for
the issue of aesthetic value could only confound the issue of authenticity (Bätschmann,
1996). In an analysis of the role that the Holbein exhibition at Dresden played in the
forging of art history as an academic discipline, Bader (2018a) recounts the skeptical
remarks of one of the most eminent Holbein scholars: “Off to one side, on a writing
desk, can be found a pen, a large book, and a placard above it. Professor Fechner, the
Preface ix
they had only conducted a handful of studies on aesthetic appreciation, mostly on the
effects of the proportions of simple geometrical forms, 34 years after Fechner’s (1876)
Aesthetics. Psychologists’ interest in the two fields founded by Fechner could hardly have
been more unalike. But why?
The reason, in Santayana’s (1896) words, was that:
The moderns, also, even within the field of psychology, have studied first the function
of perception and the theory of knowledge, by which we seem to be informed about
external things; they have in comparison neglected the exclusively subjective and
human department of imagination and emotion. We have still to recognize in
practice the truth that from these despised feelings of ours the great world of percep-
tion derives all its value, if not also its existence.
(Santayana, 1896, p. 3)
The editors of this volume would like to express their deepest gratitude to the authors
for the time, diligence, and care they have put into each of the chapters that make up
this book. Contributions to handbooks are not valued nearly enough by academic per-
formance metrics. We would also like to thank Charlotte Holloway, Laura Heston, and
Martin Baum at Oxford University Press, whose commitment, guidance, and support
from beginning to end made this handbook a reality.
References
Bader, L. (2018a). Artists versus art historians? Conflicting interpretations in the Holbein con-
troversy. Journal of Art Historiography, 19, 1–23.
Bader, L. (2018b). The Holbein exhibition of 1871—an iconic turning point for art history. In M.
W. Gahtan & D. Pegazzano (Eds.), Monographic exhibitions and the history of art (pp. 129–
142). New York, NY: Routledge.
Bätschmann, O. (1996). Der Holbein-Streit: eine Krise der Kunstgeschichte. Jahrbuch Der
Berliner Museen, 38, 87–100.
Fechner, G. T. (1860). Elemente der Psychophysik. Leipzig: Breitkopf und Härtel.
Fechner, G. T. (1866a). Die historischen Quellen und Verhandlungen über die Holbein’sche
Madonna: Monographisch zusammengestellt und discutirt. Archiv Für Die Zeichnenden
Künste, 12, 193–266.
Fechner, G. T. (1866b). Vorbesprechung über die Dentungsfrage der Holbein’schen Madonna
mit Rücksicht auf die Handzeiclmung Nr. 65 des Baseler Museum. Archiv Für Die
Zeichnenden Künste, 12, 1–30.
Fechner, G. T. (1868). Nachtrag zu den drei Abhandlungen über die Holbein’sche (Meier’sche)
Madonna. Archiv Für Die Zeichnenden Künste, 14, 149–187.
Fechner, G. T. (1870a). Der Streit um die beiden Madonnen von Holbein. Die Grenzboten.
Zeitschrift Fur Politik Und Literatur, 2, 1–18.
Fechner, G. T. (1870b). Ueber das Holbein’sche Votivbild mit dem Bürgermeister Schwartz in
Augsburg. Archiv Für Die Zeichnenden Künste, 16, 1–39.
Fechner, G. T. (1871a). Ueber die Aechtheitsfrage der Holbein’schen Madonna. Discussion un
Acten. Leipzig: Breitkopf und Härtel.
Fechner, G. T. (1871b). Zur experimentalen Aesthetik. Leipzig: Hirzel.
Fechner, G. T. (1872). Bericht über das auf der Dresdner Holbein-ausstellung ausgelegte Album.
Leipzig: Breitkopf und Härtel.
Fechner, G. T. (1876). Vorschule der Ästhetik. Leipzig: Breitkopf und Härtel.
Gropp, R.- M. (2011, July 14). Holbein— Madonna. Deutschlands teuerstes Kunstwerk.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.
Haskell, F. (2000). The Ephemeral Museum: Old Master Paintings and the Rise of the Art
Exhibition. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Leder, H. (2005). Zur Psychologie der Rezeption moderner Kunst. In B. Graf & A. B. Müller
(Eds.), Sichtweisen. Zur veränderten Wahrnehmung von Objekten in Museen (pp. 79–90).
Berlin: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
Santayana, G. (1896). The sense of beauty. Being the outline of aesthetic theory. New York: Charles
Scribner’s Sons.
Titchener, E. B. (1910). The past decade in experimental psychology. The American Journal of
Psychology, 21, 404–421.
Contents
SE C T ION 2 . M E T HOD S
9. Historiometric Methods 199
Dean Keith Simonton
xiv Contents
SE C T ION 3 . OB J E C T F E AT U R E S
18. The Role of Collative Variables in Aesthetic Experiences 385
Manuela M. Marin
19. Processing Fluency 430
Michael Forster
20. The Use of Visual Statistical Features in Empirical Aesthetics 447
Daniel Graham
21. Color 475
Oshin Vartanian
Contents xv
SE C T ION 4 . A RT F OR M S
25. The Empirical Aesthetics of Music 573
Elvira Brattico
26. The Aesthetics of Action and Movement 605
Emily S. Cross and Andrea Orlandi
27. Aesthetics of Dance 623
Beatriz Calvo-Merino
28. The Audio-Visual Aesthetics of Music and Dance 638
Guido Orgs and Claire Howlin
29. Aesthetic Responses to Architecture 660
Alexander Coburn and Anjan Chatterjee
30. Aesthetics, Technology, and Popular Movies 682
James E. Cutting
31. Empirical Aesthetics of Poetry 704
Winfried Menninghaus and Stefan Blohm
32. Aesthetic Responses to the Characters, Plots, Worlds, and Style of
Stories 721
Marta M. Maslej, Joshua A. Quinlan, and Raymond A. Mar
SE C T ION 5 . T H E P E R S ON
33. The Role of Attention, Executive Processes, and Memory in
Aesthetic Experience 751
John W. Mullennix
34. Children’s Appreciation of Art 770
Thalia R. Goldstein
xvi Contents
SE C T ION 6 . T H E C ON T E X T
39. The General Impact of Context on Aesthetic Experience 885
Matthew Pelowski and Eva Specker
40. Empirical Aesthetics: Context, Extra Information, and Framing 921
Helmut Leder and Matthew Pelowski
41. Studying Empirical Aesthetics in Museum Contexts 943
Jeffrey K. Smith and Lisa F. Smith
42. Aesthetic Experience in Everyday Environments 960
Paul J. Silvia and Katherine N. Cotter
43. The Impact of the Social Context on Aesthetic Experience 973
Stefano Mastandrea
SE C T ION 7. A P P L IC AT ION S
44. Design and Aesthetics 993
Paul Hekkert
45. The Role of Empirical Aesthetics in Consumer Behavior 1010
Vanessa M. Patrick and Henrik Hagtvedt
46. On the Empirical Aesthetics of Plating 1027
Charles Spence
Index 1053
List of Contributors
F OU N DAT ION S
Chapter 1
E m pirical Ae st h et i c s
An Overview
Gustav T. Fechner (1871, 1876) had high hopes for empirical aesthetics. He expected it
to evolve into a unified system of general principles of beauty and art. Fechner’s empir-
ical aesthetics, thus, had the same goals as philosophy, but it progressed in the opposite
direction. Whereas philosophical aesthetics began “from above,” with general principles
that could then be applied to specific cases, empirical aesthetics began “from below.”
Aesthetics from below meant dealing first with the most basic elements and facts of aes-
thetics. It meant, specifically, explaining the reasons for liking and disliking particular
cases, and why objects give pleasure or displeasure. From these explanations, a series
of principles could then be deduced, which would eventually coalesce into a compre-
hensive system of beauty and the arts. Fechner, thus, conceived empirical aesthetics as
the scientific investigation of beauty and art that begins by collecting specific facts that can
later be used to build up general principles and, eventually, a general system of aesthetics.
A century later, this general system of aesthetics was still not in sight. Empirical
aesthetics had not even made much progress moving from the particular cases to the
general principles (see Section 2, and Nadal & Ureña, this volume). Daniel E. Berlyne
summarized the achievements of a century-worth of research in empirical aesthetics
as “relatively sparse and, on the whole, not profoundly enlightening” (Berlyne, 1974,
p. 5). Berlyne (1971, 1974) attributed the lack of meaningful progress to unfounded
assumptions, outdated theories, and obsolete methods. So, he set out to place empir-
ical aesthetics within a general information theory and motivational framework and to
develop a new suite of methods. Berlyne’s (1974) “new experimental aesthetics” differed
from Fechner’s “old experimental aesthetics” in that it focused on properties that
modified arousal levels, its explanations were grounded in motivational mechanisms, it
studied nonverbal behavior as well as verbal judgments, and it did not aspire to produce
4 Marcos Nadal and Oshin Vartanian
an autonomous aesthetic system, but to show how aesthetic phenomena were the result
of common psychological processes. As such, Berlyne (1972) conceived empirical aes-
thetics as the scientific study of the motivational effects of collative properties of stimulus
patterns. More specifically, empirical aesthetics was the study of how and why struc-
tural features make stimuli appear surprising, novel, complex, or ambiguous; how they
modulate arousal levels and, consequently, the stimuli’s hedonic value, that is to say,
their pleasurableness, reward value, and incentive value (Berlyne, 1974).
In the 50 years that have passed since Berlyne (1971) reformulated empirical aes-
thetics via his new experimental aesthetics, the field has grown substantially and has
benefited from the addition of many new methods. Berlyne’s focus on arousal-related
motivational mechanisms turned out to be overly restrictive and simplistic. We now
know that liking something, or finding it pleasing, beautiful, or attractive, is not merely
a matter of responding to its features. We know that liking, pleasingness, beauty, and at-
tractiveness are influenced by momentary personal factors, such as expectations, avail-
able information (Pelowski & Specker, this volume and Leder & Pelowski, this volume),
attention, and memory (Mullennix, this volume), and by stable personal attributes,
such as personality (Swami & Furnham, this volume), age, (Goldstein, this volume),
expertise (Kozbelt, this volume), aesthetic sensitivity (Myszkowski, this volume), and
cultural background (Che & Sun, this volume), among others. Even the physical context
(Smith & Smith, this volume and Silvia & Cotter, this volume) and the social context
(Mastandrea, this volume) can modulate assessments of liking, pleasingness, beauty,
and attractiveness. Indeed, aesthetic appreciation is a good example of the contextual
permeability of perception, cognition, and emotion (Bar, 2004; Mesquita, Barrett,
& Smith, 2010). We also know now that aesthetic appreciation cannot be reduced to
arousal-boosting or -reducing motivational mechanisms. We know it involves complex
interactions between several perceptual, cognitive, and affective processes—realized in
the form of top-down and bottom-up processes (Chatterjee & Vartanian, 2014; Leder,
Belke, Oeberst, & Augustin, 2004; Skov, 2019). Berlyne was right when he argued
that the phenomena we consider aesthetic rely on general neural and psychological
mechanisms, although the data and methods available to him could not reveal the diver-
sity and complexity of those mechanisms.
Clearly, the knowledge we have gained and the methods we have added since Berlyne
(1971, 1974) refashioned empirical aesthetics, and certainly since Fechner (1871, 1876)
created the domain, require broadening the definition of empirical aesthetics. The most
inclusive definition would conceive empirical aesthetics as the scientific field that uses
empirical methods to study aesthetics. Although tautological, this definition specifies
the features of the knowledge empirical aesthetics seeks and generates (scientific know-
ledge), the kinds of methods it uses (empirical methods), and what the knowledge it
seeks and generates is about (aesthetics). It avoids Fechner’s promise of a general system
of art and aesthetics, and Berlyne’s reduction of all explanation to a single major mech-
anism. The scientific and empirical aspects of this definition are probably quite uncon-
troversial, but there will surely be disagreement among empirical aestheticians today
about what aesthetics is. So, let us first see what it means that empirical aesthetics is a
Empirical Aesthetics 5
scientific field, and why it is that it uses empirical methods. We can then turn to the con-
tentious issue of what aesthetics is or is not about.
• First, that, as with research in biology, medicine, and other scientific disciplines, re-
search in empirical aesthetics occurs with the understanding that its focus of study
is coextensive with the natural world. As such, research findings and inferences
emerging in empirical aesthetics must be informed by and can potentially con-
tribute to knowledge in other domains of natural science.
• Second, that empirical aesthetics generates descriptive knowledge by recording data
as they are observed, as with surveys and questionnaires, natural observation, and
central tendency and dispersion summary statistics. It also generates explanatory
knowledge when it uses experimental methods. Experiments involve the manipu-
lation of one or several factors and the observation of the effects on one or several
outcomes under controlled conditions. Experimental control is indispensable for
explanations in terms of causes and effects, and the associated ability to draw causal
inferences.
• Third, it means that knowledge in empirical aesthetics is not disjointed, but
assembled into scientific theories. Empirical aesthetics formulates scientific
theories based on the descriptive and explanatory knowledge it generates. It uses
those theories to make predictions about future results, in the form of hypotheses,
and to interpret those results. Thus, the theories of empirical aesthetics should
make clear and falsifiable predictions, be consistent with existing results, and make
accurate predictions of new results. A good scientific theory is able to accurately
describe (what), identify the underlying mechanisms (how), and interpret (why)
observations in its domain (Dayan & Abbott, 2001, p. xiii).
• Fourth, it means that these descriptive and explanatory results can be—and should
be—tested again in replication studies. Many tenets in empirical aesthetics, and
psychology and neuroscience in general, rest only on single experiments, even
though some are taught and presented in handbooks as established facts. The
knowledge generated by empirical aesthetics should be reliable, but reliability is
difficult to measure unless experiments are repeated and replicated. Some of these
replications might confirm previous results, and support their conclusions, while
others might not. Reiterated failures to replicate should lead to the rejection of
6 Marcos Nadal and Oshin Vartanian
those tenets, and to new alternative explanations. In this sense, attempts at falsifica-
tion must be central to the practice of the science.
• Fifth, it means that the findings in empirical aesthetics are revisable. It is not a
weakness of scientific knowledge that it is revisable and provisional; it is one of its
fundamental strengths. With revision comes progress, so the more a scientific field
revises it knowledge, the faster it progresses. A scientific domain is alive when there
is room for major improvements to current knowledge, but lifeless when there is
little room for improvement, if that is possible at all. The revisability of scientific
knowledge is what distinguishes it from dogma. Scientific dogmatism—resistance
to revise ideas held on to as truths despite challenging results—has more in
common with faith than with science.
• Sixth, it means that empirical aesthetics commonly progresses through the piece-
meal accretion of results produced by different teams of researchers. New findings,
or a reinterpretation of old ones, might occasionally make a field leap forward,
and some individuals have a pivotal impact on progress, as Fechner and Berlyne
undoubtedly had on empirical aesthetics. But these are the exceptions. As a rule,
science is an incremental and collective endeavor.
induced certain arousal dynamics (i.e., hypothesized consequences) that, in turn, lead
to (i.e., hypothesized causes) pleasure or displeasure (i.e., observed consequences).
Theories are the source of the interpretation of patterns of collected observations, and
the source of predictions about future observations. Indeed, it is debatable whether
atheoretical observation is even possible, given that our decisions regarding what to ob-
serve are influenced heavily by expectations. Thus, empirical aesthetics does not collect
observations for the sake of it, but rather to improve its explanations and predictions.
The objects investigated by the science are on the one hand judgments of aesthetic
pleasure and displeasure, and on the other works of art. The separation of the two
groups shows that there was truth in the old distinction between a philosophy of
beauty and a philosophy of art. The aesthetic judgment extends beyond works of
art, since there is a beauty of nature as well as of art; and works of art give us more
than the aesthetic judgment, since when we have decided as to the pleasingness or
displeasingness of their impression we can go on to discuss the conditions of their
origination, the relation between portrayal and portrayed, between the form and
contents, copy and model, etc. etc.
(Külpe, 1897, p. 88)
Berlyne (1972) agreed that empirical aesthetics should study art and aesthetic appreci-
ation, but he was wary of grounding the definition of the field on either aspect. Such a
definition, he believed, would misleadingly suggest that aesthetics was a separate do-
main of human life, and would cut empirical aesthetics off from the rest of the behav-
ioral and brain sciences: “The essentially superstitious view that the aesthetic realm is
sharply distinct from the rest of life and governed by principles peculiar to itself has long
been a bugbear” (Berlyne, 1972, p. 304).
Today, empirical aesthetics continues to be divided about what makes art and aes-
thetic experiences unique and different to other kinds of objects and experiences, re-
spectively. The various positions on this topic lie along a continuum. At one pole of the
continuum we find researchers who argue that art and aesthetic experience involve
unique forms of pleasure or emotion, and that it is therefore important to distinguish
aesthetic pleasure, aesthetic emotions or art emotions from nonaesthetic or non-art-
based pleasure and emotion (Christensen, 2017; Fingerhut & Prinz, 2020; Makin, 2017;
8 Marcos Nadal and Oshin Vartanian
Menninghaus et al., 2019). At the other pole of the continuum we find researchers who
argue that art and aesthetic experience involve the same kind of pleasure and emotions
as any other kind of object and experience and that, therefore, the notions of aesthetic
pleasure, aesthetic or art emotions are unnecessary and misleading (Berlyne, 1972;
Nadal & Skov, 2018; Skov & Nadal, 2019, 2020). Somewhere between both of these poles
we find the views of researchers who have argued that aesthetic experiences arise from
a unique combination of general cognitive and affective processes (Leder et al., 2004;
Pelowski, Markey, Forster, Gerger, & Leder, 2017), and those who have argued that aes-
thetic emotion is ordinary emotion lacking its motivational component (Chatterjee,
2014; Chatterjee & Vartanian, 2014).
A Brief History of
Empirical Aesthetics
In the preceding pages our chief aim has been to determine the
nature and the mode of action of the influences under which the
Assyro-Chaldæan sculptor had to do his work. We have explained
how certain conditions hampered his progress and in some respects
arrested the development of his skill.
The height to which the plastic genius of this people might have
carried their art had their social habits been more favourable to the
study of the nude, may perhaps be better judged from their treatment
of animals than anything else. Some of these, both in relief and in
the round, are far superior to their human figures, and even now
excite the admiration of sculptors.
The cause of this difference is easily seen. When an artist had to
represent an animal, his study of its form was not embarrassed by
any such obstacle as a long and heavy robe. The animal could be
watched in its naked simplicity and all its instinctive and
characteristic movements grasped. The sculptor could follow each
contour of his model; he could take account of the way in which the
limbs were attached to the trunk; he saw the muscles swell beneath
the skin, he saw them tighten with exertion and relax when at rest.
He was not indifferent to such a sight; on the contrary, he eagerly
drank in the instruction it afforded, and of all the works he produced
those in which such knowledge is put into action are by far the most
perfect; they show us better than anything else how great were his
native gifts, and what a fund of sympathy with the beauties of life and
with its inexhaustible variety his nature contained. Whether he model
an animal separately or introduce it into some historic scene, it is
always well rendered both in form and movement.
This is to be most clearly seen in the rich and varied series of
Assyrian reliefs, but the less numerous works of the same kind of
Babylonian origin show the same tendency and at least equal talent.
In copying the principal types of the animal world with fidelity and
vigour, the Assyrian sculptors only followed the example set them by
their south-country masters.
Fig. 68.—Head of a cow, bronze.
British Museum. Width across the
cheeks 3¾ inches.
A cow’s head in bronze, which was brought from Bagdad by Mr.
Rassam, is broad in treatment and of great truth (Fig. 68); the same
good qualities are to be found in a terra-cotta tablet found by Sir
Henry Rawlinson in the course of his excavations in the Birs-
Nimroud (Fig. 69). It represents a man, semi-nude and beardless
and with a stout stick in his hand, leading a large and powerfully
made dog by a plaited strap. It is a sort of mastiff that might be used
for hunting the wild beasts in the desert and marshes, the wild boar,
hyena, and panther, if not the lion. The characteristics of the species
are so well marked that naturalists have believed themselves able to
recognise it as that of a dog which is still extant, not in Mesopotamia
indeed, but in Central Asia.[167] We may seek in it for the portrait of
one of those Indian hounds kept, in the time of Herodotus, by the
Satrap of Babylon. His pack was so numerous that it took the
revenues of four large villages to support it.[168]
Similar subjects were represented upon other tablets of the same
origin. One of them shows a lion about to devour a bull and disturbed
by a man brandishing a mace. Nothing could be more faithful than
the action of the animal; without letting go his prey he raises a paw,
its claws opened and extended and ready to be buried in the side of
the rash person who interrupts his meal.[169]