An Unbreakable Path? A Comparative Study of Decentralization and Local Government Development Trajectories in Ghana and Uganda

International
Review of
Administrative
Article Sciences
International Review of
Administrative Sciences
77(2) 347–377
An unbreakable path? ! The Author(s) 2011
A comparative study of Reprints and permissions:
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decentralization and local DOI: 10.1177/0020852311399844
ras.sagepub.com
government development
trajectories in Ghana and Uganda
Nicholas Awortwi
Erasmus University, The Hague
Abstract
The evolutionary theory of path dependency suggests that the longer an institution has
been in place, the more resilient it is to change. Given enough time and self-reinforcing
mechanisms, an organizational and institutional path develops and becomes highly resis-
tant to change and likely to endure for a long time. Since the path benefits those who
created it, the same actors cannot unlock it. Only an ‘exogenous shock’ (an event
outside the path) can radically change the incentives or constraints facing the actors
and enable a country to break free of the path. This article applies these propositions to
explain the past, present and future trajectories of decentralization and local govern-
ment (LG) institutional development in Ghana and Uganda. The article shows that
Uganda pursued a sequence of political, administrative and fiscal decentralization
whereas in Ghana the order was administrative, political and fiscal. As a result,
Uganda has made a little progress, more than Ghana, in strengthening LG institutions.
However, given that neither Uganda nor Ghana followed an ideal sequence of decen-
tralization reforms that would have strengthened LGs against unbridled central govern-
ment (CG) interference, currently CGs in both countries are retaking much of what
was initially decentralized. The article concludes that recentralization and further weak-
ening of LGs are likely to continue in both countries because the initial path that was
created benefited CG politicians and bureaucrats and they are committed to staying on
that course.
Points for practitioners

Many countries have developed a decentralization policy that aims at streamlining the
relationship between central and local governments. However, professionals working in
the field of public management and administration need to bear in mind that recentra-
lization is possible even in the midst of a decentralization policy. This is because while
Corresponding author:
Nicholas Awortwi, Institute of Social Studies, PO Box 29776, Erasmus University, The Hague 2502 LT,
The Netherlands
Email: awortwi@iss.nl
348 International Review of Administrative Sciences 77(2)
central government leadership finds it expedient to appear to support a decentraliza-

tion policy they do not wish to see the growth of powerful local institutions that might
challenge their monopoly over power and resources that are needed for local devel-
opment. Sustained donor pressure as a condition for budgetary support is a plausible
exogenous factor that can force central government leadership in developing countries
to commit to the tenets of decentralization.
Keywords
intergovernmental relations, public administration, regional and local government
Introduction: decentralization as evolving paradigm shift

A survey conducted more than a decade ago in 75 developing and transitional
nations with populations greater than five million found that only 12 had not
embarked on some form of decentralization (Dillinger, 1994: 8). The theoretical
rationale for undertaking decentralization is that transfer of some central govern-
ment (CG) authority, resources, responsibilities and accountability to sub-national
governments empowers local institutions and organizations to undertake more
effective self-governance and development appropriate to local conditions
(Balagun, 2000; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006; Oyugi, 2000). However, in reality
African countries that are implementing decentralization have diverse rationales –
political, economic, ethnic, and territorial – that may have a tangential relationship
at best to the theoretical rationale stated above. For instance, according to Shah
and Thompson (2004: 3), ethnic-based political conflicts set off the type of decen-
tralization found in Ethiopia, Nigeria, and South Africa; while territorial conflicts
lent weight in Madagascar, Mali, and Senegal. Improving service delivery was the
impetus for decentralization in Cote D’Ivoire. Nevertheless, as decentralization
progresses in a country other intentions are added, sparking a new form of decen-
tralization that may shift the emphasis from the previous ones.
Currently more than two-thirds of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)
have implemented one or more decentralization policy reforms. According to
Olowu (2003), the current decentralization policy focus in Africa is devolution,
in which the power to deliberate, make decisions, plan and execute development
programmes for localities is transferred from CG politicians to locally elected pol-
iticians, thereby promoting local self-governance. Many analysts argue that the
current process differs from the efforts of the 1960s and 1970s because it is
taking place alongside broad economic and political reforms and with the support
of donors that have made democratic reforms a condition for maintaining support
(Abrahamsen, 2000; Romeo, 1996; Mkandawire, 1999). Despite the shift in focus, a
typical conclusion that often emerges from studies on African decentralization is
that, on the whole, CGs have been reluctant to decentralize sufficient powers and
resources to LGs and so the potential benefits of building and deepening institu-
tions for local self-governance have not been realized from the current round of
Awortwi 349
decentralization reforms (Conyers, 2007; Crook, 2003; Crook and Manor, 1998;
Helmsing, 2005; Olowu and Wunsch, 2004; Ribot, 2002; Smoke, 2003; Therkildsen,
1993).
As Helmsing puts it:
Only in a few countries there is [sic] a broad-based political drive towards democratic
decentralisation. In many countries, decentralisation is a reluctant process: although
CGs see the need for more local embedding of the state, they are reluctant to devolve
substantial powers to LGs. CG officials remain control oriented (2005: 313).
Using the database of the Global Urban Observatory, Helmsing (2005) shows that
in 19 out of 27 SSA countries, CGs have the power to close down LGs. In 14 of the
27 countries the CG can unilaterally remove local councillors. In Nairobi (Kenya)
and Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) CGs have successfully dissolved locally elected
councils and appointed commissions to manage the cities (Karanja, 2005;
Mhamba and Titus, 2001). This practice is more widespread in politically contested
cities and districts. In only 18 out of 27 countries do LGs have some powers to set
local tax rates (mostly subject to CG approval). In only three countries do LGs
have full autonomy to set tax rates. In 12 of the 27 countries LGs have no bor-
rowing powers. In only nine of the 27 countries do LGs have full autonomy to
select their own contractors.
The questions many critics continue to ask are: Why has progress in local self-
governance stalled in many countries in Africa after almost two decades of imple-
menting democratic decentralization reforms? Why do those that purport to
strengthen LG institutions as part of the new rationale for their decentralization
later take back from LGs what they have already decentralized? Why are LG
actors unable to resist recentralization? Critics and advocates of decentralization
in Africa ask these questions because many of them assume that there is a direct
connection between decentralization and empowerment of institutions for local
self-governance without questioning this overarching assumption. This article
argues that if decentralization is conceived as a multi-dimensional process that
entails political bargaining over the content and implementation of different
types of policy, it will be established that certain forms of decentralization in
fact decrease the power and institutional development of LGs to promote local
self-governance. It will also be established that implementation of decentralization
involves making strategic decisions from alternative choices. Each of these pro-
cesses has the potential to weaken instead of strengthen the inter-governmental
balance of power. Therefore in order to conclude that decentralization has not
brought about the needed empowerment at the local level there is a need to estab-
lish first what type of decentralization policies are being implemented, when did
those policies start, who initiated them, and how have those policies been
sequenced. Second, since different forms of decentralization policies have been
implemented in SSA there is a need for a framework to provide a better under-
standing of how decentralization in one area interacts with, reinforces or halts
decentralization reforms in other areas and their likely effect on institutions for
local self-governance.
This article unpacks decentralization policies into its various forms and uses
path dependency analysis (Mahoney, 2000; Pierson, 2000, 2004) and Falleti’s
sequential theory of decentralization (Falleti, 2005) to argue that the sequence in
the implementation of decentralization policies matters in determining the degree
of empowerment or progress in LG autonomy in comparison with CG in terms of
(a) economic resources that enhance the capacity of LGs to pursue their desired
courses of action; (b) legal authority, which sets an institutional limit on what LGs
can and cannot do and; (c) organizational capacities, which facilitate coordination
at each level of government. In other words the study aims to establish that the
current weakened institutional structures and mechanisms for local self-governance
are based on earlier reforms that created a path that has been difficult to depart
from by those whose interest the path serves.
Decentralization policies, path dependency and sequential

theory
Decentralization has been defined in many ways on the basis of what the policy
aims to achieve: transferring responsibility for planning, management, and
resource-raising from the CG to field units of CG ministries or agencies
(Rondinelli, 1981); changing relationships of power and subordination between
central and sub-national levels and redefining the functional roles of units at
each of these levels (Elcock and Minogue, 2001: 101); and creating open, responsive
and effective LG systems for decision-making (UNDP, 1998: 4). In this study lower
levels of government are considered recipients of the transferred responsibilities,
resources, or authority and therefore market decentralization is not discussed.
Much of the literature on inter-governmental decentralization distinguishes three
different forms of decentralization:
Administrative decentralization
In administrative decentralization, a set of policies creates or transfers local
bureaucratic procedures and functions from the CG to a local administration.
The bureaucratic procedures relate to laws and regulations governing local admin-
istration while functional areas fall under the ambit of planning and delivery of
services. Administrative decentralization may be in the form of deconcentration –
where local officials have no decision-making power – or delegation – where local
officials may have some minor decision-making powers (Crook and Manor, 1998:
6–7). The local administration is usually headed by a centrally appointed executive
official who is accountable directly to the CG. This type of decentralization was
widespread in SSA during colonization and still exists decades after political inde-
pendence. Given that the main aim of administrative decentralization is to provide
services, performance improvement at the local level involves changing the culture
Awortwi 351
of government employees. In the literature on public sector reform, administrative

changes involve a shift from Weber’s bureaucratic model to what is now called new
public management (NPM) with emphasis on efficiency, effectiveness, cost reduc-
tion and value for money (Awortwi and Sitoe 2006; Hood, 1991; McCourt and
Minogue, 2001; Minogue, 1998; Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). In more radical
administrative reform, CG sectoral agencies may be converted into free-standing
agencies or enterprises.
Fiscal decentralization
Fiscal decentralization involves four policies to increase the fiscal autonomy of
LGs: (i) expenditure assignment clearly delineating the CG’s and LGs’ responsi-
bilities for providing and paying for specific services to citizens; (ii) revenue assign-
ment demarcating taxable revenue sources as well as tax-raising powers between
the CG and LGs and possibly creating a new sub-national tax to strengthen the
fiscal base of LGs and give them authority to decide how to spend their revenue;
(iii) inter-governmental policy enabling a CG to transfer financial resources in the
form of grants to LGs; and (iv) regulatory policy to monitor and set limits on LG
finances (Fjelstad, 2001; Prud’Homme, 2003).
Political decentralization
Political or democratic decentralization refers to the transfer of some powers from
CG politicians to elected LG politicians, who are given autonomy to determine all
their local processes of development (Smith, 1996). Such autonomy may be
enshrined in a country’s constitution or be legislated. For political decentralization
to move beyond platitudes, a set of constitutional amendments, legal instruments
and electoral reforms are designed to open new or reactivate existing but dormant
spaces for representation of LG politics. The reform may result in (a) election
instead of appointment of councillors and mayors; (b) creation of local councils
with the power to make laws and authorize the use of budgeted finance by exec-
utives; (c) enabling citizens to recall their councillors for underperformance or vote
them out during elections; and (d) autonomy of local councils to hire, motivate,
manage and fire local bureaucrats without CG interference.
In the three typologies presented above, administrative deconcentration repre-
sents the weakest form of decentralization because it provides the fewest direct
links between decision-makers and the local population. Political decentralization
is the strongest. If administrative decentralization takes place and the organiza-
tional capacity of the local bureaucracy is improved through, for example, training,
but without transfer of funds and authority to make and implement decisions, the
degree of LG autonomy is constrained. Similarly, the transfer of requisite funds
without administrative capacity can create serious fiscal constraints at both local
and national levels. Under political decentralization, local leaders have a relatively
higher degree of autonomy than under administrative decentralization. Staff who
work at the local level are employees of the LG and they deliver LG services. CG
subventions to LGs to deliver services become grants, which LGs may allocate in
line with their perceived priorities. Political decentralization also ensures that the
executive branch of the LG is accountable to the legislative branch for the imple-
mentation of decisions and that bureaucrats are subject to the control and direction
of an accountable local executive. However, full political decentralization raises the
risk of a sub-national government beginning to oppose the centre and perhaps
depriving national executives of their legitimate national dominion.
Thus, the choice between three different decentralization policies involves polit-
ical and strategic calculations by the interest groups that initiate them. Politicians
at the centre have little wish to cede their vast powers, notably those over public
finances, decision-making, hiring and firing, to the local level, so they can be
expected to resist all three decentralization policies. Interest group politics heavily
influences how decentralization reforms are designed. If decentralization is gradual,
CG bureaucrats and politicians may be given an opportunity to organize, and they
are likely to build coalitions to circumvent reforms. A gradual approach might
work if a strong political commitment to reform were expected in the foreseeable
future and adversely affected groups were unlikely to be able to organize against
reform (Shah and Thompson, 2004: 18–20). Therefore any successful decentraliza-
tion process would involve bargaining, manipulation and consensus-building
between those who stand to lose and those who would gain from it.
Path dependency
The concept of path dependency in evolutionary theory explains how decisions and
choices that are made today and in the future are dependent on decisions and
choices made in the past. An institutional path begins with a critical juncture – a
point in time – where at least two alternative paths are probable. These junctures
are ‘critical’ because, once a particular option has been selected, it becomes pro-
gressively more difficult to return to the initial point where multiple alternatives
were still available (Collier and Collier, 1991; Deeg, 2001; Mahoney, 2000). As
events move down the path, the initial step in a particular direction is reinforced
through self-reinforcing mechanisms, and change becomes more restricted.
Self-reinforcing mechanisms arise in a number of ways. First, once actors have
invested substantial time and resources in a given path they have a strong incentive
to sustain the path and recover their cost. Second, learning effects may also
strengthen the path; as actors learn to utilize the institutions constituting the
path more effectively, their value and utility is enhanced, creating an incentive to
preserve the established path. Third, as other actors follow the initial actors in their
commitment to a given path, coordinating effects take root and thus enhance the
benefits accruing to all actors on the path. Given enough time and self-reinforcing
mechanisms, a path develops that becomes highly resistant to substantial change
and endures for a long time (Antonelli, 1999; Arthur, 1994; Pierson, 2004). Pierson
argues that only an ‘exogenous shock’ may then bring about the end of the path.
Awortwi 353
Thelen (2000, 2003) disagrees, arguing that endogenous mechanisms may also
influence change to new paths. For instance, mechanisms of change and reproduc-
tion can operate simultaneously. Over time, the mechanisms of change may coun-
teract those reproducing the path, leading to a major alteration in the overall
trajectory of the path. Thelen identifies ‘institutional layering’, ‘conversion’ and
‘marginal actors’ as endogenous influences toward a new path. Institutional layer-
ing occurs when actors use institutional material already available but in new ways
or combinations, or new institutions are added to existing ones; conversion occurs
when existing institutions are turned to new purposes; and marginal actors, for
instance politicians, may use existing mechanisms to turn a path to a new direction
more favourable to their interests.
Sequential theory of decentralization

Falleti (2005) draws on some of the elements of path dependency (Pierson, 2000),
self-reinforcing sequences (Mahoney, 2000), mechanisms of reproduction (Collier
and Collier, 1991) and institutional change (Thelen, 2000, 2003, 2004) to develop
a ‘sequential theory of decentralization’. Falleti’s sequential theory of decentral-
ization is based on three propositions: (1) Institutional design of decentralization
policies is highly dependent on when those policies take place within the sequence
of reforms. According to Falleti, political and fiscal decentralization policies that
take place early in the sequence tend to increase the power of LG actors, whereas
early administrative decentralization reforms tend to negatively affect their
power. (2) There are a set of preferences of national and sub-national actors
with regard to types of decentralization. National politicians and executives
prefer administrative decentralization (A) to fiscal decentralization (F), which
in turn is preferred to political decentralization (P) or A > F > P. The rationale
for this ordering is that the national government seeks to divest itself of expen-
diture responsibilities first and foremost. If the CG is forced to choose between
surrendering fiscal and political authority, it will choose to give away fiscal
authority and retain political control, which may serve to influence the expendi-
ture decisions made by LGs. The same reason applies to explain the reverse order
of preferences of LGs: P > F > A. Their preference, first and foremost, is
political decentralization. If the state president does not control the appointment
and removal of Mayors and Governors, they can push forward the issues and
concerns of their territorial units without fear of retaliation from above. If
Mayors and Governors have to choose between fiscal and administrative decen-
tralization, they will choose the transfer of revenue over responsibilities. (3) The
origin or the state context in which the decentralization process takes place and
the timing of each reform are crucial. In Latin America where Falleti conducted
his research, for example, in the context of the oligarchic states, decentralization
policies sought to consolidate or balance power among regional elites while in the
context of the developmental states, decentralization policies sought to strengthen
certain regions to make them more adequate for private investment. In the
context of market-oriented states, decentralization policies largely sought to

reduce the size of CG. Falleti identifies six sequences of decentralization policy
trajectory according to the timing of the first decentralization policy. The first
decentralization policy sets constraints on what is feasible in the remainder of the
sequences and allows us to establish a basic model of the impact of different
sequences of decentralization reforms on the inter-governmental balance of
power. He argues that the level of government whose territorial interest prevails
at the start of the policy is likely to dictate the pace and kind of decentralization
policies that will follow. If LGs’ interests predominate early on, political decen-
tralization is likely to prevail. This will produce a policy ratchet effect that will
enhance LG autonomy and strengthens mobilization of local support to bargain
with the CG for resources. In the second round of decentralization, Mayors and
Governors will most likely demand fiscal decentralization and influence its terms.
Administrative decentralization will be the last and therefore be funded. The final
outcome of this trajectory of decentralization will be P ! F ! A that conforms
to the preferences of sub-national government and is likely to result in a high
degree of local autonomy. However, if the interests of CG politicians and bureau-
crats dominate, administrative decentralization is likely to be the first. It will
transfer more responsibility but less power and resources to LGs. Under-funding
will affect the capacity of LGs to fulfil their responsibilities and make them
dependent on the CG for grants, accepting conditions and dictates relating to
the use of those grants. For the second and third rounds of decentralization
reforms, if they take place, CG politicians will choose fiscal over political decen-
tralization in order to retain their power. The outcome of this trajectory of
reforms (A ! F ! P) would conform to the preferences of CG politicians
and executives and is likely to result in little or no change in the redistribution
of power to LGs. Falleti also shows that exogenous changes such as fiscal crises,
democratization processes or midterm elections could produce reversal or alter-
native sequences such as P ! A ! F and A ! P ! F. Finally, there could be a
tie between national and sub-national interests at the outset of the reform pro-
cess, such that no side is capable of achieving its most preferred option. In this
case, either the status quo will prevail or bargaining actors will compromise in
their second most preferred outcome: fiscal decentralization. If this happens, the
way in which the sequence continues will depend on the effects of this reform on
the relative power of national and sub-national executives. If the national exec-
utive prevails, administrative decentralization should follow, with political decen-
tralization happening last. This will lead to a medium to low change in the
balance of power. The crucial issue here is the time lag between the first and
second rounds of reforms. Alternatively, if after a tie sub-national executives’ and
politicians’ interests prevail the outcome will be F ! P ! A. This sequence
should lead to a great change in the balance of power in favour of LGs. The first
two moves in this sequence would allow LGs to build strongholds of supporters
because they have the resources and power to do so. The six sequences in Falleti’s
propositions are summarized in Table 1.
Awortwi 355
Table 1. Sequences of decentralization and their effects on inter-governmental balance of

power and institutional development for local self-governance
Degree of
change in
Prevailing inter-governmental
interest in 1st Dec. Feedback 2nd Dec. 3rd Dec. balance of
first move type mechanisms type type powera
LGs P Self-reinforcing F A High

CG A Self-reinforcing F P Low
LG P Reactive A F Medium/low
CG A Reactive P F Medium
Tie F Reactive A P Medium/low
Tie F Self-reinforcing P A High
A ¼ administrative decentralization, P ¼ political decentralization, F ¼ fiscal decentralization.
a
‘High’ value in the degree of change of the intergovernmental balance of power corresponds to a
higher degree of autonomy or local self-governance whereas a ‘low’ value indicates that the degree of self-
governance has remained practically unchanged.
In Africa, as Ribot observes, the ‘sequencing of decentralization reforms has not

been well researched but appears important to the success of decentralization’
(Ribot, 2002: 54). Uganda and Ghana are two countries in Africa that have
made significant progress in decentralization implementation. They share several
commonalities that make their decentralization trajectories suitable for compari-
son. First, both countries were colonized by Britain which left a legacy of a unitary
system of government that concentrates power and resources at the centre and
conservatively devolves less to LGs. As former British colonies, the role of field
officers was strengthened to provide general supervision and control of LGs on
behalf of the central government (Shah, 2006). It is therefore safe to assume that
issues of decentralization would be politically relevant after independence. Second,
both countries developed a type of decentralization based on their post-colonial
local context with the aim of improving service delivery within the context of a
developmental state.1 Third, post-independent Uganda and Ghana have experi-
enced a volatile political past with military regimes that not only proscribed the
Western democracy of multi-party politics, branding them as divisive and unsui-
table for Africa, but also set off endogenous processes to change their (de)central-
ization past and create new paths for various reasons. Fourth, Uganda and Ghana
have implemented all three types of decentralization within the framework of ratio-
nalizing the state–local relationship with the aim of strengthening local institutions
for local governance. And fifth, both countries are often praised by donor agencies,
development practitioners and researchers for steady progress since the late 1980s
in reforming the institutions of power, resources and responsibilities that define
state–local relationships (Langseth, 1996; Ndegwa, 2002). However, as in the
1960s, it is sometimes easy to romanticize the recent progress in decentralization

without critically assessing the extent of progress. In addition, since virtually all
institutions undergo some modifications over time, characterizing those decentral-
ization changes requires deeper analysis. How have the two countries sequenced
their decentralization? Who were the main protagonists or opponents of their
decentralization trajectories and how do we characterize the sources of resilience
on the path? How has the sequencing promoted LG institutions for self-govern-
ance? Are the decentralization policies path altering or merely movement along the
existing path?
In answering these questions within the framework of providing some explana-
tions for and a more realistic understanding of why many African countries have
chosen the kind of decentralization policies and practices that provide restricted
authority and resources to LGs, the study extensively reviews official government
policies, both formal and informal, and follows up with in-depth field interviews
with past and present high-level national politicians and bureaucrats who were
instrumental in designing the decentralization policies in the two countries. LG
politicians and members of an umbrella LG association, political commentators
and academics were also interviewed. In addition, the article is informed by the
author’s personal experience in the two countries.2 In the rest of the article, we
follow the two countries’ decentralization trajectories starting from the moment of
independence so as to provide a longer time perspective (and not a temporary
event) in decentralization policy changes and effects (Pollitt, 2008).
Overview of the decentralization trajectory in Ghana

History has it that during colonization, Ghana as a nation was divided into four
territories: (a) the Gold Coast, comprising mainly people living along the coastline;
(b) the Ashantis comprising people living in the interior; (c) Protectorate Northern
territory; and (d) British Togoland, a former German colony. The four territories
were administered separately until 1946, when the British government ruled them
as a single state. Decentralization during this period was in the form of native
administration that consisted of hand-picked or non-elected members (mostly par-
amount chiefs, sub-chiefs and elders). The native authorities assisted the British
colonial government to administer law and order in 26 local councils. When Britain
relinquished its control in 1957, Ghana became the first sub-Saharan country in
colonial Africa to gain independence. The territories were subsequently reorga-
nized into 10 administrative regions.
The first state–local reform that took place was administrative decentralization
in the form of deconcentration, with sectoral ministries organized in territorial
hierarchies whose apex was in the national capital, and agencies at the regional
and local level (Ayee, 1994, 2008). The key objective of administrative decentral-
ization was to expand public services to all parts of the country. Planning and
implementation of development policies and programmes in education, housing,
health, electricity, water and sewerage, roads, and postal and telecommunications
Awortwi 357
services were transferred to parastatals and agencies attached to CG (Tordoff,

1980; Amonoo, 1981). From independence until the early 1970s various laws
were passed to maintain a distinction between CG and LGs. In terms of this dis-
tinction, there had always been two different machineries for the administration of
Ghana: one based in the capital with branches at the local (district) level (decon-
centration) or field officers, and the other, separate and distinct, based in well-
defined localities and referred to as local councils or LGs. The deconcentrated
agencies at the local level dealt with national matters, while LGs dealt with locally
based issues, although the distinction between these roles was not always clear. The
LG bodies grew up side by side with deconcentrated agencies. Local council works
were undertaken by civil servants appointed by the CG. All decision-making,
whether it concerned acquisition of a licence to operate a small business or ride
a motorcycle or an application for a passport to travel abroad, had to be processed
in the nation’s capital. The regional offices and their civil servants became the
conduits through which local councils reached the CG. The LGs were required
to provide basic services and amenities in their localities without regard to whether
or not they had the resources to deliver. Unable to raise funds to meet their obli-
gations, and attract able and competent officers, the LG bodies only succeeded in
creating for themselves an unpleasant image, in most cases, of ineptitude and
incompetence. Apart from central–local problems, there were also mounting eco-
nomic problems, mismanagement and rampant corruption during this period. This
gave grounds for frequent military takeovers and long periods of military rule
(1966–69; 1972–79) and short periods of democratic rule (1969–71; 1979–81).
Each of the regimes took turns to establish commissions of enquiry with the aim
of improving central–local relationships. In one such move, in 1974 the National
Redemption Council (NRC; a military regime) abolished the distinction between
local councils and CG bodies at the local level and created a single structure called
the district council and assigned to it the responsibility of the totality of govern-
ment at the local level. Under this system, services such as agriculture, education,
public health, the fire service, community development, town and country plan-
ning, administration, etc. were transferred to district councils. The regime did not
transfer political authority to the districts to oversee implementation. That was left
to CG-appointed bureaucrats, who were the same persons who had always
looked to the nation’s capital (Accra) for instructions. The functions that were
transferred to the district councils (under NRC Decree 258) were also not accom-
panied by a simultaneous transfer of resources. During this period, attempts were
successfully made to centralize even further in Accra functions which had hitherto
been exercised with moderate success by district councils, examples being public
transport provided by the Omnibus Services Authority and the Ghana Education
Service. Furthermore, the 10 regional administrations were made very strong
and only became additional bureaucratic road blocks in the attempt to decentralize
to the local (district) level. In the perspective of Falleti’s sequential theory the
interest that prevailed in the first move from independence up until 1970s was
that of the CG.
After two decades of implementing administrative decentralization (1957–1970s)

central bureaucrats and politicians developed an affinity for it and because there
was no strong endogenous and exogenous pressure to compel them to change
direction, administrative or a weak form of LGs was practised and continued up
until 31 December 1981, when Flight Lt Rawlings and a small group of soldiers
took over the affairs of the state, suspended the Constitution, dissolved Parliament,
and proscribed existing political parties. The military regime formed the
Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) and exercised executive and legis-
lative powers. Flt Lt Rawlings announced that ‘power will not be concentrated at
the top any more’ (Yeebo, 1985: 66). One year later, in December 1982, the PNDC
regime issued an 11-point decentralization plan designed to reform the state–local
relationship and promote democracy, grassroots institutional empowerment for
local self-governance, and greater government efficiency. The PNDC was therefore
seen as major regime change. However, the regime which was made up mainly of
low-rank soldiers inexperienced in politics and a few technocrats with socialist
leanings, felt insecure and considered political decentralization premature; so it
also abandoned political decentralization.
The first reform that the regime undertook was again an administrative decen-
tralization seeking to increase government efficiency and effectiveness in the face of
dwindling state resources. It transferred many government ministries to LGs to
improve planning and execution of projects (Crook and Manor, 1998: 204). The
regime then defined its vision of decentralization as ‘the devolution of central admin-
istrative (Not Political) authority to the local level in order to ensure popular
grassroots participation’ (PNDC, 1983: 3). It transferred 86 functions, including
preparation and submission of development plans, resource mobilization, provi-
sion of basic social infrastructure services among others, to LGs. The desire to
change from their initial conception of political to administrative decentralization
was reinforced by the prescription of a structural adjustment programme that was
instigated by the World Bank in 1983 in a package that included rationalization,
retrenchment and divestiture of some government services.
The administrative reform programme had three components: (i) size and struc-
ture; (ii) comprehensive restructuring of pay, grading and an incentive system; and
(iii) an institutional training programme to reorient civil servants to the changing
needs of the service (Awortwi, 2003: 116–118; Larbi, 1995). Without strong oppo-
sition from political parties or labour unions, 47,439 civil servants, many of whom
worked at the local level, were dismissed (Ayee, 1991; Herbst, 1992; World Bank,
1993). In July 1985 the regime decreed that only 50 percent of the salaries and
wages of LG employees (and the recurrent expenditure of 22 deconcentrated gov-
ernment departments) would be paid by the CG. This caused extreme hardship and
large arrears accumulated in the LGs. Hutchful (1997) shows that administrative
reforms failed to break the resistance of the senior civil servants who were consid-
ered responsible for the inefficiencies and shortfalls of the old system.
In July 1987, with its power beginning to wane, the military regime launched a
three-tier LG system that included some elements of political decentralization.
Awortwi 359
In addition to the existing 65 local councils, it created 45 new LG territories under

the jurisdiction of district assemblies (DAs). Regional councils were created to
coordinate the LGs. Below the DAs the regime proposed to establish sub-district
authorities, town councils and unit committees as the lowest structures to provide
focal points for discussion of local problems and take remedial action. It further
announced a programme setting out modalities for elections of local councillors;
but, with pockets of pressure groups beginning to coalesce around remnants of
banned political parties, it decreed that elections to the DA were to be on an
individual, not political party, basis. Furthermore, chiefs and traditional authori-
ties were not allowed to be involved in politics – ostensibly to insulate them from
the chicanery associated with politics, but actually to prevent local coalitions
from becoming strong enough to negotiate power-sharing with the regime. At
the community level, the regime established populist People’s Defence
Committees (PDC) and later Committees for Defence of the Revolution (CDR)
in every Ghanaian village and town to mobilize support for its own agenda and to
undermine the authority of the traditional chiefs who were considered hostile to the
regime.
In the nominal political decentralization that started in 1988, six years after the
implementation of administrative decentralization reforms, 4846 councillors
(assemblymen and women) were elected for a three-year term. Most of the elected
councillors were members of the CDR. To further strengthen their control at the
local level, the regime appointed another 2423 councillors to make a total of 7269
nationwide. While the regime justified the need to appoint some technocrats and
well-respected community members who were put off by the electoral process, the
appointment of one-third of the councillors was to guarantee a place for the sup-
porters of the regime, especially those who were not elected. The appointment of
the councillors was also to build a locally based political class in anticipation of a
future national democratization process (Gyimah-Boadi, 1990). The regime intro-
duced PNDC Law 207, which made LGs the highest political and administrative
authority at the local level and responsible for the overall development of local
areas. Instead of allowing the councillors to elect one of their own to be the Mayor
in a form of weak mayor system or direct election of Mayors (strong mayor
system), the regime continued on the path where District Chief Executives or
Mayors were appointed by the CG. The regime appointed politically loyal cadres
to head the administration of the LGs who could only be removed by Flt Lt
Rawlings and not the elected councillors or the people.
Three years after the PNDC regime started its version of political decentraliza-
tion reform, it was compelled to return the country to multi-party democracy by (a)
international donor pressure, (b) pressure from banned political groups, and (c) its
need for legitimacy. However, it managed to exclude LGs from the multi-party
process because donors and political groups were more concerned with national
politics and less about LGs. As a result, a partisan CG political system was super-
imposed on a non-partisan LG system. The 1992 democratic constitution endorsed
PNDC Law 207 (later transmuted to Act 462). According to Kwamena Ahwoi,
former PNDC Secretary for LGs and an architect of Ghana’s decentralization

programme,
The regime was not allowed to develop the path that it wanted. The introduction of
[the] constitutional era distorted the path that we had in mind. The PNDC did not
have the support of CG bureaucrats; so, instead of [the] devolution that we wanted,
civil servants found ways of dribbling us into implementing [a] deconcentrated system.
Though in the spirit of the law the current decentralization aims at promoting devo-
lution, [the] actual practice is deconcentration or at best nominal devolution
(Interview with the author, 7 August 2008).
Fiscal reform was the last decentralization policy to be introduced. Until fiscal
decentralization was introduced in 1994, there was no basis for calculating
grants to LGs and only small amounts were given at the discretion of the LG
ministry. Normally the CG would wait until November/December to transfer its
unspent money to LGs. In 1990, the CG allowed DAs to collect some taxes until
then collected by the internal revenue service.3 This revenue was shared by all the
local councils according to a formula determined only by the LG ministry. In 1994
the ceded revenue was replaced by a constitutional provision mandating the CG to
transfer 5 percent of the national revenue to LGs. An independent common fund
administrator was appointed to develop a formula for sharing out the fund. Even
though the constitution mandated 5 percent, only 3–4 percent of national revenue
was actually transferred to LGs from 1994 to 2000 (Awortwi, 2003: 121). In 2000,
when the New Patriotic Party (NPP) was voted into office, it promised to increase
CG transfers from 5 percent to 7.5 percent, but that promise was not fulfilled for
six years.
Overview of the decentralization trajectory in Uganda

During colonization, Uganda had a system of LG ranging from centralized king-
dom areas based on hierarchical chiefs to highly decentralized non-kingdom areas
(North-East and South-West). The first attempts by the colonial regime to set up
local administration were in 1919 when the Native Authority Ordinance was passed
providing more powers and responsibilities to the chiefs. The chiefs collected taxes,
presided over native courts, maintained and enforced law and order and consti-
tuted native councils at the district and community levels. The native councils were
neither representative nor democratic. In the non-kingdom areas, the chiefs owed
their creation, appointment and allegiance to the District Commissioner who, in
turn, was responsible to the CG. In 1955, the District Council Ordinance was
passed to provide for elected councils and endowed them with functions such as
primary education, maintenance of roads, administration of police, etc. So at inde-
pendence in 1962, when Britain relinquished its control, Uganda was bequeathed
fairly autonomous local administrations based largely on two sub-national
Awortwi 361
systems: federal/semi-federal in kingdom areas and district councils in non-king-

dom areas (Golooba-Mutebi, 2008; Lubanga, 1996; Makara, 1998).
The 1962 independence constitution further granted significant powers to local
authorities over their own composition, land administration and service provision
(local roads, primary and junior secondary education, rural water supplies, dispen-
saries and preventive health services). Local authorities were given powers to raise
autonomous revenues through graduated poll tax,4 property tax, market dues,
rents, fees, licences and loans. The centre also agreed to give grants to local author-
ities. The majority of the members of the kingdom councils and district councils
were directly elected by the people. In summary, the period of independence from
1962 to 1966 witnessed growing LGs. However, the CG became anxious about the
increasing autonomy of the LGs and started curtailing the powers of the councils
on the pretext that they were breeding political opposition to the CG. The mon-
archies and the federal systems were subsequently abolished, the 1962 constitution
was abrogated and replaced by the 1967 ‘pigeon-hole’ constitution.5 This led to a
fractured CG–LG system and culminated in the promulgation of the 1967 Local
Administrations Act, which effectively recentralized powers, service delivery func-
tions and revenue collection authority (Golooba-Mutebi, 2008; MoLG, 2006a).
For example, LG budgets were subject to the approval of the LG minister and
local by-laws were subordinated to the ministry, which also had the power to
revoke them. The minister had the power to terminate the mandate of local coun-
cillors and dissolve local councils. The lowest-ranking LG employees were
appointed by the President (Golola, 2001: 3–4). From 1972 to 1985, institutions
of local self-governance that were fostered by the colonial government and contin-
ued after independence withered away and centralizing tendencies were reinforced.
LGs became not only instruments of CG and political party control but also
sources of patronage and personal enrichment. This system continued until 1986,
when Yoweri Museveni’s forces defeated the civilian government of Milton Obote
after a five-year insurgency (1981–85). During the civil war local people in areas
under guerrilla control (the famous Luwero triangle) organized themselves into
resistance councils (RCs) whose leaders were locally elected to keep law and
order (Museveni, 1997). When Museveni and his National Resistance Movement
(NRM) assumed full control over the country in January 1986, incumbent local
political leaders and government bureaucrats were perceived as counter-revolution-
ary agents and so the regime encouraged the formation of more local resistance
councils from village level to district level. The RCs, which originally served the
security and mobilization needs of the guerrilla movement, were transformed into
organs of state administrative control and forums for local political empowerment
(Azfar et al., 2006; Khadiagala, 1995). The presence of Museveni and his NRM was
therefore seen as a major turning point in the centre–local relationship which had
deteriorated to its lowest level. In the same year elections were organized in which
people lined up behind their choice of candidate for RC leadership and thus voted
without a secret ballot. The RCs became a new concept of revolutionary democ-
racy that emphasized local participation and people’s power in the management of
public life. According to Ssewakiryanga (2004: 12) this created considerable con-
fidence in the system of local governance ushered in by the NRM regime. The RCs
took over most of the powers and roles of the chiefs and became the institutions
that defined the relationship between local people and higher authorities.6 For
instance, no soldier or policeman could arrest anyone without first reporting to
the RC chairperson. RC Statute No. 9 (1987) made public servants answerable to
their councils, a very significant change because it fused the political and admin-
istrative roles of the RC system for the first time. RCs were given power to hold
accountable all local state officials: army and police personnel, chiefs, magistrates
and all technical officials functioning within the districts. They also had the power
to ask the CG appointing authority to recall any civil/public servant in their juris-
diction for abuse of office or incompetence. They were given the deliberative and
legislative function of passing by-laws applicable to the area of their jurisdiction
and the judicial function of adjudicating, arbitrating and settling local disputes.
The statute was a major turning point in the state–local relationship and gave local
politicians major powers to influence local governance. The NRM interest in push-
ing for political decentralization was given a shot in the arm when it found a willing
ally in both bilateral and multilateral donors. By the time the NRM came to power,
donors were pushing for economic and political reform in countries hitherto sub-
ject to dictatorship and economic mismanagement. They were preaching the virtues
of ‘good governance’ and ‘bottom-up’ development strategies involving the public
in decision-making and to ‘relieve’ the CGs of some of their economic, political and
social responsibilities.
From 1987 to 1995 decentralization policies and practices raised the political
profile of local councils but did not give them sufficient authority to manage human
and financial resources. RCs had to work with deconcentrated CG service delivery
agencies, and tensions inevitably emerged between the RCs and the deconcentrated
civil servants. By mid-1990 the resistance council system seemed to have reached its
limits as an effective system of decentralized government (Golooba-Mutebi, 2000;
Kasfir and Twebaze, 2005). In the absence of fiscal and administrative levers, local
councils were limited, in practice, to the mundane, such as the distribution of
essential commodities in times of shortage. In 1995 Uganda entered a new consti-
tutional era where the principle of decentralization by devolution was spelt out.
Most of the provisions of the LG resistance council statutes of 1987 and 1993 were
entrenched in the 1995 Constitution and further elaborated by the 1997 LG Act.
The promulgation of the LG Act (1997) marked a second round of reforms in the
form of administrative decentralization. The Act made a clear and legally based
distinction between the roles of the centre and LGs. The CG, through line ministries,
was charged with setting national policy and standards; inspecting, supervising,
monitoring and coordinating activities of LGs to ensure compliance with national
policies and standards. LGs were to implement a broad range of devolved services
such as primary education, secondary and technical education, health centres and
hospitals with the exception of referral cases, feeder roads, water, land administra-
tion, and extension services, in addition to other lawful activities that they might
Awortwi 363
Table 2. LG share of total national revenue in Uganda, 1997/98–2006/07
Year 1997/98 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07
% 17.0 34.0 35.0 38.0 32.5

Sources: LGFC (2004: 73, 2007: 11), MoLG (2006c: 70).
wish to undertake for the development of their areas. They could approve their own
budgets and plans and oversee their implementation. Furthermore, with the pro-
mulgation of the 1997 LG Act, agriculture, veterinary services, forestry, transport,
cooperatives, and small-scale industry were decentralized in the same way as social
services. The district CG employees were taken over by the district council to form
one unified staff, headed by the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO), whose imme-
diate allegiance also shifted from the CG to the local council (GoU, 1997: 43).
District service commissions, tender boards, land commissions and public
accounts committees at the district level, which in the past had been CG agencies,
became locally autonomous. According to Langseth and Mugaju (1996), the admin-
istrative decentralization was the most far-reaching ever attempted in the country.
However, the funding was inadequate. There were a few pockets of resistance; for
example, the central Uganda computer service did not want to give up its monopoly
of managing the payroll of all LG employees. It took several years after the 1997 Act
was passed before some of the districts were allowed to manage their own payroll.
Fiscal decentralization was the final reform. Though the Mamdani Inquiry
Commission that was set up in 1987 recommended three ways of expanding LG
revenue (Republic of Uganda, 1987),7 serious discussion of fiscal reforms only
started after 19958 with a vote system that supported LG recurrent expenditures.9
Donors had a major influence on the design of the fiscal decentralization agenda.
Initially they mostly funded discrete projects. DANIDA began by supporting the
operations of LGs in Rakai district with US$16m. The Belgian Development Fund
provided US$9.2m to Hoima and Masindi districts (Ssewakiryanga, 2004: 15). The
World Bank later provided US$12.74m for an institutional capacity-building proj-
ect that worked out the modalities for inter-governmental transfers, strengthening
financial management and district personnel and providing district offices with
equipment, cars and computers.
The 1997 LG Act provided three types of fiscal transfer (conditional, uncondi-
tional and equalization grants) to LGs to implement their decentralized responsi-
bilities.10 An independent LG finance commission was established to advise the
President on all matters concerning the distribution of revenue between the CG and
LGs and the allocation to each LG of grants from the consolidated fund. The CG
amended the Income Tax Act to enable LGs to retain their portion of agency fees
arising from taxes they collected on behalf of the Uganda Revenue Authority
(MoLG, 2008: 10). LGs were also allowed to raise funds from other sources,
including borrowing from the financial markets. Since 2000, CG grants to LGs
have not fallen below 30 percent of the national revenue (see Table 2).
Table 3. Decentralization trajectory and local governance practices in Ghana and Uganda
Expected degree
of change in
Prevailing inter-governmental
interest in Decentralization balance of power Actual practice based
Country first move trajectory (Falleti 2005) on field research
Ghana CG A!P!F Medium Weak

Uganda LG P !A ! F Medium Moderate
Comparative analysis of the decentralization trajectories of

Ghana and Uganda and their effects on the institutional
development of LGs
From the preceding discussions it is clear that Ghana and Uganda have
implemented decentralization reforms following two different trajectories.
While Ghana’s sequence was administrative, political and later fiscal decentraliza-
tion, Uganda’s was political, administrative and then fiscal. In this section we show
that both sequences created a weak to moderate degree of institutions for local self-
governance in line with Falleti’s sequential theory, though the gradient of change
favours LGs in Uganda rather than Ghana (see Table 3).
Creating an initial path for local political disempowerment in Ghana and

empowerment in Uganda?
An initial path to LG political disempowerment was created in Ghana when the
CG implemented administrative before political decentralization in the early years
following independence, as well as subsequently (especially during the PNDC
regime) when the possibility of breaking off and beginning a new path was not
taken up. From that critical juncture onwards, decisions taken by CG politicians
and bureaucrats increasingly made LGs powerless. All bureaucrats at the LG level
and one-third of LG councillors continued to be appointed by CG politicians and
bureaucrats, which not only enabled the CG to dominate the agenda of LGs but
also led to a system where accountability was upwards to CG politicians instead of
downwards to the people. The majority of speakers of local councils are also gov-
ernment appointees, thus further weakening the link between electorate and
council.
The NPP government that succeeded the Rawlings regime had promised a con-
stitutional amendment to make LG elections multi-party and the position of
Awortwi 365
district chief executives electable, but it reneged on its commitment after winning
power. A senior party official told the author:
We knew that electing DCEs would be the right thing but we couldn’t do it because we
needed the DCEs to propagate our manifesto and also to solidify our hold on to
power at the local level after being in opposition for that long.
The NPP government enacted one of the most deleterious LG Acts (Act 656),
recentralizing about 80 percent of government workers at the LG level and giving
regional coordinating councils more powers to control LGs. It also passed a law
ensuring that common office stationery and sanitation equipment were procured
through the centralized agency system. LGs in Ghana have no chance of influencing
national policy. Budgets and by-laws all need approval by CG. Ghana’s non-parti-
san LG elections result in LGs full of people with no formal agenda. CG politicians
have managed to keep LGs apolitical to avoid mass mobilization of LG interest
groups. Donors, who could have provided the necessary exogenous influence, have
been preoccupied with a return to multi-party national elections and have less inter-
est in LGs. In Uganda, the NRM pursued a preference for local political empower-
ment from the beginning so as to build its own legitimacy. Some of the literature has
reached similar conclusions and substantiates the argument that Uganda’s decen-
tralization process improved local institutions. Steffensen and Trollegaard note that
the 1995 Ugandan Constitution and the 1997 Local Government Act ‘are among the
most detailed and comprehensive legislative frameworks in sub-Saharan Africa’
(Steffensen and Trollegaard, 2000). Uganda’s local courts (LC) system is highly
effective in providing peace and security to rural people, who seldom have direct
access to police protection. The LCs have empowered the people by making LC1 the
courts of jurisdiction for minor crimes. Local people are judged before their peers in
a setting where they understand the proceedings and where the punishments are
based on community standards (Wunsch and Ottemoeller, 2004: 189). To quote
Devas and Grant (2003: 312–313) ‘the LC system in Uganda, [which] provides mul-
tiple opportunities for citizens to participate in public meetings and elections, from
the village level up to the district, has been quite successful. There is a system of
annual budget conference at each level, giving citizens some opportunity to have a
voice in the choice of priorities in the budget.’ Golola (2001: 6) makes a similar point:
‘Raising the local people’s interest in the management of their affairs is probably the
strongest outcome of the decentralization effort in Uganda.’ In July 2005, after the
CG unilaterally abolished graduated tax, which for the past two decades had con-
tributed more than 75 percent of locally generated revenue, the LGs successfully
negotiated for compensatory transfers of UGShs34b (US$16m) in 2005/06 and
UGShs45b (US$21.2m) in 2006/07. In 2008, the LGs pushed the CG to introduce
two new revenue sources with a combined estimated value of UGShs70b
(US$33.1m) as further compensation.11
In addition, the central architects of Uganda’s decentralization reforms were
highly knowledgeable and respected technocrats at the country’s premier
university, Makerere. The current Prime Minister was a member of the commission
that was established in 1987 to design the decentralization trajectory that Uganda
would follow. CG politicians and bureaucrats in Uganda are also more receptive to
LGs’ concerns than in Ghana. President Museveni’s pursuit of local self-govern-
ance was rooted in the political movement system that brought him to power.
Museveni’s regime altered the mindset of senior civil servants during the early
years through political and ideological training (Ottaway, 1998). Throughout the
field interviews, most senior bureaucrats at the centre and at the local level asserted
that aligning their work around decentralization was very important in helping to
fulfil the President’s vision. In contrast, Ghana’s senior civil servants display much
ambivalence and disdain for the country’s decentralization and there is less tech-
nical competence among CG politicians.
Sustaining local democratic governance and participation

Competition for political office not only provides the driving force and creates the
environment for responsive and innovative leadership, it also helps to sustain dem-
ocratic institutional development. By contesting elections at the LG level, politi-
cians rise through the ranks of their parties. In Uganda, the vibrancy of political
decentralization is demonstrated by the competitive nature of local council elec-
tions. The high turnover of councillors at every election (in some areas as much as
80 percent) is periodically bringing new people into the political system, thereby
expanding the pool of local political knowledge and experience. Voter turnout in
LG elections is also high and comparable with the turnout in national elections (see
Table 4) except in 2006 when Museveni’s recentralization policies turned off some
voters.
In the case of Ghana, the nature of political decentralization has resulted in a
lack of interest at the local level. During the first LG election in 1988/89, 59 percent
of the registered voters turned out to vote but in the second election in 1994, only
29 percent of the registered voters turned out. Subsequent LG elections have seen
voter turnout improved but only marginally as compared to national elections
(see Table 5)
At the unit committee election in 1993, more than 3000 positions were not
contested. In 1998, 65 percent of the locally electable positions were uncontested
Table 4. Voter turnout in national and local government elections in Uganda
Type of election 1996 (%) 2001 (%) 2006 (%)
Presidential 60.7 55.7 67.8

Parliamentary 72.9 69.7 69.2
LG – 59.7 46.3
Source: Golooba-Mutebi, 2008: 152.
Awortwi 367
(Crook, 1999) and in 2002 only 5619 positions out of 15,386 (36 percent) had the
required number of candidates. Another 1929 had no candidate at all, so elections
did not take place in those localities (CDD, 2002; Daily Graphic, 2002). National
elections provide some excitement for the people and make them feel that their
decisions matter. People feel empowered when they see national politicians grov-
elling for their votes. The feeling is different in LG elections; campaigning is often
boring and, to make matters worse, the LGs seem not to make much difference in
people’s lives. At least some Members of Parliament promise to have roads
repaired and some fulfil their promise, but LG politicians promise nothing and
deliver nothing. However, if they are elected, mayors worried about losing their
jobs will be forced to make themselves more useful to the people.
In Ghana, CG politicians are fully paid but LG politicians receive no payment.
In Uganda, LGs and the Uganda Local Government Association have negotiated
with the CG to pay full-time salaries to holders of the top five LG positions:
District Chairperson (Mayor), three members of the Executive Committee,
and the Speaker of the Council. The monthly salaries of the president and vice-
president of the district local council are UGShs2m (US$1025) and UGShs1m,
respectively, while other executives earn UGShs600,000 (US$307) a month. The
salaries of the top LG politician are higher than those of the top civil servants in the
ministry.
In local human resource management, too, Uganda has made substantially more
institutional progress than Ghana. LGs are the employers of all the staff in their
jurisdiction.12 LG employees constitute about 75 percent of the national public
service workforce (MoLG, 2006b: 22). Every district-level LG in Uganda has a
service commission whose members are nominated by the district council to
appoint, promote, discipline and dismiss employees. This has helped not only to
shorten the decision-making process but also to strengthen the employees’ loyalty
to LGs. The downside of Uganda’s approach is that recruitment of staff sometimes
favours citizens who come from the district and are therefore susceptible to patron-
age politics. In Ghana, LG employees are appointed, posted, transferred, pro-
moted, and disciplined by CG bureaucrats, who have little or no information
about their work performance at the local level. Civil servants have no allegiance
to the LG in whose jurisdiction they work and they frequently ignore LG policies
and priorities, refuse to attend meetings with locally elected officials, and generally
Table 5. Voter turnout in national and LG elections in Ghana
National election (Year) 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008
Voter turnout (%) 50.2 78.2 60.4 81.5 69.52

LG Election (Year) 1988/89 1994 1998 2002 2006
Voter turnout (%) 59.3 29.3 41.6 32.8 44
Source: National Electoral Commission, Accra, Ghana.
maintain allegiance to the CG. Locally elected councillors face severe frustrations
in the very assembly they are supposed to control.
Recentralization: taking back much of what had been decentralized

While many analysts conclude that significantly more progress has been made in
strengthening LGs in Uganda than in Ghana (for example, Crook, 2003;
Mitchinson, 2003; Ndegwa, 2002; Olowu, 2003; Onyach-Olaa, 2003; Wunsch and
Ottemoeller, 2004), in general there are doubts whether the gains are sustainable. In
Uganda, from the early 2000s, when the power of President Museveni and his
regime was challenged by four factors: a leadership struggle within the movement;
a new generation of parliamentarians with their own agenda and for whom the
‘glue’ of the movement’s history was less significant; a new generation of politicians
with different experiences and political views from the NRM veterans; and donors
that wanted a return to multi-party democracy and perhaps to get rid of President
Museveni and his movement system (Makara et al., 2009), the regime began a
systematic reversal of decentralization as a strategy to minimize the risk of losing
to any competitor. Among other things, the Constitution was amended to intro-
duce a regional tier above LGs to silence the Buganda Kingdom, which wanted a
federal system that would give it autonomy from the CG. The regional tier not only
extended bureaucracy but also gave the centre additional control over LGs. (b) In
2008 the CG considered a draft proposal to take over management of the national
capital, Kampala, from the city council, appointing the mayor and running the city
from the centre.13 Historically, Kampala has been an opposition stronghold and
the NRM has lost heavily in both national and LG elections there. On 29 June the
kingdom of Buganda warned the CG of dire consequences if it went ahead with the
plan to manage Kampala from the centre (Daily Monitor, 19 June 2009). The
government did not take the warning seriously, resulting in clashes in which at
least 10 people were killed in September 2009. Additionally, the 1997 LG Act has
been amended to abolish district tender boards so that the CG can influence con-
tract awards and the CG has gradually increased the proportion of conditional
grants to wipe out LGs’ financial discretion. In resource-poor countries, whoever
controls the funds can easily manipulate the dynamics of local politics through
patronage (Tangri, 1999). The CG has tied about 88 percent of the grants to
specific expenditures that serve the interests of the centre (see conditional grants
in Table 6) thus weakening LGs’ financial discretion and capacity to allocate and
spend resources.
In 2007 the CG amended the LG Act and recentralized the appointment of LG
chief administrative officers (CAOs), their deputies and town clerks. This will
ensure that CAOs, who are the head of the technical staff, shift their allegiance
from LG politicians to the CG. There is speculation that the CAO who are also
electoral returning officers would be manipulated by the NRM. In the past where
the NRM lost, President Museveni accused CAOs of conniving with the opposition
and immediately after the last local election he threatened to appoint only cadres
Awortwi 369
Table 6. Allocation of CG transfers to LGs in Uganda, 1999/2000–2004/05
Central government transfers (%)
Grant 1999/2000 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05
Unconditional grants 20.0 15.7 12.0 11.5 11.1 10.8

Equalization grants 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.4 0.4
Conditional grants 79.0 83.4 87.3 87.8 88.5 88.8
Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Calculated from Local Government Finance Commission data.
who subscribe to the NRM government philosophy as CAOs. In March 2009, all
CAOs underwent military and ideological training for one month.
Administration of police, prisons and veterinary staff have also been centralized.
Furthermore, the CG has created many new LGs, especially in opposition areas, in
the hope that it would be able to take some votes away from them.14 In most cases,
new districts were created at the request of communities and their leaders, but it
serves the interest of Museveni’s regime to approve these requests in return for
votes (Steiner, 2007: 182).
Turning to Ghana, decentralization policies have degenerated into increasing
concentration of power and resources in key central ministries, departments and
agencies to the detriment of the 167 LG territories. CG annual budgets are increas-
ingly being couched mostly in terms of ministries, departments and agencies, with a
rare mention of LGs. Only 49 percent of the CG grants to LGs are under the
discretion of the LGs. Following enactment of the 1992 Local Government Act
(Act 462), a series of attempts were made to integrate all civil servants at the local
level into one personnel management system, but all failed because of opposition
from CG bureaucrats, apparently because it would take away their powers and
resources. The bill for the Act was held up for 10 years until donors made its
enactment a condition for the release of budgetary support (Koranteng and
Larbi, 2008: 217). A compromise policy (LGS Act 656) was enacted in 2005, but
it created a very weak LG service system that centralized government agencies such
as education, health, forestry, fire, game and wildlife. In addition, enactment of
a national procurement law has taken away LGs’ discretion to buy in the market
(see Ahwoi, 2005, for a breakdown of recentralization in Ghana).
Conclusion and theoretical reflection

In this article we have unpacked the concept of decentralization in its administra-
tive, fiscal and political dimensions and, using insights from path dependency and
Falleti’s sequential theory of decentralization, we have examined systematically the
decentralization trajectories of Ghana and Uganda. The study shows that both
countries have implemented all three types of decentralization but there are
differences in the sequence of implementation. The analysis shows that in the case
of Ghana the national interest prevailed at the beginning of state–local reforms and
therefore administrative decentralization occurred first. Fiscal and political decen-
tralization did not accompany the administrative reforms and therefore a weak LG
foundation was created. This initial path that was created made LGs so subordi-
nate to the CG that CG politicians and executives who benefited from weak LG
systems did not have any desire to break free of the path. Even the most brutal and
populist military regime that promised so much of local political empowerment
could not depart from the path but had to follow it. However, instead of continu-
ing on its preferred sequence and thereby further weakening LGs, in Ghana inter-
national donor pressure, the PNDC’s need for legitimacy, and pressure from
banned political parties compelled the military regime to pursue political decen-
tralization instead of fiscal in a reversed order of preference. In this case Ghana’s
second decentralization policy reform was a reactive mechanism from endogenous
and exogenous factors. The degree of change therefore resonates with Falleti’s
propositions. The path that started with a weak LG system right from indepen-
dence in 1957 was carried on by successive governments even though all professed
to break free from it.
Uganda’s case shows that at independence sub-national interest prevailed and
therefore local self-governance was pursued. Political decentralization strengthened
both kingdom and non-kingdom areas culminating in the rise of federal systems.
However, as LGs began to exert pressure on the CG there was a negative reactive
feedback from the CG resulting in constitutional changes. The initial local self-
governance system was therefore short-lived. In fact until the NRM seized power,
LG institutions had been weakened considerably. Museveni’s regime that
embarked on a radical endogenous political decentralization reform with the
hope of breaking off from recentralization path could not live up to expectations.
Instead of following up with fiscal reforms, which would have been consistent with
the regime’s initial desire to build strong LG institutions, the process veered off and
introduced unfunded administrative decentralization for two years before finally
implementing fiscal decentralization. Though the sequence laid a moderate foun-
dation for the development of LG institutions compared with Ghana’s process, it
was not enough to build resilience against ‘shocks’ and manipulations from the
centre. Since 2005 the CG has started to take back some of the LGs’ powers at an
alarming pace. Museveni’s failure to consolidate or further strengthen LGs was
also a reactive measure to curtail political opposition which had started to chal-
lenge his regime.
It is interesting to note that the World Bank argued in its World Development
Report 1998/99 that LG officials were gaining knowledge and experience and that
with continued pressure on the centre, recentralization was unlikely. Yet, about a
decade later, we are still referring to an unbreakable path of CG hegemony over
LGs. The apparent lack of commitment by African leaders to political decentral-
ization is a structural problem that has been developed over the years through
institutionalization of weak decentralization policies that offer little or no
Awortwi 371
empowerment to local institutions. (Re)centralization will continue in Africa partly

because the sequences of decentralization chosen by many countries are not meant
to build resilience against CG manipulations. While CG politicians and bureau-
crats find it expedient to appear to support building local institutions for self-
governance, they do not wish to see the growth of powerful local institutions
that might challenge their monopoly of power and resources. Sustained donor
pressure as a condition for budgetary support is a plausible exogenous factor
that can force CG to change course but, painfully in SSA, donors have gradually
shifted their attention from decentralization and LGs to national democracy and
human rights, leaving LGs to their own devices.
In terms of theoretical reflection, the regime change introduced by Rawlings and
Museveni was an attempt to depart from the previous path of central domination,
and in the context of path dependency, an endogenous mechanism of change with-
out any outside influence. From that viewpoint the findings resonate with Thelen’s
view that endogenous mechanism may also influence changes to new paths. Thelen
also argues that mechanisms of change and reproduction can operate simulta-
neously, and over time the mechanism of change may counteract those reproducing
the path, leading to a major alteration in the overall trajectory of the path. In
Ghana, Rawlings’ regime, despite the brutality in its approach to creating a new
path, could not counteract the bureaucrats who were reproducing the path. As
earlier indicated by the former Minister of LG, ‘the PNDC did not have the sup-
port of CG bureaucrats; so, instead of devolution that the regime wanted, civil
servants found ways of dribbling us into implementing deconcentration and there-
fore reproducing the path’. In Uganda, Museveni could not stay on the new path
that had been started. The fundamental question that arises from Ghana’s and
Uganda’s experiences of the endogenous change mechanism is: to what extent are
these mechanisms or actors able to stay on a new path without falling back?
Another perspective is that although Ghana’s and Uganda’s experiences corrob-
orate with some of the elements of path dependency and Falleti’s sequential theory
of decentralization, deeper reflection on the current recentralization in both coun-
tries would also reveal a shortfall of the theories’ explanation of weak local self-
governance in Africa. CG politicians and executives are very dominant in local
affairs in Africa partly because the local context has not been conducive to change
in support of deepening political decentralization and local self-governance.
Industrialization and urbanization that changed the political context and generated
demand for the decentralization of power in Latin America (Burki et al., 1999)
have been late phenomena in SSA. A modern economy that distributes political
resources and skills for a wide variety of individuals, interest groups, business
organizations, and labour unions to demand for a voice in government, and there-
fore broadening coalitions for local action, has not happened. Therefore endoge-
nous pressure involving mass mobilization of local interest groups to work towards
resisting recentralization or ensuring that CG politicians commit to sustainable
local-self governance (as shown by Falleti) to have worked successfully in breaking
(re)centralization in Latin America and especially in the Colombia’s case) is a long
shot in SSA. Given the presence of relatively young and weak state institutions and
structures that are unable to enforce the rule of law, CG regimes that see decen-
tralization as a zero-sum game would continue to dictate how LGs should be
organized and run on their terms. Therefore further analysis of decentralization
in Africa using regime theory would provide additional explanations of how and
under what conditions CG regimes would sustainably support local government
autonomy.
Notes
We are indebted to the anonymous reviewer of International Review of Administrative
Sciences for their insightful suggestions. The pictorial representation in detail of the PSM
second-order model is available from the first author.
1. A state whose ideological underpinnings are developmental and one that seriously
attempts to deploy its administrative and political resources to the task of economic
development (Mkandawire, 1998: 2).
2. The author has worked at the Ministry of Local Government in Ghana as a development
planning officer (1996–2000), and in Uganda was a leader of a Dutch Government proj-
ect to enhance the capacity of the Nsamizi Training Institute of Social Development to
develop courses for local government officers (2004–09).
3. The taxes, termed ‘ceded revenue’, were imposed on entertainment, casinos, betting,
transport, advertisements, and categories of self-employed persons. They yielded
6301m in 1990, 6594m in 1991 and 62.1b in 1992 (US$1 ¼ 6285 at the 1993 exchange
rate).
4. A direct form of personal tax (poll tax) which constitutes about 75 percent of the total
revenue of LGs
5. So-called because members of parliament only found out about the new constitution
when they received it in their pigeon-holes.
6. The 1967 Local Administration Act, sec. 40–44, tasked the chiefs with maintenance of law
and order, including the power to enforce local council by-laws, effect arrest, enforce
measures in the interests of socioeconomic development and adjudicate disputes, collect
government revenues, and act as a communication channel between government and
population.
7. The recommendations were: Each parent ministry technically responsible for a
mandatory service should draw up a district-by-district development plan and
advance the corresponding finance to realize that plan; block grants should be allo-
cated on the basis of need and not as an annual source of revenue; the taxation
powers taken away from LGs in 1968 should be returned to them, and new taxes, such
as on real estate, large-scale manufacturing and production companies, should be
introduced.
8. In 1993/94 the CG allowed 13 districts to raise and allocate their own revenue. They were
followed by another 13 districts in 1994/95 and the remaining 35 districts in 1995/96
(Golola, 2001: 11).
9. Before 1987, LGs had lost the power to collect most revenues, such as from rents, local
forests, royalties and fishing licences. The block grants to LGs fell from 4.3 percent of the
CG recurrent budget in 1981 to 1.6 percent in 1986. The nominal share of the national
Awortwi 373
development budget to LGs also fell from 3 percent in 1982 to 0.4 percent in 1983
and was 1 percent in 1986 (Republic of Uganda, 1987: 94).
10. Unconditional grants cover LGs’ recurrent budgets, while the conditional ones cover
developmental expenditure. The equalization grant is a subsidy to LGs considered to be
poor and ‘lagging behind’ in specific services.
11. The new revenue sources were a US$2 per room tax on all hotel and lodge guests and a
local service tax on all persons in gainful employment.
12. Each of the 81 districts has about 250 paid office staff and 700 salaried field staff.
13. The 1995 Constitution (ch. 2, sec. 5) permits such a move but the urgency with which
CG politicians are pushing for recentralization of the city administration is a response to
the growing opposition of Kampala citizens to the national government.
14. Of the 46 districts that have been created since 1990, 16 have been in the East, 11 in the
North, 10 in the West and nine in Central Uganda; 27 districts were created between
2005 and 2008.
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International Institute of Social Studies of Erasmus University, The Hague,
The Netherlands.

An Unbreakable Path? A Comparative Study of Decentralization and Local Government Development Trajectories in Ghana and Uganda

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International

Points for practitioners

central government leadership finds it expedient to appear to support a decentraliza-

Introduction: decentralization as evolving paradigm shift

Decentralization policies, path dependency and sequential

of government employees. In the literature on public sector reform, administrative

Sequential theory of decentralization

context of market-oriented states, decentralization policies largely sought to

Table 1. Sequences of decentralization and their effects on inter-governmental balance of

LGs P Self-reinforcing F A High

In Africa, as Ribot observes, the ‘sequencing of decentralization reforms has not

1960s, it is sometimes easy to romanticize the recent progress in decentralization

Overview of the decentralization trajectory in Ghana

services were transferred to parastatals and agencies attached to CG (Tordoﬀ,

After two decades of implementing administrative decentralization (1957–1970s)

In addition to the existing 65 local councils, it created 45 new LG territories under

former PNDC Secretary for LGs and an architect of Ghana’s decentralization

Overview of the decentralization trajectory in Uganda

systems: federal/semi-federal in kingdom areas and district councils in non-king-

Table 2. LG share of total national revenue in Uganda, 1997/98–2006/07

Year 1997/98 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07

% 17.0 34.0 35.0 38.0 32.5

Ghana CG A!P!F Medium Weak

Comparative analysis of the decentralization trajectories of

Creating an initial path for local political disempowerment in Ghana and

Sustaining local democratic governance and participation

Table 4. Voter turnout in national and local government elections in Uganda

Type of election 1996 (%) 2001 (%) 2006 (%)

Presidential 60.7 55.7 67.8

Table 5. Voter turnout in national and LG elections in Ghana

National election (Year) 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008

Voter turnout (%) 50.2 78.2 60.4 81.5 69.52

Recentralization: taking back much of what had been decentralized

Table 6. Allocation of CG transfers to LGs in Uganda, 1999/2000–2004/05

Central government transfers (%)

Grant 1999/2000 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05

Unconditional grants 20.0 15.7 12.0 11.5 11.1 10.8

Conclusion and theoretical reflection

empowerment to local institutions. (Re)centralization will continue in Africa partly

Management: Changing Ideas and Practices in Governance. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar,

Nicholas Awortwi is a Senior Lecturer in Development Management at the

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