EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS 2004, 5, 15 - 27 NUMBER 1 (SUMMER 2004)

Behaviorism, Interbehaviorism and the Boundaries

of a Science of Behavior1
Emmanuel Zagury Tourinho
Universidade Federal do Pará, Brazil

As Kantor emphasized, the significant

aspect of our science is found not in
method, but in our conceptualizations
of behavior (Marr, 1984)

In the history of behaviorist psychology, one controversial issue has been the independence of a
behavioral science, and in particular its relation to biological sciences. In this article, the boundaries of a
science of behavior are discussed in the light of B. F. Skinner’s and J. R. Kantor’s works, including some
propositions concerning subjective or private experience. Important similarities in the two approaches are
pointed out, especially with regard to their commitment to a relational (non-reductionist) view of behavioral
phenomena. The possibility of behavior analysis treating privacy in a more consistent manner is also
proposed, using Kantor’s conclusions on this issue. Lastly, it is suggested that Kantor’s work, carried out
in the 1920s, predates important positions that tend to affirm the independence of a behavioral science,
and that taking such positions into consideration could be relevant to understanding the criticisms directed
at experimental analysis of behavior almost 50 years later.
Descriptors: Radical behaviorism, interbehaviorism, physiology of behavior.

Behaviorist tradition in dealing with system; the group of philosophical/conceptual,

psychological problems embodies a variety
of ideas and research programs which are
sometimes closely interrelated in various aspects
or, ocasionnaly, conflicting. This paper consists
of an effort to move forward in defining the
boundaries of behavior analysis, a system based
in the works by B. F. Skinner, while identifying
some similarities and conflicts between Skinner’s
version of behaviorism and J. R. Kantor’s
interbehaviorism. (The expression “behavior
analysis” is used here to refer to the Skinnerian
1 “represent well-reasoned and forceful arguments
The writing of this paper was supported by grants (#520062/
98-1and #477298/2001-0) from the Conselho Nacional de De-
senvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico, CNPq, Brazil (a Brazilian
governmental agency for the advancement of science and tech-
nology). Parts of the paper were presented at the XXXII Annual
Meeting of the Sociedade Brasileira de Psicologia [Brazilian Society
of Psychology], October 2002. The author would like to thank the
reviewers for their comments and suggestions on a previous version
of the paper.Correspondence may be sent to: Rua Aristides Lobo,
884, Apt. 100. Reduto. 66.053-020, Belém, Pará, Brazil. E-mail:
tourinho@amazon.com.br
15
empirical and applied work which constitutes
the field of a science of behavior; respectively,
radical behaviorism, the experimental analysis of
behavior, and applied behavior analysis).
Skinnerian behaviorism and interbehaviorism
share fundamental view points about the features
of a behavioral science (cf. Moore, 1987; Morris,
1984), but they differ with respect to some
philosophical, conceptual and methodological
issues (cf. Hayes, 1994; Kantor, 1970; Morris,
1984). According to Morris, the two approaches
for a natural science of behavior – a naturalism
that stands in contrast to alternative systems of
psychology” (p. 197). But, according to Kantor
(1970), research (experimental, with infra-human
organisms, in controlled situations) developed by
experimental behavior analysts is too restricted
to meet the requirements of a natural science of
16 Emmanuel Zagury Tourinho
behavior. In some measure, these two observations
reflect what has been taken as a marked
difference between the two behaviorist systems:
interbehaviorism evolved strongly in the direction
of a comprehensive philosophical and conceptual
approach to psychological phenomena; behavior
analysis (though encompassing philosophical,
conceptual, and applied work) is most frequently
recognized as an empirical behavioral science,
developing methods and carrying out controlled
investigations on basic behavioral processes.
Marr (1984) illustrates this point by arguing that
“Kantor developed his views primarily through
both broad and deep historical and philosophical
scholarship” (p.189), while “Skinner...was first and
foremost a laboratory worker” (p. 189). Morris
(1984) recommended integration between the two
behaviorist emphases and suggested that Kantor’s
interbehaviorism could fill a void that resulted in
erroneous interpretations by the media and other
sectors of society and thereby compromised the
acceptance of behavior analysis. Morris adds:
“Interbehavioral psychology is quite explicit and
sophisticated about metatheoretical assumptions.
These need to be integrated with the empirical
and conceptual strengths of radical behaviorism
to improve the acceptability of a natural science
of behavior” (p. 202). In accepting that Kantor’s
interbehaviorism offers relevant metatheoretical
references to a behavioral science, we are not
ignoring Skinner’s important philosophical
and conceptual works that ground behavior
analysis, but simply agreeing with Morris’s call
for an integration of the contributions of the
two behaviorist systems.
One similarity in the two systems is insistence
on an independent behavioral science, one that is
clearly distinguished from physiology, and
biology. The present paper deals with this theme
with the objectives of (a) outlining Skinner’s views
on the boundaries between behavior analysis and
(neuro)physiology; (b) identifying Kantor’s views
on the same topic and delineating their similarity
to the Skinnerian approach; (c) summarizing
the views of several authors who show that
behavior analysis has gained from contributions
(e.g., Moore, 1984) or influences (e.g., Morris,
Higgins & Bickel, 1982) of Kantor’s work and
(d) arguing that Kantor’s approach contributes to
a metatheoretical treatment of independence and
complementarity between the science of behavior
and physiology. The motivation for this analysis
arises largely from an interest in the topic of
private events, which requires a clear demarcation
of the boundaries of behavioral phenomena. For
this reason, the privacy theme will be emphasized
in the following sections.
Skinner and the Boundaries of a Science of
Behavior
Skinner, throughout his work, elaborated a
behavior-analytic view of the independence and
complementarity between a science of behavior
and (neuro)physiology (e.g., Skinner, 1938, 1953/
1965, 1990), which has been critically examined
in behavior-analytic literature (e.g., Baer, 1996;
Bullock, 1996; Donahoe, 1996; Donahoe &
Palmer, 1994; Moore, 1997; Morris, 1988; Poling
& Byrne, 1996; Reese, 1996a, 1996b). The present
section summarizes two aspects of Skinner’s
propositions: on the one hand, a relational (non
reductionist) definition of behavior as a subject
matter is central to establishing the boundaries of
a science of behavior. On the other hand, Skinner’s
formulation allows a consistent interpretation
of private events concerning references to
physiological components (conditions) of those
phenomena, as long as “private” is not identified
with “internal”. (Some other aspects of Skinner’s
approach to the boundaries of behavior analysis
and physiology will be mentioned in the next
section, in contrast to Kantor’s positions).
In the 1930s, when Skinner began to elaborate
his explanatory system, he suggested that spurious
reference to the central nervous system in
psychology functioned “to divert attention away
from behavior as a subject matter” (Skinner, 1938,
p. 4). His view was that a science of behavior
should avoid references to the nervous system,
as well as to mental fictions, and take behavior
as a subject matter in itself. Skinner understood
behavior as “that part of the functioning of
an organism which is engaged in acting upon
or having commerce with the outside world”
(Skinner, 1938, p.6). Fuller (1973) has stated that
this Skinnerian definition “sounds somewhat in-
terbehavioral, since commerce implies a two-way
 Behaviorism, Interbehaviorism and the Boundaries of a Science of Behavior
interaction (↔)” (p. 319). Approaching behavior
as a relationship of the organism as a whole with
the outside world is in the origin of Skinner’s
system. The reflex was firstly defined as “an
observed correlation of two events, a stimulus and
a response” (Skinner, 1931/1961, p. 337, italics
added). Skinner (1931/1961) also noted that “in
the description of behavior we are interested in
the relationships within a regressive series of events
extending from the behavior itself to those energy
changes at the periphery which we designate as
stimuli” (p. 338, italics added). Such a view of
behavior avoids reductionist intepretations, as
some comments on the topic in behavior-ana-
lytic literature illustrate. Roche and Barnes (1997)
argue that
Although organismic activity may be
reduced to its physiological components,
this activity should not be mistaken for the
subject matter of behavior analysis. Activi-
ties of organisms become interesting to
the behavior analyst only when they have
been conceptualized as historical acts in con-
text ... Thus, the subject matter of behavior
analysis is action, rather than movement (p.
606, italics added).
In a presentation of contextualism as the
world view of behavior analysis, Morris (1988)
also refers Skinner’s relational definition and
argues that
behavior is a dynamic, synergistic, and
active interrelation, not a thing, in which a
response is but one component. The unit
of behavior includes not only responses,
but more importantly the functions of
those responses, along with their inter-
related stimulus functions in current and
historical context (p. 300).
Even when one considers only the response
component of a behavior, in a behavior-analytic
view it will be the response of the organism as a
whole. “It is the organism as a whole that behaves”
(Skinner, 1975, p.44); it is the “behavior of the
organism as a whole” (Skinner, 1990, p. 1206)
that is the product of processes of variation
and selection. This is in accordance with Hayes’s
(1994) discussion of psychological acts, which is
based in Kantor’s works:
from a psychological perspective, parts
17
of the organism, considered separately from
the whole, do not participate in psychologi-
cal events. Rather, they participate in the
events isolated by other sciences, namely
biology or physiology. In other words, the
spleen and the liver and the stomach and
the lungs do not engage in psychological acts
– and neither does the brain. It is not the
eyes that see, the ears that hear, the legs
that walk, the brain that thinks – it is rather
the whole organism who engages in these
acts (p.151).
In later texts, Skinner reiterates the definition
of behavior presented in 1931, and introduces
new ideas about the (neuro)physiological basis of
behavioral phenomena. For instance, in 1953 he
affirms that “there is still a measure of circularity
in much physiological explanation, even in the
wrintings of specialists” (Skinner, 1953/1965, p.
28), and adds that “the causes to be sought in the
nervous system are ... of limited usefulness in the
prediction and control of specific behavior” (pp.
28-29). A more consistent reference to physiology
appears in Skinner’s (1990) presentation of the
principle of selection by consequences, within
which a psychological science of behavior is
encompassed. According to Skinner (1990),
“physiology studies the product of which the
sciences of variation and selection study the
production” (p. 1208). Finally, in commenting on
a chapter of his 1938 book, Skinner (1988/1989a)
affirms that it was “a declaration of independence
from physiology” (p. 129). Based on Skinner’s
writings, such independence may be formulated
in the analysis of private events.
The Skinnerian interpretation of privacy is
supported in the idea that biological variables
are conditions for, but do not define behavioral
phenomena. Biological variables are conditions
in the sense that they are required for behavioral
phenomena; they are not included in the defintion
of behavior (cf. Roche & Barnes, 1997). Of course
we may maintain the idea of a “private universe”
(cf. Skinner, 1953/1965), which suggests that
physiological events may take part in behavioral
relations. However, when one considers the
processes through which physiological events
acquire behavioral functions, one recognizes that
those events in turn depend on events outside
18 Emmanuel Zagury Tourinho
the skin for their acquisition (cf. Skinner, 1945,
1953/1965, 1963/1969, 1974/1993). Thus the
ultimate explanation will always point to an
extra-organism variable.
The identification of private with internal leads
to a set of problems in Skinner’s work (cf. Hayes,
1994; Ribes, 1982; Tourinho, 1997). On one hand,
because some events described by Skinner (1945,
1963/1969, 1968, 1974/1993,) as private (e.g.,
covert responses) are events of the organism
as a whole (and as such they are not internal or
external to the organism). On the other, because
the proposition of private events as internal
events may result in a type of reductionism
(for instance, when an “ache” is interpreted as a
physiological change, instead of being interpreted
as a response to physiological conditions which
acquired stimulus functions). These problems,
however, can be avoided considering that the
nature of privacy is summed up in the fact that
certain events may affect an individual in the form
of interoceptive or proprioceptive stimulation,
whereas those events may affect others (when
they do) merely in the form of exteroceptive
stimulation. According to Skinner (1953/1965),
“a private event may be distinguished by its limited
accessibility but not, so far as we know, by any
special structure or nature” (p. 257). A toothche
is a private event not because of its localization,
but due to the fact that “the individual’s response
to an inflamed tooth ... is unlike the response
which anyone else can make to that particular
tooth, since no one else can establish the same
kind of contact with it” (Skinner, 1953/1965, p.
257). Additionally, Skinner’s (e.g., 1968) analysis
of covert responses, as responses of the organism
as a whole, does not require the reference to
any particular organic system involved in their
production. Covert responses are viewed simply
as responses emitted “on such a reduced scale
that [they] cannot be observed by others - at least
without instrumentation” (Skinner, 1953/1965,
p. 263).
Skinner’s remarks have been pointed as
“somewhat inconsistent about the relation
between psychology and physiology” (Reese,
1996a, p. 65), but it has also been acknowleged
that “his usual position was that reductionism
is not useful” (Reese, p.65). In most of his
references to the problem, Skinner presents
behavior analysis as a discipline independent of
and complementary to physiology. Specifically
in the case of private stimulation, we may
continue to view behavior as a relationship (cf.
Skinner, 1938), in which physiological events may
participate with stimulus functions (based on an
association with public events), but do not define
that particular relationship.
Kantor and the Boundaries of a Science of
Behavior
Consistent with his argument that psychology
is the natural science of behavior, Kantor claims
on various occasions that psychology’s references
to physiological knowledge, and especially to the
possibility of physiological reductionism, move
psychology away from the study of organism-
environment interactions. Beginning in 1922,
Kantor (e.g., 1922, 1923, 1947) has pointed out
that psychology used the nervous system as a
“descriptive fact”, or as an “explanatory instru-
ment”. In either case this led to problems. On
the one hand, it reproduced mistaken concep-
tions about the nervous system2; on the other, it
established a barrier to psychology’s development
as a science.
Using physiology in certain descriptions of
reflexes ignored not only other systems (muscu-
lar, glandular, etc.) involved in responding but
also events having the function of stimuli. From
Kantor’s perspective, that use ignores that the
event explained “in its essence is an interaction of
a complete response with the specific stimulus”
(Kantor, 1922, p. 39). Reference to the nervous
system as a form of explanation sustains theories
unsupported by behavioral observation and pro-
motes mentalism, leading to such an “aberration
in our vision of physiological facts as to prevent
us from describing human behavior as it occurs
and interpreting it in factual terms” (Kantor, p.
41). In the following paragraphs, some central
points of Kantor’s analysis are taken into account.
Similarities with Skinner’s views, and Kantor’s
2
Given the penetration of physiology in psychological dis-
cussions of the period, Kantor (1922) proposed in this article “to
investigate the neural conceptions prevalent in psychology with
the hope that we can thereby suggest what is factual and what is
fictitious in these conceptions” (p. 38).
 Behaviorism, Interbehaviorism and the Boundaries of a Science of Behavior
contibutions to an approach of the boundaries
of a science of behavior are highlighted. The
analysis may also contribute to an understanding
of Kantor’s (1970) critical view of the experimen-
tal analysis of behavior.
The independence of a science of behavior
Like Skinner (1938), Kantor (1922) believed
that “psychology should be emancipated from
physiology” (p. 42). In a debate in 1923, some
consequences of this position were made explicit.
First, psychological science should work with a
clear definition of its subject matter, which for
Kantor (1923) consisted of “interactions of or-
ganisms and stimuli objects” (p.688). A response
is always seen as the response of an organism as a
whole, as a “total unitary biological happening”(p.
689), a “unit of action” (p.686), where the group
of systems that constitute the organism partici-
pate. “The neural, muscular, glandular, affective,
perceptive or discriminative factors are all com-
ponent functions, each constituting a member of
a large unified activity” (p. 686). From this point
of view, the nervous system appears simply as a
component of a more complex event (response);
it is part of the response, but does not define it,
much less should be interpreted as its cause.
To reject any reference to the nervous system
in the description or explanation of behavior re-
sults from the understanding that “it is not only
not an adequate or a relevant cause but no cause
at all (Kantor, 1923, p. 686); to fall back on the
nervous system consists of a “violation of scien-
tific methodology (namely, to seek the cause of a
phenomenon in a part of itself)” (Kantor, 1922,
p. 43). In view of the fact that the neurophysi-
ological event is merely a component of a more
inclusive event, the response (which in turn is
merely part of a psychological phenomenon, the
interaction between organism and environment),
to refer to it as a possible cause or correlate of
behavior is to ignore the nature and complexity
of the behavioral phenomenon. However, what
seems to minimize the importance of the nervous
system, for Kantor represents the possibility of
restoring its role in regulating organism-environ-
ment relationships. Once the nervous system is
properly considered as a condition for (but not
cause of) behavioral relations, its importance will
19
be more clearly recognized. In Kantor’s (1923)
words,
not until we study the neural functions
as factors in the complex or unit of action
(response) in which they operate, will we
understand them and their importance.
Never can we understand neural mecha-
nisms by making them into surrogates
for, or aspects of, “psychic” or “mental”
occurrences or events (p. 689).
A similar statement was made by Skinner
(1977) in a critical discussion of cognitivism: “The
respective sciences of behavior and physiology
will move forward most rapidly if their domains
are correctly defined and analyzed” (p.10). That
is, the progress of both the science of behavior
and physiology requires the preliminary step of
correctly defining the features of their subjetct
matter, and the types of explanations that re-
spect those features (preventing, for example,
from reductionism). This is basic to achieving
sound explanations of human behavior “by the
cooperative action of ethology, brain science and
behavior analysis” (Skinner, 1989b, p. 18).
Psychology’s independence from neighbor-
ing sciences is announced by Kantor (1966) as a
“metapostulate” or “basic assumption” of the sci-
ence of behavior. This independence also prom-
ises the possibility of dialogue and cooperation
with other sciences: “Such relative independence
in no [way] precludes the necessary and most use-
ful cooperation of related sciences in the work
of ascertaining the existence of certain kinds of
events and their characteristics” (Kantor, 1966, p.
382). This idea reflects some of Kantor’s earliest
comments on the topic: “any particular scientist
interested in psychological organisms, in order to
understand most thoroughly and most broadly
the common phenomena, must get the results of
his scientific colleagues, but this never means that
one type of fact is more fundamental or basic”
(Kantor, 1923, p. 690).
Similar to physiological appeals, mentalist
theories run counter to a scientific interpreta-
tion of behavior. Consequently, the affirmation
of psychology’s independence as a science, whose
subject matter consists of organism-environment
interactions, also serves to reject mentalism (Kan-
tor, 1966). According to Kantor (1966), mentalist
20 Emmanuel Zagury Tourinho
psychologists attribute “alien qualities and proper-
ties upon the behavior of persons” (p. 379); but
“whenever we study psychological events our
observations concern concrete activities of or-
ganisms as they interbehave with stimulus objects,
which may be other organisms” (Kantor, 1966,
p. 379). The definition of psychology’s subject
matter works, therefore, not to define conditions
of complementarity between mentalist and be-
haviorist perspectives, but to refute an incoherent
mentalist approach to behavior.
In many aspects, Skinner’s (1938) criticism
of physiological explanations for behavior coin-
cides with Kantor’s. As mentioned above, Skinner
(1938) approached behavior as “acting upon or
having commerce with the outside world” (p. 6);
Kantor (1923) was interested in the interaction
of the organism as a whole with the environ-
ment, “one total unitary biological happening”
(p. 689). Skinner critized the “circularity in much
physiological explanation” (1953/1965, p. 28)
and argued that “a conceptual nervous system
cannot ... be used to explain the behavior from
which it is inferred (1974/1993, p.235); Kantor
(1922, 1923, 1978) considered that appeals to
the nervous system functioned, like mentalist
ideas, to deprive psychological analysis of its
very subject matter. In Skinner’s (1990) view,
psychology is interested in the behavior of the
“body-cum-brain”, and “the more we know
about the body-cum-brain as a biochemical
machine, the less interesting it becomes in its
bearing on behavior” (p. 1208); Kantor (1922,
1923, 1947) emphasized the relational character
of the psychological phenomenon (organism-
environment interactions) and, consequently,
the inconsistencies of explanations that refer to
physiological events as causes or correlates of
behavior. Further, Skinner’s (1938) discussion
of physiology is later refered to as “a declaration
of independence” (Skinner, 1988/1989a p. 129);
for Kantor (1966), a principle of independence
of psychology is basic to the constitution of the
science of behavior and regulates its relationships
with other fields of knowledge.
Physiological reductionism supporting mentalism
Physiological reductionism is viewed by
Kantor as an attempt to justify mentalist con-
ceptions, “probably the most confusing and futile
procedure for ameliorating the deficiencies of the
mentalistic tradition” (Kantor, 1978, p. 338). It
is in hopes of conferring a scientific character to
mentalism, postulating an empirical counterpart
to hypothetical processes, that the appeal to neu-
rophysiology breaks into 20th century psychol-
ogy. In 1923, Kantor (1923) affirmed that neural
events “are considered causal and determining
only because they are regarded as mentalities” (p.
692). Prior to this, he had already affirmed that
“the neural mechanisms are used to uphold some
sort of mentalism” (Kantor, 1922, p. 40).
Contrary to the argument that there is always
a neurophysiological precedent for a response,
Kantor (1923) alleges that the demand to specify
that “precedent” would only make sense in the
light of the supposition that the physiology of
one psychological phenomenon is an event exter-
nal to the phenomenon itself; this is pertinent only
for mentalist psychologies, it is only for them that
“the need exist to commit the methodological er-
ror of reducing psychological data to some other
kind” (p. 690). Once again, Kantor is rejecting
both physiological reductionism and mentalism,
which are inter-related (physiological reduction-
ism works to justify mentalism, and mentalism
provides a room for physiological reductionism
in a psychological science), and are obstacles to
the development of a science of behavior. Faced
with mind-body dualism, Kantor (1966) rejected
the two “substances” and arrived at one more
“metapostulate” in which the science of behavior
resides: non-reductionism.
In Kantor’s (e.g., 1978, 1979) view, the sur-
vival of reductionist perspectives in psycho-
logical discourse, even with the development of
(inter)behavioral investigation, means that the
mentalist systems in place at the beginning of
the 20th century are maintained in the cognitiv-
ism of the latter half of the that century. They
illustrate the same problem pointed out in the
1920s, even when the brain is substituted for the
mind as “the faculties of the soul [are] made into
centers of the brain” (Kantor, 1978, p. 338). Ac-
cording to Kantor, for cognitivists, “psychology
can be scientific by equating pure phantasms of
the soul with functions of a tangible organ. Of
course the entire identification is purely verbal
 Behaviorism, Interbehaviorism and the Boundaries of a Science of Behavior
and involves spurious interpretations of an im-
portant organ” (p. 338). As the result of errors of
this type, cognitivism becomes “the antithesis of
science” (Kantor, 1979, p. 158), contributing to
“reducing all the complex behavior of the cogni-
tive type into mystical and specious brain action
and consciousness” (Kantor, 1979, p. 158)3.
In the works by Kantor considered in this
paper, explanations presented as psychological,
but that promote a physiological reductionism,
are viewed in the final analysis as attempts to
restore the principles of a mentalist tradition in
psychology. Therefore, an interbehavioral solu-
tion to these efforts consists not of eliminating
the reference to the mental component from
these positions—admitting only the body com-
ponent—but completely rejecting the preoccupa-
tion with body events, focusing the relationships
which define the subject matter of psychology.
The relationshiops of the 20th century cog-
nitivism and physiological reductionism are also
identified by Skinner (1977, 1985, 1989b): “cogni-
tive psychologists have ... turned to brain science
and computer science for confirmation of their
theories” (Skinner, 1989b, p. 18), but “no account
of what is happening inside the human body, no
matter how complete, will explain the origins of
human behavior” (Skinner, 1989b, p. 18). The
“metaphor of storage” according to which con-
tingencies of reinforcement are “stored as repre-
sentations and rules” (Skinner, 1985, p. 294) is an
instance of spurious interpretation of the brain,
which should not be viewed as an “encyclopaedia,
library or museum” (Skinner, 1985, p. 300). Even
if the brain were proved to store information,
that would not suffice as psychological explana-
tion. Behavior analysis turns to contingencies of
reinforcement to explain behavioral change and
leaves it to brain science the investigation of what
is going inside the organism. Cognitive science,
however, “cannot leave [what is happening inside]
to neurology because processing information is
part of the story they want to tell” (Skinner, 1985,
p. 295).
3
The extent to which Kantor’s (1978, 1979) characterization of
cognitivism is appropriate to all contemporary versions of cognitive
psychology may be disputable, but an analysis of the issue is beyond
the scope of this article.
21
Physiology and (in) sufficiency of the reflex concept
When behavioral psychology was still en-
gaged in investigations based on the principles
of reflexes, Kantor (1922) identified a tendency
to consider complex human behavior as the sum
of reflex relations. Kantor considered that ten-
dency as a product of the reductionist culture
that persisted in psychological thought. This topic
merits separate consideration to emphasize that
Kantor, in the behaviorist tradition, foresaw the
need for behavioral principles beyond those
pertinent to the investigation and explanation
of reflex behavior.
The passage in which Kantor (1922) deals with
the problem begins with a proposal to emanci-
pate psychology from physiology. Next, Kantor
attributes to the “neural theory” an erroneous
interpretation of behavior by psychologists
themselves: “even when psychologists consider
that they are studying responses to stimuli the
neural prejudice influences them to consider all
psychological behavior as merely the integration
of reflexes” (p. 42). Kantor raises two objec-
tions to the notion of reflex integration. First,
“reflex acts belong to the permanent behavior
equipment of the individual and are not capable
of integration” (p. 42). In other words, reflexes
constitute a phylogenetic product with respect
to which it is not possible to produce original
combinations (but only condition new stimuli
capable of eliciting them). Second, “to think of
all of our behavior as reflexes or combinations of
reflexes means to overlook the great variety and
complexity of our actual behavior” (p. 42). The
insufficiency of the concept of reflex is especially
evident when considering relationships in which
cultural variables participate, such as “complex
social, esthetic, and moral adaptations to our hu-
man surroundings” (p. 42).
Because the reflex relationship is not enough
to account for complex human phenomena, to
adopt it as an explanation implies an appeal to
unobserved fictional properties that suggest fun-
damental processes occurring in other domains.
In other words, “it is inevitable when we make
reflexes the basis of every reaction that we intro-
duce surreptitiously and ad hoc qualities and condi-
tions which really are not there” (Kantor, 1922,
p. 42). It was only in 1937, fifteen years later, that
22 Emmanuel Zagury Tourinho
Skinner (1937) recognized the insufficiency of the
reflex in explaining the behavioral relations he
was investigating (cf. Coleman, 1984). Skinner was
not partisan to neural or mentalist explanations
for behavior (the arguments in his 1938 book are
consistent with Kantor’s criticisms of those doc-
trines). But Skinner’s use of the “drive” concept
in the elaboration of his explanatory system can
be taken as a consequence of the type of problem
pointed out by Kantor (invention of fictions).
Kantor criticized this Skinnerian concept (cf.
Verplanck, 1995), calling it a “spook”. As Morris
et al. (1982) pointed out, Skinner “credited Kan-
tor with convincing him of the dangers inherent
in the concept of drive” (p. 160).
In light of Kantor’s view on the scope of a
psychology strictly based on the study of reflex,
one has a clearer understanding of the criticism
he makes of experimental analysis of behavior in
a 1970 conference (Kantor, 1970) given to Divi-
sion 25 (Experimental Analysis of Behavior) of
the American Psychological Association, which
would result in a wider schism between Skinner-
ians and Kantorians (cf. Verplanck, 1995). On that
occasion, Kantor addressed what he saw as merits
and limitations of the experimental analysis of
behavior. Among the limitations, he mentioned
the narrowness of the research program derived
from reflex investigation. Kantor did not inter-
pret the approach to behavior, with conceptual
instruments derived from reflex research, as being
influenced by neural theories, but pointed out that
one may have a correlate result when physiological
explanations are avoided and the investigation is
limited to conditioning: “when human behavior
is considered it is either fitted into a reflex frame-
work or inadequately treated” (p. 108). That is, the
variability and complexity of human behavior is
not adequately considered.
In that examination of experimental analysis
of behavior, Kantor (1970) discusses the concepts
of “experimentation”, “analysis” and “behavior”
as used in behavior-analytic literature. Regarding
experimentation, he points out that it is regulated
by reflex and operant paradigms. Limiting experi-
mentation to conditioning processes leads to two
problems in behavior analysis: “(1) the simplifica-
tion of all behavior, and (2) the inclination toward
specialized patterns of research” (Kantor, p. 102).
Consequently, one fails to investigate behavioral
processes or relationships that do not conform
to conditioning procedures and one reduces the
range of the behavioral phenomena investigated.
Regardless of the fact that the investigation con-
ducted by behavior analysts is relevant and merits
recognition, conditioning should not be viewed
as “anything more than one way of working with
a certain kind of behavior performed by certain
kinds of organisms. We may not regard condition-
ing or any other single kind as the necessary and
sufficient way to deal with all behavior” (Kantor,
p. 102). Also, in discussing the need to expand
the scope of behavior analysis, Kantor implicates
reflex research with the discipline’s limitations.
To him, “TEAB [The Experimental Analysis of
Behavior] ... should be fully alert against build-
ing up conditioning tactics into strategies, and
particular strategies into psychological principles,
and in this way creating a general bias for a re-
flex-generated interpretation of all psychological
events” (Kantor, pp. 104-105). In discussing the
term “behavior”, Kantor suggested alternative
sets of investigation to correct the fact that “on
the whole, TEAB is much more inclined toward
the analysis of responses than behavioral fields,
a circumstance influenced by the partial reflex-
conditioning origin of the movement” (Kantor,
p. 105).
Behavior analysts evidently do not agree with
Kantor’s (1970) diagnosis of the experimental
analysis of behavior. In favor of their emphasis
on experimental research based on the principles
of conditioning, behavior analysts respect the fact
that the structuring of a community of research-
ers around well defined research programs was a
positive thing for their survival and expansion, in
contrast to the decline in the number of behavior
researchers who present themselves as Kantorians
(although the survival and influence of Kantor’s
thinking can be evaluated through other means
– cf. Morris et al., 1982). Also, Kantor’s analysis
can foster a productive reflection on the scope
and the limits of a science of behavior, but his ap-
praisal of the experimental analysis of behavior
ignored that sound philosophical, conceptual, and
applied works are also encompassed in behavior
analysis (cf. Hawkins & Anderson, 2002; Moore
& Cooper, 2003; Tourinho, 1999), extending the
 Behaviorism, Interbehaviorism and the Boundaries of a Science of Behavior
field of the discipline.
In 1922, when Kantor pointed out the limita-
tions of explanatory systems that restricted them-
selves to reflex conditioning, the Skinnerian pro-
gram had not yet been started. Kantor had already
noted that investigation of reflexes, if psychology
were to be limited to it, would restrict the scope
of psychological science, or bring it back again
to mentalism. His later criticism of experimental
analysis of behavior (Kantor, 1970) is consistent
with that point of view. Regardless of the fact
that the advent of the operant concept (Skinner,
1937) and the investigation derived therefrom
made it possible to expand the scope of behavior
analysis, it was not this step that caused behavior
analysis to completely embrace the variability and
complexity of human behavioral phenomena. For
example, Skinner (1945) proposed interpretation
as a method to open new areas of investigation
and broaden the scope of the field. In Skinner’s
(1984a) view private events might be interpreted
with the concepts of a science of behavior: “to
extend the terms and principles found effective
[in laboratory analyses] to the interpretation of
behavior where laboratory conditions are impos-
sible is feasible and useful” (p.578). However,
private events were not included among the
investigative interests of behavior analysts at
the time of Skinner’s (1945) first discussion of
interpretation.
In another article in which he discussed the
relationships between interbehaviorism and ex-
perimental analysis of behavior, Kantor (1974)
concluded that there are great differences be-
tween the two approaches, if the latter were to
be considered sufficient as a psychological system.
However, if experimental analysis of behavior
were approached as “a unique specialized move-
ment within the general field of psychology,
one may well assign it an important place in the
naturalistic sciences of interbehavioral psychol-
ogy” (p. 5). Again, one finds in Kantor’s criticism
no reference to the distinction between the ex-
perimental analysis of behavior (whose scope and
limits are to be established) and the field of be-
havior analysis (which encompasses conceptual,
philosophical, empirical and applied work - cf.
Hawkins & Anderson, 2002; Moore & Cooper,
2003; Tourinho, 1999).
23
Psychological phenomena as historical organism-environment
relationships and the interbehavioral approach to “subjective”
phenomena
Psychology has as its subject matter “the
interactions of organisms and stimuli objects”
(Kantor, 1923, p. 688), but an appropriate de-
scription (which specifies functions of stimuli and
responses) of these relationships takes historical
aspects into account. Psychological processes
are adaptive in the face of stimuli-objects, but
“the stimulating situations are not the exclusive
conditions for the building up of particular reac-
tions. Another very important set of conditions
is found in the previous psychological develop-
ment of the organism” (Kantor, 1922, p. 47). For
Kantor, therefore, ontogenesis limits the field of
interactions with objects of the organism’s cur-
rent environment.
Behavioral relations are also limited by the
phylogenetic biological apparatus. Thus, Kan-
tor (1973) also mentions a basic postulate of
the interbehavioral system, according to which
“psychological events are evolved from biological
behavior” (Kantor, p. 458). Kantor’s approach
to phylogenesis and ontogenesis of behavior
is in accordance with Skinner’s causal mode of
selection by consequences. According to Skinner
(1981/1984b) human behavior is a product of:
“(i) the contingencies of survival responsible for
the natural selection of the species and (ii) the
contingencies of reinforcement responsible for
the repertoires acquired by its members, includ-
ing (iii) the special contingencies maintained by
and evolved social environment” (p. 478). That is,
phylogenesis, ontogenesis and culture are “three
levels of variation and selection” (Skinner, 1981/
1984b, p. 478) that explain human behavior. Up
to this point, we find in Kantor ideas that ap-
proximate those of Skinner (1981/1984b) with
regards to phylogenetic and ontogenetic levels of
determination. What Skinner defines as cultural
level is also found in the Kantorian analysis when
he deals with the theme of privacy.
When we start to examine private events, we
are still dealing with historical relationships. In the
case of “affective behaviors”, according to Kan-
tor (1966), it is possible to distinguish between
idiosyncratic relations, with respect to which “the
24 Emmanuel Zagury Tourinho
stimulus and response functions are coordinated
in the individual’s exclusive contacts with things”
(p. 395); and cultural relations, “built up in con-
nection with other persons in specific groups
with which the individual is identified in various
ways” (p. 395). In any case, what defines an event
as being pertinent to the field of subjectivity or
privacy is its “uniqueness” (Observer, 1973, p.
84) or “specificity” (Observer, 1981, p. 228).
Imagination serves as an example. Imagination
can be considered a type of “implicit” behavior,
a relation that involves a response partially under
the control of something that is absent, or “the
interaction of a person with a stimulus object
which is not present” (Kantor, 1978, p. 340).
Before Kantor, such a type of behavior received
consistent treatement by Skinner (1953/1965),
in a discussion about seeing in the absence of
things seen. Skinner’s and Kantor’s analysis of
the problem are compatible, though conceptu-
ally diverse.
The observability of stimuli and responses
constitutes, for Kantor, a relevant aspect of
behavioral relations in the field of privacy. This
aspect can be dealt with by referring to stimuli
and responses as “apparent” or “non-apparent”
(cf. Hayes, 1994). The partially non-apparent
character of a response results from the fact
of its being “subtle”, since it is emitted with
reduced participation of the motor apparatus.
For example, “many affective responses and
acts like dreaming, planning, and remembering
involve reaction systems that are subtle in their
operation” (Kantor & Smith, 1975, p. 55). Im-
portantly, Kantor maintains that it is always the
organism as a whole that behaves; “the activity
of the organism is a single unitary act” (Kantor
& Smith, 1975, pp. 51). Insofar as the activity of
the organism as a whole exists, a response will
never be entirely unobservable; its observability
will be partly a result of the observer’s familiar-
ity with the observed organism. “When implicit
interactions are subtle, they are very difficult to
observe ... Only when we know a man thoroughly,
are acquainted with his interbehavioral history
and behavior equipment, can we know the nature
of his implicit action” (Kantor & Smith, 1975, p.
200). No specification of anatomical-physiologi-
cal components is required for describing a be-
havioral relationship as “subjective” or “private”;
no information in this domain will be valid as a
description of behavior.
According to Kantor (1966), since the unique-
ness of privacy results from the implicit character
of certain relationships, or from the subtle form
of certain responses, “we can point to the elimi-
nation of traditional ideas of inner and private
processes which require expression in order to
be publicly known and approached” (Kantor,
1966, pp. 403-404). The fact that two individuals
may not establish the same contact with a given
stimulus is not viewed by Kantor as a feature of
privacy. If we understand privacy as specificity,
this property can be pointed out in any relation-
ship. According to Kantor (Observer, 1981) “in a
world where every event is ‘private’, that is unique,
there is no problem of privacy” (p. 230). Kan-
tor speaks of “specificity” to reply to Skinner,
or rather, to question the characterization that
Skinner makes of a private stimulation as unique
for the individual. Kantor replies to this affirming
that every relationship is unique.
An interesting attitude is assumed by
a behaviorist not completely emancipated
from a dualistic background and who uses
the term “private” in its popular connota-
tion when he asserts that the individual’s
response to an inflamed tooth, for example,
is unlike the response which anyone else
can make to that particular tooth (Skin-
ner, 1953, p. 257). What the behaviorist
overlooks is that the same statement can
be made of any stimulus object (Observer,
1981, p. 230).
Skinner’s statement concerning the different
type of contact involved in private stimulation
may be interpreted as compatible with the
recognition of the idiosyncratic character
of every behavioral relation. Even though
all behavioral relations are idiosyncratic from
the standpoint of stimulus control, the type of
contact that can be established with “private
stimuli” is unique. With respect to what occurs
in the individual’s body, only the individual can
be affected by interoceptive or proprioceptive
stimulations. These are not specially acessible
to the individual, for they depend on relations
with exteroceptive stiumuli to acquire behavioral
 Behaviorism, Interbehaviorism and the Boundaries of a Science of Behavior
functions, but the different type of contact should
not be neglected. Skinner was perspicacious in
realizing the importance this would acquire in
modern western culture, especially with the
practices that promote self-observation and
self-control. Kantor, in turn, argues consistently
against the idea that privacy establishes some
kind of problem for psychology. With regard to
privacy, one can speak of a variation in complexity
of what needs to be explained, but not simply of
a problem of inaccessibility.
Conclusion
Limited to the objectives enumerated in the
beginning paragraphs, the present paper discusses
only a few aspects of Skinner’s and Kantor’s
projects for a psychological science, their critical
view of the discipline’s historical development
and their solutions for establishing that science’s
boundaries. In the works examined, Kantor’s
criticisms regarding the adoption of physiological
references to explain behavior can be pointed
out throughout his work as developments of
the restriction he presented in 1922 on the use
of the nervous system as a “descriptive fact”
(when only one component of the response
elementis considered) and as an “explanatory
instrument” (when the appeal to physiology
serves the mentalist cause); such restrictions are
extensively reviewed and discussed in Kantor’s
(1947) book on physiological psychology. Kantor
(1947) concluded that there is an “authentic”
physiological psychology only when the organism
as a whole is the object of the analysis.
Contemporary developments in neurosciences
have provoked a greater interest in integration
between behavior analysis and (neuro)physiology,
but a consensual formulation of complementarity
in the two sciences is lacking (cf. Baer, 1996;
Bullock, 1996; Donahoe, 1996; Donahoe &
Palmer, 1994; Moore, 1997; Poling & Byrne,
1996; Reese, 1996a, 1996b). A productive
discussion on the matter might consider to what
extent “integrating” solutions solve the problems
pointed out by Kantor (1922) and Skinner (1938).
In other words, to what extent do we continue
with a non-reductionist description of psychological
phenomena, from a non-mentalist perspective,
25
when we incorporate in our explanations
references to the (neuro)physiology of the
behavioral phenomena (cf. Donahoe & Palmer,
1994; Morris, 1988; Hayes, 1994; Reese, 1996a,
1996b).
The behavior analysis mentioned above is not
covered by the restrictive description that Kantor
(1970, 1974) provided of the experimental analysis
of behavior. It is a cultural system (Glenn, 1993,
2001) or a field of knowledge that articulates
conceptual, empirical and applied contents and
that can avail itself of Kantor’s formulations
about psychology as a science of behavior.
According to Glenn (2001), “if behavior
analysis is to have a future, it must function as
a cohesive whole in the culture at large and be
recognized as a discipline in its own right” (p.
128). The functioning of behavior analysis as
postulated by Glenn (2001) perhaps depends
as much on dialogue with other disciplines
as well as other versions of behaviorism; for
example, Kantor’s interbehaviorism. One
cannot say that this interpretation of behavior
analysis is widely promoted, or that it prevails in
behavior-analytic literature. That may pertain to
a problem in behavior analytic production similar
to that pointed out by Machado, Lourenço, and
Silva (2000) in a discussion of psychological
systems: “a pattern of unhealthy growth due
to a disproportionate emphasis on factual
investigations at the expense of theoretical and
conceptual investigations, particularly the latter”
(p. 2). Morris et al. (1982) affirmed the need for
integrating the contributions of Skinnerian and
Kantorian behaviorisms and we agree this would
be an excellent way to alter that pattern.
In dealing with the problem of privacy,
Kantor’s rejection of the internal-external
dichotomy and the emphasis on interactions
avoid problems that are not entirely solved in
the Skinnerian approach. Specifically, by not
working with the “inside world” category, Kantor
can continue to approach interactions pertinent to
the theme of subjectivity without identifying its
subject matter with that of physiology, a position
that Skinner’s relational view also recommends,
but which is difficult to reconcile with the concept
of “inside world” and with the reference to the
skin as a boundary. In addition, Kantor’s approach
26 Emmanuel Zagury Tourinho
to the problem of observability constitutes a
consistent interpretation, since it continues with
the organism as a whole and places in the field of
interpersonal relationships all that is idiosyncratic
in the interactions that concern subjectivity. It is
with Skinner’s approach, however, that we are
led to become aware of aspects of the subjective
experience which make it original in modern
western culture; aspects related to (anatomo-
physiological) events which take on an important
role in this culture and with which the contact
of individuals (in the form of interoceptive or
proprioceptive stimulation) is differentiated.
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