Accounting for necessity and possibility within Lewis’ possible worlds

In his paper, Possible Worlds, David Lewis explores modality by delving into the existence of possible

worlds as distinct realms that embody different sets of possibilities. Lewis argues that possible worlds are

not just figments of imagination but independent entities that exist in their own right. This paper aims to

examine Lewis's concept of necessity and possibility within possible worlds, and it will explain how

Lewis defines possible worlds and why Lewis considers possible worlds to be real. Finally, this paper will

contrast Alvin Plantinga, as possible opposition, with the views of Lewis, and more specifically, how

Plantinga views transworld individuals.

An important question within discussing modality is 'what is the nature of necessity and

possibility?' Necessity refers to the property of being true or necessary in all possible worlds. In contrast,

possibility refers to a property in which an entity could be different than in at least one possible world. Commented [CP1]: It could prove useful to use example
here
Which introduces the fundamental argument of modal notions between de re modality and de dicto

modality. More specifically, de re modality refers to a thing's exemplification of a property or relation,

whereas de dicto refers to a proposition as a whole. Lewis asserts that necessity and possibility can be

quantified over possible worlds, which we can demonstrate with logical notation (Lewis 1979, 86). There

are two propositions to be made: necessarily true and possibly true, represented by the following ∀w(p →

p), ∃w(p ∧ p). Assume ∀w(p → p) (Necessarily true proposition). Take a possible world, w₀. According

to ∀w(p → p), in every possible world, if p holds in that world, then p holds in that world (p → p).

Therefore, in the specific possible world, w₀, if p holds, then p holds. Therefore, that p is true in our

specific possible world, w₀.This aligns with the assertion that to speak of a proposition as necessarily true

invokes a universal quantifier "∀" over worlds. Assume ∃w(p ∧ p) (Possibly true proposition). This Commented [CP2]: While this may be true, the fact that
some thing is necessary in one world does not necessarily
indicate it will be necessary in another
means there exists at least one possible world, say w₀, where p holds and p holds. Therefore, that p is true

in at least one possible world. This aligns with the assertion that to speak of a proposition as possibly true
appeals to an existential quantifier "∃" over worlds. What differentiates the two statements is the

quantifying element. To analyze the argument above as de dicto modality, one would focus on modal

properties of prepositions. In contrast, in de re modality, there would be a focus on specific individuals or

objects. To conclude, the argument for possible worlds by Lewis above demonstrates a framework that

accommodates both de dicto (in terms of what is said) and de re (In terms of what is referred to)

modalism, illustrates the significance of possible world concept by Lewis.

According to Lewis, possible worlds are worlds that exist in addition to our own. Lewis claims

that there are other worlds besides the one we claim. Lewis refers to these as "Possible worlds". Lewis

also argues that possible worlds are not bound by our world. "Realism about unactualized possibilities is

exactly the thesis that there are more things than actually exist" (Lewis 1979, 86). Overall, Lewis's theory

of possible worlds stems from the fact that there are more things than actually exist and that these possible Commented [CP3]: This is unclear, confusing

worlds are distinct from the one we inhabit. Lewis argues for the existence of possible worlds by

claiming, "I believe that there are possible worlds other than the one we happen to inhabit."(Lewis 1979,

84) He asserts that this claim is based on the incontrovertible truth that things may appear differently than Commented [CP4]: This is hardly an argument

they are. This possibility of different entities are "possible worlds”. Lewis adds by stating that there is a

presumption in favor of taking statements at face value unless there is trouble doing so (Lewis 1979, 84).

Lewis's argument can be simplified into two Premises. Firstly, ∃x (x ≠ Actual World) there exists a world

x that is not the actual world. Secondly, ∀s (Presumption(s) => ¬Trouble(s)) for all sentences s, if there is

a presumption in favor of taking s at face value, then there shall be no trouble in doing so. Therefore, ∃y

(y ≠ Actual World) there exists a possible world y that is not the actual world. However, by coming to this

conclusion, Lewis finds himself in troubling implications such that there are more things that actually

exist and that these "possible worlds" are unique from the one we reside.

To provide some background, Plantinga agrees with the theory of possible worlds; however, he

introduces the idea of actualism. Actualism asserts that only things that actually exist are considered real.
Plantinga claims that our concept of existence is the only logical, ontological framework for

characterizing the concept of possible worlds (M.J. Loux 2017, 171).

A major objection of Lewis by Plantinga of Lewis would be the rejection of Lewis's argument

that transworld individuals violate the Indiscernibility of Identicals. Lewis, in contrast to Plantinga, does

not believe in transworld individuals and that individuals are bound to their own respective world: "The

unactualized possibilities I do believe in, confined each to his own world and united only by ties of

resemblance to their counterparts elsewhere... do not pose any special problems of individuation. At least,

they pose only such problems of individuation as might arise within a single world." (Lewis 1979, 87)

Plantinga argues that the following, if an individual x is swarthy in one possible world but not the other,

it does not mean that x both has and does not have the property of being swarthy. Plantinga asserts that x

has the world-indexed property of being swarthy in one world. Plantinga also claims that x lacks the

world-indexed property for being in another world. Then, world-indexed properties for x in different

worlds are different properties to add; it is possible to characterize things in terms of properties that are

not indexed. Therefore, Plantinga's reference to world-indexed properties allows for a coherent

description of individuals across different possible worlds without necessitating the abandonment of

standard properties (M.J. Loux 2017, 180-183). Lewis would respond to Plantinga's acceptance of

transworld individuals with the following argument. Firstly, if an individual x both processes and does not

possess the property of being swarthy, it leads to a contradiction. Therefore, Plantinga's acceptance of

transworld individuals leads to a contradiction of the properties of individuals. Finally, contradictory

properties lead the concept of transworld individuals to be logically untenable. Commented [CP5]: This section could’ve been expanded to
include Lewis’ own position

Lewis's concept of possible worlds establishes a strong framework for understanding the nature

of necessity and possibility, asserting that these worlds are independent of our own. He argues that there

are more things than actually exist and that possible worlds are distinct. Unlike Lewis's view, Plantinga

questions the validity of Lewis's possible worlds, notably concerning transworld individuals. To conclude,
Lewis maintains positing the reality of possible worlds is necessary for a complete understanding of

modality.

David, Lewis “ 4 Foundations” possible worlds 4.1 (1979): 84-91

Loux, Michael J. & Crisp, Thomas M. “Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction, Fourth Edition”.
Routledge. (2017): 149-179