The Oldest Typology of Argumentation Schemes

ANTOINE C. BRAET
Dutch and Speech Department
Universiteit Leiden
P.N. van Eyckhof 1
Leiden
The Netherlands

ABSTRACT: The Rhetoric to Alexander (about 340 B.C.) contains a list of proofs (pisteis)
and other types of argumentation which may be seen as the oldest surviving typology of
argumentation schemes (avant la lettre). In the present article this typology is derived and
compared with modern proposals. The conclusion is that the oldest typology is surprisingly
similar to the most recent classifications.

KEY WORDS: Rhetoric, (typology of) argumentation schemes, topos/locus (topics)

1. INTRODUCTION

Argumentation schemes are rightfully one of the most widely debated

subjects in modern argumentation theory. It could even be maintained that
this is where it all started, in 1958. The classic works by Perelman and
Olbrechts-Tyteca and Toulmin which appeared that year focus on this
subject. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca formulated one of the most influ-
ential typologies of schemes, while Toulmin reserved an important place
in his ‘lay-out of arguments’ for the ‘warrant’, which in later typologies
would come to form the basis of the classification. One example of the
latter is the work of the American debate theorist Hastings (1962), which
together with the typology of Perelman and his associate was the major
source of inspiration for the authors of the later proposals.
Among the earliest were those put forward by Dutch argumentation
theorists during the eighties. A notable contribution was made by Schellens
(1985) who, following on the work of Toulmin, built critically upon both
Perelman and Hastings (abridged English-language version in Schellens,
1987, extensive German version and discussion in Kienpointner, 1992).
Schellens not only provided an overview of the most common types of
argumentation schemes (such as causal argumentation, analogy argumen-
tation, etc.), but also proposed quite an exact notational system, formu-
lating more precisely than previous treatments the critical questions which
a judge can employ in assessing the use of a certain scheme in a concrete
argumentation. Not only Schellens is deserving of mention here, but also
the pragma-dialecticians of the Amsterdam School, who in the eighties
began with the formulation and classification of schemes, together with

Argumentation 18: 127–148, 2004.

 2004 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
128 ANTOINE C. BRAET

critical questions (earliest Dutch-language publication Van Eemeren,

Grootendorst and Kruiger, 1984, earliest English-language version Van
Eemeren and Kruiger, 1987). The most recent and most detailed study by
a pragma-dialectician is Garssen (1997), which contains an enlightening
evaluation of previous typologies of these schemes, including that of
Schellens.
In the nineties, too, which were marked by growing interest in
argumentation schemes, the influence of Perelman and Hastings remained
undiminished. Perelman was influential, in part via the critical examina-
tion by Schellens, in regard to the work of the Austrian classical scholar
Kienpointner (major publication in 1992, an extensive work containing
some 60 schemes). Hastings had considerable influence on Walton’s concise
monograph (1996). (Grennan, 1997 contains one more detailed contempo-
rary typology.)
Thus it will be clear that argumentation schemes form a fruitful area of
research within modern argumentation theory, an area in which researchers
– as is right and proper – are attempting to make some progress by means
of critical interaction. The present article focuses on the classical origins
of this modern research. In most of the modern publications cited above,
little or no attention is given to this subject, the sole exception being the
study undertaken by Kienpointner in 1992.
Not only does Kienpointner incorporate older typologies than those of
Perelman, he also provides a history of the concept ‘argumentation scheme’
which goes back to antiquity.1 He correctly seeks the origin of the concept
in classical Greek dialectics and rhetoric, to be precise, in the notion of
‘topic’ (topos; in Latin locus). In this connection Kienpointner (1992,
p. 115) points to Aristotle as the ‘Begründer der abendländischen Topik’.
This is correct in the sense that Aristotle did introduce the concept of ‘topic’
and even distinguished various types. It is, however, not correct to see
Aristotle as the first to concern himself with the phenomenon of topic/
argumentation scheme and with the various types. On the basis of a work
such as the Rhetoric to Alexander it can be demonstrated that in classical
rhetoric there was an older tradition in which this material was studied on
an ‘pre-conceptual’ level, before there was a concept to express it. The
reflection of this in the Rhetoric to Alexander may be seen as the oldest
typology of argumentation schemes (avant la lettre) to have been handed
down. In this article it is my intention to derive this typology and – by
way of encore – to broadly compare it with modern proposals. This will
make it clear that the oldest typology contains a surprising amount of
material which appears in the most recent classifications.
And to give some idea of the broader framework of this study: my
findings provide further proof – here for the specific case of the classifi-
cation of argumentation schemes – that today’s largely normative argu-
mentation theory has significant roots in classical Greek rhetoric, and even
in as ‘opportunistic’ a work as the Rhetoric to Alexander.
 THE OLDEST TYPOLOGY OF ARGUMENTATION SCHEMES 129

2. THE RHETORIC TO ALEXANDER: ORGANIZATION OF THE BOOK

The Rhetoric to Alexander is a highly practical handbook of rhetoric.2 The

work is often attributed – on fairly thin grounds – to Anaximenes of
Lampsacus and was probably written shortly after 340 B.C. While it is
not demonstrably an older work than Aristotle’s Topics and Rhetoric, it
does clearly represent an older ‘pre-conceptual’ tradition. We do not yet
find such Aristotelian concepts as enthymêma (in the sense of ‘single argu-
mentation’) and topos (the principle on which an argumentation scheme
rests). Even the notion of ‘argumentation’ is lacking. But this does not alter
the fact that all the things for which these concepts stand can be found here.
(In this article I will not be presenting a systematic comparison with
Aristotle. In my view, the remarkable parallels, even in the area of argu-
mentation schemes, should not be attributed to an exchange, but rather to
common predecessors.)3
The surviving text of the work4 is made up of three parts. Each part
consists mainly of guidelines for the contents of the speech, in particular
for the development of argumentations. The guidelines in each part are
arranged differently. In Part 1, Chapters 1–5, the author follows a classi-
fication according to the type of speech. He distinguishes recommendations
for argumentations appropriate to exhortation and dissuasion, eulogy and
vituperation, accusation and defense, and inquiry (the first three pairs cor-
respond largely to the three types of speeches discussed by Aristotle: the
political, the ceremonial and the judicial speech). In Part 2, Chapters 6–28,
the guidelines are arranged according to type of argumentation – a number
of these chapters are not devoted to argumentations, but rather to such
matters as style. For example, the difference between argumentation on
the basis of examples and on the basis of signs is discussed. In Part 3,
Chapters 29–33, we again find mainly argumentation guidelines, but now
arranged according to the parts of the speech to which the recommenda-
tions refer. It sets out, from beginning to end, exactly what the orator can
touch upon in the course of his speech.
Part 2 in particular deals with what will later be known as topics and,
still later, as argumentation schemes – the author himself uses the term
pisteis, or proofs, mainly in order to provide proof of the facts in lawsuits.
But even Part 1 contains principles which may be seen as argumentation
schemes, even though the author does not equate them with the pisteis. In
anticipation of the interpretation below, these principles are presented in
relation to the following five types of argumentation:
– argumentation on the basis of classification (Chapter 1. 4–12)
– argumentation on the basis of analogous acts (Chapter 1, 13–24)
– argumentation on the basis of opposite acts (Chapter 1, 13–24)
– argumentation on the basis of authoritative statements on previous
comparable acts (Chapter 1, 13–24)
– argumentation on the basis of significance criteria (Chapter 3)
130 ANTOINE C. BRAET

(Of these five, the first four are – incorrectly – associated largely with
exhortation and dissuasion and the fifth with eulogy and vituperation. I will
return to this point later.)
Of the pisteis in Part 2, two groups can be distinguished: intrinsic and
extrinsic pisteis, i.e., those which are and those which are not derived from
the case itself (7.2 and 14.7).

Intrinsic pisteis (Chapters 7–13):

– eikos: argumentation on the basis of causal probability (7)
– paradeigma: two types of argumentation by means of examples (8)
– tekmêrion: sign of contradiction (no clear scheme) (9)
– enthymêma: in a different sense than in Aristotle, namely a kind of
contradiction which overlaps the previous category (again, no clear
scheme) (10)
– gnômê: maxim, also difficult to interpret as argumentation scheme (11)
– sêmeion: argumentation on the basis of a sign (12)
– elenchos: refutation, actually more like two degrees of modality in the
conclusion than normal argumentation schemes (13)

Extrinsic pisteis (Chapters 14–17)

Four types of authority argumentation:
– doxa tou legontos: the view of the speaker himself (14)
– martyria: voluntary testimony (15)
– basanos: testimony under torture (16)
– horkos: statement under oath (17)

3. DERIVATION OF THE ARGUMENTATION SCHEMES

In this section I will attempt to derive the individual argumentation schemes

on which the above principles from Part 1 and the pisteis from Part 2 appear
to be based. It goes without saying that in doing so I will rely mainly on
what the text of the Rhetoric to Alexander offers in the way of clues. But
in view of the often unclear treatment, some degree of ‘hineininterpretieren’
is unavoidable. The argumentation schemes which are part of modern argu-
mentation theory will serve as a heuristic framework.5 If the text is followed
closely enough, this does not necessarily mean that one will find what one
previously planted there.
As regards the concept ‘argumentation scheme’, the term does not appear
in the work itself, let alone a general basic scheme or a standard method
of notation. Following on the later topical traditions and Kienpointner
(1992), I have opted here to present the various schemes as variants of
‘modus ponens’, with the topical principle serving as the ‘if-then’ state-
ment (this component best describes that type of substantial relationship
 THE OLDEST TYPOLOGY OF ARGUMENTATION SCHEMES 131

between standpoint and argument in a single argumentation which char-

acterizes the argumentation scheme; cf. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst,
1992, p. 100).6
Below I will follow closely the text of the handbook. Subheadings will
indicate the principles employed by the author of the Rhetoric to Alexander
(the place appears in parentheses). For each principle, I will derive one or
more argumentation schemes which in my view may be found in that
particular principle (the schemes are numbered and appear in square
brackets).

The principle of direct application of an exhaustive series of criteria

consisting of dikaion (just) etc. to the actions under discussion (Chapter
1.4–12)
In 1.4–5 the author says that someone who recommends an action must
demonstrate that this action is dikaion (just), nomimon (lawful), sympheron
(expedient), kalon (honourable), hêdy (pleasant) and rhaidion (easily prac-
ticable) or, if difficult, dynaton (possible) and anankaion (necessary). (This
is apparently meant to be an exhaustive series.) For the benefit of the person
recommending the action, categories of actions which are recognized as
just, lawful, expedient, etc. are enumerated. For example, just actions
include such categories as ‘to honour one’s parents, do good to one’s friends
and repay favours to one’s benefactors’ (1.7:21b37–39).
What the person recommending the action must do is to verify whether
the actions contained in his proposal can be classified under one of the
recognized categories of actions which meet the criteria laid down. The
argumentation scheme contained in the implied manner of argumentation
can be formulated as follows.7
[1]8 (1) If an action belongs to a certain category, then the action
meets criterion x
(2) This action belongs to that category
(3) Therefore, this action meets criterion x
The x can be replaced by just, lawful, expedient, etc. The substantial type
of relation on which this scheme rests is a combination of belonging to a
certain category of actions and meeting the accompanying criterion.9 This
type of relation is expressed as the ‘if-then’ statement in (1): the topic which
is characteristic of the scheme.
It should be noted that this scheme [1] is only a partial one which,
moreover, as a subscheme is subordinate to what we know today as
pragmatic argumentation. It is a partial scheme because it must be applied
an exhaustive number of times, until it has been demonstrated that the
recommended action meets all the required criteria, from ‘just’ up to
and including ‘necessary’. It is a subscheme of pragmatic argumentation
132 ANTOINE C. BRAET

because the classification of the recommended action in the criteria is

no more than an initial step in the argumentation. Ultimately it is about
demonstrating, on the basis of the justice, lawfulness, expediency, etc., of
an action, that it is desirable, in other words, that it should be carried out.
This implies a pragmatic argumentation scheme: if an action displays the
required characteristics, then the action is desirable and should be carried
out. Because this scheme is more or less implicit, I have not given it a
number.

Principles for the indirect application of the above mentioned criteria

(dikaion, just, etc.): ek tôn homoiôn (on the basis of similar actions), etc.
(Chapter 1.13–24)
In addition to placing the proposed action in a category of actions that
definitely meet the criterion, the author of the Rhetoric to Alexander refers
in 1.13 to three supplementary indirect methods for someone who is
recommending something. To make it plausible that the desired criteria
are applicable to the recommended action, one can also make use of the
following: similar actions the qualification of which is indisputable (ek
tôn homoiôn), opposite actions the qualification of which is indisputable
(ek tôn enantiôn), and authoritative qualifications of previous similar
actions (ek tôn kekrimenôn).
No further details are given concerning this method, only concrete
examples of applications appropriate to the various criteria. I will take a
few of the examples (which are not always uniform) and reduce them to
the argumentation schemes which were apparently followed.

Ek tôn homoiôn (on the basis of similar actions)

The examples represent two different subtypes:
(a) ‘As we deem it just to obey our parents, in the same way it behoves
our sons to copy the conduct of their fathers’ (1.14:22a29–31), appli-
cation of dikaion, just)
(b) ‘As the lawgiver has punished thieves with the severest penalties,
so also deceivers ought to be severely punished, because they are
thieves who steal our minds’ (1.17:22b5–7), application of nomimon,
lawful).
Both examples involve similarity, but it is not the same type of similarity.
In (a) the similarity between the actions appears to rest mainly on the sim-
ilarity of the relationship between the two parties involved (our parents :
we = we : our children).10 In (b) we see a – figurative – similarity in a char-
acteristic of the action: in both stealing and deceiving, something has been
taken away. These two types of difference can be expressed in different
analogy schemes,11 but it is also possible to abstract from these a more
general analogy scheme:12
 THE OLDEST TYPOLOGY OF ARGUMENTATION SCHEMES 133

[2] (1) If an – in some way – analogous action meets criterion x,

then the action under discussion meets criterion x
(2) An analogous action meets criterion x
(3) Therefore this action (the action under discussion) meets
criterion x
The substantial relation here is some form of analogy or similarity between
actions. Statement (1) formulates the topical principle at the root of this
argumentation scheme: if it has been established that criteria are applicable
to analogous actions, then they are also applicable to the actions under
discussion.13
In the following schemes, as in schemes [1] and [2], statement (1)
always indicates the topical principle that is characteristic of the scheme.
That principle will no longer be paraphrased separately.

Ek tôn enantiôn (on the basis of opposite actions)

Again, the examples contain two subtypes:
(a) ‘If it is profitable to honour virtuous citizens, it would be expedient
to punish vicious ones’(1.22:22b38–39, application of sympheron,
expedient)
(b) ‘If you think it inexpedient for us to go to war with Thebes single-
handed, it would be expedient for us to make an alliance with Sparta
before going to war with Thebes’ (1.22:22b40–23a2)
These examples illustrate two possible ways of demonstrating the applic-
ability of a criterion: using a ‘whole’ or a ‘half ’ opposition. Here I have
combined the two subtypes:14
[3] (1) If (a) an opposite action in an opposite case meets criterion
x, then the action under discussion meets criterion x; if (b)
an opposite action in a similar case meets the opposite
of criterion x, then the action under discussion meets
criterion x
(2) (a) An opposite action in an opposite case meets criterion
x; (b) an opposite action in a similar case meets the opposite
of criterion x
(3) Therefore this action (now under discussion) meets
criterion x

Ek tôn kekrimenôn (on the basis of authoritative judgments of previous

cases)
In this case, a single example will suffice:

Not only do I myself assert that this was the intention of the
lawgiver in enacting this law, but also on a former occasion,
134 ANTOINE C. BRAET

when Lysitheides put forward considerations very similar to

those now advanced by me, the court voted in favour of his
interpretation of the law (1.19, application of nomimon lawful)
What we have here is a combination of precedent and authority argumen-
tation. Given the general description in 1.13:22a26–27 and the other
examples, the emphasis is on the second aspect, although the first is also
included. For this reason I give the following formulation of the scheme15
which appears to underlie the examples given:
[4] (1) If according to a recognized authority a previous com-
parable action meets criterion x, then the action under
discussion meets criterion x
(2) According to a recognized authority a previous comparable
action meets criterion x
(3) Therefore this action (under discussion) meets criterion x

Principles for auxêsis (amplification) and tapeinôsis (minimizing)

(Chapter 3)
The principles of amplification and minimizing, which are primarily but
not exclusively useful for praise and rebuke, have to do with supplemen-
tary significance criteria which serve to demonstrate the relative applica-
bility of the criteria dikaion, nomimon, etc.16 We are referring here to
characteristics such as the number of good or bad consequences, the inten-
tionality, and the unicity of someone’s deeds. These extra criteria are not
given in the form of a list, but rather are presented (3.6–12) within the
framework of a whole series of amplification methods which are made quite
concrete – the minimizing principles are largely dismissed with the obser-
vation that they consist of the reverse of the amplification principles
(3.13).17
I will not attempt to make each individual scheme explicit – to some
extent they consist of a renewed use of analogy, opposition and authority.
It will suffice to present a single general scheme for a negative qualifying
amplification, within which I indicate certain specific alternative variants
(a), (b) and (c) (based on 3.6 and 10).18
[5] (1) If an action which can in itself be characterized as negative
(a) has had more bad consequences, (b) was carried out
intentionally, (c) was carried out for the first time, then a
relatively negative qualification is appropriate
(2) This action, which can in itself be characterized as negative,
has (a) more bad consequences, (b) . . . , (c) . . .
(3) Thus in the case of this action, which can in itself be
characterized as negative, a relatively negative qualification
is appropriate
 THE OLDEST TYPOLOGY OF ARGUMENTATION SCHEMES 135

Pisteis: intrinsic principles such as eikos (probability), paradeigma

(example), etc. (Chapters 7–13), and extrinsic principles such as doxa
tou legontos (view of the speaker), martyria (testimony), etc. (Chapters
14–17)
As the author observes in 6.3:28a5–7, the pisteis are mainly but not exclu-
sively useful in accusatory and defensive – judicial – speeches. It will be
clear from the discussion which follows that they are primarily suited for
demonstration of the facts (in terms of the later theory of status: in the
status coniecturalis).

Eikos (probability argumentation) (Chapter 7)

An eikos is described as a statement which evokes in the mind of the
audience examples of what is being maintained. For instance, if a speaker
makes statements of the type ‘I wish for my friends prosperity and for my
enemies adversity’, then the audience will find this plausible, since they
are familiar with these and comparable sentiments. An eikos should appeal
to what the audience will recognize. (7.4)
In the light of the rest of Chapter 7, this description and the explana-
tory remarks are to some extent misleading: the description suggests that
it could refer to particular statements about the feelings of the speaker.19
Further on, however, it is clear that eikos has to do with general princi-
ples, and involves not only statements concerning emotions (pathê), but
also statements on two other categories: custom (ethos) and advantage
(kerdos).
These three ‘sources’ for the derivation of eikota are presented in 7.5–6
in a purely judicial context (28a38).20 On the basis of the examples, these
three categories can be used for the demonstration of the facts: point out
emotions such as desire, the customs of the group to which the defendant
belongs, and advantage, in order to make the charge plausible (for the
defendant emotions such as fear are mentioned in order to render the charge
implausible).
Although in 7.7 ff. we find an application in exhortation and dissua-
sion, and in the case of judicial speeches examples outside of the proof of
the facts are also given,21 the most important scheme that can be derived
from Chapter 7 (with three subtypes) is as follows:
[6] (1) If the defendant (a) experienced a certain emotion,22 (b)
belongs to a certain group, (c) gained some advantage from
the action, then the defendant – probably – committed the
crime in question.
(2) The defendant (a) experienced a certain emotion, (b)
belongs to a certain group, (c) gained some advantage from
the action
(3) Therefore the accused – probably – committed the crime
136 ANTOINE C. BRAET

In this scheme statement (1) is a formulation of the eikos principle: the

principle that the members of the jury subscribe to on the basis of their
own experience of life.23 It is a plausible causal generalization concerning
human behaviour, on the basis of which – given certain causes – the
probable occurrence of criminal behaviour can, as it were, be predicted
with hindsight.24

Paradeigma (example) (Chapter 8)

Paradeigmata or examples are described in 8.1 as actions which were
previously carried out and which are comparable to or opposite to the
actions under discussion. Examples are useful when probabilities are insuf-
ficient to make our statements plausible.
In 8.3–8 two types of examples are clarified: examples which illustrate
an expected course of events (kata logon) and examples which illustrate
an unexpected course of events (para logon). A judicial, an exhortative and
a dissuasive example are given for each of these.25 A judicial example in
agreement with the expectation is that of wealthy people who conduct them-
selves more honestly than poor people; in an example counter to expecta-
tions, it is the wealthy people who conduct themselves more dishonestly
(8.3–4). Political examples are, in line with expectations, conquests by
parties with more allies and troops and, counter to expectations, conquests
by parties with fewer of both (8.5–8).
For the interpretation, the – non-fictitious26 – illustrations and the accom-
panying discussion contexts are the most helpful.
The clearest examples are the political illustrations which predominate
in this chapter. Here apparently these examples serve to render the effec-
tiveness of a proposal plausible or implausible. The exhortative party puts
forward – paradoxical – examples to support his – paradoxical – proposal
(8.9). In other words, a specific case in the future is defended by a com-
parison with one or more specific cases in the past or present.27
The judicial example of the rich versus the poor suggests a somewhat
different form of argumentation. Here it is not so much a question of case-
by-case analogy directly before the standpoint, but more an inductive
generalizing subargumentation for the often implicit if-then principle in
the main argumentation.28 There is a need for such subargumentation in
a situation where a main argumentation of the eikos type has been
put forward which is not automatically accepted, because the audience
does not acknowledge the implicit eikos principle. Suppose the prosecutor
accuses someone of theft on the basis of the fact that he is poor.
The missing principle, which may not be immediately acceptable – ‘if
someone is poor, then he steals’ – can be supported by examples (kata
logon).
If this somewhat uncertain interpretation is correct,29 then there are two
schemes in this chapter:
 THE OLDEST TYPOLOGY OF ARGUMENTATION SCHEMES 137

[7] (1) If one or more analogous actions have achieved their aim,
then the proposed action will also achieve its aim
(2) One or more analogous actions have achieved their aim
(3) Therefore the proposed action will achieve its aim
[8] (1) If one or more – typical – members of a particular class
have carried out certain – judicially relevant – actions,
then this holds true for all or most of the members of that
class
(2) One or more – typical – members of a particular class have
carried out this – judicially relevant – action
(3) Therefore this holds true for all or most of the members of
that class
Scheme [7] is a special variant of what is commonly known as analogy
argumentation:30 the effectiveness of a specific future action is demonstrated
on the basis of the analogy with the effectiveness of one or more actions
in the past and/or the present. See, for example, the more general scheme
[2] ek tôn homoiôn. Scheme [8] is a special variant of the inductive deriva-
tion of a topical principle: (3) formulates an eikos principle that is useful
in a judicial probability argumentation within the framework of a proof of
the facts.

Tekmêria, enthymêmata and gnômai (the first two terms both stand for
certain signs of contradiction,31 the third term for a maxim) (Chapter 9–11)
The scope of this article is insufficient to explain in detail why it is almost
impossible to link these principles with argumentation schemes. Thus, with
the exception of a brief clarification in the note,32 the matter will not be
discussed here.

Sêmeion (sign) (Chapter 12)

The sêmeion is a sign of something else when the two commonly appear
together: it precedes, appears together with, or follows. A sign can also
indicate that what it signifies does NOT appear, and conversely, the absence
of a sign can lead to the conclusion that what is signified does NOT appear,
as well as to the conclusion that it DOES appear. (12.1–2:30b35–36) (No
examples are given, but in the second case, there is the classic argument
that someone’s slender build indicates that he did not attack a stronger
individual.)
Signs fall into two categories: they can lead to a – more or less probable
– belief and to – certain – knowledge (12.2:30b35–36). The origin of this
difference is not clear. An attempt to locate it in the difference between a
purely correlative and a causal relationship between sign and signified 33
would seem to be an extreme case of interpretation after the fact.
138 ANTOINE C. BRAET

In view of the list of ‘sources’ from which signs can be derived –

including witnesses and their testimony – a judicial context34 suggests itself,
as well as indications that the accused did or did not commit the crime.
Apparently it is primarily a question of circumstantial evidence within the
framework of the proof of facts in a lawsuit (see also the mention of judges
in Chapter 14.5:31a42 and the placement in Chapter 36.17–18).
As a result of the three points in time at which the sign can appear
(before, together with, and after what is signified), we have here a
whole series of argumentation schemes. ‘Positive’ and ‘negative’ variants
(presence and absence of sign and signified) make the list even more
detailed. The following ‘basic scheme’, an abstraction from the exact
temporal relation between sign and signified, opts for the positive presence
of sign and signified:
[9] (1) If a certain sign is present, then the accompanying
signified is also present
(2) A certain sign is present
(3) Therefore, the accompanying signified is also present
When taking the temporal relations into account, it is possible – as in some
modern typologies35 – to distinguish two schemes alongside this basic
scheme: a predictive scheme (the sign before the signified) and an explana-
tory scheme (the sign after the signified). Furthermore, it is possible to
draw up schemes with one or two ‘negative’ components, such as ‘If a
certain sign is not (in retrospect) present, then the accompanying signified
was (previously) not present; a certain sign is not (in retrospect) present;
therefore the accompanying signified was (previously) not present.36

Elenchos (refutation)
An elenchos is described as something that cannot be otherwise than we
say it is. This ‘impossibility’ is based on the necessity of nature, on our
own representation of things, on the impossibility of nature, or on the
representation of things by the opponent (13.1).37
Although the term elenchos need not have the specific meaning of ‘refu-
tation’,38 the examples do suggest a refutative function. 39 The refutative
function of this pistis is so powerful because of the ‘modality’ of the proof:
it is an absolute refutation because we are dealing here with a necessary
or impossible relationship. That relationship can be objective, i.e. rooted
in nature, or (inter)subjective, as when it is stated by the parties. The objec-
tive variant appears to overlap with the certain sêmeion, and the (inter)sub-
jective variant with the eikota in their most probable forms.
Apart from the latter forms of overlap, there do not appear to be any
normal argumentation schemes here. The accent is on the modality in the
conclusions. Therefore the following scheme, with two subvariants, will
not be numbered as an argumentation scheme:
 THE OLDEST TYPOLOGY OF ARGUMENTATION SCHEMES 139

(1) If a certain affair is the case, then (a) an accompanying affair is

necessarily the case or (b) an accompanying affair cannot possibly be
the case
(2) A certain affair is the case
(3) Therefore the accompanying affair is (a) necessarily the case or (b)
cannot possibly be the case

Extrinsic pisteis (additional proofs) (Chapters 14–17)

The extrinsic pisteis can easily be considered together, as they are all
variants of a certain category of authoritative argumentation. In all these
pisteis a statement is presented as factually true (see below) on the basis
of a special form of ‘authority’ of the person making the statement. The
speaker derives this special form of ‘authority’ from the exceptional
position in which he finds himself: from his experience in the field of the
statement and the importance he attaches to speaking the truth (in the case
of doxa tou legontos or the view of the speaker himself, 14.8:31b10–11);
from the fact that he is aware of the specific facts (in the case of martyria
or testimony, 15.1:31b20), idem, but in addition, from the fact that he made
the statement on the rack (in the case of basanos or statement on the rack,
16.1:32a12–13 [here we are talking about the statements of slaves, which
are only considered reliable or ‘authoritative’ if they were made under
duress]); or from the fact that the statement was made under oath (in horkos
or statement under oath, 17.1:32a33–34).
Where the last three judicial types are concerned, the nature of the
evidence indicates that it is a question of a factual statement – the place
in 36.17–18 shows that we are talking about the means used to prove the
facts in lawsuits. In the case of the first – political – type, the nature of
the statement is not quite as clear, but the experience factor and the context
in which ‘the view of the speaker’ in 32.2 is mentioned indicate that here,
too, we are dealing with a factual claim. In this case it is in all probability
a statement on the effectiveness of a proposal: on the basis of his experi-
ence the speaker assures us that his proposal will achieve its aim. What is
common to all these cases is that the speaker in a ‘truth-guaranteeing’
position makes a factual statement, which is plausible because the speaker
finds himself in that position.
It is possible to capture all the different variants of one particular
category of authoritative argumentation in a single argumentation scheme:

[10] (1) If someone is in a truth-guaranteeing position, then the

factual – political or judicial – statement which he makes
on the basis of that position is plausible
(2) This person is in such a situation
(3) Therefore his factual – political or judicial – statement
flowing from that position, is plausible
140 ANTOINE C. BRAET

This scheme, with its restriction to a truth-guaranteeing position40 and

factual statements on a political or judicial question,41 is a subcategory
of authoritative argumentation in general. We have already encountered
another subcategory of this in type [4] ek tôn kekrimenôn.
The above is possibly the oldest known list of argumentation schemes.
In the next section I will try to establish the systematics underlying this
list, in other words, to explicate ‘the oldest typology of argumentation
schemes’. I will then compare them with modern proposals.

4. THE TYPOLOGY OF THE RHETORIC TO ALEXANDER IN COMPARISON WITH

MODERN TYPOLOGIES

The first observation concerning the ten argumentation schemes in

the previous section is that they are tailored to the types of standpoints
which they can be used to defend. Certain standpoints are appropriate for
certain types of speeches. This will be clear from the following recapitu-
lation, in which each scheme is represented only by a topical if-then
principle. The consequence part of each principle indicates the type of
standpoint for which the scheme can be employed. The type of speech is
given, together with the type of question to which the argumentation can
be applied.
Direct application of the exhaustive series of criteria consisting of
dikaion (just), nomimon (lawful), etc. to exhortative, dissuasive and other
actions via argumentation on the basis of classification:

[1] If an action belongs to a certain category, then the action meets

criterion x

Indirect application of the above mentioned series of criteria (dikaion (just),

nomimon (lawful), etc.) to exhortative, dissuasive and other actions via
argumentation on the basis of similarity, on the basis of authoritative
statements on previous similar cases (ek tôn homoiôn, ek tôn enantiôn,
ek tôn kekrimenôn):

[2] If an (in some way) analogous action meets criterion x, then the
action under discussion meets criterion x
[3] If (a) an opposite action in an opposite case meets criterion x,
then the action under discussion meets criterion x; if (b) an
opposite action in a similar case meets the opposite of criterion
x, then the action under discussion meets criterion x
[4] If according to a recognized authority a previous comparable
action meets criterion x, then the action under discussion meets
criterion x
 THE OLDEST TYPOLOGY OF ARGUMENTATION SCHEMES 141

Reinforcement of a value judgment (auxêsis) on praiseworthy/reprehen-

sible and other actions via argumentation on the basis of the number
of consequences, etc.
[5] If an action which can in itself be characterized as negative (a)
has had more bad consequences, (b) was carried out intention-
ally, (c) was carried out for the first time, then a relatively
negative qualification is appropriate
Making it plausible that a crime has been committed via argumenta-
tion on the basis of probability (eikos)
[6] If someone (a) experienced a certain emotion,42 (b) belongs to
a certain group, (c) gained some advantage from the action,
then he – probably – committed the crime in question
Making it plausible that a proposal will achieve its aim via argumenta-
tion on the basis of a parallel example (paradeigma 1)
[7] If one or more analogous actions have achieved their aim, then
the proposed action will achieve its aim
Making it plausible that a class of people have carried out certain – judi-
cially relevant – actions via argumentation on the basis of inductive
generalizing examples (paradeigma 2)
[8] If one or more (typical) members of a certain class have carried
out certain – judicially relevant – actions, then this holds true
for all or most of the members of this class
Making a – judicially relevant – fact plausible via argumentation on the
basis of signs (sêmeion)
[9] If a certain sign occurs, then the accompanying signified occurs
Making it plausible that a proposal will achieve its aim, or that a
crime has been committed via argumentation on the basis of a truth-
guaranteeing position (extrinsic pisteis)
[10] If someone is in a truth-guaranteeing position, then the factual
– political or judicial – statement he makes on the basis of that
position is plausible
This series can be divided into two parts. In cases [1]–[5] we are talking
about schemes which serve to substantiate an absolute or relative qualifi-
cation of actions, i.e., schemes which can be used for an evaluative stand-
point. In cases [6]–[10] the schemes serve to demonstrate the actual
carrying out of the actions or the actual occurrence of consequences, i.e.,
schemes that are useful for a descriptive standpoint. In short: these schemes
are intended for substantiating an evaluation or an existence (in past, present
or future)
142 ANTOINE C. BRAET

[1] direct application of criteria via classification

[2] indirect application of criteria via analogy
evaluation [3] indirect application of criteria via opposite
[4] indirect application of criteria via authority
[5] application of criteria via significance criteria

[6] in particular, quasi prediction of an action via causal

probability (eikos)
[7] prediction of an effect via analogy (paradeigma 1)
existence [8] making plausible group action via inductive gener-
alization (paradeigma 2)
[9] making plausible an action via a sign (sêmeion)
[10] predicting an effect/making plausible an action via
authority (extrinsic pisteis)

Comparing this typology with the many modern typologies (see for a
critical overview Kienpointner, 1992 and Garssen, 1997), we see that they
bear a resemblance to most of them, but that the most striking similarity
is to be found in the classification proposed by Schellens (1985). This is
due primarily to the fact that Schellens combines elements from the clas-
sifications of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958) and Hastings (1962).
Because of the close similarity to Schellens, I will examine this resem-
blance first and in fairly great detail. Then I will point out the parallels
with more recent proposals.
Schellens (1985, pp. 68–70) makes use of the following main classifi-
cations (with in parentheses the parallels with the Rhetoric to Alexander,
which will be clarified later):
1 schemes bound to a certain type of standpoint ([1]–[10])
1.1 schemes based on regularity (bound to a descriptive standpoint
([6]–[10])
1.2 schemes based on rules (bound to an evaluative standpoint [1]–[5])
1.3 the pragmatic scheme (this is part of [5] and above [1])
2 schemes that are not bound to a certain type of standpoint ([10] is a
precursor of this type)
The most important similarity between Schellens (and also Hastings) and
the Rhetoric to Alexander is the fact that the classifications are based on
the type of standpoint which lends itself to the use of a scheme. There are
also striking parallels between, on the one hand, Schellens’ classification
(derived from Perelman), which is based on regularity and rules, and on
the other hand, the dichotomy existence-evaluation in the classical author.
There is also a resemblance – although less clear – between the pragmatic
scheme and the free schemes. This requires some explanation.
Schellens’ important pragmatic scheme is somewhat obscured in the
Rhetoric to Alexander, but if one looks carefully, it can be found in two
places. It appears not only as part of [5], subtype relative appreciation on
 THE OLDEST TYPOLOGY OF ARGUMENTATION SCHEMES 143

the basis of consequences, but – as previously noted in section 3 – it is

present ‘above’ [1]: an action is to be recommended if it meets a series
of criteria, including the highly characteristic criterion ‘efficacious’
(sympheron). Its appearance ‘above’ [1] is important here. The classical
doctrine of the criteria for a recommended action, which we find first in
the Rhetoric to Alexander and which is referred to in later classical rhetoric
as the telika kephalaia, is the oldest variant of the doctrine of the stock
issues from policy debates (Nadeau, 1958), and this doctrine is in turn an
important variant of the pragmatic scheme, as Schellens (1985, pp. 66 and
168) correctly points out.
The concept of unbound schemes, which Schellens derived from
Hastings, is somewhat difficult to identify in the Rhetoric to Alexander.
However, we see a beginning, which is elaborated upon in later classical
rhetoric. Category [10] of the extrinsic pisteis is linked in a practical sense
to the descriptive political or judicial standpoints, but – according to the
author himself – it is essentially independent from the nature of the question
under discussion. What we are dealing with here are the forms of author-
itative argumentation which in Schellens (1958, p. 69) are listed under the
unbound schemes.
This concludes our discussion of the parallels between the four main
classes in Schellens and the Rhetoric to Alexander. But there are also sim-
ilarities on the level of the subtypes:
– under regularity: subtype on the basis of causal regularity: [6]; subtype
on the basis of non-causal regularity [9]43
– under rules: subtype on the basis of evaluative rules: [1] and [5]
– in unbound schemes: subtype on the basis of authority: [4] and [10];
subtype on the basis of examples and analogy: [2], [7] and [10] (in
Schellens these schemes are unbound through the abstract ‘context-free’
(Kienpointner, 1992) formulations; the Rhetoric to Alexander contains
specific bound variants, geared to evaluating or making plausible.)
Of the more recent studies – I will disregard the unsystematic list put
forward by Walton (1996)44 – I would like to look at Kienpointner (1992)
and Garssen (1997).
Kienpointner’s typology not only builds strongly on Schellens and his
sources of inspiration – resulting in comparable parallels with the Rhetoric
to Alexander – he has also included a number of schemes which are derived
directly from the topical tradition since antiquity. For this reason we find
here two extra similarities to the Rhetoric to Alexander: in Kienpointner
[1] falls under Einordnung and [3] under Gegensatz.
Garssen is less interested in a new typology. What he concentrates on
is whether the pragma-dialectic classification in three main classes which
was developed during the eighties by Van Eemeren, Grootendorst and
Kruiger (1984) and Van Eemeren and Kruiger (1985, 1987) can encom-
pass all the types of argumentation schemes distinguished in other modern
classifications. His conclusion is that the types distinguished elsewhere all
144 ANTOINE C. BRAET

fall into one of the three main pragma-dialectic classes: symptom – com-
parison – causality. This also holds true for the list in the Rhetoric to
Alexander: [1], [3], [4], [5], [8], [9] and [10] fall under symptom, [2] and
[7] under comparison, and [6] under causality. This also makes it clear that
the types in the Rhetoric to Alexander were already distributed over three
– in modern eyes – important main classes, with an overrepresentation of
the first pragma-dialectic main class, which does, however, include a great
many modern subtypes (see the overview in Garssen, 1997, p. 120).
If, in conclusion, I add to the above comparison with modern classifi-
cations and the types of schemes which they include, the observation that
the modern notion of linking critical questions to argumentation schemes
was dawning as far back as the Rhetoric to Alexander (Braet, 1996, p. 352),
then we may conclude that the oldest treatment of argumentation schemes
contains a remarkable number of insights later launched by modern argu-
mentation theorists. This is all the more remarkable because the function
is different: the author of the Rhetoric to Alexander was intent on the
productive use of the means of inventio, while the modern Dutch argu-
mentation theorists mentioned above are interested in the receptive use
of the means of evaluation,45 while Kienpointner focuses on a survey of
argumentation schemes in modern everyday argumentation. The even more
important difference in approach between the author of the Rhetoric to
Alexander, who was interested solely in effect, and normative modern
theorists like the Dutch and Walton is apparently less telling here – even
though, for example, the critical questions in the first approach are
presented as possibilities for refutation for the opponent (Braet, 1996,
p. 352).
An explanation for the similarities discovered here would appear to lie
in two directions. On the one hand, there is an unbroken chain of deriva-
tions from modern authors right back to the oldest topics. The key authors
seem to be Perelman (who refers to classical sources), Hastings (who goes
back to older sources on the basis of the debate literature at his disposal)
and, more recently, Kienpointner (who is the most systematic in his exam-
ination of the topical tradition). At the same time, in the study of topics,
as in other rhetorical subjects, old insights are occasionally rediscovered.
To take a minor example: independently46 of the Rhetoric ad Alexander,
Schellens came up with the idea that ‘permissible’ (cf. ‘just’ and ‘lawful’)
should be included in the pragmatic scheme as criterion.47

NOTES
1
The historical component is only a brief summary of Kienpointner’s unpublished
Habilitationsschrift dating from 1989.
2
The book was probably intended for two groups: ordinary citizens who were involved
in lawsuits or who intended to speak at political gatherings, and the upcoming class of
rhetorical professionals consisting of teachers of rhetoric, writers of commissioned pleas
 THE OLDEST TYPOLOGY OF ARGUMENTATION SCHEMES 145

(logographers), the precursors of lawyers (synegoroi), and political spokesmen (orators in

the strict sense of the word).
3
For the authorship of the Ad Alexandrum, the dating, and the relation to Aristotle, see
Braet (1996, in particular note 4).
4
The edition followed here is Chiron (1998a). This edition, with French translation and an
abundance of informative notes, coincides largely with that of Fuhrmann (1966): see Chiron
(1998a, Intr. 96) for the differences. References to chapters and sections are derived from
the Chiron edition; only in the case of specific references are these followed by the Bekker
pages, columns and lines. I quote from Rackham’s English translation (1937).
5
In the notes I will on various occasions refer to modern treatments of argumentation
schemes. These do not employ a uniform notation method or a uniform classification. My
method of notation is closest to that of Kienpointner (1992). (See next paragraph of the
main text.)
6
I pass over the possibility of logically reconstructing the argumentation schemes not only
with modus ponens, but also with modus tollens etc. (cf. Kienpointner, 1992).
7
The author indicates in 1.5 that the criteria in question are applicable to all actions, praxeis,
and in 1.6 that the method of argumentation discussed here is useful in exhortation and
dissuasion speeches, but also in other types of speech. In addition, this passage devotes
attention to a ‘negative’ scheme for the dissuader, which has been omitted here.
8
The numbering of argumentation schemes which I employ here is misleading in the sense
that it results in a series that is not presented as such by the author.
9
In modern surveys of argumentation schemes this falls into the category ‘argumentation
on the basis of classification’ (for a comparable term, see for example Kienpointner, 1992,
p. 285, scheme (9) and Walton, 1996, pp. 53–55).
10
Chiron (1998a, ed., n. 79) sees the similarity as that between the action of obeying and
the action of copying one’s parents; in my view, the structural parallel is dominant.
11
In the modern literature a distinction is made between literal and figurative analogies;
conversely, in the case of the examples which I have chosen (see, however, the example of
healthy persons and united societies, 1.21:22b33–36), the figurative analogy is usually seen
as an analogy on the basis of similar relations; see, for example, Kienpointner (1992, pp.
384–393, together with the reference to the well-known treatment by Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca, 1958).
12
In the following three schemes I will in general refer to ‘actions’. In Chapter 1, however,
the three schematic argumentation methods are only applied to actions which are recom-
mended or discouraged. But at the same time the schemes are also tacitly applied outside
such a context (see also note 7). Analogy argumentation in particular is used in an even wider
sense than in the qualification of actions. According to the author, it can also be used to make
plausible the occurrence of effects of – political – actions or the carrying out of – criminal
– actions (see, for example, 7.8–9). If we abstract from the nature of the standpoint that is
being defended in this way and the rather specific content thus acquired by the argumenta-
tion (cf. Kienpointner, 1992, pp. 231–235 on more and less context-abstract formulations of
schemes), then in [2]–[4] we are dealing with three main types of generally applicable argu-
mentation schemes.
13
In the modern literature we often see that this if-then rule has been replaced by the
‘premise’ that the two things being compared are comparable (see for example Schellens,
1985, p. 204 and Walton, 1996, pp. 77–78); however, this ‘premise’ is an assumption which
cannot replace the if-then rule in the scheme.
14
This is the second type of argumentation by which subtypes are distinguished in the Ad
Alexandrum. In fact, this is characteristic of all argumentation types and the accompanying
schemes: there are always variations. In the modern argumentation literature the scheme on
the basis of opposites and the many conceivable subtypes are often disregarded, probably
because in practice the methods of argumentation on the basis of opposites are rare (see on
this point Kienpointner, 1992, pp. 306–328, one of the few modern treatments).
15
To my knowledge, this combination of argumentation on the basis of authority and prece-
146 ANTOINE C. BRAET

dent does not appear in the modern literature. The forms are distinguished separately, for
example, Schellens (1985, pp. 179–189) and Kienpointner (1992, pp. 393–402) on the
argumentation from authority in general and Walton (1996, pp. 94–95) on argument from
precedent.
16
In this connection, it may be useful to mention that amplification (and minimizing)
involve – or can involve – argumentation, since there are also non-argumentative forms. This
fact is somewhat obscured by the contrast customarily found in ancient rhetoric between
proving doubtful facts and amplifying established facts.
17
See Chiron (1998a, ed., n. 183) for the combined application of these methods in the
case of amplification.
18
With the exception of the fairly extensive treatment of loci in this connection in Perelman
and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958, section 21 ff.), the scheme for qualifying argumentation in
Schellens (1985, pp. 139–140) is one of the few modern examples (cf. the significance criteria
in ‘academic debate’ handbooks – for example, Freeley, 1993 – for the issue of significance).
19
Cf. Goebel (1989, pp. 43–44).
20
Cf. Chiron (1998a, ed. n. 262 and 1998b, pp. 352–353).
21
In 7.7 no illustration of eikos is given for exhortation and dissuasion; in 32.1–2 mention
is made of argumentation on the basis of the normal course of events in order to defend
proposals – or the effectiveness of proposals (?) – but no further clarification of this method
of argumentation is given. In the judicial speeches argumentation on the basis of emotions
or custom is recommended outside the proof of the facts, to excuse or justify an admitted
crime (7.13–14).
22
We find no example of this subtype, which is quite conceivable, in the text.
23
Cf. Goebel (1989, pp. 44–45). Goebel incorrectly states that the defender does not make
use of the pathê for purposes of argumentation.
24
Cf. Schellens (1985, p. 93) on ‘quasi prediction’.
25
Cf. Price (1975, p. 17) and Chiron (1998a, ed. n. 288).
26
Aristotle’s Rhetoric 2.20 also contains fictitious examples; see Price (1985, pp. 27 ff.)
on the nature of the examples.
27
The discussion in 29b21 (exclusively examples from the past) differs slightly from that
in 30a7–8 (examples from the present as well) (cf. Price, 1975, p. 16 and Chiron, 1998a, ed.
n. 298).
28
See Kienpointner (1992, pp. 243–244) for the difference between indirect inductive
generalizing support for a missing if-then premise and case-by-case analogy directly before
a standpoint.
29
Cf. Price (1975, p. 28) on the varying degree of universality of the claim that is sup-
ported by the examples.
30
For example, Schellens (1985, pp. 197–205) and Walton (1996, pp. 77–80).
31
These descriptions are preferable to the customary misleading translations, which indicate
that these words have a different meaning here than in Aristotle.
32
In the tekmêria it is a question of contradictions between claims made in the speech and
outside facts, or contradictions between claims within the speech itself (9.1:3014–16).
Enthymêmata include the same types of contradictions, as well as various other types of
‘contradictions’ such as those between actions which have been carried out and the criteria
from Chapter 1 (10.1). The indication of the various types of contradictions in the argu-
ments of the opponent does not appear to be based on an argumentation scheme. It is simply
a question of establishing the existence of an inconsistency which undermines the powers
of conviction of the opponent’s argument; one does not put forward an argument oneself
(or only in the following implicit sense: ‘If someone now claims p, but elswhere
claims/claimed non-p, then it can be derived from this that his claim p is not tenable) (I
abandon the possibility of setting up one or several argumentation schemes dealing with
inconsistency.)
A gnômê is a personal judgment of facts (behaviour) in general, i.e., a general principle.
For example, ‘I do not think it possible for a man to become an able general if he is without
 THE OLDEST TYPOLOGY OF ARGUMENTATION SCHEMES 147

experience of affairs’ (11.3:30b10–12). To the extent that the gnômê or principle does involve
argumentation, it would appear to be a form in which the gnômê forms an if-then principle,
and the rest of the argumentation and the standpoint remain implicit. Thus there is no clear
argumentation scheme to be found here.
33
This is suggested by Chiron (1998b, p. 370). Greg (1972, p. 51) interprets the sêmeion
as non-causal.
34
Cf. Chiron (1998a ed. nn. 320–322).
35
Cf. Schellens (1985, pp. 89–114) and Kienpointner (1992, pp. 328–364).
36
Cf. Kienpointner (1992, p. 338).
37
See, for text problems, the Chiron edition (1998a, ad loc.).
38
See Chiron (1998a, ed. n. 323, cf. 1998b, p. 374).
39
In the last example, an alibi refutation, this is unmistakable, while the other examples
can also be interpreted in this way. The example of the little boy is an adequate reaction to
the accusation that he stole the sum of money in question, and the torture example an adequate
reaction to a confession that does not suit us. (The judicial domain of this means and the
application within the framework of the proof of facts is clear not only from the nature of
these examples, but also from 14.6:31b4 and 37.17–18.)
40
Cf. Walton (1996, pp. 61–63).
41
See references to the modern literature in note 15.
42
We find no example of this subtype, which is quite conceivable, in the text.
43
For the schemes on the basis of regularity Schellens (1985, p. 68) uses as his main clas-
sification that in predictive and explanatory schemes. Traces of this can be found in the Ad
Alexandrum (see note 24), but there is a greater degree of similarity in the case of the division
which Schellens (1985, p. 89) makes subordinate to the distinction predictive-explanatory:
the well-known division into causal versus non-causal.
44
Walton (1996, p. 46) himself indicates that after Kienpointner he has no desire to draw
up a new classification. He derives his types mainly from Hastings, with a few new types
and subtypes which occasionally run remarkably parallel to those in the Ad Alexandrum
(see note 40).
45
In this connection, you could say that the classification of the schemes on the basis of
the types of standpoints defended is more appropriate to the inventio function in the Ad
Alexandrum than the critical perspective favoured by Schellens.
46
Personal communication (e-mail 2001).
47
My thanks go to Bart Garssen and Peter Jan Schellens for their comments on a previous
version of this article.

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