Design of Numerical Fiscal Rules 2021

European Commission
Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs

Unit C4 - National Fiscal Frameworks and Institutions
Numerical fiscal rules database
Background:
DG ECFIN has gathered information on national numerical fiscal rules in the EU. This is done annually through a sur
This file presents this information and explains how we calculate the final index for design strength of numerical fis
The index takes the following elements into account:

1. General information on the fiscal rule
2. Scores for different dimensions of the fiscal rule
3. Different elements for weighting the rule (such as sector coverage)
Source:
The database draws from responses by respresentatives from the Ministries of Finance in each Member State.
The replies are reviewed by these representatives every year, and updated when changes occur.
These replies are checked by representatives from the Directorate-General of Economic and Financial Affairs.
Contact:
ecfin-fiscalframework@ec.europa.eu
e annually through a survey among representatives from the 27 EU Member States.
strength of numerical fiscal rules in each Member State.
each Member State.
nd Financial Affairs.
European Commission
Unit C4
Abbreviations
EU Member States A Annual

AT Austria BA Budgetary accounting system
BE Belgium BBR Budget balance rule
BG Bulgaria BC Business cycle (multiannual)
CY Cyprus C Constitution / higher than ordinary law
CZ Czech Republic CA Coalition agreement
DE Germany CC Coordination committee
DK Denmark CG Central government
EE Estonia CM Council of Ministers
EL Greece CO Council Opinion
ES Spain CoA Court of auditors
FI Finland DR Debt rule
FR France EC European Commission
HR Croatia ECB European Central Bank
HU Hungary ER Expenditure rule
IE Ireland ESA ESA10 system of accounts
IT Italy FC Fiscal Council
LT Lithuania FRI Fiscal Rule Index
LU Luxembourg GG General government (includes CG, RG,
LV Latvia LG, SS)
MT Malta GOV Government
NL Netherlands GS Governmental structure
PL Poland IND Independent
PT Portugal IMF International Monetary Fund
RO Romania L Legal act
SE Sweden LG Local government
SI Slovenia M Multiannual
SK Slovakia MF Ministry of finance
MIN Ministry/ministries
MTBF Medium-term budgetary framework
n/a Not applicable
NP National parliament
NR No response
O Other
p.a. Per annum
PA Political agreement
PC Political commitment
PF Public finances
R Replaced
RG Regional government
RR Revenue rule
SCP Stability and Convergence Programme
SS Social security
. Answer missing
Dimensions and scoring patterns for the Fiscal Rule Index
From information on characteristics of fiscal rules, a composite Fiscal Rule Index is obtained as follows.
First, a Fiscal Rule Strength Index (FRSI) is calculated taking into account five criteria:
1) legal base, 2) binding character, 3) bodies monitoring compliance and the correction mechanism, 4) correctio
This methodology is inspired by Deroose, Moulin and Wierts (2005). For the above criteria, for each rule scores
Criterion 1: Statutory/legal base of the rule

3 Constitutional (including higher than ordinary law)
2 Legal Act of ordinary nature
1 Coalition agreement (including Government program voted in parliament or agreement between go
0 Political commitment by a given authority (central/local government, minister of finance) or an annu
Criterion 2: Room for setting or revising objectives

3 The target of the rule, as defined in in its establishing act, cannot be changed or temporarily suspen
1 Subject to parliamentary approval, the Government can either temporarily change the target or it is
0 The government can change the target of the rule at any time without parliamentary approval (e.g.
Criterion 3a: Nature of the body in charge of rule monitoring and the correction mechanism
3 Monitoring by an independent authority (i.e. fiscal council type of institution)
2 Monitoring by the court of auditors (if not hosting an independent fiscal council) and/or parliament
1 Monitoring only by the ministry of finance or other government body
0 No regular public monitoring of the rule (no report systematically assessing compliance)
Criterion 3b: Real-time monitoring

1 Real-time monitoring (quarterly or more frequent) takes place and the statutory base of the rule spe
0.5 Real-time monitoring (quarterly or more frequent) takes place but the statutory base of the rule doe
0 No real-time monitoring takes place
Criterion 3c: Nature of the body in charge of monitoring the correction mechanism in case of deviation f
1.5 An independent authority (e.g. fiscal council or court of auditors endowed with appropriate mandate
1 The court of auditors and/or parliament
0 The ministry of finance or other government body
0 No specific body in charge of monitoring the correction mechanism
0 No correction mechanism in place
Criterion 3d: Independent body providing/endorsing macro/budgetary forecasts

2 if there is an independent body providing or endorsing the official macroeconomic and budgetary fo
1 if there is an independent body providing or endorsing the official macroeconomic or budgetary fore
0 if there is no independent body providing or endorsing neither the official macroeconomic nor budg
Criterion 4: Correction mechanisms in case of deviation from the rule

4 the correction mechanism is triggered automatically and there are pre-determined rules framing the
2 the correction mechanism is triggered automatically or there are pre-determined rules framing the n
1 the government is obliged to take or present corrective measures before the parliament or the relev
0 the government is not obliged to take or present corrective measures and there are no pre-determin
Criterion 5: Resilience to shocks or events outside the control of the government
The score of this dimension is simply the sum of the elements defined below:
• Does the rule contain clearly defined escape clauses which are in line with the SGP? (1/0)
• Is there a budgetary margin defined in relation to the rule (i.e. the planned spending targets are set
• Are targets defined in cyclically-adjusted terms or do they account for the cycle in any way (e.g. tar
• Are there exclusions from the rule in the form of items that fall outside authorities' control at least in
For a full explanation of the calculation of the final country index, please see sheet 'C-FRSI reconstructio
al Rule Index
ndex is obtained as follows.
correction mechanism, 4) correction mechanisms, and 5) resilience to shocks

above criteria, for each rule scores are attributed as follows.
arliament or agreement between government sub-sectors which is not a law)

ment, minister of finance) or an annual budget law
ot be changed or temporarily suspended by the Government except in well- defined situations (i.e. escape clauses)
emporarily change the target or it is mandated to decide on the target (in case the target is not defined in its establishing act)
without parliamentary approval (e.g. the statutory base of the rule merely contains broad principles of the obligation for the government or the relevant a
orrection mechanism
nt fiscal council) and/or parliament
y assessing compliance)
nd the statutory base of the rule specifies corrective actions to be taken during budget execution in case a risk of non-respect of the rule is detected thr
ut the statutory base of the rule does not specify corrective actions to be taken during budget execution in case a risk of non-respect of the rule is dete
mechanism in case of deviation from the rule

endowed with appropriate mandate)
al macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts on which the annual budget is prepared.

al macroeconomic or budgetary forecasts on which the annual budget is prepared.
he official macroeconomic nor budgetary forecasts on which the annual budget is prepared.
are pre-determined rules framing the nature/size and/or timeline of the correction
e pre-determined rules framing the nature/size and/or timeline of the correction
es before the parliament or the relevant authority, but without a predefined timeline for such action and with no pre-determined rules framing the nature
sures and there are no pre-determined rules framing the nature/size and/or timeline of the correction.
in line with the SGP? (1/0)
he planned spending targets are set at a lower level than the expenditure ceilings) or a safety margin linked to the MTO which is enshrined in national le
unt for the cycle in any way (e.g. targets defined over the cycle)? (1/0)
utside authorities' control at least in the short term (e.g. interest payments, unemployment benefits)? (1/0)
se see sheet 'C-FRSI reconstruction'

) correction mechanisms, and 5) resilience to shocks
ule scores are attributed as follows.
etween government sub-sectors which is not a law)

or an annual budget law
rily suspended by the Government except in well- defined situations (i.e. escape clauses)
get or it is mandated to decide on the target (in case the target is not defined in its establishing act)
oval (e.g. the statutory base of the rule merely contains broad principles of the obligation for the government or the relevant authority to set targets)
he rule specifies corrective actions to be taken during budget execution in case a risk of non-respect of the rule is detected through the real-time alert m
e rule does not specify corrective actions to be taken during budget execution in case a risk of non-respect of the rule is detected through the real-time
eviation from the rule
dgetary forecasts on which the annual budget is prepared.

getary forecasts on which the annual budget is prepared.
c nor budgetary forecasts on which the annual budget is prepared.
raming the nature/size and/or timeline of the correction

ming the nature/size and/or timeline of the correction
r the relevant authority, but without a predefined timeline for such action and with no pre-determined rules framing the nature/size and/or timeline of the
e-determined rules framing the nature/size and/or timeline of the correction.
ets are set at a lower level than the expenditure ceilings) or a safety margin linked to the MTO which is enshrined in national legislation? (1/0)
y (e.g. targets defined over the cycle)? (1/0)
at least in the short term (e.g. interest payments, unemployment benefits)? (1/0)
onstruction'
European Commission
Unit C4
C3c - Body in charge
providing/endorsing
Fiscal Rule Strength

budgetary forecasts
defined in cyclically
Accounting system
C1 - Statutory base
Time frame (years)
of establishing the
deviation from the
deviation from the

Body in charge of
Target/constraint
C5d - Exclusions
C5b - Budgetary/
C3a - Monitoring
Monitoring body
Non-compliance
C2 - Adjustment
establishing the
Coverage of GG
C4 - Correction
adjusted terms
Statutory base
existence of a
existence of a
safety margin
In force since
C5c - Targets
macro and/or
C5a - Escape
In force until
Description
information
mechanism
mechanism
C3d - Body
C3b - Alert
Additional
Rule code
finances
Country
clauses
In force
actions
margin
Sector
target
target
Index
body
Type
Central Government, 2 Ordinary law . . . 1999 2000 Replaced by NSP 2001/2005. 75.0% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
Regional
Budget balance Government, Local Deficit targets for the CG, RG (Länder), and LG contained in a National
1011 AT rule Government Nominal budget balance Stability Pact within a multiannual budgetary setting. ESA
Central Government,
Regional 4 Ordinary law . . . 2001 2004 Replaced by NSP 2005. 75.0% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
Budget balance Government, Local Deficit targets for the CG, RG (Länder), and LG contained in a National
1012 AT rule Government Nominal budget balance Stability Pact within a multiannual budgetary setting. ESA
Central Government,
Regional (3.1) Statutory base based on constitutional law. (4.1) GS body:
4 Ordinary law Government structure Government structure Possibility of sanctions 2005 2007 75.0% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
Government, Local committee with CG, RG, LG representatives.
Budget balance Government Deficit targets for the CG, RG (Länder), and LG contained in a National
1013 AT rule Nominal budget balance Stability Pact within a multiannual budgetary setting. ESA
General Government 4 Ordinary law Government structure Ministry of finance Corrective plan is presented to NP 2008 2010 69.0% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
Budget balance The ASP sets targets for the maximum allowed deficit at the respective
1014 AT rule Nominal budget balance levels of government. ESA
Ministry of finance, Court

Budget balance The ASP sets targets for the maximum allowed deficit at the respective Ministry of finance,
1015 AT General Government Nominal budget balance 4 Ordinary law of auditors, Government Corrective plan is presented to NP 2011 2011 69.0% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
rule levels of government. Government structure
structure
ESA
Ministry of finance, Court
Budget balance Structural balance as % of The Austrian Stability Pact sets targets for the maximum allowed deficit Correction mechanism is triggered automatically. 3 3 2 0.5 1 1 4 0 0 0 0 7.2
1016 AT General Government ESA 4 Ordinary law of auditors, Government Court of auditors 2012 2016 69.0% N
rule GDP at the respective levels of government. There are pre-defined consequences
structure
The Debt Brake specifies that the Austrian federal budget has to be
(1.3/2.9) The structural balance is the headline balance adjusted
Budget balance Structural balance as % of structurally balanced from 2017 onwards. Structural balance is defined Constitutional or higher Ministry of finance, Correction mechanism is triggered automatically. 3 3 3 0 1.5 1 4 1 0 1 0 8.47
1017 AT General Government ESA Multiannual Court of auditors 2017 2021+ for one-off and other temporary factors plus the cyclical 99.0% Y
rule GDP as a structural budget balance of the Central Government including than ordinary law Independent body There are pre-defined consequences
component.
Social Security Funds of no less than -0.45% of GDP.
The respective increase in expenditure by the federal government, the (1.3/2.9) The rule is updated every year with a new legal act.
Nominal Expenditure in
1021 AT Expenditure rule General Government provinces and the municipalities must be in line with the provisions of BA 4 Ordinary law Ministry of Finance Ministry of Finance Corrective plan is presented to NP 2009 2014 (2.8) Cash expenditures. (2.11) Note that there are variable 42.0% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
absolute terms
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97. ceilings (see 1.3/2.9).
The respective increase in expenditure by the federal government, the

Constitutional or higher 3 3 3 0 1 1 2 0 0 1 1 7.33
1022 AT Expenditure rule General Government Nominal expenditure growth provinces and the municipalities must be in line with the provisions of ESA 4 Independent body Court of auditors Correction mechanism is triggered automatically. 2015 2021+ 61.5% Y
than ordinary law
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97.
Portion of public debt exceeding 60% of GDP shall be reduced by 1/20 Constitutional or higher Independent body, Court of Correction mechanism is triggered automatically. 3 3 3 0 1.5 1 4 0 0 0 0 7.47
1041 AT Debt rule General Government Debt-to-GDP ratio ESA Multiannual Independent body 2017 2021+ 66% Y
each year on average (3 years) than ordinary law auditors There are pre-defined consequences
The federal level, the provinces and municipalities coordinate their

Budget balance budgets in order not to exceed the maximum allowed limit for general Constitutional or higher Ministry of finance, 3 3 3 0 1 1 2 1 0 0 0 6.83
1051 AT General Government Nominal budget balance ESA Other Court of auditors Correction mechanism is triggered automatically. 2012 2021+ 66.0% Y
rule government deficit in nominal terms according to the EU Stability and than ordinary law Independent body
Growth Pact (max. 3% of GDP).
Real growth of primary expenditure for CG ought to be equal or lower Independent body,
2011 BE Expenditure rule Central Government Real expenditure growth rate BA 4 Coalition agreement Government Structure No pre-defined action 1993 1998 23.0% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
than 0%. National Parliament
Growth of revenues in Growth of fiscal revenues has to be in line with GDP growth (both in Ministry of finance,
2021 BE Revenue rule Central Government BA 4 Coalition agreement No body No pre-defined action 1992 1999 23.0% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
relation to GDP growth nominal terms). Government Structure
Besides, new rule for local governments in the Flemish Region

Independent body, from 2014: structural balance over the (6 year) legislature
Budget balance GS (RG) corrects possible slippages by appropriate
2031 BE Local Government Nominal budget balance Balanced budget rule for LG: mandatory balance of budgetary accounts. BA Annual Ordinary law Government structure Government Structure (RG) 1990 2009 (positive cash flow margin) to take into account the investment 12.2% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
rule actions
(RG) cycle. For details concerning the new rule: Decision of the
Flemish government of 25 June 2010.
Besides, new rule for local governments in the Flemish Region
Independent body, from 2014: structural balance over the (6 year) legislature
Budget balance GS (RG) corrects possible slippages by appropriate
2032 BE Local Government Nominal budget balance Balanced budget rule for LG: mandatory balance of budgetary accounts. BA Annual Ordinary law Government structure Government Structure (RG) 2010 2013 (positive cash flow margin) to take into account the investment 12.2% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
rule actions
(RG) cycle. For details concerning the new rule: Decision of the
Flemish government of 25 June 2010.
New accounting framework for LGs in the Flemish Region and

particularly a new definition of the mandatory financial balance.
Assessment made on the basis of the annual balance and the
structural cash flow margin (corresponds to structural balance in
the long term and is the difference between the operating
Correction mechanism is not triggered automatically. revenue and expenditure, from which borrowing costs are
Budget balance Budget balance in nominal Balanced budget rule for local governments: mandatory balance of Independent body, Government structure 2 3 3 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 5.17
2033 BE Local Government BA Multiannual Ordinary law GS (RG) corrects possible slippages by appropriate 2014 2021+ deduced). This cash flow margin determines the fiscal capacity 13.2% Y
rule terms budgetary accounts. Government structure (Regional governments)
actions of a LG and indicates whether it can incur new investment
expenditure without contracting a loan. Concerning the annual
balance, the annual result must be positive each year. In the
Walloon Region: entry into force of the reform (mandatory
budgetary balance, multiannual framework, new deadlines
requirements for budgetary documents).
Numerical targets set on the budget balance.

Initially targets for Communities and Regions (balanced budget for
Budget balance
2041 BE Regional Government Nominal budget balance 2010). The targets contain a maximum real growth rate of primary ESA Multiannual Coalition agreement Independent body No body Possibility of sanctions 1990 2011 21.9% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
rule
expenditure that is compatible with the stabilisation, and later on the
reduction, of the debt ratio.
The targets have been adapted in the context of the crisis. The objective
Budget balance of a balanced budget for the general government sector was set at the
2042 BE Regional Government Nominal budget balance ESA Multiannual Coalition agreement Independent body No body Possibility of sanctions 2012 2013 21.9% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
rule latest in 2015. Besides, Regions and Communities have defined their
own objectives.
The annual structural balance of the general government must be at

MTO (currently 0% of GDP) or respect the adjustment path towards it,
Budget balance Structural balance as % of as defined in the Stability Programme, with a lower limit of a structural Constitutional or higher Independent body, Correction mechanism is triggered automatically. 3 3 3 0 1.5 1 4 1 0 1 0 8.47
2043 BE General Government ESA Multiannual Independent body 2014 2021+ 100.0% Y
rule GDP deficit of 0,5% of GDP. This limit can be extended to a structural deficit than ordinary law Government structure There are pre-defined consequences
of 1% of GDP if the debt to GDP ratio is significatively below 60% and
the risks for the sustainability of public finances in the long term are low.
Budget balance Budget balance in nominal 0 3 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3.07

2051 BE Social Security Balanced budget rule for the social security sector. BA Multiannual Coalition agreement Court of auditors Government structure No pre-defined action 2003 2016 34.9% N
rule terms
Independent body,
Budget balance Budget balance in nominal 2 3 3 0.5 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 5.53
2052 BE Social Security Balanced budget rule for the social security sector. BA Multiannual Ordinary law Government structure, Government structure Correction mechanism is triggered automatically. 2017 2021+ 34.9% Y
rule terms
Court of Auditors
The ceiling changed twice after 1999: from 2000 to 2003, the
Real growth of health care expenditure for federal government ought to Government, possibly 2 3 2 0.5 0 1 2 0 0 0 1 5.77
2061 BE Expenditure rule Social Security Real expenditure growth rate BA Multiannual Ordinary law Ministry of finance Automatic mechanism of sanction 1995 2015 ceiling was 2.5%, and from 2004 it is 4.5%. In 2012, the ceiling 34.9% N
be equal or lower than 4,5%. social partners
will be 2% and 3% in 2013-2014;
The ceiling changed twice after 1999: from 2000 to 2003, the
Real growth of health care expenditure for federal government ought to Independent body, 2 3 3 0.5 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 5.53
2062 BE Expenditure rule Social Security Real expenditure growth BA Multiannual Ordinary law Government structure Automatic mechanism of sanction 2016 2021+ ceiling was 2.5%, and from 2004 it is 4.5%. In 2012, the ceiling 34.9% Y
be equal or lower than 1,5%. Government structure
will be 2% and 3% in 2013-2015;
The outstanding portion of the consolidated government debt at the end

Ministry of finance, National Automatic correction mechanism with possible
3011 BG Debt rule General Government Nominal debt in % of GDP of each year as a ratio of the projected gross domestic product may not ESA Multiannual Ordinary law Ministry of finance 2003 2013 97.5% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
Parliament sanctions
exceed the previous year ratio until this ratio is more than 60%.
The state budget act for the relevant year may set out additional
The nominal amount of the consolidated general government debt at the Ministry of finance, National Automatic correction mechanism with possible constraints on assuming debt by the municipalities and social
3012 BG Debt rule General Government Nominal debt in % of GDP ESA Multiannual Ordinary law Ministry of finance 2014 2015 100.0% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
end of every year may not exceed 60 per cent of the GDP. Parliament sanctions security funds, including constraints applicable to a specific
municipality or social security fund.
The nominal amount of the consolidated general government debt at the Constitutional or higher Ministry of finance, Correction mechanism is triggered automatically. 3 3 3 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 6.8
3013 BG Debt rule General Government Debt-to-GDP ratio ESA Multiannual Ministry of Finance 2016 2021+ 100.0% Y
end of every year may not exceed 60 per cent of the GDP. than ordinary law Independent body There are pre-defined consequences
Nominal Expenditure in % of
3021 BG Expenditure rule General Government Ceiling on the size of the general government sector: 40% of GDP. BA Multiannual Political commitment Ministry of finance Ministry of finance No pre-defined actions 2006 2011 97.5% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
GDP
Nominal Expenditure in % of Expenditure under the consolidated fiscal programme may not exceed The expenditure rule was embedded into the Budget Law in
3022 BG Expenditure rule General Government BA Multiannual Ordinary law Ministry of finance Ministry of finance No pre-defined actions 2012 2014 97.5% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
GDP 40% of GDP. 2012.
Nominal expenditure ceiling Expenditure under the consolidated fiscal programme may not exceed Constitutional or higher Ministry of finance, 3 1 3 0 1.5 0 2 0 1 0 0 5.37
3023 BG Expenditure rule General Government BA Multiannual Independent body No pre-defined actions 2015 2016 100.0% N
as % of GDP 40% of GDP. than ordinary law Independent body
Nominal expenditure ceiling Expenditure under the consolidated fiscal programme may not exceed Constitutional or higher Ministry of finance, Correction mechanism is triggered automatically. 3 3 3 0 0 0 4 0 1 0 0 7.3
3023 BG Expenditure rule General Government BA Multiannual Ministry of Finance 2017 2019 100.0% N
as % of GDP 40% of GDP. than ordinary law Independent body There are pre-defined consequences
Nominal expenditure ceiling Expenditure under the consolidated fiscal programme may not exceed Constitutional or higher Ministry of finance, Correction mechanism is triggered automatically. 3 3 3 0 0 0 4 1 1 0 0 7.8
3024 BG Expenditure rule General Government BA Multiannual Ministry of Finance 2020 2021+ 100.0% Y
as % of GDP 40% of GDP. than ordinary law Independent body There are pre-defined consequences
The rule sets ceilings to the level of the budget balance on a cash basis.
Budget balance
3031 BG General Government Nominal budget balance The budget balance is the difference of the budget revenue and the BA 3 Political commitment Ministry of finance Ministry of finance No pre-defined actions 2011 2011 97.5% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
rule
budget expenditures excluding elements of financing.
The rule sets ceilings to the level of the budget balance on a cash basis. With the amendmends to the Budget Law in 2012, the budget
Budget balance
3032 BG General Government Nominal budget balance The budget balance is the difference of the budget revenue and the BA 3 Ordinary law Ministry of finance Ministry of finance No pre-defined actions 2012 2013 balance rule sets a ceiling on the deficit under the consolidated 97.5% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
rule
budget expenditures excluding elements of financing. fiscal programme on a cash basis as a percentage of GDP.
The rule sets annual ceilings on the deficit of the Consolidated Fiscal
Budget balance Programme (CFP) of 2% of GDP on a cash basis. The budgetary Constitutional or higher Ministry of finance, 3 3 3 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 5.8
3033 BG General Government Nominal budget balance BA 3 Ministry of Finance Correction mechanism is triggered automatically 2014 2019 100.0% N
rule balance objective concerning the CFP calculated on a cash basis shall than ordinary law Independent body
be to reach and/or maintain a nil or positive balance.
The rule sets annual ceilings on the deficit of the Consolidated Fiscal
Budget balance Programme (CFP) of 2% of GDP on a cash basis. The budgetary Constitutional or higher Ministry of finance, 3 3 3 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 6.3
3034 BG General Government Nominal budget balance BA 3 Ministry of Finance Correction mechanism is triggered automatically 2020 2021+ 100.0% Y
rule balance objective concerning the CFP calculated on a cash basis shall than ordinary law Independent body
be to reach and/or maintain a nil or positive balance.
The nominal value of the municipal guarantees issued may not exceed 5
per cent of the sum total of revenues from own sources and the block Constitutional or higher 3 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 4.77
3041 BG Debt rule Local Government Debt service ratio BA Multiannual Ministry of Finance Ministry of finance No pre-defined actions 2005 2013 25.5% Y
equalizing grant under the last audited report on the implementation of than ordinary law
the budget of the municipality
The annual amount of municipal debt payments for each municipality

may not exceed 15 per cent of the annual average amount of own
Constitutional or higher 3 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 4.77
3042 BG Debt rule Local Government Debt service ratio revenue and the total balancing subsidy for the past three years BA Multiannual Ministry of Finance Ministry of finance No pre-defined actions 2014 2021+ 25.5% Y
than ordinary law
calculated on the basis of information from the annual reports on the
municipal budget implementation.
The medium-term budgetary objective for the structural deficit of the

Budget balance general government sector on an annual basis shall not exceed 0.5 per GOV/ MF is obliged to propose corrective measures
3061 BG General Government Structural budget balance ESA Annual Ordinary law Ministry of finance Ministry of finance 2014 2015 100.0% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
rule cent of the GDP. The medium-term budgetary objective shall be for the NP
calculated net of one-off and temporary measures.
The medium-term budgetary objective for the structural deficit of the

general government sector on an annual basis shall not exceed 0.5 per
cent of the gross domestic product. The medium-term budgetary
objective shall be calculated net of one-off and temporary measures.
Budget balance Structural balance as % of The medium-term budgetary objective for the structural deficit on an Constitutional or higher Ministry of finance, Ministry of finance, Correction mechanism is triggered automatically. 3 3 3 0 1.5 0 4 1 0 1 0 8.2
3062 BG General Government ESA Annual 2016 2021+ 100.0% Y
rule GDP annual basis may exceed 0.5 per cent of the gross domestic product, but than ordinary law Independent body Independent body There are pre-defined consequences
may not exceed 1 per cent thereof, provided that the amount of the
consolidated debt of the general government sector is below 40% of the
gross domestic product and the risks in terms of the long-term
sustainability of public finances are low.
Budget balance Nominal balance as % of The general government deficit on an annual basis may not exceed 3% Constitutional or higher Ministry of finance, 3 3 3 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 5.8
3071 BG General Government ESA Annual Ministry of finance Correction mechanism is triggered automatically 2014 2021+ 100.0% N
rule GDP of the GDP. than ordinary law Independent body
Budget balance Nominal balance as % of The general government deficit on an annual basis may not exceed 3% Constitutional or higher Ministry of finance, 3 3 3 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 6.3
3072 BG General Government ESA Annual Ministry of finance Correction mechanism is triggered automatically 2014 2021+ 100.0% Y
rule GDP of the
The GDP.expenditure growth shall not exceed the reference growth of
annual than ordinary law Independent body
the potential gross domestic product. The scope of expenditure and the
methodology for calculating the reference growth of the potential gross
Nominal Expenditure growth
3081 BG Expenditure rule General Government domestic product shall be determined according to the requirements set ESA Annual Ordinary law Ministry of finance Ministry of finance No pre-defined actions 2014 2014 100.0% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
rate
out in Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the
strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the
surveillance and coordination of economic policies.
The annual expenditure growth shall not exceed the reference growth of
Constitutional or higher Ministry of finance, 3 3 3 0 1.5 0 0 1 1 0 0 6.2
3082 BG Expenditure rule General Government Nominal expenditure growth domestic product shall be determined according to the requirements set ESA Annual Independent body No pre-defined actions 2015 2016 100.0% N
than ordinary law Independent body
The annual expenditure growth shall not exceed the reference growth of
Constitutional or higher Ministry of finance, Correction mechanism is triggered automatically. 3 3 3 0 0 0 4 1 0 0 0 7.3
3083 BG Expenditure rule General Government Nominal expenditure growth domestic product shall be determined according to the requirements set ESA Annual Ministry of finance 2017 2021+ 100.0% Y
than ordinary law Independent body There are pre-defined consequences
The medium-term balance objective concerning municipal budgets

Budget balance
3091 BG Local Government Nominal budget balance calculated on a cash basis shall be to maintain a balanced budgetary BA Multiannual Ordinary law Ministry of finance No body No pre-defined actions 2014 2014 22.6% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
rule
balance.
The medium-term balance objective concerning municipal budgets

Budget balance Nominal balance as % of Constitutional or higher 3 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4.27
3092 BG Local Government calculated on a cash basis shall be to maintain a balanced budgetary BA Multiannual Ministry of finance Ministry of finance No pre-defined actions 2014 2021+ 26.0% Y
rule GDP than ordinary law
balance.
The average growth rate of expenditure for local activities under
Nominal Expenditure growth municipal budgets for the forecasted medium-term period shall not
30101 BG Expenditure rule Local Government BA Annual Ordinary law Ministry of finance No body No pre-defined actions 2014 2014 22.6% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
rate exceed the average growth rate of the reported expenditure for local
activities for the past four years.
The average growth rate of expenditure for local activities under

municipal budgets for the forecasted medium-term period shall not Constitutional or higher 3 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4.27
30102 BG Expenditure rule Local Government Nominal expenditure growth BA Annual Ministry of finance Ministry of finance No pre-defined actions 2014 2021+ 26.0% Y
exceed the average growth rate of the reported expenditure for local than ordinary law
activities for the past four years.
Budget balance
4011 CY General Government Structural budget balance Targets for the GG structural balance as % of GDP. ESA Multiannual Ordinary law Ministry of finance Ministry of finance Corrective plan is presented to NP 2013 2013 90.0% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
rule
The rule for the budgetary position establishes that the general structural
Budget balance Structural balance as % of fiscal balance is balanced or in surplus in the medium term. This rule Constitutional or higher Ministry of finance, Ministry of finance, Correction mechanism is triggered automatically. The lower limit of the medium-term fiscal target is defined 3 3 3 0 1.5 1 4 1 0 1 0 8.47
4012 CY General Government ESA Multiannual 2014 2021+ 100.0% Y
rule GDP shall be deemed met if the annual structural balance of the general than ordinary law Independent body Independent body There are pre-defined consequences explicitly as in the Fiscal Compact.
government has achieved the set medium-term fiscal target.
Budget balance Nominal balance in absolute Constitutional or higher Ministry of finance, 3 3 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 4.53
4021 CY Local Government Local authorities should only prepare balanced annual budgets ESA Multiannual Ministry of finance No pre-defined actions 1986 2021+ 4.0% Y
rule terms than ordinary law Government structure
According to article 43 of Fiscal Responsibility and Budgetary

Court of auditors, Ministry Ministry of finance,
Framework Law 2014 (Ν. 20(I)/2014), when the ratio of public debt to Constitutional or higher Correction mechanism is triggered automatically. 3 3 3 0 1.5 1 4 0 0 0 0 7.47
4031 CY Debt rule General Government Debt-to-GDP ratio ESA Multiannual of finance, Independent Independent body, 2015 2021+ 100.0% Y
GDP at market prices exceeds 60%, as determined by Protocol (no 12), than ordinary law There are pre-defined consequences
body European Commission
the ratio is reduced under th provisions of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97.
The maximal volume of general government expenditure is derived in

particular from the structural part of this sector’s revenues increased by
1% of GDP (the currently defined medium-term budgetary objective).
The expenditure framework is derived from the structural balance
Budget balance Structural balance as % of Ministry of finance, Ministry of finance, Correction mechanism is triggered automatically. 2 3 3 0 1.5 0 4 0 0 1 0 7.03
5041 CZ General Government serving as the starting point for drawing up draft state budgets and draft ESA Multiannual Ordinary law 2017 2019 100.0% N
rule nomainal GDP Independent body Independent body There are pre-defined consequences
budgets of state funds expenditure limits. The rule is supplemented with
an automatic correction mechanism, reflecting in a retrospective manner
the evaluated difference between the real expenditure level and the
expenditure level defined by the rule.
The maximal volume of general government expenditure is derived in

particular from the structural part of this sector’s revenues increased by
1% of GDP (the currently defined medium-term budgetary objective).
The expenditure framework is derived from the structural balance
Budget balance Structural balance as % of Ministry of finance, Ministry of finance, Correction mechanism is triggered automatically. 2 3 3 0 1.5 0 4 0 0 1 0 7.56
5042 CZ General Government serving as the starting point for drawing up draft state budgets and draft ESA Multiannual Ordinary law 2020 2021+ 100.0% Y
rule nomainal GDP Independent body Independent body There are pre-defined consequences
budgets of state funds expenditure limits. The rule is supplemented with
an automatic correction mechanism, reflecting in a retrospective manner
the evaluated difference between the real expenditure level and the
expenditure level defined by the rule.
Debt break sets the rule for the general government units about their
Correction mechanism is triggered automatically. 2 3 3 0 1.5 0 4 0 0 0 0 6.53
5051 CZ Debt rule General Government Debt-to-GDP ratio budgets should the general government debt exceeds the level of 55 % ESA Annual Ordinary law Independent body Independent body 2017 2021+ 100.0% Y
There are pre-defined consequences
of GDP.
Nominal debt as % of total The local government units are obliged to keep their debt at maximum Correction mechanism is triggered automatically. 2 3 1 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 5.6
5061 CZ Debt rule Local Government BA Annual Ordinary law Ministry of Finance Ministry of Finance 2017 2021+ 27.0% Y
revenues level of 60 % of their 4-year average of revenues. There are pre-defined consequences
Budget balance Golden rule: public borrowing is only allowed if it does not exceed public Constitutional or higher Ministry of finance,
6011 DE Central Government Nominal budget balance BA Annual No body No pre- defined action 1990 2008 16.4% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
rule investment. Exceptions allowed for stabilisation purposes only. than ordinary law National Parliament
The budgets of the Federation shall in principle be balanced without

Budget balance Budget balance as % of Constitutional or higher Ministry of finance, National Correction mechanism is triggered automatically.
6012 DE Central Government revenue from credits. This principle is fulfilled for the Federation when BA Annual Independent body 2009 2020 17.3% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
rule GDP than ordinary law parliament There are pre-defined consequences
structural net borrowing does not exceed 0.35 % of GDP.
The budgets of the Federation shall in principle be balanced without

Budget balance Budget balance as % of Constitutional or higher Ministry of finance, National Correction mechanism is triggered automatically. 3 3 3 0.5 1.5 1 4 0 0 1 0 8.6
6016 DE Central Government revenue from credits. This principle is fulfilled for the Federation when BA Annual Independent body 2021 2021+ 17.3% Y
rule GDP than ordinary law parliament There are pre-defined consequences
structural net borrowing does not exceed 0.35 % of GDP.
(2.8) Cash-based accounting. (4.1), (5.1) GS body: Financial

Central Government, Nominal Expenditure growth Maximum expenditure growth of annually 1% on average for federal
6021 DE Expenditure rule BA 5 Coalition agreement Government Structure Government Structure No pre-defined action 1990 2007 Planning Council with CG, RG, LG members. (1.7) In force 54.0% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
Regional Government rate government and Länder.
since the early 1980s.
Central Government, Nominal Expenditure growth

6022 DE Expenditure rule Maximum expenditure growth to be below revenue growth on average. BA 5 Coalition agreement Government Structure Government Structure No pre-defined action 2008 2009 54.0% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
Regional Government rate
Budget balance Budget balance as % of Balanced budget rule for local governments ('administrative' and capital Correction mechanism is triggered automatically.
6031 DE Local Government BA Annual Ordinary law Independent body Government structure 1990 2021+ 16.9% 2 3 1 0 0 1 4 0 0 0 1 Y 6.37
rule GDP accounts). There are pre-defined consequences
The budgets of the Länder shall in principle be balanced without revenue

Budget balance Budget balance as % of Constitutional or higher
6041 DE Regional Government from credits. This principle is fulfilled for the Länder when structural net BA Annual Independent body Lander Parliaments Correction mechanism is triggered automatically 2009 2021+ 22.6% 3 3 2 0.5 1 1 2 0 0 1 0 Y 6.7
rule GDP than ordinary law
borrowing does not exceed 0 % of GDP.
Budget balance Budget balance as % of Nominal balance of all revenues and expenditures. There is a minimum Ministry of Finance,
6051 DE Social Security BA Annual Ordinary law Independent body No pre-defined action 2009 2021+ 43.1% 2 3 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 Y 4.13
rule GDP reserve for the health insurance of 25% of monthly expenditure. Government structure
Budget balance Structural balance as % of The general government structural deficit must not exceed an upper limit Constitutional or higher Correction mechanism is triggered automatically.
6061 DE General Government ESA Annual Independent body Independent body 2013 2021+ 100.0% 3 3 3 0 1.5 1 4 1 0 1 0 Y 8.47
rule GDP of 0.5% of nominal gross domestic product. than ordinary law There are pre-defined consequences
Budget balance
7011 DK General Government Structural budget balance Structural budget surpluses in the interval 0.5 - 1.5% of GDP. ESA Multiannual Coalition agreement Ministry of finance Ministry of finance No pre-defined action 1992 2006 100.0% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
rule
Budget balance Fiscal policy is planned to achieve a balanced budget in structural terms
7012 DK General Government Structural budget balance ESA Multiannual Coalition agreement Ministry of finance Ministry of finance No pre-defined action 2007 2013 97.5% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
rule in 2020 while at all times respecting the MTO.
Budget balance Structural balance as % of Fiscal policy is planned to achieve a balanced budget in structural terms
7013 DK General Government ESA Multiannual Coalition agreement Ministry of finance Ministry of finance No pre-defined action 2014 2017 100.0% 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 N 2.77
rule GDP in 2020 while at all times respecting the MTO.
Tax freeze: The tax freeze implies that direct or indirect tax rates can not
Limits on direct or indirect
7031 DK Revenue rule General Government be raised, whether expressed as a percentage or as an amount in n/a n/a Coalition agreement Ministry of finance Ministry of finance No pre-defined action 2001 2010 87.5% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
tax rates
Danish kroner.
The yearly target for the structural budget balance is the Medium-Term
Budget balance Structural balance as % of Constitutional or higher Ministry of finance, Ministry of finance, Correction mechanism is triggered automatically.
7041 DK General Government Objective (MTO) as specified in the Stability and Growth Pact, although ESA Annual 2012 2021+ 100.0% 3 3 3 0.5 1.5 0 4 1 0 1 0 Y 8.33
rule GDP than ordinary law Independent body Independent body There are pre-defined consequences
with a lower threshold for the structural deficit of 0.5 per cent of GDP.
Nominal expenditure ceilings for three main areas (central government,

Ministry of finance, National
Nominal expenditure ceiling regional government and local government) of the budget set in Constitutional or higher Ministry of finance, Correction mechanism is triggered automatically.
7051 DK Expenditure rule General Government BA Multiannual parliament, Independent 2014 2019 75% 2 1 3 1 1.5 0 4 0 0 0 1 N 5.97
in absolute terms concordance with rule no. 7013 and legally binding for 4 years (rolling 4 than ordinary law Independent body There are pre-defined consequences
body
years i.e. one year is deleted and one year is added each year).
Nominal expenditure ceilings for three main areas (central government,

Nominal expenditure ceiling regional government and local government) of the budget set in Constitutional or higher Ministry of finance, Correction mechanism is triggered automatically.
7052 DK Expenditure rule General Government BA Multiannual parliament, Independent 2020 2021+ 75.0% 3 1 3 1 1.5 0 4 0 0 1 1 Y 7.13
in absolute terms concordance with rule no. 7013 and legally binding for 4 years (rolling 4 than ordinary law Independent body There are pre-defined consequences
body
years i.e. one year is deleted and one year is added each year).
Budget balance Structural balance as % of

7061 DK General Government 2025-plan aiming at a balanced budget in structural terms in 2025 ESA Multiannual Political agreement Ministry of Finance Ministry of Finance No pre-defined action 2017 2021+ 100% 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 Y 1.43
rule GDP The rule is supported by a paragraph (no 116) in the
Constitution: If a proposed amendment to the state budget or to
Corrective measures are proposed - possibility of its draft has the effect of decreasing estimated revenue, or
sanctions. Depending on the corrective measures increasing expenditure or reallocating expenditure, the
Budget balance
8011 EE General Government Structural budget balance Balanced budget rule for GG. BA but inline with ESA 4 Coalition agreement Ministry of finance Ministry of finance being approved by the Parliament, for example: the 1993 2011 proponent of the amendment shall append financial calculations 97.5% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
rule
ministry of finance can also, if needed, limit payments to the proposed amendment which demonstrate the sources of
from the Treasury. revenue necessary to cover the expenditure. The rule has also
Corrective measures are proposed - possibility of beenrule
The stated in basically
is supported byall the State Budget
a paragraph Strategies
(no 116) in the as well
sanctions. Depending on the corrective measures as coalition agreements.
Constitution: If a proposed amendment to the state budget or to
Budget balance Structural budget position of the general government sector is in balance
8012 EE General Government Structural budget balance BA but in line with ESA 4 Coalition agreement Ministry of finance Ministry of finance being approved by the Parliament, for example: the 2012 2013 its draft has the effect of decreasing estimated revenue, or 98% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
rule or in surplus, taking into account the forecast.
ministry of finance can also, if needed, limit payments increasing expenditure or reallocating expenditure, the
from the Treasury. proponent of the amendment shall append financial calculations
Budget balance Structural balance as % of Structural budget position of the general government sector is in balance Constitutional or higher Ministry of finance, Correction mechanism is triggered automatically.
8013 EE General Government BA but in line with ESA 4 Independent body 2014 2021+ 100% 3 3 3 0 1.5 1 4 1 0 1 0 Y 8.47
rule GDP or in surplus, taking into account the forecast. than ordinary law Independent body There are pre-defined consequences
Local governments are not allowed to increase their debt over the 60 per
Debt ceiling as % of
8021 EE Debt rule Local Government cent of their budget revenue of which the allocations from the state BA Annual Ordinary law Ministry of finance Ministry of finance Framing its nature/size and timeline 1997 2010 22% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
budgeted revenues
budget for a specific purpose have been deducted.
Local governments are not allowed to increase their debt over the 60 per
8022 EE Debt rule Local Government Net debt cent of their budget revenue of which the allocations from the state IPSAS Annual Ordinary law Ministry of finance Ministry of finance Correction mechanism is triggered automatically 2011 2021+ 23% 2 1 1 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 1 Y 4.03
budget for a specific purpose have been deducted.
Central government units cannot accumulate net debt obligations
Nominal debt in % of
8031 EE Debt rule Central Government exceeding 40% of its annual revenue, unless a specific government ESA Multiannual Ordinary law Government Structure Government Structure No pre-defined action 2010 2013 11% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
revenues
permit has been granted.
Central government units cannot accumulate net debt obligations
Constitutional or higher Ministry of finance,
8032 EE Debt rule Central Government Debt as % of current revenue exceeding 40% of its annual revenue, unless a specific government ESA Multiannual Ministry of finance Correction mechanism is triggered automatically 2014 2021+ 70% 3 3 3 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 Y 6.07
permit has been granted.
When the general government debt as a percentage of GDP in market

prices exceeds the 60% reference value, the difference with respect to Ministry of finance,
9021 EL Debt rule General Government Debt-to-GDP ratio ESA Multiannual Ordinary law Ministry of finance No pre-defined action 2014 2021+ 100.0% 2 3 3 0.5 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 Y 4.53
the reference value must be reduced by 1/20 annually on average Independent body
according to article 2 of EU Regulation 1467/1997.
Ministry of finance,
Budget balance Structural balance as % of Structural budget balance must be at the MTO and in any case cannot Constitutional or higher Ministry of finance, Correction mechanism is triggered automatically.
9041 EL General Government ESA Multiannual Independent body, 2019 2021+ 100.0% 3 3 3 0 1.5 1 4 1 1 1 0 Y 8.96
rule GDP be lower than the threshold defined by the Fiscal Compact than ordinary law Independent body There are pre-defined consequences
European Commission
In "normal" economic conditions, GG and its sub-sector must show a (2.1/2.2). The rule applies individually to each subsector of the
Budget balance Ministry of finance,
10011 ES General Government Nominal budget balance balanced budget or a surplus. This is embedded in a medium-term fiscal ESA 3 Ordinary law Ministry of finance MF presents corrective plan with appropriate actions 2002 2005 oublic administration therefore covering the whole general 100.0% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
rule Government Structure
framework (3 years) consistent with the Stability Programme. government.
The budgetary objectives take into account the economy's cyclical

Budget balance position, allowing budget deficits in periods of slow growth but requiring
10012 ES General Government Nominal budget balance ESA Multiannual Ordinary law Ministry of finance Ministry of finance No pre-defined action 2006 2011 97.5% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
rule surpluses in periods of high growth. The overall deficit during downturns
must not exceed 1% of GDP.
No Public Administration may incur a structural deficit, defined as a Independent body, Ministry
Budget balance Structural balance as % of Constitutional or higher Ministry of finance, Correction mechanism is triggered automatically.
10014 ES General Government deficit adjusted to the cycle and not including exceptional or temporary ESA Multiannual of finance, Government 2012 2021+ 100.0% 3 3 3 1 1 1 4 1 0 1 1 Y 9.1
rule GDP than ordinary law Government structure There are pre-defined consequences
measures. structure
Nominal debt in absolute For each RG, indebtedness must be the same (nominal terms) at the Specific actions are decided by the Ministry of Finance
10041 ES Debt rule Regional Government ESA Annual Coalition agreement Ministry of finance Ministry of finance 2003 2011 32.2% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
terms begining and at the end of each year.
The annual growth of the elegible expenditure cannot exceed the

10051 ES Expenditure rule General Government average medium-term growth rate of GDP (over a period of 9 years), in ESA Multiannual Ordinary law Ministry of finance Ministry of finance No pre-defined action 2011 2011 70.0% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
rate
nominal terms.
Local Government,
The annual growth of the eligible expenditure cannot exceed the average Independent body, Ministry The expenditure rule was extended to all public administrations,
Regional Constitutional or higher Ministry of finance, Correction mechanism is triggered automatically.
10052 ES Expenditure rule Nominal expenditure growth medium-term growth rate of GDP (over a period of 10 years), in nominal ESA Multiannual of finance, Government 2012 2021+ while in 2011 it only applied to the central government and its 45.5% 3 3 3 1 1 1 4 0 0 1 1 Y 8.6
Government, Central than ordinary law Government structure There are pre-defined consequences
terms. structure organisms and Local Entities.
Government
The overall debt of public administrations cannot surpass the limit

authorised by the European Union, that is, 60% of GDP. The Organic
Independent body, Ministry
law 2/2012, of 27th April, on Budgetary Stability and Financial Stability Constitutional or higher Ministry of finance, Correction mechanism is triggered automatically.
10062 ES Debt rule General Government Debt-to-GDP ratio ESA Multiannual of finance, Government 2012 2021+ 100.0% 3 3 3 1 1 1 4 1 0 0 0 Y 8.1
establishes the limit for each subsector of the public administration: than ordinary law Government structure There are pre-defined consequences
structure
Central Administration 44%, Autonomous Communitites 13%, Local
entities 3%, Social Security 0%.
Balanced CG finances to be secured under normal conditions of

Budget balance economic growth at the end of the electoral period. Cyclical or other No pre-defined action; political pressure to ensure
11011 FI Central Government Structural budget balance ESA Multiannual Political commitment Ministry of finance Government Structure 1999 2002 55.0% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
rule short-term deviations allowed, if they do not jeopardize the reduction of compliance
the CG debt ratio. CG deficit must not exceed 2,75% of total output.
Target of structural surplus of 1% by the end of the parliamentary term.

(1.7), GOV decision, February 2009: the rule can be
Budget balance Cyclical or other short-term deviations allowed, if they do not jeopardise No pre-defined action; political pressure to ensure
11012 FI Central Government Nominal budget balance ESA Multiannual Political commitment Ministry of finance Government Structure 2003 2008 temporarily lifted if this is accompanied by decisions to reinforce 55.0% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
rule the reduction of the CG debt ratio. CG deficit must not exceed 2,5% of compliance
GG finances structurally.
total output, even in a weak economy.
No pre-defined action; political pressure to ensure
11021 FI Debt rule Central Government Nominal debt in % of GDP CG debt must be reduced over the legislative period. BA 5 Political commitment Ministry of finance Government Structure 1995 2007 55.0% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
compliance
Real Expenditure in absolute At the beginning of the electoral period, CG sets a ceiling for expenditure
11031 FI Expenditure rule Central Government over this period. BA Multiannual Political commitment Ministry of finance Government Structure GS proposes corrective measures 1999 2006 30.0% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
terms
Each year in connection with the annual decision on Spending Limits , The Ministry of Finance, which is responsible of the
Real Expenditure in absolute during the annual budgetary process, the Ministry of Finance adjusts the fiscal policies and preparation of the fiscal frameworks,
11032 FI Expenditure rule Central Government BA 4 Coalition agreement Ministry of finance Ministry of finance 2007 2014 20.8% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
terms sets nominal budgetary expenditure ceilings to the next year’s price will make proposals of necessary corretive measures
level. by converting the amounts set in real terms to nominal amounts. for the Cabinet.
At the beginning of the parliamentary term, the Government decides on
the parliamentary term spending limits, i.e. a ceiling for budget
expenditure, as well as the rules governing the spending limits procedure
for the entire four-year parliamentary term. The spending limits’
allocation for each administrative branch is reviewed within the
parliamentary term spending limits in March-April as part of the General
Government Fiscal Plan. Decisions are made on the basis of the
spending proposals of the ministries’ administrative branches. For the
administrative branches, the General Government Fiscal Plan serves as
a guide to the preparation of the following year’s draft budget. Around
four-fifths of central government budget appropriations are allocated in
Real expenditure ceiling in Ministry of finance,
11033 FI Expenditure rule Central Government accordance with the spending limits framework, which is binding for the BA 4 Coalition agreement No body No pre-defined action 2015 2019 21.5% 1 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 N 2.73
absolute terms Independent body
whole parliamentary term. The annual General Government Fiscal Plan
reviews the spending limits allocations for each administrative branch
and updates the spending limits to correspond with changes in price and
cost level as well as changes in the structure of spending limits
expenditure. In the annual decisions, the spending policy defined in the
Government Programme and in the parliamentary term’s first General
Government Fiscal Plan, which is the basis for the parliamentary term
spending limits, is not changed. The Government is committed to
adhering to the spending rule and to the central government spending
limits decision which is based on it and included in the first General
Government Fiscal Plan of the parliamentary term.
At the beginning of the parliamentary term, the Government decides on
the parliamentary term spending limits, i.e. a ceiling for budget
expenditure, as well as the rules governing the spending limits procedure
for the entire four-year parliamentary term. The spending limits’
allocation for each administrative branch is reviewed within the
parliamentary term spending limits in March-April as part of the General
Government Fiscal Plan. Decisions are made on the basis of the
spending proposals of the ministries’ administrative branches. For the
administrative branches, the General Government Fiscal Plan serves as
a guide to the preparation of the following year’s draft budget. Around
four-fifths of central government budget appropriations are allocated in
Real expenditure ceiling in Ministry of finance,
11034 FI Expenditure rule Central Government accordance with the spending limits framework, which is binding for the BA 4 Coalition agreement No body No pre-defined action 2020 2021+ 21.5% 1 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 Y 2.73
absolute terms Independent body
whole parliamentary term. The annual General Government Fiscal Plan
reviews the spending limits allocations for each administrative branch
and updates the spending limits to correspond with changes in price and
cost level as well as changes in the structure of spending limits
expenditure. In the annual decisions, the spending policy defined in the
Government Programme and in the parliamentary term’s first General
Government Fiscal Plan, which is the basis for the parliamentary term
spending limits, is not changed. The Government is committed to
adhering to the spending rule and to the central government spending
limits decision which is based on it and included in the first General
Government Fiscal Plan of the parliamentary term.
(4.1) IND body: auditing committees. GS: MIN of Interior. (5.1)

Same as (4.1). (1.7) Issued in March 1995. Reforms of the rule
Balanced budget rule for LG: in the case of a deficit, the budget should
Budget balance Independent body, Independent body, Preparation of plans to cover eventual deficits, possible 2001 and 2006: a target has to be formulated on the quality and
11041 FI Local Government Nominal budget balance be balanced in the next 4 years; measures to cover the deficit to be BA 4 Ordinary law 1995 2000 35.0% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
rule Government Structure Government Structure personal admonitions financing of services in the beginning of the council period; a
proposed.
balanced or surplus budget has to be reached in the next 4
years.
Local Government Act. Regulates municipalities in bringing their budgets The government is obliged to take specific corrective
Budget balance Ministry of finance,
11042 FI Local Government Nominal budget balance in balance. Contains provisions on budget and financial plans, financial BA 4 Ordinary law Ministry of finance actions (undertake further adjustment measures if 2001 2014 37.4% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
rule Government Structure
statements, reporting on operations, and financial supervision. deficit targets are not met)
Local Government Act. Regulates municipalities in bringing their budgets

Budget balance Budget balance in nominal
11043 FI Local Government in balance. Contains provisions on budget and financial plans, financial BA 4 Ordinary law Ministry of finance Ministry of finance No pre-defined action 2015 2019 39.4% 2 3 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 N 3.87
rule terms
statements, reporting on operations, and financial supervision.
Local Government Act. Regulates municipalities in bringing their budgets

Budget balance Budget balance in nominal
11044 FI Local Government in balance. Contains provisions on budget and financial plans, financial BA 4 Ordinary law Ministry of finance Ministry of finance No pre-defined action 2020 2021+ 39.4% 2 3 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 Y 4.37
rule terms
statements, reporting on operations, and financial supervision.
Counter-cyclical regulation of unemployment security contributions and

Allocation of revenue earnings-related pension contributions using so-called EMU-buffer funds Agreement between
11051 FI Revenue rule Social Security BA Multiannual Government structure No body No pre-defined action 1999 2021+ 33.7% 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 Y 1.87
surpluses that exist in the unemployment insurance fund in the private sector sectors of GG
pension scheme.
The growth of the central government debt-to-GDP ratio must level off
11071 FI Debt rule Central Government Nominal debt in % of GDP ESA 4 Political agreement No body No body No pre-defined action 2011 2014 26.9% 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 N 1.93
during the electoral period (2011-2015).
The growth of the central government debt-to-GDP ratio must level off Ministry of finance,
11072 FI Debt rule General Government Debt-to-GDP ratio ESA 4 Political agreement Independent body No pre-defined action 2015 2021+ 100.0% 1 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 Y 1.73
during the electoral period (2011-2015). Independent body
Budget balance Automatic correction measures and possibility of

11081 FI Central Government Nominal budget balance The central government deficit should not exceed 1% of GDP. ESA 4 Political agreement No body No body 2011 2014 22.0% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
rule sanctions
Budget balance Budget balance as % of
11082 FI Central Government The central government deficit should not exceed 0.5% of GDP. ESA Multiannual Political agreement No body Independent body No pre-defined action 2015 2019 26.9% 1 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 N 1.73
rule GDP
Budget balance Budget balance as % of
11083 FI Central Government The central government deficit should not exceed 0.5% of GDP. ESA Multiannual Political agreement No body Independent body No pre-defined action 2020 2021+ 26.9% 1 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 Y 1.73
rule GDP
Budget balance Structural balance as % of The government sets medium-term objective for the structural balance of Constitutional or higher Independent body, Independent body, Correction mechanism is triggered automatically.
11091 FI General Government ESA Multiannual 2013 2021+ 100.0% 3 1 3 0 1.5 1 4 1 0 1 0 Y 7.13
rule GDP the general government than ordinary law Government structure European Commission There are pre-defined consequences
Budget balance Nominal balance as % of

110101 FI Local Government Local government deficit should not exceed 0,5 % of GDP ESA Multiannual Political agreement Independent body Independent body No pre-defined action 2015 2019 39.4% 1 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 N 1.73
rule GDP
110102 FI Local Government Local government deficit should not exceed 0,5 % of GDP ESA Multiannual Political agreement Independent body Independent body No pre-defined action 2020 2021+ 39.4% 1 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 Y 1.73
rule GDP
Social security funds should have a surplus of 1.0 % of GDP. Social
Budget balance Nominal balance as % of security subsectors have own targets: employment pension funds should
110111 FI Social Security ESA Multiannual Political agreement Independent body Independent body No pre-defined action 2015 2019 33.7% 1 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 N 1.73
rule GDP have a surplus of 1.0 % of GDP and other social security funds should
be in balance (0 % of GDP)
Social security funds should have a surplus of 1.0 % of GDP. Social

Budget balance Nominal balance as % of security subsectors have own targets: employment pension funds should
110112 FI Social Security ESA Multiannual Political agreement Independent body Independent body No pre-defined action 2020 2021+ 33.7% 1 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 Y 1.73
rule GDP have a surplus of 1.0 % of GDP and other social security funds should
be in balance (0 % of GDP)
Budget balance Nominal balance as % of General government net lending % of GDP, target is set to be 0 % of Government programme
110151 FI General Government ESA Multiannual Independent body No body No pre-defined action 2020 2021+ 100.0% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
rule GDP GDP in 2023 voted in Parliament
Budget balance Nominal balance as % of General government net lending % of GDP, target is set to be 0 % of Government programme
110152 FI General Government ESA Multiannual Independent body No body No pre-defined action 2021 2021+ 100.0% 1 1 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 Y 2.4
rule GDP GDP in 2023 voted in Parliament

110161 FI Local Government Wellbeing services counties are close to balance in 2023 ESA Multiannual Political agreement Independent body No body No pre-defined action 2021 2021+ 100.0% 1 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 Y 1.73
rule GDP
Allocation of unexpected Independent body,
12021 FR Revenue rule Central Government CG to define the allocation of higher than expected tax revenues ex ante. BA Annual Ordinary law National Parliament No pre-defined action 2006 2008 40.0% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
revenues National Parliament
Allocation of higher-than-
12022 FR Revenue rule Central Government Any unexpected tax revenues are to be used to reduce the budget deficit. BA Annual Ordinary law National parliament National parliament No pre-defined action 2009 2021+ 34.4% 2 1 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 Y 4.13
expected revenues
Budget balance Budget balance in nominal Golden rule: voted budgets must be in balance; ex post deficits cannot Constitutional or higher Government structure,
12031 FR Local Government BA Annual Government structure Correction mechanism is triggered automatically 1983 2021+ 19.7% 3 3 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 Y 5.8
rule terms exceed 5% of current revenues (10% for small municipalities). than ordinary law Court of auditors
Budget balance Structural balance as % of Constitutional or higher National parliament, National parliament, Correction mechanism is triggered automatically.
12081 FR General Government Targets for the structural balance as % of GDP. ESA Multiannual 2013 2021+ 100.0% 3 3 3 0 1.5 1 4 1 0 1 0 Y 8.47
rule GDP than ordinary law Independent body Independent body There are pre-defined consequences
Budget balance GOV presents a budget bill to the NP that ensures the primary balance, Ministry of finance, Court
13011 HU General Government Primary budget balance ESA Annual Ordinary law No body No pre-defined action 2007 2008 100.0% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
rule in the Maastricht sense, being in sufficit. of Audit
Rule requires
The annual budget
ceiling act debt-creating
of the to determine the primary balance
commitments of LG target for the
(borrowing
Debt ceiling related to
13021 HU Debt rule Local Government second yearcharges,
and related followingbond
the subject
issues,year
etc.)such
is setthat (a) the primary
in proportion to thebalance BA Annual Ordinary law No official body No body No pre-defined action 1996 2011 18.5% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
repayment capacity
target is not
capacity a primary
to repay debt.deficit, (b) real government debt does not increase
Primary budget balance in
Central Government, in the year following the subject year, and (c) expected government debt
13031 HU Debt rule nominal terms; real debt in BA 3 Ordinary law Independent body No body No pre-defined action 2009 2011 79.0% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
Social Security at the end of the second year after the subject year must not be higher
percentage change As long as the public debt exceeds half of the Gross Domestic Product,
than debt at the end of the second year preceding the subject year.
the National Assembly may only adopt a Central Budget Act which Constitutional or higher
13051 HU Debt rule General Government Nominal debt in % of GDP Change in planned primary CG expenditure between first and second BA Annual Independent body National Parliament Obligation to propose corrective measures 2014 2014 100.0% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
contains public debt reduction in proportion to the Gross Domestic than ordinary law
years following the subject year in real terms needs to be specified.
Product.
As long as the public debt exceeds half of the Gross Domestic Product, Independent body,
the National Assembly may only adopt a Central Budget Act which Constitutional or higher National Parliament, Ministry of finance,
13052 HU Debt rule General Government Debt-to-GDP ratio BA Annual Correction mechanism is triggered automatically 2015 2019 100.0% 3 3 2 0 1.5 0 2 0 0 0 1 N 6.7
contains public debt reduction in proportion to the Gross Domestic than ordinary law Ministry of Finance, Court Independent body
Product. of Auditors
As long as the public debt exceeds half of the Gross Domestic Product, Independent body,
the National Assembly may only adopt a Central Budget Act which Constitutional or higher National Parliament, Ministry of finance,
13053 HU Debt rule General Government Debt-to-GDP ratio BA Annual Correction mechanism is triggered automatically 2020 2021+ 100.0% 3 3 3 0 1.5 0 2 0 0 0 1 Y 6.7
contains public debt reduction in proportion to the Gross Domestic than ordinary law Ministry of Finance, Court Independent body
Product. of Auditors

Budget balance Nominal balance as % of General government deficit must not exceed 3% of the gross domestic
13061 HU General Government ESA Multiannual Ordinary law Independent body parliament, Independent No pre-defined action 2013 2021+ 100.0% 2 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Y 4.13
rule GDP product
body
Budget balance Structural balance as % of The general government balance should be set to a level that allows the
13071 HU General Government ESA Annual Ordinary law Independent body National Parliament No pre-defined action 2014 2021+ 100.0% 2 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 Y 4.63
rule GDP achievement of the medium-term budgetary objective.
1% of GNP is set aside from CG expenditure and automatically paid into
Allocation of expenditure to
14011 IE Expenditure rule Central Government the National Pension Reserve Fund each year for investment on behalf BA Annual Ordinary law Ministry of finance Ministry of finance No pre-defined action 2000 2012 1.9% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
a specific purpose
of the State.
Budget balance Nominal balance as % of For any given year, LG must have a net total deficit (in EDP terms) of no Ministry of finance, Ministry of finance,
14031 IE Local Government ESA Multiannual Political commitment No pre-defined action 2004 2021+ Interest payments are excluded 7.5% 0 0 1 0.5 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 Y 1.17
rule GDP more than a fixed nominal amount. Government structure Government structure
When the ratio of general government debt to gross domestic product at
market prices exceeds 60 per cent, the ratio shall be reduced in
14041 IE Debt rule General Government Nominal debt in % of GDP ESA Multiannual Ordinary law Ministry of finance Ministry of finance No pre-defined action 2013 2014 100.0% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
accordance with the 1997 excessive deficit Regulation until the ratio
reaches 60 per cent.

market prices exceeds 60 per cent, the ratio shall be reduced in Constitutional or higher Correction mechanism is triggered automatically.
14042 IE Debt rule General Government Debt-to-GDP ratio ESA Multiannual European Commission Ministry of finance 2015 2021+ 100.0% 3 3 3 0 0 1 4 0 0 0 0 Y 7.07
accordance with the 1997 excessive deficit Regulation until the ratio than ordinary law There are pre-defined consequences
Budgetary position of general government: - is in balance or in surplus

and this will be deemed to be the case if the medium-term budgetary
Budget balance Structural balance as % of Ministry of finance, The structural balance is the cyclically-adjusted budgetary
14051 IE General Government objective set under the Stability and Growth Pact is achieved or, - if it is ESA Multiannual Ordinary law European Commission Correction mechanism is triggered automatically 2012 2016 100.0% 3 0 3 0 0 1 2 0 0 1 0 N 4.57
rule GDP Independent body balance adjusted for one-off and temporary measures.
not, that it is on the adjustment path towards adhering to our medium-
term budgetary objective.
Budgetary position of general government: - is in balance or in surplus

and this will be deemed to be the case if the medium-term budgetary
Budget balance Structural balance as % of Constitutional or higher Correction mechanism is triggered automatically. The structural balance is the cyclically-adjusted budgetary
14052 IE General Government objective set under the Stability and Growth Pact is achieved or, - if it is ESA Multiannual Independent body European Commission 2017 2021+ 100.0% 3 3 3 0 1.5 1 4 1 0 1 0 Y 8.47
rule GDP than ordinary law There are pre-defined consequences balance adjusted for one-off and temporary measures.
not, that it is on the adjustment path towards adhering to our medium-
(1.3/2.9) 13% contributed for products supplied by pharmacies

or Regional Health Bodies; 3% contributed for products supplied
Central Government, Nominal Expenditure in Expenditure ceiling for pharmaceutical products: 16% of the financing Ministry of finance,
15011 IT Expenditure rule ESA Annual Ordinary law Government Structure Corrective actions 2001 2007 by hospitals. (4.1) GS body: Italian Pharmaceutical Agency 5.0% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
Regional Government absolute terms level for the National Health Service contributed by the State. Government Structure
(AIFA); MIN of Health. (5.6/5.7) Absorption of deficit: AIFA:
60%; regions: 40%.
Expenditure ceilings for pharmaceutical products (including patient co- Other (permanent rule,
Nominal Expenditure in payments, so-called "tickets") expressed as a percentage of the extending the timehorizon Ministry of finance,
15012 IT Expenditure rule Regional Government ESA Ordinary law Government Structure Corrective actions 2008 2011 The target of the rule was modified. 2.1% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
absolute terms financing level for the national health service contributed by the State. beyond the yearly budgetary Government Structure
Ceilings: 16,4% (2008); 16% (2009). cycle)
Expenditure ceilings for pharmaceutical products (including patient co- Other (permanent rule,
Nominal Expenditure in payments, so-called "tickets") expressed as a percentage of the extending the timehorizon Ministry of finance,
15013 IT Expenditure rule Regional Government ESA Ordinary law Government Structure Corrective actions 2012 2012 The target of the rule was modified. 2.1% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
absolute terms financing level for the national health service contributed by the State. beyond the yearly budgetary Government Structure
Ceilings: 16,4% (2008); 16% (2009). cycle)
Expenditure ceilings for pharmaceutical products (including patient co-

Ministry of finance, Correction mechanism is triggered automatically.
15014 IT Expenditure rule Regional Government Nominal expenditure ceiling payments, so-called "tickets") expressed as a percentage of the ESA Permanent law Ordinary law Government structure 2013 2016 2.1% 2 1 1 0.5 0 1 4 0 0 0 0 N 4.67
Government structure There are pre-defined consequences
financing level for the national health service contributed by the State.
Expenditure ceilings for pharmaceutical products (including patient co-

Ministry of finance, Correction mechanism is triggered automatically.
15015 IT Expenditure rule Regional Government Nominal expenditure ceiling payments, so-called "tickets") expressed as a percentage of the ESA Multiannual Ordinary law Government structure 2017 2021+ 2.0% 2 3 1 0.5 0 1 4 0 0 0 0 Y 6
financing level for the national health service contributed by the State.
Regional Internal Stability Pact provides LG with measures to limit expenditure.

15021 IT Expenditure rule Government, Local Expenditure evolution depends on kind of entities (regions, ESA 3 Ordinary law Ministry of finance Government Structure Automatic sanction mechanism 1999 2006 30.0% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
rate
Government municipalities, provinces) and year to which it refers to.
With the Stability Law, LG's objective is a financial balance, calculated

on a mixed accrual/cash basis, expressed as a percentage of the
Regional Budget balance (LG);
Budget balance average current expenditure for years 2006-2008.Regions have been
15022 IT Government, Local Nominal expenditure growth ESA Multiannual Ordinary law Independent body Government Structure Automatic sanction mechanism 2007 2008 11.6% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
rule given expenditure ceilings, calculated both on accrual and cash basis,
Government rate (RG)
and expressed as a percentage of the average final expenditure for
years 2007-2009.
REGIONS : According to Decree Law 112/2008, in the years 2009-2010-

2011 total final expenditure of the Regions, programmed in 2008, must
not exceed final expenditure less 0.6% in year 2009, final expenditure
plus 1.0% in 2010 (only if compliant with the Pact in the previous year)
and final expenditure less 0.9% in 2011. LOCAL GOVERNMENTS:
Expenditure Regional Budget balance (LG);
According to Decree Law 112/2008, in the years 2009-2010-2011 local Ministry of finance, Court Government Structure,
15023 IT rule/Budget Government, Local Nominal expenditure growth BA, ESA Multiannual Ordinary law Automatic sanction mechanism 2009 2010 20.3% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
Governments should achieve a pre-defined budget balance, calculated of Auditors Court of Auditors
balance rule Government rate (RG)
with a mixed accrual/cash basis on the financial balance for year 2007.
These balances, expressed as a percentage referred to year 2007, are
different for local governments compliant or not compliant with the pact
in 2007 and may also vary according to the value, positive or negative,
of the financial balance for year 2007.
REGIONS : According to Decree Law 112/2008, in the years 2009-2010-
2011 total final expenditure of the Regions, programmed in 2008, must
not exceed final expenditure less 0.6% in year 2009, final expenditure
plus 1.0% in 2010 (only if compliant with the Pact in the previous year)
and final expenditure less 0.9% in 2011. LOCAL GOVERNMENTS:
According to Decree Law 112/2008, in the years 2009-2010-2011 local Ministry of finance, Court Government Structure,
Governments should achieve a pre-defined budget balance, calculated of Auditors Court of Auditors
with a mixed accrual/cash basis on the financial balance for year 2007.
These balances, expressed as a percentage referred to year 2007, are
different for local governments compliant or not compliant with the pact
in 2007 and may also vary according to the value, positive or negative,
of the financial balance for year 2007.

The regional spending ceiling is computed both on an accrual basis and Ministry of finance, Court Government Structure,
on the euro-compatible accrual one. of Auditors Court of Auditors
The regional spending ceiling is computed both on an accrual basis and Ministry of finance, Court Government Structure,
15026 IT rule/Budget Government, Local Nominal expenditure growth BA, ESA Multiannual Ordinary law Automatic sanction mechanism 2015 2015 28.7% 3 3 2 0 1 1 4 1 0 0 1 N 8.07
on the euro-compatible accrual one. of Auditors Court of Auditors
The nominal balanced rule applies to all local governments

(municipalities, provinces, metropolitan cities and regions), regardless of
the number of inhabitants. There is a unique target for municipalities,
Regional provinces, metropolitan cities, ordinary and autonomous regions and
Budget balance Budget balance in absolute Constitutional or higher Ministry of finance, Court Ministry of finance. Court of Correction mechanism is triggered automatically.
15027 IT Government, Local other local authonomies. The regional spending ceiling is computed fully BA, ESA Multiannual 2016 2021+ 43.6% 3 3 2 0 1 1 4 1 0 0 0 Y 7.57
rule terms than ordinary law of auditors auditors There are pre-defined consequences
Government on an accrual basis. The new rule contained in Law 243/2012, as
reformed in 2016, allow for local public investments to be financed not
only through the use of debt, but also through the use of administration
results in previous years.
Regional
Budget balance Budget balance in absolute Golden rule: local and regional bodies are allowed to carry on deficit only Constitutional or higher Ministry of finance, Court
15031 IT Government, Local BA, ESA Multiannual Ministry of finance No pre-defined action 2001 2021+ 45.6% 3 3 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 Y 4.8
rule terms to finance investments (article no. 119 of the Italian constitution). than ordinary law of auditors
Government
Healthcare pact: agreement to regulate transfers from GOV to regions to Board of Performance
Budget balance Automatic correction mechanism and possibility of
15041 IT Regional Government Nominal budget balance finance the national healthcare system. The level of the transfers is ESA 3 Ordinary law Assessors (with CG and Government Structure 2001 2006 7.0% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
rule financial sanctions
subject to the fulfilment of certain conditions. RG members)
Healthcare pact: agreement to regulate transfers from GOV to regions to Board of Performance
Budget balance
15042 IT Regional Government Nominal budget balance finance the national healthcare system. The level of the transfers is ESA Multiannual Ordinary law Assessors (with CG and Government Structure Appointment of a commission to reduce deficits 2007 2009 13.0% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
rule
subject to the fulfilment of certain conditions. RG members)
Healthcare pact: agreement to regulate transfers from the government to

Budget balance Budget balance in absolute regions (regional health bodies) to finance the national healthcare Ministry of finance, Ministry of finance, Correction mechanism is triggered automatically.
15043 IT Regional Government ESA Multiannual Ordinary law 2010 2021+ 13.5% 2 1 1 1 0 1 4 0 0 0 0 Y 4.80
rule terms system (Servizio Sanitario Nazionale). The level of the transfers is Government structure Government structure There are pre-defined consequences
subject to the fulfilment of certain conditions.
General government entities shall contribute to the achievement of

balanced budgets which corresponds to the medium-term objective,
defined in structural terms. The financial and budgetary planning
There is a pre-defined timeline within which corrective
Budget balance Structural balance as documents shall set out, for each fiscal year in the planning period, the Constitutional or higher Ministry of finance, Ministry of finance,
15051 IT General Government ESA Multiannual measures need to be taken. There are pre-defined 2014 2021+ 100.0% 3 3 3 0 1.5 1 4 1 0 1 0 Y 8.47
rule change of % of GDP target balance of the consolidated accounts, which shall be broken down than ordinary law Independent body Independent body
consequences
into subsectors so as to ensure the attainment of at least the medium-
term objective or else, in the cases envisaged in Articles 6 and 8 below,
adherence to the adjustment path towards it.
Law n. 243/2012 (art. 4) disposes the full compliance with EU rules

There is a pre-defined timeline within which corrective The debt criterion is not breached when a certain set of other
about public debt and foreseen that fiscal objectives (MTO, structurral Constitutional or higher Ministry of finance, Ministry of finance,
15061 IT Debt rule General Government Debt-to-GDP ratio ESA Multiannual measures need to be taken. There are pre-defined 2014 2021+ relevant factor is assessed as significant (stock-flow adjustment, 100.0% 3 3 3 0 1.5 1 4 0 0 1 0 Y 7.97
deficit) should be set so as to allow the debt-GDP ratio to be compliant than ordinary law Independent body Independent body
consequences debt arrears and solidarity contributions to EFSF/ESM)
with the EU debt rule.
The annual target rate of growth in general government expenditure, net

Constitutional or higher Ministry of finance, Ministry of finance, Exclusions are: interest payments, unemployment benefits,
15071 IT Expenditure rule General Government Real expenditure growth of items specified by EU Law, may not exceed the reference rate as Other Multiannual Corrective measures are not triggered automatically 2014 2021+ 100.0% 3 3 3 0 1.5 1 1 0 0 1 1 Y 6.97
than ordinary law Independent body Independent body public investment and other
calculated in accordance with EU Law.
If the GG budgets showed a deficit on average over the past 5 calendar

Nominal Expenditure growth years, then the annual growth rate of the planned State budget BA (but the GG deficit follows Ministry of finance, Court
16021 LT Expenditure rule Central Government Multiannual Ordinary law Ministry of finance No pre-defined action 2008 2014 31.0% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
rate appropriations may not exceed 0,5% of the average growth rate of the ESA) of Audit
State budget revenue of those 5 years.
Appropriations which exceed 3% of GDP at current prices shall rely on

the provision that, in case where arithmetic average of general
government sector balance indicators of the past five complete years is Ministry of finance,
Central Government, Constitutional or higher Ministry of finance, National Correction mechanism is triggered automatically.
16022 LT Expenditure rule Nominal expenditure growth negative, the aggregate growth of the appropriations of these budgets BA Annual National parliament, 2015 2021+ 76.6% 3 3 3 0.5 1 1 4 0 1 1 1 Y 8.97
Social Security than ordinary law parliament There are pre-defined consequences
(with the exception of net of EU financial support) is not higher than 1/2 Independent body
of the average multi-annual growth rate of the potential GDP at current
prices.
Allocation of unexpected Ministry of finance,Court of

16031 LT Revenue rule Central Government Excess revenue shall be used to reduce the deficit of the current year . ESA Multiannual Ordinary law Independent body No pre-defined action 2008 2011 44.8% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
revenues Auditors
Allocation of unexpected Ministry of finance,National

16032 LT Revenue rule Central Government Excess revenue shall be used to reduce the deficit of the current year . ESA Multiannual Ordinary law Independent body No pre-defined action 2012 2014 44.8% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
revenues Parliament
Allocation of higher-than-
Court of auditors, Ministry Court of auditors, Ministry
16033 LT Revenue rule Central Government expected revenues to deficit Excess revenue shall be used to reduce the deficit of the current year. BA Annual Ordinary law No pre-defined action 2008 2021+ 50.5% 2 3 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 Y 4.13
of finance of finance
reduction
(4.1) GS body: Council of Municipality.(5.6/5.7) Administrative

Budget balance Government, National responsibility: the supervisor authorised by GOV has right to
16041 LT Local Government Nominal budget balance LG must approve balanced budgets. BA Annual Ordinary law Government Structure No pre-defined action 1990 2005 20.8% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
rule Parliament submit a claim to the Court in the case of infringement of a legal
act.
The rule allows deficit of local government budgets that cannot exceed
Budget balance Government, National
16042 LT Local Government Nominal budget balance expenditure from borrowed funds for capital expenditure within borrowing BA Annual Ordinary law Government Structure No pre-defined action 2006 2014 24.0% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
rule Parliament
limits approved by Parliament.
The rule allows deficit of local government budgets that cannot exceed
16043 LT Local Government Nominal budget balance expenditure from borrowed funds for capital expenditure within borrowing BA Annual Ordinary law Government Structure Correction mechanism is not triggered automatically 2015 2015 22.2% 2 1 1 0.5 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 N 3.43
rule Parliament
limits approved by Parliament.
Small budgets of the GG have to be nominally balanced Quotation of the

rule: “Each budget attributable to general government sector, the
planned appropriations of which do not exceed 0.3 % of the last-year
GDP at current prices, shall be planned, approved, amended and
Budget balance Budget balance as % of implemented in a way that the appropriations of the budget did not Constitutional or higher Ministry of finance, Ministry of finance, Court of
16044 LT Local Government BA Annual Correction mechanism is triggered automatically 2016 2021+ 22.4% 3 3 2 0.5 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 Y 6.4
rule GDP exceed its revenue, with the exception of the year when, according to than ordinary law National parliament auditors
the economic development scenario published by the Government or its
authorised institution, regarding which the Control Institution published
its conclusion, a negative output gap is planned. In the latter case, the
appropriations may not exceed revenue by more than 1.5 %”
Each year, with the exception of the year of exceptional circumstances,

at least one of the following terms and conditions shall be satisfied: 1)
general government sector is actually in surplus in structural terms; 2)
actual structural general government sector balance indicator in absolute
value is lower than the medium-term objective in absolute value and is
Budget balance Structural balance as % of annually decreasing, with the exception of the year when the output gap Constitutional or higher Ministry of finance, Correction mechanism is triggered automatically.
16051 LT General Government ESA Multiannual National parliament, 2015 2021+ 100.0% 3 3 3 0.5 1.5 1 4 1 0 1 0 Y 8.6
rule nominal GDP is negative; 3) actual structural general government sector balance than ordinary law Independent body There are pre-defined consequences
Independent body
indicator in absolute value is lower than the medium-term objective in
absolute value in the year when the output gap is negative. 4) actual
structural general government sector balance indicator adjustment
towards the medium-term objective in absolute value is not lower than
the targeted structural adjustment in absolute value.
The budget of the State Social Insurance Fund of the Republic of

Lithuania for a year concerned shall be planned, approved, amended
and implemented in a way that its structural deficit calculated on accrual Ministry of finance, National
Budget balance Local Government, Structural balance as % of Constitutional or higher National parliament,
16071 LT basis could increase only in the year when, according to the economic ESA Multiannual parliament, Independent No pre-defined action 2016 2021+ Part of the rule will enter into force in 2018 27.1% 3 3 2 0.5 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 Y 5.43
rule Social Security nominal GDP than ordinary law Government structure,
development scenario published by the Government of the Republic of body
Independent body
Lithuania or its authorised institution, regarding which the Control
Institution published its conclusion, a negative output gap is planned
The budgets of Compulsory health insurance fund and large

municipalities have to be structurally balanced. Quotation of the rule:"
Each budget attributable to general government sector, with the
exception of the budget of the State Social Insurance Fund of the Ministry of finance, Ministry of finance, National
Budget balance Local Government, Structural balance as % of Constitutional or higher
16081 LT Republic of Lithuania, State budget and the budgets the planned ESA Other National parliament, parliament, Independent No pre-defined action 2018 2021+ Second half of rule 7. Possibly to be merged. 49.5% 3 3 2 0.5 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 Y 5.43
rule Social Security nominal GDP than ordinary law
appropriations of which do not exceed 0.3 % of the last-year GDP at Government structure body
current prices, shall be planned, approved, amended and implemented
in a way that judging by its structural balance indicator calculated on
accrual basis, it is in surplus or balanced"
Where the arithmetic average of the statistical balance indicators of the

general government sector for the past five complete calendar years as
known at the time of drafting of the State budget or drafting of
Central Government, amendments to the State budget is deficit (net borrowing), the annual National parliament, National parliament,
16091 LT Expenditure rule Nominal expenditure BA Other Ordinary law No pre-defined action 2015 2021+ 76.5% 2 3 2 0.5 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 Y 5.27
Social Security growth rate in percentage of the TOTALITY of expenditures of the State Ministry of finance Ministry of finance
budget , Social Insurance Fund budget and Health insurance fund
budget should not exceed one half of the average multiannual growth
rate in percentage of potencial GDP.
Budget balance Annual budget balance rule with constitution of reserve funds for BA, compatible with
17031 LU Social Security Nominal budget balance Multiannual Ordinary law Government Government Obligation to take effective measures 1992 1994 31.7% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
rule healthcare. ESSPROS and ESA 9
17032 LU Social Security Nominal budget balance Annual Ordinary law Government Government Automatic corrections 1995 1997 20.0% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
rule healthcare and long-term healthcare. ESSPROS and ESA
17033 LU Social Security Nominal budget balance Annual Ordinary law Government Structure Government Structure Obligation to take effective measures 1998 2011 40.6% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
rule healtcare, long-term helathcare and private sector pension schemes. ESSPROS and ESA
Budget balance Annual budget balance rule with constitution of reserve funds for BA, compatible with The reform has no structural character, it is a temporary
17034 LU Social Security Nominal budget balance Annual Ordinary law Government Structure Government Structure Obligation to take effective measures 2012 2014 40.6% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
rule healtcare, long-term helathcare and private sector pension schemes. ESSPROS and ESA modification of reserves requirement as a response to the crisis.
Budget balance Nominal balance in absolute Annual budget balance rule with constitution of reserve funds for BA, compatible with
17035 LU Social Security Annual Ordinary law Government structure Government structure Correction mechanism is triggered automatically 2015 2019 41.8% 2 3 1 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 N 4.87
rule terms healtcare, long-term helathcare and private sector pension schemes. ESSPROS and ESA
Budget balance Nominal balance in absolute Annual budget balance rule with constitution of reserve funds for BA, compatible with
17036 LU Social Security Annual Ordinary law Government structure Government structure Correction mechanism is triggered automatically 2020 2021+ 41.8% 2 3 1 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 Y 4.87
rule terms healtcare, long-term helathcare and private sector pension schemes. ESSPROS and ESA
Local governments current budget must be balanced. Extraordinary

Budget balance Nominal balance in absolute
17041 LU Local Government expenditure (public investment) can be financed by debt, but repayment BA Annual Ordinary law Government structure Government structure No pre-defined action 1989 2021+ 10.2% 2 3 1 0.5 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 N 4
rule terms
costs must be financed by the current budget.
Local governments current budget must be balanced. Extraordinary

Budget balance Nominal balance in absolute
17042 LU Local Government expenditure (public investment) can be financed by debt, but repayment BA Annual Ordinary law Government structure Government structure No pre-defined action 1989 2021+ 10.2% 2 3 1 0.5 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 Y 4
rule terms
costs must be financed by the current budget.
Budget balance Adjustment path towards the MTO (structural deficit equal or lower than
17051 LU General Government Structural budget balance ESA Multiannual Political agreement No body No body No pre-defined action 2013 2013 100.0% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
rule 0.5% of GDP by 2018).
Budget balance Structural balance as % of Adjustment path towards the MTO (structural deficit equal or lower than Constitutional or higher European Commission, European Commission, Correction mechanism is triggered automatically.
17052 LU General Government ESA Multiannual 2013 2019 100.0% 3 3 3 0 1.5 1 4 1 0 1 0 N 8.46
rule GDP 0.5% of GDP by 2018). than ordinary law Independent body Ministry of Finance There are pre-defined consequences
Budget balance Structural balance as % of Adjustment path towards the MTO (structural deficit equal or lower than Constitutional or higher European Commission, European Commission, Correction mechanism is triggered automatically.
17053 LU General Government ESA Multiannual 2020 2021+ 100.0% 3 3 3 0 1.5 1 4 1 0 1 0 Y 8.46
rule GDP 0.5% of GDP by 2018). than ordinary law Independent body Ministry of Finance There are pre-defined consequences
For this rule there are exceptions provided according to the

Expenditure, excluding GDP deflator (inflation), shall not increase faster
18031 LV Expenditure rule General Government Nominal expenditure growth ESA Multiannual Ordinary law Independent body National parliament No pre-defined action 2014 2021+ determined derogations in Article 9 of Council Regulation No 100.0% 3 1 3 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 Y 4.23
than growth of potential GDP.
1175/2011 amending Council Regulation No 1466/97.
The structural balance shall not be less than -0.5% of GDP. The
transitional provisions of the FDL prescribe that this rule shall be applied,
Budget balance Structural balance as % of Correction mechanism is triggered automatically.
18042 LV General Government if the planned structural balance of the previous year exceeds -1.0% of ESA Multiannual Organic law Independent body Independent body 2013 2021+ 100.0% 3 3 3 0 1.5 1 4 1 1 1 0 Y 8.97
rule GDP There are pre-defined consequences
GDP, but until the fulfilment of this rule a structural balance is planned to
be higher by 0.5% of GDP than in the previous year.
GG debt-to-GDP, in accordance with the European Council Regulation

18051 LV Debt rule General Government Nominal debt in % of GDP ESA Multiannual Ordinary law Independent body Ministry of finance No pre-defined action 2013 2013 100.0% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
No 2223/96 at the end of the year, shall not exceed 60%.
GG debt-to-GDP, in accordance with the European Council Regulation

18053 LV Debt rule General Government Debt-to-GDP ratio ESA Multiannual Ordinary law Independent body National parliament No pre-defined action 2013 2021+ 100.0% 2 3 3 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 Y 4.9
No 2223/96 at the end of the year, shall not exceed 60%.
The ratio of the unsettled amount of the state debt at the end of the year
in relation to the projection of the gross domestic product may be greater
19011 HR Debt rule Central Government Nominal debt in % of GDP BA Annual Ordinary law No body no body No pre-defined action 2009 2014 89.6% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
than the last year’s ratio, provided that the mentioned ratio does not
exceed 60% of the gross domestic product
The annual growth rate of total general government expenditures

Expenditure growth rate in (excluding expenditures on EU programmes fully matched by EU funds Ministry of finance, Correction mechanism is not triggered automatically.
19021 HR Expenditure rule General Government ESA Annual Ordinary law Government 2011 2013 92.7% 2 3 3 0.5 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 N 5.77
terms of GDP revenue and interest expenditures) can not be higher than the annual Independent body Obligation to propose corrective measures
growth rate of nominal GDP.
The annual growth rate of total general government expenditures

Nominal expenditure growth (excluding expenditures on EU programmes fully matched by EU funds Ministry of finance, Ministry of finance,
19022 HR Expenditure rule General Government ESA Annual Ordinary law No pre-defined action 2014 2018 91.5% 2 3 3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 Y 5.13
(excl. interest) revenue and interest expenditures) can not be higher than the annual Independent body Independent body
growth rate of nominal GDP.
Structural balance expressed as a share in gross domestic product shall

Budget balance Structural balance as % of Ministry of finance, Ministry of finance,
190310 HR General Government be realized according to the adjustment plan in order to achieve medium- ESA Annual Ordinary law No pre-defined action 2019 2021+ 100.0% 2 3 3 0 0 0 2 1 0 1 0 Y 7.50
rule GDP Independent body Independent body
The increase in the expenditure of the general budget must not exceed
Ministry of finance, Ministry of finance,
190410 HR Expenditure rule General Government Nominal expenditure growth the referential potential GDP growth rate, increased by the expected ESA Annual Ordinary law No pre-defined action 2019 2021+ 91.5% 2 3 3 0 0 0 2 1 0 1 1 Y 8.03
Independent body Independent body
price rise.
The share of public debt in GDP must not exceed the 60% reference
value. If the share exceeds this value, the difference between the share
Corrective measures triggered automatically. The
of public debt in GDP and the 60% reference value has to be reduced Ministry of finance, Ministry of finance,
190510 HR Debt rule General Government Debt-to-GDP ratio ESA Annual Ordinary law Government shall be obliged to propose measures that 2019 2021+ 100.0% 2 3 3 0 1.5 0 2 1 0 1 0 Y 7.03
according to the dynamics that complies with the EU legal provisions Independent body Independent body
will lead to the fulfilment of fiscal rules.
(reduction by 1/20 on average based on forward or backward rule, taking
into account the effects of the cycle)
Any setbacks against the expenditure ceilings must be compensated

Real Expenditure in absolute (2.11) From 2010 Interest expenses are included in the
20011 NL Expenditure rule General Government within the sector; windfalls can only be used to compensate for setbacks ESA 4 Coalition agreement Ministry of finance Ministry of finance MF proposes corrective measures 1994 2011 92.5% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
terms expenditure framework.
within that sector. Windfalls cannot be used to finance new expenditures.
Any setbacks against the expenditure ceilings must be compensated (2.11) From 2010 Interest expenses are included in the
Real Expenditure in absolute
20012 NL Expenditure rule General Government within the sector; windfalls can only be used to compensate for setbacks ESA 4 Coalition agreement Ministry of finance Ministry of finance MF proposes corrective measures 2012 2013 expenditure framework.. Scores were changed in at least one 92.5% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
terms
within that sector. Windfalls cannot be used to finance new expenditures. dimension
Any setbacks against the expenditure ceilings must be compensated Ministry of finance,
Real Expenditure in absolute
20013 NL Expenditure rule General Government within the sector; windfalls can only be used to compensate for setbacks ESA No time-frame specified Ordinary law National Parliament, Ministry of finance MF proposes corrective measures 2014 2014 92.5% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
terms
within that sector. Windfalls cannot be used to finance new expenditures. Independent body
The multiannual expenditure ceilings are defined at the coalition

agreement and prevent that income windfalls are used for extra
expenditures. Any setbacks against the expenditure ceilings must be Ministry of finance, Correction mechanism is not triggered automatically,
20014 NL Expenditure rule General Government Real expenditure ceiling ESA No time-frame specified Ordinary law Ministry of finance 2015 2016 100.0% 3 1 3 0.5 1.5 1 2 0 0 0 1 N 5.77
compensated within the sector; windfalls can only be used to Independent body but MF proposes corrective measures
compensate for setbacks within that sector. Windfalls cannot be used to
finance new expenditures or are automatically used to lower the debt
The multiannual expenditure ceilings are defined at the coalition

agreement and prevent that income windfalls are used for extra
Real expenditure ceiling in expenditures. Any setbacks against the expenditure ceilings must be Constitutional or higher Ministry of finance, Ministry of finance, Correction mechanism is not triggered automatically,
20015 NL Expenditure rule General Government ESA Multiannual 2017 2021+ 99.0% 3 1 3 0.5 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 Y 5.37
absolute terms compensated within the sector; windfalls can only be used to than ordinary law Independent body Independent body but MF proposes corrective measures
compensate for setbacks within that sector. Windfalls cannot be used to
finance new expenditures or are automatically used to lower the debt
At the beginning of the electoral period, coalition agrees on the desired
development of the tax base. This multi-year path is adhered to during
the period. Additional tax increases are compensated through tax relief
Allocation of unexpected and vice versa. When compliance with the medium-term objective
20021 NL Revenue rule General Government ESA 4 Coalition agreement Ministry of finance Ministry of finance MF proposes corrective measures 1994 1997 97.5% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
revenues specified in the Stability and Growth Pact and the actual EMU balance
shows a multiyear surplus at the time of the decision-making on the
To allow side
revenue automatic stabilisation,
in August the revenue
then 50 percent of therule only shall
surplus ppliesbe
toallocated
policy
measures. This means
to the repayment of the that whenever
national a particual
debt (starting fromtax2010).
is reduced, this
Limits on burden of social should be accompanied by an increase of taxes somewhere else. If tax
20022 NL Revenue rule General Government BA 4 Coalition agreement Ministry of finance Ministry of finance MF proposes corrective measures 1998 2014 92.0% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
charges, in nominal terms revenue is low because of an economic downturn it is not relevant for
the revenue rule. This setback would be absorbed by the government
To allow
deficit, automatic
thus allowingstabilisation, the revenuetorule
automatic stabilisation only pplies to policy
work.
measures. This means that whenever a particual tax is reduced, this
Limits on burden of social should be accompanied by an increase of taxes somewhere else. If tax Ministry of finance, Correction mechanism is not triggered automatically,
20023 NL Revenue rule General Government BA 4 Coalition agreement Ministry of finance 2015 2015 68.4% 2 1 1 0.5 1.5 1 1 0 0 1 0 N 4.07
charges, in nominal terms revenue is low because of an economic downturn it is not relevant for Independent body but MF proposes corrective measures
the revenue rule. This setback would be absorbed by the government
deficit, thus allowing automatic stabilisation to work.
Expenditure ceilings, revenue rules and budgetary rules are at the core
of this framework and they are set at the start of the government period
in the medium-term plan. To allow automatic stabilisation, cyclical
changes in revenues are not included in the framework. This means that
windfalls are automatically used to lower the debt, but at the same time
Limits on burden of social lower-than-expected revenues do not have to be compensated for. The Constitutional or higher
20024 NL Revenue rule General Government BA 4 Ministry of finance National parliament No predefined actions 2016 2021+ 68.4% 3 1 3 0.5 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 Y 4.37
charges, in nominal terms revenue rule only applies to policy measures. This means that whenever than ordinary law
a particual tax is reduced, this should be accompanied by an increase of
taxes somewhere else. If tax revenue is low because of an economic
downturn it is not relevant for the revenue rule. This setback would be
absorbed by the government deficit, thus allowing automatic stabilisation
to work.
The Law on the Sustainability of Public Finances introduced a correction

mechanism which comes into effect in the event of significant deviations
from the MTO or other EU numerical rule. The Act obliges the
Netherlands to take sufficient measures if, an authorized EU institution /
Council indicates that the budget policy of the Netherlands is not Correction mechanism is triggered automatically.
Budget balance Structural balance as % of Constitutional or higher Ministry of finance, Ministry of finance,
20051 NL General Government resulting in adequate compliance with European budget rules. The same ESA Other GOV/MF is obliged to prepare corrective measures for 2014 2021+ 100.0% 3 3 3 1 1.5 1 4 1 0 1 0 Y 8.73
rule GDP than ordinary law Independent body Independent body
applies if based on the independent economic estimates by the CPB, the the NP and publicly justify non-compliance
minister of finance determines that the national and/or European budget
rules will not be respected. The act also contains a correction
mechanism to, in the end, deepen the control of central government over
subnational governments.
Correction mechanism is triggered automatically.

Fiscal policy should comply with the EU-requirement for government Constitutional or higher Ministry of finance, Ministry of finance,
20061 NL Debt rule General Government Debt-to-GDP ratio ESA Other GOV/MF is obliged to prepare corrective measures for 2014 2021+ 100.0% 3 3 3 1 1.5 1 4 1 0 0 0 Y 8.23
debt (i.e. a maximum of 60% of GDP) than ordinary law Independent body European Commission
the NP and publicly justify non-compliance
Correction mechanism is triggered automatically.

Budget balance Nominal balance as % of Fiscal policy should comply with the EU-requirement for actual (nominal) Constitutional or higher Ministry of finance, Ministry of finance,
NL General Government ESA Multiannual GOV/MF is obliged to prepare corrective measures for 2013 2021+ 100.0% 3 3 3 1 1.5 1 4 1 0 0 0 Y 8.23
rule GDP balance (i.e. a maximum of 3% of GDP) than ordinary law Independent body European Commission
the NP and publicly justify non-compliance
Ministry of finance, Court Government Structure,

Budget balance (1.3/2.9) 4-year nominal anchor of 30 billion PLN (or 3% of
21011 PL Central Government Nominal budget balance Anchor of budget. BA Multiannual Political commitment of Auditors, National National Parliament, Court GOV proposes corrective measures 2006 2007 55.0% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
rule GDP) for the CG budget.
Parliament of Auditors
(1.3/2.9) If the debt is between 55% and 60% of GDP, the draft
central budget must not increase the ratio of central government
debt to GDP in the following year and for local draft budgets a
formula based on the restriction of the deficit-to-reven. In 2011,
three new consequences of exceeding 55% of GDP by the
public debt were added: 1) The Council of Ministers makes a
Constitutional or higher Court of Auditors, Ministry Government Structure
21021 PL Debt rule General Government Nominal debt in % of GDP Public debt must not exceed 60% of GDP. BA Multiannual GOV proposes corrective measures 1997 2013 review of binding regulations in order to present propositions of 97.5% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
than ordinary law of finance (Coouncil of Ministers)
legal solutions which have an impact on the level of state budget
revenue, including VAT tax rates; 2) The State Fund for
Rehabilitation of Persons with Disabilities receives a subsidy
equal to 30% of funds designed for a given year; 3) The
government bodies can incur new debt on preparing the
investment only if it is financed by the EU .
(1.3/2.9) If the debt is between 55% and 60% of GDP, the draft
central budget must not increase the ratio of central government
debt to GDP in the following year and for local draft budgets a
formula based on the restriction of the deficit-to-reven. In 2011,
three new consequences of exceeding 55% of GDP by the
public debt were added: 1) The Council of Ministers makes a
Constitutional or higher Court of Auditors, Ministry Government Structure
21022 PL Debt rule General Government Nominal debt in % of GDP Public debt must not exceed 60% of GDP. BA Multiannual GOV proposes corrective measures 2014 2020 review of binding regulations in order to present propositions of 97.5% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
than ordinary law of finance (Coouncil of Ministers)
legal solutions which have an impact on the level of state budget
revenue, including VAT tax rates; 2) The State Fund for
Rehabilitation of Persons with Disabilities receives a subsidy
equal to 30% of funds designed for a given year; 3) The
Court of auditors, National government bodies can incur new debt on preparing the
Constitutional or higher National parliament, Correction mechanism is triggered automatically. investment only if it is financed by the EU .
21024 PL Debt rule General Government Debt-to-GDP ratio Public debt must not exceed 60% of GDP. BA Multiannual parliament, Ministry of 2021 2021+ 97.5% 3 3 2 0.5 1 0 4 1 0 0 1 Y 7.93
than ordinary law Ministry of finance There are pre-defined consequences
finance, Independent body
For each local government unit total debt at the end of fiscal year is not
Government Structure Government Structure
allowed to be higher than 60% of the revenue for the given year. Also at
21031 PL Debt rule Local Government Nominal debt in % of GDP BA Multiannual Ordinary law (Regional chamber of (Regional chamber of No pre-defined action 2009 2011 25.8% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
the end of each quarter total debt cannot exceed 60% of the planned
auditors) auditors)
revenue for the given year.
For each local government unit total debt at the end of fiscal year is not
Government Structure Government Structure
allowed to be higher than 60% of the revenue for the given year. Also at
21032 PL Debt rule Local Government Nominal debt in % of GDP BA Multiannual Ordinary law (Regional chamber of (Regional chamber of No pre-defined action 2012 2014 25.8% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
the end of each quarter total debt cannot exceed 60% of the planned
auditors) auditors)
revenue for the given year.
The rule limits the growth rate of discretionary and new legally mandated Ministry of finance,
21041 PL Expenditure rule other expenditure, which also covers current legally mandated expenditure, if BA Multiannual Ordinary law National Parliament, Court Ministry of finance Obligation to take corrective measures 2011 2011 10.0% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
rate
the act defining them is modified. of Auditors
The rule limits the growth rate of discretionary and new legally mandated Ministry of finance,
Nominal Expenditure growth Planned current expenditures of local government cannot exceed
21042 PL Expenditure rule other expenditure, which
planned current also covers
revenues currentby
augmented legally mandated
the budget expenditure,
surplus from if BA Multiannual Ordinary law National Parliament, Court Ministry of finance Obligation to take corrective measures 2012 2012 10.0% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
rate
the act defining
previous them
years and is surplus
the modified.
of funds in the current account resulting of Auditors
from settlements of the securities issued, bank and non-bank loans from
Budget balance previous years. Executed current expenditures of local government
21051 PL Local Government Nominal budget balance BA Multiannual Ordinary law Court of Auditors Court of Auditors No pre-defined action 2011 2011 24.1% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
rule cannot exceed executed current revenues. Current deficit is allowed only
in budget execution in the amount of expenditure connected with the
execution of current tasks financed by the EU funds and non-refundable
financial means from EFTA member countries, if not receive in a given
year.
Planned current expenditures of local government cannot exceed
planned current revenues augmented by the budget surplus from
previous years and the surplus of funds in the current account resulting
Budget balance Budget balance in absolute previous years. Executed current expenditures of local government Correction mechanism is triggered automatically.
21052 PL Local Government BA Annual Ordinary law National parliament Government structure 2011 2019 30.1% 2 3 2 1 1 0 4 0 0 0 0 N 6.4
rule terms cannot exceed executed current revenues. Current deficit is allowed only There are pre-defined consequences
year.
Planned current expenditures of local government cannot exceed

planned current revenues augmented by the budget surplus from
previous years and the surplus of funds in the current account resulting
Budget balance Budget balance in absolute previous years. Executed current expenditures of local government Correction mechanism is triggered automatically.
21053 PL Local Government BA Annual Ordinary law National parliament Government structure 2020 2021+ 30.1% 2 3 2 1 1 0 4 0 0 0 1 Y 6.9
rule terms cannot exceed executed current revenues. Current deficit is allowed only There are pre-defined consequences
year.
The dynamics of the expenditure under the scope of the rule is limited to
Nominal Expenditure in the medium-term real GDP growth multiplied by the inflation target, with BA (the nominal balance in the National parliament,
21061 PL Expenditure rule General Government Annual Ordinary law National Parliament, Court No pre-defined action 2016 2019 90.0% 2 3 2 0.5 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 N 5
absolute terms the inclusion of the discretionary measures and the correction correction mechanism in ESA) Ministry of finance
of Auditors
mechanism.
21062 PL Expenditure rule General Government Annual Ordinary law National Parliament, Court No pre-defined action 2020 2020 90.0% 2 3 2 0.5 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 N 5
of Auditors
mechanism.
21067 PL Expenditure rule General Government Annual Ordinary law National Parliament, Court No pre-defined action 2021 2021+ 90.0% 2 3 3 0.5 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 Y 6.03
of Auditors
mechanism.
The ratio of installments of loans and interest payable in this fiscal year,
redemption of securities and interest payable on them, potential
payments resulting from sureties and guarantees granted to the planned
Ministry of Finance, Correction mechanism is triggered automatically.
21072 PL Debt rule Local Government Debt service ratio revenues cannot exceed in given fiscal year the arithmetic mean from BA Multiannual Ordinary law Government structure 2014 2019 28.9% 2 3 2 1 1 0 4 0 0 1 0 N 6.9
the ratio of its current revenues augmented by revenues from the sales
of assets and reduced by current expenditures computed for the
previous three years to budget revenues in total.
The ratio of installments of loans and interest payable in this fiscal year,
redemption of securities and interest payable on them, potential
payments resulting from sureties and guarantees granted to the planned
Ministry of Finance, Correction mechanism is triggered automatically.
21073 PL Debt rule Local Government Debt service ratio revenues cannot exceed in given fiscal year the arithmetic mean from BA Multiannual Ordinary law Government structure 2020 2021+ 28.9% 2 3 2 1 1 0 4 1 0 1 1 Y 7.9
the ratio of its current revenues augmented by revenues from the sales
of assets and reduced by current expenditures computed for the
previous three years to budget revenues in total.
Budget balance Budgets of services with financial and administrative autonomy must be
22011 PT Central Government Nominal budget balance BA Annual Ordinary law Ministry of finance Ministry of finance Corrective measures 2002 2011 61.0% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
rule in balance or positive.
Budget balance Budgets of services with financial and administrative autonomy must be
22012 PT Central Government Nominal budget balance BA Annual Ordinary law Ministry of finance Ministry of finance No pre-defined action 2012 2014 61.0% 2 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 N 2.8
rule in balance or positive.
Court of auditors, National
Budget balance Budget balance in nominal Budgets of services with financial and administrative autonomy must be Constitutional or higher
22013 PT Central Government BA Annual parliament, Ministry of Ministry of finance No predefined actions 2015 2021+ 59.5% 3 3 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 Y 5.07
rule terms in balance or positive. than ordinary law
finance
Aims at stabilizing the nominal budget balance by capping LG net debt Ministry of finance,
22021 PT Debt rule Local Government Ceiling on net borrowing ESA Annual Ordinary law Ministry of finance No predefined actions 2003 2006 13.0% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
growth at 0%. Government Structure
The target is a nominal budget balance. Net indebtedness for LG capped Ministry of finance,
Nominal debt in % of at 125% of previous year's revenues, a ceiling for medium and long term Government Structure Ministry of finance, Court of
22022 PT Debt rule Local Government ESA Annual Ordinary law Automatic sanction mechanism 2007 2011 11.0% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
revenues loans (100%) and short-term loans (10%). Net debt growth ceiling for (Directorate General for Auditors
LG capped at 0%. LG)
The target is a nominal budget balance. Net indebtedness for LG capped Ministry of finance,
Nominal debt in % of at 125% of previous year's revenues, a ceiling for medium and long term Government Structure Ministry of finance, Court of
22023 PT Debt rule Local Government ESA Annual Ordinary law Automatic sanction mechanism 2012 2013 11.0% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
revenues loans (100%) and short-term loans (10%). Net debt growth ceiling for (Directorate General for Auditors, Independent body
LG capped at 0%. LG)
The law also sets a limit to the current balance minus the
average amortization of medium and long-term loans (current
The debt at the end of the year cannot exceed 1.5 times on average the
gross revenue collected should be equal or higher to the current
current net revenue collected in the previous 3 years. Additionally, the Constitutional or higher Court of auditors,
22024 PT Debt rule Local Government Debt ceiling in nominal terms BA Annual Court of auditors Correction mechanism is triggered automatically 2014 2021+ expenditure plus the average amortization of medium and long- 11.6% 3 3 2 0.5 1 1 2 1 0 0 1 Y 7.2
total debt can only increase in each year by 20% of the margin available than ordinary law Government strucutre
term loans, where the average amortization of medium and long
at the beginning of each financial year.
term loans corresponds to borrowed capital divided by the initial
maturity of the loan in years).
Ministry of finance, Court of

22031 PT Debt rule Regional Government Debt ceiling Ceiling defined in the Annual State Budget law. BA Annual Ordinary law Ministry of finance Automatic sanction mechanism 2007 2011 3.0% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
Auditors.
Ministry of finance, Court of
22032 PT Debt rule Regional Government Debt ceiling Ceiling defined in the Annual State Budget law. BA Annual Ordinary law Ministry of finance Automatic sanction mechanism 2012 2013 3.0% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
Auditors.
Total liabilities should not be higher than 1.5 times the average of the
current net revenue collected in the last 3 years. Liabilities include loans,
Court of auditors,
Budget balance Budget balance in nominal leasing contracts and other kinds of debt to financial institutions and Constitutional or higher Government structure,
22033 PT Regional Government BA Annual Independent body, Correction mechanism is triggered automatically 2014 2021+ 3.0% 3 3 2 0.5 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 Y 6.2
rule terms other accounts payable. The law also states that the floating debt cannot than ordinary law Regional parliament
Government structure
exceed 0.35 times the average net current revenue collected over the
past 3 years.
General Government budget balance in percentage of GDP, defined

accordingly with ESA rules and excluding the cyclical economic effects
and one-off operations should not be lesser than the medium-term
objective (-0.5%). If there the debt ratio is below 60% of GDP and there
are not long-term risk of sustainability, the structural deficit could be 1% European Commission, European Commission,
Budget balance Structural balance as % of Constitutional or higher Correction mechanism is triggered automatically.
22041 PT General Government of GDP. While the medium-term objectives is not reached, the reduction ESA Annual Ministry of finance, Ministry of finance, 2014 2021+ 100.0% 3 3 3 0.5 1.5 1 4 1 0 1 0 Y 8.6
rule GDP than ordinary law There are pre-defined consequences
of the structural balance should be at least equal to 0.5p.p. Until the Independent body Independent body
medium-term objective (structural balance of -0.5%) is reached, the
growth rate of public expenditure (net of extraordinary, temporary or
discretionary measures on the revenue side), may not exceed the
medium-term potential GDP growth rate.
European Commission,
GG debt-to-GDP must not be greather than 60%. When the debt-to-GDP European Commission,
22051 PT Debt rule General Government Debt-to-GDP ratio is higher than 60%, the excess part should be reduced at an average ESA Annual Ministry of finance, Correction mechanism is triggered automatically 2013 2021+ 100.0% 3 3 3 0.5 1.5 1 2 0 0 1 0 Y 7.1
than ordinary law Government structure,
rate of one twentieth per year. Independent body
Independent body
Court of auditors, Court of auditors, Regional

Nominal debt in absolute End of year liabilities<=1.5 times the average of the current net revenue Constitutional or higher Regional Parliament, Parliament, Ministry of Correction mechanism is triggered automatically.
22061 PT Debt rule Regional Government BA Annual 2014 2021+ 3.2% 3 3 2 0.5 1 1 4 1 0 0 1 Y 8.2
terms collected in the last three years than ordinary law Ministry of Finance, Finance, Government There are pre-defined consequences
Government structure structure
The collected current revenue should at least be equal (or higher) to the
Budget balance Budget balance in absolute Constitutional or higher Local parliament, Court of Local parliament, Court of Correction mechanism is triggered automatically.
22071 PT Local Government current expenditure plus average medium and long-term loans Mix between ESA and CA Annual 2014 2021+ 12.1% 3 3 2 0.5 1 1 4 0 0 0 0 Y 7.2
rule terms than ordinary law Auditors auditors There are pre-defined consequences
amortization.
Budget balance Budget balance as % of Local government budgets, excluding loans to finance investment and Court of auditors, Ministry
23011 RO Local Government BA Annual Ordinary law Court of auditors No pre-defined action 2007 2021+ 27.2% 2 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Y 4.13
rule GDP debt refinancing, have to be balanced. of finance
Local governments cannot contract or guarantee loans if their annual

Debt ceiling as % of current Court of auditors,
23021 RO Debt rule Local Government public debt service (principal payment, interest, commissions) including BA Annual Ordinary law Government structure No pre-defined action 2010 2021+ 27.2% 2 3 1 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 1 Y 6.5
revenue Government structure
the loan they want to contract, is higher than 30% of their own revenue.
The annual structural deficit of public administration is either balanced or

in surplus. The rule shall be considered complied with if the annual
Budget balance Structural balance as % of structural balance of the public administration (i) does not exceed -1% of Constitutional or higher Ministry of finance, Correction mechanism is triggered automatically.
23031 RO General Government ESA Multiannual Government structure, 2014 2021+ 100.0% 3 3 3 0 1.5 0 4 1 1 1 0 Y 8.7
rule GDP GDP at market prices, or (ii) converges towards the medium-term than ordinary law Independent body There are pre-defined consequences
Independent body
budgetary objective according to an adjustment path agreed with the
institutions of the European Union.
The annual increase of public administration expenditures complies with

23041 RO Expenditure rule General Government Nominal expenditure growth the provisions of EC Council Regulations no. 1466/97, as subsequently ESA Multiannual European Commission No pre-defined action 2014 2018 88.0% 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 Y 5.8
amended and supplemented.
The annual increase of public administration expenditures complies with

Constitutional or higher Ministry of finance, European Commission, Correction mechanism is triggered automatically.
23042 RO Expenditure rule General Government Nominal expenditure growth the provisions of EC Council Regulations no. 1466/97, as subsequently ESA Multiannual 2019 2021+ 88.0% 3 3 3 0 1.5 0 4 0 1 0 1 Y 8.2
than ordinary law Independent body Government structure There are pre-defined consequences
amended and supplemented.
Other (permanent rule, Ministry of finance, Ministry of finance,

The public debt according to the EU methodology shall not exceed 60% extending the timehorizon Constitutional or higher Government structure, Government structure, Correction mechanism is triggered automatically.
23051 RO Debt rule General Government Debt-to-GDP ratio ESA 2014 2021+ 100.0% 3 3 3 0.5 1.5 0 4 1 1 0 0 Y 8.33
of GDP. beyond the yearly budgetary than ordinary law National parliament, National parliament, There are pre-defined consequences
cycle) Independent body Independent body
Budget balance Budget balance as % of Local Government Act: local governments are obliged to balance their There is a pre-defined timeline within which corrective
24011 SE Local Government BA Annual Ordinary law Government structure No body 2000 2021+ 49.4% 2 3 2 0 1 0 4 0 0 1 1 Y 7.13
rule GDP budgets. measures need to be taken
Court of Auditors,
Central Government, Nominal Expenditure in Nominal expenditure ceiling for CG and extra-budgetary old-age pension Government, National
24021 SE Expenditure rule BA 3 Coalition agreement Government Obligation to correct by appropriate actions 1996 2006 56.4% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
Social Security absolute terms system targeted. Parliament, Ministry of
finance
Court of Auditors,
Central Government, Nominal Expenditure in Nominal expenditure ceiling for CG and extra-budgetary old-age pension Government, National
24022 SE Expenditure rule BA Multiannual Coalition agreement Government Obligation to correct by appropriate actions 2007 2009 56.4% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
Social Security absolute terms system targeted. Parliament, Ministry of
finance
All expenditure in the central government budget is subject to the

(1.3/2.9) From 2010 it is compulsory for Government to use an
Central Government, Nominal expenditure ceiling expenditure ceiling, apart from expenditure for interest on the central Constitutional or higher Independent body, Ministry
24023 SE Expenditure rule BA Multiannual Ministry of finance Correction mechanism is triggered automatically 2010 2021+ expenditure ceiling for a minimum period of three years. 31.7% 2 1 3 1 1 0 4 0 1 0 1 Y 6.33
Social Security in absolute terms government debt. Moreover, off-budget expenditure in the old-age than ordinary law of finance
Previously it was voluntary. (2.11) interest payments
pensions system is also covered by the expenditure ceiling.
Court of Auditors,
24031 SE General Government Structural budget balance A surplus for the GG in terms of 2% of GDP over the cycle targeted. ESA Business cycle (multiannual) Coalition agreement No body No pre-defined action 2000 2006 100.0% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
rule Parliament, Ministry of
finance
Correction mechanism is not triggered automatically.

Independent body,
Budget balance Structural balance as % of A surplus for the general government in terms of 1% of GDP over the The Government is required to outline a plan for
24031 SE General Government ESA Multiannual Ordinary law Government structure, National parliament 2007 2018 100.0% 2 3 3 0.5 1 0 2 0 0 1 0 N 6.03
rule GDP cycle targeted. returning to the target if it estimates that a deviation
Ministry of finance
from it exists.
Correction mechanism is not triggered automatically.

Independent body,
Budget balance Structural balance as % of A surplus for the general government in terms of 0.33% of GDP over the The Government is required to outline a plan for
24032 SE General Government ESA Multiannual Ordinary law Government structure, National parliament 2019 2021+ 100.0% 2 3 3 0.5 1 0 2 0 0 1 0 Y 6.03
rule GDP cycle targeted. returning to the target if it estimates that a deviation
Ministry of finance
from it exists.
The central measure of fiscal sustainability, i.e. public debt, is given a

more prominent role in the Swedish fiscal framework by the introduction
Government programme Independent body,
24041 SE Debt rule General Government Debt-to-GDP ratio of a 35 per cent debt anchor formulated in Maastricht debt terms. The ESA Other National parliament No pre-defined action 2019 2021+ 100.0% 2 3 3 0.5 1 0 2 0 1 0 0 Y 6.03
voted in Parliament National Parliament
debt level is intended to fall trend-wise in the medium term with the new
debt anchor.
(2.7) From 2000 to 2004. (2.11) Municipalities may borrow for

certain purposes (to finance housing construction, water
supplies, disposal and treatment of waste water) if the total level
The debt/GDP ratio of GG and non-financial public entities (classified
25011 SI Debt rule General Government Nominal debt in % of GDP BA 4 Coalition agreement Ministry of finance Ministry of finance No pre-defined action 2000 2009 of existing and anticipated new debt exceeds 10% of the 100.0% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
outside GG) cannot exceed 40% of GDP.
revenues of the previous year, provided that the total payment
of principal and interest in an individual year does not exceed
3% of the revenues.
The total payment of principal and interest in each year must not exceed
Nominal debt service ratio in Court of Auditors, Ministry (2.11) Donation, EU funds, earmarked expenditure for
25021 SI Debt rule Local Government 8% of revenues of the previous year. LG cannot borrow abroad. Any LG BA Annual Ordinary law Ministry of finance No pre-defined action 1990 2011 12.2% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
% of revenues of finance investments from central government budget.
borrowing needs approval of MF.
The total payment of principal and interest in each year must not exceed
Nominal debt service ratio in Court of Auditors, Ministry
25022 SI Debt rule Local Government 8% of revenues of the previous year. LG cannot borrow abroad. Any LG BA Annual Ordinary law Ministry of finance No pre-defined action 2012 2014 12.2% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
% of revenues of finance
borrowing needs approval of MF.
Nominal Expenditure in The establishing legal act of the rule sets nominal expenditure ceilings
25031 SI Expenditure rule General Government BA Multiannual Coalition agreement Ministry of finance Ministry of finance No pre-defined action 2010 2011 97.5% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
absolute terms for year t to t+5.
The upward ceiling on the general government expenditure in the year,

in which the level of GDP is below potential, is calculated by the
difference between envisaged revenue of the general government and
Budget balance Structural balance as % of the product between a factor reflecting the minimum value of the Constitutional or higher There is a pre-defined timeline within which corrective
25051 SI General Government Other Multiannual Independent body Independent body 2015 2021+ 100.0% 3 3 3 0 1.5 1 4 1 0 1 0 Y 8.47
rule GDP general government balance, defined in the ratified international treaty than ordinary law measures need to be taken
regulating the stability, coordination and governance of the economic
and monetary union, and the position of the economy in the business
cycle multiplied and the forecasted level of potential GDP.
Expenditure not considered in the State budget law can only be

Independent body,
Nominal Expenditure in executed if its total amount does not exceed 1% of total expenditure
26011 SK Expenditure rule Central Government BA Annual Ordinary law Government, National IND, National Parliament Obligation to take effective measures 2002 2011 47.2% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
absolute terms approved in the budget law and the deficit is not increased. Allows
Parliament
increasing expenditure in good times. Initially, the rule set a limit of 15%.
Expenditure not considered in the State budget law can only be

Independent body,
Nominal Expenditure in executed if its total amount does not exceed 1% of total expenditure IND (FC), National
26012 SK Expenditure rule Central Government BA Annual Ordinary law Government, National No pre-defined action 2012 2015 48.6% 2 0 3 0.5 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 N 3.03
absolute terms approved in the budget law and the deficit is not increased. Allows Parliament
Parliament
increasing expenditure in good times. Initially, the rule set a limit of 15%.
Borrowing limits for regional and local governments: 1) total debt cannot
Debt ceiling and limit on
exceed 60% of current revenue in the previous budget year in nominal
repayment as % current of Constitutional or higher Ministry of finance, Ministry of finance,
26021 SK Debt rule Local Government terms (i.e. capital revenues and revenues from financial transactions are ESA Annual Correction mechanism is triggered automatically 2002 2021+ 16.4% 3 3 3 0 1.5 1 2 0 0 0 0 Y 6.47
revenue in previous budget than ordinary law Independent body Independent body
excluded); 2) annual instalments to reimburse debt cannot exceed 25 %
year in nominal terms
of revenue in the previous budget year in nominal terms.
Two parts of LG budgets distinguished. (1) Current budget: no deficit

Budget balance permitted. (2) Capital budget: deficit possible, if financed by (i) by past
26031 SK Local Government Nominal budget balance BA Annual Ordinary law Ministry of finance No body No pre-defined action 2002 2004 18.0% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
rule unused funds, (ii) loans, or (iii) surplus from current budget in the on-
going year.
Two parts of LG budgets distinguished. (1) Current budget: no deficit

Budget balance permitted. (2) Capital budget: deficit possible, if financed by (i) by past
26032 SK Local Government Nominal budget balance BA Annual Ordinary law Ministry of finance No body No pre-defined action 2005 2008 18.0% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a N n/a
rule unused funds, (ii) loans, or (iii) surplus from current budget in the on-
going year.
Local governments' current budget has to be adopted either as balanced

or in surplus. Capital budget can be in deficit, provided that this deficit is
Budget balance Budget balance as % of Constitutional or higher Ministry of finance, Ministry of finance,
26041 SK Local Government financed by unspent funds of local governments transferred from ESA Annual Correction mechanism is triggered automatically. 2005 2021+ 16.4% 3 3 3 1 1.5 1 2 1 0 0 0 Y 7.23
rule GDP than ordinary law Independent body Independent body
previous years, loans or by surplus of the current budget in the
respective fiscal year.
The constitutional fiscal responsibility act specifies thresholds of general

government gross debt (hence debt), which triggers policy
actions/sanctions starting by a letter explaining the debt level. Exceeding
of the final threshold triggers a vote of confidence by the Parliament.
There are 4 threshold intervals: 50-53%, 53-55%, 55-57% and 57-60% Constitutional or higher Ministry of finance, Ministry of finance, Correction mechanism is triggered automatically.
26051 SK Debt rule General Government Debt-to-GDP ratio Other (Maastricht definition) Multiannual 2012 2021+ 100.0% 3 3 3 0.5 ir 1 4 0 0 0 0 Y 7.6
The uppermost debt ceiling is specified as 60% of GDP until 2017. than ordinary law Independent body Independent body There are pre-defined consequences
Subsequently, all the debt intervals will be gradually reduced by one
percentage point each year until the uppermost debt ceiling reaches
50% of GDP in 2027. Ie. in 2018 the upper ceiling will be 59% of GDP,
the second high 56% of GDP and so on
The general government structural deficit shall be equal or lower than

0.5% of GDP. If the general government debt is considerably lower than
60% of GDP and long term sustainability risks are low, the structural
Budget balance Structural balance as % of deficit may not be higher than 1% of GDP. Additionally, an adequate Constitutional or higher Ministry of finance, Ministry of finance, Correction mechanism is triggered automatically.
26061 SK General Government ESA Annual 2014 2021+ 100.0% 3 3 3 0.5 1.5 1 4 1 0 1 0 Y 8.6
rule GDP trajectory must be established to achieve the medium term objective than ordinary law Independent body Independent body There are pre-defined consequences
(MTO). The rule has been transposed in line with the Treaty on Stability,
Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union
(TSCG).

market prices exceeds 60 per cent, the ratio shall be reduced in Constitutional or higher Correction mechanism is triggered automatically.
28011 MT Debt rule General Government Debt-to-GDP ratio ESA Multiannual Independent body Government structure, 2014 2021+ 100.0% 3 3 3 0 1.5 2 4 1 1 0 0 Y 8.73
accordance with the 1997 Excessive Deficit Regulation until the ratio than ordinary law There are pre-defined consequences
Independent body
Budget balance Structural balance as % of The budgetary rule is that for each year either the structural budgetary Constitutional or higher Correction mechanism is triggered automatically.
28021 MT General Government ESA Multiannual Independent body Government structure, 2014 2021+ 100.0% 3 3 3 0 1.5 2 4 1 1 1 0 Y 9.23
rule GDP position of the general government is in balance or in surplus. than ordinary law There are pre-defined consequences
Independent body
Data
explanation
Column B Identifier of the rule. The identifier is built up as follows: the first or first two digits indicate the country. Then, in the second or third place a "0" separates the country identifier from the next figures providing additional
information. Thus, the third or fourth digit provides for a consecutive numbering of rules in that country, and the last digit stands for the version, 1 being the earliest (e.g. 27021 indicates: a) 27= UK; b) 2= second rule;
c) 1= version one of this second rule).
Column N Since the dataset is truncated, the start date 1990 does not distinguish between rules that came into force in that year and those in force already before. In some cases, column P indicates earlier entry into
force, but such information is incomplete.
Columns R-AB and n/a means that the index for those rules has only been computed with the old methodology or that the index does not exist yet because the rule will enter into force in the future.
AD
*
Rule to enter into force after December 31st 2020. Included in the database for information purpose but not taken into account for the calculation of the countries fiscal rule indexes.
European Commission
Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs
Unit C4
Rules in red are reformed in this year
no country type sector cover
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997

1017 AT BBR GG 99.0%
1022 AT ER GG 61.5%
1041 AT DR GG 66.0%
1051 AT BBR GG 66.0%
2032 BE BBR LG 13.2%
2043 BE BBR GG 100.0%
2052 BE BBR SS 34.9%
2062 BE ER SS 34.9% 5.77 5.77 5.77
3013 BG DR GG 100.0%
3024 BG ER GG 100.0%
3034 BG BBR GG 100.0%
3042 BG DR LG 25.5%
3062 BG BBR GG 100.0%
3072 BG BBR GG 100.0%
3083 BG ER GG 100.0%
3092 BG BBR LG 26.0%
30102 BG ER LG 26.0%
4012 CY BBR GG 100.0%
4021 CY BBR LG 4.0% 4.53 4.53 4.53 4.53 4.53 4.53 4.53 4.53
4031 CY DR GG 100.0%
5042 CZ BBR GG 100.0%
5051 CZ DR GG 100.0%
5061 CZ DR LG 27.0%
6013 DE BBR CG 17.3%
6031 DE BBR LG 16.9% 6.10 6.10 6.10 6.10 6.10 6.10 6.10 6.10
6041 DE BBR RG 22.6%
6051 DE BBR SS 43.1%
6061 DE BBR GG 100.0%
7041 DK BBR GG 100.0%
7052 DK ER GG 75.0%
7061 DK BBR GG 100.0%
8013 EE BBR GG 100.0%
8024 EE DR LG 23.0%
8032 EE DR CG 70.0%
9021 EL DR GG 100.0%
9041 EL BBR GG 100.0%
10014 ES BBR GG 100.0%
CG, RG, 6.1%, 25%,

10052 ES ER
LG 16.6%
10062 ES DR GG 100.0%
11035 FI ER CG 27.0%
11044 FI BBR LG 39.4%
11052 FI RR SS 33.7%
11074 FI DR GG 100.0%
11084 FI BBR CG 26.9%
11093 FI BBR GG 100.0%
110104 FI BBR LG 39.4%
110114 FI BBR SS 33.7%
110152 FI BBR SS 100.0%
110161 FI BBR SS 100.0%
12022 FR RR CG 34.4%
12031 FR BBR LG 19.7% 5.80 5.80 5.80 5.80 5.80 5.80 5.80 5.80
12081 FR BBR GG 100.0%
13053 HU DR GG 100.0%
13061 HU BBR GG 100.0%
13071 HU BBR GG 100.0%
14031 IE BBR LG 7.5%
14042 IE DR GG 100.0%
14052 IE BBR GG 100.0%
15016 IT ER RG 2.0%
15027 IT BBR RG, LG 43.6%
15031 IT BBR RG, LG 45.6%
15044 IT BBR RG 13.5%
15051 IT BBR GG 100.0%
15061 IT DR GG 100.0%
15071 IT ER GG 100.0%
16022 LT ER CG, SS 76.6%
16033 LT RR CG 50.5%
16044 LT BBR LG 22.4%
16051 LT BBR GG 100.0%
16071 LT BBR LG, SS 27.1%
16081 LT BBR LG, SS 49.5%
16091 LT ER CG, SS 76.5%
17036 LU BBR SS 41.8%
17042 LU BBR LG 10.2% 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
17053 LU BBR GG 100.0%
18031 LV ER GG 100.0%
18042 LV BBR GG 100.0%
18053 LV DR GG 100.0%
19031 HR BBR GG 100.0%
19041 HR ER GG 91.5%
19051 HR DR GG 100.0%
20014 NL ER GG 100.0%
20024 NL RR GG 68.4%
20051 NL BBR GG 100.0%
20061 NL DR GG 100.0%
20071 NL BBR GG 100.0%
21024 PL DR GG 90.3%
21053 PL BBR LG 24.3%
21067 PL ER GG 90.0%
21073 PL DR LG 28.9%
22013 PT BBR CG 62.9%
22024 PT DR LG 11.6%
22033 PT DR RG 3.0%
22041 PT BBR GG 100.0%
22051 PT DR GG 100.0%
22061 PT DR RG 3.2%
22071 PT BBR LG 12.1%
23011 RO BBR LG 27.2%
23021 RO DR LG 27.2%
23031 RO BBR GG 100.0%
23042 RO ER GG 100.0%
23051 RO DR GG 100.0%
24011 SE BBR LG 49.4%
24023 SE ER CG, SS 31.7%
24032 SE BBR GG 100.0%
24041 SE DR GG 100.0%
25051 SI BBR GG 100.0%
26025 SK DR LG 16.4%
26041 SK BBR LG 16.4%
26051 SK DR GG 100.0%
26061 SK BBR GG 100.0%
28011 MT DR GG 100.0%
28021 MT BBR GG 100.0%
Fiscal rule strength index (FRSI)
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
7.20 7.20
6.83 6.83
3.07 3.07 3.07 3.07 3.07 3.07 3.07 3.07 3.07 3.07 3.07
5.77 5.77 5.77 5.77 5.77 5.77 5.77 5.77 5.77 5.77 5.77 5.77 5.77 5.77 5.77 5.77
4.77 4.77 4.77 4.77 4.77 4.77 4.77 4.77 4.77
4.53 4.53 4.53 4.53 4.53 4.53 4.53 4.53 4.53 4.53 4.53 4.53 4.53 4.53 4.53 4.53
7.93 7.93 7.93 7.93 7.93

6.10 6.10 6.10 6.10 6.10 6.10 6.10 6.10 6.10 6.10 6.10 6.10 6.10 6.10 6.10 6.10
6.43 6.43 6.43 6.43 6.43
3.87 3.87 3.87 3.87 3.87
8.20
8.33 8.33
4.03 4.03 4.03
8.33 8.33
8.33 8.33
7.83 7.83
1.87 1.87 1.87 1.87 1.87 1.87 1.87 1.87 1.87 1.87 1.87 1.87 1.87 1.87 1.87
7.13
3.53 3.53 3.53 3.53 3.53

5.80 5.80 5.80 5.80 5.80 5.80 5.80 5.80 5.80 5.80 5.80 5.80 5.80 5.80 5.80 5.80
8.47
3.33
1.17 1.17 1.17 1.17 1.17 1.17 1.17 1.17 1.17 1.17
4.57 4.57
4.67
4.80 4.80 4.80 4.80 4.80 4.80 4.80 4.80 4.80 4.80 4.80 4.80 4.80
4.80 4.80 4.80 4.80
4.13 4.13 4.13 4.13 4.13 4.13
4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
8.47
8.97
4.90
8.23
6.40 6.40 6.40

2.80 2.80
7.10
4.13 4.13 4.13 4.13 4.13 4.13 4.13

6.50 6.50 6.50 6.50
7.13 7.13 7.13 7.13 7.13 7.13 7.13 7.13 7.13 7.13 7.13 7.13 7.13 7.13
6.33 6.33 6.33 6.33
6.03 6.03 6.03 6.03 6.03 6.03 6.03
7.23 7.23 7.23 7.23 7.23 7.23 7.23 7.23 7.23

2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
7.20 7.20 7.20 8.47 8.47 8.47 8.47 8.47
7.33 7.33 7.33 7.33 7.33 7.33 7.33
7.47 7.47 7.47 7.47 7.47
6.83 6.83 6.83 6.83 6.83 6.83 6.83 6.83
5.17 5.17 5.17 5.17 5.17 5.17 5.17 5.17
8.47 8.47 8.47 8.47 8.47 8.47 8.47 8.47
3.07 3.07 3.07 5.53 5.53 5.53 5.53 5.53
5.77 5.77 5.53 5.53 5.53 5.53 5.53 5.53
7.47 6.80 6.80 6.80 6.80 6.80 6.80
5.37 5.37 7.30 7.30 7.30 7.80 7.80
5.80 5.80 5.80 5.80 5.80 6.30 6.30
4.77 4.77 4.77 4.77 4.77 4.77 4.77 4.77
8.20 8.20 8.20 8.20 8.20 8.20
5.80 5.80 5.80 5.80 5.80 5.80 6.30 6.30
6.20 6.20 6.80 6.80 6.80 7.30 7.30
4.27 4.27 4.27 4.27 4.27 4.27 4.27 4.27
4.27 4.27 4.27 4.27 4.27 4.27 4.27 4.27
8.47 8.47 8.47 8.47 8.47 8.47 8.47 8.47
4.53 4.53 4.53 4.53 4.53 4.53 4.53 4.53
7.47 7.47 7.47 7.47 7.47 7.47 7.47
7.03 7.03 7.03 7.03 7.03
6.53 6.53 6.53 6.53 6.53
5.60 5.60 5.60 5.60 5.60
7.93 7.93 7.93 7.93 8.20 8.20 8.60 8.60
6.10 6.10 6.10 6.10 6.37 6.37 6.37 6.37
6.43 6.43 6.43 6.43 6.70 6.70 6.70 6.70
3.87 3.87 3.87 3.87 4.13 4.13 4.13 4.13
8.20 8.20 8.20 8.20 8.47 8.47 8.47 8.47
8.33 8.33 8.33 8.33 8.33 8.33 8.33 8.33
7.13 7.13 7.13 7.13 7.13 7.13 7.13 7.13
1.43 1.43 1.43 1.43 1.43
8.47 8.47 8.47 8.47 8.47 8.47 8.47 8.47
4.03 4.03 4.03 4.03 4.03 4.03 4.03 4.03
6.07 6.07 6.07 6.07 6.07 6.07 6.07 6.07
4.53 4.53 4.53 4.53 4.53 4.53 4.53 4.53
6.97 6.97 8.97
8.33 8.33 8.33 8.33 9.10 9.10 9.10 9.10
8.33 8.33 8.33 8.33 8.60 8.60 8.60 8.60

7.83 7.83 7.83 7.83 8.10 8.10 8.10 8.10
2.73 2.73 2.73 2.73 2.73 2.73 2.73
3.87 3.87 3.87 3.87 3.87 4.37 4.37
1.87 1.87 1.87 1.87 1.87 1.87 1.87 1.87
1.73 1.73 1.73 1.73 1.73 1.73 1.73
1.73 1.73 1.73 1.73 1.73 1.73 1.73
7.13 7.13 7.13 7.13 7.13 7.13 7.13 7.13
1.73 1.73 1.73 1.73 1.73 1.73 1.73
1.73 1.73 1.73 1.73 1.73 1.73 1.73
2.40 2.40
1.73
3.53 3.53 3.53 3.53 4.13 4.13 4.13 4.13
5.80 5.80 5.80 5.80 5.80 5.80 5.80 5.80
8.47 8.47 8.47 8.47 8.47 8.47 8.47 8.47
6.70 6.70 6.70 6.70 6.70 6.70 6.70
3.33 3.33 3.33 3.33 4.13 4.13 4.13 4.13
3.83 3.83 3.83 3.83 4.63 4.63 4.63 4.63
1.17 1.17 1.17 1.17 1.17 1.17 1.17 1.17
7.07 7.07 7.07 7.07 7.07 7.07 7.07
4.57 4.57 4.57 8.47 8.47 8.47 8.47 8.47
4.67 4.67 4.67 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00
8.07 7.57 7.57 7.57 7.57 7.57 7.57
4.80 4.80 4.80 4.80 4.80 4.80 4.80 4.80
4.80 4.80 4.80 4.80 4.80 4.80 4.80 4.80
8.47 8.47 8.47 8.47 8.47 8.47 8.47 8.47
7.97 7.97 7.97 7.97 7.97 7.97 7.97 7.97
6.97 6.97 6.97 6.97 6.97 6.97 6.97 6.97
8.97 8.97 8.97 8.97 8.97 8.97 8.97
4.13 4.13 4.13 4.13 4.13 4.13 4.13 4.13
3.43 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.47 6.47 6.47
8.60 8.60 8.60 8.60 8.60 8.60 8.60
5.70 5.70 5.70 5.70 5.70 5.70
5.43 5.70 5.70 5.70
5.27 5.27 5.27 5.27 5.27 5.27 5.27
4.87 4.87 4.87 4.87 4.87 4.87 4.87
4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
8.47 8.47 8.47 8.47 8.47 8.47 8.47 8.47
4.23 4.23 4.23 4.23 4.23 4.23 4.23 4.23
8.97 8.97 8.97 8.97 8.97 8.97 8.97 8.97
4.90 4.90 4.90 4.90 4.90 4.90 4.90 4.90
7.53 7.53 7.53
8.03 8.03 8.03
7.03 7.03 7.03
5.77 5.77 5.37 5.37 5.37 5.37 5.37
4.07 4.37 4.37 4.37 4.37 4.37 4.37
8.73 8.73 8.73 8.73 8.73 8.73 8.73 8.73
8.23 8.23 8.23 8.23 8.23 8.23 8.23 8.23
8.23 8.23 8.23 8.23 8.23 8.23 8.23 8.23
7.93 7.93 7.93 7.93 7.93 7.93 7.93 7.93
6.40 6.40 6.40 6.40 6.40 6.40 6.90 6.90
5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 6.03
6.90 6.90 6.90 6.90 6.90 6.90 7.90 7.90
2.80 5.07 5.07 5.07 5.07 5.07 5.07 5.07
7.20 7.20 7.20 7.20 7.20 7.20 7.20 7.20
6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20
8.60 8.60 8.60 8.60 8.60 8.60 8.60 8.60
7.10 7.10 7.10 7.10 7.10 7.10 7.10 7.10
8.20 8.20 8.20 8.20 8.20 8.20 8.20 8.20
7.20 7.20 7.20 7.20 7.20 7.20 7.20 7.20
4.13 4.13 4.13 4.13 4.13 4.13 4.13 4.13
6.50 6.50 6.50 6.50 6.50 6.50 6.50 6.50
8.70 8.70 8.70 8.70 8.70 8.70 8.70 8.70
5.80 5.80 5.80 5.80 5.80 8.20 8.20 8.20
8.33 8.33 8.33 8.33 8.33 8.33 8.33 8.33
7.13 7.13 7.13 7.13 7.13 7.13 7.13 7.13
6.33 6.33 6.33 6.33 6.33 6.33 6.33 6.33
6.03 6.03 6.03 6.03 6.03 6.03 6.03 6.03
6.03 6.03 6.03
8.47 8.47 8.47 8.47 8.47 8.47 8.47
6.47 6.47 6.47 6.47 6.47 6.47 6.47
7.23 7.23 7.23 7.23 7.23 7.23 7.23 7.23
7.60 7.60 7.60 7.60 7.60 7.60 7.60
8.60 8.60 8.60 8.60 8.60 8.60 8.60 8.60
8.73 8.73 8.73 8.73 8.73 8.73 8.73 8.73
9.23 9.23 9.23 9.23 9.23 9.23 9.23 9.23
European Commission
Unit C4
Reconstruction of the current index figures, rule level and country level
Rule characteristics Rule Country aggregation
country rule no type sector since until FRSI coverage ranking weighted FRSI
AT 10110 BBR GG 2017 2021 0.85 0.99 1 8.38
AT 10210 ER GG 2015 2021 0.73 0.62 3 1.50
AT 10410 DR GG 2017 2021 0.75 0.66 2 2.46
AT 10530 BBR GG 2012 2021 0.68 0.66 4 1.13
BE 20330 BBR LG 2014 2021 0.52 0.13 1 0.68
BE 20410 BBR GG 2014 2021 0.85 1.00 1 8.47

BE 20520 BBR SS 2017 2021 0.55 0.35 1 1.93
BE 20640 ER SS 2016 2021 0.55 0.35 1 1.93
BG 30120 DR GG 2016 2021 0.68 1.00 3 2.27
BG 30230 ER GG 2017 2021 0.78 1.00 2 3.90

BG 30330 BBR GG 2014 2021 0.63 1.00 4 1.58
BG 30420 DR LG 2014 2021 0.48 0.26 1 1.22
BG 30610 BBR GG 2016 2021 0.82 1.00 1 8.20
BG 30710 BBR GG 2014 2021 0.63 1.00 4 1.58
BG 30820 ER GG 2017 2021 0.73 1.00 3 2.43
BG 30910 BBR LG 2014 2021 0.43 0.26 2 0.54
BG 301010 ER LG 2014 2021 0.43 0.26 2 0.54
CY 40120 BBR GG 2014 2021 0.85 1.00 1 8.47
CY 40210 BBR LG 1986 2021 0.45 0.04 1 0.18
CY 40310 DR GG 2015 2021 0.75 1.00 2 3.73
CZ 50410 BBR GG 2017 2021 0.76 1.00 1 7.57
CZ 50510 DR GG 2017 2021 0.65 1.00 2 3.27
CZ 50610 DR LG 2017 2021 0.56 0.27 1 1.51
DE 60160 BBR CG 2009 2021 0.86 0.17 1 1.48
DE 60310 BBR LG 1990 2021 0.64 0.17 1 1.08
DE 60410 BBR RG 2009 2021 0.67 0.23 1 1.52
DE 60510 BBR SS 2009 2021 0.41 0.43 1 1.78
DE 60610 BBR GG 2013 2021 0.85 1.00 1 8.47
DK 70410 BBR GG 2012 2021 0.83 1.00 1 8.33
DK 70510 ER GG 2014 2021 0.71 0.75 2 2.68
DK 70610 BBR GG 2017 2021 0.14 1.00 3 0.48
EE 80130 BBR GG 2017 2021 0.85 1.00 1 8.47
EE 80210 DR LG 2011 2021 0.40 0.23 1 0.93
EE 80310 DR CG 2014 2021 0.61 0.70 1 4.25
EL 90210 DR GG 2014 2021 0.45 1.00 2 2.27
EL 90410 BBR GG 2019 2021 0.90 1.00 1 8.97
ES 100130 BBR GG 2012 2021 0.91 1.00 1 9.10
ES 100520 ER LG 2012 2021 0.86 0.08 1 0.70
ES 100521 ER RG 2012 2021 0.86 0.27 1 2.33
ES 100522 ER CG 2012 2021 0.86 0.10 1 0.88
ES 100610 DR GG 2012 2021 0.81 1.00 2 4.05
FI 110350 ER CG 2015 2021 0.27 0.27 1 0.73
FI 110440 BBR LG 2015 2021 0.44 0.39 1 1.72
FI 110520 RR SS 1999 2021 0.19 0.34 1 0.63
FI 110740 DR GG 2015 2021 0.17 1.00 2 0.87
FI 110840 BBR CG 2015 2021 0.17 0.27 2 0.23
FI 110930 BBR GG 2013 2021 0.71 1.00 1 7.13
FI 1101040 BBR LG 2015 2021 0.17 0.39 2 0.34
FI 1101140 BBR SS 2015 2021 0.17 0.34 2 0.29
FI 1101520 BBR GG 2020 2021 0.24 1.00 2 1.20
FI 1101610 BBR LG 2021 2021 0.17 0.39 2 0.34
FR 120220 RR CG 2018 2021 0.41 0.34 1 1.42
FR 120310 BBR LG 1983 2021 0.58 0.20 1 1.14
FR 120820 BBR GG 2015 2021 0.85 1.00 1 8.47
HR 190310 BBR GG 2019 2021 0.75 1.00 2 3.77
HR 190410 ER GG 2019 2021 0.80 0.92 1 7.35
HR 190510 DR GG 2019 2021 0.70 1.00 3 2.34
HU 130530 DR GG 2015 2021 0.67 1.00 1 6.70
HU 130620 BBR GG 2013 2021 0.41 1.00 3 1.38
HU 130710 BBR GG 2014 2021 0.46 1.00 2 2.32
IE 140310 BBR LG 2004 2021 0.12 0.07 1 0.09
IE 140410 DR GG 2015 2021 0.71 1.00 2 3.53
IE 140520 BBR GG 2017 2021 0.85 1.00 1 8.47
IT 150150 ER RG 2017 2021 0.60 0.02 4 0.03
IT 150280 BBR LG 2016 2021 0.76 0.28 1 2.09
IT 150281 BBR RG 2016 2021 0.76 0.16 1 1.21
IT 150310 BBR LG 2001 2021 0.48 0.28 2 0.66
IT 150311 BBR RG 2001 2021 0.48 0.18 2 0.43
IT 150430 BBR RG 2010 2021 0.48 0.14 3 0.22
IT 150510 BBR GG 2014 2021 0.85 1.00 1 8.47
IT 150610 DR GG 2014 2021 0.80 1.00 2 3.98
IT 150710 ER GG 2014 2021 0.70 1.00 3 2.32
LT 160220 ER CG 2015 2021 0.90 0.50 1 4.44
LT 160221 ER SS 2015 2021 0.90 0.27 1 2.42
LT 160310 RR CG 2008 2021 0.41 0.50 3 0.70
LT 160420 BBR LG 2016 2021 0.65 0.22 1 1.45
LT 160510 BBR GG 2015 2021 0.86 1.00 1 8.60
LT 160710 BBR SS 2016 2021 0.57 0.27 2 0.77
LT 160810 BBR LG 2018 2021 0.57 0.22 2 0.64
LT 160811 BBR SS 2018 2021 0.57 0.27 2 0.77
LT 160910 ER CG 2015 2021 0.53 0.50 2 1.30
LT 160911 ER SS 2015 2021 0.53 0.27 3 0.47
LU 170310 BBR SS 2015 2021 0.49 0.42 1 2.04
LU 170410 BBR LG 1989 2021 0.40 0.10 1 0.41
LU 170520 BBR GG 2013 2021 0.85 1.00 1 8.47
LV 180310 ER GG 2014 2021 0.42 1.00 3 1.41
LV 180410 BBR GG 2013 2021 0.90 1.00 1 8.97
LV 180510 DR GG 2013 2021 0.49 1.00 2 2.45
MT 280110 DR GG 2014 2021 0.87 1.00 2 4.37
MT 280210 BBR GG 2014 2021 0.92 1.00 1 9.23
NL 200130 ER GG 2017 2021 0.54 0.89 4 1.19
NL 200220 RR GG 2016 2021 0.44 1.00 3 1.46
NL 200510 BBR GG 2014 2021 0.87 1.00 1 8.73
NL 200610 DR GG 2014 2021 0.82 1.00 2 4.12
NL 200710 BBR GG 2014 2021 0.82 1.00 2 4.12
PL 210240 DR GG 2014 2021 0.79 0.90 1 7.16
PL 210530 BBR LG 2011 2021 0.69 0.30 2 1.05
PL 210670 ER GG 2016 2021 0.60 1.00 2 3.02
PL 210730 DR LG 2014 2021 0.79 0.30 1 2.40
PT 220110 BBR CG 2015 2021 0.51 0.59 1 3.01
PT 220220 DR LG 2014 2021 0.72 0.12 1 0.84
PT 220320 BBR RG 2014 2021 0.62 0.03 2 0.09
PT 220420 BBR GG 2014 2021 0.86 1.00 1 8.60
PT 220510 DR GG 2013 2021 0.71 1.00 2 3.55
PT 220610 DR RG 2014 2021 0.82 0.03 1 0.26
PT 220710 BBR LG 2014 2021 0.72 0.12 1 0.87
RO 230110 BBR LG 2007 2021 0.41 0.27 1 1.12
RO 230210 DR LG 2010 2021 0.65 0.27 2 0.88
RO 230310 BBR GG 2014 2021 0.87 1.00 1 8.70
RO 230420 ER GG 2014 2021 0.82 0.88 2 3.61
RO 230510 DR GG 2014 2021 0.83 1.00 2 4.17
SE 240110 BBR LG 2000 2021 0.71 0.49 1 3.52
SE 240220 ER CG 2010 2021 0.63 0.38 1 2.39
SE 240221 ER SS 2010 2021 0.63 0.13 1 0.81
SE 240320 BBR GG 2007 2021 0.60 1.00 1 6.03
SE 240410 DR GG 2019 2021 0.60 1.00 2 3.02
SI 250520 BBR GG 2015 2021 0.85 1.00 1 8.47
SK 260240 DR LG 2015 2021 0.65 0.16 2 0.53
SK 260410 BBR LG 2005 2021 0.72 0.16 1 1.18
SK 260510 DR GG 2015 2021 0.76 1.00 2 3.80
SK 260610 BBR GG 2014 2021 0.86 1.00 1 8.60
ry level Background info
untry aggregation
Step # name column
C-FRI rule number B
type C
sector D
1 frsi G
13.48 2 coverage H
3 ranking I
4 weighted frsi J
5 C-FRI K
13.01
Time series
standardized C- FRI
Country Fiscal Rule Strength Index calculation (brief step-

1 For each dimension (see sheet 'FRI-dimensions and scores'), scores are standardis
This results in the index score (FRSI) in column G.
2 The FRSI is multiplied by the coverage of general government (GG) for that rule (s
22.26 coverage = % of GG expenditure covered by sub-sector *
3 If more rules apply to the same GG sub-sector, then the rules with the lower FRSI
12.38 ranking 2 means FRSI /2, ranking 3 means FRSI /3, etc.
4 Weighted FRSI = (column G * 10) *column H / column I

12.35
5 C-FRI = sum of all scores for that country in column J
14.33
11.49
13.65
11.23
17.07
13.49
11.03
13.46
10.39
12.09
19.41
21.57
10.91
12.83
13.60
19.62
13.63
17.23
18.48
15.78
8.47
14.11
Background information regarding the different elements of the final FRSI score
explanation
Construction of the code: country number, 0, rule number, version of the rule, government sector
(0 if only one sector is covered by the rule).
BBR = budget balance rule, DR = debt rule, ER = expenditure, RR = revenue rule.
GG = general government, CG = central government, RG = regional government, LG = local
government, SS = social security.
Average of scores for each criterium divided by maximum score for that criterium. Scores per rule
can be found in the sheet 'Fiscal Rules Database'). Sub-criteria (e.g. cr5B) are aggregated where
relevant (Cr3 and Cr5).
Size of the government sector (Eurostat data) * share of sector covered by the rule.
To account for the fact that multiple fiscal rules could overlap and cover the same government sub-
sector, the fiscal rules are ranked for each country and each sector. The rule with the highest FRSI
is given the highest ranking of 1, since the rule with a higher ranking would plausibly be the one
driving the fiscal performance of the sub-sector.
The rules are weighted to adjust for coverage and ranking and then multiplied by 10.
The Country FRI is the sum of the weighted FRSI in place in the country (Column J).
Note: C-FRI is standardized by dividing by the standard deviation to create the full time series of
final country scores on sheet 'Fiscal rules Index 1990-2021'.
untry Fiscal Rule Strength Index calculation (brief step-by-step process)

heet 'FRI-dimensions and scores'), scores are standardised to run between 0 and 1.
his results in the index score (FRSI) in column G.
he coverage of general government (GG) for that rule (see column H).
overage = % of GG expenditure covered by sub-sector * % of this sub-sector covered by the rule.
same GG sub-sector, then the rules with the lower FRSI will get a lower ranking.
nking 2 means FRSI /2, ranking 3 means FRSI /3, etc.
G * 10) *column H / column I
or that country in column J

ements of the final FRSI scores
notes / examples
Example: first version of the foourth rule in Austria = 10410
Note: if a rule covers more than 1 sector, they are given multiple rows. They can be easily recognized
by a grey hue in the table (e.g. ES rule 5).
Formula: FRSI = (Cr1/3) * 0.2 + (Cr2/3) 0.2 + (Cr3a + Cr3b + Cr3c + Cr3d / 7.5) * 0.2 + (Cr4/4) * 0.2 +
(Cr5a + Cr5b + Cr5c + Cr5d / 4) * 0.2
Example: If a rule covers 50% of local government, and local government makes up roughly 10% of a
country's public spending, then that rule covers 5% of total GG expenditure.
Example: If a country has three rules covering the same sector (two rules with the same FRSI and
another one with a lower FRSI), ranking would be as follows: Rule 1: ranking 1, Rule 2: ranking 1, Rule 3:
ranking 2.
Formula: weighted = (FRSI * 10) * coverage*1/ranking;

European Commission
Unit C4
Weighted FRI scores - country level (C-FRSI)

Country 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
AT . . . . . . .
BE 2.10 2.10 5.18 6.23 6.23 6.77 6.77 6.77
BG . . . . . . . .
CY 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43
CZ . . . . . . . .
DE . 4.61 4.61 4.61 4.61 4.61 4.61 4.61
DK . . 5.15 5.15 6.14 6.14 6.14 6.14
EE . . . 8.55 8.55 8.55 8.55 10.47
EL . . . . . . . .
ES 2.46 2.46 2.46 2.46 2.46 2.46 2.46 2.46
FI . . . . . 5.17 5.17 5.17
FR 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85
HR . . . . . . . .
HU . . . . . . . .
IE . . . . . . . .
IT . . . . . . . .
LT 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.07 3.80
LU 0.43 0.43 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.33 1.33 1.33
LV . . . . 1.92 1.92 1.92 1.92
MT . . . . . . . .
NL . . . . 9.89 9.89 9.89 9.89
PL . . . . . . . 7.07
PT . . . . . . . .
RO 1.26 1.26 1.26 1.26 1.26 1.26 1.26 1.26
SE . . . . . . . 3.44
SI . . . . . . . .
SK . . . . . . . .
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
. 5.86 5.86 6.59 6.59 6.59 6.59 5.98 5.98
6.77 5.71 4.67 4.67 4.67 4.67 4.67 4.67 4.67
. . . . . 6.96 6.96 7.11 9.23
0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43
. . . . . . . . .
4.61 4.61 4.61 4.61 4.61 4.61 4.61 4.61 4.61
6.14 6.14 6.14 9.49 9.49 9.49 9.49 9.49 9.49
10.47 10.47 10.47 10.47 10.47 10.47 10.47 10.47 10.47
. . . . . . . . .
2.46 2.46 2.46 2.46 8.73 9.51 9.51 9.51 8.90
5.17 8.09 8.09 8.36 8.36 8.19 8.19 8.19 8.19
1.92 1.92 1.92 1.92 1.92 1.92 1.92 1.92 2.81
. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
. . 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.66 0.66 0.66
. 2.09 2.09 5.51 5.51 5.51 5.51 5.51 5.51
3.80 3.80 3.80 3.80 3.80 3.80 3.80 3.80 4.05
2.42 5.05 5.05 5.05 5.05 5.05 7.48 7.48 7.48
1.92 1.92 1.92 1.92 1.92 1.92 1.92 1.92 1.92
. . . . . . . . .
7.96 7.96 7.96 7.96 7.96 7.96 7.96 7.96 7.96
7.07 7.07 7.07 7.07 7.07 7.07 7.07 7.07 9.94
. . . . 2.91 3.62 3.62 3.62 3.62
1.26 2.05 2.05 2.05 2.05 2.05 2.05 2.05 2.05
3.44 3.44 11.44 11.44 11.44 11.44 11.44 11.44 11.44
. . . . . . . . .
. . . . 3.89 3.89 3.89 3.89 3.89
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
5.98 5.73 7.61 7.61 8.08 9.19 9.19 9.19 9.02
4.67 4.67 4.67 4.67 4.67 4.82 4.82 11.70 11.70
9.23 9.23 9.23 9.23 10.87 11.99 11.99 19.35 20.28
0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 10.45 12.38 12.38
. . . . . . . . .
4.61 4.61 6.95 5.63 7.19 7.19 13.73 13.73 13.73
8.99 8.99 8.99 8.99 4.99 1.77 9.46 11.93 11.93
10.47 10.47 10.47 11.20 11.20 8.42 10.34 13.65 13.65
. . . . . 6.52 6.52 6.93 6.93
8.90 8.90 8.90 8.90 12.39 14.91 14.91 16.35 16.54
8.17 6.45 4.74 4.74 5.42 5.23 12.23 12.07 12.07
2.81 3.56 4.47 3.96 5.78 5.78 10.83 10.46 10.83
. . 3.53 3.53 8.23 8.23 8.23 8.23 4.70
. . . . . . 2.47 9.44 9.73
0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.63 9.86 9.86 9.44
4.59 4.50 4.84 5.02 5.13 5.13 5.31 19.41 19.54
4.05 6.51 6.51 6.51 6.51 6.60 6.60 6.60 17.90
7.48 7.48 7.48 5.80 5.80 5.82 7.09 9.77 10.41
1.92 1.92 1.92 1.92 1.92 1.92 9.86 12.83 12.83
. . . . . . . 13.60 13.60
7.96 7.96 7.96 7.96 7.96 8.32 8.32 21.44 21.08
9.94 7.07 8.57 8.57 9.93 9.78 9.18 10.39 12.94
3.83 3.83 3.83 3.83 3.83 4.50 11.85 12.47 17.23
2.05 2.05 2.05 2.05 2.05 2.05 2.05 16.18 16.18
12.14 12.14 12.14 12.73 12.73 12.73 12.73 12.73 12.73
. . . . . . . . 8.47
3.89 3.89 3.79 3.79 3.79 11.23 11.23 14.11 14.11
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
9.02 13.48 13.48 13.48 13.48 13.48
12.15 13.01 13.01 13.01 13.01 13.01
20.66 21.59 21.59 21.59 22.26 22.26
12.38 12.38 12.38 12.38 12.38 12.38
. 12.35 12.35 12.35 12.35 12.35
13.73 13.73 14.26 14.26 14.33 14.33
11.93 11.49 11.49 11.49 11.49 11.49
13.65 13.65 13.65 13.65 13.65 13.65
7.43 9.70 9.70 11.23 11.23 11.23
16.54 16.54 17.07 17.07 17.07 17.27
12.47 12.47 12.47 12.81 13.15 13.49
10.83 10.83 11.03 11.03 11.03 11.03
4.70 4.70 4.70 13.46 13.46 13.46
9.73 9.73 10.39 10.39 10.39 10.39
9.44 12.09 12.09 12.09 12.09 12.09
19.41 19.41 19.41 19.41 19.41 19.41
18.67 18.67 21.57 21.57 21.57 21.57
10.41 10.41 10.41 10.41 10.91 10.91
12.83 12.83 12.83 12.83 12.83 12.83
13.60 13.60 13.60 13.60 13.60 13.60
21.88 19.62 19.62 19.62 19.62 19.76
12.94 12.94 12.94 12.94 13.12 13.42
17.23 17.23 17.23 17.23 17.23 17.40
16.18 16.18 16.18 18.98 18.98 18.98
12.73 12.73 12.73 15.74 15.74 15.74
8.47 8.47 8.47 8.47 8.47 8.47
14.11 14.11 14.11 14.11 14.11 14.11
European Commission
Unit C4
Standardised fiscal rules index

Country 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
AT -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02
BE -0.66 -0.66 -0.12 0.06 0.06 0.15 0.15 0.15
BG -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02
CY -0.94 -0.94 -0.94 -0.94 -0.94 -0.94 -0.94 -0.94
CZ -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02
DE -1.02 -0.22 -0.22 -0.22 -0.22 -0.22 -0.22 -0.22
DK -1.02 -1.02 -0.14 -0.14 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
EE -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.79
EL -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02
ES -0.61 -0.61 -0.61 -0.61 -0.61 -0.61 -0.61 -0.61
FI -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -0.13 -0.13 -0.13
FR -0.87 -0.87 -0.87 -0.87 -0.87 -0.87 -0.87 -0.87
HR -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02
HU -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02
IE -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02
IT -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02
LT -0.83 -0.83 -0.83 -0.83 -0.83 -0.83 -0.83 -0.36
LU -0.94 -0.94 -0.68 -0.68 -0.68 -0.78 -0.78 -0.78
LV -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -0.69 -0.69 -0.69 -0.69
MT -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02
NL -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69
PL -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 0.20
PT -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02
RO -0.80 -0.80 -0.80 -0.80 -0.80 -0.80 -0.80 -0.80
SE -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -0.42
SI -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02
SK -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
-1.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.01 0.01 0.01
0.15 -0.03 -0.21 -0.21 -0.21 -0.21 -0.21 -0.21 -0.21 -0.21
-1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 0.18 0.18 0.21 0.58 0.58
-0.94 -0.94 -0.94 -0.94 -0.94 -0.94 -0.94 -0.94 -0.94 -0.94
-1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02
-0.22 -0.22 -0.22 -0.22 -0.22 -0.22 -0.22 -0.22 -0.22 -0.22
0.02 0.02 0.02 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.51
0.79 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.79
-1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02
-0.61 -0.61 -0.61 -0.61 0.44 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.47 0.47
-0.13 0.38 0.38 0.42 0.42 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.39
-0.69 -0.69 -0.69 -0.69 -0.69 -0.69 -0.69 -0.69 -0.53 -0.53
-1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02
-1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02
-1.02 -1.02 -1.01 -1.01 -1.01 -1.01 -0.90 -0.90 -0.90 -0.90
-1.02 -0.66 -0.66 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.23
-0.36 -0.36 -0.36 -0.36 -0.36 -0.36 -0.36 -0.36 -0.32 -0.32
-0.58 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34
-0.69 -0.69 -0.69 -0.69 -0.69 -0.69 -0.69 -0.69 -0.69 -0.69
-1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02
0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36
0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.70 0.70
-1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -0.52 -0.39 -0.39 -0.39 -0.39 -0.36
-0.80 -0.66 -0.66 -0.66 -0.66 -0.66 -0.66 -0.66 -0.66 -0.66
-0.42 -0.42 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 1.08
-1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02
-1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -0.35 -0.35 -0.35 -0.35 -0.35 -0.35
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
-0.03 0.30 0.30 0.38 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.54 0.54 1.31
-0.21 -0.21 -0.21 -0.21 -0.19 -0.19 1.00 1.00 1.08 1.23
0.58 0.58 0.58 0.86 1.05 1.05 2.32 2.48 2.55 2.71
-0.94 -0.94 -0.94 -0.94 -0.94 0.79 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12
-1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 1.11
-0.22 0.18 -0.05 0.22 0.22 1.35 1.35 1.35 1.35 1.35
0.51 0.51 0.51 -0.17 -0.72 0.59 1.01 1.04 1.04 0.97
0.79 0.79 0.92 0.92 0.44 0.77 1.34 1.34 1.34 1.34
-1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 0.11 0.11 0.18 0.18 0.26 0.66
0.47 0.47 0.47 1.05 1.48 1.48 1.72 1.84 1.84 1.84
0.10 -0.20 -0.20 -0.08 -0.12 1.09 1.07 1.07 1.13 1.13
-0.40 -0.25 -0.33 -0.02 -0.02 0.85 0.79 0.85 0.85 0.85
-1.02 -0.41 -0.41 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 -0.21 -0.21 -0.21
-1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -0.59 0.61 0.66 0.66 0.66
-0.90 -0.90 -0.90 -0.90 -0.91 0.68 0.68 0.61 0.61 1.07
-0.24 -0.18 -0.15 -0.13 -0.13 -0.10 2.33 2.35 2.33 2.33
0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12 2.07 2.20 2.20
0.34 0.34 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.26 0.75 0.78 0.78 0.78
-0.69 -0.69 -0.69 -0.69 -0.69 0.65 1.16 1.20 1.20 1.20
-1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 1.33 1.33 1.33 1.33
0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.42 0.42 2.68 2.62 2.76 2.37
0.20 0.46 0.46 0.70 0.67 0.57 0.78 1.22 1.22 1.22
-0.36 -0.36 -0.36 -0.36 -0.24 1.03 1.13 1.96 1.96 1.96
-0.66 -0.66 -0.66 -0.66 -0.66 -0.66 1.77 1.77 1.77 1.77
1.08 1.08 1.18 1.18 1.18 1.18 1.18 1.18 1.18 1.18
-1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 0.44 0.44 0.44
-0.35 -0.36 -0.36 -0.36 0.92 0.92 1.42 1.42 1.42 1.42
2018 2019 2020 2021
1.31 1.31 1.31 1.31
1.23 1.23 1.23 1.23
2.71 2.71 2.82 2.82
1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12
1.11 1.11 1.11 1.11
1.44 1.44 1.45 1.46
0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97
1.34 1.34 1.34 1.34
0.66 0.92 0.92 0.92
1.93 1.93 1.93 1.96
1.13 1.19 1.25 1.31
0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89
-0.21 1.31 1.31 1.31
0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78
1.07 1.07 1.07 1.07
2.33 2.33 2.33 2.33
2.70 2.70 2.70 2.70
0.78 0.78 0.86 0.86
1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20
1.33 1.33 1.33 1.33
2.37 2.37 2.37 2.39
1.22 1.22 1.25 1.30
1.96 1.96 1.96 1.99
1.77 2.26 2.26 2.26
1.18 1.71 1.71 1.70
0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44
1.42 1.42 1.42 1.42

Design of Numerical Fiscal Rules 2021

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Design of Numerical Fiscal Rules 2021

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European Commission

Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs

Numerical fiscal rules database

The index takes the following elements into account:

each Member State.

EU Member States A Annual

Criterion 1: Statutory/legal base of the rule

Criterion 2: Room for setting or revising objectives

Criterion 3b: Real-time monitoring

Criterion 3d: Independent body providing/endorsing macro/budgetary forecasts

Criterion 4: Correction mechanisms in case of deviation from the rule

ndex is obtained as follows.

correction mechanism, 4) correction mechanisms, and 5) resilience to shocks

arliament or agreement between government sub-sectors which is not a law)

nt fiscal council) and/or parliament

mechanism in case of deviation from the rule

al macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts on which the annual budget is prepared.

se see sheet 'C-FRSI reconstruction'

etween government sub-sectors which is not a law)

eviation from the rule

dgetary forecasts on which the annual budget is prepared.

raming the nature/size and/or timeline of the correction

C3c - Body in charge

Fiscal Rule Strength

deviation from the

Ministry of finance, Court

The respective increase in expenditure by the federal government, the

The federal level, the provinces and municipalities coordinate their

Besides, new rule for local governments in the Flemish Region

New accounting framework for LGs in the Flemish Region and

Numerical targets set on the budget balance.

The annual structural balance of the general government must be at

Budget balance Budget balance in nominal 0 3 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3.07

The outstanding portion of the consolidated government debt at the end

The annual amount of municipal debt payments for each municipality

The medium-term budgetary objective for the structural deficit of the

The medium-term budgetary objective for the structural deficit of the

The medium-term balance objective concerning municipal budgets

The medium-term balance objective concerning municipal budgets

The average growth rate of expenditure for local activities under

According to article 43 of Fiscal Responsibility and Budgetary

The maximal volume of general government expenditure is derived in

The maximal volume of general government expenditure is derived in

The budgets of the Federation shall in principle be balanced without

The budgets of the Federation shall in principle be balanced without

(2.8) Cash-based accounting. (4.1), (5.1) GS body: Financial

Central Government, Nominal Expenditure growth

The budgets of the Länder shall in principle be balanced without revenue

Nominal expenditure ceilings for three main areas (central government,

Nominal expenditure ceilings for three main areas (central government,

Budget balance Structural balance as % of

When the general government debt as a percentage of GDP in market

The budgetary objectives take into account the economy's cyclical

The annual growth of the elegible expenditure cannot exceed the

The overall debt of public administrations cannot surpass the limit

Balanced CG finances to be secured under normal conditions of

Target of structural surplus of 1% by the end of the parliamentary term.

(4.1) IND body: auditing committees. GS: MIN of Interior. (5.1)

Local Government Act. Regulates municipalities in bringing their budgets

Local Government Act. Regulates municipalities in bringing their budgets

Counter-cyclical regulation of unemployment security contributions and

Budget balance Automatic correction measures and possibility of

Budget balance Nominal balance as % of