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Gestural Imaginaries Dance and Cultural Theory in The Early Twentieth Century Lucia Ruprecht Full Chapter
Gestural Imaginaries Dance and Cultural Theory in The Early Twentieth Century Lucia Ruprecht Full Chapter
Gestural Imaginaries Dance and Cultural Theory in The Early Twentieth Century Lucia Ruprecht Full Chapter
Gestural Imaginaries
ii
Gestural Imaginaries
Dance and Cultural Theory in the
Early Twentieth Century
Lucia Ruprecht
1
iv
1
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Press in the UK and certain other countries.
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
CONTENTS
List of Figures ix
Series Editor’s Foreword xi
Acknowledgments xiii
List of Abbreviations xv
6. Gestures between the Auratic and the Profane: Niddy Impekoven’s and
Franz Kafka’s Reenactments of Liturgy 151
Notes 229
Bibliography 287
Index 313
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ix
FIGURES
x F igures
With Gestural Imaginaries: Dance and Cultural Theory in the Early Twentieth
Century, Lucia Ruprecht presents us with a new history of modern dance for
the most part in the German ambit of the early twentieth century. By iso-
lating the concept of gesture as crucial to the performance and interpretation
of modern dance and related theatrical, philosophical, and literary as well as
critical enterprises, Ruprecht opens up a new conceptual and performative
domain of European dance modernism. She conceptualizes the field of ges-
ture at this time as a broader one than dance alone can claim as its own, yet
one which signifies its cultural necessity and effectiveness most convincingly
through danced performance. Gesture, for Ruprecht, exists in a proliferating
field that moves across the borders of literature, criticism, film, theater, and
choreography. For this reason, her work differs from earlier reflections on ges-
ture in that she avoids giving an ontological definition of gesture, and this is
also a reason for her to align gesture with the imaginary.1
Ruprecht grounds her understanding of gesture primarily in Walter
Benjamin’s understanding of it as a critical and ethical rhythm governed by
vibrancy and intermittency. Gesture is thus a formal feature of much early
twentieth-century choreography while also being a hermeneutic category of
inquiry into its own meaning and interpretation or, rather, into its particular
method of constructing meaning choreographically and corporeally. What
Ruprecht calls the modernist field of gestural proliferation exceeds the bounds
of dance and writing, performance and literature, as each proves to be of
theoretical import for the other. In other terms, gesture itself is an operative
concept increasingly seen to blur the boundaries between danced movement
and critical theory.
In addition, this book inaugurates an important new stage in the relation-
ship of dance studies to philosophy. Dance studies has relied since its incep-
tion on philosophical insights into a host of issues touching upon the body
and gesture in order to carve out its own sphere of scholarly inquiry. In the
xi
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This book is a conversation with many people, but without two of them, it would
not exist in its current shape: Gabriele Brandstetter, who hosted my Humboldt
Fellowship at the Institute of Theater and Dance Studies at Free University Berlin
from 2013 to 2015, provided a wonderfully stimulating research environment,
and offered feedback and presentation space, mentorship, friendship, and sup-
port; and Mark Franko, who published an early version of one of the chapters,
agreed to include the book in the Oxford Studies in Dance Theory series, invited
me to teach and present at his department in Philadelphia, and instigated in-
tellectual exchange that sparked my thinking over the past few years. I am im-
mensely grateful to both of them. There are more friends and colleagues whose
comments and advice were instrumental. Susan Manning was an enthusiastic
interlocutor from the start, continuing our conversation that began many years
ago. Susan Leigh Foster’s suggestions steered me into productive directions. My
engagement with Weimar dance was triggered in discussions with Kate Elswit,
first as her supervisor, then as colleague and friend; her energetic presence is
visible on the pages of this book. Carrie Noland, Rebecca Schneider, Astrid
Deuber-Mankowsky, Michael Minden, Alexander Schwan, and Jonas Tinius
contributed fabulous papers to the symposium on the ethics of gesture that
I organized at Emmanuel College, Cambridge, in 2016; the thinking that went
on during this day has marked my work on Gestural Imaginaries. My profound
thanks are due to Andrew Webber, as always, for his comments on selected
book chapters, his mentorship, and his friendship. Katja Haustein and Marie
Kolkenbrock sent perceptive remarks on a chapter-in-progress. Barry Windeatt
shared literature on gesture. Christopher Johnson provided a warm welcome to
his gesture workshop at the Warburg Institute in December 2016. I am grateful
to colleagues and friends who invited me to present aspects of my research on
this book at conferences and lecture series in Germany, the United Kingdom,
Ireland, and Poland: Carolin Duttlinger, Sabine Huschka, Benjamin Schofield,
xvi
xiv A cknowledgments
Clare Foster, Yvonne Hardt, Nikolaus Müller- Schöll, Sabine Egger, Nina
Tolksdorf, Mona de Weerdt and Andreas Schwab, Georgina Born, Christopher
Haworth, and Jonas Tinius, Deborah Holmes and Heide Kunzelmann, and
Joanna Szymajda and Wojciech Klimczyk.
I would like to extend my thanks to the director and staff at Deutsches
Tanzarchiv Köln, Frank- Manuel Peter, Donatella Cacciola, Bettina Hesse,
Christel Dreiling, and Garnet Schuldt-Hiddemann; to Hedwig Müller at the
Theaterwissenschaftliche Sammlung Schloss Wahn; and to the staff at the archives
of the Akademie der Künste and the Lipperheidesche Kostümbibliothek, Berlin.
Earlier versions of two chapters have been published elsewhere: chapter 2
appeared in Dance Research Journal 47, no. 2 (2015), and parts of chapter 3 in
Franz Kafka in Context, edited by Carolin Duttlinger (Cambridge University
Press, 2017). I wish to thank the editors of these publications for permission
to reprint here. I am grateful to the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation for
offering me a Fellowship during which I began my research toward this book.
At Cambridge I owe thanks to the directors of the German Endowment Fund
and the Schröder Fund, and to Emmanuel College. At Oxford University Press,
heartfelt thanks go to my anonymous readers, to Norman Hirschy and Lauralee
Yeary, and to Christina Nisha Paul.
Finally, I wish to thank my parents and mother-in-law, for their unstinting
help with the running of life between work and family. Above all, I wish to
thank Jens and Lisa Antonia.
xv
ABBREVIATIONS
Prologue
Inaugurating Gestures—Le Sacre du printemps
the perspective of the “damaged subject on which his œuvre is patterned” (PM,
4). Damage is represented musically by replacing the agency of the autonomous
individual with forms of merely instinctual defense. Gesture, here, is prone to
the de-individualizing drive of the score’s irregular rhythmical structure, which
asks for immediate physical responses; it is associated with a form of “shock”
that makes “the individual directly aware of his nullity in the face of the titanic
machinery of the entire system” (PM, 117). Gesture is reactive rather than ac-
tive; more than anything else, it is a physical reflex of (failed) protection against
harm.15
Adorno’s aesthetic of gesture thus rehearses the theory of psychic trauma that
Freud developed in Beyond the Pleasure Principle. In Freud, trauma is induced
by an element of surprise in the fright experienced by the victim, “the state that
possesses us when we find ourselves plunged into danger without being pre-
pared for it.”16 In Adorno, this happens to Sacre’s girl victim, the Chosen One.
She is at the mercy of Stravinsky’s polyrhythm, unable to foresee or assimilate
the music’s arbitrary blows:
This is manifest in the “Danse finale de l’élue,” in the human sacrifice, where
the most complicated measures alternate with each other in the smallest tem-
poral segments. This compels the conductor to walk a tightrope for the sole
purpose of using convulsive blows and shocks that cannot be anticipated by
any preparatory anxiety to hammer into the dancer and the audience an im-
mutable rigidity. [. . .] it is accepted that the shock cannot be integrated into
the self. The musical subject abdicates the struggle to bear up and instead
makes do by acceding to the blows in its own reflexes. He [sic!] acts literally
like someone gravely wounded, the victim of an accident that he cannot ab-
sorb and that he therefore repeats in the hopeless exertions of dreams. What
appears to be the complete absorption of the shock, the compliance of the
music with the rhythmical blows inflicted on it externally, is in truth pre-
cisely the sign that the absorption has miscarried. (PM, 117–18)
The gestural body that emerges as a result of such music is defined by repet-
itive reactions. In this, as Adorno has it, Stravinsky’s score is representative
of all traditional ballet music, which “prescribe[s]gestures, and, beyond that,
comportments” (PM, 126); what is more, Stravinsky even “reestablished” the
“disciplinary nature of dance [. . .]. His accents amount to so many acoustic
signals to the stage” (PM, 143). Adorno’s musically defined gesture does not
partake in the “expressive-dynamic” (PM, 145) paradigm of the psychological
tradition, nor in any other lost model of individuation. But neither does it be-
long to the progressive forms of Schoenbergian constructivist modernism.17
Gesture is at the service of ritual violence, becoming “a name for everything
6
[. . .] there is no aesthetic antithesis between the one sacrificed and the tribe;
rather, her dance accomplishes the uncontested, immediate identification
with it. [. . .] The girl chosen dances herself to death [. . .]. Nothing of her
as an individual is reflected except the unconscious and accidental reflex of
pain: In terms of its inner organization, her solo, like all the other dances, is
a collective circle dance bereft of any dialectic of universal and particular.
(PM, 118–19)
the victim but with the annihilating authority. Through the liquidation of
the victim, it rids itself of intentions, those of its own proper subjectivity.
(PM, 109–10)
Adorno observes this loss not only in the prominence of rhythm as blow, but
also in the absence of melody.22 Melodious musical subjectivity is replaced with
the detached attitude of pastiche, of “musical quotation, self-reproduction,
willful fragmentation, imitation of ancient forms,” which together produce “the
prehistorical” as artistic “effect” rather than authentic reconstruction.23 This
strand of Adorno’s argument jars with the otherwise unrelentingly accusatory
tone of the Stravinsky chapter. It detects a salutary “dialectical ambiguity” (PM,
112) in the works of the composer through which he is in fact partly redeemed.
In anticipation perhaps to objections against his diatribe, Adorno here
acknowledges a type of thoroughly self-aware musical bravura in Stravinsky.
This bravura may take pleasure in the archaism that it produces, but does not
actually believe in it: “all regression in Stravinsky’s work is manipulated pre-
cisely as a copy that never for a moment forgets aesthetic self-control.” In other
words, if regression in this context equals violence, “The Rite of Spring wants
not simply to surrender itself ” to the violent impact “but to gain mastery over
it through copying it” (PM, 113). In “Misunderstandings,” Adorno argues that
those among Stravinsky’s works that dedicate themselves “most shrewdly to
such mimesis are the most productive ones” (PM, 167). Accordingly, in the
Stravinsky chapter we encounter passages where Adorno presents the “detach-
ment” (PM, 111) of Sacre’s staged disclosure of barbarism as “mimetic defense”
(PM, 126) against the actual madness of war, rather than as war’s unthinking
propagation. The more positive passages even associate Sacre with the lib-
eral spirit of bourgeois revolution. Fascism, Adorno claims, “which literally
liquidates liberal culture along with its critics,” is “just for this reason unable to
tolerate” in its theaters such disclosure of barbarism as spectacle:
In the Third Reich of countless human sacrifice, The Rite of Spring would
not have been performable, and whoever dared directly to acknowledge the
barbarism of the ideology’s modus operandi was dropped and disgraced.
Without its lies, German barbarism—as may indeed have occurred to
Nietzsche—might well have exterminated barbarism itself along with the
lies. (PM, 112)
of violent death, Adorno also shows how this strategy does not hold in the
first place. Carried away by its perfect construction of archaic essentialism,
the music buys into its own simulacrum. Fending off the drastic brutality of
regression by exposing it does not mean that this brutality is redeemed. The
music’s production of archaic effect, that is, works, in the end, only too well.
Even if brutal “nature” is only a phantasm in Rite of Spring, this phantasm ulti-
mately proves to be the “herald of absolute oppression” (PM, 113). Stravinsky’s
“already-lapsed modernism” thus implies “an opening” toward the tyranny of
“the primordial past” (PM, 111). Self-reflective play as a form of distanced sub-
jectivity becomes complicit with the sacrifice of the subject; antipsychological
strategy dissolves into diffuse communality. Adorno uncovers a troubling ten-
dency toward positivistic essentialism both in Sacre and in other works by the
composer.24 Superseding anydetachment, “aesthetic nerves” ultimately “quiver
to return to the Stone Age” (PM, 113):
At each whirl of Nijinsky, when he knelt, crossed his hands, and closed the
figure he had begun when he leaped into space, my whole pleasure was
to see again in thought the entire sweep of his movement—alive, pure,
severe, rising up as if one blow had torn it away from the vague mass of
the possible in a single piece. No doubt, no smudges, nothing appealing to
my hesitation; I was strong and content like a man who, in a glance, sees
a system of propositions scrupulously isolated from error in all its points.
(SP, 134)
each time the body feels possible starting points in itself, the dancer again
springs into movement. He is constantly taking possession of himself again,
like a bubbling spring whose energy surge must be successively drained
off; he goes back into himself, and the dance becomes the analysis, the
enumeration of all those urges to move that he discovers within himself.
[. . .] Whatever interval there might be among the inclinations of the body,
Nijinsky wants to follow straight along them and to break into movement
only if it is theirs. But as he cannot accompany them all at the same time,
as soon as he has followed one of them for a moment, he suddenly leaves
it, breaks with it, goes back, and picks up another. His dance is both faithful
and truncated! (SP, 136–37)32
11
The dance of Fokine was so inexpressive that in order to make the spectators
understand the changes taking place in the actors’ souls, the latter had to
have recourse to visual mimicry: frowning eyebrows or a smile. This, added
to their gestures, superimposed, showed how powerless their gestures were.
[. . .] But in Nijinsky’s dance, the visage no longer plays an independent role.
It is a prolongation of the body [. . .]. The body itself speaks first. It moves only
as a whole; it is united, and its speech consists in leaping suddenly, spreading
the arms and legs, or in moving sideways, with knees bent, the head leaning
toward the shoulder. At first sight it seems less adroit, less diverse, less intel-
ligent. However, with its compact movements, its sudden volte-face, its way
of coming to a pause, then shaking itself frantically without changing place,
it says a thousand things more than the eloquent, rapid, elegant speaker an-
imated by Fokine. (SP, 140)
Where Adorno locates gestural shocks in a musical score that deprives the body
of expressive potential, this potential is restored by a more differentiated analyt-
ical brutality with which Nijinsky handles his dancers:
He takes his dancers, arranges their arms, turns them about, would break
them in two if he dared; with pitiless cruelty, he works with these bodies as
if they were things; he imposes impossible movements upon them, attitudes
which seem deformed. But he does so in order to get out of them all the ex-
pression they can give. And at last, in fact, they do speak. (SP, 141)
Fig. 51
The bottom end should be slightly slotted, in order to receive the
end of a crowbar (see fig. 52).
It is now placed in position, and gently tightened up by the
leverage of a crowbar acting in the slot, and using the sole piece as
a fulcrum.
The advantage of the sole piece not being at right angles to the
shore can now be seen, as if it were so laid no tightening could be
gained by the leverage. This system is an improvement upon the
tightening up by wedges, as the structure is not jarred in any
manner. If the frame is to have more than one shore, they are
erected in the same manner, the bottom shore being the first put up,
the others succeeding in their turn. When in position the shores are
dogged to the sole piece and a cleat is nailed down on the outer side
of the system. The bottom ends are then bound together by hoop
iron just above the ground level. To prevent the shores sagging,
struts are fixed as shown on fig. 49.
Fig. 52
Besides preventing the sagging these struts serve the purpose of
keeping the shores in position. They may be fixed as nearly at right
angles to the shores as possible, or at right angles to the wall; in any
case they should reach to the wall plate at a point just below the
needle. The struts should be nailed to the shores and wall plate. If
the latter is wider than the shores, it should be cut to receive the
struts.
It sometimes occurs that the timbers are of insufficient length to
reach from the sole piece to wall plate. To overcome this difficulty, a
short timber is laid on the sole piece against and parallel to the next
middle raker, and on this short timber a rider shore stands reaching
to its position on the wall plate (see fig. 49).
When this is done the top middle raker should be stiffer to resist
the increased cross strain. Stiffness is gained by increasing the
depth. A rider shore is tightened by oak folding wedges driven
between the foot of the shore and the short timber which supports it.
Note must be taken that the outer raker is not carried too near the
top of the building, or else the upward thrust of the shores, which
always exists with raking shores, might force the bond or joints.
Fir is the best wood for shoring owing to the ease with which it can
be obtained in good length. Another advantage is its straightness of
fibre; although, as it is more easily crushed by pressure across the
grain, it does not answer so well as oak for wedges, sole pieces, &c.
In erecting flying or raking shores, notice should be taken of the
following points.
The systems should be placed from 12 to 15 feet apart if on a wall
without openings, otherwise on the piers between the openings.
In very defective walls it is an advantage to use lighter scantlings,
the systems being placed closer together. Heavy timbers handled
carelessly may precipitate the collapse which it is the intention to
avoid.
Wedge driving and tightening should be done as gently as
possible. It should be remembered that support only is to be given,
and not new thrusts set up, which may result in more harm than
good.
Fig. 54
In carrying out these operations note should be taken of the
following points:—
1. That the dead shores should not stand over cellars or such
places. It is better to continue the needle to such a length that solid
ground is reached, and the needle can then be strutted from the
dead shore.