Audia Et Al 2022 Public Opinion and Impression Management in The Communication of Performance During The Second Iraq War

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Public Opinion and Impression Management in the

Communication of Performance During the Second Iraq
War
Pino G. Audia, Horacio E. Rousseau, Mary Kate Stimmler
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Pino G. Audia, Horacio E. Rousseau, Mary Kate Stimmler (2023) Public Opinion and Impression Management in the
Communication of Performance During the Second Iraq War. Organization Science 34(2):777-800. https://doi.org/10.1287/
orsc.2022.1598
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ORGANIZATION SCIENCE
Vol. 34, No. 2, March–April 2023, pp. 777–800
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Public Opinion and Impression Management in the

Communication of Performance During the Second Iraq War
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Pino G. Audia,a,* Horacio E. Rousseau,b Mary Kate Stimmlerc

a
Tuck School of Business, Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire 03755; b College of Business, Florida State University, Tallahassee,
Florida 32306; c Google Inc., Mountain View, California 94043
*Corresponding author
Contact: pino.g.audia@tuck.dartmouth.edu, https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7299-513X (PGA); hrousseau@business.fsu.edu,
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2356-2888 (HER); marykate@google.com (MKS)
Received: October 4, 2018 Abstract. Although studies show that organizations engaged in controversial actions often
Revised: January 19, 2020; aim to minimize the release of threatening information, scholars know relatively little
February 23, 2021; August 13, 2021; about what may prompt organizations to increase transparency in these situations. In this
January 24, 2022
study, we focus on support from public opinion as a condition that may influence the dis-
Accepted: March 18, 2022
closure of sensitive performance information to the public. Using the second Iraq War as
Published Online in Articles in Advance:
May 20, 2022
an empirical context, we focus on the extent to which public officials—Pentagon spokes-
persons—release and frame information about war performance. This outcome is critical
https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2022.1598 because the way in which organizations communicate their performance to outsiders has
often been regarded as a key defensive impression management tactic. We hypothesize
Copyright: © 2022 The Author(s)
that high public support for the war will increase the likelihood that Pentagon officials
release information about sensitive combat performance indicators in their press briefings
and identify contingencies, such as adversity and organizational spokespersons’ power,
that moderate this relationship. We also explore whether high public support decreases the
strategic use of alternate performance frames that emphasize metrics that signal progress
toward a desirable end state. Using a unique data set based on the coding of press brief-
ings, public opinion data, and other public sources, we find support for several of our
hypotheses. We discuss implications for understanding the relationship between public
opinion and impression management and highlight the importance of extending this
research to nongovernmental organizations.
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work as “Organization Science. Copyright © 2022 The Author(s). https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2022.
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by-nc-nd/4.0/.”
Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2022.1598.
Keywords: impression management • public opinion • accountability • power • government • Iraq War • organizational symbolism •
framing • communication • performance
A popular Government, without popular information, which threatened organizations engage in this strate-
or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce gic “presentation of self” (Goffman 1959) is through
or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both. —James Madison impression management tactics, such as minimizing
the release of organizationally threatening informa-
tion (Bolino et al. 2008, Graffin et al. 2016). Indeed,
Introduction evidence suggests that organizations engaged in con-
Organizations seek to gain influence over their envi- troversy reduce transparency, the timely disclosure of
ronments by obtaining the support and endorsement publicly relevant information (Albu and Flyverbom
of critical audiences. Because engaging in controver- 2019), by managing their informational environment
sial actions threatens this support, organizations often to influence the impressions of critical audiences, such
try to reduce direct scrutiny by resorting to impres- as shareholders and investors (Davidson et al. 2004,
sion management tactics—efforts intended to posi- Graffin et al. 2016), customers (Elsbach et al. 1998),
tively influence the image held by target audiences stock analysts (Busenbark et al. 2017), and the media
(Elsbach and Sutton 1992, Bolino et al. 2008). A way in (Dutton and Dukerich 1991).
777
Audia, Rousseau, and Stimmler: Public Opinion and Impression Management
778 Organization Science, 2023, vol. 34, no. 2, pp. 777–800, © 2022 The Author(s)
Although prior research has generated a wealth of more heterogeneous set of constituents than ever
insights into why and how organizations strategically before (Wang et al. 2021).
manage the disclosure of threatening information, In our analysis, we address three questions. First,
almost no attention has been devoted to the factors does public support for a controversial course of
that may increase transparency when organizations action increase the extent to which organizational
carry out controversial actions. Journalists, analysts, members release information about sensitive perform-
and watchdog organizations often comment on, and ance indicators? Second, does public support reduce
usually regret, the lack of transparency that plagues the extent to which organizational members use alter-
institutions involved in contentious public matters. nate performance frames that signal progress and
Interestingly, these commentators note that despite obfuscate sensitive information? Third, what factors
advances in information technology and increased influence the extent to which organizational members
pressure from activists, organizations, such as large respond in these ways? To address these questions,
corporations, healthcare institutions, and govern- we chose as an empirical setting: the second Iraq War
ments, still hide much relevant information from the from its inception in March 2003 to December 2006.
public (Pearson 2018). This continued lack of transpar- We chose this setting for two main reasons. First,
ency suggests that studying the factors that encourage although the influence of public opinion on organiza-
the release of sensitive performance information is tions has been noted in previous studies, the Iraq War
critical to extend our understanding of the use (or is an “extreme” context characterized by extraordi-
nonuse) of impression management tactics and to pro- nary consequences (e.g., losses of large numbers of
mote accountability to the public. human lives, allocation of considerable economic
In this study, we focus on public opinion—the resources) and in which public opinion is conspicuous
cumulative preferences and sentiments of the popula- (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007, Hällgren et al. 2018).
tion (Hobolt and Klemmemsen 2005, Stimson 2018)— Not only are government organizations managing a
as a factor that may alter transparency when organiza- contentious war particularly sensitive to public opin-
tions are engaged in controversial actions. Specifically, ion, which involves a broad audience rather than nar-
we expect that high public support, a condition that row groups of activists, but an extreme context, such
can lower organizational members’ defensiveness, as war, increases the chances of observing behaviors
will increase the disclosure of sensitive outcomes, that are less prominent in the kinds of settings that
whereas low public support will decrease it. How- organizational researchers typically examine. Second,
ever, public opinion may not only influence the level the fast pace of modern war operations combined
of disclosure of sensitive outcomes but also, affect with the strong public interest in war events created a
what type of information organizational members dis- context in which military leaders continuously
close and how they frame performance outcomes. reported on the progress of the second Iraq War. Press
Unsupportive public opinion, for example, may lead conferences are an important venue that provides
organizational members to highlight outcomes that organizational members with opportunities for
help maintain a favorable image and boost public sup- impression management (Ginzel et al. 1993), and
port. Thus, we also explore how public opinion using Pentagon biweekly press briefings allows us to
may influence the strategic use of alternate frames detect the use of impression management tactics on a
(Goffman 1974, Benford and Snow 2000, Fiss and relatively real-time basis.
Zajac 2006). This comprehensive examination of the In this setting, we examine the extent to which pub-
influence of public opinion on impression manage- lic officials—Pentagon spokespersons—talked about
ment enables us to identify contingencies that may (i.e., disclosed) war performance metrics in press
modify how organizational members respond to the briefings. We focus on this outcome because how
pressures of the public—a source of pressure that dif- organizations communicate their performance to out-
fers from those previously analyzed in the literature, siders has often been regarded as a defensive im-
such as activists and social movements (Elsbach et al. pression management tactic aimed at maintaining a
1998, McDonnell and King 2013), journalists (West- favorable image (Meyer and Rowan 1977, Bansal and
phal et al. 2012), stock analysts (Busenbark et al. 2017), Clelland 2004). We expect that high public support for
and foreign competitors (Ravasi and Schultz 2006). A the war will increase the likelihood that Pentagon offi-
deeper understanding of public opinion is critical cials discuss sensitive combat performance indicators
given the continued growth of opinion polls, which in their press briefings. Additionally, we hypothesize
has led to a higher pervasiveness and relevance of that adversity evidenced by troop deaths and lack of
public opinion (Watts and Dodds 2007). As suggested resources decreases this effect, whereas higher power
by recent work, social networks disseminate the pub- of spokespersons increases it. Considering the strate-
lic’s views with greater velocity and emotionality than gic use of alternate performance frames, we explore
in the past (Etter et al. 2019), reaching a larger and whether high public support reduces the release of
Organization Science, 2023, vol. 34, no. 2, pp. 777–800, © 2022 The Author(s) 779
information about performance metrics that signals responsive to varying levels of public support, which
progress in the war, such as those related to Iraq’s recon- may in turn affect information disclosure. High public
struction and rebuilding, an effect that might be stronger support may buffer organizational members from exter-
when members simultaneously disclose sensitive per- nal pressures, lowering their defensiveness and leading
formance information. We test these relationships using a to higher disclosure of sensitive outcomes. Conversely,
unique data set based on the coding of press briefings, low support for controversial actions may further acti-
public opinion data, and other public sources. vate tactics aimed at defending perceptions of the
organization not only by reducing the disclosure of sen-

Controversy, Impression Management, sitive information but also, by elevating the use of alter-
Transparency, and Public Opinion nate frames to report performance (Goffman 1974, Fiss
Impression management research describes the efforts and Zajac 2006, Kaplan 2008). In short, public opinion
undertaken by organizations to create, maintain, or should influence the intensity with which organizations
alter the image held by target audiences (Elsbach and pursuing controversial actions employ defensive im-
Sutton 1992, Bolino et al. 2008). Just as individuals pression management tactics.
manage how they present themselves to others in social Although empirical organizational research on pub-
interactions (Goffman 1959), organizations, through the lic opinion is scarce, some scholars suggest that public
actions of spokespersons, engage in impression manage- opinion may influence organizations (Oliver 1991,
ment tactics to influence the way critical audiences Deephouse 1996). Social movement researchers claim
perceive them; these tactics are used to secure audience that stakeholders can mobilize public opinion in favor
support and to cultivate a more positive evaluation of or against the actions of certain firms (Vergne 2012,
(Wayne and Liden 1995). Research shows that organiza- McDonnell and King 2013), and some empirical evi-
tions deploy impression management tactics for a variety dence suggests that multinational companies try to
of strategic reasons, such as responding to image conform to local public opinion as a way to show def-
threats in the face of controversial issues (Elsbach erence and gain legitimacy in foreign contexts (e.g., Li
and Sutton 1992, Ravasi and Schultz 2006), anticipat- et al. 2007). Additionally, negative public opinion
ing controversies (Elsbach et al. 1998, Arndt and polls regarding environmental degradation contrib-
Bigelow 2000), influencing investors and stock ana- uted to a substantial increase in capital expenditures
lysts (Westphal and Graebner 2010, Washburn and by chemical firms and the creation of the Responsible
Bromiley 2014, Aguilera et al. 2017), convincing non- Care Program, an effort to maintain self-regulatory
shareholding stakeholders (Bansal and Kistruck institutions without external sanctions (Hoffman 1999,
2006, Carter 2006, McDonnell and King 2013), and King and Lenox 2000). Although these studies tend to
reassuring external constituents about the quality of relegate public opinion to the background, they indi-
a firm’s leadership (Westphal et al. 2012). cate that organizations will often strive to align them-
This literature suggests that defensive and anticipa- selves with public sentiment.
tory impression management tactics become most To develop theory on the specific mechanisms by
evident in times of crisis or controversy when organiza- which public opinion may influence impression man-
tional legitimacy is threatened (Elsbach 2003, Graffin agement, we draw on social psychological research on
et al. 2016). Scholars have found that firms offset negative accountability (Tetlock 1983, Lerner and Tetlock 1999).
information regarding controversial acquisitions (Graffin Accountability theory applies well to our context
et al. 2016), conceal negative financial data (Abrahamson because military officials view the public as a critical
and Park 1994), and obfuscate information regarding audience to whom they are accountable. Although pub-
events critical to stakeholders (Dutton and Dukerich 1991, lic opposition to military action makes elected officials
Elsbach et al. 1998, Graffin et al. 2011). and military leaders reluctant to use military interven-
Despite the multiple circumstances that prompt tion as a means to resolve international conflicts (Lutt-
organizations engaged in controversial actions to mini- wak 1994, Record 2007), commitment to war has often
mize the release of threatening information, impression been found to foster defensive behaviors (Hackett and
management scholars have accumulated relatively few Zhao 1994). Indeed, communication through press
insights about factors that might decrease the perceived releases during the second Iraq War was a key strategic
intensity of external pressures felt by organizational concern for military leaders and thus, represents a crit-
members, thus leading to transparency in times of cri- ical venue for exploring impression management.
sis. In particular, public opinion—the prevalent views
and preferences among the general public (Hobolt and Accountability and Public Opinion
Klemmemsen 2005)—may be a critical factor influenc- The social psychological literature on accountability
ing the disclosure of sensitive information by organiza- provides a valuable foundation for disentangling
tions facing controversy. Given that their legitimacy is the relationship between public opinion and impres-
threatened, these organizations should be particularly sion management. From this theoretical perspective,
feeling obligated to explain or justify one’s conduct to discussion of performance information that may
some significant other affects how individuals think undermine external support. Pfeffer (1981, p. 29) suggests
and behave (Scott and Lyman 1968, Tetlock 1992). A that “one of the interesting aspects of many organizations
key distinction in the literature on accountability is that is the efforts undertaken to systematically avoid assess-
between predecision and postdecision accountability ment, especially assessment of outcomes that are of poten-
(Lerner and Tetlock 1999). Perceptions of being account- tial interest to various groups or individuals in contact
able to an audience before deciding (or forming an with the organizations.” To illustrate this tactic, he uses
opinion) are generally associated with openness to examples of hospitals unwilling to publicly disclose mor-
others’ viewpoints. When the audience’s views are tality and morbidity figures, schools reluctant to commu-
known, individuals often display an inclination to con- nicate scores on standardized tests to outsiders, and public
form to those views (Tetlock 1983, Tetlock et al. 1989). companies opposing disclosures of adverse legal actions.
Alternatively, if audiences’ views are unknown and In essence, organizations avoid assessment, Pfeffer notes,
conformity is not an option, individuals engage in pre- by not disclosing performance data that, regardless of its
emptive self-criticism, whereby they form more com- valence, may attract scrutiny and may have potentially
plex judgments, take more time to process available damaging effects on external support. Here, we refer to
evidence, and consider multiple perspectives on the issue this type of performance information as sensitive perform-
(Tetlock 1983, Koonce et al. 1995, Mero and Motowidlo ance information.
1995, Carnaghi and Yzerbyt 2006). In doing so, they try to Organizational research on symbolic management
secure support by anticipating audiences’ objections. also suggests that managers will often control the
However, research on accountability suggests that flow of sensitive information in ways that allow them
openness cedes the way to defensiveness when individ- to mitigate scrutiny and secure stakeholders’ support
uals have irrevocably committed themselves to a (Elsbach 1994, Westphal and Zajac 1998, Schnacken-
course of action. Moreover, strong commitment berg et al. 2019). This literature suggests that deem-
primes decision makers to view audiences as critical phasizing sensitive outcomes may be a particularly
of their views and actions (Tetlock et al. 1989, Lerner suitable symbolic tactic used to report organizational
and Tetlock 1999). In such circumstances, studies find outcomes in a way that is acceptable to stakeholders,
that individuals engage in “defensive bolstering,” a particularly under conditions of ambiguity or uncer-
tainty. For example, start-ups that do not yet have a
tendency to generate thoughts that justify the original
proven track record substitute in their communication
commitments. Instead of acknowledging their mis-
to external stakeholder performance metrics, such as
takes, individuals form more rigidly defensive views
revenues, with less conventional achievements, such
(Morris and Moore 2000) and have a hard time writ-
as partially completed products (Zott and Huy 2007).
ing off sunk costs (Simonson and Staw 1992).
Analogously, public companies under scrutiny engage
Accountability research not only is compatible with
in selective disclosure of their environmental perform-
core tenets of impression management but also, offers
ance—a critical and sensitive indicator for various
the possibility of variance in the degree of defensive-
stakeholders—as a symbolic tactic aimed at obfuscating
ness displayed by individuals committed to a course
less favorable information and maintaining a positive
of action. This research suggests, for instance, that
impression (Marquis et al. 2016). Selective disclosure of
accountable actors are likely to reduce their defensive- sensitive performance data also appears in other con-
ness when they expect audiences to evaluate their texts. For example, in the highly regulated hedge fund
actions less harshly than originally anticipated or when industry, funds terminate voluntary reporting of per-
audiences signal that controversial actions will be less formance indicators to commercial databases when
severely assessed or sanctioned (Frink et al. 2008, Hall managers believe disseminating this information may
et al. 2017). These conditions may prompt organiza- repel prospective investors (Agarwal et al. 2013).
tional members to feel protected from external pres- During times of war, government organizations may
sures, prompting them to become more transparent in find reducing the release of sensitive performance infor-
their information disclosure. Hence, we build on these mation a particularly useful defensive impression man-
insights to explore how variations in public support agement tactic. Indeed, the ability to shift the focus
influenced the disclosure of performance information in away from performance is particularly valuable for
the context of the second Iraq War. government officials who engage in actions that receive
considerable external scrutiny, such as costly military
Hypotheses operations (Gelpi et al. 2009). Research in political sci-
Public Opinion and Release of Information About ence shows that governments aim to frame public per-
Performance ceptions of war performance in a way that favors the
As we noted earlier, a key tactic to dilute accountabil- maintenance of public support (Boettcher and Cobb
ity pressures in the face of controversy is avoiding the 2006), especially because public belief in a war’s likely
success makes the public more tolerant of war sacrifices, actions, leading organizational members to anticipate
such as troop deaths (Gelpi et al. 2005). that such actions will be more severely assessed than in
In the specific context of the second Iraq War, we other circumstances. For instance, organizational mem-
expect that Pentagon officials may have responded to bers in firms undertaking risky unrelated acquisitions
public opinion by altering the release of information (which could destroy shareholder value) are well aware
about performance indicators that can raise apprehen- that these actions violate stakeholders’ expectations and
sion and concern from the public, such as those related thus, manage their information disclosure accordingly
to combat outcomes. Unsupportive public opinion (Graffin et al. 2016). Similarly, a change in Chief Execu-
should decrease the release of information about com- tive Officer raises defensiveness in board members
bat performance because this information could cast because markets tend to label such events as ambigu-
doubt on the chosen path of action, thus increasing ously negative (Graffin et al. 2011). Other forms of adver-
criticism and raising questions about the existence of sity, such as boycotts, also increase perceptions of threat
compelling reasons to use military force (Kull et al. because they can pose severe reputational damage to
2003). Moreover, the release of information about com- firms (McDonnell and King 2013).
bat performance may remind the public about the indi- The evidence from these studies suggests that because
vidual sacrifices involved in war, making it harder to adversity raises perceptions of threat, it may erode the
elicit public consent for military action. Conversely, effect of public support for a course of action. Organiza-
public support for the war should reduce government tional members may still discuss sensitive performance
organizational members’ defensiveness because such indicators as a response to war support but do so less
support indicates that engaging in war will be assessed intensely than when adversity is less prominent. There-
less severely by the public (Frink et al. 2008, Hall et al. fore, adversity should negatively moderate the relation-
2017). Furthermore, government officials may interpret ship between public support and the release of sensitive
public opinion favorable to war as a “vote of con- information.
fidence” on their competency to handle the crisis Here, we examine two indicators of adversity that
(Voeten and Brewer 2006), thus expecting audiences to are particularly relevant to our empirical setting. A
be more tolerant about combat performance indicators first critical indicator of adversity during a war is the
that remind them of the human and material costs of cumulative number of U.S. troops lost in combat
the war. This sense of security may prime organiza- (Karol and Miguel 2007, Gelpi et al. 2009). Because
tional members to feel buffered from external pressures, deaths of U.S. troops occur mostly before occupying
prompting them to become more transparent in their forces can restore public order and conclude war
disclosure of sensitive outcomes. These arguments sug- operations, a higher number of U.S. troop deaths may
gest that organizational members reporting on contro- generate perceptions of threat that erode the buffer
versial actions increase the release of information about created by a supportive public opinion. A second indi-
sensitive performance indicators when public support cator of adversity concerns the availability of resour-
is high. Hypothesis 1 states this formally. ces for the military budget. Research on accountability
suggests that variance in the level of resources and
Hypothesis 1. The stronger public support for conten-
capabilities available to accountable entities should
tious actions is, the greater organizational members’ release
moderate the relationship between external demands
of information about sensitive performance indicators.
and felt accountability (e.g., Frink et al. 2008, Hall et al.
2017). In the context of war, adversity in the form of a
Contingencies Affecting the Influence of reduction in the financial resources available may debil-
Public Opinion itate the buffer created by a supportive public opinion
Although public support may prompt an increase in among organizational members, as they perceive the
the release of information regarding sensitive per- need to justify a course of action in a situation where
formance indicators, the context in which organiza- autonomy is becoming severely constrained. In both
tional members assess public support may condition cases, we anticipate that adversity will weaken the link
this effect. The same level of support from public between public support and the release of information
opinion may take on different meanings depending regarding sensitive performance indicators.
on organizational members’ perceptions of other con- Hypothesis 2. The positive relationship between public
ditions that may impact their perceptions of threat. support for contentious actions and organizational mem-
bers’ release of sensitive performance indicators will be
Adverse Outcomes Known to weaker when facing higher levels of adversity.
Organizational Members
A prominent condition that shapes perceptions of threat is Power of Organizational Members
adversity. Adversity increases threat because it raises con- Organizational members reporting on controversial
crete doubts regarding the consequences of controversial actions may not be uniform in their reactions to public
support. An individual attribute that may alter their ambiguous signals by keeping some features in view
reactions to supportive public opinion is the power while downplaying or even hiding others. Studies show
they possess within the organizational hierarchy, which that organizational members strategically employ spe-
we define as “asymmetric control over valued resources cific frames to secure internal and external support (Fiss
in social relations” (Magee and Galinsky 2008, p. 361). and Zajac 2006, Kaplan 2008, Kellogg 2009). For instance,
Specifically, the power they possess may alter the extent temporal framing of competitive action announcements
to which they pay attention to a supportive public opin- enables firms to garner positive media and investor
ion and view it as a vote of confidence. reactions while delaying retaliation from competitors
An extensive body of work in social psychology (Nadkarni et al. 2019). Firms also frame controversial
finds that those who possess low power are particu- actions by issuing statements that direct the attention of
larly attentive to the constraints that outsiders place investors to the positive (or nonnegative) outcomes of
on their actions and vigilant about possible negative these actions (Rhee and Fiss 2014, Blagoeva et al. 2020).
evaluations from audiences (Keltner et al. 2003, Gui- Although these studies have made substantial inroads,
note 2017, Cho and Keltner 2020). Because they are understanding of the conditions that influence the stra-
more sensitive to threats than to rewards, low-power tegic use of alternate frames remains limited. As noted,
organizational members may give limited attention to organizational members charged with communicating
high public support. High power, on the other hand, to outsiders how the organization is performing may
makes people more focused on the pursuit of valued choose different frames to characterize performance.
rewards and more attentive to information aligned They may, therefore, reduce transparency by using
with such desired outcomes (Keltner et al. 2003, Gui- frames that emphasize progress—that is, developments
note 2017, Cho and Keltner 2020). Because a suppor- that signal getting closer to a desirable end state.
tive public opinion is a key condition that makes the Because an unsupportive public opinion raises defen-
goal of winning the war more attainable, high-power siveness, as we have suggested in our analysis leading
organizational members may pay careful attention to it to Hypothesis 1, low public support may lead organiza-
and also view it as a confirmation of the appropriateness tional members to deploy alternate frames emphasizing
of their actions. So, although a supportive public opin- progress. Conversely, if supportive public opinion
ion reduces the defensiveness that thwarts the release of increases transparency, it may reduce the use of such
information concerning sensitive performance indica- alternate performance frames.
tors, research on the psychological effects of power sug- In the war context, the strategic use of alternate
gests that its influence on this impression management frames to articulate progress likely involves resorting to
tactic will be greater for organizational members who the disclosure of indicators that correlate with victory
possess high power than for those who possess low and highlight a sense of achievement. Specifically, Pen-
power. Based on our analysis, we expect that, in tagon officials may emphasize progress indicators, such
response to public support for the war, officials who as those related to Iraq’s reconstruction and rebuilding.
possess high power release more information about sen- Indeed, large-scale efforts were directed to reconstruct
sitive performance indicators than officials who possess Iraq after the invasion, as reflected in the vast resources
low power. This is stated formally in Hypothesis 3. assigned to infrastructure (e.g., roads, sanitation, electric
power, oil production) and democratization efforts
Hypothesis 3. The positive relationship between public sup- (Tarnoff 2009). However, Pentagon officials may have
port for contentious actions and organizational members’ developed a discourse around reconstruction and
release of sensitive performance indicators will be weaker for rebuilding efforts to justify occupation and “sell” mili-
organizational members who possess lower power. tary actions to an increasingly doubtful public (e.g.,
Sovacool and Halfon 2007). As public support
Public Opinion and the Deployment of decreased, rhetorical emphasis on these progress indica-
Alternate Frames tors might have been how Pentagon officials framed
In addition to influencing the release of information performance because these goals resonated with the
about sensitive performance indicators, public opin- values and beliefs of the American public and persua-
ion may also impact how organizational members use sively articulated controversial war actions “as a neces-
other tactics to report performance. Here, we explore sary cost of war” (Gelpi et al. 2005, p. 10). Strong public
the possibility that organizational members engage in support, in contrast, may have reduced the use of this
the strategic use of alternate performance frames that impression management tactic.
shift audiences’ attention away from sensitive out-
comes likely to prompt opposition. A frame is a Hypothesis 4. The stronger public support for contentious
“schemata of interpretation” (Goffman 1974, Snow actions is, the less organizational members release informa-
et al. 1986) that enables individuals to make sense of tion about progress performance indicators.
Organizational members may also combine the continued to spiral out of control in the second and
release of information about progress performance third years of the war.
indicators with the disclosure of sensitive perform- The Iraq War—plagued by emergencies, unex-
ance information. They may respond to shifts in pected disruptions, and the potential for considerable
public opinion by alternating between different types physical and material losses—represents what schol-
of performance information sequentially. However, ars categorize as an “extreme” context (Eisenhardt and
abrupt changes or inconsistencies in information dis- Graebner 2007, Hällgren et al. 2018). Extreme contexts
closure can increase audience suspicion (Ashforth and are useful for building and testing theory for at least
Gibbs 1990, Gelpi et al. 2009), thus reducing public two reasons. First, they provide a unique context in
confidence and casting doubt on the legitimacy of the which to study “hard to get at” organizational phenom-
organization. ena. Second, they are likely to generate a higher level of
A plausible alternative may be that, facing low pub- information than ordinary cases, increasing the chances
lic support, organizational members deploy alternate that often concealed behaviors become more observable
frames emphasizing progress in combination with than in other instances. As noted earlier, during a war,
sensitive performance information as a way to obfus- public opinion becomes prevalent and easy to track,
cate such unfavorable information. Disclosure of governments continuously attend to public opinion,
information about progress indicators may enable the and real-time organizational responses rise above the
organization to manage decreasing public support by surface (e.g., via press conferences).
framing performance in a manner that resonates with Among recent wars, the Iraq War is a particularly
the public, defending the organization’s public image. appropriate context for testing our theory because
However, this tendency may operate most strongly impression management was a central concern for the
when organizations inform the public about sensitive Pentagon. An investigation by the New York Times
outcomes that raise doubts about whether the organi- revealed that Pentagon officials met with military ana-
zation is achieving its goal. Thus, if public support lysts who covered the war in the media to provide
reduces the use of alternate frames emphasizing prog- them with firsthand information that urged them to
ress (as per Hypothesis 4), the magnitude of such a speak favorably of the war (Barstow 2008). From the
reduction might be higher when members are simul- Pentagon side, this active public relations strategy
taneously disclosing sensitive information. was justified on the grounds that if governments
Hypothesis 5. The negative relationship between public “don’t manage their message strategy, and counter
support for contentious actions and organizational mem- misinformation, they soon will find themselves unable
bers’ mentions of progress performance indicators will be to execute policy” (Basile 2017, p. 3). The Pentagon
stronger (i.e., more negative) when members release infor- also engaged in various new tactics aimed at influenc-
mation about sensitive performance indicators. ing audiences, such as “embedding” reporters within
the military (because reports coming from within mili-
Methods tary lines often have a more positive view of the mili-
Empirical Context and Data tary), controlling photographic coverage of battlefield
Multinational forces, led by the United States under events (e.g., returning wounded soldiers after mid-
the administration of George W. Bush, started the sec- night so the press would not take pictures of them),
ond Iraq War on March 20, 2003 as a response to the and of course, altering the extent to which they dis-
threat posed by Iraq’s failure to unconditionally com- cuss performance information. In short, the Pentagon
ply with United Nations weapons inspections. A during the Bush administration prioritized effectively
month after the beginning of the invasion, the Penta- managing its informational environment. As summar-
gon reported that combat operations had ended and ized by Colonel Kenneth Allard, the Iraq War “will be
that the reconstruction phase had begun (DePalma remembered as a conflict in which information fully
2003), but that assessment turned out to be premature. took its place as a weapon of war” (Miller 2004).
When attacks against U.S. armed forces accelerated We examine how Pentagon officials disclosed infor-
during the summer of 2003, the Pentagon reconsid- mation about war performance during the period that
ered its earlier evaluation and admitted that the war extends from March 2003 to December 2006. The
was still on (Department of Defense 2003). The situa- period under study coincides with Donald Rumsfeld’s
tion continued to deteriorate during the first year. In tenure as Secretary of Defense, during which he over-
October 2003, for example, the press reported that saw the war. Rumsfeld left after the Iraq Study Group,
U.S. soldiers came under attack more than 100 times chaired by former Secretary of State James Baker, for-
per week across Iraq (Berenson 2003). As the first year mulated a negative assessment of the situation in Iraq.
of war operations ended, insurgents gained control of His departure led to the appointment of a new Secre-
several cities. As our data show, military operations tary of Defense and new high-ranking generals. The
accountability effects we are investigating in this As expected, coding the speeches of Pentagon offi-
study were likely less prominent after December 2006 cials involved dealing with more ambiguities than
because people generally feel less accountable for many other types of discourse. One of the most persis-
actions initiated by others (Simonson and Staw 1992). tent issues was the level of abstraction used. Although
Our data source is Pentagon press briefings, which sometimes the performance measurement used was
provide on the record indications of the views of the quite clear (e.g., “Yesterday four American marines
Pentagon. Online Appendix A provides an example of a … were killed”), at other times the performance
transcript of a briefing. We retrieved press briefings from measurement was more abstract (“This tiny minority
the Department of Defense (DOD) website. During our of thugs is growing weaker”). The codes developed
observation period, briefings were typically held on a also reflect this variance in abstraction (e.g., United
biweekly basis and were the main vehicle by which the States and allies killed and strength of the enemy,
Secretary of Defense and military leaders disseminated respectively). Performance metrics also varied in the
information about war developments. For each speech, frequency with which they were used. “Security” was
we coded only the introductory section in which Penta- used in 78 speeches. “Killing enemy leadership” was
gon officials gave updates on the war in Iraq before they used in only five speeches. The performance metrics
took any questions from the press. We followed this are also related to broad outcome goals (“freedom
approach because it was in this preliminary part of each and liberty”) and specific process goals (“kill ene-
briefing, rather than during the later question and answer mies”). Of the 32 performance metrics identified by
sessions with the press, that Pentagon officials could the coders, 22 were used by Pentagon officials at least
choose whether and how they talked about war perform- three times and are included in our analysis. Exam-
ance. The interpretation of the question and answer part ples of metrics that were dropped are “enemy
of the briefing, although informative of how Pentagon surrender,” “end of terrorism,” and “diplomacy and
officials might use a broader range of impression man- negotiations.”1 Table 1 presents a representative quote
agement strategies in response to a potentially skeptical for each of the 22 performance metrics, and Table 2
audience, would instead reflect the influence of a combi- offers examples of block quotes with and without per-
nation of factors that are more difficult to disentangle. formance metrics. To calculate interrater reliability at
the speech level, we tabulated coincidences within
units (i.e., performance metrics) and then, computed
Coding Procedure
Krippendorff's alpha intercoder reliability coefficient.
To measure the release of information about perform-
Krippendorff’s alpha value was 0.68, a score above
ance information, two research assistants who were the minimum threshold of 0.6 and a satisfactory result
unaware of the hypotheses being tested coded each of considering the high complexity of the coding. When
the 182 speeches included in our analysis. We in- coders did not agree about a performance metric
structed the coders to code any statement that gave appearing in a speech, we coded that metric as not
the reader a sense of progress, failure to progress, or appearing in that speech. This coding produced a con-
desire to progress during the war. We excluded refer- servative measure for the use of a performance metric.
ences from consideration of the war in Afghanistan, We then scaled up codes to the month level of analy-
the general performance of the U.S. military, and sis. If any speech during a particular month included
oblique references to the international war on terror. a specific metric of performance, then we coded that
The speeches were coded in a randomized order. performance metric as one for that month, and if no
To develop the coding framework, we followed a speech during that month included a particular per-
grounded theory approach (Strauss and Corbin 1990) formance measurement, then we coded that perform-
and allowed the performance metrics to emerge from ance metric as zero for that month.
the data without any preconceptions. Specifically, we As Table 1 reveals, the performance metrics to
followed Krippendorff (2004) and Campbell et al. which Pentagon officials referred in their speeches fell
(2013), who recommend analyzing a random selection into three broad aspects of military performance: com-
of 10% of the total qualitative documents, which in bat, reconstruction, and rebuilding government (Scha-
our study, meant 20 speeches. Analyzing these dlow 2003). Our coding framework fits the view that
speeches in batches of three, the coders added any the successful completion of a war often follows a nat-
newly found types of performance metrics to the cod- ural sequence (Schadlow 2003, p. 83). Upon entering
ing framework until they reached a saturation point the country, the military effort focuses primarily on
where no new performance indicators were found. combat operations, and after displacing the regime,
This procedure generated 32 performance metrics, greater attention is given to rebuilding the country’s
which ranged from “ending terrorism,” and “disarm- infrastructure and its government. In Figure 1, which
ing Iraq” to “rebuilding Iraq’s government” and shows the percentage of performance metrics used by
“autonomy for Iraq.” Pentagon officials falling in these three performance
Table 1. Examples of Performance Metrics Used in Pentagon Press Briefings
Quote
Combat
End Saddam’s regime “As the coalition makes progress, the Iraqi people are losing the fear of the regime
… Let me assure them that life without Saddam Hussein is not a distant
dream”
Capture leaders “This week Saddam Hussein’s trade minister was captured by coalition forces”
Kill leaders “Tuesday was a good day for the Iraqi people. The brutal careers of Uday and
Qusay Hussein came to an end”
Capture enemies “We have more than 7,000 enemy prisoners”
Kill enemies “Coalition forces killed several of the attackers”
Strength of enemy “The threat posed by the insurgents is very real. They continue their attacks on
the coalition and have recently increased attacks on Iraqi forces and civilians”
“They are a tough, aggressive enemy”
Disarming Iraq “Of the 800-plus tanks they began with, all but a couple of dozen have been
destroyed or abandoned”
Violence “We do believe that about 350 civilians have been killed as a result of the
sectarian violence following the bombing”
Attacks by enemy “Insurgents have killed approximately 100 security forces”
United States and allies wounded “Also, more than 150 have been wounded in battle”
United States and allies deaths “The 85 brave U.S. service members killed remind us of the heavy price we often
pay for freedom”
Strength of the United States and allies “We have over 340,000 coalition forces in the region”
Mistakes “I’d like to express our regrets to the families of the Iraqis killed yesterday at the
check point … Loss of any innocent life is tragic”
U.S. and allies weapon use “Our forces have fired more than 700 cruise missiles and dropped more than 9,000
precision-guided munitions”
Reconstruction and rebuilding
Security “There are now about 7,000 Iraqi policemen back at work in Bagdad and that
number should also increase in the days ahead”
Reconstruction “Reconstruction momentum is building. In June there were only 230 projects …
By the end of November there were over 1,000”
Quality of life “Children in Iraq are returning to school, and basic services like healthcare,
electricity, and water … are improving every day”
Economy “On the economic front, we have introduced a new currency that will be actually
given to the Iraqi people in October”
Foreign aid “Thirty-eight nations have made offers of financial assistance totaling more than
$1.8 billion”
Autonomy for Iraq “The Iraqi people are now experiencing the right of democracy and everything
that goes with the responsibility of democracy, as they work to form a
government of their choice”
Rebuilding government “Local governments and town councils are being formed in virtually every city
and town across the country”
Liberty/freedom “In Karbala, over a million Shi’a Muslims were able to complete their pilgrimage
without interference … since 1977. That is an important accomplishment, a
sign that free expression and religious liberty are returning to Iraq”
categories, we see that in 2003 and 2004 the focus was significant in 2005 and 2006, leading the Iraq Study
primarily on combat. Combat continued to be extremely Group chaired by former Secretary of State James
relevant through the four-year period. However, in rela- Baker to conclude in December 2006 that “the situation
tion to other metrics, it began to lose its dominant posi- is grave and deteriorating.” Despite these difficulties,
tion in 2005 and 2006, as the release of information as we have seen in Figure 1, information about combat
about reconstruction and rebuilding government met- actually declined as a percentage of all performance
rics increased. information released in those years, a pattern that may
At first glance, this progression seems to suggest that reflect impression management efforts.
having obtained one set of objectives (e.g., removing
Hussein from power using military force), Pentagon Variables and Hypotheses Testing
officials then turned their attention to the next logical set Dependent Variables. To measure the disclosure of
of issues (e.g., repairing the damage from the military sensitive performance information, we focus on combat
effort and setting up a new government). The war’s pro- metrics because they represent not only a critical per-
gression, however, casts doubt on this interpretation. As formance dimension by which military leaders judge
Figure 2 suggests, U.S. military deaths continued to be their success but also, a critical determinant of public
Table 2. Examples of Block Quotes with and Without Performance Metrics
Quote
Block quote with performance metrics “A growing number of Iraqi intelligence operatives have been arrested while
(capture enemies, U.S. and allies weapon use) others simply ignore their orders to attack coalition targets, waiting for the
Iraqi regime to collapse. And, where are Iraqi’s leaders? The night before
the ground war began, coalition forces launched a strike on a meeting of
Iraqi’s senior command and control and they have not been heard from
since. The fact that Saddam Hussein did not show up for his televised
speech today is interesting. With each passing day more regime targets
are being hit and more coalition forces are pouring into the country.”
Block quote without performance metrics “One of the most important aspects of a free society is, of course, free
expression, including the expression of minority views. One of the ways
that minority opinion can be expressed in free nations is through protests
and demonstrations. Here in the U.S., for example, the majority of
Americans supported the war in Iraq, but some opposed it, and some
took to the streets to make their opposition heard. The same is true for
other democracies. On Tuesday, for example, hundreds of people marched
in Moscow to celebrate Lenin’s birthday and called for a restoration of the
Soviet Union.”
attitudes toward the war (Gelpi et al. 2005). We develop the count of reconstruction and rebuilding metrics men-
two measures; the first is the probability that any com- tioned in a given month’s press briefings.
bat metric identified by the coders was included in a
month’s briefings, and the second is the count of com- Independent Variables. To measure public support for
bat metrics released in a given month’s press briefings. the war, we used public opinion polls conducted by
To measure the disclosure of information concerning ABC. The survey asked the following: “All in all, con-
progress indicators, we focus on reconstruction and sidering the costs to the United States versus the bene-
rebuilding metrics because they are generally viewed as fits to the United States, do you think the war with
indicating transition to a war stage that is closer to war Iraq is worth fighting, or not?” The sample of
success (Sovacool and Halfon 2007). Here, we also respondents was random, was nationwide, and typi-
develop two measures that mirror the approach used cally had a 4.5-point error margin. Our measure is the
for combat metrics; the first measure captures the prob- percentage of individuals who said they felt “some-
ability that any reconstruction and rebuilding metric what” or “strongly” that the war was worth fighting.
was included in a month’s briefing, and the second is The survey, conducted by telephone 38 times between
Figure 1. (Color online) Proportion of Different Categories of Performance Metrics in Pentagon Press Briefings
Figure 2. (Color online) U.S. Troop Deaths, March 2003 to December 2006
March 2003 and December 2006, usually had approxi- spiked up, on the other hand, at the end of 2005, when
mately 500 respondents. For the months in which we millions of Iraqis cast ballots to elect members of the
had missing values, we used interpolated values. As newly formed Iraq Parliament. Public support for the
Figure 3 displays, public support for the war declined war was 39% in November 2005, but Iraq’s elections
over time from a high value of 70 in April 2003 to a boosted it to 46%.
low value of 35 in October 2006. Nonetheless, several As proposed in our theory section, we consider two
major events impacted public support for the war in measures of adversity. The first is the cumulative
both positive and negative ways during the observa- number of U.S. troop deaths caused by car bombs,
tion period. Between November and December 2003, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), mortar attacks,
public support increased from 52% to 59%, likely as a and helicopter losses. We refer to these as deaths
result of news on the capture of Saddam Hussein. caused by IEDs. We focus on IED deaths because they
Four months later, the dissemination of pictures docu- became associated with the guerrilla strategy pursued
menting abuses by American soldiers in the Abu by the insurgents. IEDs, in particular, exposed the vul-
Ghraib prison contributed to public support for the nerability of the U.S. military because they were diffi-
war declining to 49%. Public support for the war cult to locate and could be activated wirelessly. The
Figure 3. (Color online) Public Support for the Iraq War, April 2003 to December 2006
sense of vulnerability created by IEDs is palpable in for the possibility that the release of information about
the words of a sergeant who admitted that “we were performance emerging in the data could be biased by
all very fearful of the thought of being blown up, dis- Rumsfeld’s personal characteristics, we include in our
figured by these bombs. However, there’s nothing we analyses the percentage of briefings in which Secre-
could do” (ABC News 2006). These deaths accounted tary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld spoke during any
for more than 50% of all U.S. deaths incurred in the particular month—Rumsfeld’s speeches. Additionally,
Iraq War. The Department of Defense and the Direc- we included U.S. deaths caused by “friendly” fire—
torate for Information Operations and Reports are the nonhostile fire deaths—which could be salient indicators
sources of information regarding U.S. troop deaths. that may have influenced the propensity of organiza-
Because this variable is a cumulative count of troops tional members to disclose war performance.
killed, higher values indicate more adverse outcomes. The release of sensitive information about perform-
In supplemental analyses, not reported here, we ance may have been influenced by war protests, as
obtained the same results when we computed U.S. noted by social movement scholars (McDonnell and
troop deaths as a percentage of U.S. troops, as one King 2013, McDonnell et al. 2015). Because the war in
could imagine that U.S. troop deaths are dependent Iraq was met with substantial resistance from acti-
on the number of U.S. troops on the battlefield. vists, we controlled for the number of war-related pro-
The second measure of adversity represents a tests. In line with prior research (e.g., McDonnell and
change in the level of resources apportioned to the King 2013), we compiled this information by search-
military budget, measured as the DOD budget increase. ing keywords, such as “Iraq protests” and “Iraq War,”
The DOD budget measures the total resources that go from the Factiva database for the corresponding
to military-related expenditures. Thus, we expect that period. Our search encompassed several media out-
an increase in the military budget would boost organi- lets, including national newspapers, such as the New
zational members, thus increasing the extent to which York Times, Wall Street Journal, and Washington Post.
they release information about war performance met- We also controlled for important goals related to
rics in response to public support. We obtained these the Iraq War. First, we included the level of Iraq’s oil
data from The Costs of War Project from The Watson production. Iraq’s oil production reflected—although
Institute of International and Public Affairs at Brown only partially and speculatively—the extent to which
University (Crawford 2018). an armed invasion of Iraq was able to secure an inflow
To capture the degree of spokespersons’ power (to test of oil. Securing oil was perceived as critical for the
Hypothesis 3), we manually coded the ranks of all U.S. Government, and insiders have recognized that
military officials who participated in press releases “oil did play a role in the decision to go to war”
throughout our study period. As Berg et al. (2010, p. (Vogler 2017, p. 14) and that “it cannot be denied that
160) suggest, “formal power most often accrues to the Bush administration had close ties to the oil
those who hold positions in the organization that industry” (Walker 2019, p. 94). These accounts suggest
reflect higher rank or position in the organization” that securing oil inflow was a critical indicator during
(see also Ragins and Sundstrom 1989, p. 51). Military the war (and a central goal of reconstruction) and that
officials with high rank derive greater power both increases in oil production would be seen as a positive
from authority (i.e., their formal position) and from indicator. We obtained this information from the Fed-
their ability to provide or withhold resources as well eral Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
as provide punishments to those lower in the hier- Similarly, we control for prices of the Dow Jones
archy. The regular Army ranks range from O1 to O10, Industrial Average Index. We focused on this indicator
and the lowest rank in our data set is O3. Thus, we because it is an often-used measure of economic
awarded each official a number analogous to that of strength during times of war (Schneider and Troeger
their military rank. For instance, Richard Myers, an 2006). Furthermore, the Dow Index is sensitive to dis-
O10 four-star general, was given a 10. Les Brownlee, ruptive events, such as wars (Charles and Darné 2014)
an O6 Colonel, was coded as six. The most powerful and thus, provides a good indicator of investors’ sen-
individual, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, timents. In supplemental analyses not reported here,
was coded as 11. Our final measure represents the we obtained the same results when using the Stand-
sum of all ranks of spokespersons in a given speech. ard & Poor‘s 500 and National Association of Secur-
We obtained the same results when we measured this ities Dealers Automated Quotation indices.
variable using the rank of the most powerful person Additionally, we included the total spending on
involved in the speech. Iraq reconstruction assistance. We obtained these data
from the “Iraq: Reconstruction Assistance” report, ela-
Control Variables. On average, 4.51 speeches were borated by Curt Tarnoff for members of the U.S. Con-
coded for each month, and Secretary of Defense Don- gress (Tarnoff 2009). This report provides estimates of
ald Rumsfeld gave 52% of these speeches. To control U.S. financial aid to Iraq (in millions of dollars), which
was intended to stabilize the country, recover the eco- and rebuilding performance metrics being mentioned in
nomic infrastructure, and introduce a representative the 46 months included in our observation period. Next,
government (among other goals). Finally, we include we employ Poisson regression models with robust stand-
month fixed effects in all our models. ard errors, where the dependent variable is the number
of mentions given to reconstruction and rebuilding met-
Analyses. To test Hypotheses 1–3, our first step is to rics in the press briefings held in any given month.
use logistic regressions with the robust standard Again, because these are monthly models, the sample
errors of White (1980) where the dependent variable is size is 46.

the probability that any given combat performance
metric is mentioned in the press briefings held in any Results
given month. Because some of our variables are Tables 3 and 4 provide descriptive statistics for models
highly correlated, we refrained from including all on the release of performance information at the metric
interactions in one model to avoid multicollinearity. and month levels, respectively. Table 5 displays the
The maximum Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) in our results of the logistic regression on the release of infor-
models was 8.9 (Dow Jones Index); the mean VIF was mation about combat performance. A look at the con-
3.64, below the rule of thumb cutoff of 10. As we trol variables reveals that Rumsfeld’s involvement in
noted, performance metrics identified by coders var- the press briefing did not alter the disclosure of combat
ied regarding abstraction and frequency. To control performance metrics. However, the total number of
for this variance, these models include combat metric war protests displays significant coefficients across the
fixed effects. The sample size for this analysis is 644, different models; protests were associated with an
which results from estimating the probability of any increase in the release of information about combat per-
of the 14 combat performance metrics being men- formance. Regarding our hypotheses, in Model (2) we
tioned in the 46 months included in our observation see that the coefficient of public support for the war is
period. Our second step is to employ Poisson regres- positive and significant (b 0.067, p 0.005). This effect
sion models with robust standard errors to examine of public opinion is also sizeable. A one-standard
the relationships between the independent variables deviation (SD) increase in war support increased the
and the count of combat metrics in the press briefings likelihood of releasing information about combat per-
held in a given month. Because these are monthly formance by 39%. This result is consistent with the
models, our sample is 46, which is the number of month-level models, as shown in Model (2) of Table 6.
months covered by our analysis. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 received support.
To test Hypotheses 4 and 5, we follow the same Hypothesis 2 predicts that adversity negatively
approach used to test Hypotheses 1–3. We start by run- moderates the positive relationship between public
ning logistic regressions in which the dependent variable support and the release of information about combat
is the probability that any given reconstruction and re- performance. We tested Hypothesis 2 using two dif-
building performance metric (i.e., progress indicator) is ferent proxies for adversity: IED deaths and DOD
mentioned in a given month’s press briefings. The sam- budget increase. In Model (3) of Table 5, the coefficient
ple size for this analysis is 368, which results from esti- of the interaction term between IED deaths and
mating the probability of any of the eight reconstruction public support is negative and significant (b −0.161,
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Analyses of Release of Performance Information (Metric Level), N 644
No. Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1 Combat performance 0.239 0.426

2 Reconstruction and rebuilding performance 0.358 0.480
3 War support 48.347 8.707 0.176 −0.025
4 IED deaths 0.391 0.333 −0.064 0.181 −0.641
5 DOD budget 19.9 10.301 0.171 0.028 0.625 −0.582
6 Power spokespersons 45.847 31.624 0.178 0.224 −0.026 0.311 0.098
7 Rumsfeld’s speeches 0.528 0.357 0.016 −0.185 0.461 −0.688 0.273 −0.237
8 Nonhostile deaths 10.695 5.089 0.073 0.022 0.359 −0.374 0.503 −0.051 0.117
9 War protests 1.5 4.023 0.103 0.083 0.018 0.068 0.068 0.160 −0.067 −0.103
10 Iraq oil production 1.765 0.502 −0.191 −0.056 −0.683 0.449 −0.679 −0.267 −0.272 −0.551 0.005
11 Dow Jones 10.146 0.915 −0.164 0.056 −0.751 0.835 −0.737 −0.080 −0.526 −0.427 −0.062 0.691
12 Rebuilding assistance 8.707 5.904 −0.116 −0.182 −0.090 −0.312 −0.548 −0.512 0.332 −0.192 −0.131 0.370 0.041
Notes. IED deaths and Dow Jones are expressed in thousands, Iraq oil production is in millions of barrels, and rebuilding assistance is in billions of
dollars. For correlations between the reconstruction and rebuilding performance (variable 2) and independent and control variables (variables 3–12),
N 368.
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Analyses of Release of Performance Information (Month Level), N 46
No. Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1 Combat performance 3.347 2.359

2 Reconstruction and rebuilding performance 4.478 3.462 0.343
3 War support 48.347 8.707 0.450 −0.301
4 IED deaths 0.391 0.333 −0.164 0.600 −0.641
5 DOD budget 19.9 10.301 0.437 −0.081 0.625 −0.582
6 Power spokespersons 45.847 31.624 0.455 0.683 −0.026 0.311 0.098

7 Rumsfeld’s speeches 0.528 0.357 0.040 −0.487 0.461 −0.688 0.273 −0.237
8 Nonhostile deaths 10.695 5.089 0.188 −0.050 0.359 −0.374 0.503 −0.051 0.117
9 War protests 1.5 4.023 0.264 0.123 0.018 0.068 0.068 0.160 −0.067 −0.103
10 Iraq oil production 1.765 0.502 −0.491 −0.062 −0.683 0.449 −0.679 −0.267 −0.272 −0.551 0.005
11 Dow Jones 10.146 0.915 −0.422 0.283 −0.751 0.835 −0.737 −0.080 −0.526 −0.427 −0.062 0.691
12 Rebuilding assistance 8.707 5.904 −0.298 −0.460 −0.090 −0.312 −0.548 −0.512 0.332 −0.192 −0.131 0.370 0.041
Note. IED deaths and Dow Jones are expressed in thousands, Iraq oil production is in millions of barrels, and rebuilding assistance is in billions of
dollars.
p 0.016). When public support for the war was high deviation above mean) than when they were at the
(one SD above the mean), Pentagon spokespersons mean. Figure 4(a) graphs this interaction effect, show-
were 37% less likely to mention a war performance ing that the likelihood of releasing information about
metric when IED deaths were high (one standard sensitive combat performance increases as public
Table 5. Logit Models of Release of Information About Combat Performance Metrics
Variables Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5)
Main effect
Public support for the war (Hypothesis 1) 0.067** 0.143*** −0.131* −0.020
(0.024) (0.042) (0.064) (0.039)
Interactions
Public support × IED deaths (Hypothesis 2) −0.161*
(0.065)
Public support × DOD budget (Hypothesis 2) 0.009***
(0.003)
Public support × Power spokespersons (Hypothesis 3) 0.002**
(0.001)
Independent variables and controls
IED deaths −0.715 7.443* 2.173 −3.354
(1.791) (3.728) (2.091) (2.065)
DOD budget increase −0.040 0.001 −0.313** −0.059
(0.063) (0.066) (0.105) (0.064)
Power spokespersons 0.030*** 0.028*** 0.032*** −0.045†
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.025)
Rumsfeld’s speeches −0.155 0.524 0.357 0.641 0.671
(0.416) (0.517) (0.518) (0.511) (0.513)
Nonhostile fire deaths −0.006 0.062† 0.093* 0.096* 0.064†
(0.029) (0.036) (0.040) (0.040) (0.038)
Number of war-related protests 0.072* 0.100** 0.112** 0.109** 0.089**
(0.030) (0.033) (0.034) (0.035) (0.033)
Iraq oil production −0.601 0.339 0.626 1.069* 0.293
(0.381) (0.468) (0.492) (0.541) (0.475)
Dow Jones −0.341 −0.071 0.416 1.038† 1.072†
(0.224) (0.417) (0.479) (0.546) (0.566)
Reconstruction assistance −0.025 −0.013 0.062 0.254* −0.063
(0.022) (0.086) (0.093) (0.122) (0.090)
Constant 2.487 −6.627 −17.844* −16.881* −12.856*
(2.205) (5.656) (7.634) (6.935) (6.169)
Month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Combat metric fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 644 644 644 644 644
McFadden’s pseudo-R2 0.184 0.225 0.234 0.241 0.237
Note. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
*p < 0.05 (two-tailed tests); **p < 0.01 (two-tailed tests); ***p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests); †p < 0.1 (two-tailed tests).
Table 6. Poisson Models of Release of Information About Combat Performance Metrics in a Month
Variables Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5)
Main effect
Public support for the war (Hypothesis 1) 0.041*** 0.076*** −0.053 0.007
(0.011) (0.020) (0.040) (0.024)
Interactions
Public support × IED deaths (Hypothesis 2) −0.082*
(0.040)
Public support × DOD budget (Hypothesis 2) 0.004*
(0.002)
Public support × Power spokespersons (Hypothesis 3) 0.001†
(0.000)
IED deaths (in thousands) −0.736 3.639 0.820 −1.311
(1.068) (2.819) (1.742) (1.151)
DOD budget increase −0.047 −0.019 −0.153*** −0.045
(0.038) (0.045) (0.046) (0.038)
Power spokespersons 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.017*** −0.007
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.016)
Rumsfeld’s speeches −0.046 0.373 0.240 0.348 0.377
(0.330) (0.379) (0.308) (0.310) (0.333)
Nonhostile fire deaths −0.001 0.042† 0.055* 0.051* 0.039†
(0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.021) (0.022)
Number of war-related protests 0.041** 0.061*** 0.067*** 0.065*** 0.057***
(0.016) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012)
Iraq oil production −0.380 0.260 0.363 0.491* 0.184
(0.279) (0.243) (0.222) (0.233) (0.269)
Dow Jones (in thousands) −0.168 −0.153 0.093 0.315 0.184
(0.214) (0.236) (0.286) (0.320) (0.349)
Rebuilding assistance (in thousands) −0.017 −0.037 0.012 0.096 −0.041
(0.016) (0.056) (0.072) (0.099) (0.056)
Constant 3.655† 0.322 −5.362 −3.846 −1.271
(2.056) (3.080) (4.731) (3.788) (3.207)
Month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 46 46 46 46 46
McFadden’s pseudo-R2 0.165 0.261 0.274 0.282 0.270
*p < 0.05 (two-tailed tests); **p < 0.01 (two-tailed tests); ***p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests); †p < 0.1 (two-tailed tests).
support increases, but it increases to a lesser extent show a similar pattern, as reported in Models (3) and (4)
when adversity is high. of Table 6. This evidence, therefore, lends strong support
Model (4) provides support for the other adversity to Hypothesis 2.
indicator, showing that the interaction term between Hypothesis 3 predicts that the power of spokesper-
the DOD budget and public support is positive and sons positively moderates the effect of public support
significant (b 0.009, p < 0.001). Here, the interaction on the disclosure of combat performance. Model (5) in
coefficient is positive because a higher increase in the Table 5 shows that the interaction term between
budget suggests a lower degree of adversity. Indeed, spokespersons’ power and public support is positive
when public support was high, spokespersons were and significant (b 0.002, p 0.005). Indeed, when
8% more likely to discuss war performance metrics public support for the war was high, Pentagon spokes-
when they received a substantial budget increase (one persons were 90% more likely to discuss combat
standard deviation above the mean) compared with performance metrics when their power was high (one
an average budget increase. Figure 4(b) shows that the standard deviation above the mean) compared with
likelihood of discussing a combat metric increases as when they held average levels of power. Figure 5 graphs
public support increases, but, when the DOD budget the interaction effect of spokespersons’ power and pub-
increase is high (i.e., adversity is low), disclosure of lic support on the likelihood that members discussed
such metrics increases at a faster rate. combat performance. This graph shows that the likeli-
Together, Models (3) and (4) indicate that the positive hood of discussing combat performance increases as
effect of public support on Pentagon officials’ release of public support increases, but it increases at a faster rate
information about sensitive combat performance was when power is high. This result is also replicated in our
reduced by adversity. The aggregate month-level models month-level models, as shown in Model (5) of Table 6,
Figure 4. (Color online) (a) Effect of IED Deaths and Public Support on the Release of Information About Combat Performance
(a) (b)
Note. (b) Effect of DOD budget increase and public support on the release of information about combat performance.
although significance levels are reduced to 10%. Overall, such metrics (b −0.026, p 0.029) and a significant
these findings support Hypothesis 3. and negative coefficient of the interaction between com-
We now turn our attention to empirical tests of bat metrics and public support (b −0.007, p 0.039).
Hypotheses 4 and 5 concerning the strategic use of Offering a visual representation of this interaction effect
alternate frames of performance emphasizing progress. reported in Table 8, Figure 6 shows that mentions of
Table 7 reports the results of the logistic regressions, in reconstruction and rebuilding metrics included in press
which the dependent variable is the release of informa- briefings decrease as public support increases, as pro-
tion about any reconstruction and rebuilding metric in posed in Hypothesis 4, and this decrease is significantly
a given month’s press briefings, whereas Table 8 reports steeper when mentions of combat metrics are high, as
the results of the Poisson models of the count of recon- proposed in Hypothesis 5. Notably, when mentions of
struction and rebuilding metrics mentioned in a combat metrics are high, mentions of progress metrics
month’s briefings. The signs of the coefficients of the decrease by 40% when public support increases by one
independent variables of interest are in line with standard deviation. Consistent with the view advanced
Hypotheses 4 and 5, but the coefficients are significant in this study that supportive public opinion increases
only in the count models in Table 8. So, the probability transparency, Pentagon spokespersons released infor-
of releasing information about any reconstruction and mation about reconstruction and rebuilding mostly
rebuilding metric is not significantly related to public when simultaneously facing lower public support levels
support, but the total number of progress metrics men- and disclosing sensitive combat indicators.
tioned is. In Table 8, we see a significant and negative In retrospect, these results point to a scenario that,
coefficient of public support for the overall count of although partly unexpected, is still consistent with
Figure 5. (Color online) Effect of Spokespersons’ Power and Public Support on the Release of Information About Combat
Performance
Table 7. Logit Models of Release of Information About Reconstruction and Rebuilding

Performance Metrics
Variables Model (1) Model (2)
Main effect
Public support for the war (Hypothesis 4) −0.005 0.036
(0.029) (0.056)
Interaction
Public support × Combat metrics (Hypothesis 5) −0.009
(0.010)
Combat metrics 0.074 0.549
(0.105) (0.543)
IED deaths (in thousands) 0.021 0.024
(0.015) (0.015)
DOD budget increase −0.046 −0.062
(0.048) (0.050)
Power spokespersons 0.018* 0.018*
(0.009) (0.009)
Rumsfeld’s speeches −0.097 −0.308
(0.601) (0.639)
Nonhostile fire deaths 0.007 −0.004
(0.045) (0.045)
Number of war-related protests −0.009 −0.017
(0.044) (0.044)
Iraq oil production −0.544 −0.549
(0.592) (0.588)
Dow Jones (in thousands) −0.292 −0.620
(0.566) (0.627)
Rebuilding assistance (in thousands) −0.068 −0.091
(0.065) (0.067)
Month fixed effects Yes Yes
Combat metric fixed effects Yes Yes
N 368 368
McFadden’s pseudo-R2 0.303 0.305
*p < 0.05 (two-tailed tests).
our suggestion that spokespersons use alternate per- the speeches referred to combat and reconstruction as
formance frames to preserve external support. When occurring simultaneously.
support is low, spokespersons obfuscate the release of
information about sensitive performance metrics by Robustness Checks
hammering home the point that progress is being Although our analysis implies a potential causal rela-
achieved by releasing information about a greater tionship where the arrow goes from public support
number of progress metrics than they would usually for the war to the release of sensitive performance
consider including in a month’s press briefings. In information, one can easily conceive of a relationship
those situations, spokespersons highlight a large set of in which the arrow goes in the other direction. We
progress metrics to amplify the saliency of this infor- consider this potential endogeneity by using an
mation to the public. These results lend qualified sup- instrumental variable approach in which a variable
port to Hypotheses 4 and 5. unrelated to the outcome variable is used as a predic-
As a whole, the data we report rule out the possibil- tor (instrument) of the explanatory variable suspected
ity that the negative relationship between public to be a source of endogeneity.
support and mentions of combat metrics reflects the Our instrument is the monthly volume of media
passage of time. By that account, over time, as the war coverage of the Iraq War as evidenced by the minutes
progressed, combat became less relevant, and recon- of the weeknight news broadcasts of ABC, CBS, and
struction and rebuilding took center stage. That NBC news dedicated to coverage of the Iraq War (i.e.,
account, however, is at odds with the way the war invasion, occupation, insurgency). Although media
unfolded. Combat did not become less important as coverage is independent of whether news is positive
time went by. Indeed, IED deaths did not decline, as or negative, it has been found to be positively linked
shown in Figure 2. In addition, the interaction effect in to public support for the war, presumably because it
support of Hypothesis 5 implies that at least some of increases the salience of the war among members of
Table 8. Poisson Models of Release of Information About Reconstruction and

Rebuilding Performance Metrics in a Month
Variables Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
Main effect
Public support for the war (Hypothesis 4) −0.026* 0.009
(0.012) (0.022)
Interaction
Public support × Combat metrics (Hypothesis 5) −0.007*
(0.003)
Combat metrics 0.055 0.388*
(0.041) (0.153)
IED deaths (in thousands) 2.009* 2.003** 2.187**
(0.919) (0.769) (0.699)
DOD budget increase 0.004 0.001 −0.003
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Power spokespersons 0.015*** 0.010** 0.011**
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Rumsfeld’s speeches 0.095 0.108 −0.079
(0.345) (0.318) (0.326)
Nonhostile fire deaths 0.018 0.012 0.006
(0.021) (0.023) (0.021)
Number of war-related protests 0.005 −0.006 −0.012
(0.009) (0.013) (0.013)
Iraq oil production −0.127 −0.330 −0.249
(0.225) (0.223) (0.215)
Dow Jones (in thousands) −0.357† −0.426* −0.627**
(0.195) (0.217) (0.238)
Rebuilding assistance (in thousands) 0.007 −0.004 −0.008
(0.047) (0.047) (0.044)
Constant 3.632 6.111* 6.545*
(2.485) (2.864) (2.919)
Month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
N 46 46 46
McFadden’s pseudo-R2 0.386 0.394 0.400
*p < 0.05 (two-tailed tests); **p < 0.01 (two-tailed tests); ***p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests);
†
p < 0.1 (two-tailed tests).
the public (Gelpi et al. 2009). The source of data regard- distinct indicators: media coverage of combat during
ing media coverage is Andrew Tyndall, producer of the the Iraq War and media coverage of the Iraq War (com-
Tyndall Report (http://www.tyndallreport.com), who bat included). Whereas media coverage of combat
generously made available monthly data regarding two displays a small but significant correlation with the
Figure 6. (Color online) Effect of Mentions of Combat Indicators and Public Support on the Release of Information About
Reconstruction and Rebuilding
disclosure of combat metrics, media coverage of the media companies (Leetaru 2018), little is known about
Iraq War has a positive but not significant correlation the influence of these important aggregate public views
with the disclosure of combat metrics (r 0.037, not sig- on organizational actions.
nificant). Additionally, the p-value of Cragg–Donald’s Our theory and empirical results demonstrate
Wald F weak instrument test statistic is below 0.001, starkly different implications regarding the use of
rejecting the null hypothesis that the instrument is weak. defensive impression management tactics based on
We, therefore, use media coverage of the Iraq War as the whether an organization receives support from public
instrument variable. The average media coverage was opinion. Relying on the second Iraq War as an empiri-
226 minutes, with a minimum value of 49 minutes in cal context and examining how Pentagon’s spokesper-
July 2006 and a maximum value of 710 in March 2003. sons communicate about war performance in press
To study the effect of public support—instrumented briefings, we find that public support for the war sig-
by media coverage—on the release of information nificantly increased the release of information about
about sensitive performance metrics, such as combat sensitive combat performance indicators. Further-
metrics, we use a two-stage least squares. In the first more, we show that the positive relationship between
stage, we regress public opinion support on media public support and the disclosure of combat perform-
coverage, including all covariates and year and per- ance information decreased with adversity in the
formance metric fixed effects. As expected, media form of higher U.S. deaths and lower organizational
coverage significantly increases war support (b resources and increased when the power of spokes-
0.016, p < 0.001). The predicted values from this equa- persons holding press briefings was higher. We also
tion provide “instrumented” public support (i.e., the report evidence that when the disclosure of sensitive
exogenous component of public support for war). In combat information was high, public support lowered
the second stage, we then reestimate our models using the strategic use of alternate performance frames
“public support (instrumented)” instead of public that placed greater emphasis on progress indicators,
support. Interactions are also calculated using the such as those related to Iraq’s reconstruction and
instrumented public support variable. Because of rebuilding.
space constraints, we present these results in Table A1 This paper makes several contributions. First, we
in the online appendix. Reassuringly, the results in provide a deeper understanding of the relationship
between public opinion and impression management.
this alternative specification remain entirely consistent
Our purpose was to theorize and empirically show
with our previous results.
that public opinion influences the use of impression
The pattern of the results remains unchanged also
management tactics and that this relationship is con-
when we conducted robustness checks that used alter-
tingent upon various factors. In this way, we comple-
native measures of IED deaths and the power of
ment prior impression management research, which
spokespersons and eliminated some of the control vari-
has focused on pressures stemming from actors, such
ables to mitigate concerns of overfitting. Also, we found
as activists and social movements (Elsbach et al. 1998,
that a sudden increase in the number of IED deaths
McDonnell and King 2013), journalists (Westphal et al.
(over 75% increase from prior month) reduced the posi-
2012), financial analysts (Westphal and Graebner
tive effect of public support on mentioning combat met-
2010, Busenbark et al. 2017), and foreign competitors
rics, although this effect was not greater than the effect
(Ravasi and Schultz 2006), but has neglected broader,
of the measure of cumulative deaths. All these analyses collective pressures from sources, such as public opin-
are available from the authors upon request. ion—a source that has gained preeminence over the
last decade. Adding consideration of public opinion
Discussion to this literature is important not only because of its
This study seeks to shed new light on how organiza- growing pervasiveness and relevance but also, because
tions respond to public opinion by examining public organizations often confront external influences that
opinion’s influence on organizations’ propensity to are not uniform. To the extent that supportive public
disclose performance information to the public. opinion serves as a buffer from perceptions of threat, as
Although researchers have noted the increasingly crit- this study indicates, it may attenuate the use of impres-
ical role of public opinion in assessing controversial sion management expected to stem from pressures gen-
practices in large private companies (e.g., Clemente erated by activists, media, or regulators. In fragmented
and Roulet 2015) and news media continuously report environments in which organizations are exposed to
on changes in public opinion regarding controversial scrutiny and support from actors that are not aligned in
matters, such as drug pricing by pharmaceutical com- their assessments, strong support from the public may
panies (Hancock 2017), the disclosure of nutritional underlie variations in transparency.
information by food companies (Surowiecki 2016), Second, we provide relatively rare evidence that
and the collection of private information by social public opinion influences whether an organization
will increase transparency by varying the release of adds to that body of work by shedding light on how
performance information. By doing so, we validate the management of external perceptions unfolds once
the early intuition of Pfeffer (1981) that impression a war begins and how organizational and contextual
management may consist of avoiding assessment factors shape the direction and intensity of the
through the omission of publicly sensitive performance response to public opinion.
information. However, our study extends this insight Regarding the potential limitations of our findings,
by providing some evidence that unsupportive public although management scholars have relied on
opinion may also lead organizational members to rely extreme events, such as wars, for studying diverse
on alternate performance frames that highlight prog- phenomena, such as industry emergence (Baum and
ress, especially when simultaneously disclosing sensi- McGahan 2013), the effect of organizational structure
tive performance information. In the Iraq War context, on attention (Jacobides 2007), and recovery from
organizational members mitigated the potential impact psychological injury (de Rond and Lok 2016), the unique-
of sensitive combat information by focusing on the ness of our empirical setting can limit the generaliz-
more positive reconstruction and rebuilding indicators, ability of our findings to other contexts. Because wars
arguably to obfuscate information that threatens exter- involve death, destruction, and the fate of nations, it
nal support. We view our analysis of alternate frames is difficult to dispute that they subject policy makers
as exploratory because spokespersons for the Depart- to high levels of external pressures uncommon in
ment of Defense may have used other tactics to present other settings. Moreover, our window of examination
and frame performance information besides what we of the Iraq War occurs in close proximity to two presi-
were able to capture in our data. Nonetheless, we hope dential elections. It is, therefore, plausible that the
that our results will encourage scholars to further in- effect of public opinion on the release of performance
vestigate how organizational members articulate differ- information emerging in our data may be less potent
ent types of performance information in contexts in in other settings. Additionally, it is important to exer-
which organizational members exercise considerable cise caution in generalizing our findings to other
discretion over the content of the communication. For impression management tactics. Limiting the release
instance, in corporations, organizational members may of sensitive performance information and deploying
manage the release of performance information to alternate performance frames may be just two of the
make overall outcomes appear better than they really impression management tactics organizations use to
are through a combination of tactics, such as selectively influence external perceptions. Pentagon officials may
disclosing performance metrics, using persuasive lan- have used other impression management tactics while
guage, or changing performance reference groups (Jor- talking in public about performance.
dan and Audia 2012, Marquis et al. 2016, Pan et al. A fruitful avenue for future research consists of
2018, de Vaan et al. 2019, Audia et al. 2022). Building on extending research on the role of public opinion to the
this study and adding to other work on the strategic private sector. As both governments and businesses
use of frames in organizations (Rhee and Fiss 2014, increasingly espouse values of transparency and
Nadkarni et al. 2019, Blagoeva et al. 2020), future openness (Van der Wal et al. 2006), they will likely
research might consider whether and when corpora- face more intense scrutiny from the general public
tions vary the release of information about progress (Wang et al. 2021). Consider the example of Big Tech
indicators that signal getting closer to a desirable end firms. Public opinion polls show that Americans are
state. relatively split regarding the regulation (and eventual
Third, by applying theory from organizational re- dismantling) of Big Tech firms, including Amazon,
search on impression management to the study of the Google, Apple, and Facebook (Saad 2019). However,
Iraq War, this study yields new insights into how gov- as public opinion on this subject shifts, these firms
ernment organizations communicate during a war. may respond by altering their level of defensive
Political scientists recognize that the management of impression management tactics accordingly. Indeed,
external perceptions by the government is a critical some journalistic evidence suggests that some of these
activity in the conduct of a war, and much work firms already expect a turn in public opinion (because
focuses on how governments secure the necessary of growing public concerns regarding data privacy
support to initiate a war (e.g., Basile 2017). Addition- and tax avoidance schemes), which has led them to
ally, political scientists have studied the importance of launch anticipatory Public Relations (P.R.) tactics,
international institutions on public support for war such as paying newspapers to promote positive con-
(Grieco et al. 2011), how public opinion processes war tent about them or increasing their lobbying expendi-
outcomes through local (Gartner and Segura 2008) tures (The New Yorker 2019).
and personal lenses (Gartner 2008), and what factors Public opinion may also influence firm actions when
influence public sensitivity to sensitive outcomes, government regulation is limited or absent. Firms in
such as death counts (Gelpi et al. 2005). Our analysis agrichemical and food industries, for example, face
strong public opposition that may influence their choices public opinion influences impression management
and actions. According to the Pew Research Center, 51% and promotes accountability to the public.
of the public in the United States believes that genetically
modified foods “pose a serious risk to their health.”2 Acknowledgments
This public sentiment has led firms in this field to engage The authors thank Barry Staw and Phil Tetlock for their com-
ments on earlier versions of the paper, Wes Sine for his excel-
in various types of strategic actions, from promoting sci-
lent editorial guidance, and three anonymous reviewers for
entists’ views that genetically modified foods are safe to
offering many valuable suggestions that helped strengthen the

engaging in what watchdog organizations position as paper. The authors also benefited from suggestions made by
impression management tactics, which include P.R. cam- seminar participants at Cornell University, the Massachusetts
paigns, lobbying, and hiding information regarding the Institute of Technology Sloan School of Management, and the
health risks of such products (Ruskin 2015). Nonetheless, Yale School of Management. Pino Audia and Horacio Rous-
some firms in the industry are willing to engage with the seau contributed equally to the paper.
public by increasing transparency, suggesting that not
all firms embrace impression management tactics to the Endnotes
1
same extent. For instance, Hershey Foods has opted to The list of 32 metrics is available from the authors upon request.
share ingredients and sourcing information online to 2
See https://www.pewresearch.org/science/2018/11/19/public-
regain the trust of consumers.3 This example suggests perspectives-on-food-risks/.
3
that future work may build on this study to further dis- See https://www.foodbusinessnews.net/articles/11532-transparency-
entangle the link between public opinion and impression critical-for-the-future-of-food.
management in nongovernmental organizations, explor-
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Audia Et Al 2022 Public Opinion and Impression Management in The Communication of Performance During The Second Iraq War

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Public Opinion and Impression Management in the

Pino G. Audia,a,* Horacio E. Rousseau,b Mary Kate Stimmlerc

organization not only by reducing the disclosure of sen-

Table 1. Examples of Performance Metrics Used in Pentagon Press Brieﬁngs

Table 2. Examples of Block Quotes with and Without Performance Metrics

errors of White (1980) where the dependent variable is size is 46.

No. Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

1 Combat performance 0.239 0.426

No. Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

1 Combat performance 3.347 2.359

6 Power spokespersons 45.847 31.624 0.455 0.683 −0.026 0.311 0.098

Table 5. Logit Models of Release of Information About Combat Performance Metrics

Table 7. Logit Models of Release of Information About Reconstruction and Rebuilding

Variables Model (1) Model (2)

Table 8. Poisson Models of Release of Information About Reconstruction and

Variables Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)

offering many valuable suggestions that helped strengthen the

struggle-for-iraq-occupation-4-us-killed-ambush-iraq-mob-drags- Eisenhardt KM, Graebner ME (2007) Theory building from cases:

41(9):1712–1742. through illegitimate actions: A marriage of institutional and

nytimes.com/2017/09/23/sunday-review/prescription-drugs- Oliver C (1991) Strategic responses to institutional processes. Acad.

Jacobides MG (2007) The inherent limits of organizational structure org/is-lack-of-openness-and-transparency-in-government-a-

organizations: A mixed-methods study of the global arms

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