Harvey v. Santiago, G.R. No.

82544, June 28, 1988

There can be no question that the right against unreasonable searches and seizures
guaranteed by Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, is available to all persons, including
aliens, whether accused of crime or not.
As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched and as has been held,
"reasonableness" is the touchstone of the validity of a government search or intrusion.30 And
whether a search at issue hews to the reasonableness standard is judged by the balancing of
the government - mandated intrusion on the individual's privacy interest against the promotion of
some compelling state interest. In the criminal context, reasonableness requires showing of
probable cause to be personally determined by a judge. Given that the drug - testing policy for
employees--and students for that matter--under RA 9165 is in the nature of administrative
search needing what was referred to in Vernonia as "swift and informal disciplinary procedures,"
the probable - cause standard is not required or even practicable. Be that as it may, the review
should focus on the reasonableness of the challenged administrative search in question.

The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of the privacy interest
upon which the drug testing, which effects a search within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the
Constitution, intrudes. In this case, the office or workplace serves as the backdrop for the
analysis of the privacy expectation of the employees and the reasonableness of drug testing
requirement. The employees' privacy interest in an office is to a large extent circumscribed by
the company's work policies, the collective bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by
management and the bargaining unit, and the inherent right of the employer to maintain
discipline and efficiency in the workplace. Their privacy expectation in a regulated office
environment is, in fine, reduced; and a degree of impingement upon such privacy has been
upheld.

In the case of students, the constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless
drug testing for students emanates primarily from the waiver by the students of their right to
privacy when they seek entry to the school, and from their voluntarily submitting their persons to
the parental authority of school authorities. In the case of private and public employees, the
constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing proceeds
from the reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement.

Case: Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)

Facts: Charles Katz was suspected of transmitting wagering information over the phone, so the
FBI installed a listening device on the outside of a public phone booth that he regularly used.
The FBI agents recorded his conversations and used them as evidence to convict him of illegal
gambling activities.

Issue: Whether the recordings of Katz's conversations made by the FBI constituted a search
under the Fourth Amendment.
Holding: The Supreme Court held that the recordings of Katz's conversations constituted a
search under the Fourth Amendment.

Reasoning: The Court rejected the government's argument that a physical intrusion into the
phone booth was necessary to constitute a search. Instead, the Court emphasized that the
Fourth Amendment protects not only the person but also the sanctity of a person's private
conversations and information. The Court established that a search occurs when the
government violates a person's reasonable expectation of privacy, which can extend to public
places under certain circumstances. The Court concluded that Katz had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the phone booth, as evidenced by his efforts to keep his conversations
private by closing the door and covering the phone's transmitter.

Impact: The Katz case expanded the scope of the Fourth Amendment's protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures. It established that a search can occur even in public
places if an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy. The case has had a significant
impact on privacy law, particularly in the realm of electronic surveillance.

Pollo v. Constantino-David, G.R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011

(1) Did petitioner have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and computer files?; and
(2) Was the search authorized by the CSC Chair, the copying of the contents of the hard drive
on petitioner’s computer reasonable in its inception and scope?

1. Petitioner failed to prove that he had an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy either
in his office or government-issued computer which contained his personal files.
Petitioner did not allege that he had a separate enclosed office which he did not share
with anyone, or that his office was always locked and not open to other employees or
visitors. Neither did he allege that he used passwords or adopted any means to prevent
other employees from accessing his computer files. On the contrary, he submits that
being in the public assistance office of the CSC-ROIV, he normally would have visitors in
his office like friends, associates and even unknown people, whom he even allowed to
use his computer which to him seemed a trivial request.

2. A search by a government employer of an employee’s office is justified at inception when

there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the
employee is guilty of work-related misconduct.

Even conceding for a moment that there is no such administrative policy, there is no
doubt in the mind of the Commission that the search of Pollo’s computer has
successfully passed the test of reasonableness for warrantless searches in the
workplace as enunciated in the above-discussed American authorities. It bears
emphasis that the Commission pursued the search in its capacity as a government
employer and that it was undertaken in connection with an investigation involving
 a work-related misconduct, one of the circumstances exempted from the warrant
requirement.

The initial remote search of the hard drive of petitioner’s computer, as well as the
subsequent warrantless searches was held as valid under the O’Connor ruling that a
public employer can investigate work-related misconduct so long as any search is
justified at inception and is reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified
it in the first place.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated
October 11, 2007 and Resolution dated February 29, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 98224 are AFFIRMED.

Ratio: Determining the reasonableness of any search involves a twofold inquiry: first, one must
consider ‘whether the…action was justified at its inception,’ x x x ; second, one must determine
whether the search as actually conducted ‘was reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place,’

A "search" in the context of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence involves the examination or

inspection of an individual's property or belongings by a government entity, typically to uncover
evidence of misconduct or criminal activity.

Burgos v. Chief of Staff, G.R. No. L-64261, December 26, 1984

Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that
the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
The Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses
of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Search Warrants Nos. 20-82[a] and 20-82[b] issued by
respondent judge on December 7, 1982 are hereby declared null and void and are accordingly
set aside.

Microsoft Corp. v. Maxicorp, Inc., G.R. No. 140946, September 13, 2004

Probable cause means "such reasons, supported by facts and circumstances as will warrant a
cautious man in the belief that his action and the means taken in prosecuting it are legally just
and proper.” Thus, probable cause for a search warrant requires such facts and circumstances
that would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and
the objects sought in connection with that offense are in the place to be searched.

The judge determining probable cause must do so only after personally examining under oath
the complainant and his witnesses. The oath required must refer to "the truth of the facts within
the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to
convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the
issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause. The applicant must have personal
knowledge of the circumstances. "Reliable information" is insufficient. Mere affidavits are not
enough, and the judge must depose in writing the complainant and his witnesses.

During the preliminary examination, the RTC subjected the testimonies of the witnesses to the
requisite examination. NBI Agent Samiano testified that he saw Maxicorp display and offer for
sale counterfeit software in its premises. He also saw how the counterfeit software were
produced and packaged within Maxicorp’s premises. NBI Agent Samiano categorically stated
that he was certain the products were counterfeit because Maxicorp sold them to its customers
without giving the accompanying ownership manuals, license agreements and certificates of
authenticity.

Sacriz testified that during his visits to Maxicorp, he witnessed several instances when Maxicorp
installed petitioners’ software into computers it had assembled. Sacriz also testified that he saw
the sale of petitioners’ software within Maxicorp’s premises. Petitioners never authorized
Maxicorp to install or sell their software.

The testimonies of these two witnesses, coupled with the object and documentary evidence
they presented, are sufficient to establish the existence of probable cause. From what they have
witnessed, there is reason to believe that Maxicorp engaged in copyright infringement and unfair
competition to the prejudice of petitioners. Both NBI Agent Samiano and Sacriz were clear and
insistent that the counterfeit software were not only displayed and sold within Maxicorp’s
premises, they were also produced, packaged and in some cases, installed there.

The determination of probable cause does not call for the application of rules and standards of
proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits. As implied by the words
themselves, "probable cause" is concerned with probability, not absolute or even moral
certainty. The prosecution need not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt. The
standards of judgment are those of a reasonably prudent man, not the exacting calibrations of a
judge after a full-blown trial.

WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the instant petition. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 23 December 1998 and its Resolution dated 29 November 1999 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 44777 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE except with respect to articles seized under
paragraph (c) of Search Warrants Nos. 96-451, 96-452, 96-453 and 96-454. All articles
seized under paragraph (c) of the search warrants, not falling under paragraphs a, b, d, e
or f, are ordered returned to Maxicorp, Inc. immediately.

Castro v. Pabalan, G.R. No. L-28642, April 30, 1976

Facts:

Respondent Ernesto I. Lumang applied for a search warrant against petitioners Maria Castro
and Co Ling, alleging that they were in possession of narcotics and other contraband. The
application was supported by the joint affidavit of Sergeant Francisco C. Molina and Corporal
Lorenzo G. Apilado of the Philippine Constabulary. The search warrant was issued on the same
day for illegal traffic of narcotics and contraband, without specifying the particular offense and
without a detailed description of the place to be searched and the things to be seized.

Issue:

Whether the search warrant was issued upon probable cause, as required by the Constitution
and the Rules of Court.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that the search warrant was illegal due to lack of probable cause. The
Constitution requires that a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge. In this case, the application for the search warrant and the supporting
affidavit failed to allege specific acts performed by the petitioners that would constitute the
offenses imputed to them. The application and affidavit contained only abstract averments of
violations of laws without specifying the particular acts or omissions that constituted the
offenses.

This excerpt from the epochal opinion of former Chief Justice Concepcion in Stonehill v. Diokno
is highly relevant: "Two points must be stressed in connection with — this constitutional
mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by
the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly
describe the things to be seized. None of these requirements has been complied with in the
contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and
juridical persons therein named had committed a 'violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code.' In other words, no specific
offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense
committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the
warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the
introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular
acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws.

Another infirmity was the failure to comply with the basic procedural requisite that a search
warrant "shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense." Here
reference was made to "an illegal traffic of narcotics and contraband." The latter is a generic
term covering all goods exported from or imported into the country contrary to applicable
statutes. Necessarily then, more than one offense could arise from the activity designated as
illegal traffic of narcotics and contraband.

In conclusion, the court held that the search warrant was invalid for lack of probable cause and
specificity in describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized. The court quoted
Chief Justice Concepcion in Stonehill v. Diokno, stating that "no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and that
the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized." The court ordered the return of
certain seized items that were considered personal effects of the petitioners but upheld the
seizure of other goods that were forbidden by law.

Asian Surety v. Herrera, G.R. No. L-25232, December 20, 1973

A good and practical rule of thumb to measure the nearness of time given in the affidavit as to
the date of the alleged offense, and the time of making the affidavit is thus expressed: The
nearer the time at which the observation of the offense is alleged to have been made, the more
reasonable the conclusion of establishment of probable cause.

Alvarez v. CFI, G.R. No. L-45358, January 29, 1937

What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure in any particular case is

purely a judicial question, determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved,
including the purpose of the search, the presence or absence or probable cause, the manner in
which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the
articles procured.

In view of the foregoing and under the above-cited authorities, it appears that the affidavit, which
served as the exclusive basis of the search warrant, is insufficient and fatally defective by
reason of the manner in which the oath was made, and therefore, it is hereby held that the
search warrant in question and the subsequent seizure of the books, documents and other
papers are illegal and do not in any way warrant the deprivation to which the petitioner was
subjected.

Therefore, if the affidavit of the applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense
with that of other witnesses. Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent in this case was insufficient
because his knowledge of the facts was not personal but merely hearsay, it is the duty of the
judge to require the affidavit of one or more witnesses for the purpose of determining the
existence of probable cause to warrant the issuance of the search warrant. When the affidavit of
the applicant of the complaint contains sufficient facts within his personal and direct knowledge,
it is sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there exist probable cause; when the applicant's
knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses having a personal
knowledge of the fact is necessary. We conclude, therefore, that the warrant issued is likewise
illegal because it was based only on the affidavit of the agent who had no personal knowledge
of the facts.

The true test of sufficiency of a deposition or affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is
whether it has been drawn in a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and the affiant be held
liable for damage caused. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal
knowledge of the applicant for search warrant, and/or his witnesses, not of the facts merely reported
by a person whom one considers to be reliable.

The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner
or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the
individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable
cause.
That the search and seizure made are illegal for the following reasons: (a) Because the warrant
was based solely upon the affidavit of the petitioner who had no personal knowledge of the facts
of probable cause, and (b) because the warrant was issued for the sole purpose of seizing
evidence which would later be used in the criminal proceedings that might be instituted against
the petitioner, for violation of the Anti-Usury Law;

This constitutional provision also demands "no less than personal knowledge by the
complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be
justified" in order to convince the judge, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the
issuance of the warrant, of the existence of a probable cause.

20th Century Fox Film v. CA, G.R. Nos. 76649-51, August 19, 1988 (probable cause in film
piracy cases)

The lower court, therefore, lifted the three (3) questioned search warrants in the absence of
probable cause that the private respondents violated P.D. 49. As found out by the court, the NBI
agents who acted as witnesses did not have personal knowledge of the subject matter of their
testimony which was the alleged commission of the offense by the private respondents. Only the
petitioner's counsel who was also a witness during the application for the issuance of the search
warrants stated that he had personal knowledge that the confiscated tapes owned by the private
respondents were pirated tapes taken from master tapes belonging to the petitioner. However,
the lower court did not give much credence to his testimony in view of the fact that the master
tapes of the allegedly pirated tapes were not shown to the court during the application.

All these factors were taken into consideration by the lower court when it lifted the three
questioned search warrants. There is no truth, therefore, to the petitioner's allegation that the
lower court based its January 2, 1986 order only "on the fact that the original or master copies of
the copyrighted films were not presented during the application for search warrants, thus
leading it to conclude that it had been "misled by the applicant and his witnesses."

The presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films from which the pirated films were
allegedly copied, was necessary for the validity of search warrants against those who have in
their possession the pirated films. The petitioner's argument to the effect that the presentation of
the master tapes at the time of application may not be necessary as these would be merely
evidentiary in nature and not determinative of whether or not a probable cause exists to justify
the issuance of the search warrants is not meritorious. The court cannot presume that duplicate
or copied tapes were necessarily reproduced from master tapes that it owns.

The application for search warrants was directed against video tape outlets which allegedly
were engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films belonging to the
petitioner pursuant to P.D. 49.

The essence of a copyright infringement is the similarity or at least substantial similarity of the
purported pirated works to the copyrighted work. Hence, the applicant must present to the court
the copyrighted films to compare them with the purchased evidence of the video tapes allegedly
pirated to determine whether the latter is an unauthorized reproduction of the former. This
linkage of the copyrighted films to the pirated films must be established to satisfy the
requirements of probable cause. Mere allegations as to the existence of the copyrighted films
cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant.

Although the applications and warrants themselves covered certain articles of property usually
found in a video store, the Court believes that the search party should have confined
themselves to articles that are according to them, evidence constitutive of infringement of
copyright laws or the piracy of intellectual property, but not to other articles that are usually
connected with, or related to, a legitimate business, not involving piracy of intellectual property,
or infringement of copyright laws.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The questioned decision and resolution of
the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.

Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 110318, August 28, 1996

In the case at bar, NBI Senior Agent Lauro C. Reyes who filed the application for search warrant
with the lower court following a formal complaint lodged by petitioners, judging from his affidavit
and his deposition, did testify on matters within his personal knowledge based on said complaint
of petitioners as well as his own investigation and surveillance of the private respondents' video
rental shop. Likewise, Atty. Rico V. Domingo, in his capacity as attorney-in-fact, stated in his
affidavit and further expounded in his deposition that he personally knew of the fact that private
respondents had never been authorized by his clients to reproduce, lease and possess for the
purpose of selling any of the copyrighted films.

Both testimonies of Agent Reyes and Atty. Domingo were corroborated by Rene C. Baltazar, a
private researcher retained by Motion Pictures Association of America, Inc. (MPAA, Inc.), who
was likewise presented as a witness during the search warrant proceedings. The records clearly
reflect that the testimonies of the above named witnesses were straightforward and stemmed
from matters within their personal knowledge. They displayed none of the ambivalence and
uncertainty that the witnesses in the 20th Century Fox case exhibited. This categorical
forthrightness in their statements, among others, was what initially and correctly convinced the
trial court to make a finding of the existence of probable cause.

The difference, it must be pointed out, is that the records in the present case reveal that (1)
there is no allegation of misrepresentation, much less a finding thereof by the lower court, on
the part of petitioners' witnesses; (2) there is no denial on the part of private respondents that
the tapes seized were illegitimate copies of the copyrighted ones not have they shown that they
were given any authority by petitioners to copy, sell, lease, distribute or circulate, or at least, to
offer for sale, lease, distribution or circulation the said video tapes; and (3) a discreet but
extensive surveillance of the suspected area was undertaken by petitioners' witnesses sufficient
to enable them to execute trustworthy affidavits and depositions regarding matters discovered in
the course thereof and of which they have personal knowledge.

As correctly pointed out by petitioners, a blind espousal of the requisite of presentation of the
master tapes in copyright infringement cases, as the prime determinant of probable cause, is
too exacting and impracticable a requirement to be complied with in a search warrant
application which, it must not be overlooked, is only an ancillary proceeding.
There is, to repeat, no law or rule which requires that the existence of probable cause is or
should be determined solely by a specific kind of evidence.

In Philippine jurisprudence, probable cause has been uniformly defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed, and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place
sought to be searched.It being the duty of the issuing officer to issue, or refuse to issue, the warrant
as soon as practicable after the application therefor is filed,the facts warranting the conclusion of
probable cause must be assessed at the time of such judicial determination by necessarily using
legal standards then set forth in law and jurisprudence, and not those that have yet to be crafted
thereafter.

CASE: Salazar v. Achacoso, G.R. No. 81510, March 14, 1990

. . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.

It is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest.In one case, it was declared that
mayors may not exercise this power: Neither may it be done by a mere prosecuting body:

We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest
warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare
Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect.

The power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for deportation is, obviously, exceptional.
It (the power to order arrests) can not be made to extend to other cases, like the one at bar.
Under the Constitution, it is the sole domain of the courts.

People v. Marcos, G.R. No. L-31757, October 29, 1982

Whereas, after examination under oath of Supervising Agent, NBI Jose Vicente and Cesar de
Leon, both of the NBI Regional Office, at Dagupan City, this Court finds that there is probable
cause to believe that the owner and/or manager of the Suntory Grocery, located at No. 36 Rajah
Soliman St., Baguio City, is in possession such stock of La Tondena product, San Miguel Gin,
which is adulterated, bearing auxiliary stamps which is tampered and possession of falsified or
fake crown caps, which is now under investigation by the National Bureau of Investigation, in
this City.

The search warrant issued by the City Court did not mention any specific offense deemed to
have been violated by respondent Yu Cua Sio. It is in the application filed by the NBI agents
which states that the owner and/or manager of the Suntory Grocery has in his possession and
control stocks of San Miguel Gin which are adulterated and therefore, violative of the provisions
of Articles 188 and 189 of the Revised Penal Code. These articles of the Revised Penal Code
are entitled: "Substituting and Altering Trademarks, Tradenames, or Service marks" and "Unfair
Competition and Fraudulent Registration of Trademark and Tradename," respectively. As aptly
stated by the Solicitor General, "the specific acts defining said offenses and mentioned in said
articles are closely allied to each other that in a sense, the punishable acts defined in one of
them can be considered as including, or necessarily included in the other."

There is no merit also in the pronouncement by respondent Judge that the search warrant was
issued to fish for evidence just because the application for search warrant states that its
purpose is "to take possession and control of the articles to be used as evidence in the above
case under investigation."

The search warrant as issued mentions that respondent has in his possession and control
stocks of La Tondeña product which are adulterated, with fake auxiliary stamps, and are using
crown caps which are not produced by the company. The articles seized in the premises of
respondent Yu Cua Sio show that he was in possession of these articles mentioned in the
application for search warrant and in the search warrant itself. Possession of said fake stamps
is illegal and the same should not be returned to respondent Yu Cua Sio.

ACCORDINGLY, the order of respondent Judge, dated October 13, 1969, is SET ASIDE, and
private respondent Yu Cua Sio is hereby ordered to return the articles seized if they had been
delivered to him by the NBI agents.

Mata v. Bayona, G.R. No. L- 50720 March 26, 1984

We hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality for being violative of the Constitution
and the Rules of Court.

Under the Constitution "no search warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to be
determined by the Judge or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce."
More emphatic and detailed is the implementing rule of the constitutional injunction, Section 4 of
Rule 126 which provides that the judge must before issuing the warrant personally examine on
oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their
depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to
him.

Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining
Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce
and to attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge
may be able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold
liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false.

The term "depositions" is sometimes used in a broad sense to describe any written statement
verified by oath; but in its more technical and appropriate sense the meaning of the word is
limited to written testimony of a witness given in the course of a judicial proceeding in advance
of the trial or hearing upon oral examination. 4 A deposition is the testimony of a witness, put or
taken in writing, under oath or affirmation before a commissioner, examiner or other judicial
officer, in answer to interlocutory and cross interlocutory, and usually subscribed by the
witnesses.
The other point is that nothing can justify the issuance of the search warrant but the
fulfillment of the legal requisites.

We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge to
conform with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to
the record, rendering the search warrant invalid.

Nolasco v. Paño, G.R. No. L-69803, October 8, 1985 (Read also the dissents of JJ. Cuevas &
Teehankee)
The lack of particularization is also evident in the examination of the witness presented by the
applicant for Search Warrant.
The foregoing questions propounded by respondent Executive Judge to the applicant's witness
are not sufficiently searching to establish probable cause. The "probable cause" required to
justify the issuance of a search warrant comprehends such facts and circumstances as will
induce a cautious man to rely upon them and act in pursuant thereof. Of the 8 questions asked,
the 1st, 2nd and 4th pertain to Identity. The 3rd and 5th are leading not searching questions.
The 6th, 7th and 8th refer to the description of the personalities to be seized, which is Identical
to that in the Search Warrant and suffers from the same lack of particularity. The examination
conducted was general in nature and merely repetitious of the deposition of said witness. Mere
generalization will not suffice and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause upon
which a warrant may issue.

WHEREFORE, while Search Warrant No. 80-84 issued on August 6, 1984 by respondent
Executive Judge Ernani Cruz Paño is hereby annulled and set aside, and the Temporary
Restraining Order enjoining respondent from introducing evidence obtained pursuant to the
Search Warrant in the Subversive Documents case hereby made permanent

Dissenting opinion. J. Teehankee

The majority pronouncement that "as an incident to (petitioner Mila Aguilar- Roque's) arrest, her
dwelling at No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City could have been searched, even without a
warrant, for evidence of rebellion" is patently against the constitutional proscription and settled
law and jurisprudence. Mr. Justice Cuevas amply discusses this in the dissenting portion of his
separate opinion. Suffice it to add and stress that the arresting CSG Group themselves knew
that they needed a search warrant and obtained the void warrant in question. The exception of
Rule 126, sec. 12 which allows a warrantless search of a person who is lawfully arrested is
absolutely limited to his person, at the time of and incident to his arrest and to dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense." Such
warrantless search obviously cannot be made in a place other than the place of arrest.
Dissenting opinion: Cuevas
With respect to the time and place of the warrantless search allowed by law, it must be
contemporaneous with the lawful arrest. Stated otherwise, to be valid, the search must have
been conducted at about the time of the arrest or immediately thereafter and only at the place
where the suspect was arrested,
But what appears undisputed is that the search was made in a place other than the place of
arrest and, not on the occasion of nor immediately after the arrest. It cannot be said, therefore,
that such a search was incidental to the arrest of the petitioners. Not being an incident of a
lawful arrest, the search of the premises at 239B Mayon St., Quezon City WITHOUT A VALID
SEARCH WARRANT is ILLEGAL and violative of the constitutional rights of the respondent.
The things and properties seized on the occasion of said illegal search are therefore
INADMISSIBLE in evidence under the exclusionary rule.

Roan v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 71410, November 25, 1986

To be valid, a search warrant must be supported by probable cause to be determined by the

judge or some other authorized officer after examining the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce. No less important, there must be a specific description of the place to be
searched and the things to be seized, to prevent arbitrary and indiscriminate use of the warrant.

The respondent judge also declared that he "saw no need to have applicant Quillosa's
deposition taken considering that he was applying for a search warrant on the basis of the
information provided by the aforenamed witnesses whose depositions as aforementioned had
already been taken by the undersigned."

In other words, the applicant was asking for the issuance of the search warrant on the basis of
mere hearsay and not of information personally known to him, as required by settled
jurisprudence." The rationale of the requirement, of course, is to provide a ground for a
prosecution for perjury in case the applicant's declarations are found to be false. His application,
standing alone, was insufficient to justify the issuance of the warrant sought. It was therefore
necessary for the witnesses themselves, by their own personal information, to establish the
applicant's claims.

Even assuming then that it would have sufficed to take the depositions only of the witnesses
and not of the applicant himself, there is still the question of the sufficiency of their depositions.

It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary or
pro-forma, if the claimed probable cause is to be established. The examining magistrate must
not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and
justification of the application.

A study of the depositions taken from witnesses Esmael Morada and Jesus Tohilida, who both
claimed to be "intelligence informers," shows that they were in the main a mere restatement of
their allegations in their affidavits, except that they were made in the form of answers to the
questions put to them by the respondent judge. Significantly, the meaningful remark made by
Tohilida that they were suspicious of the petitioner because he was a follower of the opposition
candidate in the forthcoming election (a "Lecarista") did not excite the respondent judge's own
suspicions. This should have put him on guard as to the motivations of the witnesses and
alerted him to possible misrepresentations from them.

WHEREFORE, Search Warrant No. 1-84 issued by the respondent judge on May 10, 1984, is
hereby declared null and void and accordingly set aside. Our restraining order of August 6,1985,
is made permanent. No costs.

Burgos v. Chief of Staff, G.R. No. L-64261, December 26, 1984

Petitioners fault respondent judge for his alleged failure to conduct an examination under oath
or affirmation of the applicant and his witnesses, as mandated by the above-quoted
constitutional provision as wen as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court .This objection,
however, may properly be considered moot and academic, as petitioners themselves conceded
during the hearing on August 9, 1983, that an examination had indeed been conducted by
respondent judge of Col. Abadilla and his witnesses.

In mandating that "no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the
judge, ... after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce; the Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge by the complainant or
his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified. In
Alvarez v. Court of First Instance, this Court ruled that "the oath required must refer to the truth
of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the
purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit
and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause." As couched, the
quoted averment in said joint affidavit filed before respondent judge hardly meets the test of
sufficiency established by this Court in Alvarez case.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Search Warrants Nos. 20-82[a] and 20-82[b] issued by respondent
judge on December 7, 1982 are hereby declared null and void and are accordingly set aside. The
prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction for the return of the seized articles is hereby granted and all
articles seized thereunder are hereby ordered released to petitioners. No costs.

People v. Tee, G. R. Nos. 140546-47, January 20, 2003

Before a valid search warrant is issued, both the Constitution and the 2000 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. require that the judge must personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses under oath or affirmation. The personal examination must not be merely routinary or
pro forma, but must be probing and exhaustive.
In the instant case, it is not disputed that Judge Antonio Reyes personally examined NBI
Special Investigator III Darwin A. Lising, the applicant for the search warrant as well as his
witness, Danilo G. Abratique. Notes of the proceedings were taken by Atty. Delilah Muñoz, Clerk
of Court, RTC of Baguio City, Branch 61, whom Judge Reyes had ordered to be summoned. In
the letter of transmittal of the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Baguio City, Branch 61 to Branch 6 of
said court, mention is made of "notes" at "pages 7-11. We have thoroughly perused the records
of Search Warrant No. 415 (7-98) and nowhere find said "notes."

The depositions of Lising and Abratique were not attached to Search Warrant No. 415
(7-98) as required by the Rules of Court. We must stress, however, that the purpose of the
Rules in requiring depositions to be taken is to satisfy the examining magistrate as to the
existence of probable cause. The Bill of Rights does not make it an imperative necessity that
depositions be attached to the records of an application for a search warrant. Hence, said
omission is not necessarily fatal, for as long as there is evidence on the record showing what
testimony was presented. In the testimony of witness Abratique, Judge Reyes required
Abratique to confirm the contents of his affidavit; there were instances when Judge Reyes
questioned him extensively. It is presumed that a judicial function has been regularly performed,
absent a showing to the contrary.
A magistrate’s determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is
paid great deference by a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis for that
determination. Substantial basis means that the questions of the examining judge brought out
such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed, and the objects in connection with the offense sought to be
seized are in the place sought to be searched.

In this case, NBI Special Investigator Lising’s knowledge of the illicit drugs stored in appellant’s
house was indeed hearsay. But he had a witness, Danilo Abratique, who had personal knowledge
about said drugs and their particular location. Abratique’s statements to the NBI and to Judge Reyes
contained credible and reliable details. As the NBI’s witness, Abratique was a person on whose
statements Judge Reyes could rely. His detailed description of appellant’s activities with respect to
the seized drugs was substantial. In relying on witness Abratique, Judge Reyes was not depending
on casual rumor circulating in the underworld, but on personal knowledge Abratique possessed.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 6, in Criminal Case
No. 15800-R, convicting appellant MODESTO TEE alias "ESTOY" TEE of violation of Section 8 of
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellant is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The fine of ONE MILLION (P1,000,000.00)
PESOS imposed on him is sustained. Appellant is likewise directed to pay the costs of suit.

People v. Tuan, G.R. No. 176066, August 11, 2010

Violation of R.A. 6425 as amended by R.A. 7659 has been committed and that there are good and
sufficient reasons to believe that Estela Tuan, has in her possession and control at her resident at
Brgy. Gabriela Silang, Baguio City, the following:

- Undetermined Quantity of Marijuana Dried Leaves and/or Marijuana Hashish

xxxx

which are subject of the offense which should be seized and brought to the undersigned.
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at anytime in the day the house of the
accused Estela Tuan at Brgy. Gabriela Silang, Baguio City, and forthwith seize and take possession
of the following:

- Undetermined Quantity of Marijuana Dried Leaves and/or Marijuana Hashish

Therefore, the validity of the issuance of a search warrant rests upon the following factors: (1) it must
be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself
and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge
must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may
produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons
or things to be seized.

There is no dispute herein that the second and third factors for a validly issued search warrant were
complied with, i.e., personal determination of probable cause by Judge Cortes; and examination,
under oath or affirmation, of SPO2 Fernandez and the two informants, Lad-ing and Tudlong, by
Judge Cortes. What is left for the Court to determine is compliance with the first and fourth factors,
i.e., existence of probable cause; and particular description of the place to be searched and things to
be seized.

A description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer serving the warrant can, with
reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the
community. A designation or description that points out the place to be searched to the exclusion of
all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the constitutional
requirement of definiteness. In the case at bar, the address and description of the place to be
searched in the Search Warrant was specific enough. There was only one house located at the
stated address, which was accused-appellant’s residence, consisting of a structure with two floors
and composed of several rooms.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated September 21, 2006 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00381, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.

Stonehill v. Diokno, G.R. No. L-19550, June 19, 1967

Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in
question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of
the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners
herein.
As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the
legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple
reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the
personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of
each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is
well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been
impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and
cannot be availed of by third parties. Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the
use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and
premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of said
papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and
may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity.

The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was
compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:

Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,

portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business
transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss statements.

Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business
transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The
warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned
corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of
Rights — that the things to be seized be particularly described — as well as tending to defeat its
major objective: the elimination of general warrants.

that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as specified in the
Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures therein made are
illegal;

Columbia Pictures v. Flores, G.R. No. 78631, June 29, 1993

The search warrant must contain a specific description of the place to be searched and the articles
sought to be seized must be described with particularity.

(c) Television sets, video cassette recorders, rewinders, tape head cleaners, accessories, equipment
and other machines and paraphernalia or materials used or intended to be used in the unlawful sale,
lease, distribution, or possession for purpose of sale, lease, distribution, circulation or public
exhibition of the above-mentioned pirated video tapes which they are keeping and concealing in the
premises above-described, which should be seized and brought to the Undersigned.

The language used in paragraph (c) of Search Warrant No. 45 is thus too all-embracing as to include
all the paraphernalia of FGT in the operation of its business. As the search warrant is in the nature of
a general one, it is constitutionally objectionable.

In consequence, respondent court was merely correcting its own erroneous conclusions in issuing
Search Warrant No. 45 when it ordered the return of the seized television sets and other
paraphernalia specified in the motion filed by FGT. This can be gleaned from its statement that ". . .
the machines and equipment could have been used or intended to be used in the illegal reproduction
of tapes of the copyrighted motion pictures/films, yet, it cannot be said with moral certainty that the
machines or equipment(s) were used in violating the law by the mere fact that pirated video tapes of
the copyrighted motion pictures/films were reproduced. As already stated, FGT Video Network, Inc.
is a registered and duly licensed distributor and in certain instances and under special instructions . .
. reproducer of videograms, and as such, it has the right to keep in its possession, maintain and
operate reproduction equipment (s) and paraphernalia (s).
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, the assailed order of May 29, 1987 AFFIRMED, and the
temporary restraining order issued on June 18, 1987, vacated and lifted.

Prudente v. Dayrit, G.R. No. 82870 December 14, 1989

The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner
or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the
individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable
cause.

Moreover, a perusal of the deposition of P/Lt. Florenio Angeles shows that it was too brief and short.
Respondent Judge did not examine him "in the form of searching questions and answers." On the
contrary, the questions asked were leading as they called for a simple "yes" or "no" answer.

In Stonehill vs. Diokno, Where the warrants involved were issued upon applications stating that the
natural and juridical persons therein named had committed a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff
and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code and Revised Penal Code," the Court held that no
specific offense had been alleged in the applications for a search warrant, and that it would be a
legal hearsay of the highest order to convict anybody of a "Violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code and Revised Penal Code" without reference to any
determinate provision of said laws and codes.

In the present case, however, the application for search warrant was captioned: "For Violation of PD
No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.) While the said decree punishes several offenses, the
alleged violation in this case was, qualified by the phrase "illegal possession of firearms, etc." As
explained by respondent Judge, the term "etc." referred to ammunitions and explosives. In other
words, the search warrant was issued for the specific offense of illegal possession of firearms and
explosives. Hence, the failure of the search warrant to mention the particular provision of PD No.
1-866 that was violated is not of such a gravity as to call for its invalidation on this score. Besides,
while illegal possession of firearms is penalized under Section 1 of PD No. 1866 and illegal
possession of explosives is penalized under Section 3 thereof, it cannot be overlooked that said
decree is a codification of the various laws on illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and
explosives; such illegal possession of items destructive of life and property are related offenses or
belong to the same species, as to be subsumed within the category of illegal possession of firearms,
etc. under P.D. No. 1866. As observed by respondent Judge.

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned orders dated
9 March 1988 and 20 April 1988 as well as Search Warrant No. 87-14 are hereby ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE.

People v. Salanguit, G.R. No. 133254-55, April 19, 2001

However, the fact that there was no probable cause to support the application for the seizure of drug
paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that the search warrant is void. This fact would be
material only if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized by the police. The fact is that none was taken
by virtue of the search warrant issued. If at all, therefore, the search warrant is void only insofar as it
authorized the seizure of drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure of methamphetamine
hydrochloride as to which evidence was presented showing probable cause as to its existence.
Thus, in Aday v. Superior Court,the warrant properly described two obscene books but improperly
described other articles. It was held:

Although the warrant was defective in the respects noted, it does not follow that it was invalid as a
whole. Such a conclusion would mean that the seizure of certain articles, even though proper if
viewed separately, must be condemned merely because the warrant was defective with respect to
other articles. The invalid portions of the warrant are severable from the authorization relating to the
named books, which formed the principal basis of the charge of obscenity. The search for and
seizure of these books, if otherwise valid, were not rendered illegal by the defects concerning other
articles. ...In so holding we do not mean to suggest that invalid portions "of a warrant will be treated
as severable under all circumstances. We recognize the danger that warrants might be obtained
which are essentially general in character but as to minor items meet the requirement of particularity,
and that wholesale seizures might be made under them, in the expectation that the seizure would in
any event be upheld as to the property specified. Such an abuse of the warrant procedure, of
course, could not be tolerated.

It would be a drastic remedy indeed if a warrant, which was issued on probable cause and
particularly describing the items to be seized on the basis thereof, is to be invalidated in toto
because the judge erred in authorizing a search for other items not supported by the
evidence.Accordingly, we hold that the first part of the search warrant, authorizing the search of
accused-appellant's house for an undetermined quantity of shabu, is valid, even though the second
part, with respect to the search for drug paraphernalia, is not.

Accused-appellant contends that the warrant was issued for more than one specific offense because
possession or use of methamphetamine hydrochloride and possession of drug paraphernalia are
punished under two different provisions of R.A. No. 6425 It will suffice to quote what this Court said
in a similar case to dispose of this contention:

While it is true that the caption of the search warrant states that it is in connection with "Violation of
R.A. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972," it is clearly recited in the text
thereof that "There is probable cause to believe that Adolfo Olaes alias 'Debie' and alias 'Baby' of
No.628 Comia St., Filtration, Sta. Rita, Olongapo City, has in their session and control and custody
of marijuana dried stalks/leaves/ seeds/cigarettes and other regulated/prohibited and exempt
narcotics preparations which is the subject of the offense stated above."

Although the specific section of the Dangerous Drugs Act is not pinpointed, there is no question at all
of the specific offense alleged to have been committed as a basis for the finding of probable cause.
The search warrant also satisfies the requirement in the Bill of Rights of the particularity of the
description to be made of the "place to be searched and the persons or things to be seize

WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
96, Quezon City, finding accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of possession of illegal
drugs under §16 of R.A. No.6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended, and
sentencing him to suffer a prison term ranging from six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum,
and four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum, and ordering the
confiscation of 11.14 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride is AFFIRMED .
In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, the decision of the same court finding accused-appellant Roberto
Salanguit y Ko guilty of possession of prohibited drugs under §8 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of Pl00,000.00 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and accused- appellant is ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
However, the confiscation of the 1,254 grams of marijuana, as well as the 11.14 grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, and its disposition as ordered by the trial court is AFFIRMED .

Alih v. Castro, G.R. No. L-69401, June 23, 1987

Illegality of search and seizure does not ipso jure result in return of seized items

WHEREFORE, the search of the petitioners' premises on November 25, 1984, is hereby declared
ILLEGAL and all the articles seized as a result thereof are inadmissible in evidence against the
petitioners in any proceedings. However, the said articles shall remain in custodia legis pending the
outcome of the criminal cases that have been or may later be filed against the petitioners.

Uy Kheytin v. Villareal, G.R. No. 16009, September 21, 1920

In the present case there was an irregularity in the issuance of the search warrant in question in that
the judge did not first examine the complainant or any witnesses under oath, as required by section
98 of General Orders No. 58. But the property sought to be searched for and seized having been
actually found in the place described by the complainant, reasoning by analogy from the case of an
improper arrest, we are of the opinion that that irregularity is not sufficient cause for ordering the
return of the opium found and seized under said warrant, to the petitioners, and exonerating the
latter.
Reread for probable cause.
Section 97 provides that "a search warrant shall not issue except for probable cause" and section 98
above quoted provides the manner in which that probable cause shall be determined by the judge
issuing the warrant. In the present case, however, the judge did not examine any witness under oath
but relied solely upon the sworn application of the Constabulary officer in determining whether there
was probable cause. In that application the complainant swore positively: "That in the house of
Chino Uy Kheytin, Sto. Niño St., No. 20, Iloilo, under the writing desk in his store, there is kept a
certain amount of opium." This statement was found to be true by the subsequent finding and
seizure of a considerable quantity of opium in the place mentioned. The question now is, whether
the omission of the judge to comply with the requirements of section 98 would, under the
circumstances, justify the court in declaring that the search warrant in question was illegal and
ordering the return of the opium found and seized under said warrant.

The important question that remains to be decided is whether, under a search warrant for opium, the
officers of the law were authorized to seize books, personal letters, and other property having a
remote or no connection with opium. The respondent M. S. Torralba, lieutenant of the Constabulary,
testified that he seized these articles because he believed or suspected that they had some relation
with the opium in question; in other words, he thought that they might be used as evidence against
the petitioners when they are prosecuted for a violation of the Opium Law. The respondents contend
that this was a sufficient justification under the law for the seizure of such articles under the same
warrant for opium.
We are of the opinion that the respondent's contention in untenable. Both the Jones Law (sec. 3)
and General Orders No. 58 (sec. 97) specifically require that a search warrant should particularly
describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized. The evident purpose and intent of this
requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those, and only those, particularly described in the
search warrant — to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they shall
seize, to the end that "unreasonable searches and seizures" may not be made, — that abuses may
not be committed. That this is the correct interpretation of this constitutional provision is borne out by
American authorities.

That the officers of the law believed that the books, papers, etc., which they seized might be used as
evidence against the petitioners herein a criminal action against them for a violation of the Opium
Law, is no reason or justification under the law for the seizure: First, because they were not
"particularly described" or even mentioned in the search warrant; second, because, even if they had
been mentioned in the search warrant, they could not be legally seized, for a search warrant cannot
be used for the purpose of obtaining evidence; and third, because to compel a person to produce his
private papers to be used in evidence against him would be equivalent to compelling him to be a
witness against himself.

From all of the foregoing our conclusions are:

1. That although in the issuance of the search warrant in question the judge did not comply with the
requirements of section 98 of General Orders No. 58, the petitioners are not entitled to the return of
the opium and its paraphernalia which were found and seized under said warrant, and much less are
they entitled to be exonerated because of such omission of the judge.

Therefore, it is hereby ordered and decreed that each and all of the respondents herein, their
assistants or successors, be, and they hereby are, forbidden from examining or making any use of
said books, letters, telegrams, etc., namely, the articles described in items Nos. 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 14,
and 15 of the sheriff's return (Exhibit 3, reproduced at the top of page 3 of this decision 1) and they
are hereby ordered to immediately return the said articles to the petitioners. So ordered.

Warrantless search and seizure

Search incident to a lawful arrest
Malacat v. CA, G.R. No. 123595, December 12, 1997

Sec. 5. — Arrest, without warrant; when lawful — A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; The arrest must be made shortly after
the criminal act. and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped . . .

A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) has been
denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has been described as a
"hot pursuit" arrest.

In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the
incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g.,
whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law
requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made — the process cannot be
reversed. At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search the person of the
arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and
seize any money or property found which was used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the
crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the means of
escaping or committing violence.

What is unequivocal then in this case are blatant violations of petitioner's rights solemnly guaranteed
in Sections 2 and 12(1) of Article III of the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Seventeenth Division of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 15988 is SET ASIDE for lack of jurisdiction on the part of said Court and, on ground
of reasonable doubt, the decision of 10 February 1994 of Branch 5 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila is REVERSED and petitioner SAMMY MALACAT y MANDAR is hereby ACQUITTED and
ORDERED immediately released from detention, unless his further detention is justified for any other
lawful cause.

People v. Chua, G.R. No. 128222, June 17, 1999

In cases of in fragrante delicto, arrests, a peace officer or a private person may without a warrant,
arrest a person, when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. The arresting officer, therefore, must have
personal knowledge of such facts or as recent case law adverts to, personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances convincingly indicative or constitutive of probable cause.

In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the
incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g.,
whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law
requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made — the process cannot be
reversed.

To reiterate, the search was not incidental to an arrest. There was no warrant of arrest and the
warrantless arrest did not fall under the exemptions allowed by the Rules of Court as already shown.
From all indications, the search was nothing but a fishing expedition.

WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, San
Fernando, La Union in Criminal Case No. 4037 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
accused-appellant CHUA HO SAN @ TSAY HO SAN is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged,
the evidence not being sufficient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
 People v. Cuizon, G.R. No. 109287, April 18, 1996

The Instant Case Does Not Fall Under

The Exceptions for Warrantless Searches, etc.

Re-assessing the factual backdrop of the case at bench, this Court cannot agree with and accept the
conclusion of the trial court that the appellants were caught in flagrante delicto which would justify
the search without a warrant.

Par. (b) of the same provision is likewise inapplicable since its equally exacting requirements have
also not been met. The prosecution failed to establish that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in
fact just been committed and the arresting officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the accused-appellants had committed it. Appellant Cuizon could not, by the mere act of handing
over four pieces of luggage to the other two appellants, be considered to have committed the offense
of "carrying and transporting" prohibited drugs. Under the circumstances of the case, there was no
sufficient probable cause for the arresting officers to believe that the accused were then and there
committing a crime. The act per se of handing over the baggage, assuming the prosecution's version
to be true; cannot in any way be considered a criminal act. It was not even an act performed under
suspicious circumstances as indeed, it took place in broad daylight, practically at high noon, and out
in the open, in full view of the public. Furthermore, it can hardly be considered unusual, in an airport
setting, for travellers and/or their welcomers to be passing, handing over and delivering pieces of
baggage, especially considering the somewhat obsessive penchant of our fellow countrymen for
sending along ("pakikipadala") things and gifts through friends and relatives. Moreover, one cannot
determine from the external appearance of the luggage that they contained "shabu" hidden beneath
some secret panel or false bottom. The only reason why such act of parting with luggage took on the
color and dimensions of a felonious deed, at least as far as the lawmen were concerned, was the
alleged tip that the NBI agents purportedly received that morning, to the effect that appellant Cuizon
would be arriving that same day with a shipment of shabu. To quote from another decision of like
import, "(A)11 they had was hearsay information (from the telephone caller), and about a crime that
had yet to be committed."

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, accused-appellant Antolin Cuizon y Ortega

is hereby ACQUITTED on constitutional grounds. His immediate release is ordered unless he is
detained for other valid causes. Accused-appellant Steve Pua y Clofas is hereby found GUILTY of
the crime of Illegal Transport of Regulated Drugs, penalized under Section 15, R.A. No. 6425, as
amended, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; the Decision
appealed from, as herein modified, is hereby affirmed as to appellant Pua. Finally, the case as to
appellant Lee is hereby ordered REMANDED to the trial court in order that said accused may be
given his day in court. The Decision appealed from is also AFFIRMED with respect to the disposition
of the prohibited drugs involved in the case.

Posadas v. CA, G.R. No. 89139, August 2, 1990 [CRITIQUE]

In Posadas vs. Court of Appeals, the accused was seen acting suspiciously, and when accosted by
two members of the Davao INP who identified themselves as lawmen, he suddenly fled, but was
pursued, subdued and placed in custody. The buri bag he was carrying yielded an unlicensed
revolver, live ammunition and a tear gas grenade. This Court upheld his conviction for illegal
possession of firearms, holding that there was under the circumstances sufficient probable cause for
a warrantless search.

People v. Claudio, G.R. No. 72564, April 15, 1988 [CRITIQUE]

In People vs. Claudio, the accused, a passenger on a bus bound for Baguio city, was arrested by a
policeman on the same bus because of the distinctive odor of marijuana emanating from the plastic
bag she was carrying. The Court held the warrantless arrest under the circumstances to be lawful,
the search justified and the evidence thus discovered admissible in evidence.

People v. Maspil, G.R. No. 85177, August 20, 1990 [CRITIQUE]

In People vs. Moises Maspil, Jr., et al., agents of the Narcotics Command set up a checkpoint on a
highway in Atok, Benguet, to screen vehicular traffic on the way to Baguio City due to confidential
reports from informers that Maspil and a certain Bagking would be transporting a large quantity of
marijuana. At about 2 a.m. of November 1, 1986, the two suspects, riding a jeepney, pulled up to the
checkpoint and were made to stop. The officers noticed that the vehicle was loaded with some sacks
and tin cans, which, when opened, were seen to contain marijuana leaves. The Court upheld the
search thus conducted as being incidental to a valid warrantless arrest.

People v. Tangliben, G.R. No. L-63630 April 6, 1990 [CRITIQUE]

In People vs. Tangliben, the accused, carrying a traveling bag at a bus terminal, was noticed by
lawmen to be acting suspiciously, and was also positively fingered by an informer as carrying
marijuana, and so he was accosted by policemen who happened to be on a surveillance mission;
the lawmen asked him to open the bag, in which was found a package of marijuana leaves. It was
held that there was a valid warrantless arrest and search incident thereto. The Court in effect
considered the evidence on hand sufficient to have enabled the law enforcers to secure a search
warrant had there been time, but as the case "presented urgency," and there was actually no time to
obtain a warrant since the accused was about to board a bus, and inasmuch as an informer had
given information "on the spot" that the accused was carrying marijuana, the search of his person
and effects was thus considered valid.

People v. Mengote, G.R. No. 87059 June 22, 1992

The Solicitor General submits that the actual existence of an offense was not necessary as long as
Mengote's acts "created a reasonable suspicion on the part of the arresting officers and induced in
them the belief that an offense had been committed and that the accused-appellant had committed
it." The question is, What offense? What offense could possibly have been suggested by a person
"looking from side to side" and "holding his abdomen" and in a place not exactly forsaken?

These are certainly not sinister acts. And the setting of the arrest made them less so, if at all. It might
have been different if Mengote bad been apprehended at an ungodly hour and in a place where he
had no reason to be, like a darkened alley at 3 o'clock in the morning. But he was arrested at 11:30
in the morning and in a crowded street shortly after alighting from a passenger jeep with I his
companion. He was not skulking in the shadows but walking in the clear light of day. There was
nothing clandestine about his being on that street at that busy hour in the blaze of the noonday sun.
On the other hand, there could have been a number of reasons, all of them innocent, why his eyes
were darting from side to side and be was holding his abdomen. If they excited suspicion in the
minds of the arresting officers, as the prosecution suggests, it has nevertheless not been shown
what their suspicion was all about. In fact, the policemen themselves testified that they were
dispatched to that place only because of the telephone call from the informer that there were
"suspicious-looking" persons in that vicinity who were about to commit a robbery at North Bay
Boulevard. The caller did not explain why he thought the men looked suspicious nor did he elaborate
on the impending crime.

In the recent case of People v. Malmstedt, the Court sustained the warrantless arrest of the accused
because there was a bulge in his waist that excited the suspicion of the arresting officer and, upon
inspection, turned out to be a pouch containing hashish. In People v. Claudio, the accused boarded
a bus and placed the buri bag she was carrying behind the seat of the arresting officer while she
herself sat in the seat before him. His suspicion aroused, be surreptitiously examined the bag, which
he found to contain marijuana. He then and there made the warrantless arrest and seizure that we
subsequently upheld on the ground that probable cause had been sufficiently established.

The case before us is different because there was nothing to support the arresting officers' suspicion
other than Mengote's darting eyes and his hand on his abdomen. By no stretch of the imagination
could it have been inferred from these acts that an offense had just been committed, or was actually
being committed, or was at least being attempted in their presence.

This case is similar to People v. Aminnudin, where the Court held that the warrantless arrest of the
accused was unconstitutional. This was effected while be was coming down a vessel, to all
appearances no less innocent than the other disembarking passengers. He had not committed nor
was be actually committing or attempting to commit an offense in the presence of the arresting
officers. He was not even acting suspiciously. In short, there was no probable cause that, as the
prosecution incorrectly suggested, dispensed with the constitutional requirement of a warrant.

Par. (b) is no less applicable because its no less stringent requirements have also not been satisfied.
The prosecution has not shown that at the time of Mengote's arrest an offense had in fact just been
committed and that the arresting officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating that Mengote
had committed it. All they had was hearsay information from the telephone caller, and about a crime
that had yet to be committed.

The truth is that they did not know then what offense, if at all, had been committed and neither were
they aware of the participation therein of the accused-appellant. It was only later, after Danganan
had appeared at the Police headquarters, that they learned of the robbery in his house and of
Mengote's supposed involvement therein. 8 As for the illegal possession of the firearm found on Mengote's person, the
policemen discovered this only after he had been searched and the investigation conducted later revealed that he was not its
owners nor was he licensed to possess it.

Before these events, the Peace officers had no knowledge even of Mengote' identity, let alone the
fact (or suspicion) that he was unlawfully carrying a firearm or that he was involved in the robbery of
Danganan's house.
 People v. Cogaed, G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014People v. Cogaed, G.R. No. 200334, July 30,
2014
On the other hand, "stop and frisk"searches are conducted to prevent the occurrence of a crime. For
instance, the search in Posadas v. Court of Appeals was similar "to a ‘stop and frisk’ situation whose
object is either to determine the identity of a suspicious individual or to maintain the status quo
momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more information."This court stated that the "stop
and frisk" search should be used "[w]hen dealing with a rapidly unfolding and potentially criminal
situation in the city streets where unarguably there is no time to secure . . . a search warrant."

The assailed search and seizure may still be justified as akin to a "stop and frisk" situation whose
object is either to determine the identity of a suspicious individual or to maintain the status quo
momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more information.

It is the police officer who should observe facts that would lead to a reasonable degree of suspicion
of a person. The police officer should not adopt the suspicion initiated by another person. This is
necessary to justify that the person suspected be stopped and reasonably searched. Anything less
than this would be an infringement upon one’s basic right to security of one’s person and effects.

. Warrantless search of moving land vehicles