Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union, G.R. No.

L-25246 September 12, 1974

Facts:

Benjamin Victoriano (hereinafter referred to as Appellee), a member of the religious sect known as the "Iglesia ni
Cristo", had been in the employ of the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Company) since 1958.
As such employee, he was a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers' Union (hereinafter referred to as Union) which
had with the Company a collective bargaining agreement containing a closed shop provision which reads as follows:

Membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of employment for all permanent employees workers
covered by this Agreement.

The collective bargaining agreement expired on March 3, 1964 but was renewed the following day, March 4, 1964.

Under Section 4(a), paragraph 4, of Republic Act No. 875, prior to its amendment by Republic Act No. 3350, the
employer was not precluded "from making an agreement with a labor organization to require as a condition of
employment membership therein, if such labor organization is the representative of the employees." On June 18,
1961, however, Republic Act No. 3350 was enacted, introducing an amendment to — paragraph (4) subsection (a)
of section 4 of Republic Act No. 875, as follows: ... "but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious
sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization".

The appellee, as a member of a religious sect that prohibits its members to be part of a union, wanted to separate
from the union. The Union asked the Company to dismiss Victoriano from the service in view of the fact that he was
resigning from the Union as a member. This prompted Victoriano to file an action to enjoin the Company and the
Union from dismissing him.

Issue:

WON the act is violative of the Equal protection clause as it grants the members of the Iglesia Ni Cristo an
exemption from the operation of closed shop agreement, for while the Act exempts them from union obligation and
liability, it nevertheless entitles them at the same time to the enjoyment of all concessions, benefits and other
emoluments that the union might secure from the employer.

Ruling:
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all
citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against
inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by statute. Equality of operation of statutes
does not mean indiscriminate operation on circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of
rights. The Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were
the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not
prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to
operate.

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in the other
departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with
one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is
that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter
of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the
classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences, that it must be germane to
the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each
member of the class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on
a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.

Thus, for a classification to be valid it must pass the test of reasonableness, which requires that:
(1) it be based on substantial distinctions;

(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;

(3) it must not be limited to present conditions; and

(4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class.

The Act classifies employees and workers, as to the effect and coverage of union shop security agreements, into
those who by reason of their religious beliefs and convictions cannot sign up with a labor union, and those whose
religion does not prohibit membership in labor unions.
The classification introduced by said Act is also germane to its purpose. The purpose of the law is precisely to avoid
those who cannot, because of their religious belief, join labor unions, from being deprived of their right to work and
from being dismissed from their work because of union shop security agreements.
Republic Act No. 3350, furthermore, is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of its enactment.
The law does not provide that it is to be effective for a certain period of time only. It is intended to apply for all times
as long as the conditions to which the law is applicable exist. As long as there are closed shop agreements between
an employer and a labor union, and there are employees who are prohibited by their religion from affiliating with
labor unions, their exemption from the coverage of said agreements continues.
Finally, the Act applies equally to all members of said religious sects; this is evident from its provision. The fact that
the law grants a privilege to members of said religious sects cannot by itself render the Act unconstitutional, for as
We have adverted to, the Act only restores to them their freedom of association which closed shop agreements
have taken away, and puts them in the same plane as the other workers who are not prohibited by their religion from
joining labor unions.
A classification otherwise reasonable does not offend the constitution simply because in practice it results in some
inequality. Anent this matter, it has been said that whenever it is apparent from the scope of the law that its object is
for the benefit of the public and the means by which the benefit is to be obtained are of public character, the law will
be upheld even though incidental advantage may occur to individuals beyond those enjoyed by the general public.

Biraogo v. Truth Commission, G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010

The then President Benigno Aquino III created a commission as one of his fulfillment to his Election Campaign
“Kung walang corrupt, Walang mahirap”. The commission is named the “Truth commission”. One of is provision
reads as:

WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body dedicated solely to investigating and finding out the truth
concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration, and which will recommend
the prosecution of the offenders and secure justice for all;

SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. – There is hereby created the PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION,
hereinafter referred to as the "COMMISSION," which shall primarily seek and find the truth on, and toward this end,
investigate reports of graft and corruption of such scale and magnitude that shock and offend the moral and ethical
sensibilities of the people, committed by public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous administration; and thereafter recommend the
appropriate action or measure to be taken thereon to ensure that the full measure of justice shall be served without
fear or favor.

SECTION 17. Special Provision Concerning Mandate. If and when in the judgment of the President there is a
need to expand the mandate of the Commission as defined in Section 1 hereof to include the investigation of cases
and instances of graft and corruption during the prior administrations, such mandate may be so extended
accordingly by way of a supplemental Executive Order.
The Plaintiff argue that the E. O. No.1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation
and prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even
as it excludes those of the other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.

In their Consolidated Comment, the respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), essentially
questioned the legal standing of petitioners and defended the assailed executive order with the following arguments:
The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly created for laudable
purposes.

Issue:
4. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection clause

Ruling:
The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends
the requirements of justice and fair play. It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all
persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a
valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be
valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial
distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. "Superficial differences do not make for a valid
classification."

Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal
protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth
"concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration" only. The intent to single
out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has been made in at least three portions
of the questioned executive order.

In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class
of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes
arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly
reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution.

In Executive Order No. 1, however, there is no inadvertence. That the previous administration was picked out was
deliberate and intentional as can be gleaned from the fact that it was underscored at least three times in the
assailed executive order. It must be noted that Executive Order No. 1 does not even mention any particular act,
event or report to be focused on unlike the investigative commissions created in the past. "The equal protection
clause is violated by purposeful and intentional discrimination."

Separate Opinion:

(1) No Substantial Distinction –

There is no substantial distinction between the corruption which occurred during the past administration and the
corruption of the administrations prior to it. Allegations of graft and corruption in the government are unfortunately
prevalent regardless of who the President happens to be. Respondents’ claim of widespread systemic corruption is
not unique only to the past administration.

(2) Not Germane to the Purpose of the Law –

The purpose of E.O. No. 1 (to put an end to corruption in the government) is stated clearly in the preamble of the
aforesaid order:

WHEREAS, the President’s battle-cry during his campaign for the Presidency in the last elections "kung walang
corrupt, walang mahirap" expresses a solemn pledge that if elected, he would end corruption and the evil it breeds;
xxx

In the light of the unmistakable purpose of E.O. No. 1, the classification of the past regime as separate from the past
administrations is not germane to the purpose of the law. Corruption did not occur only in the past administration. To
stamp out corruption, we must go beyond the façade of each administration and investigate all public officials and
employees alleged to have committed graft in any previous administration.

(3) E.O. No. 1 does Not Apply to Future Conditions –

As correctly pointed out by petitioners, the classification does not even refer to present conditions, much more to
future conditions vis-avis the commission of graft and corruption. It is limited to a particular past administration and
not to all past administrations.

The above-quoted provisions show that the sole subject of the investigation will be public officers and employees of
the previous administration only, that is, until such time if and when the President decides to expand the Truth
Commission’s mandate to include other administrations (if he does so at all).

(4) E.O. No. 1 Does Not Apply to the Same Class –

Lastly, E.O. No. 1 does not apply to all of those belonging to the same class for it only applies to the public officers
and employees of the past administration. It excludes from its purview the graft and the grafters of administrations
prior to the last one. Graft is not exclusive to the previous presidency alone, hence there is no justification to limit the
scope of the mandate only to the previous administration.

Dissenting Opinion: ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Petitioners Lagman, et al. argue that EO 1 violates the equal protection clause because the investigation of the
Truth Commission is limited to alleged acts of graft and corruption during the Arroyo administration.

A reading of Section 17 of EO 1 readily shows that the Truth Commission’s investigation is not limited to the Arroyo
administration. Section 17 of EO 1 provides:

Section 17. Special Provision Concerning Mandate. If and when in the judgment of the President there is a need to
expand the mandate of the Commission as defined in Section 1 hereof to include the investigation of cases and
instances of graft and corruption during the prior administrations, such mandate may be extended accordingly by
way of a supplemental Executive Order. (Emphasis supplied)

The President can expand the mandate of the Truth Commission to investigate alleged graft and corruption cases of
other past administrations even as its primary task is to investigate the Arroyo administration. EO 1 does not confine
the mandate of the Truth Commission solely to alleged acts of graft and corruption during the Arroyo Administration.

Both the Truth Commission and the PCGG are primarily tasked to conduct specific investigations, with their
mandates subject to expansion by the President from time to time. This Court has consistently upheld the
constitutionality of the PCGG Charter.

First, the prescriptive period for the most serious acts of graft and corruption under the Revised Penal Code is 20
years, 15 years for offenses punishable under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and 12 years for offenses
punishable under special penal laws that do not expressly provide for prescriptive periods. Any investigation will
have to focus on alleged acts of graft and corruption within the last 20 years, almost half of which or 9 years is under
the Arroyo administration.

Second, the Marcos, Ramos and Estrada administrations were already investigated by their successor
administrations. This alone is incontrovertible proof that the Arroyo administration is not being singled out for
investigation or prosecution.

Third, all the past Presidents, with the exception of Presidents Ramos, Estrada and Arroyo, are already dead. The
possible witnesses to alleged acts of graft and corruption during the Presidencies of the deceased presidents may
also be dead or unavailable. In fact, the only living President whose administration has not been investigated by its
successor administration is President Arroyo.

Fourth, the more recent the alleged acts of graft and corruption, the more readily available will be the witnesses, and
the more easily the witnesses can recall with accuracy the relevant events. Inaction over time means the loss not
only of witnesses but also of material documents, not to mention the loss of public interest.

Fifth, the 29-month time limit given to the Truth Commission prevents it from investigating other past
administrations.There is also the constraint on the enormous resources needed to investigate other past
administrations. Just identifying the transactions, locating relevant documents, and looking for witnesses would
require a whole bureaucracy.

These are not only reasonable but also compelling grounds for the Truth Commission to prioritize the investigation
of the Arroyo administration. To prioritize based on reasonable and even compelling grounds is not to
discriminate, but to act sensibly and responsibly.

Classifying the "earlier past administrations" in the last 111 years as just one class is not germane to the purpose
of investigating possible acts of graft and corruption. There are prescriptive periods to prosecute crimes. There are
administrations that have already been investigated by their successor administrations. There are also
administrations that have been subjected to several Congressional investigations for alleged large-scale anomalies.
There are past Presidents, and the officials in their administrations, who are all dead. There are past Presidents who
are dead but some of the officials in their administrations are still alive. Thus, all the "earlier past administrations"
cannot be classified as just one single class − "a class of past administrations" ‒ because they are not all similarly
situated.

To insist that "earlier past administrations" must also be investigated by the Truth Commission, together with the
Arroyo administration, is utterly bereft of any reasonable basis other than to prevent absolutely the investigation of
the Arroyo administration

The majority opinion will also mean that the PCGG Charter − which tasked the PCGG to recover the ill-gotten
wealth of the Marcoses and their cronies − violates the equal protection clause because the PCCG Charter
specifically mentions the Marcoses and their cronies. The majority opinion reverses several decisions of this Court
upholding the constitutionality of the PCCG Charter, endangering over two decades of hard work in recovering
ill-gotten wealth.

The incumbent President was overwhelmingly elected by the Filipino people in the 10 May 2010 elections based on
his announced program of eliminating graft and corruption in government. As the Solicitor General explains it, the
incumbent President has pledged to the electorate that the elimination of graft and corruption will start with the
investigation and prosecution of those who may have committed large-scale corruption in the previous
administration. During the election campaign, the incumbent President identified graft and corruption as the major
cause of poverty in the country as depicted in his campaign theme "kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap." It was
largely on this campaign pledge to eliminate graft and corruption in government that the electorate overwhelmingly
voted for the incumbent President.
This Court, in striking down EO 1 creating the Truth Commission, overrules the manifest will of the Filipino people to
start the difficult task of putting an end to graft and corruption in government, denies the President his basic
constitutional power to determine the facts in his faithful execution of the law, and suppresses whatever truth may
come out in the purely fact-finding investigation of the Truth Commission.

History will record the ruling today of the Court’s majority as a severe case of judicial overreach that made the
incumbent President a diminished Executive in an affront to a co-equal branch of government, crippled our already
challenged justice system, and crushed the hopes of the long suffering Filipino people for an end to graft and
corruption in government.

Dissenting Opinion:

There is a disjoint between the premises and the conclusion of the Decision caused by its discard of the
elementary rules of logic and legal precedents. It suffers from internal contradiction, engages in semantic
smoke-and-mirrors and blatantly disregards what must be done in evaluating equal protection claims, i.e., a judge
must ask whether there was indeed a classification; the purpose of the law or executive action; whether that
purpose achieves a legitimate state objective; the reason for the classification; and the relationship between the
means and the end. Within those layers of analysis, the judge must compare the claimed reason for classification
with cases of like or unlike reasoning. He knows the real world, he looks at its limitations, he applies his common
sense, and the judge knows in his judicial heart whether the claimed reason makes sense or not. And because he is
a practical man, who believes as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes did that the life of the law is in experience, he
knows false from genuine claims of unconstitutional discrimination.

At the outset, it must be emphasized that EO 1 did not, for purposes of application of the laws on graft and
corruption, create two classes – that of President Arroyo and that of other past administrations. Rather, it prioritized
fact-finding on the administration of President Arroyo while saying that the President could later expand the
coverage of EO 1 to bring other past administrations under the same scrutiny. Prioritization per se is not
classification.

The lumping together of all Philippine political administrations spanning 111 years, for purposes of testing
valid legislation, regulation, or even fact-finding is unwarranted. There is inherent illogic in the premise of the
Decision that administrations from the time of Aguinaldo to Arroyo belong to one class

On the first test. Is the classification reasonable, based on substantial distinctions that make for real
difference? The government has already given several reasons why the distinction between the administration of
President Arroyo is different from other past administrations. The distinction does not lie in any claim that corruption
is the sole hallmark of the Arroyo administration – far from it. The distinction lies in reason – administrative
constraints, availability of evidence, immediate past acts, non-prescription of causes of actions – all of which are not
whimsical, contrived, superficial or irrelevant. It must also be emphasized that the Court, as quoted above,
recognizes that in many cases, the classification lies in narrow distinctions. We have already discussed how in
Luna v. Sarmiento the Court recognized subclasses within a class and upheld the narrow distinction made by
Congress between these subclasses. So if past administrations have already been the subject of a fact-finding
commission, while one particular administration has not been so subjected, that alone is a good basis for making a
distinction between them and an administration that has not yet been investigated

On the second test. The classification is germane to the purpose of the law – to get a headstart on the campaign
against graft and corruption. If the investigation into the root of corruption is to gain traction, it must start
somewhere, and the best place to start is to examine the immediate past administration, not distant past
administrations.

On the third test. Of course this is not relevant in this case, for the law being examined in Victoriano was one that
granted prospective rights, and not one that involves fact-finding into past acts as with EO 1.
On the last test. This asks whether the law applies equally to all members of the segregated class. It must be
emphasized that in the Victoriano case, this last test was applied not to all the workers in the bargaining unit, but it
was applied to the subclass of workers whose religions prohibit them from joining labor unions. In application to this
case, the question should then have been, not whether there is equality of treatment between all political
administrations under EO 1, but whether within the subclass of third level public officials of the Arroyo administration
– that is, the subject of EO 1 – there is unequal treatment. Obviously, the answer is no. The majority applied the last
test backwards by asking whether there is equality of treatment among all political administrations and concluding
that there was no equality of treatment, even before it could answer the first test of whether the classification
between the Arroyo administration and other past administrations was reasonable.

It must be emphasized that the Victoriano case on which the majority heavily relies states in several parts that
classification must necessarily result in inequality of treatment and that such inequality does not give rise to a
constitutional problem. It is the lack of reason that gives rise to a constitutional issue, not the inequality per se. To
quote again:

The mere fact that the legislative classification may result in actual inequality is not violative of the right to equal
protection, for every classification of persons or things for regulation by law produces inequality in some degree, but
the law is not thereby rendered invalid. A classification otherwise reasonable does not offend the constitution simply
because in practice it results in some inequality. Anent this matter, it has been said that whenever it is apparent from
the scope of the law that its object is for the benefit of the public and the means by which the benefit is to be
obtained are of public character, the law will be upheld even though incidental advantage may occur to individuals
beyond those enjoyed by the general public.

Beltran v. Secretary of Health, G.R. No. 133640, November 25, 2005

Facts:

Commercial blood banks were to be phased out according to the National Blood Services Act of 1994 or Republic
Act No. 7719 and its implementing rules primarily to ensure the safety of the blood supply. The law aimed to
promote voluntary blood donation and regulate blood banks, as commercial blood banks were seen as potentially
compromising safety due to the practice of paying donors. This practice led to higher risks of receiving contaminated
blood, as paid donors were more likely to hide their medical histories or engage in high-risk behaviors. The
government sought to shift towards a system reliant on voluntary, unpaid donors to improve the safety and reliability
of the blood supply.

A 1994 study by the New Tropical Medicine Foundation, supported by USAID, found that in the Philippines,
commercial blood banks supplied 64.4% of collected blood units, while the PNRC, government, and private
hospital-based banks supplied smaller portions. Commercial banks produced significantly more blood than other
sources. The study also revealed that most donors to commercial and private hospital-based banks were paid, while
donors to the PNRC and government banks were mostly voluntary. Blood from commercial sources was found to be
three times more likely to have infections than that donated to the PNRC.

Blood banking and blood transfusion services in the country have been arranged in four (4) categories: blood
centers run by the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC), government-run blood services, private hospital blood
banks, and commercial blood services.

Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 was enacted into law on April 2, 1994. The Act
seeks to provide an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and by regulating blood
banks in the country. The law took effect on August 23, 1994.

On April 28, 1995, Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995, constituting the Implementing Rules and Regulations
of said law was promulgated by respondent Secretary of the Department of Health (DOH).

Section 7 of R.A. 7719 provides:

"Section 7. Phase-out of Commercial Blood Banks - All commercial blood banks shall be phased-out over a
period of two (2) years after the effectivity of this Act, extendable to a maximum period of two (2) years by the
Secretary."

Section 23 of Administrative Order No. 9 provides:

"Section 23. Process of Phasing Out. -- The Department shall effect the phasing-out of all commercial blood
banks over a period of two (2) years, extendible for a maximum period of two (2) years after the effectivity of R.A.
7719. The decision to extend shall be based on the result of a careful study and review of the blood supply and
demand and public safety.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the questioned legal provisions, namely, Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719
and Section 23 of Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995, on the following grounds:

The questioned legal provisions of the National Blood Services Act and its Implementing Rules violate the equal
protection clause for irrationally discriminating against free standing blood banks in a manner which is not germane
to the purpose of the law;

Issue:

WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS VIOLATE
THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE;

Ruling:

What may be regarded as a denial of the equal protection of the laws is a question not always easily determined. No
rule that will cover every case can be formulated. Class legislation, discriminating against some and favoring others
is prohibited but classification on a reasonable basis and not made arbitrarily or capriciously is permitted. The
classification, however, to be reasonable: (a) must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences;
(b) must be germane to the purpose of the law; (c) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and, (d) must
apply equally to each member of the class.

Republic Act No. 7719 or The National Blood Services Act of 1994, was enacted for the promotion of public health
and welfare. In the aforementioned study conducted by the New Tropical Medicine Foundation, it was revealed that
the Philippine blood banking system is disturbingly primitive and unsafe, and with its current condition, the spread of
infectious diseases such as malaria, AIDS, Hepatitis B and syphilis chiefly from blood transfusion is unavoidable.
The situation becomes more distressing as the study showed that almost 70% of the blood supply in the country is
sourced from paid blood donors who are three times riskier than voluntary blood donors because they are unlikely to
disclose their medical or social history during the blood screening.

The above study led to the passage of Republic Act No. 7719, to instill public consciousness of the importance and
benefits of voluntary blood donation, safe blood supply and proper blood collection from healthy donors. To do this,
the Legislature decided to order the phase out of commercial blood banks to improve the Philippine blood banking
system, to regulate the supply and proper collection of safe blood, and so as not to derail the implementation of the
voluntary blood donation program of the government. In lieu of commercial blood banks, non-profit blood banks or
blood centers, in strict adherence to professional and scientific standards to be established by the DOH, shall be set
in place.

Based on the foregoing, the Legislature never intended for the law to create a situation in which unjustifiable
discrimination and inequality shall be allowed. To effectuate its policy, a classification was made between nonprofit
blood banks/centers and commercial blood banks.

We deem the classification to be valid and reasonable for the following reasons:
One, it was based on substantial distinctions. The former operates for purely humanitarian reasons and as a
medical service while the latter is motivated by profit. Also, while the former wholly encourages voluntary blood
donation, the latter treats blood as a sale of commodity.

Two, the classification, and the consequent phase out of commercial blood banks is germane to the purpose of the
law, that is, to provide the nation with an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and
treating blood transfusion as a humanitarian or medical service rather than a commodity. This necessarily involves
the phase out of commercial blood banks based on the fact that they operate as a business enterprise, and they
source their blood supply from paid blood donors who are considered unsafe compared to voluntary blood donors
as shown by the USAID-sponsored study on the Philippine blood banking system.

Three, the Legislature intended for the general application of the law. Its enactment was not solely to address the
peculiar circumstances of the situation nor was it intended to apply only to the existing conditions.

Lastly, the law applies equally to all commercial blood banks without exception.

Having said that, this Court comes to the inquiry as to whether or not Republic Act No. 7719 constitutes a valid
exercise of police power.

Quinto v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189698, December 1, 2009 (decision, per J. Nachura); February 22, 2010 (resolution
of the MR, per C.J. Puno)

Facts:

The controversy arose from the law authorizing the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to use an automated
election system (AES). Initially enacted in 1997, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8436 allowed for the use of an AES in
national and local elections. Section 11 of this law prescribed the format of the official ballot, including arrangements
for candidate names and ballot security measures.

The amendments to R.A. No. 8436 introduced by R.A. No. 9369 included provisions regarding the filing of
certificates of candidacy (CoC) and the resignation of public appointive officials upon filing. Specifically, any person
holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the armed forces and officers and
employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations, would be considered ipso facto resigned from their
office at the start of the day of filing their CoC. This provision aimed to ensure that candidates running for office
would not hold conflicting positions of authority. Political parties were also allowed to hold conventions to nominate
their official candidates within thirty days before the start of the period for filing a certificate of candidacy.

The petitioners' contention for equal protection stems from their argument that Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678,
which considers persons holding appointive positions ipso facto resigned upon filing their certificates of candidacy
(CoCs), discriminates against them compared to those holding elective positions. They argue that this distinction
violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution, as it treats similarly situated individuals differently without
any reasonable basis. The petitioners claim that this provision unfairly restricts their right to seek public office, unlike
those holding elective positions who are not considered resigned upon filing their CoCs.

Notably, this proviso is not present in Section 11 of R.A. No. 8436, the law amended by R.A. No. 9369. The proviso
was lifted from Section 66 of B.P. Blg. 881 or the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) of the Philippines, which reads:

Sec. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position.- Any person holding a public appointive office or position,
including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned
or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.
Issue:

WON the Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and in Section 66 of the OEC violates the equal protection clause.

Ruling:

The supreme Court granted the Petition.

The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification.-
If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated
and regulated differently from the other. The Court has explained the nature of the equal protection guarantee in this
manner:

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
discrimination or the oppression of inequality.- It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either in the
object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate.- It does not demand absolute equality among
residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as
to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.- The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which
applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and
reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.

In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act may pass the constitutional
norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four (4) requisites of valid classification be complied with, namely:

(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;

(2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.

The first requirement means that there must be real and substantial differences between the classes treated
differently. Nevertheless, the classification would still be invalid if it does not comply with the second requirement if it
is not germane to the purpose of the law. The third requirement means that the classification must be enforced not
only for the present but as long as the problem sought to be corrected continues to exist. And, under the last
requirement, the classification would be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not treated similarly,
both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.

Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office
by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed
therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their
designation thereto by an appointing authority.- Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity
and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.

If we accept these as the underlying objectives of the law, then the assailed provision cannot be constitutionally
rescued on the ground of valid classification. Glaringly absent is the requisite that the classification must be
germane to the purposes of the law. Indeed, whether one holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils
sought to be prevented by the measure remain. For example, the Executive Secretary, or any Member of the
Cabinet for that matter, could wield the same influence as the Vice-President who at the same time is appointed to a
Cabinet post (in the recent past, elected Vice-Presidents were appointed to take charge of national housing, social
welfare development, interior and local government, and foreign affairs). With the fact that they both head executive
offices, there is no valid justification to treat them differently when both file their CoCs for the elections. Under the
present state of our law, the Vice-President, in the example, running this time, let us say, for President, retains his
position during the entire election period and can still use the resources of his office to support his campaign.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The second proviso in the third paragraph of
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 4(a) of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8678 are declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Garcia v. Drilon, G. R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013

Facts:

The National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women reported that from 2000 to 2003, over 90% of abuse cases
against women were committed by their intimate partners such as their husbands and live-in partners. To address
this, Congress passed the Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262 on March 8, 2004, after nine years of advocacy by women's
groups. This law, effective March 27, 2004, defines and criminalizes acts of violence against women and their
children (VAWC) perpetrated by intimate partners, including husbands, former husbands, or anyone with whom the
woman has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom she has a common child.

Rosalie Jaype-Garcia filed a petition for a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her husband, Jesus C. Garcia,
citing physical abuse, emotional, psychological, and economic violence, as well as marital infidelity. Rosalie claimed
that Jesus was dominant, controlling, and demanded absolute obedience. She described instances of abuse,
including being grabbed and shaken with force, hit forcefully on the lips causing bleeding, and subjected to threats
and intimidation.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City issued several TPOs to protect Rosalie and her children, directing
Jesus to stay away from them, surrender firearms, and provide financial support. Despite these orders, Jesus
allegedly continued to harass and threaten Rosalie, leading to her filing additional applications for TPOs.

In response, Jesus challenged the constitutionality of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 926, he argued that it violates the
equal protection clause because it allegedly discriminates against men by presuming that only women and children
can be victims of violence. He contended that the law's focus on protecting women and children from violence,
without similar protection for men, creates an unequal treatment under the law. This argument challenges the
constitutionality of the law, suggesting that it does not provide equal protection to all individuals regardless of
gender.

The Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed Jesus's petition, citing failure to raise the constitutional issue before the trial
court and considering the challenge a collateral attack on the law. The case highlights the challenges faced in
addressing VAWC and the legal mechanisms in place to protect victims.

Issue: WON the R.A. No. 9262 is violative of the equal protection clause.

Ruling:

R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws.

All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be
based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class.

I.R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions.

The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more likely than men to be
victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women all make for real differences
justifying the classification under the law.
II. The classification is germane to the purpose of the law.

The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to address violence
committed against women and children, spelled out in its Declaration of Policy, as follows:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of women and children and
guarantees full respect for human rights. The State also recognizes the need to protect the family and its members
particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.

III. The classification is not limited to existing conditions only, and apply equally to all members

Moreover, the application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing conditions when it was promulgated, but to future
conditions as well, for as long as the safety and security of women and their children are threatened by violence and
abuse.

R.A. 9262 applies equally to all women and children who suffer violence and abuse.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Substantial Distinctions

Ichong v. Hernandez, G.R. No. L-7995, May 31, 1957

Facts:

The case involves the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 1180, which nationalizes the retail trade business in the
Philippines. The law prohibits aliens from engaging in the retail trade, with exceptions for those already engaged in
the business before May 15, 1954, and for citizens and entities of the United States. The importance of the retail
trade in the nation's economy is emphasized, highlighting its essential role in providing daily necessities to
residents. There is a perceived dominance of alien retailers in the market, with concerns raised about their control
over distribution and potential abuses. The law is argued to be enacted in the interest of national economic survival
and security, falling within the legitimate scope of police power to ensure the welfare of citizens and the nation.

The petitioner, an alien resident, argues that the law violates the equal protection clause as it discriminates against
aliens by prohibiting them from engaging in the retail trade, while allowing citizens and entities of the United States
to do so. The government, on the other hand, argues that the law is a valid exercise of police power to protect
national economic survival.

Issue:

WON the R.A. No. 1180 is violative of the equal protection clause as it singles out alien traders in retail. WON the
classification is based on substantial distinction.

Ruling:

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the
object to which it is directed or by territory within which is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among
residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as
to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which
applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and
reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.
The mere fact of alienage is the root and cause of the distinction between the alien and the national as a trader. The
alien resident owes allegiance to the country of his birth or his adopted country; his stay here is for personal
convenience; he is attracted by the lure of gain and profit. His aim or purpose of stay, we admit, is neither illegitimate
nor immoral, but he is naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for this country where he temporarily
stays and makes his living, or of that spirit of regard, sympathy and consideration for his Filipino customers as would
prevent him from taking advantage of their weakness and exploiting them.

The question as to whether or not citizenship is a legal and valid ground for classification has already been
affirmatively decided in this jurisdiction as well as in various courts in the United States. In the case of Smith Bell &
Co. vs. Natividad, 40 Phil. 136, where the validity of Act No. 2761 of the Philippine Legislature was in issue,
because of a condition therein limiting the ownership of vessels engaged in coastwise trade to corporations formed
by citizens of the Philippine Islands or the United States, thus denying the right to aliens, it was held that the
Philippine Legislature did not violate the equal protection clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights.

The petition is hereby denied, with costs against petitioner.

Dumlao v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-52245 January 22, 1980 (Read also the dissent of J. Teehankee)

Facts:

The petitioner, Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his certificate of candidacy
for said position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980.

Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as
discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. Said Section 4
provides:

Sec. 4. Special Disqualification in addition to violation of section 10 of Art. XI I-C of the Constitution and
disqualification mentioned in existing laws, which are hereby declared as disqualification for any of the elective
officials enumerated in section 1 hereof.

Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which
he is entitled under the law, and who shall have been 6,5 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to
which he seeks to be elected shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired
(Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner Dumlao alleges that the aforecited provision is directed insidiously against him, and that the classification
provided therein is based on "purely arbitrary grounds and, therefore, class legislation."

Issue: WON the section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 is violative of the due process. WON the classification is
based on substantial distinction.

Ruling:

The assertion that Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is contrary to the safer guard of equal protection is neither well taken. The
constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based
on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another class. For
purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger
employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not
so compulsorily retirable.

WHEREFORE, 1) the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared valid

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

I dissent from the majority's dismissal of the petition insofar as it upholds the discriminatory and arbitrary provision of
Sec. 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 which would impose a special disqualification on petitioner Patricio Dumlao from
running for the elective local office of governor of his home province of Nueva Vizcaya and would in effect bar the
electors of his province from electing him to said office in the January 30 elections, simply because he is a retired
provincial governor of said province "who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled
under the law and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he
seeks to be elected."

To specially and peculiarly ban a 65-year old previously retired elective local official from running for the same
elective office (of governor, in this case) previously held by him and from which he has retired is arbitrary,
oppressive and unreasonable. Persons similarly situated are not similarly treated, e.g. a retired vice-governor,
mayor or councilor of 65 is entitled to run for governor (because the disqualification is for the retiree of 65 to run for
the same elective office from which he retired) but petitioner is barred from doing so (although he may run for any
other lesser office). Both are 65 and are retirees, yet one is barred from running for the office of governor.

And even in the case of 65-year old local elective officials, they are disqualified only when they have received
payment of the retirement benefits to which they are entitled under the law (which amount to very little, compared to
retirement benefits of other executive officials and members of the judiciary). If they have not received such
retirement benefits, they are not disqualified. Certainly, their disqualification or non-disqualification and consequent
classification as "old blood" or "new blood" cannot hinge on such an irrelevant question of whether or not they have
received their retirement benefits.

The classification is patently arbitrary and unreasonable and is not based on substantial distinctions which make for
real differences that would justify the special disqualification of petitioner, which, it is claimed, "is based on a
presumption that elective local officials who have retired and are of advanced age cannot discharge the functions of
the office they seek as those who are differently situated." Such presumption is sheer conjecture. The mere fact
that a candidate is less than 65 or has "young or new blood" does not mean that he would be more efficient,
effective and competent than a mature 65 year old like petitioner who has had experience on the job and who was
observed at the hearing to appear to be most physically fit.

Ceniza v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-52304, January 28, 1980

Facts:

Batas Blg. 8853 provides for the classification of cities in the Philippines into highly urbanized and component cities
based on their annual revenue. Highly urbanized cities are not allowed to participate in the election of provincial
officials, while component cities can do so if their charter allows. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
adopted Resolution No. 1421 to determine which cities' voters are entitled to vote for provincial officials.

The petitioners argue that the classification of cities as highly urbanized if they had an annual revenue of P40m and
all others as component cities was violative of the equal protection clause.

Issue: WON the classification based on the annual revenue in their participation in the election of provincial officials
is based on substantial distinction.

Ruling:

The classification of cities into highly urbanized cities and component cities on the basis of their regular annual
income is based upon substantial distinction. The revenue of a city would show whether or not it is capable of
existence and development as a relatively independent social, economic, and political unit. It would also show
whether the city has sufficient economic or industrial activity as to warrant its independence from the province where
it is geographically situated. Cities with smaller income need the continued support of the provincial government
thus justifying the continued participation of the voters in the election of provincial officials in some instances.
The petitioners also contend that the voters in Mandaue City are denied equal protection of the law since the voters
in other component cities are allowed to vote for provincial officials. The contention is without merit. The practice of
allowing voters in one component city to vote for provincial officials and denying the same privilege to voters in
another component city is a matter of legislative discretion which violates neither the Constitution nor the voter's
right of suffrage.

The equal protection of the law contemplates equality in the enjoyment of similar rights and privileges granted by
law. It would have been discriminatory and a denial of the equal protection of the law if the statute prohibited an
individual or group of voters in the city from voting for provincial officials while granting it to another individual or
groups of voters in the same city.

WHEREFORE, the petition should be, as it is hereby dismissed.

Nuñez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. L-50581-50617, January 30, 1982

Facts:
Petitioner, a public official, was accused before the Sandiganbayan of estafa through falsification of public and
commercial documents. He filed a motion to quash on constitutional and jurisdictional grounds, arguing that
Presidential Decree No. 1486, as amended, creating the Sandiganbayan, violated the due process, equal
protection, and ex post facto clauses of the Constitution. He claimed that the procedures in the Sandiganbayan
unduly discriminate against him, particularly the limited right to appeal and the single chance for appeal to the
Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether the trial of the accused, a public official, by the Sandiganbayan unduly discriminates against the accused,
in light of the difference of the procedures (especially appellate) in the Sandiganbayan vis-a-vis regular courts.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the creation of the Sandiganbayan and the procedures therein do not unduly
discriminate against the accused. The Court emphasized that the Constitution specifically provided for the creation
of the Sandiganbayan to address the problem of dishonesty in the public service, and thus, those tried by such court
should have been aware that a different procedure may apply to them. The Court also ruled that the procedures in
the Sandiganbayan, including the limited right to appeal, do not violate the equal protection clause, as they are
based on substantial distinctions that make real differences and are germane to the purposes of the law. The Court
further held that there is no violation of the ex post facto clause, as the procedures in the Sandiganbayan do not
take away any vital right of the accused necessary for the protection of life and liberty. Therefore, the petition was
denied, and the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1486, as amended, creating the Sandiganbayan, was
upheld.

Ratio:
The substantial distinction between the procedures in the Sandiganbayan and regular courts lies in the specific
mandate of the Sandiganbayan to address the problem of dishonesty and abuse of trust in the public service. The
Constitution expressly provided for the creation of the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over cases involving graft and
corrupt practices committed by public officials. This distinction is based on the recognition that public officials, by
virtue of their positions, hold a higher standard of accountability and trustworthiness compared to private individuals.

The limited right to appeal and the single chance for appeal to the Supreme Court in the Sandiganbayan are
designed to ensure swift and effective prosecution of cases involving public officials accused of corruption. This is in
line with the state's interest in promoting honesty and integrity in public service and maintaining public trust in
government institutions. These procedures are thus germane to the purposes of the law and are necessary to
achieve the goal of combating graft and corruption in the public sector.

In contrast, regular courts handle a wide range of cases involving both public and private individuals, and their
procedures are designed to ensure the fair and impartial administration of justice for all parties involved. The
difference in procedures between the Sandiganbayan and regular courts reflects the need to address the unique
challenges posed by corruption in the public sector and does not violate the equal protection clause.

PASEI v. Drilon, G.R. No. 81958, June 30, 1988

Facts:

The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), a firm "engaged principally in the
recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas placement," challenges the Constitutional validity of
Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of
"GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND
HOUSEHOLD WORKERS," in this petition for certiorari and prohibition. Specifically, the measure is assailed for
"discrimination against males or females;" that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers
and females with similar skills;

Issue: WON the D.O No.1 is violative of the Equal protection clause as it only applies to domestic helpers and
females with similar skills

Ruling:

There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but it does not thereby
make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under the
Constitution does not import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications,
provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the
law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class.

The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female workers — rests on substantial
distinctions.

As a matter of judicial notice, the Court is well aware of the unhappy plight that has befallen our female labor force
abroad, especially domestic servants, amid exploitative working conditions marked by, in not a few cases, physical
and personal abuse. The sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina workers, even rape and various
forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of returning workers, are compelling motives for urgent Government
action. As precisely the caretaker of Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to protect victims of exploitation.
In fulfilling that duty, the Court sustains the Government's efforts.

The same, however, cannot be said of our male workers. In the first place, there is no evidence that, except perhaps
for isolated instances, our men abroad have been afflicted with an Identical predicament. The petitioner has
proffered no argument that the Government should act similarly with respect to male workers. The Court, of course,
is not impressing some male chauvinistic notion that men are superior to women. What the Court is saying is that it
was largely a matter of evidence (that women domestic workers are being ill-treated abroad in massive instances)
and not upon some fanciful or arbitrary yardstick that the Government acted in this case. It is evidence capable
indeed of unquestionable demonstration and evidence this Court accepts. The Court cannot, however, say the same
thing as far as men are concerned. There is simply no evidence to justify such an inference. Suffice it to state, then,
that insofar as classifications are concerned, this Court is content that distinctions are borne by the evidence.
Discrimination in this case is justified.
The Court finds, finally, the impugned guidelines to be applicable to all female domestic overseas workers. That it
does not apply to "all Filipina workers" is not an argument for unconstitutionality. Had the ban been given universal
applicability, then it would have been unreasonable and arbitrary. For obvious reasons, not all of them are similarly
circumstanced. What the Constitution prohibits is the singling out of a select person or group of persons within an
existing class, to the prejudice of such a person or group or resulting in an unfair advantage to another person or
group of persons.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED

Tatad v. Secretary, G.R. No. 124360, November 5, 1997

Facts:

The petitioners challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8180, "An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil
Industry and For Other Purposes," which ended 26 years of government regulation in the downstream oil industry.
Prior to 1971, there was no government agency regulating the oil industry, and companies were free to enter and
exit the market without interference. In response to the 1971 oil crisis, the Oil Industry Commission (OIC) was
created to regulate the industry, including fixing market prices of petroleum products and regulating refineries'
capacities.

In 1996, Congress deregulated the downstream oil industry with R.A. No. 8180. The law allowed any person or
entity to import, purchase, lease, own, and operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities. The deregulation
process had two phases: the transition phase and the full deregulation phase. The transition phase included
liberalization of oil importation, implementation of an automatic pricing mechanism, and restructuring of oil taxes.
Full deregulation commenced on February 8, 1997, with the implementation of E.O. No. 372.

The petitions at bar assail the constitutionality of various provisions of R.A No. 8180 and E.O. No. 372.
In G.R. No. 124360, petitioner Francisco S. Tatad seeks the annulment of section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180. Section
5(b) provides:

b) Any law to the contrary notwithstanding and starting with the effectivity of this Act, tariff duty shall be imposed and
collected on imported crude oil at the rate of three percent (3%) and imported refined petroleum products at the rate
of seven percent (7%), except fuel oil and LPG, the rate for which shall be the same as that for imported crude oil:
Provided, That beginning on January 1, 2004 the tariff rate on imported crude oil and refined petroleum products
shall be the same: Provided, further, That this provision may be amended only by an Act of Congress.

The petition is anchored on three arguments:

First, that the imposition of different tariff rates on imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum products
violates the equal protection clause. Petitioner contends that the 3%-7% tariff differential unduly favors the three
existing oil refineries and discriminates against prospective investors in the downstream oil industry who do not have
their own refineries and will have to source refined petroleum products from abroad.

Issue:

WON the classification in having a different tariff rate on imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum products
is based on substantial distinctions.

Ruling:

In the cases at bar, it cannot be denied that our downstream oil industry is operated and controlled by an oligopoly, a
foreign oligopoly at that. Petron, Shell and Caltex stand as the only major league players in the oil market. All other
players belong to the lilliputian league. As the dominant players, Petron, Shell and Caltex boast of existing refineries
of various capacities. The tariff differential of 4% therefore works to their immense benefit. Yet, this is only one edge
of the tariff differential. The other edge cuts and cuts deep in the heart of their competitors. It erects a high barrier to
the entry of new players. New players that intend to equalize the market power of Petron, Shell and Caltex by
building refineries of their own will have to spend billions of pesos. Those who will not build refineries but compete
with them will suffer the huge disadvantage of increasing their product cost by 4%. They will be competing on an
uneven field. The argument that the 4% tariff differential is desirable because it will induce prospective players to
invest in refineries puts the cart before the horse. The first need is to attract new players and they cannot be
attracted by burdening them with heavy disincentives. Without new players belonging to the league of Petron, Shell
and Caltex, competition in our downstream oil industry is an idle dream.

The provision on inventory widens the balance of advantage of Petron, Shell and Caltex against prospective new
players. Petron, Shell and Caltex can easily comply with the inventory requirement of R.A. No. 8180 in view of their
existing storage facilities. Prospective competitors again will find compliance with this requirement difficult as it will
entail a prohibitive cost. The construction cost of storage facilities and the cost of inventory can thus scare
prospective players. Their net effect is to further occlude the entry points of new players, dampen competition and
enhance the control of the market by the three (3) existing oil companies.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions are granted. R.A. No. 8180 is declared unconstitutional

International School Alliance of Educators v. Quisumbing, G.R. No. 128845, June 1, 2000.

Facts:

The International School, Inc. employs both foreign and local teachers, classifying them as either "foreign-hires" or
"local-hires." Foreign-hires receive higher salaries and additional benefits, including housing, transportation,
shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance. These benefits are justified by the School's need to attract
professionals from abroad due to the "dislocation factor" and limited tenure. The local-hires, mostly Filipinos, claim
discrimination due to receiving lower salaries than their foreign counterparts. The School argues that the difference
is based on reasonable classification, as foreign-hires face economic disadvantages and require competitive
compensation to work in the Philippines. The Department of Labor and Employment upheld the classification,
stating that it does not violate equal protection laws and is necessary for the School's international competitiveness.
The union representing the teachers sought relief, contesting the disparity in salary rates, but the DOLE denied their
motion, affirming the School's compensation scheme.

Issue: WON the policy of the International School is violative of the Equal protection Clause. WON the classification
of foreign-hire and local-hire is based on substantial distinction.

Ruling:

The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay
for equal work." Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar
conditions, should be paid similar salaries.This rule applies to the School, its "international character"
notwithstanding.

The School contends that petitioner has not adduced evidence that local-hires perform work equal to that of
foreign-hires.The Court finds this argument a little cavalier. If an employer accords employees the same position and
rank, the presumption is that these employees perform equal work. This presumption is borne by logic and human
experience. If the employer pays one employee less than the rest, it is not for that employee to explain why he
receives less or why the others receive more. That would be adding insult to injury. The employer has discriminated
against that employee; it is for the employer to explain why the employee is treated unfairly.
The employer in this case has failed to discharge this burden. There is no evidence here that foreign-hires perform
25% more efficiently or effectively than the local-hires. Both groups have similar functions and responsibilities, which
they perform under similar working conditions.

The School cannot invoke the need to entice foreign-hires to leave their domicile to rationalize the distinction in
salary rates without violating the principle of equal work for equal pay.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The petition is hereby GRANTED IN PART. The Orders of the
Secretary of Labor and Employment dated June 10, 1996 and March 19, 1997, are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE insofar as they uphold the practice of respondent School of according foreign-hires higher salaries than
local-hires.

DECS v. San Diego, G.R. No. 89572, December 21, 1989

Facts:

The issue revolves around a student's eligibility to retake the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) after failing it
three times, as per the rule limiting attempts to three. He filed a mandamus petition, initially citing constitutional
rights to academic freedom and quality education. He later challenged the constitutionality of the rule itself, citing
due process and equal protection. The trial court granted his petition, but this decision was overturned. The ruling
was reversed as it was deemed that the petitioner was not arbitrarily deprived of his right to pursue medical
education.

Issue: WON the three flunk rule in MNAT is violative of the Equal protection Clause. WON there is a substantial
distinction to those subjected to the three flunk rule and those who are not.

Ruling:

There can be no question that a substantial distinction exists between medical students and other students who are
not subjected to the NMAT and the three-flunk rule. The medical profession directly affects the very lives of the
people, unlike other careers which, for this reason, do not require more vigilant regulation. The accountant, for
example, while belonging to an equally respectable profession, does not hold the same delicate responsibility as
that of the physician and so need not be similarly treated. There would be unequal protection if some applicants who
have passed the tests are admitted and others who have also qualified are denied entrance. In other words, what
the equal protection requires is equality among equals.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent court dated January 13, 1989, is
REVERSED, with costs against the private respondent. It is so ordered.

Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, G.R. No. 105371 November 11, 1993

Facts:

R.A. No. 7354, entitled "An Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation, Defining its Powers, Functions and
Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the Industry and for Other Purposes Connected Therewith," was
enacted to establish a nationwide postal system in the Philippines. Its objectives include facilitating the economical
and speedy transfer of mail and other postal matters, promoting international cooperation through postal services,
providing a range of postal services to cater to different needs, and ensuring sufficient revenues to finance postal
services and standards.

The petition challenges the constitutionality of Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 and Circular No. 92-28 of the Philippine
Postal Corporation, which withdrew the franking privilege from various government offices, including the Judiciary.
The petitioners argue that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from the Judiciary while retaining it for other
government offices violates the equal protection clause. The respondents contend that the law is based on a valid
classification and is not discriminatory, as it also withdrew the privilege from other government offices. The issue
revolves around whether the withdrawal of the franking privilege constitutes discrimination and violates the equal
protection clause.

Sec. 35 of R.A. No. 7354, which is the principal target of the petition, reads as follows:

Sec. 35. Repealing Clause. — All acts, decrees, orders, executive orders, instructions, rules and regulations or parts
thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are repealed or modified accordingly.

All franking privileges authorized by law are hereby repealed, except those provided for under Commonwealth Act
No. 265, Republic Acts Numbered 69, 180, 1414, 2087 and 5059. The Corporation may continue the franking
privilege under Circular No. 35 dated October 24, 1977 and that of the Vice President, under such arrangements
and conditions as may obviate abuse or unauthorized use thereof.

Issue: WON there is a substantial distinction between the other Branches of the government and the Judiciary as to
warrant a withdrawal of the franking privileges of the Judiciary.

Ruling:

According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed, Similar subjects, in other words,
should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others.

In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been withdrawn, Section 35 has
placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it recognizes the need of the President of the
Philippines and the members of Congress for the franking privilege, there is no reason why it should not recognize a
similar and in fact greater need on the part of the Judiciary for such privilege. While we may appreciate the
withdrawal of the franking privilege from the Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, we fail to
understand why the Supreme Court should be similarly treated as that Committee. And while we may concede the
need of the National Census and Statistics Office for the franking privilege, we are intrigued that a similar if not
greater need is not recognized in the courts of justice.

Assuming that basis, we cannot understand why, of all the departments of the government, it is the Judiciary, that
has been denied the franking privilege. There is no question that if there is any major branch of the government that
needs the privilege, it is the Judicial Department, as the respondents themselves point out. Curiously, the
respondents would justify the distinction on the basis precisely of this need and, on this basis, deny the Judiciary the
franking privilege while extending it to others less deserving.

In their Comment, the respondents point out that available data from the Postal Service Office show that from
January 1988 to June 1992, the total volume of frank mails amounted to P90,424,175.00. Of this amount, frank
mails from the Judiciary and other agencies whose functions include the service of judicial processes, such as the
intervenor, the Department of Justice and the Office of the Ombudsman, amounted to P86,481,759. Frank mails
coming fromthe Judiciary amounted to P73,574,864.00, and those coming from the petitioners reached the total
amount of P60,991,431.00. The respondents' conclusion is that because of this considerable volume of mail from
the Judiciary, the franking privilege must be withdrawn from it.

The argument is self-defeating. The respondents are in effect saying that the franking privilege should be extended
only to those who do not need it very much, if at all, (like the widows of former Presidents) but not to those who
need it badly (especially the courts of justice). It is like saying that a person may be allowed cosmetic surgery
although it is not really necessary but not an operation that can save his life.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is partially GRANTED and Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Circular No. 92-28 is SET ASIDE insofar as it withdraws the franking privilege from the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional trail Courts, the Municipal trial Courts, and the National Land
Registration Authority and its Register of Deeds to all of which offices the said privilege shall be RESTORED. The
temporary restraining order dated June 2, 1992, is made permanent.

Fariñas v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 147387, December 10, 2003

Facts:

Republic Act No. 9006, also known as The Fair Election Act, was enacted to enhance the holding of free, orderly,
honest, peaceful, and credible elections through fair election practices. It consolidated House Bill No. 9000 and
Senate Bill No. 1742, which aimed to allow the use of mass media for election propaganda and to eliminate unfair
election practices. One of the controversial provisions of Republic Act No. 9006 was Section 14, which expressly
repealed Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code. Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code provided that any
elective official running for an office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

The petitioners assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates against appointive officials. By the repeal
of Section 67, an elective official who runs for office other than the one which he is holding is no longer considered
ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing his certificate of candidacy. Elective officials continue in public office even
as they campaign for reelection or election for another elective position. On the other hand, Section 66 has been
retained; thus, the limitation on appointive officials remains - they are still considered ipso facto resigned from their
offices upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy. Creating an unequal treatment between elective and
appointive officials.

The respondents further argue that the repeal of Section 67 does not violate the equal protection clause as there is
a substantial distinction between elective and appointive officials. Elective officials hold office by virtue of the popular
will, while appointive officials do not. Therefore, they can be treated differently under the law.

Issue: WON the classification of the Appointed officials and Elective Officials is based on “Substantial Distinctions”

Ruling:

The court dismissed the petition.

Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is Not Violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution

Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office
by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed
therefrom only upon stringent conditions.On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their
designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity
and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority

Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that under Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I,
Subsection A. Civil Service Commission, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292),
appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any
partisan political activity or take part in any election except to vote. Under the same provision, elective officials, or
officers or employees holding political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral
activities.

By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, the legislators deemed it proper to
treat these two classes of officials differently with respect to the effect on their tenure in the office of the filing of the
certificates of candidacy for any position other than those occupied by them. Again, it is not within the power of the
Court to pass upon or look into the wisdom of this classification.
Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e., elected officials vis-a-vis appointive officials,
is anchored upon material and significant distinctions and all the persons belonging under the same classification
are similarly treated, the equal protection clause of the Constitution is, thus, not infringed.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED

PHILRECA v. Secretary of the DILG, G.R. No. 143076, June 10, 2003

Facts:

The petitioners, including the Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives Association, Inc. (PHILRECA) and several
electric cooperatives, filed a petition for Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul as
unconstitutional sections 193 and 234 of R.A. No. 7160, also known as the Local Government Code. They argued
that these provisions, which withdrew their tax exemptions, violated the equal protection clause and impaired the
obligation of contracts. The petitioners relied on Presidential Decree No. 269, as amended, which provided tax
incentives to electric cooperatives, including exemption from income taxes and other national and local government
taxes and fees. They also cited loan agreements with the United States Agency for International Development
(USAID) that contained provisions exempting the loans from taxation. However, with the passage of the Local
Government Code, the petitioners claimed that their tax exemptions were invalidly withdrawn.

The petitioners argue that sections 193 and 234 of the Local Government Code violate the equal protection clause
by unduly discriminating against them. They claim that these provisions unfairly favor cooperatives registered under
R.A. No. 6938, the Cooperative Code of the Philippines, by granting them tax exemption privileges not extended to
cooperatives registered under P.D. No. 269, as amended. The petitioners assert that both types of cooperatives are
similarly situated: both are registered with government agencies (NEA and CDA), both operate to serve their
member-consumers, and both were tax-exempt before the Local Government Code was enacted. Therefore, the
petitioners argue that singling out R.A. No. 6938-registered cooperatives for tax exemptions under the Local
Government Code while excluding P.D. No. 269-registered cooperatives constitutes a violation of the equal
protection clause.

The pertinent parts of Sections 193 and 234 of the Local Government Code provide:

Section 193. Withdrawal of Tax Exemption Privileges.—Unless otherwise provided in this Code, tax exemptions or
incentives granted to, or presently enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or juridical, including government-owned
and controlled corporations, except local water districts, cooperatives duly registered under R.A. No. 6938,
non-stock and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions, are hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of this
Code.

Section 234. Exemptions from real property tax.—The following are exempted from payment of the real property tax:

(d) All real property owned by duly registered cooperatives as provided for under R.A. No. 6938

Issue: WON there is a substantial distinction between Cooperatives under P.D. No. 269 and R.A. No. 6938 as to
warrant an exclusion from the tax exemption.

Ruling:

There is No Violation of the Equal Protection Clause

We hold that there is reasonable classification under the Local Government Code to justify the different tax
treatment between electric cooperatives covered by P.D. No. 269, as amended, and electric cooperatives under
R.A. No. 6938.
First, substantial distinctions exist between cooperatives under P.D. No. 269, as amended, and cooperatives under
R.A. No. 6938. These distinctions are manifest in at least two material respects which go into the nature of
cooperatives envisioned by R.A. No. 6938 and which characteristics are not present in the type of cooperative
associations created under P.D. No. 269, as amended.

a. Capital Contributions by Members

A cooperative under R.A. No. 6938 is defined as: [A] duly registered association of persons with a common bond of
interest, who have voluntarily joined together to achieve a lawful common or social economic end, making equitable
contributions to the capital required and accepting a fair share of the risks and benefits of the undertaking in
accordance with universally accepted cooperative principles.

The importance of capital contributions by members of a cooperative under R.A. No. 6938 was emphasized during
the Senate deliberations as one of the key factors which distinguished electric cooperatives under P.D. No. 269, as
amended, from electric cooperatives under the Cooperative Code.

Senator Aquino. … That is why in Article III we have the following definition:

A cooperative is an association of persons with a common bond of interest who have voluntarily joined together to
achieve a common social or economic end, making equitable contributions to the capital required.

In this particular case [cooperatives under P.D. No. 269], Mr. President, the members do not make
substantial contribution to the capital required. It is the government that puts in the capital, in most cases.

b. Extent of Government Control over Cooperatives

Another principle adhered to by the Cooperative Code is the principle of subsidiarity. Pursuant to this principle, the
government may only engage in development activities where cooperatives do not posses the capability nor the
resources to do so and only upon the request of such cooperatives.

In contrast, P.D. No. 269, as amended by P.D. No. 1645, is replete with provisions which grant the NEA, upon the
happening of certain events, the power to control and take over the management and operations of cooperatives
registered under it.

The extent of government control over electric cooperatives covered by P.D. No. 269, as amended, is largely a
function of the role of the NEA as a primary source of funds of these electric cooperatives. It is crystal clear that
NEA incurred loans from various sources to finance the development and operations of the electric cooperatives.
Consequently, amendments to P.D. No. 269 were primarily geared to expand the powers of the NEA over the
electric cooperatives to ensure that loans granted to them would be repaid to the government. In contrast,
cooperatives under R.A. No. 6938 are envisioned to be self-sufficient and independent organizations with minimal
government intervention or regulation. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the temporary restraining
order heretofore issued is LIFTED.

Germane to the Purpose of the Law

People v. Cayat, G.R. No. L-45987, May 5, 1939

Facts:

That on or about the 25th day of January, 1937, in the City of Baguio, Commonwealth of the Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this court, the above-named accused, Cayat, being a member of the non-Christian tribes, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully, and illegally receive, acquire, and have in his possession and under his control or
custody, one bottle of A-1-1 gin, an intoxicating liquor, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the
members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of Act No. 1639.
Accused interposed a demurrer which was overruled. At the trial, he admitted all the facts alleged in the information,
but pleaded not guilty to the charge for the reasons adduced in his demurrer and submitted the case on the
pleadings. The trial court found him guilty of the crime charged and sentenced him to pay a fine of fifty pesos (P50)
or supper subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The case is now before this court on appeal. Sections 2
and 3 of Act No. 1639 read:

SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful for any native of the Philippine Islands who is a member of a non-Christian tribe within
the meaning of the Act Numbered Thirteen hundred and ninety-seven, to buy, receive, have in his possession, or
drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and
liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of this
Act, except as provided in section one hereof; and it shall be the duty of any police officer or other duly authorized
agent of the Insular or any provincial, municipal or township government to seize and forthwith destroy any such
liquors found unlawfully in the possession of any member of a non-Christian tribe.

SEC. 3. Any person violating the provisions of section one or section two of this Act shall, upon conviction thereof,
be punishable for each offense by a fine of not exceeding two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for a term not
exceeding six months, in the discretion of the court.

Issue:

WON the Act No. 1639 is violative of the equal protection Clause. WON the classification is germane to the purpose
of the Law.

Ruling:

It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not equal
protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. And the classification, to be
reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not
be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.

That it is germane to the purposes of law cannot be doubted. The prohibition "to buy, receive, have in his
possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called
native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the
passage of this Act.," is unquestionably designed to insure peace and order in and among the non-Christian tribes.
It has been the sad experience of the past, as the observations of the lower court disclose, that the free use of
highly intoxicating liquors by the non-Christian tribes have often resulted in lawlessness and crimes, thereby
hampering the efforts of the government to raise their standard of life and civilization.

Judgment is affirmed, with costs against appellant.

Dumlao v. Comelec

Facts:

The petitioner, Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his certificate of candidacy for
said position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980.

Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as
discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. Said Section 4
provides:

Sec. 4. Special Disqualification in addition to violation of section 10 of Art. XI I-C of the Constitution and
disqualification mentioned in existing laws, which are hereby declared as disqualification for any of the elective
officials enumerated in section 1 hereof.
Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which
he is entitled under the law, and who shall have been 6,5 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to
which he seeks to be elected shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired
(Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner Dumlao alleges that the aforecited provision is directed insidiously against him, and that the classification
provided therein is based on "purely arbitrary grounds and, therefore, class legislation."

Issue: WON the Classification is germane to the purpose of the Law.

Ruling: TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

Respondent's claim, as accepted by the majority, is that the purpose of the special disqualification is "to infuse new
blood in local governments but the classification (that would bar 65-year old retirees from running for the same
elective local office) is not rational nor reasonable. It is not germane nor relevant to the alleged purpose of "infusing
new blood" because such "old blood" retirees may continue in local governments since they are not disqualified at
all to run for any other local elective office such as from provincial governor, vice-governor, city, municipal or district
mayor and vice- mayor to member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan Sangguniang Panglunsod and Sangguniang
Bayan, other than the local elective office from which they retired.

The mere fact that a candidate is less than 65 or has "young or new blood" does not mean that he would be more
efficient, effective and competent than a mature 65year old like petition er who has had experience on the job and
who was observed at the hearing to appear to be most physically fit.

And even in the case of 65-year old local elective officials, they are disqualified only when they have received
payment of the retirement benefits to which they are entitled under the law (which amount to very little, compared to
retirement benefits of other executive officials and members of the judiciary). If they have not received such
retirement benefits, they are not disqualified. Certainly, their disqualification or non-disqualification and consequent
classification as "old blood" or "new blood" cannot hinge on such an irrelevant question of whether or not they have
received their retirement benefits.

PASEI v. Drilon, G.R. No. 81958, June 30, 1988

Facts:

The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), a firm "engaged principally in the
recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas placement," challenges the Constitutional validity of
Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of
"GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND
HOUSEHOLD WORKERS," in this petition for certiorari and prohibition. Specifically, the measure is assailed for
"discrimination against males or females;" that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers
and females with similar skills.

Issue: WON the classification in the D.O. No1 is germane to the Purpose of the Law.

Ruling:

There is likewise no doubt that such a classification is germane to the purpose behind the measure. Unquestionably,
it is the avowed objective of Department Order No. 1 to "enhance the protection for Filipino female overseas
workers" this Court has no quarrel that in the midst of the terrible mistreatment Filipina workers have suffered
abroad, a ban on deployment will be for their own good and welfare.

The Order does not narrowly apply to existing conditions. Rather, it is intended to apply indefinitely so long as those
conditions exist. This is clear from the Order itself ("Pending review of the administrative and legal measures, in the
Philippines and in the host countries . . ."), meaning to say that should the authorities arrive at a means impressed
with a greater degree of permanency, the ban shall be lifted. As a stop-gap measure, it is possessed of a necessary
malleability, depending on the circumstances of each case. Accordingly, it provides:

9. LIFTING OF SUSPENSION. — The Secretary of Labor and Employment (DOLE) may, upon recommendation of
the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), lift the suspension in countries where there are:

1. Bilateral agreements or understanding with the Philippines, and/or,

2. Existing mechanisms providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of Filipino workers.

Ichong v. Hernandez, supra

Ruling:

Quinto v. Comelec (resolution of the MR), supra

Facts:

The controversy arose from the law authorizing the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to use an automated
election system (AES). Initially enacted in 1997, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8436 allowed for the use of an AES in
national and local elections. Section 11 of this law prescribed the format of the official ballot, including arrangements
for candidate names and ballot security measures.

The amendments to R.A. No. 8436 introduced by R.A. No. 9369 included provisions regarding the filing of
certificates of candidacy (CoC) and the resignation of public appointive officials upon filing. Specifically, any person
holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the armed forces and officers and
employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations, would be considered ipso facto resigned from their
office at the start of the day of filing their CoC. This provision aimed to ensure that candidates running for office
would not hold conflicting positions of authority. Political parties were also allowed to hold conventions to nominate
their official candidates within thirty days before the start of the period for filing a certificate of candidacy.

The petitioners' contention for equal protection stems from their argument that Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678,
which considers persons holding appointive positions ipso facto resigned upon filing their certificates of candidacy
(CoCs), discriminates against them compared to those holding elective positions. They argue that this distinction
violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution, as it treats similarly situated individuals differently without
any reasonable basis. The petitioners claim that this provision unfairly restricts their right to seek public office, unlike
those holding elective positions who are not considered resigned upon filing their CoCs.

This Court resolves to grant the respondent Commission on Elections’ (COMELEC) motion for reconsideration, and
the movants-intervenors’ motions for reconsideration-in-intervention, of this Court’s December 1, 2009 Decision
(Decision)

The assailed Decision granted the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A.
Tolentino, Jr. and declared as unconstitutional the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic
Act No. 9369 Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678, mainly
on the ground that they violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution and suffer from overbreadth. The
assailed Decision thus paved the way for public appointive officials to continue discharging the powers, prerogatives
and functions of their office notwithstanding their entry into the political arena.

In support of their respective motions for reconsideration, respondent COMELEC and movants-intervenors submit
the following arguments:
(1) The assailed Decision is contrary to, and/or violative of, the constitutional proscription against the participation of
public appointive officials and members of the military in partisan political activity;

(2) The assailed provisions do not violate the equal protection clause when they accord differential treatment to
elective and appointive officials, because such differential treatment rests on material and substantial distinctions
and is germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) The assailed provisions do not suffer from the infirmity of overbreadth; and

(4) There is a compelling need to reverse the assailed Decision, as public safety and interest demand such reversal.

Issue: WON the classification of the appointive officials as different of those elective elective officials as ispo facto
resigned from their office after filing of the CoC is Germane to the Purpose of the Law.

Ruling:

Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 13 of RA 9369, and Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code Do Not
Violate the Equal Protection Clause

We now hold that Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, and the second
proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of RA 9369 are not violative of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.

ii. Classification Germane to the Purposes of the Law

The Fariñas ruling on the equal protection challenge stands on solid ground even if reexamined.

any person who poses an equal protection challenge must convincingly show that the law creates a classification
that is "palpably arbitrary or capricious."He must refute all possible rational bases for the differing treatment, whether
or not the Legislature cited those bases as reasons for the enactment, such that the constitutionality of the law must
be sustained even if the reasonableness of the classification is "fairly debatable." In the case at bar, the petitioners
failed – and in fact did not even attempt – to discharge this heavy burden.

[I]t is not sufficient grounds for invalidation that we may find that the statute’s distinction is unfair, underinclusive,
unwise, or not the best solution from a public-policy standpoint; rather, we must find that there is no reasonably
rational reason for the differing treatment

In the instant case, is there a rational justification for excluding elected officials from the operation of the deemed
resigned provisions? I submit that there is.

An election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the purest expression of the sovereign power of the
people. It involves the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote. Considering that elected
officials are put in office by their constituents for a definite term, it may justifiably be said that they were excluded
from the ambit of the deemed resigned provisions in utmost respect for the mandate of the sovereign will. In other
words, complete deference is accorded to the will of the electorate that they be served by such officials until the end
of the term for which they were elected. In contrast, there is no such expectation insofar as appointed officials are
concerned.

The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is therefore germane to the purposes of the law. For
the law was made not merely to preserve the integrity, efficiency, and discipline of the public service; the Legislature,
whose wisdom is outside the rubric of judicial scrutiny, also thought it wise to balance this with the competing, yet
equally compelling, interest of deferring to the sovereign will.

The goal that employment and advancement in the Government service not depend on political performance, and at
the same time to make sure that Government employees would be free from pressure and from express or tacit
invitation to vote in a certain way or perform political chores in order to curry favor with their superiors rather than to
act out their own beliefs. It may be urged that prohibitions against coercion are sufficient protection; but for many
years the joint judgment of the Executive and Congress has been that to protect the rights of federal employees with
respect to their jobs and their political acts and beliefs it is not enough merely to forbid one employee to attempt to
influence or coerce another.

Abakada Guro v. Purisima, supra

Facts:

This petition for prohibition seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 93352
(Attrition Act of 2005).

RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and
employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a
Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials
and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status.

The Fund is sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their revenue targets for the year, as
determined by the Development Budget and Coordinating Committee (DBCC). Any incentive or reward is taken from
the fund and allocated to the BIR and the BOC in proportion to their contribution in the excess collection of the
targeted amount of tax revenue.

Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the system of rewards and incentives only to officials and employees
of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. There is no valid basis for
classification or distinction as to why such a system should not apply to officials and employees of all other
government agencies.

Issue: WON the classification of the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC as the only recipient of the
reward and incentive system is Germane to the purpose of the Law.

Ruling:

Equality guaranteed under the equal protection clause is equality under the same conditions and among persons
similarly situated; it is equality among equals, not similarity of treatment of persons who are classified based on
substantial differences in relation to the object to be accomplished.

Since the subject of the law is the revenue- generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC, the
incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law should logically pertain to the said agencies. Moreover, the law
concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they have the common distinct primary function of generating
revenues for the national government through the collection of taxes, customs duties, fees and charges.

The BIR performs the following functions:

Sec. 18. The Bureau of Internal Revenue. – The Bureau of Internal Revenue, which shall be headed by and subject
to the supervision and control of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, who shall be appointed by the President
upon the recommendation of the Secretary [of the DOF], shall have the following functions:

(1) Assess and collect all taxes, fees and charges and account for all revenues collected;

On the other hand, the BOC has the following functions:

Sec. 23. The Bureau of Customs. – The Bureau of Customs which shall be headed and subject to the management
and control of the Commissioner of Customs, who shall be appointed by the President upon the recommendation of
the Secretary[of the DOF] and hereinafter referred to as Commissioner, shall have the following functions:

(1) Collect custom duties, taxes and the corresponding fees, charges and penalties;

(2) Account for all customs revenues collected;

Both the BIR and the BOC are bureaus under the DOF. They principally perform the special function of being the
instrumentalities through which the State exercises one of its great inherent functions – taxation. Indubitably, such
substantial distinction is germane and intimately related to the purpose of the law. Hence, the classification and
treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC under RA 9335 fully satisfy the demands of equal protection.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. Section 12 of RA 9335 creating a Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee to approve the implementing rules and regulations of the law is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL and therefore NULL and VOID. The constitutionality of the remaining provisions of RA 9335
is UPHELD. Pursuant to Section 13 of RA 9335, the rest of the provisions remain in force and effect.

Duration: Not Limited to Existing Conditions Only

People v. Cayat, supra

Facts:

That on or about the 25th day of January, 1937, in the City of Baguio, Commonwealth of the Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this court, the above-named accused, Cayat, being a member of the non-Christian tribes, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully, and illegally receive, acquire, and have in his possession and under his control or
custody, one bottle of A-1-1 gin, an intoxicating liquor, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the
members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of Act No. 1639.

Accused interposed a demurrer which was overruled. At the trial, he admitted all the facts alleged in the information,
but pleaded not guilty to the charge for the reasons adduced in his demurrer and submitted the case on the
pleadings. The trial court found him guilty of the crime charged and sentenced him to pay a fine of fifty pesos (P50)
or supper subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The case is now before this court on appeal. Sections 2
and 3 of Act No. 1639 read:

SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful for any native of the Philippine Islands who is a member of a non-Christian tribe within
the meaning of the Act Numbered Thirteen hundred and ninety-seven, to buy, receive, have in his possession, or
drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and
liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of this
Act, except as provided in section one hereof; and it shall be the duty of any police officer or other duly authorized
agent of the Insular or any provincial, municipal or township government to seize and forthwith destroy any such
liquors found unlawfully in the possession of any member of a non-Christian tribe.

SEC. 3. Any person violating the provisions of section one or section two of this Act shall, upon conviction thereof,
be punishable for each offense by a fine of not exceeding two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for a term not
exceeding six months, in the discretion of the court.

Issue: WON the classification of the members of non-Christian tribes is not limited to existing conditions only.

Ruling:

The law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of its enactment. It is intended to apply for all
times as long as those conditions exist. The Act was not predicated, as counsel for appellant asserts, upon the
assumption that the non-Christians are "impermeable to any civilizing influence." On the contrary, the Legislature
understood that the civilization of a people is a slow process and that hand in hand with it must go measures of
protection and security.

Judgment is affirmed, with costs against appellant.

Ormoc Sugar Co., Inc. v. Treasurer of Ormoc City, G.R. No. L-23794, February 17, 1968

Facts:

On January 29, 1964, the Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1964, imposing a
municipal tax on the export sale of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. Payments for this tax
were made under protest by the company. Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. then filed a complaint alleging that the
ordinance was unconstitutional, violating the equal protection clause and the rule of uniformity of taxation. The
company argued that the tax was not authorized under its charter or Republic Act 2264, and amounted to a customs
duty, fee, or charge.

Section 1 of the ordinance states: "There shall be paid to the City Treasurer on any and all productions of centrifugal
sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Incorporated, in Ormoc City, a municipal tax equivalent to one per
centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of America and other foreign countries." Though referred to as a
tax on the export of centrifugal sugar produced at Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. For production of sugar alone is not
taxable; the only time the tax applies is when the sugar produced is exported.

The Court of First Instance upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance, citing the broadened taxing power of
chartered cities under the Local Autonomy Act. The company appealed directly to the Supreme Court, reiterating its
arguments against the ordinance. The ordinance imposed a tax on the export of centrifugal sugar, which applied
only when the sugar produced was exported.

Issue: WON equal protection clause is infringe. WON the classification is not limited to existing conditions only.

Ruling:

A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questioned ordinance does not meet them, for it taxes only
centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the
taxing ordinance's enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the city of
Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The
taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of
the same class as plaintiff, for the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it
cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc City Sugar Company, Inc. as the
entity to be levied upon.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, the challenged ordinance is declared
unconstitutional and the defendants-appellees are hereby ordered to refund the P12,087.50 plaintiff-appellant paid
under protest. No costs. So ordered.

Equal Application to All Members of the Same Class

Kwong Sing v. City of Manila, supra

Facts: The validity of Ordinance No. 532 of the city of Manila requiring receipts in duplicate in English and Spanish
duly signed showing the kind and number of articles delivered by laundries and dyeing and cleaning establishments,
must be decided on this appeal. The ordinance in question reads as follows:

[ORDINANCE No. 532.]

 AN ORDINANCE REGULATING THE DELIVERY AND RETURN OF CLOTHES OR CLOTHS
DELIVERED TO BE WASHED IN LAUNDRIES, DYEING AND CLEANING ESTABLISHMENTS.

Be it ordained by the Municipal Board of the city of Manila, that:

SECTION. 1. Every person, firm or corporation in the city of Manila engaged in laundering, dyeing, or
cleaning by any process, cloths or clothes for compensation, shall issue dyed, or cleaned are received
a receipt in duplicate, in English and Spanish, duly signed, showing the kind and number of articles
delivered, and the duplicate copy of the receipt shall be kept by the owner of the establishment or
person issuing same.

Chinese laundrymen are here the protestants. Their rights, however, are not less because they may be Chinese
aliens. The life, liberty, or property of these persons cannot be taken without due process of law; they are entitled to
the equal protection of the laws without regard to their race; and treaty rights, as effectuated between the United
States and China, must be accorded them.

Issue: WON the ordinance is applied Equally to all the members of the same Class.

Ruling:

Our view, after most thoughtful consideration, is, that the ordinance invades no fundamental right, and impairs no
personal privilege. Under the guise of police regulation, an attempt is not made to violate personal property rights.
The ordinance is neither discriminatory nor unreasonable in its operation. It applies to all public laundries without
distinction, whether they belong to Americans, Filipinos, Chinese, or any other nationality. All, without exception, and
each everyone of them without distinction, must comply with the ordinance. There is no privilege, no discrimination,
no distinction. Equally and uniformly the ordinance applies to all engaged in the laundry business, and, as nearly as
may be, the same burdens are cast upon them.

Villegas v. Hiu Chiong, supra

(equal application to all members of the same class that instead leads to inequality)
Facts:

The controverted Ordinance No. 6537 was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila on February 22, 1968 and
signed by the herein petitioner Mayor Antonio J. Villegas of Manila on March 27, 1968.

City Ordinance No. 6537 is entitled:

AN ORDINANCE MAKING IT UNLAWFUL FOR ANY PERSON NOT A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES TO BE
EMPLOYED IN ANY PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT OR TO BE ENGAGED IN ANY KIND OF TRADE, BUSINESS OR
OCCUPATION WITHIN THE CITY OF MANILA WITHOUT FIRST SECURING AN EMPLOYMENT PERMIT FROM
THE MAYOR OF MANILA; AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

Section 1 of said Ordinance No. 6537 prohibits aliens from being employed or to engage or participate in any
position or occupation or business enumerated therein, whether permanent, temporary or casual, without first
securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of P50.00 except persons
employed in the diplomatic or consular missions of foreign countries, or in the technical assistance programs of both
the Philippine Government and any foreign government, and those working in their respective households, and
members of religious orders or congregations, sect or denomination, who are not paid monetarily or in kind.

On May 4, 1968, private respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho who was employed in Manila, filed a petition with the
Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch I, denominated as Civil Case No. 72797, praying for the issuance of the
writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop the enforcement of Ordinance No. 6537 as well as for a
judgment declaring said Ordinance No. 6537 null and void.
On May 4, 1968, private respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho who was employed in Manila, filed a petition with the
Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch I, denominated as Civil Case No. 72797, praying for the issuance of the
writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop the enforcement of Ordinance No. 6537 as well as for a
judgment declaring said Ordinance No. 6537 null and void.

Issue: WON the Ordinance is violative of the equal protection clause.

Ruling:

The P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive but because it fails to consider valid substantial
differences in situation among individual aliens who are required to pay it. Although the equal protection clause of
the Constitution does not forbid classification, it is imperative that the classification should be based on real and
substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation. The same amount of
P50.00 is being collected from every employed alien whether he is casual or permanent, part time or full time or
whether he is a lowly employee or a highly paid executive

Levels of Scrutiny in Equal Protection Analysis

Biraogo v. Truth Commission, supra
concurring and dissenting opinion of J. Nachura, quoting British American Tobacco v. Camacho

Ruling:

Under this test, a legislative classification, to survive an equal protection challenge, must be shown to rationally
further a legitimate state interest. The classifications must be reasonable and rest upon some ground of difference
having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation. Since every law has in its favor the presumption
of constitutionality, the burden of proof is on the one attacking the constitutionality of the law to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that the legislative classification is without rational basis. The presumption of constitutionality can
be overcome only by the most explicit demonstration that a classification is a hostile and oppressive discrimination
against particular persons and classes, and that there is no conceivable basis which might support it.

The equality guaranteed under this clause is equality under the same conditions and among persons similarly
situated; it is equality among equals, not similarity of treatment of persons who are classified based on substantial
differences in relation to the object to be accomplished

He goes on to explain these "levels of scrutiny", as follows:

The first level of scrutiny, rational basis scrutiny, requires only that the purpose of the legislative or executive act not
be invidious or arbitrary, and that the act’s classification be reasonably related to the purpose. Rational basis
scrutiny is applied to legislative or executive acts that have the general nature of economic or social welfare
legislation. While purporting to set limits, rational basis scrutiny in practice results in complete judicial deference to
the legislature or executive. Thus, a legislative or executive act which is subject to rational basis scrutiny is for all
practical purposes assured of being upheld as constitutional.

The second level of scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, requires that the purpose of the legislative or executive act be an
important governmental interest and that the act’s classification be significantly related to the purpose. Intermediate
scrutiny has been applied to classifications based on gender and illegitimacy. The rationale for this higher level of
scrutiny is that gender and illegitimacy classifications historically have resulted from invidious discrimination.
However, compared to strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny’s presumption of invidious discrimination is more readily
rebutted, since benign motives are more likely to underlie classifications triggering intermediate scrutiny.

The third level of scrutiny is strict scrutiny. Strict scrutiny requires that the legislative or executive act’s purpose be a
compelling state interest and that the act’s classification be narrowly tailored to the purpose. Strict scrutiny is
triggered in two situations: (1) where the act infringes on a fundamental right; and (2) where the act’s classification is
based on race or national origin. While strict scrutiny purports to be only a very close judicial examination of
legislative or executive acts, for all practical purposes, an act subject to strict scrutiny is assured of being held
unconstitutional. (Citations omitted.)