MAO TSE-TUNG’S THOUGHT AND THE CHINESE REVOLUTION —With Special Reference to the Main Force of the Revolution— KOICHI NOMURA, Mao Tesungy taking he rural ates at hit tary tae, and ying on the ovewieiming marie of ube pest} od ali tang Marans sini a his teoril apport arable 1 lel he Ces revoation to mote How war the role pomible at all? The hey whe waco {he main fee of the Revlon, especialy ‘The inernanesion between Mag Tatung thooglt ad Marsicr-Lenisi, raga the unique charter of Map Toocang thought can be made lear by tain th above proce INTRODUCTION Since a few years ago, «loud outcry “Mao To-tung’ thought is Marcism- Lenin at the highest level in the present era” har been falling upon our feats from Peking. This outery seme to be growing more high pitched in the turmoil of the *Proletarian Cultural Revolution.” ‘The propaiton this outery conveys may not be of primary importance for non-Morxis-Leninsts, whove concern is of course the trend of actual developments in China. Abo, MarxistLeninisu in Burope or cleewhere, tepesialy in the Soviet Union, will, of course, realy reject such a propos tion. That is only natural at Teast in the evising” politcal cicamstances And as long ae these continae, it will remain meaninglom and nonproductive to discuss the validity of that proposition. Whether itis right or wrong mutt be & question to be answered when all its ideological embellishments Ihave been taken off in the cource of actual developments in China. ‘Notwithranding this Limitation coming from the existing political condi= tions, the relationship between the so-called Mao Te-tung thought, particu- larly Mao's own ideas, and Marxism-Leninism still seems to pose certain probleme which require consideration in many aspects. Mao ‘Tee-tung’s {thought come into being apparently through coatact with and dependence fon Marxism-Leninism, It led the Chinese revalution to victory and has subsequently been leading revolutionary China. What then ie the point where the two lines of Mao ‘Tsecung’s thought and Marxism-LeninismMao's Thought and the Chinese Revolution a Intersect? Or, what was the way in which Mao Tseturg’s thought accepted ‘Marxism-Leninism in leading the Chinese revolution to succes? ‘One may ask these questions, but it is not easy at all even to ascertain what are the ingredients of that vast system of thought known as Marais Leniniam. At the same time, i i in no way peable to examine Mao Tae: tung’s thought in all aspects of its history over half 2 century. Such an attempt at examination is made still more intricate and dificult by the “Great Cultural Revolution” in preventday China, I may therefore take up for diciasion here the proces in which Mao Tse-ang formed his thought and ths approach this subject, 20 10 speak, from his tide. In so doing, 1 limit the historical period, for che peesent, to the “erly yeare of Mao ‘Tse- tung” in the 1820's or che years ranging fom the frst inthe of Marais LLeninism into China through the Sret revolutionary cil war (the Northern Expedition, 925-1977) to the extablishment of a base of revolution in Ching- lkangshan. "To do so may end in a study from too limited a point of view, Dut will throw at least some light, through the analy, on a few points ‘which seem to constitute the characterise features of this thought, Moreover, it seems to be an indispensable tsk to shoulder in studying this thought, no matter how it may be evaluated, to ascertain what characteristics it was ‘given in its formative process or what changes Marxism-Leninism underweat ‘when it was accepted. 1. THE INFLUX OF MARXISM-LENINISM AND ‘THE CHINESE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT “The salvocs of the October Revolution brought ws Marxism-Leninism’ ‘and “hen, and only then, did the Chinese enter an entiely new era in their thinking and their ive" ‘So docs Mao Tsetung write in the Famous passage taken from his “On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship.” Tn fac, the impact fom the fact that the October Revolution succeeded in Russa marked the start of an over= ‘whelming infux of Marxism-Leninism into Chinn at the beginning of the 20¢ Century. On receiving the new of the October Revolution, Li Tachao, one of the founders of the Chinese Communist arty, prepared two articles, “Shi ‘min ti Sheng” (Victory of the Mass) and *Bolthevism ti Sheng" (Vietary of Bolshevim) in which he foreshowed the coming of 2 “ worker’ society," ‘while Hin Chingnin (New Youth’ the leading journal ia Use Chinese inte- Tectual world at that time, had as early as May, 1919 a special sue on ‘Marxian which was totally dedicated #0 commentary or.and studies of this theory. "The impact from the eaccesfol October Revolution was, in that ‘ene almost a *vevelation” to China, a country which had beer groping for fan outlet from semi-colonal status for more than half a century. On account of that revolution, the imperialist West was declared bankrupt, while Rusia, 2 Mao Treung, “On the Peps Demecrae Ditatonbip a Sell Woks of Mao ‘etn, Vole IV, Patng,Foegn Languages Prey, 161, p41.8 ‘The Developing, Economies 1s backward area so far placed under the taris| domination, was at once reborn a Socialist Soviet Republic. “Although the October Revolution wes a “revelation” to China, this docs ot mean that Marxism-Leniaiom immediatly took root in that county. ‘The more “revesling” it was, the more did the impact comprise strangely ined elements of prophecy and historical act. If Marsiam-Leninism, boon in the Industrial society of Burope and achieving reality in Rusia, was to be accepted in semi-feudal and eemi-colonial China, tis eaey to ee that a good. deal of difficulty was involved therein. Before it eould be accepted and Gevelop into an actual movement in that country, there was the need for ‘uch imagination concerning a practical application of that theory as well, fea fll understanding of it. Mao Toc-tng’s thought, which was afterward to become the orthodoxy of the Chinese revolution, was at this point to ‘begin tackling in its own faahion, the fundamental peablem of how to apply MarxistxLeniniam to Chinese realities Here T may set about to give a very brief picture of the Marxist-Leninist movement of China in the fist half of the 192M, with an eye to bringing into light characteristic features of Mao TTeetung’y thought in those years. ‘Asis well mown, thi period was characterized by a seria of extraordinary political events such as the founding of the Chinese Communist Party at its first congress in July, 1921 its rewolution to join the Comintern at the second congres in July (or May), 192 its decision to ellaborate with the Kuomin- tang (Nationalist Party) at the third congress in June, 192, the May 90 ‘Movement i 1825, the start of the Northern Expedition in July, 125, the ‘April 12 coup @état in 1977 and the Nationalis-Communist break-up in July of the same year. It is already evident that, throughout the period, the Gentral Committee of the Chinese Communist Pasty acted consistently in compliance with instructions from the Cominters. “There is no need to say that the party wae founded wnder the leadership of G. Voitinsky, Comintern representative in the Far East. Ako, in the instruction on NatioalisCon- ‘muss cllaboration (atthe Central Committee Moetng at Hangchovr, Aunt, 1922), the policy towards the April 12 coup d'état, and the Nationals-Com- smunist breakup at Waban ae seen the Cominter's strong hands of direction ‘working. In shor, the Marsist-Leninist movement of China which developed in parallel with the adoption of its ideas and principle, wae accompanied ‘with such concrete action as the co-operation with the Comintern, che found ing of the Commonst Party and the orgasizaton of labour unions. For this ‘eaon, it caused in this period, a good deal of controversy on strategy and tactic and eventually formed an extremely entangled political course resisting an easy solution. ‘The StaliniseTrotskyte feuding on the stage of the Com- intern after Lenin’ death, the confict of views among various groups within the Chinese Communist Party, the tiangular struggle of the Communists, Chiang Kaishel, and the Wohan Government—behind all these was the ferment of revolution threatening to sweep them away in a storm. Tei, however, not ow present purpose to follow a digremion to euch anMao's Thought and the Chinese Revelution 9 inticate Labyrinth of political history as this. I would rather present probs lems of the time in proper order while Keeping in mind the central theme of the present article ‘The politieal process in the period of the frst internal strife of evolution, Jooked bat: upon is coasexion with the political theory of Marsism-Lenin- fam, seems to indicate that most istues originated in the following thesis of [Lenin at the 2nd Comintern Congeess® With regard to the more backward states and nations, in which feudal ‘or paltiarchal and patiarchsl-peassat relations predominate, iia particularly important to bear in mind: Sixt, that all Communist Parties must asist the bourgeoivdemocratic lberation movement in these counties.... fourth, the ed, in backward countries to give special support to che peasant movement Against the landowners, against landed. proprietorship, and. against all mani festations or survivals of feudalism, and’ to strive to lend the peasant mover meat the most revolutionary character by establishing the closest possible Alliance between the West-Ewropean communi proletariat and the revolu tionary peacent movement in the Fast in the colonies, and in the backward ‘countries generally, It is particularly necessary to exert every effort to apply the basic principles of the Soviet system in counties where preapitalist ‘eations predominate—by seting up "working people's Soviets’ etc. ....” ‘Needles to say, what Lenin found in World War I ard its consequences was the need to combine “the masees of people ia the oppressed non-European fates” and “the proletarian movement in Europe” Thus the mationalit fmovement in the eolonies and. dependencier was considered an absolutely indispensable factor to ensure the achievements of the October Revoltion ‘This requirement seems to have grown stronger when the failure of revolution became apparent particularly ia Europe, and it led the Comintern to do all it could to anist the Chinese nationalist movement which was then foreshad- lowing an immense revolution, What then should be the concrete form of fuch asistance of direction was, however, in no way a question which could be amswered beforehand, In respect tothe two major problems in the thesis, namely, the communist party's assistance in the bourgeoivdemocratic liberae tion movement or the nationalist revolutionary movement and the establish nent of worker soviets, Lean himself hd to seek fora solution in “practical experience” Arising from the impact of the October Revolution, Chinese ‘Marxism was thus entering the phase of * practical experience as the Com= ‘munist Party came into being and the workers were. being organized and as it got more deeply involved in the matter of strategy and tactics for its movements. The tine was to come shortly in China when that thess was put into practice. “The waves of revolution since the early 1900 posed an normous problem, not only t speak of the Chinese Communist Party but ten more to the Comintera. As well known, the Comintern, centred around Stalin and Bukbarin, actually cought to solve the problem of a revolutionary Vets Lenny “Proininry Dre Theses on the Neos and che Colnial Quetiony” in Canad Wer, Velma 3y Mote, Progr Polisher, 1356, p16.0 The Developing Economies united font by choosing apolitical form of Nationalist Communist *intrae party collaboration” and, along this line, was to lad the revolution through the quickly changing phates of the turbulent time Here T do not wish to take up for discussion the apparently interesting ‘opie of whether or not Stalin's leadership. in howe years wat correct. It ‘would take me too far off our subject. Still it may be necessary to make ven a tentative appraisal of the point insofar as this concerns. the main theme of thie article ‘As far a8 T have checked together the insuficient material on. chs co plicated phase of the history of the Comintern aad the Chinese Comrminist Party, Sal's leadership does not stem as apprepriate as he often claimed afterward and ssid "Was our policy correct, Comrades? Tt vas absoktely correct” T would rather feel chere is more truth in the words of Benjamin Schwartz who writers “In reading Lenin's writings, one is struck by the candor with which he ‘often admits past errore without in the least diminishing the appearance of infaliblty which hedges him about... Stalin, however, whose leadership is fof quite another order, has had to resort to other methods of maintaining the appearance of infalibilty.... Whatever errors night have been committed ‘mutt have stemmed not from the Comintern leadership, but fom source.” "The Comintern was perhaps right in directing the Chinese Communist Party to co-operate with Sun Yateen's Kuomintang for vigorously carrying lout the'nationalist revolution. ‘True, without so doing, the precocious Com- rmunist Party would not have been able t© grow nor would the nationalist revolution have risen that high. But, as pointed out, the Comintern's direction certainly ems to have been too circumstantial after real power began to pass into the hands of Chiang Kaishek. Only a few weeks after the Com- {Intern accepted the Kuomintang, or Nationalist Pary, ats awociate body and its executive chote Chiang Kalshck as an honourary member, the Chungskan gunboat incident took place to bring Nationalist’ Communist feuding into the open (in March 1926) This was followed by the passage ofthe resalution of the Executive Committee of the Kuomintang which barred Communists fiom top posts in the Kuomintang organization (ia May, 1925. Apparently Chiang Kaishek had turned to the right. Nevertheles the Comintern leadership remained too defenseless to development in that direction. Alo aller the Northern Expedition force swept over the south of the Yellow River And after Stalin, in that situation, boasted “ we will ue the Chinese bourgeois find then tom it away like a squeezed-out lemon” i did. not take more than a week until another coup d'état took place on April 12. The Com inter’s policy towards the Wuhan Government following the coup is well Known. “Under the new circumstances, the 8th Plenum of Comintern laid + Bexjanin 1 Snare lie Communi and thr Rie of Ma, Cambridge, Harvard 4 ‘Leon Troy, Profle of te Chine Resin, New York, Paragon Book Gallery, 1962, phMao's Thought and the Chinese Revolution ot down accries of policies including the maintenance of Netionalist-Communist collaboration, reorganization of the Kuomintang into a mass party, intensify~ Ing the agrarian revolution, and the organization of a revolutionary army. ‘Under such circumstances, however, the policies of ileraifying the agrarian revolution and organizing a revolutionary army were by no means compatible ‘wit the requirement of maintaining collaboration withthe Kuomintang. The first period of Nationalie-Communist collaboration wat thus brought to an fend when the Comintern representative M. N. Roy presented to Wang Ghing-wei a letter suggesting the arming of 2,000 Gammunists and 50,000 wworker-pearant elements and other mater. ‘The Chinese Communist Party's eror in this period have been attributed to the right-wing opportuni of Chen TTuchiu. Te cannot be said of course that the Chen ‘Tuceis line was correct in strategy and tactics and also in the leading of party ergasizatons, But, speaking only of whether or not its instructions were appropriate, the Comintern should have been accountable forthe great part of them. When Trotsky, on the part of the opposition, ‘yrote in his seathing denunciation, “the juste of the Comintern i chickly Colored with Shanghal blood,"® he certaialy struck in the ense one aspect of the station ‘Here we may have to return to our central theme. At a time the Com- smunist Party was growing at striking tempo and yet exoeriencing a miserable failure in the first evolutionary civil wae, where Uhen could one seek for a ‘prospect of revolution ia China? Alo, how could one expect to solve the Drobleme of strategy and tactics for revolution oF of tablishing sovits of ‘workers and peasants in a backward agricultural country? Tt is of course in ‘connexion with these problems that the Mao Tseng line came on to the ‘scene, This new line had been shaping, so to speak, in a range diferent fom that of either the Chen Twhsia of the Comintern line, T may turn to Miao Teestung in a new section. Al, ‘THE COMINTERN LINE AND MAO TSE-TUNG [A ceres of actions of Mao Tee-tung in these years is already Known: he {ound the driving force of revolution in China it the peasant movement of Hunan Provinces his almost absolute confidence in the peasant movement was, however, tumed down by Chen Turhsiu; his action in the Autumn “Harvest Uprisings wat reproached by the Central Committee of the Party ‘with the subsequent deprivation of ‘his Politbureau and Front Committee posts; and yet he held am unshalable belief in his own policy until finally hhe succeeded in building a base in Chinghangshen. In particular, his policies following the Nationalis-Communist break-up, of “emphasizing the peasant movement” “arming the masees” and “building a base” constituted the Cuontial of Mao Teetung’s thought at that time. ‘Since the Northern Ex- ‘edition started, he, paced outside the main current of party leadership and + Loam Troy, of aly 2722 ‘The Developing Economies yet remaining in the maelstrom of the Chinese revolutionary movement, had ‘been asiduously groping for a prospect forthe future What then was the factor that, at that point, decisively differentiated ‘Mao Teetung’s line from Central Committe of the Party or the Comintern? Te was above all the issue of building sovits in the rural areas. ‘Truc, Mao ‘Teectung was deprived of his Front Committee pot because of a plank urging “organization of soviet” in his programme for the Auturan-Harvest Uprisings (in the fall of 1927. But included in the problems of rural soviets was not only that of strategy and tactics, but one which could be moet fundamental to the formative proces: of Marx in China ‘The timing of building sovits was, as well known, atopic of the most Incated dscusion within Use Comintern. Te was only at the Sth Congres of the Chinese Communist Party held at Moscow in July 1928 that the move- ment led by Mao Tsetung, which was at frst censured asa rifle movement” and then shunned as reformism, narrowly survived to have its own existence approved or, more exactly, tacly tolerated by the party. On the other hhand, the Trotskytes had been urging the anecesity for creation of soviets since before the April 12 coup d'état. The proposition of “creating soviets of worker” in the “backward countries” once directed by Lenin in his thesis now came to form che severest tet or politcal leadership in the revolutionary movement. It continues to develop further, producing “ the Canton Com- mune” or Li Lesan’s thesis of “inital victory in ane or several provinces” ‘There i ao need to repeat here that thee moves of politcal leadership and their consequences were closely related to the power struggle within the Comintern If'we should approach these developments no: asthe effect of arguments fn a closed chamber of Meecow but as conditions aecedent to what happened to Marsism in China afterward, the real ise did never lie in the fining itself for establishing sovies, as in the Stalinis-Trotskyte feuding. It wat ‘obviout to all eyes that the revolution would be on the ebb throughout the ‘country for some length of time after the Nationalis-Communist breakup [Not only in the cities but in the rural areas, white terror was raging. Could the Chinese soviet movement ever survive the low tide peciod of revolution? rif so, what could be such a soviet? ‘These questions must have been the ‘mect fundamental ones vies the actal conditions prevailing in China, in terms of the principles of Marxism-Leninism. It vas presely these questions that Mao Toe-tung started eecking to answer Mao ‘Tsetung, as well known, prepared a report, “Why Ts It That Red Political Power Gan Exist in China?” in October 1928, This was his fret, attempt at answering those questions, He sought to explain “the longterm survival inside a country of one or more small areas under Red politiale power completely encircled by a White regime" by break-up among White 4 Mao Taetang, “Why Te I at Rod Pola! Poe Can Et in China? in Sed Winks of Man Tuts, Volume I, Petng, Foreign Languages Prey, 186, p. 68.‘Mao's Thought and the Chinese Revolution 9s regimes as well st imperialist powers These causes or conditions were a Product of the situation in which imperaliam “indirect rules” the eco Domicaly backward semircolonial China (localized agricultural economy)” ‘We may find in this analysis of Mao Tee-tung similarity to the method Tenia applied to the October Revolution-the theory of the node of con- ‘adictions and unequal development as well as a foretadowing of Mao's Tater work, Mactan (On Contradiction). The eonditons and phenomena then existing in China had never occurced anywhere eke in the world, and sccordingly the conclusion which he drew out ef his analysis could have no perallel in the Russian experience after all. Contrary t Stalin who said at {hat time that “Soviets are formed and flourish only in circumstances of evolutionary upsurge” Mao Tue-tang, at that low tide point in the revolu- tionary trend, concluded that the revolutionary would suvve fora long time. Of course such an analysis of hia was not generally approved. He had to continue fighting defeatzm on the one hand and inaurectionism on the bother. ‘The struggle aguint the “Iiquidationists” or the “Li Lirsan course” may be said to have eoloured the Mao Tee-cung line at that time in all its "To limit the problems involved in red politial power only to.the poe sibility ofits survival would, however, oversimplify the case. Certainly at a time the revolution was on the ebb and white terror was raging about, chere ‘wae the need to analyse the possibility of euch political power. At the same time, what nesded much more consideration must have been the nature of re paitical power or the question of what would be its future prospect ‘he Course of revolution, From auch a point of view, it i easy to ste that Uther Stalin or Trotsky was keenly conscious of that cuestion in cle con fhetion with the timing of establishing soviet. As far as they viewed the fature of socialist revolution from the postion of Marxism, the hegemony of the proletariat wat an indispensable factor. Only under the alliance of ‘workers and peasants led by the proletariat, would a socialist revolution, as Tell st the direction of the national Hberation movement, be posible. For this very reason, the Comintern wile barely tolerating the existence of the political power ied by Mao Tie-tung at its 6th Congress on the one hand, Eonsistently demanded that the pestant movement he diected by the pro- Tetavit, particularly by the indostial proletariat, “The spontancous guerilla warfare of the peasant in various provinces and districs...can be a starting- poiat in the nationally victorious maw revalt only on the condition that itis fxrried on in alliance with a new revolutionary tide among the proletariat {in the ciues"™ This watement at the 6ch Comintern Congres indisputably fggests the Comintern’s attitude at that time and the direction in which the SLi Lisan course” was eventually to develop. The red government exiting, + EY. Sula, #Nows on Cantempircy Themes, 1, China" in Wik, Volume 9, ‘Mactr Fregn Languages Pabsking Hous 185, p26. MG prante BSehrt and R. Foebnl 4 Danny Hiry of Chins Coma, nd, Allen & Uavly 1852, p 162.* The Developing Economies encircled by the white districts, in the mountainous rural arest on the pros vinci borders was certainly an entity to be directed by the urban proletariat, In this connexion, the situation seemed much the same to Trotky, 10, who ‘The leading role of the slated Communists and the isolated Communist sroups in the peasant war does not decide the question of power.... The peasant war may support the dictatohip of the proletariat i hey coincide in point of time, but under no cizeamatances ean it be substituted for the dictatorship of the proletariat” Tn short, such was a corollary from Marxism-Leninism, Tt is known too well how Lesia himself, while taking up the question of an alliance of ‘workers and peasants ae fundamental tothe strategy of revolution in. Rusia, sill insisted on the hegemony of the proletariat of, in other words, how he made a sharp distinction between the main objeaives and the main force of evolution. Well then, where did the rural soviet led by Mao Testing stand in this context? "Logic would not answer the question otherwise than in two directions: whether the rural toviets would always be united with uprisings of the proletariat in the cities or whether the red_poliesl ‘power would survive as a body virally led by the proletariat, It could not be expected to see “a new revolutionary upsurge among the urban proletariat” in the period when the revolution was on the ebb. ‘The miserable optcome of the Combination of the ewo-rural sovits and urban uprsingy—has been proved hove all by the historical fact of the “Li Lisan course” ‘Then, wes Mao ‘Tee-tungle red politcal power ever led by the industrial proletariat? ‘We cannot be fully accurate in our appraisal of the red politcal power ‘at that time. Still ie dificult to sume that the soviet power which once held a base in Chingkangrhan and then developed into the Juichin Govern ‘ment was led by the industrial proletariat. Rether the Soviet could only discover the chance of survival because ic was cut of from the cites and all the more hit the blind spot of the central govesnment, Needles to say it ‘was, more than anything else, a rural soviet and « government with peasant, ‘oor peasants in particular, as its main free. Tes no doubt easy, as already pointed out, to regard, judging from these charactrsticy, the Chinese Marxist movement as one led by some élite elements. We certainly cannot But be surprised to see that those leadereof the movement succesfully held to their theory for long time in the roral areas encitclee by the white regime. ‘The real fue here may not be found only in such matters as their adamant will or ther dite leadership. "The questions we should ask are how, uader such ‘circumstances, Chinese Marxism developed itself and what charactriatcs that process gave to it. ‘Here I may rather abruptly turn to the struggle in Chingkangshan led bby Meo Teestung and step inside the base, thereby inquiring further into cour problems here in grester detail 9 Leon Troy, oy 28.‘Mao's Thought and the Chinese Revolution 95 IIL, ‘THE STRUGGLE IN CHINGKANGSHAN—THE CREATION OF A PROLETARIAT “The struggle in Chingkangshan was coloured witha series of hardships, Whea Mao Tsetung marched to Chingkangshan with te evolutionary army hoe had organized for the frst ime, consisting mainly o” a self-defence corps of peasants from Hunan Province, miners from Hanyang, and rebel troops of the Kuomintang. Shortly Chu Teh's army joined them in Chingkangshan, bringing their total strength to about 10000 men. Tt was no easy work to form, establish and maintain a base. No mention i necesary ofthe formidae ble economic and military dificultien For instance, the report which Mao ‘Twe-tng sent to the Genteal Committee of the Party at that time gives a picture as follows “The Hunen Provincial Committee has asked us to sttend to the material conditions of the soldiers and make them at least a litle better than those ff the average worker of peasant. Actually they are worse. Ia addition to tain, each man receives only five cents a day for cooking ol, salt, firewood find vegetables and even this ix hard to Keep up" Akzo, “we now have Cotton padding for winter clothing for the whole army of five thousand men Dat are sil short of cloth. Cold a the weather many of our men are stil ‘wearing only two layers of thin clothing” "The difficulties were not only economic and maiiary. ‘The greatest of them perhaps lay in the revolutionary troops or the Red Army ite. Ifthe ‘MarxistLeninist ina. semi-coloial country in_the_ period of imperialism is described as a man who thinks “the completion of the national liberation land a democratic revolution of that country are posible only by dint of the Ieadership of the proletariay.” what did the establishment of such a base mean to him? Ar mentioned before, the Red Army in Chingkangshan Comprised miners, peasants, and rebel rldiers (mercenaries) of the Kuorine tang. They were workers who left workshops, peasints, and lumpen-proletarians. ‘The Army was located in the remotest motntain datsct on the provincial border and far away from the large cities near the sea coast, Atleast the mage of the industrial proletariat-ax the leading force of revolution was centirely unknown to that district. Could then such a base provide the centre fand leadership for the carrying out of revolution in China? Taking all these into account, it virwally no wonder that a Marxist trained in Mostow, Li Lican came 10 follow the so-called "Li Lian cours,” a plan of attack ageinst Changsha, Nanchang and Wuhan or of “inital victory in one or feveral provinces” The leadership of the urban proletariat was perhaps an Inaienable, cental link of the ine for him. By the same token, the Red ‘Army at the base was s powerful yet subsidiary means or entity. ‘What wat then the care of Mao Teetung? A close examination of ao Tet, Seagal in tbe Chinghang Mousa” Sete Wk of Mo Ti ung Wore 1, p82 (Heenr ced a "Strgale”)96 ‘The Developing Economies reports and resolutions at that time leads u to come up to some problems lover the leadership of revolution. ‘A soldier of the Red Army who experienced the srugele in Chingkang- shan wrote afterward in his reclletions 22 “On the way of retreat to Chingkangahan after the failure of the Autumnne Harvest Uprisings in the fall of 1927, many ran away one after another fem four unit. After a learned Party metaber and Division Commander deserted, the wnaal greeting in certain quarter of the unit war “Where are You going?” land ‘Haven't you run avay yet2" On one occasion, a whole platoon, which hnad been ordered posted on guard daty, took Righ, inching the commander himeele” ‘Agnes Smedley ako gives a description of Chu ‘Teh toops taking part in various battles, 38 follows» ‘Here he [Chu Teh] called a conference to settle once and for all with te defeatists who, he charged, were responsible for the demoratization and Lespaic of the toope, for desertion, and troops for the acts of robbery in ‘which some of the troops had engaged. "Speaking fiercely, General Chu proposed that every man who wanted to leave the army should do. so at once. His proposal wee accepted and ‘acted on at once.” His chief of staf was the frst to go, leaving for Shanghai. Even in 1987, ten yeats later, General Chu epoke ofthis “desertion” with hatred. ‘Then others began to follow until over three hundred commanders land fighters had lef. ‘Fear and despair are at Cha Tels heart as he watched ‘man after man step out of the ranks, sack his rifles and leave” Tadeed, inapte of Chu Tel’s heartbreaking grie, such a scene may have ‘been inevitable to an army fighting a hopeles fight following a defeated insurrection, Te was peehaps through sucha trial thatthe army for revolution ‘marching to Chingkangshan could be really built up. Such a case was, however, not limited to the march to Chingkangehan, Jt meant more than anything else a problem invelved in the construction of the base of revolution itself. T may, once again, quote from a reportie “When the major detachment of the Red Army had arrived in Linghsien in mid-July, the offcers and men of the 2h Regiment, who were wavering poltially and wanted to return to their homes in southern Hanan, refsed to obey orders... As Tw Helnnching encouraged the 29th Regiment in their ‘mistaken idene and the Army Committe filed. to dieuade them, the major detachment set out... Thereupon, acting on its own, the 28h Regiment buried homeward to Vichang 1 Bay by Lei Yin tbe Cheng.ven Bitral Commitee (ed) late Jenmic Chit fons Sinstin— Hien Lire, 1 (Thiny Yeas of the Chine Literaton tt Army Sage Speck Gin Seis Fy Dy Tae Re Pins ss Apne Seley, The Gat oat Te Life eal Tine of Chu Ts, New York, Mostly ‘Ree Pre, 186, pp. 210-215 ye Mao Tretung, “Struggle” pp. 77-78‘Mao's Thought and the Chinese Revolution 7 “The causes of our August defeat were as follows: (1) some officers and men, who were wavering and homesick, ler. their fighting capacity, while others, who were unwilling to go to southern Hunan, were lacking in enthur "As seen easily, this problem appeared aot only in the troops but also in the party under the same form. ‘The report continued to say# tn our opinion the question of proletarian ideological leadership is very important. The Party organizations in the border area counties, which are Composed elmest exclsively of peasants, will go asta wnout the ideological leadership of the proletariat” ‘When one comes to think of it, how dificult it was co realize proletarian, leadership in the mountainous border area markedly characterized. by feudal ‘relations. Locale, famililiem, authoritarianism and all other types of non- proletarian gelaionship constituted the very. ground from which Mao Tse- fane’s Red Army had to draw is strength. The reslutin of the “Kaien Conference” (December, 1929) isthe most diect expresdon of the problem that Mao had to face. ‘This resolution entitled “On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Pasty” pointed out non-proletarian ideas existing in the Red Ary and called them the purely military viewpoint,” “ultrademocracy.” “the disregard of organizational dieipling” "absolute equalitarianism,” “subjecivism” “indie ‘idualis,” “the ideology of robiag sebel bands” ané “the remnants of Dptechissn” All these are, as easily seen, indications of the bent of thought Common among petty bourgeoisie, peasants, mercenaries and lumpens based fon the smallscale farming and handicraft cconomy. Particularly such ideas fs absolute equaliaranism, the ideology of robing rebel bands or subjective ‘were a tirvor of how the movement wae and had to be based on the pease Sntry and hence agrarian in its nature, Tt ie not too much to say that a Took at auch a bent thought naturally brings up ia our nemery a number of peasant revolts in the past—even the rising of Huang Chao of late Tang of Li Taucheng of the Inte Ming period. Tn fact it was far from easy to check the once victorious peasant army from going on a reckless fight. “The peasants were ao emboldened by victories that they hurled themselves against, Fegular Kuomintang toope and time and again were slaghtered”0* Here there may be no denying that the Red Army wasstill marked with those unmistakable characteristics rich as peasant fensy or hatred which Engels once pointed out in Der datcke Boursrieg (Peasant War in Germany). ‘These characteristics were nothing more than that “subjectiviam™ that Mao ‘Teetung pointed out. ‘What then was needed to rectly euch a tendency or aptitude? If the ssruggle in Chingkangshan was not to end up in a mere pessant uprising or peasant wae, it was vital for the party to lay its proletarian foundation. The party mutt be built by the working clas and led by the proletarian ideology. Mao Trung, “Suge” p97. Hi Agee Sede, ok ay B26.98 ‘The Developing Economies “Proletarian leadership isthe sole ey to victory inthe revolution. Building ‘2 proletarian foundation for the Party and seting up Party branches in fndstial enterprises in key districts ate important organizational tors for the Party at preent...." Accordingly, “Besides paying cloe attention to the labour movement in the county towns and oher big tovms, we should increase the workers’ representation in the goverament bodies "The propor- tion of workers and poor peasants should also be increased in the leading fongan of the Party at all levela™® ‘As Smedley vividly pictured in Chine’ Rad Army Moreus, 10 organize workers and win them over to the party was one of the objectives whieh the Red Army took greatest interest in achieving, Ae soon as a own was liberated, a “peasant league,” “commercial union,” “agricultural workers! union,” “women’s league," and other organizations would be made "Representatives elected therefrom would form a revolutionary committee. [At the same time, “comrades who can represent the Party” and “activist who can serve as scretaries” were requests Mao Tee-tung addresed from CChingkangshan to the Central Committee of the Party and the two provincial ‘What wat the extent to which such a proletarian party or Marxiste Leninit Party could actually be maintained in Chingkangahan? eis obvious thatthe straggle of Chingkangyhan was pomible because i had a5 its prelude the Northern Expedition or a “National Revolution” involving the whole county, and that it could find important support in co- ‘operation with the working class in the large cities and also in constant touch, ‘with the Cental Commitize of the Party, no matter how adversely these ‘may have been affected. The struggle was, in thi sense, neither an folated fight nor a mmere uprising, What comes into question here concerns the aapticude of the "fighting Bolkhevik party,” Le, the fact that “the greatest part of the Party's organizational bast” “was composed of those fom the peasantry and other small bourgeoisie” As long ss the party continued to ‘work in the agrarian districts in the mountainous border area, such limitations ‘would be inevitable An overwhelming majority ofthe party members were sill peasants while workers in the towns were more or less handicraft worker. ‘These were the actual components of the “fighting Bolshevik party.” ‘What was to happen to the party, then? Or, indeed, what Mao Tse- tung sought to do? T have no idea at all of exchading various political and ‘eonomic conditions from consideration, "As Mao Tee-tung, more than anyove eke, admitted, the development of history i determined by the objective condition, and the expansion of che base depended on the realities of China “oppresed by imperialism, feudal ‘and bureaucratic capitalism.” Th the light of our present concern, however, ‘Mao Tee-tung’s efor soem to have been concmirated on only one point, 3 Mao Taotung, “A Single Spas Gan Stare Pre Fite" Sn Stal Works of aw Tovtg Volue I 2. ae Mao Toetung, *Stogele” pS‘Mao's Thought and the Chinese Revclution 9° ‘That was to create a proletariat out of the peasants, petty bourgeoisie and Tumpenepeoletarans, It was exactly a creation. For istance, the resolution cited above, after enumerating those wrong ideas, suggests remedies and says 18 follows 28 “Reise the political level in the Party by mesns of education, destroy the theoretical root of the purely military’ viewpoint, and be clear on the fundamental efference between the Red Army and the White Army.” “In the aphere of theory, destroy the root of ultrademoreacy” How about individualism? “Phe method of correction is primarily to strengthen education £0 as to rectly individualism ideologically.” “Intensify education, ritcize incorrect ideas, and eradicate the ideology of roving rebel band” “"Bradicate putschism ideologically.” ‘Two problems may be involved here, int, in forming and maintaining ‘proletarian party in the provincial border area, there was no other means than starting mainly or exclusively in the fields’ of ideclogy and edcation ‘That was the most important, not the only, method that Mao could actually choose. Seconds as far as he wns concerned, it was pasible. T would not denote this proces of ideslogial change by such a term at “brain washing.” In the sense that the Red Army was composed of workers, peasants, poor peasants in particular and lumpen-peoletarians, its soldiers were from’ the exploited clases. ‘They should rhe against exploitation, Nevertelem, needles to say face again, they were never from the proletariat in the sense understood in the contest of the Marxism originating in Europe. Such were the circum stances in which an attempt at creating @ proletariat out of the peasants and Tumpersproletarians was being made by means of ideology and education in order to provide the leading body for the revolution, and it was actually taining succes: in the form of an established and expanding base. For Example, Ana Louise Strong tlle of the following episode 2° ‘Lit Hslgochi, when for an entire day he dewibed what he called ‘Mao's inventions in Marxian’... Even the concept of the * proletariat? said Liu, get e new meaning in China, ‘According to Marx, the indestrial ‘worker lead the revolution. But in China we have very few such people So Mao Tse-ung has been taining another kind of people—the farm bands find poor peasants in the army—who have the same qualities of discipline find devotion that the industrial workers have. ™ We may note that the eorrerponding. passage of the Chinese version of| Serong’s report reads a follows = 2 hfan Taste, “Oa Corecsng Mnakn Teste, Vola I, p07, 108, 19,15, 18. AT sng TG Cog Cin ew Yo, Deb & Compr, 11, Mong Chan, Mio Tutu Hi Smhsng (Mao Tutung's Thought) tant fom the gl of Ann Louie Seong aod pulsed by dhe Kaang-tun Shur, 1,97 nthe Pry” fn Saad Wk of Ms100 The Developing Economies “According to Marz, the factory worker are the only claw that can accept and complete communitm, because (I) they do not own tools of pro- Suction, @) they make a living by selling ther labour, and working collectively together with other workers at factories, they have the quality of discipline, Tin China, however, they are very small in number, and out of 450 milion people only 2 oF $ milli can be called factory workers. Imperial and Capitals ere training them into a reserve army for the Communist Party. [At the same time, Mao Tee-tung has wained 2 or 3 milion people of another origin. The quality of thei discipline and the spisit of devotion are no lex food than thave of the Factory workers." To Mao Teeang’s thought are applied gach phrazee ne an “Asiatic pattern of Mars” or “Asian Mariam” Certsnly, unless such @ main force was created the anti-impeialit, anti-feudal revolution would have been. Jmpomible from the fit. And such a force was being formed out of “people other than the factory workers” Considering these circumstances, those phrases should probably be applicable to, among other thingy, this aspect of Mao Tseung’ thought. Ii this connexion, however, we may remember that famous treatise of Lenin, “Cho delat?” (What Ts to Be Done?) (1902 Writing on the revolu- tionary partce of Russia at the beginning of the 0th century, Lenin scathingly ‘denounced the cult of @ spontaneous growth of the movement and emphasized ‘conscious intention to the utmost. Consciousnes of socalgm could be brought to the working cles from outside. From this point, Lenin procesded to the forming of a revolutionary party with icon dscplise—the Bolsheviks, Tn this respect, and only in this Fespet, Lenin and Mao would find themeclvs in the same circumstances and in the same dimension of theory. Probably the |greatert fect Marxism had on the Chinee revolationary movement was the tmphasis placed on conscious intention. It wae the greatest git of Marxian fo China in the peviod from Sun Vatecn’s reorganzation of the Kuomintang to the struggle in Chingkanghan to infuse ‘fire consciousness and give ‘organization to the almost inevitably and spontancously arising struggle. One ‘word of confirmation & needed here concerning "ihe concept of the proletariat ‘getting a new meaning in China” These was afue alls. decisive, Ketozal difference between Lenin's party and Mso Twestang’s. Tt wos hitorical in that i€ determined the movement and was to cowtinue on to later yeats [Notwithstanding ths, Lenin, aswell known, had talen note of the importance fof the peasants, which had changed since Marx's time. Such theses ab a ‘workers and peasants alliance andthe establishment of a pessant committee Dy poor peasants meant the most important strategic and tactical problems for Lenin in the Rusian revolution. Franlly, it seems to me, however, that Lenin vas always launted with some seme of ditt of the peasants. At least there asin Lezia no such unbounded optimism as seen in Mag Tee= tung or Chu Teh, This can be regarded as one remarkable feature of Mao ‘Teetungs thought after all, T cannot afford to, nor am T interested to, Looe farther into the manner in which the problem of the peasants has been con-‘Mao's Thought and the Chinere Revolution tot ceived in Marais or into its changes. Important is the fact that, probably faginat the expectations on the part of the Comintern, er beyond its doctrine, Mao Tee-tung was carrying forvard swch a form of struggle in the realities of China, Speaking in terme of Mao ideology shapiag, it implied forther problems such as T would dwvell upon at some length i the folowing. ‘People are not born but become the proletariat. Mort important to this proces the change of consciousnea or the reform of thought. As Tong as there are oppressed mastes or oppremed people, thee i the posibilty of the ‘ain force of revolution being formed and a revolution for liberation of the people taking place. I would shun any hasty assertion as to how such an Approsch is eeated to historical materials or to the category of the pro- Tear in Marsis, I have to admit, however, that without such an approach, the struggle in Chingkangehan would have been impossible at all ‘The expansion of the bas, the encirclement of cites by rural areas and che Chinese revolution itself would have been impesible. Not only the Chinese revolution fut more broadly the posibilty of reveluion in the backward sates in “Asia and Africa” following World War ILarz in correlation with the validity of that approsch, The grasping of conditions or the understand- ing of realli which holds that che "people's revolutior is rising lke a storm ‘the three quarters of the globe” ir not at all alien to this aspect of Mao ‘Tretung’s thought. ‘Second, this manner in which the proletariat was created was to give a peculiar shading to the “fighting Bolshevik party” of China. Although this twas a party of communis guided by and armed with the principles of ‘Marcai-Leninism, i will be easly acen in the circumstances stated here that it should come to look much more like a party of farsighted forerunners of the people devoted to the cause of revolution than a “vanguard party of the proletariat, the clas hich is to anticipate the future and support the history Ef the coming times” It was composed partially of Kuomintang rebel toldiers and partially of peasants, poor peasants in particular who-had lett their land. ‘They would like to rove around the countey and “go to the big Cities t eat and drink to their hear content”22_ Ax such they became faware that “they are the maia force of the revolution” and devoted themselves to that catse—this was the most important process of reform. They were rot simply promised clas, Rather Usey were farsighted forerunners of the people who rose against oppresion and suppresion. In them was there at [ast no muance of an anticipated or an inherent value such as implied in the word “vanguard.” ‘The proletariat meant nothing but a group of men whe serve the people “with the qualities of dicipine aid devotion.” ‘Twould for a time withhold making further inquiry into these character= inte features of Mao Tee-tung’ thought in this period. In a deeper analysis these may prove a revision, modifation or development of Marxism of, i hot so, a mark which history had left on Mao Tse-ung’s thought as the [deology of the Chinese revolution. But one more point must be made on te Moo Tatung, “On Corcing Mitten Idea ia the Pace,” I02 ‘The Developing Economies the problem relating to the creation of a proletariat. It concerns the problem of the “fighting Bolshevik party oc the Red Army. T have so far discused Ihow the proletarian party was built, exclusively is the aepect of ideological land educational reform of coreciousness. Oue would oversimplify the situa tion if one supposes thatthe party was ‘built only because of such a reform. r, history would be too simple. Needles to say, the greatest problem was Ihow to carry oxt the party construction on a reine bar As it can be expected to a certain extent, the task was carried ext through by constructing the Red Army more than anything ele, Certainly, the Red Army was, as ‘Mao Teecung ssid, the very “melting pot” of everything, in which people ‘were tained to become aware of themselves asthe “main fore of the evolu tion” and work as the forerunners of popular liberction. Conversely speaking, this meant Uhat the change was no eagy tak as long as “the mazes of lampen clements exiting broadly. in the country, particularly ia the southern peor fnces” were roving about from one place tO another and ako at long ab the ppessants adhered closely to their land and held fast to “abwolate equalitarian- fim." If this reform of mind is denoted by the word “conversion,” at the nk of misunderstanding, it was attended with many dificltes in the soviet ‘where people tended to tee on the land. Although the base was established, the soviet dati expanded and the soviet government came into being, the clas stragele over the land question went on implicitly and explicitly in that course of events. Degeneration occurred to the soviet district as is known in the party Bisory as the AB, (AatiBolshevik) League or the Fut‘en Incident, ‘where even such groups ar the "Big Este’ Aliancs” the “Free Love Group” and the “Love Makers’ Group” were organized. Te was in such circumstances ‘that peasants in the soviet distict ered out, “The soviet no good: the Red ‘Army is goods In the couree of the Rusian revolation, too, mushike are ‘aid to have cried “Long live the Soviet government! Down with the kom ‘muna.” “Apart from the similarity of the situations, the episode in China hows that the ideas and practice of the Chinee Communist Party had ‘become crystallized in the Red Army in every sense. I have to add in haste that T am aot deliberately emphasizing the miltay quality or colouring of the Chinese Communist Party. Nor am I going to say, dependent on Tzaac Deutscher's theory of *rubsittion,” that the Army acted for the party. (TAS f-a question to be answered only after studying the whole history of revolue tions, and the ides of “aubetitation” would presuppose the concept of a vanguard party in Lenin's sense.) My question hee concerns the intellectual- hhbtorcal meaning of the Red Army or the later Liberation Army and the historical role it played. For instance, in his answer to the question as to “Whether or not a party of which neasly 80 per cont of members are from the peasantry is ensured to bbe ‘an organized advance guard of the working dass! the ex-Central Com- mittee member Preag Chen, on the occasion of the 0th annivenary of the Chinese Communist Party, looked ack upon hstory and refuted ae fol- Agnes Srey, Cis Rat Army Morar, New Yok, Vanguard Pr, 184,‘Mao's Thought and the Chinese Revolution 103 love: “The party members of pewant origin in our meaning are not those fom the wealny farmers buta great majority of them aze from the employed for poor peasants, that is, from the rural proletariat or the proletariat. At the same tine, more than 30 per cent of these party members of peasant origin are thove who have long left their old farming’ ilages to work with fall their might for the party, the people and the state or those who have Served as cominatdets and fighters in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army ‘which has many years of battles behind i. Since they lft the villages they hheve been living in the militsry revolutionary organization. Such a life ‘means a special Kind of supply system of military communism ‘Therefore hot only have they always ttceived strict ideological and politic education fa» well as the trial of bales but they always live 8 strkt collective life and hhave at least no less good qualities of organization, diipline and selfcon- seiousnes than the indvstrial workers” ‘The fighter: of the Red Army certainly had no fess good qualities of ‘organization, diciptine and sellconsciousness than the industrial worken, ‘They were an amy forthe peoples iberation and a group of advanced and constious people for iberation, In this tense, the Red Army-—the Liberation ‘Army-—was not 8 mere armed force but may be regaréed even as the basic troup for the carrying out of the Chine revolution or the symbol of it. Te said that at the 8th Central Committee meeting at Lushan in 1959, Mao ‘Teectung refuted Peng Tebrhuais proposal for moderniing the army and his ritcam of the "Great Leap and tad, "IF the Army should move in sym- pithy for Peng, Twill go back to the villages of Hunan and ‘once agsin Enrol and organize peasants into a new army?” ‘The trath of this report ie fntirely unknown. As a symbolic story, however, it would suggest excellently ‘what the Liberation Army sgnifie tothe Chinese revolution and revolutionary ‘China, ‘The recent campaign to “leara from the Liberstion Army” and the roves of the Cliskfangchin Pap (Liberation Army Daily) which evticized the party committe aid took the lead of the Culetal Revolution may as well Be taken to mean the same thing, Alo, speaking allegrically, such a men- tality av seen with Mao Tseung seems, in one aspect, basicaly to lead to the attempt ot setting wp a milla of 600 million people. IV, CONCLUSION Although I have limited disewsion to a certain period, I may have adhered too closely to one aspect of it, namely, the stuggle in Chingkang- shan. Thi struggle ‘was to mark only the starting-point of the Chinese s+ Peng Chea, “Harlem Rii ig av Chg nar si” (The Vitry of Marsan ‘enn In Chingy in Molo Chiat KatumCHy8 Sate Hae rms (too Tiesungs Targht tnd the Chinese Revoluion—A.Coleedan of Ensys 10 (Cobras the 2th Anaireraey ofthe Chinee Commanin Bary), Volume I Qapance trandatin), Shoyans, Miche Havens, 181, pp-08-5.104 ‘The Developing Economies revolution. As the later courte of historical development was a zigzag ony ‘Mao Tee‘ung’s thought accordingly shaped ane developed divenely. If however, we take into account all these together—how his thought shaped at fist, what characteristics it acquired and how it was zelated to Marxism. Leninisn—would not we be able to appreciate that auch ideological character Inter have found their way into the ideas, undentanding. of realities, and knowledge of the world of contemporary China ? For instance, the important oeument which played a decisive role in directing the "Grest Proletarian Gultaral Revolution,” mamely, the editorial of the Literation Army Daly dated April 18, 1966 reads “In order to carry out the cultural revolution of socialism thoroughly, i fs needed to reeducate the cadres relating to literature and art and reorganize the ranks in these fields Ae carly a the struggle in Chingkangshan, the Red Army of workers and peasant, under the dict leadership of Chairman ‘Mao, wat led by the bright light of the *Kutien Conference” to form the ranks of red literature and art “Various quetions which the activists in Tteatare and art of our army Ihave are, for most of those people, the question 0 how to think and how to elevate people through education... We must certainly observe Chairman Mao's teoching—unite ourselves with the workers, peasants end soldiers ‘reform our thought, elevate seliconstiousness, and devotedly serve the whole people of China and the world without running after reputation and wealth snd fearing hardship and death.” ‘The Great Proictarian Cultural Revolution” now under way prewents a ‘confied picture in the political, economic and cultural field. Its consequences Still remain too dim to forcast, Ako a variety of interpretations are posible {to how and whether “Mao ‘Tee-tung’ thought” as. proclaimed therein is elated to Marxism-Leninism. T do not wish to ahve any hasty interpretation to that question on thie occasion. Still it seem sential to confirm as a prerequisite to all consideration that Mao Tresng’s thought, which wae ‘brought into being atleast through contact with Marxism-Leninism, has since taken unique shape and that it hse been working as the logic of the Chinese revolution, to sey. nothing of how it should be appreciated. Leaving the Inter development of Mao Toe-tunes thought to bs studied on another occa sion, T have to be content for a time with the atalyeis T could make fa the resent article