Great Power Competition as the New

Normal of China–US Relations Jinghao

Zhou
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Great Power
Competition as the
New Normal of
China–US Relations
Jinghao Zhou
 Great Power Competition as the New Normal
of China–US Relations

“Zhou highlights the many failures of the decades-old, Nixon-Kissinger engage-

ment approach to US-China relations. He rightly argues that facing up to the
rising competition with China is the only effective basis for a sound strategic
response. Zhou’s combination of deep familiarity with Chinese history and poli-
tics and a solid command of the theoretical and policy literature on China-U.S.
relations makes this an authoritative work for scholars and students and for
policy analysts alike. Clearly written and full of keen observations and sensible
judgments. A pleasure to read.”
—Shale Horowitz, Professor of Political Science, University of
Wisconsin-Milwaukee, USA

“Professor Zhao’s book is an insightful and unique analysis of the great power
rivalry between the US and China. Contrary to the dominant views, the author
claims that strategic competition can be fundamentally beneficial for both coun-
tries. This book is a must-read for all scholars interested in the causes and
possible repercussions of the constantly recurring frictions between Washington
and Beijing.”
—Karol Zakowski, Associate Professor of International Relations & Political
Studies, University of Lodz, Poland

“Professor Zhou’s book represents a valuable contribution to the understanding

of one of the great challenges of the 21st Century. The US-China rivalry will be
the defining factor for the geopolitical landscape for decades to come. Redefining
engagement between Western countries and China as a non-zero-sum game
requires the global community to refocus its efforts on building a new governance
architecture for an equitable planet, halting and eventually reversing climate
change, addressing global risk scenarios, and avoiding nuclear war.”
—Ulf Henning Richter, CEO of CARBON10B X

“The author has produced a treatise that provides much-needed insights into the
increasingly complex relationship between the United States and China. Delving
deep into the intricacies of comparative political systems, intertwining nexus
of domestic policy imperatives and foreign policy targets, cultural DNA and
conflicting national interests, this book represents an outstanding, indispensable
disquisition few and far between in the existing literature of the field, a must-read
for experts and non-specialists alike. In today’s fast-changing global political land-
scape towards a multipolar world, Zhou’s book is timely and requisite reading
for all educated public and professional practitioners who have interest in the
fascinating discipline in view of the new realities of world politics and interna-
tional relations. While not claiming to provide specific policy recommendations,
the author has commendably succeeded in furnishing deep understanding, with
strong theoretical survey and empirical scrutiny, developed through the chapters
of this book, in great power competition within a global context for poli-
cymakers and consultants handling the intricate relations between China the
aspiring superpower and the United States of America, the incumbent.”
—Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh, Editor-in-Chief of Contemporary Chinese Political
Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal and former
director of Institute of China Studies, University of Malaya,
Malaysia
 Jinghao Zhou

Great Power
Competition
as the New Normal
of China–US
Relations
Jinghao Zhou
Department of Asian Studies
Hobart and William Smith Colleges
Geneva, NY, USA

ISBN 978-3-031-09412-5 ISBN 978-3-031-09413-2 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-09413-2

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
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This book is dedicated to my mother

Gao Jingjuan

with loving memory

August 2, 2022
 Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Dr. Christopher Marsh, the director of research at

the Joint Special Operations University, for inviting me to give a presenta-
tion at the Great Power Competition Forum: Compound Security Threat
hosted by Joint Special Operations University in November 2020. The
Forum inspired me to continue exploring this topic and motivated me to
draft this book.
I would like to thank anonymous reviewers for reading chapters,
making comments, and offering constructive suggestions which helped
me revise the entire manuscript based on their specific suggestions and
general advice.
I would like to thank Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and
Strategic Relations: An International Journal for granting me permission
to revise the article “Intention and Objectives of Chinese Foreign Policy:
A Perspective of Chinese Culture and History” and include the revised
article in this book.
My thanks also go to Dr. Anca Pusca, Executive Editor at Palgrave
Macmillan, for reading the book proposal and chapters and managing the
publishing process. My thanks extend to Ananda Kumar Mariappan and
Mahesh Meiyazhagan for managing production issues.
I especially thank my wife, Yi-Tung Wu, for her true care and selfless
support, which enabled me to concentrate on this work and complete it.
This scholarly work embodied her contributions.

vii
 Contents

1 Introduction 1
2 U.S. Engagement Strategy Partially Failed 11
Development of China–U.S. Relations 12
Status of China–U.S. Relations 21
U.S. Engagement Strategy Failed Inevitably 29
Conclusion 40
3 Nature of the Great Power Competition 43
Conceptualization of the Great Power Competition 44
When Did the Great Power Competition Begin? 49
Who Triggered the Great Power Competition? 55
Objectives of the Great Power Competition 61
Roles of Other Players in the Great Power Competition 65
Implications of the Great Power Competition 69
Conclusion 74
4 Real Trap of China–U.S. Relations 77
Does the Thucydides Trap Apply to China–U.S. Relations? 78
Has the U.S. Fallen into the Kindleberger Trap
and the Kennedy Trap? 84
Economic Perspective Alone Cannot Fully Explain the Great
Power Competition 92
Conclusion 104

ix
x CONTENTS

5 Intention of Chinese Policymakers: Cultural Source

of the Great Power Competition 107
Roles of Chinese Culture in Making Foreign Policy 109
Characteristics of Chinese Culture and the Mindset
of Foreign Policymakers 116
Historical Memory and Chinese Diplomatic Objective 124
Conclusion 134
6 China’s Global Expansion and the International
Institution 137
The U.S.-Led International Institutions 138
Development of China’s Relations with the International
Institutions 142
China Challenges the International Institutions 147
China Pragmatically Uses the International Institutions 159
Conclusion 163
7 China’s Core Interests vs. American Vital Interests 165
China’s Core Interests Represent CCP’s Interests 166
American Vital Interests Reflect the Will of the American
People 172
The Cornerstone of American Vital Interests vs. China’s
Sharp Power 184
Conclusion 191
8 War Is Not Imminent During the Great Power
Competition 193
Will the First Shot Be Fire in the South China Sea? 194
Will the U.S. Clash with China Over the Taiwan Strait? 202
Can China Withstand War with the U.S.? 215
Conclusion 225
9 The Great Power Competition in the Post-Pandemic
Era 227
U.S. Administrations Made the Same Mistakes 228
Development Trend of the Great Power Competition 233
The Great Power Competition Will Strengthen Modern
Democracy 240
Totalitarian China Cannot Rule the World 248
Conclusion 258
 CONTENTS xi

Selected Readings 261

Index 275
 About the Author

Dr. Jinghao Zhou is an Associate Professor of Asian Studies at Hobart

and William Smith Colleges in New York. His research focuses on Chinese
ideology, politics, religions, and U.S.–China relations. He has his other
five books published, Why Is the China Model Losing Its Power? (2020),
Chinese vs. Western Perspectives: Understanding Contemporary China
(2014), China’s Peaceful Rise in a Global Context: A Domestic Aspect of
China’s Road Map to Democratization (2010), Remaking China’s Public
Philosophy and Chinese Women’s Liberation: The Volatile Mixing of Confu-
cianism, Marxism, and Feminism (2006), and Remaking China’s Public
Philosophy for the Twenty-First Century (2003). His forty-plus articles in
English appear in various journals and newspapers. He has also published
more than forty articles in Chinese journals and newspapers.

xiii
 Abbreviations

A2/AD Anti-Access/Area-Denial
ADB Asian Development Bank
AIIB Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
AMF Asian Monetary Fund
APEC Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASB Air-Sea Battle
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AUKUS A security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the
United States
BRI Belt Road Initiative
CCP Chinese Communist Party
CCTV China Central Television
CPTPP Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific
Partnership
EAEC East Asian Economic Caucus
FONA Freedom of Navigation
GDP Gross Domestic Product
HGV Hypersonic Glide vehicle
IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IDA International Development Association
IMF International Monetary Fund
IRBM Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles
JAM-GC Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons
MFN Most Favored Nation
MRBM Medium-Range Ballistic Missile
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

xv
xvi ABBREVIATIONS

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

NSS National Security Strategy
PLA People’s Liberation Army
PNTR Permanent Normal Trade Relations
PPP Purchase Power Parity
PRC People’s Republic of China
QUAD Quadruple Security Dialogue
ROC Republic of China
SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SDR Special Drawing Rights
SEC The Securities and Exchange Commission
SOE State-Owned Enterprise
STEM Science Technology Engineering Mathematics
TPP Trans-Pacific Partnership
TRA Taiwan Relations Act
TSMC Taiwanese Semiconductor Manufacturing Company
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UN United Nations
UNHRC UN Human Rights Council
US United States
WB World Bank
WHO World Health Organization
WIPO World Intellectual Property Organization
WTO World Trade Organization
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction

The relationship between China and the U.S. has nosedived to the lowest
point since Richard Nixon traveled to the People’s Republic of China
(PRC) and started the engagement process with the PRC in 1972. Now
China is powerful but is back in the arms of Russia. The U.S. engage-
ment strategy with China did not achieve the goal the U.S. expected in
the past fifty years. The Trump administration began to adopt a strategic
competition toward China. Joe Biden’s Interim National Security Strategy
Guidance (2021) ensured that the U.S. will strengthen its enduring
advantages to prevail in strategic competition with China. The 2022 U.S.
National Security Strategy still sees China’s threat as the top priority
among all other tasks although the U.S. faces great distractions due to
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and other domestic issues. It is expected that
Russia will become much weaker in the post-invasion of Ukraine. The
2021 survey conducted by the Pew Research Center shows that about
90% of American adults consider China as a competitor or enemy and
support taking a tougher approach in bilateral relations. In China, anti-
U.S. nationalism has been on the rise since the trade war driven by the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The General Secretary of the CCP Xi
Jinping points out that the biggest source of chaos in the present-day

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

Switzerland AG 2023
J. Zhou, Great Power Competition as the New Normal of China–US
Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-09413-2_1
2 J. ZHOU

world is the U.S., and the U.S. is the biggest threat to China’s secu-
rity.1 At the celebrations of the 100th anniversary of the founding of the
CCP (2021), Xi warned Westerners who try to block China’s rise will
hit a “Great Wall of steel.”2 He believes that anti-American sentiment
contributes to national unity and enhances the governance legitimacy of
the CCP. China is decisively moving in the opposite direction of the U.S.-
led international order. Xi has promised to restore China to its rightful
great power status by 2049—the 100th anniversary of the founding of
the PRC. The great power competition between China and the U.S. has
begun and become a new hegemonic narrative of academic debate in the
U.S. and China. Some scholars point out that the current China–U.S.
relations are entering a dangerous period.3
The Biden administration has acknowledged the renewed great power
competition between the U.S. and China while denying the concept of
Cold War 2.0. The 50-year history of China–U.S. relations has shown
that the great power competition has never stopped since the Cold War
because the CCP’s global ambition has been persistent since the establish-
ment of the PRC, although the PRC was not considered a great power
before 2008. The CCP has not disavowed the competition with the U.S.
while routinely calling on the U.S. to abandon a cold war mentality. All
of the major global powers care about the power balance and are destined
to compete to advance their international position through competition.
John Mearsheimer warns that it is almost certain to see great power
competition will be getting intensified and possibly lead to war between
the great powers in two decades. Most likely, the clash will be between
the U.S. and China.4 The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine will not
change the central theme of the twenty-first century—the great power
competition between China and the U.S. Instead, the U.S. has escalated

1 Quoted in Mark Moore, “Xi Jinping Calls US ‘Biggest Threat’ to China’s Security,”
New York Post, March 3, 2021.
2 习近平, “在庆祝中国共产党成立100周年大会上的讲话,” Xi Jinping, “Speech at the
Celebration of the 100th Anniversary of the Founding of the Communist Party of China,”
July 1, 2021.
3 Collins, Gabriel and Andrew S. Erickson, “U.S.–China Competition Enters the Decade
of Maximum Danger: Policy Ideas to Avoid Losing the 2020s,” Rice University’s Baker
Institute for Public Policy, December 2021.
4 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton,
2014).
 1 INTRODUCTION 3

the tension between the U.S. and the CCP by overwhelmingly passing
the Assessing Xi’s Interference and Subversion Act on April 27, 2022,
on assessing how Xi Jinping intervened and obstructed U.S. sanctions
against Russia, which will require the State Department to submit an
initial report within 30 days of the bill’s enactment and every 90 days
thereafter.5 This is the first time that the U.S. Congress had a bill named
after Xi Jinping, the core leader of the CCP. The implications of the bill
will be far-reaching in China–U.S. relations. The newly released 2022
National Defense Strategy report further defines China as the most signif-
icant competitor indicating that tenser great power competition between
the U.S. and the PRC/CCP is ahead. Although Joe Biden and Xi Jinping
have had five talks since Biden took office, the tension between China
and the U.S. continues to grow increasingly. Nancy Pelosi’s possible trip
to Taiwan has further added fuel to the tension between the two coun-
tries. During the telephone talk between Biden and Xi on July 28, 2022,
Xi warned the U.S. not to play the fire in Taiwan. A PLA spokesman said
that the PLA will not sit idle and will take strong measures to respond
if Pelosi goes ahead with her visit. The U.S. will be responsible for all
of the serious consequences. Apparently, the tension between China and
the U.S. elevated to a new high level, although this was largely rhetoric
because China and U.S. military conflict will unlikely take place before
the 20th National Congress of the CCP and the U.S. midterm elections.
The top leader of the CCP has played a critical role in the change
in China–U.S. relations in the framework of Chinese communist poli-
tics. If the 18th Congress of the CCP in 2012 marked the beginning
of the Xi Jinping era, the 19th Congress of the CCP in October 2017
formerly proclaimed the Chinese developmental model—the socialism
with Chinese characteristics—entered into a new era and China will
become the global leader by 2045. Xi Jinping’s speech at the 19th
party congress showed his worldview that the world was in the midst of
profound and complex changes moving in China’s favor and the Chinese
nation now stood tall and firm in the East. Xi believed that the path of
China’s development was not only different from Washington Consensus
but also was better than the Washington Consensus. He outlined the
two-stage plan of the global ambition: to reach the goal of socialist
modernization by 2035 and to become the global leader by 2045. Xi

5 “U.S. House Passes the Axis Act Named After Xi Jinping,” NFSC News, May 1,
2022.
4 J. ZHOU

declared that “It will be an era for all of us, the sons and daughters of the
Chinese nation, to strive with one heart to realize the Chinese Dream of
national rejuvenation. It will be an era that sees China moving closer to
center stage and making greater contributions to mankind.”6 His speech
indicated that the CCP’s aim is not simply to make a world safe, rather,
the CCP seeks an international order in which China’s achievements as
a great power are not only recognized but also credited to its partic-
ular brand of socialism as a moral triumph both for socialism and for
the Chinese nation.7 His speech clearly expressed the CCP’s determina-
tion that China wanted to lead the reform of global governance and that
the China model should replace the Washington consensus. His speech
heralded greater assertiveness in Chinese foreign policy. Now the world
is closely watching China where she is heading after the 20th National
Congress of the CCP.8
In November 2017, President Donald Trump paid a state visit to
Beijing. Chinese official media described Trump’s trip as a pilgrimage
to Xi Jinping, showing the U.S. respect and behaving well toward Xi
Jinping. The trip was a diplomatic triumph for Xi Jinping.9 In fact,
Donald Trump’s 2017 trip to Beijing was the turning point of the U.S.
foreign policy shift toward China. During the trip, Trump personally
experienced that China well planned to replace the U.S. global dominant
power based on his personal impression of Chinese officials’ confidence,
a long-term plan, and full-scale ambitions.10 His first-hand experience in
Beijing motivated him to understand that U.S. strategy toward China has
been flawed and his previous administrations and both democratic and
republican parties were misled by false theories and assumptions, such

6 Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society

in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics
for a New Era,” Delivered at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of
China, October 18, 2017.
7 Daniel Tobin, “How Xi Jinping’s ‘New Era’ Should Have Ended U.S. Debate on
Beijing’s Ambitions,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 8, 2020.
8 Mathew P. Funaiole, “Xi Jinping’s 19th Party Congress Speech Heralds Greater
Assertiveness in Chinese Foreign Policy,” Center for Strategic and International Studies,
October 26, 2017.
9 “Chinese Media Hails Success of Trump’s ‘Pilgrimage’ to Beijing,” The Guardian,
November 9, 2017.
10 Herbert Raymond McMaster, Battleground: The Fight to Defend the Free World (New
York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2020).
 1 INTRODUCTION 5

as “liberalism must-win” and “engagement policy serves American inter-

ests.” Guided by the engagement strategy, the U.S. helped China rebuild
a prosperous country, but China has turned against the U.S. and weak-
ened the U.S. international power. If the U.S. and its allies and partners
began to compete with China effectively by changing the engagement
strategy, it would be possible to turn what the CCP saw as a weakness
into strength.11 Although the Trump administration discovered China’s
global ambitions and started a new chapter of China–U.S. relations, it
did not offer theoretical explanations on why China persistently pursues
its global ambition and failed to form a consistent and workable strategy
toward the PRC. Rhetorically, the Biden administration continues the
strategic competition. Nevertheless, it has not demonstrated its readiness
in competing with China by adopting a tougher approach. The chaos of
U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Russian invasion of Ukraine
have raised a legitimate question of whether the Biden administration is
capable of handling global power competitions.
China–U.S. relations remain the central issue of the global commu-
nity in the twenty-first century. The trajectory of the bilateral relations
will have a profound impact not only on the Asia–Pacific region but
also on the entire world. The current troubled relationship between the
two nations has created serious concerns in academia. Many ask the
same question: What went wrong with U.S. foreign policy? One of the
answers to the question is that all failures of U.S. foreign policy toward
China stem from that U.S. administrations and American politicians failed
to understand the nature of the CCP, so they did not understand the
necessity and urgency of competition with China. Consequently, they
failed to implement a workable strategy to deal with China’s challenge.
This book intends to explore the question from various perspectives by
discussing why the great power competition is the new normal of China–
U.S. relations and why it is urgent for the U.S. to compete with China
by reassessing and further understanding the nature of the CCP.
When one addresses the question of what went wrong with U.S.
foreign policy, how many years should one trace back? James B. Stein-
berg, former Deputy Secretary of State, suggests that it is appropriate
to address the question by tracing back 30 years (1990–2020) because
the Bush administration’s response to the Tiananmen Square Massacre

11 Ibid.
6 J. ZHOU

(1989) significantly shaped the course of China–U.S. relations.12 As

a matter of fact, the fundamental turning point of the U.S. strategic
approach toward the PRC started with Nixon’s trip to Beijing in 1972.
There would be no normalization and engagement with the PRC without
Nixon’s 1972 trip. Did American foreign policy toward China come with
any flaws between 1972 and 1989? The answer is positive. The “30-year
argument” argument is based on an assumption that America’s China
strategy was successful between 1972 and 1989. This book will argue
that the U.S. foreign policy toward China partially failed in its inception
according to the 50-year history of U.S. engagement with China. It is
time for the U.S. to compete with the CCP/PRC in order to maintain
global peace, preserve the free world, and secure U.S.’ global dominant
power. In 2022, the Biden administration released its official Indo-Pacific
strategy, which correctly warns that there is only a narrow window of time
for the U.S. and its allies to prevent China from transforming the region
into its own sphere of influence.
It should be noted that competing and engaging with China are not
exclusive but overlapped to a certain degree. The Biden administration
insists that the stiff competition between the U.S. and China does not
have to turn into a new Cold War which implies that America’s competi-
tion with China is limited to specific regions and specific areas. The U.S.
began to implement the engagement strategy with China after Richard
Nixon’s trip to Beijing in 1972 and gradually became a foundation of
U.S. policy. The term “strategic engagement” refers to a wide range of
practices and interactions in economic cooperation, public diplomacy,
cultural exchange, and military and foreign aid between China and the
U.S. The engagement strategy was originally designed as a partnership
with China to counter the Soviet Union during the Cold War and to
help China promote economy and political liberalization and ultimately
merge into the U.S.-led international order as a responsible stakeholder.13
As a result, China has become powerful but goes the opposite direction
the U.S. expected. The engagement strategy fundamentally promoted

12 James B. Steinberg, “The Ernest May Memorial Lecture, U.S.–China Relations at a

Crossroad: Can History Guide the Path Forward,” in The Struggle for Power: U.S.–China
Relations in the 21st Century, edited by Leah Bitounis and Jonathon Price (Washington,
DC: The Aspen Institute, 2020).
13 Zoltan Feher, “The Rise and Fall of U.S. Engagement Toward China,” Center for
Strategic Studies, August 17, 2020.
 1 INTRODUCTION 7

China’s rise. The Trump administration began to revisit and alter the
course of the engagement strategy. The great power competition is the
right strategy toward China to balance great powers in the Indo-Pacific
region and international relations. However, the strategic competition
does not suggest that the U.S. should abandon engagement with China
completely. Jeffrey Bader raised accurate questions: should such broad-
based interaction be continued in a new era of increasing rivalry, or should
it be abandoned or radically altered?14 It would greatly hurt the U.S. its
own vital interests if the U.S. totally abandoned cooperation with China
during the globalized era. Strategically, we should adopt both strategic
competition and “selective engagement” with China. By adopting selec-
tive engagement, the U.S. will be able to utilize the instruments of
national power to balance against China in order to preserve peace among
great powers and maintain a balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region
and the global community.15
There are two opposing viewpoints regarding the great power compe-
tition. Some argue that China and the U.S. should work together to
bring China–U.S. relations back to the normal track because U.S.–China
competition is a zero-sum game while others insist that it is time to
take a tougher approach to China by taking all necessary means because
a tougher strategy would serve U.S. national interests. This book will
challenge both viewpoints and argue that it is unrealistic to bring China–
U.S. relations back to the so-called normal track because the great power
competition will be a new normal of China–U.S. relations and the U.S.
will gain more from strategic competition than cooperation in the long
run. The strategic competition will not be all bad for China either.
The competition would create more incentive for Chinese companies to
compete with the U.S. because they do not have any other option, but
to develop their own capabilities under U.S. technology sanctions. The
strategic competition does not preclude working with China, but the
cooperation must go through the strategic competition. The book will
show that the strategy of “great power cooperation through competi-
tion” is more positive and constructive than the approaches of “peaceful
coexist” and “maximum pressure.”

14 Jeffrey Bader, “U.S.–China Relations: Is It Time to End the Engagement?” Foreign

Policy at Brookings, 2018.
15 Maj Christy Jones, “Selective Engagement: A Strategy to Address a Rising China,”
Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, August 2, 2021.
8 J. ZHOU

This book includes nine chapters. Chapter 2, U.S. Engagement

Strategy Partially Failed, will argue that the great power competition is
the result of the failures of the engagement policy through examining
the history of China–U.S. relations in the past 50 years, assessing the
current status of China–U.S. relations, and discussing in what sense the
engagement strategy failed. This chapter will find that it was the U.S. that
created its powerful competitor, but the U.S. did not take timely actions
to counter China’s challenges. The 50-year history of China–U.S. rela-
tions has proved that it is time for the U.S. to make adjustments to the
engagement strategy and compete with China if it wants to maintain its
global dominant power within the U.S.-led liberal international order.
Chapter 3, Nature of the Great Power Competition, will conceptualize
the term “great power competition” by examining the development of
the great power competition, discussing the objectives of the great power
competition, exploring the roles of other major players in the great power
competition, and analyzing the implications of the great power competi-
tion. This chapter will conclude that it is not the U.S. but China that initi-
ated the great power competition in order to establish a China-centered
global order. The great power competition is an inevitable historical event
in the twenty-first century, but unlike the Cold War, the U.S. is more
difficult to compete with China in the coming decades because China has
become more powerful after a five-decade-long preparation.
Chapter 4, Real Trap of China–U.S. Relations, will argue that the
prospect theory and the analogy of Thucydides’ Trap, the Kindleberger
Trap, and the Kennedy Trap are helpful in understanding international
relations, but they cannot fully explain the great power competition. To
fully assess the trajectory of China–U.S. relations, it is required to seri-
ously consider how other important factors, including the difference in
political systems between China and the U.S., the relationship between
cultural DNA and foreign policymakers, and the principle and goals of
foreign policy, influence China–U.S. relations. This chapter will focus on
explanations of how the differences between the two political systems
constitute real changes to China–U.S. relations.
Chapter 5, Intention of Chinese Policymakers: Cultural Source of the
Great Power Competition, will discuss the intention of Chinese foreign
policymakers, challenge the argument that the objective of Chinese
foreign policy is only to maintain domestic political stability, and argue
that Chinese foreign policy not only aims to maintain the one-party
system and domestic social stability but also wants to replace the U.S.
 1 INTRODUCTION 9

power in the Asia–Pacific region and ultimately become the world’s top
superpower. The two objectives are the two sides of the same coin.
Chinese culture and memory of Chinese history are invisible but the
strong forces influence Chinese foreign policymakers, shape the inten-
tion of their global expansion, and drive Chinese leaders and the Chinese
nation to compete with the U.S.
Chapter 6, China’s Global Expansion and the International Institu-
tion, will discuss the basic issues of the current international order, review
the development of the relationship between China and the international
institutions, analyze how China challenges and uses the international insti-
tutions for its global expansion, and explore the consequences of China’s
challenges and the future of the international order. This chapter will
argue that the Chinese revisionism and provocative actions to alter the
U.S.-led international order are one of the major sources of the great
power competition. If the U.S. and its allies do not stand up to China’s
challenges, the CCP could be the terminator that put the U.S. global
dominance to an end in the future.
Chapter 7, China’s Core Interests vs. American Vital Interests, will
argue that China’s core interests and American vital interests fundamen-
tally conflict, and any expectation that wants to fundamentally improve
China–U.S. relations through engagement is a dead end. China’s core
interests represent the CCP’s interests, so overemphasizing the political
dimension of China’s core interests is partially responsible for the failures
of China’s foreign policy in addition to the CCP’s inaccurate vision of
international relations and misjudgment of China’s comprehensive power
because the free world will never accept the Chinese governance model of
totalitarianism. It is necessary for China to revisit the notion of China’s
core interests and modify it to avoid further deteriorating its relations
with the U.S. and other Western countries.
Chapter 8, War Is Not Imminent during the Great Power Compe-
tition, will argue that war is not imminent during the great power
competition from various perspectives after exploring the question of
whether China and the U.S. will clash over the South China Sea and
the Taiwan Strait. China’s challenges to the U.S. are real, and the
conflicts between the two countries have become inevitable and widening
far beyond the economic and trade areas. Although the future of the
great power competition remains uncertain, the great power competi-
tion does not necessarily lead to war if the U.S. takes serious actions and
10 J. ZHOU

fully prepares for a possible war with China by employing a workable

comprehensive plan to deter CCP’s global ambitions.
Chapter 9, Conclusion: The Great Power Competition in the Post-
Pandemic Era, will argue that the most important lesson the U.S. must
learn from the history of China–U.S. relations is to understand the nature
of the CCP. The ten U.S. administrations from the Nixon administration
to the Biden administration have implemented different foreign policies,
yet they have shared one similarity—they have held more or less false
understanding of the CCP and had unrealistic hope for the CCP, so they
believed their words but downplayed their deeds. The future of global
order will largely depend on how the U.S. responds to China’s challenges.
The U.S. is relatively declining but it will have a chance to turn it around
if the U.S. firmly implements the strategic competition approach.
This book does not intend to provide policy recommendations for
governments to consider, but by employing the power transition theory,
prospect theory, cultural approach, and analogies of traps, to refute the
argument that competition is not a strategy by explaining why the great
power competition is inevitable and why it is necessary to continuously
work with China in some areas through strategic competition in the era
of globalization. This book only provides one of the aspects of under-
standing the great power competition in a global context and aims to
motivate both the U.S. and China to revisit their foreign policy practice
and come up with a better foreign policy strategy for handling China–U.S.
relations.
 CHAPTER 2

U.S. Engagement Strategy Partially Failed

China and the U.S. are the two great powers in the world and share
common interests in implementing nuclear nonproliferation, controlling
diseases, lifting the population out of poverty, improving environmental
protection, and winning the war on terror. It is almost impossible for
the international community to decide on major global issues without
China’s participation. It is a futile effort for the U.S. to block China’s
rise during the era of globalization. However, it is a misconception that
a stable relationship between China and the U.S. is only based on the
two nations’ common interests. Mutual unfavorable interests also play
a role in maintaining stable China–U.S. relations. The importance of
China–U.S. relations lies mainly in their conflicting interests rather than
shared ones.1 This argument implies that the great power competition
could contribute to stabilizing China–U.S. relations. After the Trump
administration shifted U.S. security strategy from engagement to compe-
tition toward China, many expected China–U.S. relations to return to
a normal track in the post-Trump era. However, competition between
the two countries is getting fiercer under the Biden administration while
the areas of cooperation are narrowing. President Joe Biden and the
General Secretary of the CCP Xi Jinping had virtual talks in November

1 Yan Xuetong, “The Instability of China-US Relations,” The Chinese Journal of

International Politics, Vol. 3 (2010), pp. 263–292.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 11

Switzerland AG 2023
J. Zhou, Great Power Competition as the New Normal of China–US
Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-09413-2_2
12 J. ZHOU

2021, March 2022, and July 2022, attempting to manage the complex
nature of the great power competition but apparently, they touched on
the common concerns from different perspectives. The future of China–
U.S. relations is still uncertain. Where are China–U.S. relations heading?
Has the engagement approach failed completely? What should be the
main theme of China–U.S. relations, competition, or engagement in
the coming decades? U.S. officials publicly admitted that the attempt to
socialize China into Western values has failed.2 Kurt Campbell, the U.S.
coordinator for Indo-Pacific affairs on the National Security Council, has
made it clear that “The period that was broadly described as engage-
ment has come to an end.”3 To understand why it is necessary to change
U.S. engagement strategy, and why the great power competition is a new
normal of China–U.S. relations while continuing to work with China in
some areas, it is required to examine the history of China–U.S. relations,
assess the current status of China–U.S. relations, and discuss in what sense
the engagement strategy failed. This chapter will argue that the great
power competition is the result of the failures of the engagement policy.
In the past, it was the U.S. that created its powerful competitor, but the
U.S. did not take timely actions to counter China’s challenges. The 50-
year history of China–U.S. relations has proved that it is time for the U.S.
to make adjustments to the engagement strategy and compete with China
if it wants to maintain its global dominant power based on Western liberal
values.

Development of China–U.S. Relations

Since the American ship Empress of China arrived in China in 1784, China
began to have direct relations with the U.S. Within the last over 200
hundred years, the Chinese political system has fundamentally changed
twice through great political revolutions: the Revolution of 1911 which
established the first nation-state, the Republic of China (ROC), and the

2 Jonathan Holslag, “Self-Betrayal: How the West Failed to Respond to China’s Rise,”
International Spectator, May 21, 2021. Also see Kurt Campbell and Jake Sullivan, “Com-
petition Without Catastrophe,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 98, No. 5 (2019), pp. 96–110. Kurt
Campbell and Rush Doshi, “How America Can Shore Up Asian Order,” Foreign Affairs,
January 12, 2021. Richard Fontaine and Ely Ratner, “The U.S.-China Confrontation Is
Not Another Cold War,” The Washington Post, July 2, 2020.
3 “Biden’s Asia Czar Kurt Campbell Says Era of Engagement with Xi’s China Is Over,”
The Straits Times, May 21, 2021.
 2 U.S. ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY PARTIALLY FAILED 13

Communist Revolution of 1949 which established the PRC. Accordingly,

China–U.S. relations have experienced extraordinary historical changes
over the last two centuries.
The relationship between the two countries from its incept to 1911
can be characterized as unequal relationships mainly due to asymmet-
rical power. The Qing dynasty (1644–1912) was full of energy at its
inception but gradually became stagnant and corrupt. At the begin-
ning of the Qing dynasty, national comprehensive power was strong, the
political system was relatively transparent, and the national living stan-
dard increased. In the second half of the Qing dynasty, the government
became very corrupted and triggered many internal rebellions, such as
the Taiping Rebellion in 1850 and the Boxer Uprising in 1899, which
resulted in domestic chaos. China lost its military capability in fighting
against foreign invasions because of corruption, opium addiction, and
the lack of advanced technology. China lost the two Opium Wars in
1839 and 1857, respectively, and lost the first Sino-Japan war in 1895.
Consequently, China ceded its land, Hong Kong and Macau, to Western
powers, and signed many unequal treaties with Western countries, such as
the Treaty of Nanking (1842), the Sino-Portuguese Treaty (1887), and
the Boxer Protocol (1901). China and the Chinese people were humil-
iated by the Western societies for a century, starting with the defeat of
the First Opium War with the UK in 1842. China gradually became a
semi-colony of Western powers, particularly the eight Western powers,
including Austria-Hungary, the British Empire, Germany, France, Italy,
Japan, Russia, and the U.S. Under the pressures of Western powers, the
Chinese government was forced to sign over 700 unequal treaties with
Western governments and agreed to cede its lands, open fourteen ports
to Western countries, and pay a huge indemnity to the Western countries,
which deepened China’s poverty. Theoretically, China was a sovereign
country at that time, but the government was a puppet of Western powers
and was almost incapable of making any independent decisions in foreign
affairs. The U.S. had privileges in China’s territory and the U.S. officials
were even exempted from any punishment after killing Chinese citizens
in China. When the U.S. enjoyed its privileges on Chinese land, the U.S.
Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882, signed by Presi-
dent Chester Arthur, to suspend Chinese immigrants, excluding Chinese
“skilled and unskilled laborers and Chinese employed in mining” from
entering the U.S. for ten years. When the Act expired in 1892, U.S.
Congress extended it for another ten years in the form of the Geary Act,
14 J. ZHOU

but there was no significant change until the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act of 1965, which opened the door to a new stereotype of Chinese
as a model minority. The U.S. did not offer an apology until the U.S.
Congress issued an apology for the Chinese Exclusion in 2012.4
In the ROC from 1912 to October 1949, the two countries tried
to develop mutual friendly relations largely due to the common polit-
ical goal of the anti-Chinese communist movement. Sun Yat-sen was the
leader of the Revolution of 1911 and became the first president of the
ROC. He received a Western education and organized the Tong Meng
Hui, the former Nationalist Party. In his search for a new China, he was
deeply influenced by Western cultures and become the most Western-
ized Chinese leader in Chinese history. Although Sun was neither a great
strategist nor a profound ideologist, he was the first politician in modern
Chinese history to advocate democratic principles, arguing that it was
not enough to acknowledge the sovereignty of the country because the
success of the revolution could not be attained without a democracy.5
All his political efforts were made to establish a capitalist-based country.
However, the Revolution of 1911 was not a bourgeois revolution because
most of its revolutionaries were high-ranking officials, landowners, mili-
tary officers of the Qing, heads of secret societies, and armed bands.6
Thus, the nature of the nationalist government is not democratic, though
the form of the government was based on the Three People’s Principles
(三民主义, The Principle of Nationalism, Democracy, and the Livelihood
of the People). To get support from the CCP and the Soviet Union, the
first socialist country in the world, and the majority of the Chinese people,
Sun developed the policy of accommodating the CCP and worked with
the Russian government. Sun’s policy was not successful, so he stepped
down from his presidency in 1912. On March 12, 1925, Sun died of liver
cancer, and his will, stated on his deathbed, was that since the revolution
was not successful, comrades must keep going on.
Sun’s successor Jiang Jieshi (in old Chinese pronunciation, Chiang
Kai-shek) departed away from Sun’s pro-Russian communist stance by

4 Moni Basu “In Rare Apology, House Regrets Exclusionary Laws Targeting Chinese,”
CNN , December 16, 2012.
5 A James Gregor, Marxism, China & Development: Reflections on Theory and Reality
(Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1995), p. 233.
6 Jonathan Spence, Chinese Roundabout: Essays in History and Culture (New York: W.
W. Norton & Company, 1993), p. 269.
 2 U.S. ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY PARTIALLY FAILED 15

suppressing the Chinese communist movement. After settling the central

nationalist government in Nanjing in 1927, Jiang started to implement
pro-U.S. foreign policy, because Jiang viewed communism as the biggest
enemy to his regime and believed that the nationalist government could
not make peace with the international community without eliminating
the domestic communist movement. His foreign policy agenda was in
line with Western powers, especially the interests of the U.S. in Asia.
The U.S. regarded the Chinese nationalist government as its ally and
invested enormous financial and military resources to support the nation-
alist government and troops. Supported by the U.S., the nationalist
government launched three civil wars against the Chinese communist
troops, trying to eradicate the communists.
Unexpectedly, the Sino-Japan War interrupted the intentions of Jiang’s
nationalist government. The CCP took the opportunity of the war with
Japan in eight years to develop its military troops in remote regions under
the slogan of “united Jiang and anti-Japan.” The CCP’s strategy worked
well and built up 1.3 million troops at the end of the second Sino-Japan
war (1937–1945). Although the U.S. and the nationalist government
persistently implemented the policy of the anti-CCP to consolidate the
Jiang regime, the nationalist government eventually lost the popular
support from the majority of the Chinese people in part because Jiang’s
policy was out of touch with reality while the Chinese people gravely
suffered from civil wars and external aggressions. As a result, military
power began to shift in the CCP’s favor. Accordingly, the U.S. began
to implement new policies to balance the Nationalist Party and the CCP
to ensure the future of American interest in Asia in the post-Jiang era.
Finally, the nationalist government was defeated by the CCP troops and
withdrew from the mainland to Taiwan in 1949. Taipei has become the
capital of the ROC but continued to represent the government of China
in the United Nations until 1971. After Jiang passed away in 1975, his son
Jiang Jingguo began to gradually reform the Taiwanese political system
and put the Taiwanese authoritarian regime to an end by lifting martial
law in July of 1987. Since then, Taiwan has continued to strengthen its
relations with the U.S. based on the principle of the Six Assurances of
1982 and the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 in the framework of U.S.
ambiguous strategy toward the Taiwan Strait, which made the triangle
relations more complicated.
After World War II, the world entered into the Cold War era, and
the conflict between the capitalist and socialist societies, represented by
16 J. ZHOU

Western societies led by the U.S. and the socialist camp led by the
Soviet Union, increasingly intensified. Once the CCP came to power in
1949, the relationship between the two countries began an era of overall
confrontation, which lasted for more than 20 years until the historical
turning point—the U.S. President Richard Nixon visited China in 1972.
Since the establishment of the PRC, China–U.S. relations have gone
through different stages from tense confrontation to a “complex mix
of intensifying diplomacy, growing international rivalry, and [becoming]
increasingly intertwined.”7 Most of the time under the Mao regime,
China–U.S. relations were not only about the bilateral relationship but
were also affected by third-party factors. The U.S.–Soviet Cold War, the
Korean War, and the Vietnam War were the main factors contributing
to China–U.S. relations from the 1950s to the 1970s.8 The relationship
between China and the U.S. was significantly influenced by Sino-Soviet
relations and U.S.–Soviet relations during this period. The PRC was a
follower of the Soviet Union before China split with the Soviet Union
in the 1960s due to ideological and political conflicts between the two
largest communist parties. Both parties claimed that they represented true
Marxism and were a well-deserved leader of the global communist move-
ment, but both of them imposed threats to the free world. This explained
why McCarthyism spread across the U.S. in the 1950s and the U.S.
government tried to eliminate the communist movement by launching
ideological campaigns against communist countries including the PRC.
In 1950, North Korean troops invaded South Korea, attempting to
unite South Korea and North Korea. In response to the Soviet-backed
North Korean invasion of South Korea, the United Nations Security
Council convened and passed the UNSC Resolution 82 to condemn the
Soviet Union and North Korea. The Korean War officially broke out in
November 1950, after the U.S. along with other Western countries sent
military troops to Korea with the authorization from United Nations
Security Council. According to the Chinese government, to prevent the
war from coming into newborn China, the Chinese government sent
more than one million troops across the Yalu River to help North Korea,

7 Carin Zissis and Christopher Alessi, “U.S Relations With China (1949–present),”
Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/china/us-relations-china-1949---pre
sent/p17698.
8 Baijia Zhang, “Understanding Changes in Sino-U.S. Relations From A Historical
Perspective,” China International Strategy Review, Vol. 2 (2020), pp. 1–13.
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
The Project Gutenberg eBook of Book of Needs
of the Holy Orthodox Church
This ebook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States
and most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no
restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it
under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this
ebook or online at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the
United States, you will have to check the laws of the country where
you are located before using this eBook.

Title: Book of Needs of the Holy Orthodox Church

with an appendix containing offices for the laying on of
hands

Creator: Russkaia pravoslavnaia tserkov

Translator: G. V. Shann

Release date: August 28, 2023 [eBook #71513]

Language: English

Original publication: London: David Nutt, 270, Strand, 1894

Credits: Stephen Hutcheson and the Online Distributed Proofreading

Team at https://www.pgdp.net

*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK BOOK OF

NEEDS OF THE HOLY ORTHODOX CHURCH ***
 BOOK OF NEEDS.

BOOK OF NEEDS
OF THE
HOLY ORTHODOX CHURCH
WITH
AN APPENDIX
CONTAINING OFFICES FOR THE
LAYING ON OF HANDS.

Done into English

BY
G. V. SHANN.

LONDON:
DAVID NUTT, 270 STRAND.
1894.

TO
HIS EXCELLENCY
 C.P. POBEDONOSTZEFF,
CHIEF-PROCURATOR OF
THE MOST HOLY GOVERNING SYNOD
OF RUSSIA,
THESE TRANSLATIONS
ARE INSCRIBED.
 PREFACE.
The following pages contain a translation with some omissions, of
the Slavonic service book entitled, Trébnik, or, Book of Needs, so
called, because it contains the provision for that which is spiritually
needed by a Christian from the cradle to the grave.
To this is added, as an appendix, a translation of a portion of the
service book entitled, Chinóvnik archieréiskaho
svyashtshennosloujéniya, or, Office book of the bishop’s holy
service, namely, that pertaining to the laying on of hands.[1]
The original used for the translation of the first named work is an
edition published in Moscow in the year 1882, and that for the
portion of the second, one published in the same city in the year
1890.
The omissions, made under competent advice, in the translation of
Trébnik are as follows,
I. The entire of the epistle and gospel lessons, these being
indicated by their initial and concluding words only, with one
exception, namely, in the office of the sanctification of water on the
festival of the Epiphany, where the lessons from the prophecy being
written at length those of the epistle and gospel are made to
correspond.
II. Questions asked of penitents in the confessional, and
instructions concerning the imposition of penance, as explained in
foot-notes at pages 49 and 51.
III. Some prayers for various occasions which are not of general
interest (chapters xxii, xxiii, xxx, xxxi, xxxii, xxxiv, xxxv, xxxvi, xxxvii,
xxxviii, xxxix, xl, and xli).
IV. Extracts from the Nomocanon (chap. xlii), many of which refer
to obsolete heathen customs and habits, and all need the living voice
of the pastors of the church for their proper present application.
V. The Kalendar and the Paschal Tables (chapters xliii and xliv),
these having been given in the translator’s former work, Euchology,
published in Kidderminster in the year 1891.[2]
It should be understood that the originals are books for the use of
those who are conversant with the order of the church service, and
that, for that reason, many abbreviations appear in them, well known
prayers, verses, etc, being indicated by initial words only, or by
ecclesiastical terms. As these abbreviations have been imitated in
the translations, some notes are given, which, it is hoped, may
remove most of the obscurities, which, to the general reader, might
appear to pervade the work.
G. V. SHANN.
Oldswinford, Epiphany, 1894.
NOTES.
 NOTE I.
EXPLANATORY OF ECCLESIASTICAL TERMS.

Aër. The external veil which is used to cover both chalice and
paten.
Antidoron. That which remains of a Prosphora (loaf of oblation)
after the portion for consecration has been cut from it. This
remainder is given to communicants (together with wine and warm
water) immediately after the holy sacrament, and is also distributed
to those of the congregation who are not communicants at the end of
the Liturgy instead of the holy gifts themselves, and, for that reason,
it is called Antidoron. In the primitive church its distribution was
known under the term Agape, i.e., Love-feast.
Axios. Worthy. An exclamation, referring to the candidates, used at
ordinations.
Canon. An ecclesiastical composition, commemorative of any
given festival or occasion, consisting of nine spiritual songs,
according to the number of the degrees of the incorporeal hosts,
based upon these nine scriptural odes, or prayers, I. The song of
Moses in Exodus (chap. xv. 1-19). II. The song of Moses in
Deuteronomy (chap. xxxii. 1-43). This song, being indicative of God’s
judgment against sinners, is sung only in penitential seasons, hence
a Canon usually lacks the second Ode, the third following
immediately on the first. III. The prayer of Anna (1 Kings ii. 1-10). IV.
The prayer of Abbacum (chap. iii. 2 ad fin.). V. The prayer of Esaias
(chap. xxvi. 9-20). VI. The prayer of Jonas (chap. ii. 2-9). VII. The
prayer of the Three Children (Daniel iii). VIII. The song of the same
(Benedicite). IX. The song of Zacharias (Benedictus), preceded by
that of the Virgin (Magnificat). Every Ode in a Canon is preceded by
a verse called Irmos, itself being the rhythmical model of the verses
that follow, which are called Troparia, because they turn upon a
model. The Irmos however is frequently omitted, or is sung only
before Odes iii, vi, and ix (as also after these). See pages 210, 214,
and 218. A refrain pervades all the Odes. See pages 129, 183, and
209. The refrains for the Canons at pages 85 and 145 are not
expressed in the text, but these are respectively, “Have mercy upon
me, O God, have mercy upon me,” and, “Rest, O Lord, thy sleeping
servant’s soul.” The refrain is sung or said between every verse
except the last two, “Glory to the Father, and to the Son, and to the
Holy Ghost,” being prefixed to the last but one, and “Both now and
ever, and to ages of ages. Amen” to the last, which last is always
addressed to the God-bearing Virgin. Sometimes, e.g., in penitential
seasons, the verses of the Odes are sung together with those of
their scriptural prototypes, and the rubric then indicates to how many
of these verses, counting backwards from the last, the
ecclesiastically composed ones are to be subjoined. Thus at page
128 the Canon is directed to be sung to vi, i.e., six verses (counting
backwards) of the scriptural prototype in each Ode; but in this case,
if so sung, the refrain would be omitted. A Canon is moreover usually
divided into three parts, the division taking place after the third and
sixth Odes, a verse called Kathisma, or one called Hypacoë,
frequently occurring after Ode iii, and one called Condakion, followed
by one or more called Icos (pl. Icosi) after Ode vi. Sometimes an
epistle and gospel lection occurs after the Condakion and Icos. See
page 167. Finally, it is to be remarked that an Ectenia (q. v.) usually
follows Ode iii (before the Kathisma), Ode vi (before the Condakion
and Icos), and Ode ix.
Cherubic Hymn. The song sung at the great Introit in the
celebration of the Liturgy, when the prepared gifts are solemnly
carried from the Prothesis (table of oblations) through the church to
the altar. The words of the ancient song accompanying this rite are
as follows,
Let all mortal flesh be still, and let it stand in fear and awe, and
think of nothing earthly to itself, because the King of kings and Lord
of lords approacheth to be slain, and given for the faithful’s food.
(Here the procession takes place.)
Him do precede th’ angelic choirs, with all their principals and
powers, the cherubim of many eyes, and the six-winged seraphim,
who shade their faces and sing forth the song, Alleluia, alleluia,
alleluia.
These words however are now only sung on Holy Saturday, and,
except on that day, and on Holy Thursday, and at the Liturgy of the
Presanctified, are substituted by the following, dating from the time
of Justinian,
We, who the cherubim in mystery represent and sing the song
thrice-holy to the quickening Trinity, should put away now every care
of life,
(The procession.)
That we the King of all things may receive, who borne in is on
spears by angel ranks unseen. Alleluia, alleluia, alleluia.
On Holy Thursday the words are,
Of thy mysterious supper, Son of God, me a communicant accept
to-day; for I thy mystery to thy foes will not betray, nor give to thee a
kiss as Judas did; but, as the thief, I will confess thee: Lord, in thy
kingdom O remember me.
(The procession.)
Of thy mysterious supper.... the whole again, concluding with the
thrice sung Alleluia.
And at the Liturgy of the Presanctified,
Now serve the heavenly powers unseen with us; for, lo, the King of
glory cometh in. Behold, the mystic sacrifice, that perfected hath
been, is borne in on the spears.
(The procession.)
Let us draw near with faith and love, that we of life immortal may
partakers be. Alleluia, alleluia, alleluia.
Condakion. A short verse expressing the purport of any given
festival or occasion. See Canon.
Dismissal. The concluding words of an office. A full form of these
is given at page 222, but in other places, when they are expressed at
all, it is in a more or less fragmentary manner.
Ectenia. A form of prayer consisting of a number of rogations with
responses. There is a great, and a little Ectenia, an Ectenia of
earnest prayer, and one of supplication. The normal form of these is
as follows,
The great Ectenia, called also the Ectenia of peace.
In peace let us pray to the Lord. Response. Lord, have mercy, and
so after the succeeding rogations. For the peace that is from above,
and for the salvation of our souls, let us pray to the Lord. For the
peace of the whole world, the good estate of the holy churches of
God, and for the union of them all, let us pray to the Lord. For this
holy temple, and for them that with faith, piety, and fear of God enter
into it, let us pray to the Lord. For the most holy Governing Synod,
and for our Metropolitan, name, for our Archbishop, or Bishop, name,
according to the eparchy, for the honourable presbytery, the
diaconate in Christ, and for all the clergy and the laity, let us pray to
the Lord. Here follow rogations for the Emperor and the Imperial
Family, mentioning them by name. To aid them and to subdue under
their feet every enemy and adversary, let us pray to the Lord. For
this city (if it is monastery, For this holy habitation), for every city and
country, and for them that in faith dwell therein, let us pray to the
Lord. For healthiness of weather, for plentifulness of the fruits of the
earth, and for peaceful times, let us pray to the Lord. For them that
voyage, that journey, that are sick, that are suffering, that are in
bonds, and for their salvation, let us pray to the Lord. Here are
inserted additional rogations for special circumstances. For our
deliverance from all affliction, passion, and want, let us pray to the
Lord. Help us, save us, have mercy on us, and keep us, O God, by
thy grace. Commemorating our most holy, most pure, most blessed
glorious Lady, the God-bearing Ever-virgin Mary, together with all the
Saints, let us commend ourselves, and one another, and all our life
to Christ our God. Response. To thee, O Lord. Exclamation by the
priest. For to thee is due all glory, honour, and Worship, to the
Father, and to the Son, and to the Holy Ghost, now and ever, and to
ages of ages. Response. Amen.
 The little Ectenia.
Again and again in peace let us pray to the Lord. Help us....
Commemorating.... as in the great Ectenia, with a varying
exclamation.
The Ectenia of earnest prayer.
Let us all say with our whole soul, and with our whole mind let us
say, Response. Lord, have mercy. O Lord almighty, O God of our
fathers, we pray thee, hear, and have mercy. Response. Lord, have
mercy. Have mercy upon us, O God, according to thy great mercy,
we pray thee, hear, and have mercy. Response. Lord, have mercy,
three times; and so after the succeeding rogations, the next being for
the Emperor and the Imperial Family, mentioning them by name.
Then the Synod, the Metropolitan, and all sorts and conditions of
men, and those especially for whom the occasion serves are
mentioned, and the Ectenia is concluded by the priest with the
exclamation, For thou art a merciful and man-loving God, and to thee
we ascribe glory, to the Father, and to the Son, and to the Holy
Ghost, now and ever, and to ages of ages. Response. Amen.
The Ectenia of supplication.
Let us fulfil our supplication to the Lord. Response. Lord, have
mercy. Help us, save us, have mercy on us, and keep us, O God, by
thy grace. Response. Lord, have mercy. That the whole day may be
perfect, holy, peaceful, and sinless, let us ask of the Lord. Response.
Vouchsafe, O Lord, and so successively. An angel of peace, a
faithful guide, a guardian of our souls and bodies, let us ask of the
Lord. Pardon and forgiveness of our sins and iniquities, let us ask of
the Lord. What is good and profitable for our souls, and peace for the
world, let us ask of the Lord. That the remaining time of our life may
be accomplished in peace and repentance, let us ask of the Lord. A
christian end of our life, painless, unashamed, peaceful, and a good
answer at the fearful judgment-seat of Christ, let us ask.
Commemorating.... as before written, with an exclamation, or,
Having prayed.... See page 69.
 Epigonation. A lozenge shaped ornament, worn by bishops and
archimandrites, suspended from the girdle and resting upon the
knee. It signifies a spiritual sword, with which the wearers should
defend those committed to their charge.
Epitrachelion. The priest’s stole.
Exapostilarion. A verse said or sung before the psalms of praise
(Psalms cxlviii, cxlix, and cl). Some derive the term from the verse
being sung by one of the clergy who is sent out of his place in the
choir into the middle of the church to sing it; but others from it being
a verse substituting a more ancient series of verses (Lucerns), in
which the Lord is prayed to send forth light unto us.
Hypacoë. A term implying that the verse bearing its name should
be listened to with particular attention.
Icos. A stanza. See Canon.
Idiomelon (pl. Idiomela). A verse that is of its own mode, i.e., one
not composed upon an Irmos, or model.
Irmos (pl. Irmi). See Canon.
Kathisma. A verse during the singing of which it is permitted to sit.
Omophorion. The bishop’s pall.
Orarion. The deacon’s stole.
Phelonion. A vestment or cope.
Prokimenon. A verse, taken from the psalms, sung before the
reading of an appointed epistle. With this is conjoined another verse,
and the mode of saying and singing these is as follows. The reader
says the prokimenon, and the choir repeats the same. Then the
reader says the conjoined verse, and the choir again sings the
prokimenon. Finally the reader says half the prokimenon, and the
choir sings the remaining half.
Sloujébnik. The service book containing the prayers said by the
priest and deacon at Vespers, Matins, and Liturgy.
 Stasis. A subdivision of the psalter. The whole psalter is divided
into twenty sections, and each of these is subdivided into three parts.
[3]

Sticharion. A tunicle.
Stichera. Ecclesiastically composed verses, usually conjoined with
verses selected from the psalms.
Theotokion. A verse addressed to the God-bearing Virgin.
Tone. The ecclesiastical tones are eight in number, and are based
upon the ancient classical modes, namely, the Dorian, Phrygian,
Lydian, and Ionian for tones i to iv, and the minors of these for tones
v to viii. The Slavonic, Greek, and Gregorian tones correspond thus,

Slavonic. Greek. Gregorian.

I. I. I.
II. II. III.
III. III. V.
IV. IV. VII.
V. I minor. II.
VI. II minor. IV.
VII. Grave. VI.
VIII. IV minor. VIII.

Trisagion. The thrice-holy hymn, the words of which are as follow,

Holy God, holy mighty one, holy immortal one, have mercy upon
us, sung three times.
When sung in a more solemn manner at the Liturgy and other
offices before the reading of the epistle and gospel the mode is thus,
Holy God, holy mighty one, holy immortal one, have mercy upon
us. Three times.
Glory to the Father, and to the Son, and to the Holy Ghost, both
now and ever, and to ages of ages. Amen.
Holy immortal one, have mercy upon us.
 (Dynamis.)
Holy God, holy mighty one, holy immortal one, have mercy upon
us.
At Easter, Pentecost, Christmas, and Epiphany, on the day before
Palm Sunday, on Holy Saturday, and at Baptisms, this hymn is
superseded by the following,
As many as have been baptized into Christ have put on Christ.
Alleluia. Three times.
Glory to the Father.... ending, to ages of ages. Amen.
Have put on Christ. Alleluia.
As many as have been baptized into Christ have put on Christ.
Alleluia.
See pages 35 and 167.
Troparion. A verse that is composed (lit. turns) upon a model. See
Canon. The term has also a wider signification, and is used to
indicate the principal commemorative verse for any festival or
occasion, and as such is referred to in the text as “the troparion for
the day.”
 NOTE II.
EXPLANATORY OF ABBREVIATIONS.

The abbreviations found in the text, and not explained in Note i,

are,
I. Blessed be our God....
II. Blessed be the kingdom....
III. Trisagion. O most holy Trinity.... Our Father.... For thine is the
kingdom....
IV. Glory. Both now.
V. The more honourable than the cherubim....
VI. Now dismiss thy servant, O Master.... Pages 11 and 126.
VII. O come, let us worship.... thrice. Pages 46, 83, 123, and 128.
VIII. It is very meet.... Pages 51, 92, and 136.
IX. Alleluia, thrice. Pages 83 and 145.
X. Have mercy upon me, O God.... Page 85.
XI. Holy God.... Pages 138, 141, 164, 169, 220, and 224.
XII. Having seen the resurrection of Christ, we adore.... Pages 166
and 167.
XIII. Blessed art thou, O Lord: O teach me thy statutes. The
angelic counsel was amazed.... Page 167.
XIV. Glory to God in the highest.... Vouchsafe, O Lord.... Page
198.
XV. It is a good thing to give thanks unto the Lord.... Page 207.
XVI. The irmi of the great canon, A help and protection.... Page
208.
XVII. Thou who man-lovingly in depth of wisdom.... We have thee
as a fortress and a haven.... Page 209.
 XVIII. God is the Lord, and hath manifested himself unto us....
Page 225.
XIX. Hear us, O God our Saviour, thou hope of all the ends of the
earth.... Page 238.
XX. Blessed be the name of the Lord.... Page 253.
XXI. Forgive, remit.... Page 11 Appendix.
XXII. And may the mercies.... Pages 11 and 12 Appendix.
These written at length are as follows, the first five being of
frequent occurrence,
I and II. The priest’s initial blessing, Blessed be our God, always,
now and ever, and to ages of ages. Response. Amen. And, Blessed
be the kingdom of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost,
now and ever, and to ages of ages. Response. Amen.
III. Holy God, holy mighty one, holy immortal one, have mercy
upon us, three times. Glory to the Father, and to the Son, and to the
Holy Ghost, both now and ever, and to ages of ages. Amen. O most
holy Trinity, have mercy upon us: O Lord, cleanse our sins: O
Master, forgive our transgressions: visit us. O Holy One, and heal
our infirmities, for thy name’s sake. Lord, have mercy, three times.
Again, Glory to the Father ... ages of ages. Amen. The Lord’s prayer,
ending, deliver us from evil. Priest. For thine is the kingdom, and the
power, and the glory, of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy
Ghost, now and ever, and to ages of ages. Response. Amen.
IV. Glory to the Father, and to the Son, and to the Holy Ghost.
Both now and ever, and to ages of ages. Amen.
V. The more honourable than the cherubim, and incomparably
more glorious than the seraphim, who didst bear without corruption
God the Word, thee, verily the God-bearing one, we magnify.
VI. Nunc Dimittis.
VII. O come, let us worship God our King.
O come, let us worship, and fall down before Christ God, our King.
 O come, let us worship, and fall down before Christ himself, our
King and God.
VIII. It is very meet to bless thee, the God-bearing one, the ever
blessed, the entirely spotless, and the Mother of our God. The more
honourable than the cherubim, and incomparably more glorious than
the seraphim, who didst bear without corruption God the Word, thee,
verily the God-bearing one, we magnify.
IX. Alleluia, alleluia, alleluia, glory to thee, our God. Three times.
X. Psalm 50.
XI. See Trisagion. Note i.
XII. Having seen the resurrection of Christ, we adore the holy Lord
Jesus, who alone is without sin. Thy cross, O Christ, we worship,
and sing and glorify thy holy resurrection; for thou art our God, we
know none other beside thee, we call upon thy name. O come, all ye
faithful, let us adore Christ’s holy resurrection; for by the cross great
joy is come into all the world. Ever blessing the Lord, we sing his
resurrection; for, enduring crucifixion, death by death he overthrew.
XIII. Blessed art thou, O Lord: O teach me thy statutes.
The angelic counsel was amaz’d, seeing thee number’d with the
dead, thee, Saviour, who hast overthrown the might of death, hast
raised Adam with thyself, and freed all from hades.
Blessed art thou, O Lord....
Why, O disciples, do ye mix the myrrh with pitying tears? exclaim’d
the angel standing nigh the grave to them that bore the myrrh. See
ye the grave, and understand; for risen from the grave the Saviour is.
Blessed art thou, O Lord....
They that bore myrrh made haste at early morn lamenting to thy
grave, but an angel stood before them, and he said, The time for
lamentation is gone by, weep not, but tell the resurrection the
apostles.
Blessed art thou, O Lord....