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All The Kingdoms of The World On Radical Religious Alternatives To Liberalism Kevin Vallier Full Chapter
All The Kingdoms of The World On Radical Religious Alternatives To Liberalism Kevin Vallier Full Chapter
All The Kingdoms of The World On Radical Religious Alternatives To Liberalism Kevin Vallier Full Chapter
K E V I N VA L L I E R
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers
the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education
by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University
Press in the UK and certain other countries.
ISBN 978–0–19–761137–1
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197611371.001.0001
Preface ix
2. History 53
3. Symmetry 92
4. Transition 117
5. Stability 165
6. Justice 199
Acknowledgments 277
References 281
Index 297
vii
P R E FA C E
Liberal societies claim to advance human freedom and equality and resist
building social life around a single religion. But today, an opposing clan of
doctrines is on the rise. Call them religious anti-liberalisms. They claim that so-
ciety should recognize a single religion as correct and they reject liberal order
with intensity—and total conviction.
Twentieth-century politics focused more on economic conflict than religious
conflict. Many thought that religion had become a private matter and would fade
away. Yes, fanatics might sometimes intrude into secularized politics, but free
societies would make quick work of these challengers. Sensible people could
safely dismiss anti-liberals as theocrats, bigots, and fascists.
No longer. The twenty-first century has witnessed the revival of faith-infused polit-
ical movements. Consider Russia, India, Poland, Hungary, Turkey, and China. Their
anti-liberalisms sometimes arise from liberal imperialism and colonialism, as we see
in Islam and Hinduism. Christian anti-liberalisms often appear after communism.
Or they develop as a reaction to excessive church-state separation in liberal orders.
My book assesses the truth of these new anti-liberal ideologies. If you want to
understand the case for and against them, this book is for you. I can’t cover every
version of these doctrines. But I show how to assess them without deciding
which religion is true, if any. As a Christian, I see the attractions of these orders,
but I also think highly of liberal society. Radical alternatives to liberalism have
significant weaknesses. So I reject these doctrines, but I do not dismiss them.
Here I focus on the Roman Catholic anti-liberalism known as integralism. But
I also address similar anti-liberal doctrines within Chinese Confucianism and
Sunni Islam. By the book’s end, I will offer you a framework for engaging these
doctrines as a class.
Many people reject my project because they believe it addresses outlier views
with no influence. So let me explain why these doctrines are on the rise, why
they may stick around, and why we should engage them.
ix
Introduction
Religion and Politics as Human Universals
Long ago, the great world religions governed the human race. Their power was
limited only by one another. Hinduism, Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism,
Zoroastrianism (we mustn’t forget the Zoroastrians), Judaism, Christianity, and
Islam created great civilizations that infused human lives with sacredness and
meaning. The great faiths shaped our laws, our morals, and our cultures. They
crafted our art, architecture, and clothes; our homes, our weapons, our food; our
language—even our thoughts.
These doctrinal faiths arose from a universal human tendency to religious
belief. The great evolutionary psychologist Robin Dunbar writes, “For as long
as history has been with us, religion has been a feature of human life. There is
no known culture for which we have an ethnographic or an archeological rec
ord that does not have some religion.”1 Even in today’s secular cultures, many
people remain devout. Nations like the United States, which seem to secularize,
might instead be in the process of rejecting Christian beliefs for a more eclectic
spirituality.
Like religion, politics has been humanity’s constant companion. Like reli-
gion, every society has it. How, then, should we expect average humans to ap-
proach political life? What are their political aspirations and needs, and how do
they articulate their political ideas? For the vast majority of human history, reli-
gion helped answer these questions, and in many places, religion answered them
in full.
Today many see religion as a private affair, but this view is peculiar. If you
think your religion is true, it should of course shape political order. Consequently,
it is more common for religion to be a purely public matter than a strictly private
one. The human default is to form societies that interweave the sacred and the
1
Dunbar 2022, p. xi.
2 All the Kingdoms of the World
secular. Societies that separate faith and politics are the outliers, so where did
these societies come from?
Do not let the United States and Western Europe occlude your vision. Take a
global perspective. You may know that many in Poland and Hungary trade liberal
democracy for illiberal Christian politics. The Soviet Union was once the world’s
leading atheist federation. Today, Russia returns to Orthodox Christianity.
China contains a plurality of the world’s atheists. But Xi Jinping has had to
adopt Maoist methods to control popular religion. He has had to supplement
flagging Marxism with Confucianism. The twenty-first century has seen a dra-
matic revival of Confucian thought.
Muslims have fought secularizing forces for decades, often with stunning
success. Afghanistan and Iran are striking examples. Western liberal hopes for a
“modern” Islam remain unfulfilled. Indeed, some Muslim regimes de-secularize.
Turkey illustrates.
India shocks me. Its elite face a robust challenge from the Hindutva, the
Hindu nationalist movement. One of the world’s most ancient civilizations had
adopted a mix of socialism and liberalism. India proved that Western political
ideas had universal appeal. But today, it returns to ancient political form.
Human religiosity persists, and the many adherents of the great faiths
have renewed their political ambitions. Liberalism alone prevents them from
reconquering politics. A central question for twenty-first-century humanity is
whether liberalism can succeed. Another question is whether it deserves to.
Of course, we must not whitewash liberal history. Beyond their frequent in-
tolerance of religion, liberals have taken up unjust causes—imperialism, coloni-
alism, eugenics, and an indifference to the unborn. But in the main, liberals have
made humans better off. And yet today, liberals no longer inspire. Fewer and
fewer people claim their mantle, and many young people abandon liberalism
for other doctrines. This situation is dire. If we lose liberalism, we may lose its
achievements, and the rapid expansion of freedom, equality, and prosperity may
reverse.
Liberals did not anticipate the challenges that followed the demise of so-
cialism. For centuries many liberals have predicted the end of religion. Or
they comforted themselves with the belief that religion would become private.
Socialism enabled that illusion to endure. But if, as Dunbar argues, religion is
a human universal, liberals face a grave global challenge. They must accept the
permanence of religious belief and accommodate those who would give polit-
ical expression to their faiths. And they must do so while preserving liberalism’s
concrete accomplishments.
To do this, liberals must shed their hostility toward religion. Millions of people
of faith mistrust liberalism, viewing it as a covert but aggressive secularizing ide-
ology. Liberals must dispel this suspicion or discredit themselves.
Robert Frost once said, “A liberal is a person who can’t take his own side in
a quarrel.”2 Nobody says that anymore. But that was the liberal promise: liberal
order should be a diverse and open inquiry into better ways of living together.
Liberals should reclaim intellectual humility and curiosity. They must engage
those eager for liberalism to follow socialism into oblivion.
2
Quoted in Harvey Shapiro, “Story of the Poem,” New York Times, January 15, 1961, p. 2.
Int roduc tion 5
To My Three Audiences
Three groups have expressed interest in my project. The first group, liberals,
might anticipate a horror story. After all, I claim that anti-liberal views are defen-
sible and on the rise. Please don’t read the text this way. I write to make religious
anti-liberalisms more comprehensible.
3
Holmes 1993, p. 3.
4
Defenses include Waldstein (2016a), Pink (2018a), and Crean and Fimister (2020). For
overviews of the position, see Schwartzman and Wilson (2019) and Brungardt (2020).
5
Vallier 2019; Vallier 2020.
6 All the Kingdoms of the World
Today some people call themselves “postliberals” because they reject liberal
values, though most accept liberal institutions such as constitutional democracy.
Some postliberals cast about for an alternative, finding none.6 They’re searching
for other options and doubt people with confident answers. They are not yet
enemies of liberal order. They’re merely on the fence.
Postliberals will find herein an assessment of radical religious alternatives to
liberalism. I write to help postliberals assess these alternatives. But I also hope to
dissuade them from opposing liberal institutions. Religious anti-liberals, again,
face profound intellectual difficulties. If my arguments succeed, postliberals may
conclude that liberalism is worth another look—or a first look.
Finally, I write to religious anti-liberals themselves. As noted, these groups
often support an extensive state that adopts one of the great religions and shapes
people to fit within that faith. Anti-liberals seek to alter or abolish liberal orders,
and they oppose all liberal political and ethical theories. They are wrong to do so.
Since I focus on integralism, some readers may wonder whether this book is
for them. I insist that it is. By examining integralism, readers can understand re-
ligious anti-liberalisms, so I encourage liberals and postliberals to stick around.
You won’t regret it. Integralism generates all manner of puzzles—philosophical,
theological, political, economic, and legal. You will enjoy trying to solve them.
I don’t know anyone who finds the view boring once they understand it.
And while integralism is the least influential of the three theologies I examine,
a new integralist movement is growing in the United States, and its unusual
proponents have gained remarkable notoriety. Some of you are here because you
want to read about them. I won’t disappoint you in that either: I tell their story
in Chapter 1.
Structure
After introducing the integralists and integralism in Chapter 1, I offer two
arguments on their behalf. First, I review integralism’s respectable historical
lineage. I develop this history argument in Chapter 2. My second argument on
integralism’s behalf contrasts integralism with the new natural law theory, its
closest philosophical and political competitor.7 Natural law theorists believe
6
Postliberals are diverse. They include followers of Leo Strauss, Protestant postliberals such as
Stanley Hauerwas, Anglo-Catholics such as John Milbank, Eastern Orthodox writers such as Rod
Dreher, and political scientist Adrian Pabst (see Pabst 2021).
7
New natural law theorists include Germain Grisez, John Finnis, Joseph Boyle, and Robert
P. George.
Int roduc tion 7
that governments should promote natural goods such as health and education
but not spiritual goods such as salvation. The integralist disagrees: governments
should treat these goods more symmetrically. Integralists have a point, which
I develop into the symmetry argument in Chapter 3.
I then critique integralism, beginning with the main plan for reaching
integralism—integration from within. I show that integration from within
requires the violation of Catholic moral teaching. I also claim that integralism
serves as a poor guide for social reform because it leads strategists in the wrong
direction. This transition argument occupies Chapter 4. It addresses the most ob-
vious objection to integralism—its manifest infeasibility.
Most readers will reject integralism if it cannot guide social change. But
others want an ideal that inspires them, however impractical it proves to be. We
may figure out how to reach integralism one day (this argument goes), so we
must prepare. To address these integralists, I analyze integralism as a pure ideal.
Integralists say their ideal is a stable regime: a just and moral peace. But this
is not so. Integralists justify their ideal by arguing that the fall injures our minds.
Owing to sin, we cannot always distinguish right from wrong. Sinners will de-
scend into profound moral disagreements—Babel born again. So I argue that
integralism predicts disagreement, and future conflicts, that undo integralist
order. The result? Integralist regimes will become repressive or decay into milder
establishmentarian regimes. I defend this stability argument in Chapter 5.
Many will share the moral intuition that integralism is unjust since it allows
governments to restrict religious liberty. The truth is more complex. Integralists
have two inconsistent commitments concerning religious freedom: they oppose
forced baptism, but they permit the state to punish Christians who dissent from
dogma and leave the church. I claim that if justice requires the liberty to enter the
church, it demands the liberty to exit. Chapter 6 develops this justice argument.
Chapter 7 assesses Confucian and Islamic anti-liberalisms. We can also ask
questions about transition, stability, and justice within their theologies. I focus
first on the Confucian constitutionalism of Chinese political theorist Jiang
Qing and then turn to the Islamic Democratic ideal of the Tunisian politician
Rached Ghannouchi. We will see striking similarities between these doctrines
and note their related strengths and weaknesses. I argue that instability plagues
Jiang’s Confucian constitutionalism, whereas Ghannouchi’s Islamic Democracy
contains conflicting norms of justice.
Pink’s Quest
“My soul for De legibus!” I yelled from my Tucson office. It was 2007 and I was
in graduate school, studying philosophy at the University of Arizona, and des-
perate to solve a problem: How should Christians think about the relation-
ship between the good life and obligation? I thought that the philosopher and
Counter-Reformation theologian Francisco Suárez had the answer, but there
was no adequate translation of his work on the matter at that time.
That’s why I had been delighted to learn about a new edition of Suárez’s
work. The book would include most of Suárez’s famous treatise on law, De
legibus. But there were delays. In my youthful impatience, I wanted the editor,
British philosopher Thomas Pink, to hurry up.1
Little did I know that editing De legibus was not Pink’s only project. He was
on a spiritual quest to bring renewal to the Roman Catholic Church.
Surveying the empty husk of Western European Catholicism, Pink wondered
what had gone wrong. What had happened to the Church? As a philosopher
and historian, Pink had an idea. The Church had forgotten who she was, and she
must be reminded. If she could remember, she might be reborn.
What sacred truth required recovery, according to Pink? That the Church is a
political order: the Church creates law and administers grace to secure the salva-
tion of the whole human race. Earthly polities aim to secure the earthly common
good, but the heavenly polity is nobler. It saves souls.
The Church’s salvific mission, then, is both spiritual and political at once.
At minimum, the Church had long demanded independence from earthly
1
Suárez 2015 is the magisterial, eleven-hundred-page final product.
10 All the Kingdoms of the World
Alan Fimister, one of the other leading integralist thinkers, organized the conference. Other
2
integralists were in attendance, such as Fr. Thomas Crean. In some respects, integralism first revived
in Europe.
Catholic Integ ralism and the Integ rali st s 11
relevant. I interviewed many people for this book. Almost all agreed that Pappin
was critical in ensuring that the politically ambitious integralists won out. He
began to manifest serious organizational talent, which he devoted to the cause.
He also made the young community more unstable. In 2016, it shattered.
Many of the young integralists were quite left-wing economically, defending
democratic socialism and Bernie Sanders’s candidacy for the US presidency.
They found Donald Trump repulsive—everything a Catholic should oppose.
Other integralists saw things differently. Trump had the world-historical
power to displace the liberal consensus. If he commanded the American state,
he could energize a new illiberal movement. Indeed, some lauded Trump as a
new Constantine prepared to remake a pagan empire into a Christian one. The
Trumpist integralists converted a group of friends into a radical political faction
dedicated to turning the US government into a Catholic state.
Trump represented, for so many of us, a time for choosing, a turning point
that set us all against one another. He empowered many strange groups, the
integralists foremost among them.
The left-wing integralists, now a minority faction, became despondent: in
their eyes, a once noble project now served dark ends. One told me that the
Trumpist integralists are on a “demonic” path.
I cannot say what the Prince of Darkness is up to, but I can say that the
integralists found a home within the intellectual stew created in 2016. They
would even try to hijack the New Right. This process would amplify when a cer-
tain Harvard law professor entered the Slack conversation, though his initial role
was passive. His time had not yet come.
Meanwhile, the European integralists watched with mixed feelings. The re-
vival of integralism was exciting, but integralism mixed with American right-
wing populism posed real risks. Still, few spoke out, preferring to focus on
intellectual work. I started following the integralist movement in 2017. I found
it amusing, creative, innocuous, and fascinating—I am no disinterested ob-
server!—but I never expected it to grow.
Then 2018 gave integralists a right-wing stage—and they used it. In that year,
Catholic intellectual history and American conservative history collided in the
pages of First Things.
The founder of First Things, Richard John Neuhaus (1936–2009), defended the
position, having come to it slowly. He found allies in Michael Novak (1933–
2017) and George Weigel (1951–). But when leadership changed to R. R. Reno,
the magazine’s approach to liberal order shifted as well.
In February 2018, First Things published Father Romanus Cessario’s book re-
view of Edgardo Mortara’s letters.3 Edgardo, the son of Jewish parents, was born
in the Papal States in the late nineteenth century, during the pontificate of Pius
IX.4 His Catholic caretaker baptized him as an infant when she feared he was
on the brink of death. The law of the Papal States guaranteed a Catholic edu-
cation to every Catholic. Upon learning of Edgardo’s baptism, Pius IX thought
that Edgardo’s parents would raise him Jewish, which would break the law and
deprive Edgardo of a Catholic education. So Pius IX removed Edgardo from his
family.
The Mortaras vigorously and thoughtfully criticized Pius IX’s actions, and
Europe heard them. Pius IX had created an international uproar. But he held
firm, raising Edgardo as his own child. Pius IX provoked those who disagreed
with him, parading the boy in front of foreign diplomats who opposed his
actions. Here is historian Eamon Duffy’s recounting:
Despite this, Edgardo Mortara became a priest, and he died grateful, as his letters
indicate.6
In his book, Cessario defended Pius IX, creating a conflict among First Things’
readership. A few defended the kidnapping. If Pius IX had allowed the Mortaras
to raise their son, they argued, then he would not have become a priest. Pius
IX helped secure Mortara’s salvation. Everyone else cited the manifest evil of
3
Cessario 2018.
4
Tapie (2018) provides a theologically informed review of the case and offers Thomists an op-
portunity to avoid defending Pius IX. If only integralists would take it!
5
Duffy 2014, pp. 289–90.
6
Duffy 2014, p. 290. For the memoir, see Messori (2017). For a compelling case that the memoir
was fraudulently altered, see Kertzer (2018).
14 All the Kingdoms of the World
removing a child from his parents. The promise of salvation cannot legitimize
breaking up a family.7
Another controversy also sprang from First Things’ pages around the same
time. In 2019, a young Iranian-American Catholic, Sohrab Ahmari, published
“Against David French–ism,” which attacked the political principles of the
American conservative David French. Ahmari’s piece exposed the new fault
lines on the political Right. It inspired dozens of conservative think pieces.8
Some followed French in defending “right-liberalism.” Conservatives should
seek political success within the guardrails of liberal democracy, they argued, and
they should pursue a peaceful resolution of the culture war. Ahmari found this
naive: the “woke” left will not rest until the church ceases to exist, he contended.
Religious conservatives have been fools for playing by liberal rules. The Right
must fight fire with fire.
The controversy led to an in-person debate between French and Ahmari.9
French, a trained lawyer, had argued before the Supreme Court. He prepared.
Ahmari, in contrast, did not recognize the intellectual threat posed by his rival.
He floundered. In doing so, he wounded his cause. The New Right would require
more intellectual rigor to justify its existence.
Nonetheless, Ahmari made a critical argument consonant with integralist
thought: societies should orient themselves around the authentic human good,
even if others disagree. The position sounds intuitive. If Catholicism is true, why
not make all institutions Catholic?
French defended liberal order as compatible with Christianity and argued
that Ahmari exaggerated threats from the Left. But Ahmari was young—and in
possession of a certain spirited charisma. His fight had only just begun. To this
day, he claims that the spread of events like Drag Queen Story Hour vindicates
him. He will undoubtedly lead future fights. Even his friends described him
in the New York Times as someone who prefers to respond to conflict with a
“Molotov cocktail.”10
Around the time of this controversy, Ahmari appeared comfortable with
integralism. However, he has said little on its behalf since then, and the term
“integralism” does not appear in his latest book, The Unbroken Thread.11 But he
remains, after Adrian Vermeule, the most famous person associated with the
7
I review the controversy in Vallier (2021b).
8
My favorite balanced response is Anderson and George’s (2019).
9
“Cultural Conservatives: Two Visions Responding to the Post-Liberal Left” (event by the
Institute for Human Ecology, Catholic University of America, September 5, 2019), YouTube video,
1:29:20, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fAG28K0nGAU.
10
Schuessler 2022.
11
Ahmari 2021.
Catholic Integ ralism and the Integ rali st s 15
view. Of course, without Adrian Vermeule, you and I would not be having this
conversation. You may never have heard of integralism, and I may have seen only
a flash in the pan.
12
Vermeule 2018b.
16 All the Kingdoms of the World
13
Vermeule 2018b, p. 2, emphasis added.
14
Holmes 1993, pp. 39–41.
15
In some respects, Vermeule’s movement behaves like new ultramontanism. Ultramontanists
defend enormous papal power. Some insist on the pope’s impeccability (the absence of sin). For a
discussion of the ultramontanist movement, see Duffy (2014, pp. 305–18).
16
For discussion, see Hittinger (2007a, p. 17). Hittinger points out that the condemnation
brought the great French Catholic political thinker and philosopher Jacques Maritain “out of his
slumbers” on political matters.
Catholic Integ ralism and the Integ rali st s 17
The third goal Vermeule achieved was to connect integralism and American
legal philosophy. While Vermeule is one of the world’s premier scholars of
the administrative state, he also works on judicial interpretation.17 American
conservatives think judges should read the Constitution according to its framers’
intent or the text’s plain meaning. Vermeule defends a non-originalist, non-
textualist approach that directs judges to interpret the Constitution according
to the common good.18
“Common good constitutionalism” will create a judiciary more open to reli-
gious establishment. Integralism fits tidily within common good constitution-
alism because it offers an ancient, sophisticated conception of the common good.
Vermeule’s judicial philosophy may become a suitable vehicle for American
integralism, but first he must displace the right-wing consensus.19
Catholics have enormous intellectual influence among right-wing elites: if
integralists can convert them, they can rule. With one US Supreme Court jus-
tice, they can change constitutional law. Justices have spectacular power. Two-
thirds of them are already Roman Catholics.
In my view, Vermeule is building a new anti-liberal elite designed to steer
the New Right. By running a movement, the new elite can assail liberal order.
This emphasis has become quite clear in Vermeule’s new alliance with Deneen.
Vermeule and his allies have transformed the integralist movement. Its fate now
depends on the success of Vermeule’s political plans, his team’s ability to forge
enduring political alliances, and the team’s reputation on social media.
Integralism began as a movement for spiritual renewal, but today it labors
under the yoke of a digital clique in search of political power. Pink, the
movement’s founder, surveyed the decimated Western European Church and
devoted himself to reviving it. Vermeule, the movement’s leader, observes the
decay of American culture and fights to redirect that culture. The contrast is
stark. Pink wants the church to remember; Vermeule wants the church to rule.
Here things stand in 2023. Despite setbacks in the 2022 midterm elections,
the integralists soldier on by offering many on the New Right hope that they
can defeat the Left—not just now, but forever. Their goal is victory, not compro-
mise. Perhaps a new Catholic Christendom can arise from the ashes of doomed
American liberalism.
17
Breyer et al. 2017.
18
Vermeule 2022a.
19
I wrote this paragraph before the ruling in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, which
handed the conservative legal movement the greatest victory of its entire existence, diminishing in-
terest in and motivation for Vermeule’s alternative.
18 All the Kingdoms of the World
Fissures
But fissures within the integralist movement have begun to manifest them-
selves. Many integralists have reservations about Vermeule’s “big government”
integralism; these include Catholic historian Andrew Willard Jones. Jones
argues that integralism is a kind of post-sovereignty theory. Or perhaps it is a
pre-sovereignty theory. The integralist wants, in some sense, to do away with
the state in favor of a feudal order. Father Thomas Crean and theologian Alan
Fimister have their own integralism-based suspicions of the modern state.
Vermeule, Pappin, and others have decided that integralism requires
legitimizing illiberal states, which famously involves normalizing Hungarian
prime minister Viktor Orbán on the American Right. But Vermeule expresses
occasional enthusiasm for the Chinese government as well. Pappin, Ahmari, and
Deneen described China as a “civilizational equal” in the New York Times. Most
integralists know that China is a genocidal, anti-Catholic state, and they recoil
from the association between integralism and the Chinese Communist Party.
Today the integralist movement is led by a tight-knit group focused on polit-
ical strategy. This group includes Vermeule, Pappin, Chad Pecknold, Pat Smith,
and now Deneen. Then there is a much looser confederation without political
ambition but rather interested in integralism as an ideal. This group includes
Pink, Crean, Fimister, Waldstein, and others.
I also already noted the ex-integralists, mainly from the Left. I keep their
names out of these pages, but they include foundational figures in the move-
ment. While they defend aspects of integralism, they see the movement as ir-
redeemable. They think Vermeule, Pappin, and others have made the project so
toxic that they want nothing to do with it.
Strategists include Vermeule, Sohrab Ahmari, Gladden Pappin, Chad Pecknold, and others.
20
The ideal theorists include Pink, Edmund Waldstein, Thomas Crean, and Alan Fimister.
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uiendo su hijo ya en edad
conuenible para ponelle en algun
exerçiçio uirtuoso, teniendo
entendido que la ociosidad en los
moços es maestra de uicios, y
enemiga de virtud determinó
embialle a la academia
Salmantina con intençion que se
exerçitasse en aprender lo que a
los hombres sube a mayor grado
que de hombres, y asi lo puso por
obra. Pues siendo ya quinze años
pasados que su muger era
muerta, saliendo yo un dia con
otras uezinas a un mercado, que
en nuestro lugar se hazia, el
desdichado de Arsenio me uio,
por su mal, y aun por el mio, y de
su desdichado hijo. Esta uista
causó en él tan grande amor,
como de alli adelante se paresció.
Y esto me dió él a entender
muchas uezes, porque ahora en
el campo yendo a lleuar de comer
a los pastores, aora yendo con
mis paños al rio, aora por agua a
la fuente, se hazia encontradizo
conmigo. Yo que de amores aquel
tiempo sabia poco, aunque por
oydas alcançasse alguna cosa de
sus desuariados effectos, unas
uezes hazia que no lo entendia,
otras uezes lo echaua en burlas,
otras me enojaua de uello tan
importuno. Mas ni mis palabras
bastauan a defenderme dél, ni el
grande amor que él tenía le daua
lugar a dexar de seguirme. Y
desta manera se passaron más
de quatro años, que ni él dexaua
su porfia, ni yo podia acabar
conmigo de dalle el mas pequeño
fauor de la uida. A este tiempo
uino el desdichado de su hijo
Arsileo del estudio, el qual entre
otras ciencias que auia estudiado,
auia florescido de tal manera en
la poesia y en la musica, que a
todos los de su tiempo hazia
uentaja.
Su padre se alegró tanto con él
que no ay quien lo pueda
encarecer (y con gran razon)
porque Arsileo era tal, que no solo
de su padre que como a hijo
deuia amalle, mas de todos los
del mundo merescia ser amado. Y
as si en nuestro lugar era tan
querido de los principales dél y
del comun, que no se trataua
entre ellos sino de la discrecion,
gracia, gentileza, y otras buenas
partes de que su mocedad era
adornada. Arsenio se encubria de
su hijo, de manera que por
ninguna uia pudiesse entender
sus amores, y aunque Arsileo
algun dia le viese triste, nunca
echó de uer la causa, mas antes
pensaua que eran reliquias que
de la muerte de su madre le auian
quedado. Pues desseando
Arsenio (como su hijo fuese tan
excelente Poeta) de aver de su
mano vna carta para embiarme, y
por hazer lo de manera que él no
sintiese para quien era, tomó por
remedio descubrirse a un grande
amigo suyo natural de nuestro
pueblo, llamado Argasto,
rogandole muy encaresçidamente
como cosa que para si auia
menester, pidiese a su hijo Arsileo
una carta hecha de su mano, y
que le dixese que era para embiar
lexos de alli a una pastora a quien
seruia, y no le quería aceptar por
suyo. Y asi le dixo otras cosas
que en la carta auia de dezir de
las que más hazian a su
proposito. Argasto puso tan
buena diligencia en lo que le rogó,
que huuo de Arsileo la carta,
importunado de sus ruegos, de la
misma manera que el otro pastor
se la pidió. Pues como Arsenio le
uiese muy al proposito de lo que
él deseaua, tuuo manera cómo
uiniese a mis manos, y por ciertos
medios que de su parte huuo, yo
la recebi (aunque contra mi
uoluntad) y vi que dezia desta
manera.
CARTA DE ARSENIO
Soneto.