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The Syrian Information and Propaganda War The Role of Cognitive Bias Ben Cole Ebook Full Chapter
The Syrian Information and Propaganda War The Role of Cognitive Bias Ben Cole Ebook Full Chapter
Ben Cole
The Syrian Information and Propaganda War
Ben Cole
The Syrian
Information and
Propaganda War
The Role of Cognitive Bias
Ben Cole
University of Liverpool
Liverpool, UK
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Preface
v
vi PREFACE
Mood, the head of the UN observer mission to Syria in 2012, who com-
mented that “whatever I learned on the ground in Syria … is that I should
not jump to conclusions”.3 This was in turn acknowledged by some
Western MSM journalists including Janine Di Giovanni who described the
war for Newsweek as being “the most complex, challenging and cynical
conflict I have covered”.4 Three years into the war, the Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute, observed that because of these
issues “there is no unified, reliable, evidence-based narrative of the con-
flict”.5 It all left British journalist and broadcaster James Harkin, to pon-
der on the challenge of “searching for facts in the fog of Syria’s propaganda
war”.6 We therefore had to assume that everything we were reading about
the war may have been manipulated in some way, which raised the funda-
mental question of whether it was possible to ascertain the reality of events
on the ground in any absolute sense from open source reporting.
The International Crisis Group (ICG), which is one of the few second-
ary sources to fully comprehend the complexity of the situation inside
Syria, explained how the dynamics of the violence during 2011 were
clouded by unreliable claims and counterclaims. It cited one observer who
described the situation on the ground as being “very chaotic on both
sides. On the street, there is the youth and other genuine protesters, but
in some cases you also have foreign agents, fundamentalists, criminals and
the like. On the regime’s side, the various security services don’t necessar-
ily coordinate among each other, and some appear to have armed civilians.
To make matters worse, both sides lie about what is happening on the
ground, each one depicting the other as being solely to blame”.7 We
encountered a similarly confusing situation when we started our work,
with the often mixed and uncorroborated messaging that we provided in
our daily reports posing significant challenges for our analytical colleagues.
Nevertheless, through the process of gathering information we were able
to identify the dynamics of the propaganda war, which in turn enabled us
to understand how best to assess the information we were seeing.
Yet the understanding of the war that our team acquired was often very
different to the reporting that we read and watched from Western govern-
ments and MSM outlets during that period. The root cause of this discon-
nect was their propensity to frame the war in binary terms, as a war of
good revolutionaries fighting for freedom against an evil government,
which was seemingly shaped by a strong pro-opposition or anti-Assad bias.
In actuality, research shows that both the origins of the uprising and the
war itself were far too complex to shoe horn into such a crude binary
PREFACE vii
framework. Other observers of the war also noted this disconnect between
the public discourse on Syria in the West and their personal perceptions of
the reality on the ground. Among them was Stephen Kinzer from the
Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University who took
an anti-interventionist position on the conflict, who suggested that “cov-
erage of the Syrian war will be remembered as one of the most shameful
episodes in the history of the American press”.8
One potential explanation for that disconnect was that a wide range of
opinion formers including academics, journalists, and think tank staff who
should have been striving to produce objective reportage and analysis of
the war allowed themselves, either wittingly or unwittingly, to be drawn
into the propaganda war. Indeed, many secondary sources seemed to
enthusiastically embrace the chance to become players in the war, and
given the tone of some of their rhetoric seemed to became emotionally
invested in the outcome. That underlying bias underpinned what we per-
ceived to be the analytical shortcomings of many primary and secondary
sources.
Those shortcomings led the ICG to conclude in 2011 that “the main-
stream foreign media’s coverage has not clarified the picture. The crude
propaganda and disinformation broadcast and published by official and
semi-official outlets have wholly undermined their credibility”.9 This situ-
ation persisted into the latter years of the war, which prompted British
journalist Patrick Cockburn to suggest in 2017 that “Nearly everything
you have read about Syria and Iraq could be wrong”.10 He argued that “…
in the Syrian case fabricated news and one-sided reporting have taken over
the news agenda … it’s hardly surprising that in a civil war each side will
use whatever means are available to publicise and exaggerate the crimes of
the other, while denying or concealing similar actions by their own
forces”.11
It was therefore unsurprising that these same shortcomings were also
evident amongst the other teams engaged on our projects, among whom
we witnessed an almost routine dismissal of reports which challenged
opposition narratives on the grounds that those reports were simply Syrian
government, Russian or Iranian propaganda. Yet it was apparent that sim-
ply accepting the reporting of pro-opposition sources at face value and
casually dismissing reporting which supported Syrian government narra-
tives, was a deeply flawed approach because activist and pro-opposition
sources had frequently been proven to manipulate their reporting in much
the same ways as Syrian government sources did.
viii PREFACE
For Western journalists, think tank staff and others who are unable to
independently report from inside Syria, their primary mediating filters
include their pre-existing attitudes towards Syria and the Arab Spring, the
institutional biases of their employer, together with the paradigms and
narratives that frame the dominant discourse on the war. It was a similar
situation within Syria, where testimony from both opposition and govern-
ment supporters indicates that the impact of propaganda was mitigated by
a number of mediating factors that included social group membership,
personal knowledge or strongly held attitudes, personal experiences of liv-
ing in Syria both before and during the uprising, and the messaging that
people were receiving from interpersonal contacts with friends and family.
The ICG reported that messaging from interpersonal contacts often
resulted in people hearing contradictory accounts of events, but other
Syrians reported that what they were hearing was consistent with their
own experiences.13 Once they had taken sides in the uprising, people then
became vulnerable to cognitive bias effects in deciding what information
to believe and what to disbelieve. This raises the important question of
whether propaganda has had a major impact in shaping attitudes towards
the war, or whether these mediating factors have largely limited its effect.
Combined, these factors raise question marks over just how accurate
our understanding of the war in Syria actually is, and what impact the
propaganda war has had on it. To understand the war between the Syrian
government and the opposition, it is therefore first necessary to under-
stand the dynamics of the propaganda war. This includes identifying the
various reporting manipulations that are routinely employed by both pri-
mary and secondary sources on both sides of the war, along with how the
dominant paradigms and narratives that frame the dominant public and
political discourse on the war were established and maintained. The start-
ing point for reaching that understanding is an examination of the under-
lying structure and drivers of the propaganda war.
Notes
1. Teresa Salvadoretti, The role of social media in the Syrian Crisis, Asfar,
http://www.asfar.org.uk/the-role-of-social-media-in-the-syrian-crisis/.
2. Tuman, J.S. (2003) Communicating Terror: The Rhetorical Dimensions of
Terrorism, London: Sage, 116 & 135.
x Preface
3. In Syria, this is no plan for peace, Patrick Seale, the Guardian, 27 May
2012, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/may/27/
syria-no-plans-peace.
4. Inside Syria’s Propaganda Wars, Janine di Giovanni, Newsweek, 24
December 2016, http://www.newsweek.com/syria-propaganda-
aleppo-assad-536003.
5. Measuring conflict incidence in Syria, Sipri Yearbook 2015, https://www.
sipriyearbook.org/view/9780198712596/sipri-9 780198712596-
chapter-2-div1-2.xml.
6. James Harkin, What Happened in Douma? Searching for facts in the fog of
Syria’s Propaganda War, the Intercept, 9 February 2018, https://theinter-
cept.com/2019/02/09/douma-chemical-attack-evidence-syria/.
7. Popular Protest In North Africa And The Middle East (VII): The Syrian
Regime’s Slow-Motion Suicide, International Crisis Group, Middle East/
North Africa Report N°109, 13 July 2011, https://www.crisisgroup.org/
middle-east-north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/syria/popular-protest-
north-africa-and-middle-east-vii-syrian-regime-s-slow-motion-suicide.
8. The media are misleading the public on Syria, Boston Globe, 18 February
2016, https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2016/02/18/the-
media-a re-m isleading-p ublic-s yria/8YB75otYirPzUCnlwaVtcK/
story.html.
9. Popular Protest In North Africa And The Middle East (VII): The Syrian
Regime’s Slow-Motion Suicide, International Crisis Group, Middle East/
North Africa Report N°109—13 July 2011.
10. This is why Everything You’ve Read About The Wars In Syria and Iraq
Could be Wrong, the Independent, 2 December 2016, https://www.inde-
pendent.co.uk/voices/syria-aleppo-iraq-mosul-isis-middle-east-conflict-
assad-war-everything-youve-read-could-be-wrong-a7451656.html.
11. Patrick Cockburn, Who supplies the news?, London Review of Books, Vol.
39, No. 3, 2 February 2017, https://www.lrb.co.uk/v39/n03/patrick-
cockburn/who-supplies-the-news.
12. Beware the ‘trusted’ source, ABC (Australia), 16 May 2011, https://www.
abc.net.au/mediawatch/episodes/beware-the-trusted-source/9974294.
13. Popular Protest In North Africa And The Middle East (VII): The Syrian
Regime’s Slow-Motion Suicide, International Crisis Group, Middle East/
North Africa Report N°109—13 July 2011; personal communication with
@WithinSyriaBlog. 27 December 2020; Personal communication from @
iadtawil, 11 January 2020.
Acknowledgements
xi
Contents
4 Assad Is Sectarian119
8 Syria Is Secular267
10 Business as Usual339
xiii
xiv Contents
11 Limited Effects361
Index409
Abbreviations
xv
xvi ABBREVIATIONS
confidently asserted that “the incident certainly is not the first time that
pro-Assad gunmen have targeted children”. Journalists also used Twitter
to make similar claims. Vinnie O’Dowd who has worked for Channel 4
and Al Jazeera tweeted “Syrian Regime Targets kids”, while Liz Sly of the
Washington Post tweeted that “boy rescues girl from shooting in Syria.
And the soldiers keep shooting”. Those tweets were consistent with a
now-deleted tweet from an official State Department Twitter account
which also blamed the SAA.
It could be argued that the experiment highlighted the difficulty of
identifying genuine war videos from fake ones, yet the BBC was sceptical
enough to report that its authenticity was being questioned.2 Instead, the
real issue was that the video became part of the propaganda war, which
generated powerful cognitive bias effects amongst those who viewed it.
Western journalists believed that the video was genuine because it had
gone viral, it had been uploaded by what they considered to be a reliable
Syrian source, it was consistent with the paradigms and narratives that
framed the dominant discourse on the war, and it was consistent with their
personal beliefs about the war. They then sought verification from “inde-
pendent experts” who they considered to be reliable, but who actually
shared the same anti-Syrian government bias as they did, which then led
them to ignore those actors who correctly identified it as a fake.
The fact that it proved so easy to deceive MSM journalists, “indepen-
dent experts”, and activists should have given pause for thought, but those
concerned reacted by de-legitimising the experiment itself. In an open
letter they condemned Klevberg for deliberately deceiving them,3 eventu-
ally forcing him to apologise. In doing so they effectively deflected atten-
tion away from the journalistic failings the experiment had exposed,
enabling those concerned to carry on working in exactly the same way as
they had before. Yet the fact remained that the experiment had highlighted
legitimate issues concerning faked videos, cognitive bias, and the robust-
ness of journalistic practices in handling primary source material, which
are central to both the conduct, outcome and impacts of the propa-
ganda war.
narratives which frame the dominant discourse on that issue. Those para-
digms and narratives are essentially stories that explain the issue in crude
and often emotive terms, and serve as a framework to interpret and analyse
events. The principal actors in the propaganda war then use their influence
to build social networks around those paradigms and narratives as a means
to engage more minor actors with the issue.
Within each state, the dominant discourse on any given issue is estab-
lished by the principal actors of the dominant power structure that has
formed to fight the propaganda battle on that particular issue. These
power structures consist of three broad layers: an inner core, an outer
core, and a periphery. The inner core consists of governments, the infor-
mation resources they directly control, and the other actors they fund.
This core constitutes a homogeneous network which acts in a unified fash-
ion to promote the dominant discourse. The outer core consists of actors
who are typically true believers in the dominant discourse, some of whom
have close connections with actors in the inner core but generally act inde-
pendently of it. The periphery consists of networks of actors who believe
in and propagate the dominant discourse but have no direct connections
to the inner core. Some of these actors may also have cross membership
with the dominant power structures in other states, making them incred-
ibly useful for governments seeking to influence audiences in other
countries.
In Western states, these structures are not homogeneous. Only govern-
ments can be considered permanent members, whilst actors in the outer
core and periphery have the freedom to reject a dominant discourse and
leave the structure. Belief in the dominant discourse is naturally strongest
amongst the actors in the inner and outer cores, but there will always be
actors in both the outer core and periphery whose belief in the dominant
discourse is potentially frangible, and are therefore capable of being influ-
enced by propaganda. This means that the inner core is unable to directly
control the outputs of all the other actors within their respective power
structures. Instead, they have to use their influence to set the rules and
behavioural norms which dictate the way that the other actors engage with
the dominant discourse.
Within each state, the dominant discourse on any subject is generally
challenged by a similar but weaker countervailing power structure pro-
moting an alternative discourse. In respect of Western states and the Syrian
propaganda war, these countervailing power structures comprise loose
networks of actors which can be crudely described as being
4 B. COLE
despite the halo effect generated by their humanitarian work, these actors
need to be treated as having a bias.
The horns effect is the exact opposite of the halo effect, and occurs
when people allow an undesirable trait of something or somebody to neg-
atively influence their evaluation of everything related to that subject or
person. This is particularly apparent in respect of the portrayal of the
Syrian Government and those that support it, in the dominant discourse
of Western states. Actors in the dominant power structures of Western
states consider the Syrian government to be a brutal dictatorship and
therefore routinely treat information provided by it and its supporters as
fabricated propaganda.14
Halo and horns effects were apparent in the MSM reporting of the
Klevberg experiment. The widespread pro-opposition bias amongst
Western journalists meant that the rebels routinely benefitted from a halo
effect due to their depiction as heroic freedom fighters, whilst the Syrian
army routinely suffered from a horns effect due to its depiction as the
agent of a brutal dictatorship. Consequently, when journalists viewed the
video, they considered that it was most likely to have been Syrian army
snipers who were shooting at the children. This bias was then perpetuated
by them seeking corroboration of the video from individuals or organisa-
tions who shared the same pro-opposition bias as they did, and excluding
the views of the pro-Syrian government social media sources who cor-
rectly identified it as a fake. This tendency to search for, interpret, or
favour information that support one’s pre-existing beliefs or values is
known as confirmation bias, and the corresponding tendency to reject
information which does not support one’s pre-existing beliefs or values is
known as belief perseverance.
These cognitive biases are strengthened by the internal dynamics of the
groups that the actors in the propaganda war belong to. Networks of
actors act as loosely affiliated groups and exhibit many of the same dynam-
ics as more tightly-knit groups, including expectations about how mem-
bers should and should not act. The very fact of belonging to a group
leads people to consciously adjust their behaviour and attitudes to those
exhibited by the other members of the group, partly as a result of observ-
ing the negative consequences when someone deviates from those norms.15
So when an individual adopts a role in one of these networks, they will to
some extent conform to the behaviour and opinions presented by other
group members. Individuals conform to group norms in two ways. The
first is through informational influence processes, by which the individual
8 B. COLE
wants to be correct in what they do or say, and to understand the right way
to think or act. The second is normative influence processes, by which the
individual wants to be liked, approved of, and accepted by others in the
group.16
The most prominent example of conformity bias in the Syrian propa-
ganda war is groupthink, which is the tendency for a group to filter out
undesirable input so that a consensus may be reached and then main-
tained. Groups are vulnerable to groupthink when they embrace a collec-
tive desire to maintain a shared viewpoint or discourse. This is exactly what
the networks of actors on both sides of the Syrian propaganda war seek to
promote, and as a result they exhibit a number of symptoms of group-
think. The first is collective rationalisation, whereby group members dis-
credit information that does not fit their collective bias and fail to
reconsider their position when confronted with information that contra-
dicts their bias. The second is a belief in the inherent morality of their
position, and the dismissal of evidence that does not fit their collective bias
on those grounds. The third is the adoption of stereotyped views of out-
groups, negatively labelling them in order to avoid having to address spe-
cific challenges they present. The fourth is the application of social pressure
on dissenters within the group to support the collective viewpoint. The
fifth is self-censorship, whereby members of the group do not voice doubts
or share information that contradicts the groupthink. The sixth is the role
of self-appointed “mind guards” who are key members of the group who
protect or insulate the group from contradictory information.17 Once a
groupthink mentality is established it is extremely difficult to break down
because individuals experience strong pressures to conform in order to
ensure their continued membership of the group.
This effect can be argued to exert a particularly powerful influence on
MSM journalists whose jobs and reputations might be at stake if their
reporting challenges the groupthink within their respective outlets.18
Groupthink has been particularly apparent in respect of CNN, whose
reporting has been framed entirely within the dominant discourse on the
war. However, the level of bias and groupthink exhibited by CNN is rare.
Other Western MSM outlets have tended to frame the majority of their
reporting within the dominant discourse, but still publish or broadcast at
least some reports which challenge it. Even then though, the effects of
groupthink are apparent in the widespread unwillingness of individual
journalists to really champion an alternative discourse. Amongst UK MSM
outlets it is noticeable that the most persistent critics of the dominant
1 PROPAGANDA: POWER AND BIAS 9