A F R I CA POL ICY BR IE F

SUDANS WORKING GROUP

A PR I L 20 24

PART 3

How to engage
Sudanese civilians
in security sector
reform negotiations?
Photo: Victor Maschek/Shutterstock.com
INTRODUCTION
The Wilson Center’s Sudans Working Group (SWG) is conducting a four-part discussion series
designed to ensue a diverse range of Sudanese civilian voices are taken into consideration by
the United States and other key external actors as they develop and implement policies
regarding Sudan. The third session focused on the issue of security sector reform (SSR).

The ostensible trigger for the outbreak of hostilities between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and
the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) on April 15, 2023, was disagreement about the nature and
timing of merging Sudan’s two legally constituted armed forces. SSR was one of five issues left
for further negotiation when a “Framework Agreement” was being negotiated in December
2022, between the SAF, RSF and civilian representatives led by the Forces for Freedom and
Change (FFC) for creation of a new transitional government. With neither the SAF nor the RSF
in a position to “win” the now year-old civil war, any negotiated peace will need to address the
issue of security sector reform. Given the major, long-standing role the security forces,
especially the SAF, have played in the politics and economy of Sudan, SSR in the Sudanese
context will be more complicated than a force integration/force reorganization matter. Sudan’s
citizens thus have legitimate interests, like nature of the economy, budgetary priorities and
balancing human versus state security, that warrant their having a meaningful role in SSR
negotiations. As one of the April 2 session speakers said, SSR must be guided by a political and
national agenda, not a purely military one.

WHAT ARE THE MAJOR STUMBLING BLOCKS TO MEANINGFUL SSR IN

SUDAN AND HOW MIGHT THEY BE OVERCOME?
Even from a strictly military organizational perspective, there is currently a wide gap in starting points. It will
be difficult for the SAF and its political backers to back down from their current position that calls for the
disarmament and disbandment of the RSF with possible integration of individual RSF members into the SAF. On
the other hand, RSF leader Hemedti wants the RSF to retain some sort of independent identity under its own
commanders, as the RSF is his base of power for securing wealth and a desired future political role. Civilians
should not consider force reorganization as a purely military matter because how reorganization is done will
have a critical bearing on sustainability of the reorganization – and thus on peace – and on the security
sector’s future claims on budget resources, its role in the economy and its role in politics. Sudan could learn from
other countries’ approaches to force restructuring/integration. These run the gamut from total demobilization
and force reconstruction, to continuation of unit identity but with an integrated general staff, to integration of
personnel from existing units into new integrated units.

Beyond the military organizational perspective lay the broader and more fundamental issues of military
ownership of economic assets, which both SAF (and its Islamist/National Congress Party backers) and the RSF
will strongly resist ceding, justice for atrocities and other war crimes, and the role of security actors in politics and
governance. Sudanese civilians would be wise to prioritize establishing a process via a transitional government
that will separate security from politics/governance under a new constitution that would require someone to be
a politician or a military leader but not both. Second, Sudanese civilians should accept that military divestment of
economic holdings should be an agreed process rather than an event. They will need leverage to secure military
divestment of economic assets. Perhaps here they might use the nature of transitional justice to be agreed in a
broader peace and agreement as such leverage. While civilians should not give up insisting on accountability, the
type of such accountability can be made either more or less attractive to the generals whose cooperation is
needed for peace.

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Part 3 | April 2024
Recommendations
• Help civilian actors working for peace to better understand the complexities of SSR by convening a
workshop where SSR models from other countries can be presented options for modifying them to meet
Sudan’s circumstances can be discussed. An informed and united civilian position on SSR would enhance
civilian effectiveness in SSR negotiations.

• Signal to SAF, RSF and some of their key external backers that we would be prepared to engage with a
security architecture that accepts civilian control, separates participation in politics from participation in the
military/security services, agrees a clear even if gradual divestment of economic assets to civilian control,
and abides by a process of transitional justice agreed among Sudanese.

• Help prepare Sudan for transition of economic assets to civilian control by working with civilian groups now
to plan for how such economic assets/entities/firms should be restructured (privatized, state-run) and how,
so that they remain viable and not fall into the hands of a narrow oligarchy.

• Consult with key regional actors to understand what role they might seek to play in either advancing or
retarding military divestment of economic interests.

HOW TO PERSUADE THE SECURITY INSTITUTIONS’ LEADERS THAT

SSR IS A FUNDAMENTAL NATIONAL CONCERN AND THUS CIVILIAN
INTERESTS MUST BE HEARD AND TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT?
The 2019-21 transitional government’s attempts via the “Dismantling Committee” to wrest control of economic
assets from the former regime (National Congress Party) and the military was an important proximate cause of
the October 2021 coup. Both SAF (and its NCP backers) and RSF leadership felt threatened and thus overcame
their competing interests to stop efforts to expose and take over their economic assets – estimated to be over
40% of economic activity.1 Sudan’s security establishment has thrived on opaque budgets and rents from
economic activities well beyond just military-related industries (e.g., weapons production). To date, the generals
have shown little interest in the welfare of the Sudanese people as shown by their impeding desperately needed
humanitarian assistance. Civilian peace advocates maty well need to offer assurances up front to the security
leaders that the security budget will be jointly agreed during the transitional period, that certain perks (officers
clubs, education allowances, etc.) will be continued, that certain economic assets controlled by the military will
not be affected during the transition and that security officials can participate in politics in the future under
certain conditions. This is a bitter pill for many civilians in Sudan, but it reflects the reality that SSR is going to
be a 10 to 20-year process. It will take that long for a new cadre of security leaders inculcated in the notion of
civilian control of the military takes hold.

Recommendations
• Encourage civilian peace groups to be realistic about the timeline for real SSR and encourage them to think
through and agree on the concessions and conditions to be attached to them in order to convince the
security leaders to start on a path of meaningful SSR.

• Offer civilian peace groups technical advice/assistance on the complexities and pitfalls of SSR. Share
experiences from other countries where democratic civilian governments have gained control over
dominant militaries (Ghana and Chile are two examples).

• Engage the security leaders on SSR – the political and economic as well as force restructuring issues.

1 Mahdi Berair

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WHERE DO SSR NEGOTIATIONS FIT INTO OVERALL PEACE
NEGOTIATIONS?
Over the past year, the focus of most civilian and external actors has been to secure a ceasefire, humanitarian
access and beginning of political negotiations to establish a new transitional government. Where does SSR fit in?
Should it be part of the ceasefire negotiations, negotiations about forming a transitional government or left for
the transitional government to deal with? The 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan
(ARCSS) deferred security arrangements (i.e., SSR) for subsequent negotiation; the agreement collapsed within a
year. However, as the SAF and RSF are far apart on the disposition of the others forces, trying to include SSR will
complicate/prolong ceasefire negotiations. At what point are other armed groups, those supporting the SAF or
RSF as well as those remaining neutral, brought into SSR negotiations? An approach dealing only with SAF and
RSF may not be acceptable or even practical for other groups, at least not now. For example, it is hard to see
Abdulaziz al-Hilu and Abdul Wahid finding any SSR process acceptable until their political objectives are met in
broader governance negotiations. Finally, it is important to signal up front whether a traditional disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process will receive external funding if it is judged to be a feasible option
as part of SSR.

Recommendations
• Begin discussion now with civilian peace groups and security leaders about sequencing of discussion of
various aspects of SSR.

• Engage SAF, RSF and other armed groups to build political will to pursue SSR by addressing their fears and
managing expectations.

• Set clear expectations regarding DDR funding possibilities and agree on modalities for cooperation with
external partners on SSR issues.

• Engage leaders of other armed groups to elicit their thinking on sequencing of SSR discussions and elicit
their views on future force integration or demobilization options.

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The Sudans Working Group

The Sudans Working Group (SWG) engages US, African, and international policymakers and stakeholders
in inclusive and forward-leaning policy dialogue aimed at advancing the prospects for peace, security, and
development between and within Sudan and South Sudan. The SWG serves as a space for key stakeholders
to share analyses and perspectives and provide policy options for addressing critical issues related to the two
countries. The SWG is currently co-chaired by Ambassador Nureldin Satti and Ambassador Donald E. Booth.

The Africa Program

The Africa Program works to address the most critical issues facing Africa and US-Africa relations, build
mutually beneficial US-Africa relations, and enhance knowledge and understanding about Africa in the
United States.

The Middle East Program

The Wilson Center’s Middle East Program serves as a crucial resource for the policymaking community
and beyond, providing analyses and research that helps inform U.S. foreign policymaking, stimulates public
debate, and expands knowledge about issues in the wider Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.

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