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This article represents a first systematic attempt to compare the institutional histories of
the regional human rights systems in Europe, the Americas, and Africa. It argues that the
three main regional human rights systems have enacted common scripts that have produced
relatively similar institutional models across the regions under scrutiny. This is not to deny,
however, the enormous variation among the systems; nor is it to deny the role of local social
and political contexts in shaping them. Rather, the analysis seeks precisely to identify both
the common institutional scripts and the regional particularities to render the general history
of regional human rights courts and commissions—a key component of the larger history of
human rights that has been largely overlooked in current debates. We argue that the dynam-
ics of the Cold War initially shaped the bounds within which actors in each region came to
realize, re-shape, and re-signify common institutional scripts.
1. Introduction
Regional human rights have been heralded as one of the greatest innovations of interna-
tional law of the twentieth century.1 And yet, the broader debate on the history of human
rights has paid surprisingly little attention to regional human rights systems, thereby
missing some of the most salient strands of the larger history. This article represents a
first systematic attempt to compare the institutional histories of the regional human
rights systems in Europe, the Americas, and Africa. It reveals how the regional rights
systems’ evolution has been shaped in part by the same geopolitical dynamics, and how,
in many ways, they have explicitly and implicitly worked in t andem, linked by common
2
See, e.g., Moyn who pays very little attention to the early European and American human rights systems
and when he does he tends to belittle them. S. Moyn,The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (2010). And
see S. Jensen, The Making of International Human Rights: The 1960s, Decolonization, and the Reconstruction
of Global Values (2016) (rescuing the Global South contribution, but emphasizing the United Nations
alone).
3
For such an institutional approach to regional (economic) courts, see K. J. Alter, The Global Spread of
European Style International Courts, 35 W. Eur. Pol. 135 (2012).
4
S. Merry, Human Rights and Gender Violence: Translating International Law into Local Justice (2006).
5
Although we do not adopt a critical legal studies (CLS) perspective, our approach resonates with the
third world approaches to international law, as well as recent and emerging accounts of the history of
international law in Latin America and elsewhere. See, e.g., M. Mutua & A. Anghie, What Is TWAIL? 94
Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (Am. Soc’y Int’l L.) 31 (2000); M. A. Glendon, The Forgotten Crucible: The
Latin American Influence on the Universal Human Rights Idea, 16 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 27 (2003).
138 I•CON 16 (2018), 136–160
The general argument underpinning our approach is that no single actor, state, or
region can claim sole authorship of international or regional human rights. This has
historic reasons: at the time of the genesis of all three systems, the repertoire of ideas
and concepts from which they drew had already emerged in both legal and political
6
See, e.g., J. Winter & A. Prost, Rene Cassin and Human Rights—From the Great War to the Universal
Declaration (2013).
7
See, e.g., J. W. Meyer, J. Boli, G. M. Thomas, & F. O. Ramirez, World Society and the Nation-State, 103 Am.
J. Soc. 144 (1997).
8
See, e.g., M. R. Madsen, The Challenging Authority of the European Court of Human Rights: From Cold War
Legal Diplomacy to the Brighton Declaration and Backlash, 79 Law & Contemp. Probs. 141 (2016).
Between universalism and regional law and politics 139
politics: each region was positioned differently vis-á-vis the USA and the USSR, and
thus each struck a unique balance between judicialization and other forms of human
rights work, and each forges new institutions and working methods. Section 4 points
to a relative convergence in the practices and challenges facing the regional systems
9
For an overview, see S. L. Hoffmann, Human Rights in the Twentieth Century: A Critical History (2011).
10
Glendon, supra note 5, at 31. See also K. Sikkink, Latin American Countries as Norm Protagonists of the Idea
of International Human Rights, 20 Global Governance 389 (2014).
11
Gros Espiell, La Declaración Americana de los Derechos y Deberes del Hombre. Raíces conceptuales y politicas en
la historia, la filosofía, y el derecho Americano,” Número Especial, Revista Instituto Interamericano de Derechos
Humanos 41, 49 (1989). Originally it was to be called the Declaration of the International Rights and
Duties of Man. Only later did its name come to reflect the regional, as opposed to universal, aspiration. Id.
12
The Inter-American Juridical Committee had been created in 1943 by the Third Meeting of Consultation
of Ministers of External Relations (Rio de Janeiro, 1942).
140 I•CON 16 (2018), 136–160
a motion to take notice of the Universal Declaration project. However, Hector Gros
Espiell’s study of the Bogotá meeting concludes that “there were few amendments
approved in Bogotá that were based on the United Nations project.”13 Conversely,
historians of the Universal Declaration emphasize the influence of Latin American
13
Supra note 11 at 46 (translated by authors).
14
J. Morsink, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting, and Intent (1999). See also
Glendon, supra note 5, at 31.
15
D. Forsythe, Human Rights, the United States and the Organization of American States, 13 Hum. Rts. Q. 66, 76
(1991).
16
Id. at 77.
17
Suggestions for a Western option or alternative date back further and include suggestions for both North
Atlantic alliances and European federalism. See, e.g., A. W. B. Simpson, Human Rights and the End of Empire:
Britain and the Genesis of the European Convention 558 (2004).
Between universalism and regional law and politics 141
even if the ECHR was presented as mainly codifying existing national practices,18 it
found its inspiration in the UDHR and there was no attempt to deviate too much from
this common script.
Yet, the ECHR was also different. The Convention, which came a few years later
18
Id.
19
See, e.g., M. R. Madsen, From Cold War Instrument to Supreme European Court: The European Court of Human
Rights at the Crossroads of International and National Law and Politics, 32 Law & Soc. Inquiry 137 (2007).
142 I•CON 16 (2018), 136–160
and the court’s jurisdiction in 1966. That meant that access to Strasbourg was tightly
restricted during the height of the decolonization process: the only path was for
another Convention state to bring Britain before the Commission, and although this
did happen in the Cyprus case discussed below, there were no other examples of the
20
We thank Frans Viljoen for this point. See also K. Vasak, The European Convention of Human Rights Beyond
the Frontiers of Europe, 12(4) Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 1206 (1963).
21
The argument is developed in detail in M. R. Madsen, La Genèse de L’Europe des Droits de L’Homme: Enjeux
Juridiques et Stratégies d’Etat (France, Grande-Bretagne et Pays Scandinaves, 1945–1970) (2010).
Between universalism and regional law and politics 143
rights institutions eventually developed a more legal approach tailored to the main
structural constraints of the period—Cold War and decolonization—an approach best
described as “legal diplomacy.” This allowed the system to very gradually institution-
alize and create its legal tools which subsequently, during the détente of world politics
22
D. Zovatto, Antecedentes de la Creación de la Corte Interamerican de Derechos Humanos, in La Corte
Interamericana de Derechos Humanos. Estudios y documentos 209 (1999).
23
Id.
24
Forsythe, supra note 15, at 80.
144 I•CON 16 (2018), 136–160
It took a political crisis in the late 1950s to open the way for the creation of the
Inter-American Commission. The Dominican Republic’s meddling in Venezuelan
affairs alarmed Venezuela’s allies, triggering the OAS into action. In its statements
to the OAS, Venezuela raised the Trujillo government’s violation of domestic human
25
Final Act, Fifth Meeting of Consulation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Santiago, Chile, Inter-Am. C.H.R.,
OAS Doc. OEA/Ser. C?11.5 at 3 (1960), cited in R. Goldman, History and Action: The Inter-American Human
Rights System and the Role of the Inter-Amrercan Commission on Human Rights, 31 Hum. Rts. Q. 856, 862
(2009).
26
Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, adopted May 25, 1960, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/
SEr.L/V/I.1 (1960) art. 9.
27
Forsythe, supra note 15, at 82. This abstention came despite the fact that the USA successfully opposed
allowing the new Commission to hear individual complaints.
28
C. Medina, The Battle of Human Rights: Gross, Systematic Violations and the Inter-American System 75
(1988).
29
The Commission’s first two country reports both focused on Cuba. Available at http://www.oas.org/en/
iachr/reports/country.asp. It is interesting to note, further, that until the 1974 report on Chile, all the
country reports focused on smaller states in Central America and the Caribbean.
30
P. W. Kelly, Sovereign Emergencies: Latin America and the Making of Global Human Rights Politics 5 (forth-
coming 2018).
31
Medina, supra note 28, at 75.
Between universalism and regional law and politics 145
In this way, the Commission incrementally claimed the power to conduct in-country
visits (with state consent) and write reports on conditions in countries of its choosing;
to assign rapporteurships; and to conduct good offices and mediation. It even began to
accept individual petitions,32 although it soon ran up against the limits of a case sys-
32
Id., ch. 6.
33
T. Farer, The Rise of the Inter-American Human Rights Regime: No Longer a Unicorn, Not Yet an Ox, 19(3)
Hum. Rts. Q. 529 (1997).
34
Medina, supra note 28..
35
Kelly, supra note 30.
36
Farer, supra note 33, at 512.
37
Forsythe, supra note 15, at 84.
38
Kelly, supra note 30, at 14–15.
39
See infra. Section 3.2
40
F. Gonzalez, Sistema Interamericano de Derechos Humanos (2013).
146 I•CON 16 (2018), 136–160
in which the Commission was created, the Inter-American Committee of Jurists41 was
charged with writing a binding human rights Convention which provided for the cre-
ation of a court. Although a draft was ready within the year, it was not presented to the
OAS until an Inter-American Conference in 1965.42 The American Convention was
41
The IACJ was created by the OAS Charter to assist with the codification of international law. See G. Pope
Atkins, Encyclopedia of the Inter-American System 241 (1997).
42
It had been scheduled to be presented in 1961, but that meeting was canceled after the Bay of Pigs
debacle. See Goldman, supra note 25, at 863.
43
Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, in force July
18, 1978, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, at Chapter VIII.
44
This is the level at which the United States, Canada, Venezuela, and several Caribbean states currently
participate in the IAS.
Between universalism and regional law and politics 147
smaller states. The Court began operating only in 1959, after the Federal Republic
of Germany and seven smaller states had accepted its jurisdiction. Notably, the three
major European powers of France, the UK, and Italy were absent. This meant that
both the Commission and the Court not only had to develop European human rights
45
Greece v. United Kingdom, App. No. 176/56, ECtHR (Dec. 14, 1958).
46
Simpson, supra note 17.
47
App. No. 332/57, ECtHR (July 1, 1961).
48
M. R. Madsen, Legal Diplomacy—Law, Politics and the Genesis of Postwar European Human Rights, in Human
Rights in the Twentieth Century: A Critical History (2011).
148 I•CON 16 (2018), 136–160
the backdrop of very cautious legal development that, in 1966, the UK chose to accept
the optional clauses on individual petition and ECtHR jurisdiction, including for some
of its dependencies (1967). In the following years, the other key member states fol-
lowed, including France and Italy, and by 1975 the ECtHR was finally fully operational
49
France, however, only accepted individual petition in 1981.
50
Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 5856/72, ECtHR, ¶ 31(Apr. 25, 1978).
51
Airey v. Ireland, App. No. 6289/73, ECtHR, ¶ 24 (Oct. 9,1979).
52
Greece withdrew from the European system between 1970 and 1975, while Portugal and Spain only
joined the system in 1977 and 1978, respectively, after their transitions to democracy.
Between universalism and regional law and politics 149
53
J. Eckel, Human Rights and Decolonization: New Perspectives and Open Questions, 1 Human.: An Int’l J. Hum.
Rts., Humanitarianism, and Dev. 111 (2010).
54
Madsen, supra note 21.
55
It even received covert funding from the CIA. H. Tolley, The International Commission of Jurists: Global
Advocates of Human Rights (1994).
56
N. J. Udombana, Towards the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Better Later Than Never, Yale Hum.
Rts. & Dev. L.J. 1, 3 (2000).
57
F. Viljoen, A Human Rights Court for Africa, and Africans, 30 Brook. J. Int’l L. 1, 5–6 (2004).
150 I•CON 16 (2018), 136–160
58
B. H. Weston, R. A. Lukes, & K. M. Hnatt, Regional Human Rights Regimes: A Comparison and Appraisal, 20
Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 585, 610–611 (1987).
59
We thank Solomon Ebobrah for this point. See also F. Ouguergouz, The African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights. A Comprehensive Agenda for Human Dignity and Sustainable Democracy in Africa 249–255
(2003).
60
See, e.g., C. E. Welch, The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A Five-Year Report and
Assessment, 14 Hum. Rts. Q. 43 (1992).
Between universalism and regional law and politics 151
understanding of human rights; In Latin America, the result was also a kind of
diplomacy, but much less legalized and instead focused on putting political pressure
on the member states in the context of widespread violations committed by the then
dominant dictatorships. In Africa, as states agreed on the creation of a human rights
61
A. Huneeus, Reforming the State from Afar: Reform Litigation at the Human Rights Courts, 40(1) Yale J. Int’l
L. 1 (2015). See also B. Çalı, Explaining variation in the intrusiveness of regional human rights remedies in
domestic orders, in this issue at 214.
62
Felipe Gonzales, El Sistema Interamericano de Derechos Humanos: transofrmaciones y Desafios 63, 67 (2013).
152 I•CON 16 (2018), 136–160
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Certain Attributes of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-13/93,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 13 ¶¶ 27, 37 (July 16, 1993).
66
R. Uprimny, Las transformaciones constitucionales recientes en América Latina: tendencias y desafíos, in El
Derecho en America Latina: Un Mapa para el Pensamiento Jurídico del Siglo xxi 109 (César Rodríguez Garavito
ed., 2011).
67
Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nacion [CSJN], 7/7/1992, “Ekmekdjian, Miguel Angel c/ Sofovich,
Gerardo y otros,” Fallos (1992-315-1492) (Arg.).
Between universalism and regional law and politics 153
throughout the region judges adapted a French legal concept, the constitutional bloc,
to stand for the idea that international human rights treaties ratified by the state are
directly applicable constitutional law.68
Today, the Inter-American Court’s docket is still quite small, with sixteen judgments
68
Manuel Eduardo Góngora Mera, Inter-American Judicial Constitutionalism: On the Constitutional Rank of
Human Rights Treaties in Latin America through National and Inter-American Adjudication 162 (2011).
69
Available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/sitios/informes/docs/ENG/eng_2015.pdf.
70
Lineamientos 2011–2015: Fortaleciendo la Justicia Interamericana, a través de un financiamiento previsible y
armónico at 17–18.
71
A. Huneeus, Constitutional Lawyers and the Inter-American Court’s Varied Authority, 79 Law & Contemp.
Probs. 179 (2015).
72
Almonacid Arellano and Others v. Chile, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 154, ¶ 124 (Sept. 26, 2006).
154 I•CON 16 (2018), 136–160
the IAS.73 Further, it is not only governments on the Left that have disputes with the
IAS. Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia were among those that pushed for a reform pro-
cess in 2012–2013 that many viewed as a backlash against the system. And in 2014,
the Constitutional Court of the Dominican Republic (DR) devised a loophole through
73
Available at http://www.eluniverso.com/noticias/2015/01/31/nota/4502526/rafael-correa-propone-crear-
corte-latinoamericana-derechos-humanos.
74
A. Huneeus & D. Shelton, Sentencia TC 0256-14 C of the Dominican Republic Constitutional Court, 109(4)
Am. J. Int’l L. 866 (2015).
75
Armin von Bogdandy, Ius Constitutionale Commune en América Latina: Observations on Transformative
Constitutionalism, 109 Am. J. Int’l L. (Unbound) 109 (2015).
76
A detailed account on the evolution of the Court’s decisions is found in Madsen, supra note 8, at 79.
Between universalism and regional law and politics 155
to the Court. As it strived to maintain and expand the relatively high human rights
standards set in the 1980s and 1990s it became involved in the democratization pro-
cesses in Eastern Europe.
The simultaneous institutional reform of the Court both facilitated and impaired
77
In most countries, this incorporation of the Convention required a specific legislative act. For an overview, see
Helen Keller & Alec Stone Sweet, A Europe of Rights: The Impact of the ECHR on National Legal Systems (1998).
156 I•CON 16 (2018), 136–160
most of which also produced inter-state complaints before the Court. The Russian
response consisted both of non-compliance and loud political discontent.
But challenges to the ECtHR did not come only from the newer states. The Court
has also became engaged in a growing conflict with the United Kingdom, a key coun-
78
As argued in Madsen, supra note 8, at 79.
79
See, e.g., David Davis, Britain Must Defy the European Court of Human Rights on Prisoner Voting as Strasbourg
Is Exceeding Its Authority, in The European Court of Human Rights and Its Discontents: Turning Criticism into
Strength (Spyridon Flogaitis et al. eds., 2013).
80
Brighton Declaration ¶¶ 23, 25c (2012).
81
Some elements, however, also empower the Court. Laurence R. Helfer, Redesigning the European Court of
Human Rights: Embeddedness as a Deep Structural Principle of the European Human Rights Regime, 19 Eur.
J. Int’l L. 125 (2008).
82
See, e.g., RMT v. United Kingdom, App. No. 31045/10, 366 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2014); Animal Defenders
v. United Kingdom, App. No. 48876/08, 57 Eur. H.R. Rep. 21 (2013); A, B and C v. Ireland, App. No.
25579/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010).
Between universalism and regional law and politics 157
now both repositioning themselves away from the integrated core Europe, the ECHR
project is faced with the challenge of neo-sovereigntism and nationalism, a subject we
will return to in the conclusion.
83
Viljoen, supra note 57, at 9.
84
M. Debos, La création de la Cour africaine des droits de l’Homme et des peuples. Les dessous d’une ingénierie
institutionnelle multicentrée, 60 Cultures et Conflits 159, 161 (2005).
85
Viljoen, supra note 57, at 8.
158 I•CON 16 (2018), 136–160
of the OAU. The ACtHPC was well-received both by attending governments and by the
international community.86 It was seen as a collaborative effort that—despite having
borrowed ideas from the two other regional human right courts and despite having
involved international NGOs and Western-sponsored African NGOs—was mainly pro-
86
Udombana, supra note 56, at 46.
87
B. Kioko, The Road to the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights. Paper presented at African Society
of International and Comparative Law—Proceedings of the Tenth Annual Conference, Addis Ababa, 70,
Aug. 3–5, 1998.
88
There is, however, the option for filing an individual application directly to the Court but this has only
been accepted by one member state so far.
89
In some ways the African system is a blend of the others: it allows for indirect access through the
Commission, as in Latin America, but also for direct individual access for states that so choose, as in the
pre-1998 European system.
90
The home page of the ACtHPR lists four such referrals (available at http://www.african-court.org/en/
index.php/2012-03-04-06-06-00/referred-cases).
91
Tanganyika Law Society, Legal and Human Rights Centre, and Reverend Christopher R. Mtikila v. United
Republic of Tanzania, App. Nos. 009/2011 and 011.2011, Judgment of June 14, 2013.
Between universalism and regional law and politics 159
rights jurisdiction in the future.92 The Tribunal of the Southern African Development
Community (SADC) also ventured into human rights before its suspension.
Arguably the ACtHPR’s slow process of institutionalization has indirectly contrib-
uted to the development of these alternative human rights venues, many of which can
92
S. T. Ebobrah, Litigating Human Rights Before Sub-Regional Courts in Africa: Prospects and Challenges, 17
Afr. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 79 (2009).
93
C. B. Murungu, Towards a Criminal Chamber in the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, 9 J. Int’l Crim.
Just. 9, 1067 (2011).
160 I•CON 16 (2018), 136–160
have come to be widely accepted but articulated slightly differently due to regional
contextual constraints.
Second, this approach throws into relief factors that helped shape the variation that
nonetheless exists among the three systems. In particular, each system’s distinct posi-
94
See Moyn, supra note 2; S. Hopgood, The Endtimes of Human Rights (2013).