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Archiving The British Raj History of The Archival Policy of The Government of India With Selected Documents 1858 1947 Professor Sabyasachi Bhattacharya Full Chapter
Archiving The British Raj History of The Archival Policy of The Government of India With Selected Documents 1858 1947 Professor Sabyasachi Bhattacharya Full Chapter
Sabyasachi Bhattacharya
1
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Usually, the archives are sites where historians conduct research into our
past. They are not the objects of research. This work addresses that task.
This is a subject somewhat out of the ordinary for the general reader
or professional historians who tend to take the archives for granted. By
way of introducing this book, I would like to share with the readers
some thoughts that crossed my mind as I launched into this project.
Before the archives came into existence, there was a time when
there was no such source of knowledge of the past. Jacques Le Goff
takes us back to that past when he looks at a time when neither the
church in Europe nor the state in the Western countries was active
in creating an archival base in the form of written knowledge.1
The transition from oral to written knowledge at that time meant
erasure of popular oral memory by the powerful establishments
of the church and the state, Le Goff argues. Another important
intellectual intervention was that of Foucault, who highlighted
the involvement of power in the creation of historical knowledge.2
That intervention set in motion another train of thought: How to
address the problem of bias in historical sources in the archives?
In recent times, there have been illustrious exemplars of the art
of ‘reading records against the grain’.3 In India, too, there have
been attempts on the lines of the Italian historian Carlo Ginzberg.4
Parallel to that, there have been historiographic innovations in
reinterpreting archival records as a project to archive and classify all
knowledge in a universalistic framework.5
I have referred to some important intellectual interventions ques-
tioning the historian’s normal habit of accepting data in the archives as
Archiving the British Raj: History of the Archival Policy of the Government of India, with
Selected Documents, 1858–1947. Sabyasachi Bhattacharya, Oxford University Press
(2019). © Sabyasachi Bhattacharya. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199489923.003.0001
2 Archiving the British Raj
if it was beyond question. This critique created a stir even in the placid
discourse of archives. Consider, for instance, the influential writings of
Thomas Richards, Anne Stoller, or Nicholas Dirks, which influenced
the study of archives in relation to state-building and imperialism.
The most important consequence that followed was an innovation in
the use of archives. The practice of ‘reading documents against the
grain’ allowed the use of archival material in unprecedented modes.
Thus, there developed, on the one hand, an attitude of questioning
the naïve faith in archival data and, at the same time, a robust practice
of using archival data and reading them ‘against the grain’. However,
these developments have little relevance to the history of nineteenth-
century archival policy in the following pages. What seems to be
constantly relevant is the impact of political power on archival policy.
Archival Science, a major journal of archivists, devoted two numbers
in 2002 to the subject ‘Archives, Records and Power’.6
Every historian using British Indian records in the archives is
bound to feel the involvement of political power in the production
of historical knowledge. This feature of our archival records becomes
particularly evident in the historical writings on the freedom struggle
and the conflict between imperialism and all anti-imperialistic forces.
What is more, sometimes the possession of political power led to
deliberate suppression; an instance was the British Indian govern-
ment’s intervention to prevent Captain J.D. Cunningham in 1849
from using official government records in his history of the Sikh wars.
Thereafter, it became a settled official policy not to allow officials of
the government, both civil and military, access to the records for any
purpose other than official government work.
The work of J.D. Cunningham on the history of the Sikhs
and Anglo-Sikh relations, published in 1849, is of outstanding
importance.7 First, like Grant Duff’s book on the Maratha kingdom
published in 1826, this work was based on government records,
which are cited in detail in the footnotes. Second, the Government of
India took exception to the citation of official records (not yet made
public, for example, through Parliamentary Papers) by the author
and he was on that ground officially reprimanded and penalized.
Cunningham believed that he was penalized chiefly because of some
critical remarks he made about the British policy towards the Sikh
kingdom and because of a perception that he was guilty of leaning
Introduction 3
Even a casual reader of this book will perceive that in this account
the core issue that emerges is the freedom of access to the records of
the Government of India in the archives. While there was, on the
one hand, a section of British political authorities and even of the
bureaucracy that favoured not only accurate archiving of historical
events, but also some limited access to records for selected non-
official researchers, the overwhelming opinion, on the other hand, in
official circles was against such access.
Among the British serving in India, there were very few propo-
nents of the idea that the Imperial Record Office should be open
to historical research. There was strong and consistent bureaucratic
opposition to access by non-officials for research purposes. As we
shall see in the following pages, Lord Curzon was virtually the only
viceroy who spoke of the historical importance of the records of the
Indian government and the desirability of facilitating research. He
demanded information on ‘the facilities offered to the public for
research in the records’.10 He soon learned from C.R. Wilson at the
head of the Record Department that there were virtually no such
facilities. Curzon apprehended that ‘the jealous attitude of govern-
ment in this matter was a serious bar to research’. Due to Curzon’s
initiative, the governor general in council’s letter to the secretary of
state contained an admission that the absence of research facilities
was ‘a state of affairs [which] cannot but be regarded as a reproach to
our government’.11 Soon thereafter Curzon’s sudden resignation and
departure from India put to an end to the initiative he had taken.
The Indian government reverted to its usual position that archival
research facility in Indian records was unnecessary (because there was
no one in India competent to conduct historical research) as well as
dangerous (because Indian researchers would abuse their access to
records to mount political propaganda against the government).
In contrast to this position of the civil servants in India, the sec-
retaries of state in England consistently showed an awareness of the
historical value of the Indian records and the need to create facilities
for non-official historical researchers. How do we account for that
attitude, and the difference between the authorities in India and in
England? It is my surmise that this was the outcome of a complex set
of factors. To begin with, the bulk of the members of the Indian Civil
Service (ICS) had had scarcely any education beyond the grammar
Introduction 5
Notes
1. Jacques Le Goff, History and Memory, trans. S. Rendall and E. Claman
(New York, 1992).
2. Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human
Sciences (New York, 1994 [1971]); Michel Foucault, The Age of History
(New York, 1994), pp. 218–21.
Introduction 7
3. Anne Stoller, ‘Reading the Records against the Grain’, in Refiguring the
Archives, ed. Caroline Hamilton et al. (Cape Town, Dordrecht, 2002).
4. Carlo Ginzberg, The Cheese and the Worm (New York, 1976).
5. Thomas Richards, The Imperial Archive: Knowledge and the Fantasy of
Empire (London, 1993).
6. Richards, The Imperial Archive; Anne Stoller, ‘Colonial Archives and the
Arts of Governance: On the Content and the Form’, in Refiguring the
Archives, ed. Caroline Hamilton et al. (Cape Town, Dordrecht, 2002);
Nicholas Dirks, ‘Annals of the Archives: Ethnographic Notes on the
Sources of History’, in From the Margins: Historical Anthropology and Its
Futures, ed. Brian Axel (Durham, 2002); Joan M. Schwartz and Terry
Cook (guest editors), ‘Archives, Records and Power: The Making of
Modern Memory’, Archival Science, vol. 2 (2002): 1–19.
7. J.D. Cunningham, The History of the Sikhs, from the Origins of the Nation
to the Battle of the Sutlej, ed. G.T. Garratt (London, 1918 [1849]).
8. Cunningham, The History of the Sikhs, ‘Preface’, p. 31.
9. Cunningham, History of the Sikhs, ‘Preface’, p. 31.
10. Letter from J. Macfarlane, Viceroy’s secretary, to C.R. Wilson, 25
March 1904, Home (Public) Progs, No. 98, September 1904.
11. Govt of India to Secretary to State St John Broderick, 1 September
1904, Home (Public) Progs, No. 98, September 1904.
12. Secretary of State to Govt of India (Public Branch), 15 September
1892, Home (Public), No. 113, October 1892.
13. Charles Keckskemeti and Ivan Szekely, Access to Archives (Council of
Europe, 2005).
14. Keckskemeti and Szekely, Access to Archives, p. 13.
15. Department of State, USA, Public Availability of Diplomatic Archives
(Washington, DC, 1985).
1
Archiving the British Raj: History of the Archival Policy of the Government of India, with
Selected Documents, 1858–1947. Sabyasachi Bhattacharya, Oxford University Press
(2019). © Sabyasachi Bhattacharya. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199489923.003.0002
Absence of a Definite Archives Policy 9
the British officials that the threat posed in 1857 to British dominion
in India was due to the fact that the British forces in India, that is, sol-
diers of British origin, were small in number compared to the numeri-
cal strength of the Indian sepoys employed in the army. The proportion
of white men serving in the British Indian Army to the Indian sepoys
was about 1:6 in early 1857, and in many cantonments only a few
officers were white men of British origin, while the troops under them
were almost entirely ‘native’. Whereas one out of seven soldiers in
the British Indian Army was white in 1857, the statistics indicate a
huge change in the next few years. In the years 1858–60 the ratio
radically changed in favour of white soldiers and officers: their ratio
to the soldiers of Indian origin became about 1:2. Certain units, such
as the artillery, were deliberately designed now for reasons of British
security to consist only of white soldiers. Maintaining troops brought
from Britain in the ratio of one white person out of three employed
in the army in India was expensive. The overall result of all this was
that while the charges paid by India in England on military account
was £0.34 million in 1856–7, it became 1.62 million in 1860–1, and
kept rising thereafter. To sum it up, the British reaction to the uprising
of 1857 was to burden India with an enormous military expenditure.
The second impact of the 1857 uprising was the increasing levels of
public debt, and consequent annual burden of service charges or inter-
est. Indians had to pay for the suppression of their rebellion. In the five
years between 1857 and 1861–2, the total debt of the British Indian
government (mainly debt incurred in England) swelled from £59 mil-
lion to about £108 million. By 1872 it had reached 122 million. This
was largely due to military expenditure as well as auxiliary items in the
budget such as military public works, that is, expenditure on barracks
for the European soldiers. The third impact of the crisis of 1857 was
on the so-called home charges, that is to say the expenses incurred
in England by the British Indian government. Initially this increased
during 1857–8 due to military costs. The soldiers and officers brought
from Britain to serve in India were paid for by the Indian taxpayer and
the War Office in London exacted every penny spent on that account.2
The consequence of this financial crisis was the Indian govern-
ment’s drive to reduce expenditure, and an eminent economist of
those times, James Wilson, the founder of the journal The Economist
of London, as well as officials of the Treasury in England were
10 Archiving the British Raj
in the early part of the year 1860, Mr. H.D. Sandeman, then Officiating
Civil Auditor, suggested to the Civil Finance Commission the propri-
ety of destroying all useless records in the several Government Offices
in Calcutta, and disposing of them as waste paper, and proposed the
adoption of some effective means to prevent the re-accumulation of
worthless documents. The Civil Finance Commission, after consult-
ing the heads of the various Offices at the Presidency, laid the matter
before the Financial Department of the Government of India, and
recommended that a Committee of experienced and cautious men
should be appointed to treat the question in detail. The Commission
remarked that the benefit of the proposed destruction of useless
records would not be fully obtained without the substitution of one
grand central archive office for the existing record-rooms attached to
each Office, for the purpose of transferring to it, for safe preservation,
all old records that might be of value—the Offices concerned only
keeping such records as would be required for current use.3
the files at the NAI contain not a clue as regards the scholarly inter-
ests of the persons in the Records Committee. However, the Records
Committee probably drew to itself men with such interests. Members
inducted in the late 1860s included ‘A. Colvin’, probably Auckland
Colvin who served in the ICS in the North-western Provinces (later
to became lieutenant governor of the North-western Provinces and
Oudh from 1887–92) and wrote a biographical account in the
Rulers of India series of history books edited by Sir William Hunter.
‘Dr Mouat’ was evidently Dr Francis J. Mouat (1816–1897), who
was a teacher in Calcutta Medical College. For a while James Cave-
Browne served on the Records Committee; he is the author of a his-
torical treatise Indian Infanticide, Its Origins, Progress and Suppression
(London, 1857).
Among the higher authorities in India, A.O. Hume, ICS, played
an important role from outside the Records Committee. He is
chiefly known as one of the Englishmen who lent support to the
Indian National Congress, but he is also to be remembered as an
important supporter of the cause of archiving for purposes of histor-
ical documentation: that was his contribution as a secretary to the
Government of India in the Revenue and Agricultural Department
when the Records Committee was floundering for want of admin-
istrative support. Another friend of the Records Committee was
Sir Charles Trevelyan, the finance member of the viceroy’s council;
he helped in getting Wheeler the post of a salaried secretary to
the Records Committee. Among those outside of the Records
Committee, Sir William Hunter was an important personality
in determining archival policy. He joined the ICS in 1862 in the
Bengal Presidency and very soon he produced The Annals of Rural
Bengal (1868), a historical account that is still cited. Then followed
20 volumes of the Statistical Account of Bengal (1875–7) and the
Imperial Gazetteer (1881). He became an unquestionable authority
and the ‘home government’ depended on his advice on record-
keeping in the 1870s. Hunter was a prolific author who moulded
the outlook in colonial historiography. Many of the historical works
mentioned earlier, written by Erskine, Temple, Colvin, and others,
were part of the Rulers of India series edited by Hunter. He was
instrumental in giving a colonialist turn to the archiving of records
and the narration of the history of British India. At the same time,
Absence of a Definite Archives Policy 13
the Committee was requested to associate with it for the time being
the head of the Office on the records of which it might be employed,
in examining the records of the several Offices, and separating use-
less papers for disposal or destruction, having the papers selected for
preservation, bound and catalogued, and placed in a separate record-
room accessible to all persons who might wish to consult them. A
small establishment, consisting of clerks and peons, was also allowed
to the Commission. The Committee was, in this instance, prohib-
ited from concerning itself with the actual disposal or destruction
of worthless records. Later, however, the Secretary to the Committee
was ordered to arrange for the sale of such records to paper makers
in Calcutta.5
their dispatch to the secretary of state, they concealed the fact of dif-
ference of opinion between the members of the Records Committee
and its president, Seton-Karr. The viceroy in council wrote that ‘in
August 1863 the Records Committee submitted a series of revised
propositions’, and then proceeded to summarize Seton-Karr’s propos-
als that they approved.14 Thus, they pretended to believe that after
submitting proposals in June 1861 the Records Committee changed
their mind. Actually, the committee’s opinion in favour of a central
archive was rejected. The viceroy in council reported the matter the
way he did probably because the secretary of state Sir Charles Wood
was known to be in favour of a muniment room and, in fact, said so
clearly in his dispatch to the Indian government.15
Seton-Karr also proposed, inter alia, that selected records be
published from time to time. That was also the main point made by
J.T. Wheeler in his memorandum.16 Both Seton-Karr and Wheeler
emphasized the importance of publishing extracts from records,
implicitly suggesting that publishing selected records was a substitute
for archiving records in a muniment room. In fact, publication of
selected records was already under way and may be counted as the
main concrete achievement of the Records Committee. The first
attempt, a calendar of State Papers, Secret Series, of 1774–5, compiled
by a Mr Scott Smith, then secretary to the committee, was never com-
pleted due to the premature death of the compiler. Several volumes
containing extracts from the old numbers of the Calcutta Gazette
were published, but they were from a source generally available and
not really rare government records. The only good publication spon-
sored by the committee was a work of historical documentation by
Rev. J. Long, a member of the committee, who compiled and edited a
selection of records relating to Bengal from 1748 to 1767.
To revert to the main issue, whether a muniment room, or central
archive, was necessary and desirable, the rejection of the idea by the
president of the Records Committee, Seton-Karr, was seized upon as
the decisive factor by Viceroy John Lawrence and his council in their
resolution of 3 October 1865.17 This decision was taken in 1865,
while Seton-Karr had given his opinion in 1863 and the Records
Committee had suggested a central record office in 1861. The
government was obviously dragging its feet and eventually rejected
the creation of a central record room. The reasons appear to be
Absence of a Definite Archives Policy 19
The preservation and arrangement of the public Records and the facility of
access to them on the part both of the officers of Government and of persons
desiring to consult them for historical or antiquarian purposes are objects
of great importance; and although perhaps the latter object would be
best promoted by the formation of a Central Muniment Room, I
approve on the whole your decision to leave the Records, which are to
be preserved, in the several Offices to which they belong.18
More than one British ruler in India has, sinned against history, and
might well like to shut it up with confidential minutes and secret
negotiations. Within the present century, India has been desolated by
wars as cruel as those of the Heptarchy, and as unmeaning as those of
the White and Red Roses. Within the present generation, it has been
distracted and tortured by a military revolt, created by a scare about
greased cartridges, but leading to crimes more horrible than those of
the French Revolution. Yet Anglo-Indian statesmen have been known
to ignore the past.21
The phase from 1869 to 1871 was the one when the government
returned to the plan of publishing selected records and calendars and
decisively abandoned the idea of a central record room. In this matter
the advice of Sir William Hunter was decisive: there was, he said, no
need for a public record office as it existed in England and elsewhere
in Europe. Viceroy Northbrook was of the view that it would serve
a political purpose to selectively publish some documents. Thus,
the deliberations on an archival policy ended in this phase with a firm
rejection of the plan for a central record room and prioritization of
publication of selected documents of the imperial past.
It seems that the majority of the members of the governor gen-
eral’s council were averse to additional expenditure on account of
archiving. A.O. Hume pointed out that ‘a great deal of money has
been spent … and very little results have been obtained’. And yet
keeping records in good shape was important. ‘Year by year records
are decaying; and unless some measures be adopted, it will before
very long, be found that like the defunct Commission [Records
Committee, sometimes called Commission] the subjects of their
investigations have dissolved themselves’.22 In writing, thus, A.O.
Hume, later to become a founding member of the Indian National
Absence of a Definite Archives Policy 21
Congress, was in the viceroy’s council a lone voice defending the need
for careful archiving. However, given the decision at the highest level
in 1865 to abandon the scheme of a central muniment room, the
only option that was open was to press for publication of selected
documents and handbooks or guides to records.
There is evidence that the opposition to the idea of a central record
office open to the public was partly motivated by political consid-
erations. The file noting of ‘E.C.B’ of the viceroy’s council on the
question of muniment room are significant. Sir Edward Clive Bayley
(1821–1884) had a long tenure as home secretary (1862–72) and
he had also worked in the foreign and political departments. He did
not mince words: ‘There are records even of the last century which it
might cause inconvenience to throw open to the public.’23 Further,
he said that selections from records were to be made carefully. The
wily, old bureaucrat commented on Rev. Long’s selection, perhaps
bearing in mind how Long, at one time, had been on the side of the
peasantry in the Indigo Rebellion:
Bah! There is the miser in his rags and tags, who has all his life
been hoarding money and squandering his conscience; who is dying
from hunger and cold; who teaches his servants to eat to live, that is,
not more than is necessary to keep body and soul together; who is
known far and wide for his unlawful usury; who has imposed upon
himself and all his slave cattle a whole year’s fast; who in winter
heats his miserable hut only once a week; who is ready to sell
himself for a dime, and who has forty thousand roubles, in order to
leave them after his death to his stupid nephew, that seventeen-
year-old wretch who in miserliness and unscrupulous usury has
surpassed his uncle of sixty years; who steals money from himself
and takes a fine from himself for this theft; and who does not want to
get married all his life, only not to spend his income on his wife and
children. Oh, they deserve being laughed at. Ha, ha, ha!
Meseems I see his opposite. Of course, it is Spendthrift? Certainly.
Oh, that young man has not the vices of his father, but he is infested
by other vices, not less objectionable. His father hoarded money by
unlawful exactions, and he spends it recklessly. His miserly father
consumed in one month what he ought to have eaten in one day;
Spendthrift, on the contrary, devours in a day what he ought to eat
up in a year. The other walked in order not to spend money for the
feeding of the horses; this one keeps six carriages and six tandems,
not counting the saddle and sleigh horses, only that he may not get
tired of travelling all the time in one and the same carriage. The other
wore for twenty years the same miserable caftan; while to
Spendthrift twenty pairs a year seem too little. In short, his father
collected a great treasure through all illegal means, usury,
maltreatment of his kin, and ruin of the helpless; but Spendthrift ruins
himself and lavishes on others: they are both fools, and I laugh at
both. Ha, ha, ha, ha!
Who is galloping there so swiftly? Bah! it is Simple. He is hurrying
to some aristocratic house, to show there his stupidity. Simple glories
in visiting distinguished people. He goes to see them as often as
possible and, to please them, makes a fool of himself, then boasts to
others of the influence he has there. He takes part in their
conversations and, though he knows nothing, thinks he is posing as
a wise man; he reads books, but he does not understand them; goes
to the theatre, criticises the actors and, repeating what he has heard
elsewhere, speaks authoritatively: this actor is good, that one is bad.
He tells distinguished people all kinds of jokes, and wants to be
cutting in his remarks, though he never adapts them to the occasion;
in short, Simple tries to convince himself that his acts are intelligent,
but others think that they are silly. Ha, ha, ha!
Hypocrite steps humbly out of church and distributes to the poor
that surround him a farthing each, and counts them off on his rosary.
As he walks along, he mumbles his prayers. He turns his eyes away
from women, and shades them with his hands, for he avers he would
take them out if they tempted him. Hypocrite sins every minute, but
he appears as a righteous man that walks over a path strewn with
thorns. His simulated prayers, piety and fasts in no way keep him
from ruining and oppressing his like. Hypocrite has stolen thousands,
and he gives them away by farthings. By such appearances he
deceives many. He hourly preaches the nine virtues to young
people, but in the sixty years of his life he has never carried out one
himself. Hypocrite always walks humbly and never turns his looks to
heaven, for he cannot hope to deceive those that abide there; but he
looks upon the earth whose inhabitants he cheats. Ha, ha, ha!
Last evening I took a walk in the park where nearly the whole town
disports itself twice a week. I seated myself with a friend on a bench:
four men, all acquaintances of my friend, passed by us; one of them
was an ex-officer who had left the service, in order that he may not
serve the Tsar, that he may cheat the world and become rich through
illegal means. All the pettifoggers and the minor officials at the court
of justice, and all the large litigators are known to him. He hardly
ever goes out of the Land Office, and even in other places there
appears almost every day a complaint of his. All the doubtful villages
are his, and he frequently makes application for them, proving that
they once belonged to his ancestors. He has no end of genealogies
in his pocket, and upon request can prove his descent from any
family he pleases. He buys promissory notes at a great discount,
and gets the money from the creditor with all the interest due
thereupon. If anybody borrows money from him, he never asks more
than five kopeks from the rouble a month, and he deducts the
interest in advance.
To My Son Falaléy:—
Is that the way you respect your father, an honourably discharged
captain of dragoons? Did I educate you, accursed one, that I should
in my old age be made through you a laughing-stock of the whole
town? I wrote you, wretch, in order to instruct you, and you had my
letter published. You fiend, you have ruined me, and it is enough to
make me insane! Has such a thing ever been heard, that children
should ridicule their parents? Do you know that I will order you to be
whipped with the knout, in strength of ukases, for disrespect to your
parents! God and the Tsar have given me this right, and I have
power over your life, which you seem to have forgotten. I think I have
told you more than once that if a father or mother kills a son, they are
guilty only of an offence against the church.[145] My son, stop in time!
Don’t play a bad trick upon yourself: it is not far to the Great Lent,
and I don’t mind fasting then. St. Petersburg is not beyond the hills,
and I can reach you by going there myself.
Well, my son, I forgive you for the last time, at your mother’s
request. If it were not for her, you would have heard of me ere this,
nor would I have paid attention to her now, if she were not sick unto
death. Only I tell you, look out: if you will be guilty once more of