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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-22977 May 31, 1972

COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS for the port of Manila, SABINO ROMERO and Agents of the PRESIDENTIAL
ANTI-GRAFT COMMITTEE (PAGCOM), petitioners,

vs.

HONORABLE GUILLERMO E. TORRES as Presiding Judge of Branch VIII, Court of First Instance of Rizal,
HONORABLE ANDRES REYES, as Presiding Judge of Branch VI, ANGELA ALVARAN, LETICIA AFRICA,
ELPIDIO FLORESCA, CRISTETA B. CHAN and JUANITO A. ESPAÑA, respondents.

Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro, Solicitor
Augusto M. Amores, Solicitor Alejandro B. Afurong and Special Attorney Castor B. Pambid for
petitioners.

Eliezer A. Manikan for respondent Elpidio Floresca, et al.

Rafael T. Durian for other respondents.

ZALDIVAR, J.:p

Petition for certiorari and prohibition, with preliminary injunction.

On or about September 15, 1963, a shipment of 158 packages of imported goods and personal effects
arrived and were unloaded at the port of Manila. Said packages were covered by Customs Consumption
Entries Nos. 74586 and 74587, series of 1963. After the amount of P10,887.00 as customs duties,
internal revenue taxes, fees and other charges were paid by respondents Angela Alvaran and Elpidio
Floresca, said packages were released from the Manila customhouse. On October 19, 1963, while the
packages were being transported from the customs area to their destination the packages were
intercepted by agents of the Manila Police Department and were brought to the MPD Headquarters.

Under date of October 19, 1963, Juan G. Atencia, Vice-Chairman of the Presidential Anti-Graft
Committee (PAGCOM, for short) and Chief of the Special Task Force of said agency, in a formal
communication, informed the Collector of Customs of the port of Manila, "that merchandise covered by
Entry No. 74586 consisting of 72 packages and Entry No. 74587 consisting of 86 packages, and further
covered by GUACODS Delivery Permits Nos. 8590, 8589, 8593, 8592 and 8591" were in the custody of
the Manila Police Department, Precinct No. 4, located at United Nations Avenue, Manila. The Collector
was further informed that "initial findings by the Task Force show that said goods were released from
the customs zone without proper appraisal by customs personnel, thereby causing damage and losses to
the government." In view thereof, Atencia requested the Collector of Customs for the issuance of a
proper warrant of seizure and for the assignment of a representative of the Collector with the Task
Force to assist the latter in serving the warrant. This request was reiterated in a letter dated October 22,
1963, with the additional information that the packages mentioned were already in the custody of the
Task Force and stored in the private bodega of Mr. Nemesio Yabut, located at 1022 96th Street,
Guadalupe, Makati, Rizal.

The statements of Mr. Atencia and his request for a proper warrant became the basis of a seizure
proceeding (Seizure Identification No. 7963) and the issuance by Acting Collector of Customs, Pedro
Pacis, on October 22, 1963, of a warrant of seizure and detention directing the Chief, Special Task Force,
Presidential Anti-Graft Committee (PAGCOM), or his authorized agents, and the Chief, Auction and Cargo
Disposal Division of the Manila Customhouse, to effect the seizure of the aforementioned shipments.

To complement this warrant of seizure, the agents of the PAGCOM, on October 23, 1963, applied for,
and were able to secure, a search warrant from respondent Judge Andres Reyes for the search and
seizure of "highly dutiable goods illegally or anomalously withdrawn from the customs, such as
transistors, jewelries, watches, suiting materials, in commercial quantities, among others" deposited in
the premises of 1022-B 96th St., Guadalupe, Makati, Rizal, and its adjacent bodega.

At 8: 00 o'clock in the morning of October 23, 1963, PAGCOM agent Confesor B. Sansano served the
warrant of seizure and detention upon herein respondents Angela Alvaran, Elpidio Floresca and Leticia
Africa and/or their duly authorized representatives. Then at 8:30 o'clock of the same morning, the
combined team of PAGCOM-PC-Makati Police Department served the search warrant aforementioned
upon a certain Jose Cabellon, the person who was then occupying the premises (residential house)
adjoining the bodega mentioned in the preceding paragraph.

During the progress of the search and seizure, and while the merchandise and goods were being
removed by the PAGCOM-PC-Customs agents from the premises, Angela Alvaran, Elpidio E. Floresca and
Leticia Africa (respondents in the seizure identification case) filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal
a petition, dated October 23, 1963, and docketed as Civil Case No. 7883, entitled "Angela Alvaran,
Elpidio E. Floresca and Leticia Africa, petitioners, versus The Collector of Customs, Sabino Romero
and/or Agents of the PAGCOM, respondents." In their petition, Alvaran, Floresca and Africa prayed for a
writ of injunction to restrain herein petitioners from proceeding with the further enforcement of the
warrants herein-above mentioned, and from proceeding with the trial of Seizure Identification No. 7963;
for the return and delivery of the confiscated goods and merchandise to them; and for a declaration of
nullity of the warrant of seizure and detention issued by therein respondent Collector of Customs.
Before Civil Case No. 7883 could be raffled for assignment to any particular branch of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Judge Guillermo Torres of Branch VIII acted on said case. On October 24, 1963, Judge
Torres issued an order restraining the Collector of Customs and the PAGCOM "from enforcing the
warrant of seizure and detention issued by the Collector of Customs on October 22, 1963, and from
proceeding with the acts complained of" until further order from the court.

Because of the restraining order issued by Judge Torres, petitioners herein were unable to transfer to
the Bureau of Customs all the 158 packages subject of the warrant of seizure and detention
aforementioned. Nine packages could not be taken from the bodega at Guadalupe, Makati.
On October 30, 1963, herein petitioners (respondents in Civil Case No. 7883) filed with Branch VIII of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, presided by respondent Judge Torres, an opposition to the petition for
writ of preliminary injunction, with a motion to lift the restraining order. Herein petitioners maintained
then that the Collector of Customs has exclusive jurisdiction over the goods in question by virtue of
Seizure Identification Case No. 7963. Replying to said opposition and motion, herein respondents
Alvaran, Floresca and Africa contended that the Bureau of Customs had lost jurisdiction over the goods,
and therefore, the Collector of Customs could no longer validly institute seizure proceedings respecting
said goods. On December 21, 1963 respondent Judge Torres issued an order denying herein petitioners'
opposition to the petition for preliminary injunction and motion to lift the restraining order previously
issued and set the case for hearing on January 16 and 17, 1964. Herein respondents Alvaran, Floresca
and Africa asked the court for leave, and were granted, to file an amended petition. Herein petitioners
were given ten (10) days from receipt of the amended petition within which to file their answer.

Instead of filing an answer to the amended petition, however, herein petitioners filed, on January 29,
1964, a motion to dismiss the amended petition. Earlier, or on January 24, 1964, herein petitioners,
reiterating their contention that the court had no jurisdiction over the case, filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order denying their opposition to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.

In the meantime, herein respondents Cristeta B. Chan and Juanito A. España, claiming ownership of
certain goods found in the private bodega at 1022-B 96th St., Guadalupe, Makati, Rizal filed motions to
intervene in Civil Case No. 7883. In an order dated February 5, 1964 respondent Judge Guillermo Torres
granted the motions to intervene and admitted the petitions in intervention that they had filed. In the
same order, therein petitioners were given ten days from receipt thereof to answer the petitions for
intervention or to file any pleading they so desired. Instead of answering the petitions for intervention,
herein petitioners filed, on February 12, 1964, motion to dismiss the petitions for intervention.

In an order, dated April 15, 1964, respondent Judge Torres denied herein petitioners' motion to dismiss
the amended petition of Alvaran, Floresca and Africa, and also the motion to dismiss the petitions in
intervention of Chan and España. In the same order, Judge Torres also denied herein petitioners' motion
to inventory and appraise the remaining nine (9) packages left in the bodega at Guadalupe, Makati, but
left unresolved herein petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the order denying their opposition to
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. In due time, herein petitioners filed their answers to the
amended petition and the petitions in intervention, setting therein as defenses lack of jurisdiction on the
part of the court and lack of cause of action.
Meanwhile, in Branch VI of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, presided by respondent Judge Andres
Reyes,1 proceedings were also had in connection with the same shipment and/or goods, subject matter
of Civil Case No. 7883, in relation to the search warrant issued by said judge on October 23, 1963.
Respondents Alvaran, Floresca and Africa filed with said court a motion, dated October 30, 1963, for the
return of the goods seized and/or delivery thereof at a place subject to the control of the court. On
November 5, 1963, respondent Judge Reyes issued an order commanding herein petitioners Collector of
Customs and PAGCOM agents to deliver immediately the goods and articles in question to the AMCYL
bonded warehouse, subject to, and until further, orders from the court. Herein petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration of the order of November 5, 1963, but said motion was denied in an order
dated November 8, 1963.

On November 9, 1963, petitioners filed a manifestation to the effect that they would file with the
Supreme Court a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction to annul and set aside the order
dated November 8, 1963 denying their motion for reconsideration. On November 19, 1963, herein
petitioners filed with this Court a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction, entitled "Pedro
Pacis, et al. vs. Hon. Andres Reyes, et al." (G.R. No. L-22121), but said petition was not given due course.
In view of the dismissal of the petition, respondent Judge Reyes issued, on November 27, 1963, an order
appointing a special sheriff to carry out and enforce his orders of November 5 and 8, 1963.

On December 2, 1963, petitioners, questioning the adequacy of the surety bond filed with the Bureau of
Customs by the owners and/or operators of the AMCYL bond warehouse, moved for deferment of the
transfer of the confiscated goods from the Manila customhouse to the AMCYL bonded warehouse.
However, in an order, dated December 21, 1963, respondent Judge Reyes directed the petitioner to
comply with the orders of November 5 and 8, 1963.

Petitioners complied with the order of December 21, 1963 but they promptly filed an urgent motion for
reconsideration of said order and for the return of the goods to the customs premises. Without waiting
for the court's action on the motion for reconsideration, and alleging that they have no plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in law, petitioners filed the present petition before this Court.

Petitioners contend that while the respondents claim that the amount of P10,887.00 has been paid as
customs duties, internal revenue taxes and other fees and charges on the goods in question, the
petitioner Collector of Customs had found, through his deputies, that said goods had been misdeclared
and undervalued; that respondent Judge Torres cannot legally take cognizance of Civil Case No. 7963
because of the pendency of Seizure Identification No. 7963 respecting said goods; that respondents
Alvaran, Africa, Floresca, Chan and España have no cause of action against petitioners in Civil Case No.
7883 because they failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available to them; and that respondent
Judge Reyes acted without, or in excess of jurisdiction, or with abuse of discretion, when he directed the
transfer of the goods from the customs premises to the AMCYL bonded warehouse without requiring
the filing of a bond equivalent to one and one-half times the amount of the duties, taxes and other
charges on the goods, and when he delayed the resolution of petitioner's motion for reconsideration of
his order of December 21, 1963.

Separately answering the petition, respondents Judge Torres, Judge Reyes, Alvaran and Africa, through
counsel, maintained that the seizure proceedings pending before petitioner Collector of Customs was
illegal and the warrant of seizure and detention issued thereunder was null and void, it having been
issued without, and enforced beyond the jurisdiction of petitioner Collector of Customs; that petitioners
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in the seizure of the goods in question; that the actuations of
respondent judge are regular and in accordance with law; and that private respondents Alvaran and
Africa are not required to exhaust administrative remedies because petitioners acted without, and
beyond, their jurisdiction in seizing the goods in question.

On the other hand, respondents Floresca, Chan and España, through counsel, maintained most
importantly that the issuance by petitioner Collector of Customs of the warrant of seizure and detention
on October 22, 1963, after the goods had left the control and jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs, was
arbitrary, improper and illegal; and that the goods and merchandise in question are under proper
custodia legis of respondents Judge Reyes and Judge Torres, and not under petitioner Collector of
Customs, and that they may dispose of said goods and merchandise by virtue of their own authority and
not by virtue of customs laws and regulations.

Petitioners' contention that respondent Judge Torres can not legally take cognizance of Civil Case No.
7883 because of the pendency of Seizure Identification No. 7963 is well taken. The petition filed by
herein private respondents before the lower court, it should be recalled, was for the issuance of a writ
of injunction to restrain herein petitioners from proceeding with the further enforcement of the warrant
of seizure and detention, and from proceeding with the hearing of Seizure Identification No. 7963; for
the return and delivery of the seized goods; and for a declaration of nullity of the warrant of seizure and
detention issued by the Collector of Customs. In short, the petition in the court below (branch presided
by Judge Torres) sought not only the recovery of the possession of goods subject of seizure proceedings
before the Collector of Customs but also the review by the Court of First Instance of the acts and/or
resolutions of the Collector of Customs in the aforementioned seizure proceedings.
In the case of Juan Diosamito, et al. vs. Benjamin Balanque, et al.,2 this Court reiterated the ruling in the
cases of Pacis vs. Averia3 and De Joya vs. David,4 that the judicial recourse of the owner of a personal
property which is the subject of a seizure and forfeiture proceeding before the Collector of Customs, as
in the present case, is not in the Court of First Instance but in the Court of Tax Appeals, and only after
exhausting administrative remedies in the Bureau of Customs. In the Pacis case, this Court said:

The Tariff and Customs Code, in Section 2530 thereof, lists the kinds of property subject to forfeiture. At
the same time in Part 2 of Title VI thereof, it provides for the procedure in seizure and forfeiture cases
and vests in the Collector of Customs the authority to hear and decide said cases. The Collector's
decision is appealable to the Commissioner of Customs whose decision is in turn appealable to the Court
of Tax Appeals. An aggrieved party may appeal from a judgment of the Court of Tax Appeals directly to
this Court. On the other hand, Section 44(c) of the Judiciary Act of 1948 lodges in the Court of First
Instance original jurisdiction in all cases in which the value of the property in controversy amounts to
more than ten thousand pesos. This original jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, when exercised in
an action for recovery of personal property which is a subject of a forfeiture proceeding in the Bureau of
Customs, tends to encroach upon, and to render futile, the jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs in
seizure and forfeiture proceedings. ...

Should Section 44(c) of the Judiciary Act of 1948 give way to the provisions of the Tariff and Customs
Code, or vice versa? In our opinion, in this particular case, the Court of First Instance should yield to the
jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs. The jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs is provided for in
Republic Act 1937 which took effect on July 1, 1957, much later than the Judiciary Act of 1948. It is
axiomatic that a later law prevails over a prior statute. Moreover, on ground of public policy, it is more
reasonable to conclude that the legislators intended to divest the Court of First Instance of the
prerogative to replevin a property which is a subject of a seizure and forfeiture proceedings for violation
of the Tariff and Customs Code. Otherwise, actions for forfeiture of property for violations of Customs
laws could easily be undermined by the simple device of replevin.

Furthermore, Section 2303 of the Tariff and Customs Code requires the Collector of Customs to give to
the owner of the property sought to be forfeited, written notice of the seizure and to give him the
opportunity to be heard in his defense. This provision clearly indicates the intention of the law to
confine in the Bureau of Customs the determination of all questions affecting the disposal of property
proceeded against in a seizure and forfeiture case. The judicial recourse of the property owner is not in
the Court of First Instance but in the Court of Tax Appeals, and only after exhausting administrative
remedies in the Bureau of Customs.
It is now the settled rule that it is the Court of Tax Appeals and not the Court of First Instance that has
jurisdiction to review the actuations of the Customs authorities regarding the legality or illegality of a
seizure, detention, or release of imported goods; and regarding fines, forfeiture or other penalties
imposed in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the Customs Law or other laws or part of
laws administered by the Bureau of Customs. Thus, in the case Acting Collector of Customs of the Port of
Manila vs. Calauag,5 this Court said:

... The suit filed with respondent Judge was "to review and nullify whatever has already been done by
the respondents wherein petitioner without and/or in excess of their jurisdiction," namely, the issuance
of the warrant of seizure and detention, and the execution thereof by the NBI agents.

Statutes as well as jurisprudence are very clear, however, that it is the Court of Tax Appeals, and not the
Court of First Instance, that has jurisdiction to review the actuations of the Customs authorities in regard
to "seizure, detention or release of property affected; fines, forfeitures or other penalties imposed in
relation thereto, or other matters, arising under the Customs Law or other law or part of law
administered by the Bureau of Customs." So We ruled in Millarez vs. Amparo, 97 Phil. 282, 284. 285:

"Republic Act No. 1125, section 7, effective June 16, 1964 gave the Court of Tax Appeals exclusive
appellate jurisdiction to review on appeal, decisions of the Commissioner of Customs, involving 'seizure,
detention or release of property affected ... or other matters arising under the Customs Law or other law
administered by the Bureau of Customs.' In our opinion this provision necessarily has taken away the
power of the Manila court of first instance to 'review' decisions of the Customs authorities, 'in any case
of seizure' — as in this case — under section 1383 et seq. of the Revised Administrative Code.

Consequently, the respondent Judge had no authority to entertain the complaints of Serree
Investments, Lim Hu and Fructuoso Nepomuceno, which, although entitled Mandamus and Certiorari
were in reality petitions to review the actuations of the proper customs authorities, now exclusively
reviewable by the Court of Tax Appeals (R.A. 1129). Furthermore, conceding that the complaints were
strictly mandamus or certiorari civil actions, still they were groundless, the petitioners having an
adequate remedy by appeal, as stated, to the Court of Tax Appeals. Neither certiorari nor mandamus, it
will be recalled, is available where relief by appeal is provided. Therefore, the complaints having no
merit, issuance of the preliminary mandatory injunction was clearly erroneous, and the challenged writs
should be annulled.

xxx xxx xxx"

Respondent Calalang no doubt has the right to question the legality of the seizure action commenced by
the Customs authorities. For this, however, she must go to the proper court, namely, the Court of Tax
Appeals, since its jurisdiction to review seizure cases necessarily includes all questions affecting the
legality or illegality of a seizure. ...

It may be added that the goods in question were seized by virtue of a warrant of seizure and detention
prior to the filing of the petition before the lower court. From the time seizure had been effected the
Bureau of Customs had acquired jurisdiction over the goods for the purpose of the enforcement of the
tariff and customs laws, to the exclusion of the regular courts. In the case of Papa vs. Mago,6 this Court,
citing Pacis vs. Averia, supra, and De Joya vs. Lantin7 said:

In the present case, the Bureau of Customs actually seized the goods in question on November 4, 1966,
and so from that date the Bureau of Customs acquired jurisdiction over the goods for the purposes of
the enforcement of the tariff and custom laws, to the exclusion of the regular courts. Much less then
would the Court of First Instance of Manila have jurisdiction over the goods in question after the
Collector of Customs had issued the warrant of seizure and detention on January 12, 1967.

Respondents' argument that the issuance of the warrant of seizure and detention was illegal, improper
and arbitrary because it was issued after the customs duties, taxes and other charges for the imported
goods in the amount of P10,887.00 had been paid, and that the physical custody of the goods in
question was no longer with the Collector of Customs, the same having been already deposited in a
private bodega, is of no moment. Payment of an amount for customs duties, taxes, etc. does not
necessarily terminate the importation and make the release of the imported goods from the customs
zone regular. Importation is deemed terminated only upon full payment of the duties, taxes and other
charges upon the articles, or secured to be paid at the port of entry, and the legal permit for withdrawal
shall have been granted.8 Hence, if customs duties, taxes and other charges on the articles have not
been fully paid and the same were released, the release thereof would be irregular, and the goods
would be subject to seizure under Section 2530 (m) of the Tariff and Customs Code.9 Having been
released irregularly, the goods or articles involved in the present case could be seized even outside the
customs zone by the customs authorities, or by the persons deputized by the Commissioner of Customs
or by the Collector of Customs — as in the case of herein petitioners PAGCOM agents whose deputation
was specifically stated in the warrant of seizure and detention issued by the Collector of Customs.
In Papa vs. Mago, supra, this Court held that the interception and seizure of the customs authorities of
imported goods that were already released from the customs zone was considered a reacquisition by
the Collector of Customs of its jurisdiction over the goods and the custody thereof. This Court said:

Even if it be granted, arguendo, that after the goods in question had been brought out of the customs
area the Bureau of Customs had lost jurisdiction over the same, nevertheless, when said goods were
intercepted at the Agrifina Circle on November 4, 1966 by members of the Manila Police Department,
acting under direction and orders of their Chief, Ricardo G. Papa, who had been formally deputized by
the Commissioner of Customs, the Bureau of Customs had regained jurisdiction and custody of the
goods. Section 1206 of the Tariff and Customs Code imposes upon the Collector of Customs the duty to
hold possession of all imported articles upon which duties, taxes, and other charges have not been paid,
or secured to be paid, and to dispose of the same according to law. (Emphasis supplied.)

The fear expressed by the respondents, that should the stand of the petitioners be upheld — that is,
that imported goods that are already ordered released after the payment of duties, taxes and other
charges may still be seized if it is found that the duties, taxes and other charges paid were erroneously
or fraudulently assessed — the imported goods would become like a "pingpong ball" which would
bounce back and forth from the customs zone to a private bodega as many times as the payments may
be found erroneous, is unfounded. Reseizure of the imported goods can only happen if the goods had
not previously been the subject of seizure identification proceedings. As this Court has held in the Pacis
case, supra, there is provided in Part 2 of Title VI of the Tariff and Customs Code the procedure in
seizure and forfeiture cases and the Collector of Customs is vested with the authority to hear and decide
said cases. In the exercise of said authority the Collector of Customs is required to give to the owner of
the goods sought to be forfeited a written notice of the seizure and he is given the opportunity to be
heard in his defense. The decision of the Collector of Customs is appealable to the Commissioner of
Customs; in turn, the decision of the Commissioner is appealable to the Court of Tax Appeals; and the
decision of the Court of Tax Appeals is appealable to this Court. Under this procedure there can be no
instance of unwarranted reseizure of the imported goods because right before the Collector of Customs
the owner of the imported goods can prove that his importation was regular and he can demand a
correct and definite appraisal of the goods once and for all.

Hence, in the instant case, the filing by respondents Alvaran, Floresca and Africa of a petition with
respondent Judge Reyes for the return of the goods seized, etc., and the action of the latter granting
said petition, were a departure from the procedure outlined by law. Respondent Alvaran, Floresca and
Africa should have filed said petition or protest with the Collector of Customs. On the other hand, while
it is true that respondent Judge Reyes was the one who issued the search warrant respecting the goods
in question, said search warrant was obtained pursuant to Section 2209 of the Tariff and Customs Code
so that the PAGCOM-PC-Customs agents could search the dwelling house adjoining the private bodega
where the goods were kept. In other words, the search warrant was secured merely as an auxiliary
means in the enforcement of the warrant of seizure and detention issued by petitioner Collector of
Customs. To permit respondent Judge Reyes or the lower court, to take custody of the goods subject of
the seizure proceedings would in effect render ineffective the power of the customs authorities under
the customs law and deprive the Court of Tax Appeals of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction. It is Our
considered view that the law, in requiring a search warrant to be issued by a judge of the court of first
instance or by a municipal judge, in order to search a dwelling house, did not intend to divest the
customs authorities of the custody of the articles seized or held in virtue of the search warrant.
Otherwise, a municipal judge, or a judge of the court of first instance for that matter, who issued the
search warrant would have greater powers over the seized articles than the Collector of Customs — a
situation that is certainly not contemplated by the law.

Having thus shown that the lower court did not have jurisdiction to entertain Civil Case No. 7883 (before
Branch VIII), as well as the petition filed with Branch VI, and that it has no authority to take custody of
the seized goods, We consider it unnecessary to discuss the other issue raised before this Court. And let
it be stated, that while the foregoing discussions make specific mention only of the petitions filed by
respondent Alvaran, Floresca and Africa, Our ruling also applies to the petitions in intervention filed by
respondents Chan and España in Civil Case No. 7883.

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari and prohibition prayed for is granted. The Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch VIII, is declared without jurisdiction to proceed in its Civil Case No. 7883, all the
proceedings had in that case are declared null and void, and said Civil Case No. 7883 is hereby ordered
dismissed. Likewise, Branch VI of the same court is declared without authority to take custody of the
articles seized by virtue of the search warrant issued by the presiding judge of said branch on October
23, 1963 in connection with the warrant of seizure and detention issued under Seizure Identification No.
7963 of the Bureau of Customs, and the orders issued by the presiding judge of said Branch VI, dated
November 5 and 8, 1963 and December 21, 1963, are hereby annulled and set aside. The Judges
presiding Branches VI and VIII of the Court of First Instance of Rizal are hereby prohibited from further
interfering with the exercise by the petitioners of their duties and functions in connection with Seizure
Identification No. 7963 of the Bureau of Customs. Costs against the private respondents. It is so ordered.

Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar and Antonio, JJ., concur.

Castro, J., did not take part.

Concepcion, C.J., is on official leave.

Footnotes

1 Judge Reyes issued the search warrant mentioned earlier.

2 G.R. No. L-30734, July 28, 1969; 28 SCRA 836.

3 G.R. No. L-22526, November 29, 1966; 118 SCRA 907.

4 G.R. No. L-23504, December 29, 1967; 21 SCRA 1493.

5 G. R. No. L-23925, May 24, 1967; 20 SCRA 204.

6 G.R. No. L-27360, February 1, 1968; 22 SCRA 857.

7 G.R. No. L-24037, April 27, 1967; 19 SCRA 893.

8 Papa vs. Mago, supra.

9 Ibid.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

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ConstitutionStatutesExecutive IssuancesJudicial IssuancesOther IssuancesJurisprudenceInternational

Legal ResourcesAUSL Exclusive

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 94262 May 31, 1991

FEEDER INTERNATIONAL LINE, PTE., LTD., by its agent, FEEDER INTERNATIONAL (PHILS.) INC., petitioner,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, Fourteenth Division, COURT OF TAX APPEALS, and COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS,
respondents.

Emma Quisumbing-Fernando and Yolanda Quisumbing-Javellana & Associates for petitioner.

REGALADO, J.:

The instant petition seeks the reversal of the decision of respondent Court of Appeals dated May 8,
1990, affirming the decision rendered by respondent Court of Tax Appeals which found the vessel M/T
"ULU WAI" liable under Section 2530(a) of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines (Presidential
Decree No. 1464), as amended, and its cargo of 1,100 metric tons of gas oil and 1,000 metric tons of fuel
oil liable under Section 2530(a), (f), and (1-1) of the same Code and ordering the forfeiture of the said
vessel and its cargo.1

The facts as culled from the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 20470 are as follows:

The M/T "ULU WAI" foreign vessel of Honduran registry, owned and operated by Feeder International
Shipping Lines of Singapore, left Singapore on May 6, 1986 carrying 1,100 metric tons of gas oil and
1,000 metric tons of fuel oil consigned to Far East Synergy Corporation of Zamboanga, Philippines.

On May 14, 1986, the vessel anchored at the vicinity of Guiuanon Island in Iloilo without notifying the
Iloilo customs authorities. The presence of the vessel only came to the knowledge of the Iloilo
authorities by information of the civilian informer in the area. Acting on said information, the Acting
District Collector of Iloilo dispatched a Customs team on May 19, 1986 to verify the report.

The Customs team found out that the vessel did not have on board the required ship and shipping
documents, except for a clearance from the port authorities of Singapore clearing the vessel for
"Zamboanga."

In view thereof, the vessel and its cargo were held and a Warrant of Seizure and Detention over the
same was issued after due investigation. The petitioner then filed its Motion to Dismiss and to Quash the
Warrants of Seizure and Detention which the District Collector denied in his Order dated December 12,
1986.

In the course of the forfeiture proceedings, the parties, through their respective counsel, agreed on a
stipulation of facts, to wit:
l. That the existence and identity of MT "ULU WAI" subject of Sl-2-86, herein identified as Exh. "A", is
admitted.

2. That the existence and identity of l,100 metric tons of gas oil, subject of Sl-2-86-A, herein identified as
Exh. "B", is admitted;

3. That the existence and identity of 1,000 metric tons of fuel oil, subject of Sl-2-86 herein identified as
Exh. "B-1", is admitted;

4. That M/T "ULU WAI" left Singapore May 6, 1986 and was cleared by Singapore customs authorities for
Zamboanga, Philippines;

5. That subject vessel arrived at Guiuanon Island, Municipality of Nueva Valencia, sub-province of
Guimaras, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, about 1120HRS, May 14,1986;

6. That subject vessel was boarded by Customs and Immigration authorities for the first time in the
afternoon of May 19, 1986, at about 1600HRS;

7. That an apprehension report dated May 21, 1986, submitted by the Team leader of the Customs and
Immigration Team, Roberto Intrepido, marked and identified as Exh. "C", is admitted;

8. That at the time of boarding, the Master of subject vessel could not produce any ship and/or shipping
documents regarding her cargo except the Port Clearance Certificate No. 179999 issued by the Port of
Singapore authority dated May 4, 1986, marked as Exh. "D", which is hereby admitted;

9. That on May 26, 1986, the Master of M/T "ULU WAI", Capt. Romeo E. Deposa filed a Marine Protest
dated same date, which Marine Protest, marked and identified as Exh. "E", is hereby admitted;
10. That the sworn statement of said Capt. Romeo E. Deposa, marked and identified as Exh. "F", given
on May 26, 1986 before Atty. Hernando Hinojales, Customs Legal Officer, is admitted;

11. That the sworn statement of Mr. Antonio Torres, Owner's representative of M/T "ULU WAI" marked
and identified as Exh. "G" given before Atty. Hernando Hinojales on May 28,1986, is admitted;

12. That the sworn statement of Wilfredo Lumagpas, Master of M/T "CATHEAD" given before Lt. Dennis
Azarraga on June 4, 1986, marked and identified as Exh. "H", is admitted;

13. That the existence of Fixture Note No. FN-M-86-05-41 entered into by and between the National
Stevedoring & Lighterage Corporation and the Far East Synergy Corporation, marked and identified as
Exh. "I", is admitted; and;

14. That the Preliminary Report of Survey Sounding Report dated June 17, 1986, signed by J.P. Piad,
Surveyor of Interport Surveying Services, Inc. and duly attested by Ernesto Cutay, Chief Officer of the
M/T "ULU WAI" marked and identified as Exh. "J", is also admitted.2

On March 17, 1987, the District Collector issued his decision, with the following disposition:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the M/T "ULU WAI" hereby found guilty of violating Section 2530 (a)
of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines (PD 1464), as amended, while her cargo of 1,100 M/T
Gas Oil and 1,000 M/T Fuel Oil are hereby found guilty of violating Section 2530* (a), (f), and (1-1) under
the same Code and are hereby forfeited in favor of the Republic of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.3

Petitioner appealed to the Commissioner of Customs who rendered a decision dated May 13, 1987, the
decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated March 19, 1987 of the District Collector of
Customs of Iloilo, ordering the forfeiture of M/T "ULU WAI" and its cargo of 2,100 metric tons of gas and
fuel oil is hereby affirmed in toto.

SO ORDERED.4

On June 25, 1987, petitioner filed a petition for review of the decisions of the Collector and the
Commissioner of Customs with the Court of Tax Appeals, praying for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or a restraining order to enjoin the Commissioner from implementing his
decision. On December 14, 1988, the Court of Tax Appeals issued its decision, with this dispositive
portion:

WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Commissioner of Customs dated May 13, 1987, ordering the
forfeiture of the vessel M/T "ULU WAI" for violation of Section 2530(a) of the Tariff and Custom Codes
(sic), as amended, and its cargo of 1,100 metric tons of Gas Oil and 1,000 metric tons of Fuel Oil for
violation of Section 2530 * (a) and (f), and (I-1) of the same Code, is hereby affirmed. With costs.

SO ORDERED.5

Petitioner, on January 19, 1990, filed a petition for review of the Court of Tax Appeals' decision with this
Court. On March 21, 1990, we issued a resolution6 referring the disposition of the case to the Court of
Appeals in view of our decision in Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al.7
holding that final judgments or decrees of the Court of Tax Appeals are within the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals.

On May 8, 1990, the Court of Appeals rendered its questioned decision affirming the decision of the
Court of Tax Appeals. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration having been denied on July 4, 1990, it
interposed this instant petition contending that:

1. The Court of Appeals erred in finding on the basis of circumstantial evidence that an illegal
importation had been committed;
2. Petitioner was deprived of property without due process of law in that its right to be presumed
innocent was not recognized and the decision was not supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt;
and

3. The sworn statements of Deposa and Torres were taken without assistance of counsel in violation of
their constitutional right thereto.8

We find no merit in the Petition.

1. It must be here emphasized that a forfeiture proceeding under tariff and customs laws is not penal in
nature, contrary to the argument advanced by herein petitioner. In the case of People vs. Court of first
Instance of Rizal etc., et al.,9 this Court made an exhaustive analysis of the nature of forfeiture
proceedings, in relation to criminal proceedings, as follows:

. . . It is quite clear that seizure and forfeiture proceedings under the tariff and customs laws are not
criminal in nature as they do not result in the conviction of the offender nor in the imposition of the
penalty provided for in Section 3601 of the Code. As can be gleaned from Section 2533 of the code,
seizure proceedings, such as those instituted in this case, are purely civil and administrative in character,
the main purpose of which is to enforce the administrative fines or forfeiture incident to unlawful
importation of goods or their deliberate possession. The penalty in seizure cases is distinct and separate
from the criminal liability that might be imposed against the indicted importer or possessor and both
kinds of penalties may be imposed.

In the case at bar, the decision of the Collector of Customs, as in other seizure proceedings, concerns the
res rather than the persona. The proceeding is a probe on contraband or illegally imported goods. These
merchandise violated the revenue law of the country, and as such, have been prevented from being
assimilated in lawful commerce until corresponding duties are paid thereon and the penalties imposed
and satisfied either in the form of fine or of forfeiture in favor of the government who will dispose of
them in accordance with law. The importer or possessor is treated differently. The fact that the
administrative penalty be falls on him is an inconsequential incidence to criminal liability. By the same
token, the probable guilt cannot be negated simply because he was not held administratively liable. The
Collector's final declaration that the articles are not subject to forfeiture does not detract his findings
that untaxed goods were transported in respondents' car and seized from their possession by agents of
the law. Whether criminal liability lurks on the strength of the provision of the Tariff and Customs Code
adduced in the information can only be determined in a separate criminal action. Respondents'
exoneration in the administrative cases cannot deprive the State of its right to prosecute. But under our
penal laws, criminal responsibility, if any, must be proven not by preponderance of evidence but by
proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Considering, therefore, that proceedings for the forfeiture of goods illegally imported are not criminal in
nature since they do not result in the conviction of the wrongdoer nor in the imposition upon him of a
penalty, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required in order to justify the forfeiture of the goods. In
this case, the degree of proof required is merely substantial evidence which means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.10

In the case at bar, we find and so hold that the Government has sufficiently established that an illegal
importation, or at least an attempt thereof, has been committed with the use of the vessel M/T "ULU
WAI," thus warranting the forfeiture of said vessel and its cargo pursuant to the provisions of the Tariff
and Customs Code.

Before we proceed to a discussion of the factual findings of the Court of Appeals, it bears mention that
petitioner, which is a corporate entity, has no personality to invoke the right to be presumed innocent
which right is available only to an individual who is an accused in a criminal case.

2. The main issue for resolution is whether or not there was an illegal importation committed, or at least
an attempt thereof, which would justify a forfeiture of the subject vessel and its cargo.

Petitioner avers that respondent court erred in finding that an illegal importation had been committed
on the basis of circumstantial evidence, erroneously relying on Section 5 (now Section 4), Rule 133 of the
Rules of Court. As earlier stated, forfeiture proceedings are not criminal in nature, hence said provision
of Rule 133 which involves. such circumstantial evidence as will produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt does not apply.

Section 1202 of the Tariff and Customs Code provides that importation begins when the carrying vessel
or aircraft enters the jurisdiction of the Philippines with intention to unload therein. It is clear from the
provision of the law that mere intent to unload is sufficient to commence an importation. And "intent,"
being a state of mind, is rarely susceptible of direct proof, but must ordinarily be inferred from the
facts,11 and therefore can only be proved by unguarded, expressions, conduct and circumstances
generally.12
In the case at bar, that petitioner is guilty of illegal importation, there having been an intent to unload, is
amply supported by substantial evidence as clearly demonstrated by this comprehensive discussion in
respondent court's decision:

It is undisputed that the vessel M/T "ULU WAI" entered the jurisdiction of the Philippines. The issue that
calls for Our resolution is whether or not there was an intention to unload. The facts and circumstances
borne by the evidence convince Us that there was intent to unload. The following circumstances
unmistakably point to this conclusion.

1. Considering that the vessel came from Singapore, the route to Zamboanga was shorter and Iloilo lies
further north.1âwphi1 It is not logical for the sailing vessel to travel a longer distance to get the
necessary repairs.

2. When the vessel M/T "ULU WAI" anchored at Guiuanon Island, Guimaras, Iloilo, it did not notify the
Iloilo port or Customs authorities of its arrival. The master of the vessel did not file a marine protest until
12 days after it had anchored, despite the supposed urgency of the repairs needed and notwithstanding
the provision (Sec. 1016) of the Code requiring the master to file protest within 24 hours.

3. At the time of boarding by the customs personnel, the required ship's and shipping documents were
not on board except the clearance from Singaporean port officials clearing the vessel for Zamboanga.
Petitioner claims that these were turned over to the shipping agent who boarded the vessel on May 15,
1986. However, this claim is belied by the sworn marine protest (Exhibit "E") of the master of M/T "ULU
WAI" Mr. Romeo Deposa.

It was only on or about the 20th of May when I instructed one of the crew to: get down of (sic) the
vessel and find means and ways to contact the vessel's representative.

Moreover, in such Sworn Statement (Exhibit "G"), ship agent, Antonio Torres, stated that he did not
know the buyer of the oil, which is impossible if he had the Local Purchase Order of the alleged buyer,
Pogun Construction SDN. Torres also swore that his knowledge came from the vessel's owner, without
mentioning the shipping documents which indicate such data. He also said that he did not know the
consignee of the oil which would have been patent from the documents. Lastly, as also pointed out by
the court a quo, the captain of the vessel M/T "ULU WAI" Romeo Deposa, in his sworn statement to
custom authorities on May 26, 1986, enumerated the documents he allegedly gave to Mr. Antonio
Torres, but did not mention as among them the Local Purchase Order of Pogun Construction SDN and
the Bill of Lading.

4. When the vessel was inspected, the tugboat M/T "CATHEAD", and the large M/T "SEMIRANO NO.
819" were alongside it. A fixture note revealed that the barge and the tugboat were contracted by
Consignee Far East Synergy to load the cargo of the vessel into the awaiting barge and to discharge the
same to Manila (Exhibits "I" and "I-1").

It is of no moment that the fixture note did not expressly mention the vessel M/T "ULU WAI"
Government witnesses, Asencio and Lumagpas, testified that it was the vessel's cargo which was to be
unloaded and brought to Manila by them.13

The aforequoted findings of fact of respondent Court of Appeals are in consonance with the findings of
both the Collector and the Commissioner of Customs, as affirmed by the Court of Tax Appeals. We,
therefore, find no compelling reason to deviate from the elementary principle that findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals, and of the administrative and quasi-judicial bodies for that matter, are entitled to
great weight and are conclusive and binding upon this Court absent a showing of a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

3. The fact that the testimonies of Deposa and Torres were given without the assistance of counsel may
not be considered an outright violation of their constitutional right to be assisted by counsel. As
explained in the case of Nera vs. The Auditor General:14

The right to the assistance of counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required by the
Constitution or a law. Exception is made in the charter only during the custodial investigation of a
person suspected of a crime, who may not waive his right to counsel except in writing and in the
presence of counsel, and during the trial of the accused, who has the right "to be heard by himself and
counsel," either retained by him or provided for him by the government at its expense. These
guarantees are embodied in the Constitution, along with the other rights of the person facing criminal
prosecution, because of the odds he must contend with to defend his liberty (and before even his life)
against the awesome authority of the State.
In other proceedings, however, the need for the assistance of counsel is not as urgent nor is it deemed
essential to their validity. There is nothing in the Constitution that says a party in a non-criminal
proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel and that without such representation he will not be
bound by such proceedings. The assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable. The legal
profession was not engrafted in the due process clause such that without the participation of its
members the safeguard is deemed ignored or violated. The ordinary citizen is not that helpless that he
cannot validly act at all except only with a lawyer at his side.

Besides, if ever there was any doubt as to the veracity of the sworn statements of Deposa and Torres,
they should have been presented during any appropriate stage of the proceedings to refute or deny the
statements they made. This was not done by petitioner. Hence, the presumption that official duty was
regularly performed stands. In addition, petitioner does not deny that Torres is himself a lawyer. Finally,
petitioner simply contends that the sworn statements were taken without the assistance of counsel but,
however, failed to allege or prove that the same were taken under anomalous circumstances which
would render them inadmissible as evidence against petitioner. We thus find no compelling reason to
doubt the validity or veracity of the said sworn statements.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the judgment appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Paras and Padilla, JJ., concur.

Sarmiento, J., is on leave.

Footnotes

1 Penned by Associate Justice Conrado T. Limcaoco, with Associate Justices Arturo B. Buena and Socorro
Tirona Liwag concurring; Petition, Annex "E"; Rollo, 85.
2 Rollo, 86-89.

3 Petition, Annex "P"; Ibid., 145.

4 Id., Annex "R"; Ibid., 154.

* Omitted in the original text.

5 Penned by Presiding Judge Amante Filler, and concurred in by Associate Judges Constante C. Roaquin
and Alex Z. Reyes Petition, Annex "V"; Rollo, 210.

6 Petition, Annex "D"; Rollo, 84.

7 180 SCRA 609 (1989).

8 Rollo, 9-16.

9 101 SCRA 86 (1980).

10 Magistrado vs. Employees' Compensation Commissio

FIRST DIVISION

[G. R. Nos. 145422-23. January 18, 2002]

ERWIN C. REMIGIO, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, Fourth Division, respondent.

DECISION

PARDO, J.:

The Case

The case is a petition for review on certiorari[1] of the decision of the Sandiganbayan[2] finding
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 3602, in relation to Section 3601 of the
Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, and sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty of
[imprisonment for] eight (8) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to twelve (12) years, as maximum, and
to pay a fine of P8,000.00, plus revocation of his license as customs broker.

The Facts

On August 15, 1988, a shipment of one (1) 40 feet Container Van No. NYKU 5046600 arrived at the Port
of Manila from Hongkong via the S/S NORSUND. The packing list showed that the shipment was
consigned to BORHAM TRADING, located at 37 Harvard Street, Quezon City. The packing list, invoice,
bill of lading as well as the letter of credit supporting the importation showed that the 40 feet container
van contained 25 MT of Sodium Bicarbonate with a gross weight of 25,000 kgs.

On August 19, 1988, petitioner Erwin C. Remigio, a customs broker, filed with the Collector of Customs,
Port of Manila, Import Entry and Internal Revenue Declaration (Consumption Entry) No. 72259-88
covering the shipment. On the same date, Arthur Sevilla, Jr., a customs examiner, conducted an
examination of Container Van No. NYKU 5046600 and in his Examiner’s Return noted that the shipment
contained 1000 bags of 25 kgs. Sodium Bicarbonate. He recommended that the shipment be subjected
to Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industry (PCCI) clearance and magna scale weighing.
After receiving the PCCI clearance, Arthur Sevilla, Jr. forwarded the Import Entry papers together with
the PCCI clearance to Tomas P. Tuason, Customs Principal Examiner, Bureau of Customs and supervisor
of Sevilla. Tomas Tuason, after checking all the requirements and supporting documents forwarded the
same to the appraiser’s group. The importer paid duties and taxes for the shipment in the amount of
P22,972.00.

At around three o’clock in the afternoon of the same day, the Collector of Customs allowed the
container van to leave the customs area to be delivered to the consignee Borham Trading. While the
van was cruising along Quezon Boulevard in front of Santo Domingo Church, Quezon City, agents of the
Special Operations Group, Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) headed by Mr.
Benjamin Kho intercepted the 40 feet container van and brought the same to Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon
City for proper disposal.

Godofredo B. Camina, Jr., a Customs Examiner assigned to make an inventory of the container van at
Camp Aguinaldo found that the same contained only 185 bags of sodium bicarbonate, and the following
items: 8 pcs. Bridgestone Tires; 10 sacks dried fish; 4 ctns. Laser Printer OPC Kit 81; 10 pcs. Sharp PC-
1150; 1 unit Mercedes Benz 280 SE 1983 Model; 4 BLR canvas of undetermined quantity with padlock;
143 rolls of Ramie; Plastic Cards (Male & Female); 5 bunds Jusi clothing materials; 156 pieces A1 mm
leather brown gilt buckles; 24 boxes 18 mm black strap leather; 20 boxes 20 mm St. End (Metal); 20
boxes 14 mm St. End (Metal); 10 boxes 10 mm Gilt buckles; 3 bunds Handkerchief; 25 ctns 14 mm Gilt
leather buckles; 16 ctns 10 mm Gilt buckles; 18 ctns 12 mm gilt leather buckles; 10 ctns 12 mm St. End
metal; 10 ctns 14 mm St. End metal; 25 ctns 20 mm St. End (metal); 100 pcs. Catalogue magazine; 60
pcs. Assorted RTWs; 380 ctns Maling Pork Luncheon Meat; 1,000 pcs. Beta Song L-500; 15 packs Gold St.
End plated 14 mm; 7 bund men’s handkerchief; 1020 pcs. Rubber bracelet; 8 bunds handkerchief; Metal
Gilt straps; 508 pcs. Children’s watches; 100 pcs. Men’s watches; 8 pcs. Laser Printer; 10 pcs. Sharp PC
1150 Pocket Computer; outlets; switches; boosters; towels; 1 unit KV2140 RWP Song TV with remote
control; 3 units Sony SL-S480 Betamax; Casio Alarm Quartz; Chandelier 12 bulb outlet; Sanyo Stereo
Casette recorder; 4 pcs. Original mag wheels Mercedes Benz; Chandelier 16 bulb outlet; Donato Ceiling
lamp; 10 units Family Computer Nintendo Assorted ladies’ bag; suiting materials; 60 packs bracelet; 5
bunds Jusi; T-shirts; jogging pants; short; clothing materials; shoes. The customs examiner determined
that the correct duties and taxes that may be assessed on the shipment amounted to P1,643,057.00.

Special Agent Marcos de Mesa of the Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service, Bureau of Customs
verified the given address of Borham Trading at 37 Harvard Street, Cubao, Quezon City, and found it to
be non-existent.
On May 30, 1991, Special Prosecution Officer III Wilfredo R. Orencia filed with the Sandiganbayan two
Informations[3] against customs examiner Arthur Sevilla, Jr. y Gayuso and petitioner Erwin Remigio y
Cunanan for violation of Sections 3604, paragraphs (d) and (e) and Section 3602, in relation to Section
3601, paragraph 4, Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, as follows:

“Criminal Case No. 16772

“That on or about August 18, 1988 in the City of Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused Arthur Sevilla, Jr. a public officer, he being the Acting Customs Examiner, Port of Manila,
Bureau of Customs, Manila, duly assigned to conduct a 100% physical examination of the 40 footer
container van, covered under Import Entry No. 72259-88, charged with the enforcement of the
provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, as amended, while in the performance of
his official functions and taking advantage of his public position and committing the offense in relation to
his office, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously conspire or collude with his co-accused
customs broker Erwin C. Remigio to defraud the customs revenue in the amount of P1,620,085.00 to the
damage and prejudice of the government in the aforesaid amount.

“CONTRARY TO LAW.”[4]

“Criminal Case No. 16773

“That on or about August 18, 1988, and sometime prior and/or subsequent thereto in the City of Manila
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Arthur Sevilla, Jr., a public officer, he being
the Acting Customs Examiner, Port of Manila, Bureau of Customs duly assigned to conduct a 100%
physical examination of the 40 footer container van covered under Import Entry No. 72259-88, while in
the performance of his public functions, committing the offense in relation to his office and in conspiracy
with his co-accused, Erwin C. Remigio, the Customs Broker of the shipment in question, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously made an entry of the imported shipment in the said Import
Entry, by means of a false examination return totally different from the true number, weight and
classification of the shipments, per the inventory conducted, thereby enabling Erwin C. Remigio to pay
the amount of only P22,972.00 as customs duties and taxes, when the correct amount legally due is
P1,643,057.00, to the prejudice and damage of the government.

“CONTRARY TO LAW.”[5]
Upon arraignment on June 28, 1991,[6] both accused, assisted by their respective counsel, entered a
plea of not guilty to the charges. Trial ensued.

After trial on the merits, on October 19, 2000, the Sandiganbayan rendered a decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered acquitting accused Arthur G. Sevilla,
Jr. in Criminal Cases Nos. 16772 and 16773.

“The bailbond posted by said accused for his provisional liberty is hereby ordered cancelled.

“Criminal Case No. 16772 is hereby ordered dismissed with respect to accused Erwin C. Remigio.

“In Criminal Case No. 16773, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Erwin C. Remigio guilty of
violation of Sec. 3602 in relation to Sec. 3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code and in accordance with the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of 8 years and 1 day as
minimum to 12 years as maximum and to pay a fine of P8,000.00. His license as customs broker is
likewise ordered revoked.

“SO ORDERED.”[7]

Hence, this appeal.[8]

The Issue

The issue raised is whether petitioner was guilty of violation of Section 3602, in relation to Section 3601
of the Tariff and Customs Code.
The Court’s Ruling

In its decision, the Sandiganbayan found petitioner guilty of violation of Section 3602, in relation to
Section 3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines in Criminal Case No. 16773. However, the
Sandiganbayan stated it had reason to believe the accused Remigio to be liable under the final
paragraph of Section 3407. It provides:

“x x x

“Any person who files an entry or facilitates the processing or release of any shipment shall be liable for
smuggling if the ostensible owner, importer or consignee is fictitious and the shipment is found to be
unlawful. If the violator is a customs broker, his license shall also be revoked by the Commissioner of
Customs. (R.A. 7651, June 4, 1993)”

Actually, petitioner was charged with violation of Section 3602, in relation to Section 3601 of the Tariff
and Customs Code of the Philippines,[9] not Section 3407 of the same Code. What is worse, the above-
quoted provision (Section 3407) did not exist in 1988. It was only introduced in 1993 with the
enactment of R.A. No. 7651 on June 4, 1993. The law is settled that no statute, decree, ordinance, rule
or regulation shall be given retrospective effect unless expressly so provided,[10] or favorable to the
accused. An accused cannot be convicted of an offense, unless it is charged in the complaint or
information.[11]

The Sandiganbayan convicted the petitioner of violation of Section 3602, in relation to Section 3601 of
the Tariff and Customs Code, which provides:

“Sec. 3602. Various fraudulent practices against customs revenue.- Any person who makes or attempts
to make any entry of imported or exported article by means of any false or fraudulent invoice,
declaration, affidavit, letter, paper, or by any means of any false statement, written or verbal, by any
means of any false or fraudulent practice whatsoever, or knowingly effects any entry of goods, wares or
merchandise, at less than true weight or measures thereof or upon a false classification as to quality or
value, or by the payment of less than the amount legally due, or knowingly and willfully files any false or
fraudulent entry or claim for the payment of drawback or refund of duties upon exportation of
merchandise, or makes or files any affidavit, abstract, record, certificate or other document, with a view
to securing the payment to himself or others of any drawback, allowance, or refund of duties on the
exportation of merchandise, greater than that legally due thereon, or who shall be guilty of any willful
act or omission, shall, for each offense, be punished in accordance with the penalties prescribed in the
preceding section.”[12]

“Section 3602 of the Tariff and Customs Code enumerates the various fraudulent practices against
customs revenue, such as the entry of imported or exported articles by means of any false or fraudulent
invoice, statement or practice; the entry of goods at less than the true weight or measure; or the filing
of any false or fraudulent entry for the payment of drawback or refund of duties. The term ‘entry’ in
customs law has a triple meaning. It means (1) the documents filed at the customs house; (2) the
submission and acceptance of the documents; and (3) the procedure of passing goods through the
customs house.”[13]

Petitioner Remigio did not make or attempt to make an entry of imported articles by means of any false
or fraudulent invoice, declaration, affidavit, letter, paper, or by means of any false statement, verbal or
oral, or by means of any false or fraudulent practice whatsoever. In fact, it was the given address of the
consignee Borham Trading that the Sandiganbayan found to be fictitious. (Page 14 No. 2 of the
decision).”

Such situation is that contemplated in Section 3407 of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines
above quoted.

In the instant case, there is no evidence to show that the owner, importer or consignee in question,
BORHAM TRADING is fictitious. The only evidence introduced was the report of an investigator that the
address of the consignee appearing in the entry, the bill of lading and the packing list cannot be located.
The investigator himself testified that Borham Trading was registered with the Bureau of Domestic
Trade;[14] that a Letter of Credit covering the shipment was opened with the Metropolitan Bank[15]
and the shipping documents, i.e., the bill of lading, the packing list were all in the name of Borham
Trading at its given address.

While the investigator testified that at the time of the investigation the address of Borham Trading could
not be located at Harvard Street, Quezon City, the investigator did not bother to check whether there
was any change in the numbers of the buildings at Harvard Street.[16]
Accused Erwin C. Remigio, as customs broker, prepared the entry covering the shipment based on the
bill of lading, the invoice, the packing list, letter of credit, the import entry declaration and the Central
Bank Release Certificate. The given address of Borham Trading was at 37 Harvard Street, Quezon City.
There was nothing in the documents to show that there was anything amiss in the shipment or the
covering documents. A customs broker is not required to go beyond the documents presented to him
in filing an entry on the basis of such documents.

Section 3601 provides that “x x x Any person who shall fraudulently import or bring into the Philippines,
or assist in so doing, any article, contrary to law, or shall receive, conceal, buy, sell or in any manner
facilitate the transportation, concealment, or sale of such article after importation, knowing the same to
have been imported contrary to law, shall be guilty of smuggling and shall be punished with x x x.”

Accused Remigio did not fraudulently assist in the importation of any article contrary to law nor
facilitated its transportation, knowing the same to have been imported contrary to law. All accused
Remigio did was to prepare the import entry based on the shipping and other documents required by
the Bureau of Customs and file the same.

In “Farolan v. Court of Tax Appeals and Bagong Buhay Trading,[17] we declared that:

“x x The fraud contemplated by law must be actual and not constructive. It must be intentional fraud,
consisting of deception willfully and deliberately dared or resorted to in order to give up some right. As
explained earlier, the import entry was prepared on the basis of the shipping documents provided for by
the foreign supplier or shipper. Hence, Bagong Bantay Trading can be considered to have acted in good
faith when it relied on these documents.”

On the other hand, Section 3407 of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines is not a penal
provision governing the conduct of a customs broker. The liability for smuggling is provided in Section
3601, which in the instant case has not been proved.

It is indeed ironical that co-accused Arthur Sevilla, Jr., the customs examiner who failed to do his duty of
conducting a 100% examination of the shipment in violation of Sections 3604 and 3602 in relation to
Section 3601, Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines was acquitted, yet petitioner was convicted of
acts which did not constitute a statutory offense at the time the event took place.
The Fallo

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Sandiganbayan[18] and ACQUITS the petitioner of
the offense charged. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

[1] Under Rule 45, Revised Rules of Court.

[2] In Crim. Cases Nos. 16772-73, promulgated on October 19, 2000. Palattao, J., ponente, Nario and
Ferrer, JJ., concurring.

[3] Docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 16772 and 16773.

[4] Sandiganbayan Record, Vol. I, pp. 1-2.

[5] Sandiganbayan Record, Vol. II, pp. 1-2.

[6] Certificate of Arraignment, Sandiganbayan Record, Vol. !, pp. 28-29.

[7] Petition, Annex “A”, promulgated October 19, 2000, Rollo, pp. 15-30. Palattao, J., ponente, Nario and
Ferrer, JJ., concurring.
[8] Petition filed on October 30, 2000, Rollo, pp. 3-14.

[9] In Criminal Case No. 16773.

[10] Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 355 Phil. 181, 198 [1998].

[11] People v. Lozano, 357 Phil. 397, 412 [1998].

[12] As amended by R.A. 4712.

[13] Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals 248 SCRA 288 [1995].

[14] TSN, December 5, 1991, p. 18.

[15] TSN, Ibid., p. 30.

[16] TSN, Ibid., p. 2.

[17] 217 SCRA 298, 304 [1993].

[18] In Criminal Case No.16773.