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PALGRAVE STUDIES IN
ASIA-PACIFIC POLITICAL ECONOMY

Unpacking EU
Policy-Making towards
China
How Member States,
Bureaucracies, and
Institutions Shape its China
Economic Policy
Bas Hooijmaaijers
Palgrave Studies in Asia-Pacific Political Economy

Series Editor
Jean-Marc F. Blanchard
Mr. & Mrs. S.H. Wong Center for the Study
of Multinational Corporations
Los Gatos, CA, USA
The series aims to publish works, which will be meaningful to academics,
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 Bas Hooijmaaijers

Unpacking EU
Policy-Making
towards China
How Member States, Bureaucracies,
and Institutions Shape its China Economic Policy
Bas Hooijmaaijers
School of Advanced International and Area Studies
East China Normal University
Shanghai, China
Leuven International and European Studies Institute
KU Leuven
Leuven, Belgium

Palgrave Studies in Asia-Pacific Political Economy

ISBN 978-981-15-9366-6 ISBN 978-981-15-9367-3 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9367-3

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To Liu Fang, for her support and endless patience.
 Foreword

China’s economic comeback story is one of the most dramatic events of

the last four decades. After representing more than 30 per cent of global
gross domestic product (GDP) in the centuries up to 1820, China hit
only five per cent in 1975; now, after 40 years of its opening-up, China’s
economy stands at 15 per cent of global GDP. I first came to China in
1982, and have witnessed the many ups and downs of this continent-sized
country, living in both Beijing and Shanghai for more than 30 years.
Serving as the president of the European Union (EU) Chamber of
Commerce in China for seven years provided me a ringside seat from
which to observe not only China’s challenges, but also the successes it has
enjoyed, since acceding to the World Trade Organization in 2001. While
OECD countries’ economies were badly impacted by the global finan-
cial crisis in 2008, China’s took off in spectacular fashion. This created
new opportunities and benefits for Europe, but it has also brought critical
new challenges. These challenges include the impact of Chinese industrial
overcapacity, dumping and subsidies on the EU market, but also the emer-
gence of state-controlled Chinese companies in third markets. Meanwhile,
China’s domestic market still does not offer reciprocity to European firms.
It was against the backdrop of these issues that I met Dr Bas Hooij-
maaijers for the first time in Beijing in June 2017, to discuss the EU-China
solar panel dispute, the EU’s trade defence investigation into mobile
telecommunications networks from China and the challenges for the Sino-
European trade and investment relationship more generally. His research

vii
viii FOREWORD

led to the publication of his insightful book Unpacking EU policy-making

towards China.
The EU has long been considering how to effectively respond to the
challenge of China’s massive footprint across diverse sectors and loca-
tions. The analytical framework developed in this book helps to contribute
to a better understanding of this challenge and uncovers which tools
best illuminate the EU’s policy-making at various stages of the policy
process. The three case studies on the dispute over Chinese solar panels,
the investigation into Huawei’s telecommunication networks, and China’s
rise in Africa and the subsequent response of the EU, shed light on the
evolving nature of Sino-European trade relations, the internal workings
of EU trade defence policy, and, more generally, the current challenges to
globalisation and the international trading order.
Although this book aims to reach a broader audience, it is also very
much a treasure trove for academics, business people and policy-makers. It
will help businesses carry out more effective risk and business environment
assessments, facilitate business plans and develop government and public
relations strategies.
I wish this book had been published many years ago, and I hope that
it will be as thought-provoking to other readers as it was for me.

Beijing, China Jörg Wuttke

summer 2020 President of the European Union Chamber
of Commerce in China
 Acknowledgments

I am writing these acknowledgments as we are experiencing unprece-

dented times with the impact of COVID-19 being felt across the world.
However, every disadvantage has its advantage, and I was able to use the
time that I had to stay at home in the Netherlands to finalize this book
project. This book is the result of a long and exciting research journey
that allowed me to broaden my view to discover many different facets of
the rapidly changing global order. During this journey, which started in
fall 2013 at Shanghai Jiao Tong University (SJTU) as a Ph.D. candidate,
and was further strengthened and improved during my time at East China
Normal University (ECNU), I encountered a variety of different individ-
uals and institutions in both Europe and China, and I am deeply grateful
for their support.
To start with, I would like to thank my former Ph.D. supervisor,
colleague, friend, and editor of this book series Professor Jean-Marc F.
Blanchard, for his guidance and support. He deserves my warmest thanks.
This book would not have reached this high level of quality without his
intellectual input. I would like to express my appreciation to ECNU’s
School of Advanced International and Area Studies, particularly Dean
Liu Jun, and the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Univer-
sities [grant number 2017ECNU-HLYT019] for their financial support
to conduct and improve this research. I am also thankful to Professor
Stephan Keukeleire, my former boss, and master thesis supervisor at KU
Leuven, for his feedback throughout the Ph.D. process, including as an

ix
x ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

external reviewer, and the process of writing this book. I also would like to
express my appreciation to the other two external reviewers of my Ph.D.
dissertation, Professor Men Jing (College of Europe, Bruges, Belgium),
and Professor Sebastian Bersick (Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Germany) for
their feedback and suggestions. I would like to thank the Chinese Profes-
sors that participated in the various review rounds of the Ph.D. process:
Professor Zhong Yang, Professor Zhang Junhua, Professor Lin Gang, Li
Mingming (all from SJTU), Professor Liu Hongsong (Shanghai Interna-
tional Studies University), and Professor Chen Zhimin (Fudan Univer-
sity). I am also grateful to Dr. Sven Grimm and Dr. Anna Stahl for their
invaluable comments on the EU-China-Africa trilateral cooperation case.
I, too, would like to thank the KU Leuven for providing the opportunity
to stay affiliated with them as a research fellow. This allowed me to benefit
from their infrastructure, and this was and is very much appreciated.
The research project has benefitted from interviews carried out in
Europe and China. Each of the more than 100 interviews, consulta-
tions, and conversations with European, Chinese, and African officials and
experts has contributed to connecting the pieces of the research puzzle.
Writing this book would not have been possible without their invaluable
insights. Many of the interviewees concerned cannot be named in person
for anonymity reasons, but they know who they are, and I am incredibly
grateful for their input. This work also benefited from a stay at University
College Cork in the ERASMUS Plus training exchange framework in June
2019. I would like to thank Dr. Niall Duggan and Dr. Andrew Cottey for
making this stay possible. Parts of this work were presented during the
30th Association of Chinese Political Studies Annual Meeting and Inter-
national Symposium in Tianjin June 2017, the 59th Annual Convention
of the International Studies Association in San Francisco in April 2018,
the Europe-Africa-China Cooperation in the New Era: Opportunities and
Challenges conference held in Shanghai in July 2019, and the Develop-
ment Cooperation in a post BAPA+40 world Workshop hosted by Fudan
University in October 2019. I would like to take the opportunity to thank
the organizers and the participants of these events for their feedback.
I am extremely thankful to Jörg Wuttke, President of the European
Union Chamber of Commerce in China and EU Chamber staff Carl
Hayward, Jacob Gunter, and Rachel Rapaport, for providing the foreword
to this book. I would also like to thank my friends Caroline Hielegems,
Willem-Pieter de Groen, Yf Reykers, Gert-Jan Put, Jef Smulders, Irina
 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xi

Petrova, Atena Feraru, and Javier Luque for sharing this book journey
with me.
I have saved my most fundamental debts for last. Without the affec-
tion and understanding of my family, I could not have written this book.
Special thanks are due to my parents and my godparents Jeanne and Nico
for believing in me and giving me the confidence to pursue my interests.
I would also like to thank my wife, Liu Fang, for her continuous support
and endless patience.
Last but not least, I am grateful to the editors at Palgrave Macmillan—
Jacob Dreyer, Balaji Varadharaju, Ashwini Elango, Shukkanthy Siva, and
Aurelia Heumader—for their assistance in transforming the manuscript
into this book, as well as to the anonymous reviewer for his/her feed-
back. For any errors or inadequacies that may remain in this book, the
responsibility is entirely my own.

Shanghai Bas Hooijmaaijers

August 2020
 Praise for Unpacking EU
Policy-Making towards China

“Unpacking EU Policy-Making towards China is a must-read for those

wanting a richer understanding of the forces driving EU economic policy.
Featuring in-depth analyses of EU disputes with China in areas like solar
panels and telecommunications, this book reveals what analytical tools
best illuminate EU policy-making at various stages of the policy process.
It is invaluable to academics, businesspeople, and decision-makers inter-
ested in the EU and EU-China relations specifically, and foreign economic
policy generally.”
—Jean-Marc F. Blanchard, Ph.D., Founding Executive Director, Mr. &
Mrs. S.H. Wong Center for the Study of Multinational Corporations

“This book makes an innovative contribution to the theoretical and

comparative analysis of the EU’s foreign policy towards China, as it eval-
uates the explanatory value of three theories in three stages of the policy
cycle based on three case studies. The analytical framework developed by
Bas Hooijmaaijers will be very valuable for other scholars specialized in
EU-China relations, EU foreign policy, and trade policy.”
—Prof. Stephan Keukeleire, LINES Institute, KU Leuven, Belgium

“In view of the geopolitical turn in international affairs, and its impact on
the EU’s international role, a thorough understanding of the factors that
condition EU foreign policy-making is pivotal. “The challenge that China

xiii
xiv PRAISE FOR UNPACKING EU POLICY-MAKING TOWARDS CHINA

presents to the EU both internally and externally,” as Bas Hooijmaai-

jers rightly frames it, asks for innovative research. His book provides new
analysis to better understand the EU’s China policy-making, as well as
its limitations and should become essential reading for scholars, students,
and practitioners of EU-China relations.”
—Prof. Dr. Sebastian Bersick, Jean Monnet Chair, Ruhr University
Bochum, Germany

“This book offers an in-depth analysis on how different actors in the

EU work together to shape its China policy. In particular, the three case
studies give insights on the EU’s foreign policy making towards China
and make the book a good read.”
—Prof. Jing Men, Ph.D, Baillet Latour Chair of EU-China Relations
and Director of EU-China Research Centre in the Department of EU
International Relations and Diplomacy Studies, College of Europe,
Bruges, Belgium
 Contents

1 Introduction 1
Scope, Rationale, and Relevance of the Book 1
An Introduction to EU–China Relations and the EU’s
China Policy 4
The Scholarly Literature on EU-China Relations and Its
Limits 12
Theoretically-Oriented Explanations of EU Foreign
Policy-Making and Their Limits 13
Research Design, Methodology, and Case Selection 14
Findings 18
Outline 20
References 22

2 Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 29

The Bureaucratic Politics Model 29
Limitations of the Bureaucratic Politics Model 31
BPM Hypotheses for Each Stage of the Policy-Making Process 32
Issue Identification 32
Decision-Making 33
Policy Implementation 33
Neorealism 34
Limitations of Neorealism 36

xv
xvi CONTENTS

Neorealism Hypotheses for Each Stage of the Policy-Making

Process 37
Issue Identification 37
Decision-Making 37
Policy Implementation 37
Institutionalism 38
Limitations of Institutionalism 40
Institutionalism Hypotheses for Each Stage
of the Policy-Making Process 41
Issue Identification 41
Decision-Making 42
Policy Implementation 42
A Summary of the Models and Their Hypotheses 42
Conceptualization and Operationalization
of the Policy-Making Process 44
Concluding Remarks 46
References 46

3 The EU-China Solar Panel Dispute 51

Background to the Solar Panel Case 51
The European Solar Market: From Boom to Bust 51
Trade Commissioner Vows to Take a Tougher Stance
on China 52
The Option Case 52
Issue Identification: Solar Manufacturers up Against
Something not Market-Driven 53
Decision-Making: Politics Plain and Simple? 56
Policy Implementation: An Uphill Battle
from the Beginning? 71
Conclusion 78
Annex: Specification of the Solar Duties 80
References 82

4 The EU Investigation into Mobile Telecommunications

Networks from China 89
Background: Ex Officio Competences, and the Option Case 90
Issue Identification: Concerns that the Chinese Firms Would
Destroy the EU Market 90
 CONTENTS xvii

Decision-Making: Bargaining to Get a Good Outcome

for Europe 94
Policy Implementation: A Floundering Settlement 106
Conclusion 110
References 112

5 The Rise of China in Africa and the Response

of the EU: The EU-China-Africa Trilateral Dialogue
and Cooperation Initiative 117
Background to the EU-China-Africa Case 118
The Rise of China in Africa 118
The Traditional Primacy of Europe in Africa 120
The EU’s Initially Muted Response 121
Issue Identification: China’s Increasing Presence 123
Decision-Making: Seeking Engagement with China 127
Policy Implementation: A Bridge Too Far? 138
Conclusion 143
Annex: Overview European Dialogues with China on Africa 144
References 147

6 Conclusion 153
Evaluating the Competing Models 155
Theoretical Implications 162
The Business and Policy Value of the Analytical
and Empirical Findings 163
Limitations of This Study 168
Venues for Further Research 170
Closing Remarks 171
References 172

Index 175
 Abbreviations

ACP African, Caribbean and Pacific Group

AFASE Alliance for Affordable Solar Energy
ASEM Asia-Europe Meeting
AU African Union
BBC British Broadcasting Corporation
BDI Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie
BPM Bureaucratic Politics Model
BRI Belt and Road Initiative
BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa
CAI Comprehensive Agreement on Investments
CARI China Africa Research Initiative
CCP Common Commercial Policy
CCSA China Communication Standards Association
CEEC Central and Eastern European Countries
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy
COAFR Council Working Group for Africa
COASI Council Working Group for Asia
COFDI Chinese Outward Foreign Direct Investment
DAC Development Assistance Committee
DG Directorate-General
DG DEV Directorate-General for Development
DG DEVCO Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Develop-
ment
DG RELEX Directorate-General for the External Relations
DG TRADE Directorate-General for Trade
ECFR European Council on Foreign Relations

xix
xx ABBREVIATIONS

ECJ European Court of Justice

EEAS European External Action Service
EP European Parliament
EU European Union
EUFP European Union Foreign Policy
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
FOCAC Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
GDP Gross Domestic Product
HR High Representative
HR/VP High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission
IMF International Monetary Fund
IR International Relations
JAES Joint Africa-EU Strategy
LT Treaty of Lisbon
MDG Millennium Development Goals
MEP Member of the European Parliament
MES Market Economy Status
MIP Minimum Import Price
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
ODA Official Development Assistance
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PCA Partnership and Cooperation Agreements
PRC People’s Republic of China
SAIS School of Advanced International Studies
TCA Trade and Cooperation Agreement
TDI Trade Defense Instruments
TEU Treaty on the European Union
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
US United States
WTO World Trade Organization
 List of Graphs

Graph 5.1 China-Africa trade, 1992–2018 (in billion USD) 119

Graph 5.2 Chinese FDI Flow to African Countries, 2003–2018
(in billion USD) 120

xxi
 List of Tables

Table 2.1 Overview of the generic hypotheses 43

Table 2.2 Theories from the “stages approach” within public policy 44
Table 3.1 Chronology of the issue identification stage
in the EU-China solar dispute 54
Table 3.2 Chronology of the decision-making stage
in the EU-China solar dispute 57
Table 3.3 Chronology of the implementation of the solar measures 72
Table 4.1 Chronology of the issue identification stage
in the EU-China telecoms case 91
Table 4.2 Chronology of the decision-making in the EU-China
telecoms case 95
Table 4.3 Chronology of the implementation of the EU-China
settlement on telecoms 107
Table 5.1 Political and institutional dialogues of the EU and the big
three with China on Africa (by mid-2020) 145

xxiii
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Scope, Rationale, and Relevance of the Book

This book is about unpacking European Union (EU) policy-making
toward the People’s Republic of China (PRC/China). It illuminates how
member states, bureaucracies, and institutions shape the EU’s China
economic policy. China’s rise and economic comeback story are among
the most dramatic developments of the last decades, and present a chal-
lenge to the EU both internally and externally. When observing the EU’s
China policy, one is often confronted with puzzling observations. They
include, among others, the following questions. The EU stands firm
against unfair trade practices and uses trade defense instruments (TDIs)
to uphold its commitment to open markets and free trade. Why were
some EU member states simultaneously sidelining the EU by engaging
in parallel discussions with China regarding the dumping of Chinese
solar panels on the EU market? If an EU industry was aware of unfair
trade practices, for instance, by the Chinese side in telecommunication
networks, why did the industry not lodge a formal complaint to the
European Commission? Moreover, why are the member states that were
aware of these practices influential in the decision-making stage but not
in the issue identification stage of the policy process? When the European
Commission’s Directorate-General (DG) concerned with development
issues (DG DEV) was developing a strategy to deal with China’s rise in

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to 1

Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021
B. Hooijmaaijers, Unpacking EU Policy-Making towards China,
Palgrave Studies in Asia-Pacific Political Economy,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9367-3_1
2 B. HOOIJMAAIJERS

Africa, why was there internal resistance from the Commission’s former
DG involving external relations (DG RELEX)? Furthermore, why have no
concrete EU-China-Africa trilateral development projects seen the light
since the launch of the initiative in 2008? This book offers insights that
contribute to a better understanding of these puzzles.
Although the number of academic publications on EU–China rela-
tions is booming, there is a specific and general inability of contemporary
literature to explain the above’s puzzles. Academic work on EU foreign
policy (EUFP) toward China is heavily policy-driven, with very few works
using theory. This indicates a lacuna in the current literature and current
academic approaches regarding EU foreign policy-making vis-à-vis China
because even fewer academic works seek to test theoretical approaches
thoroughly (Bersick 2015). However, multiple international relations
(IR) theories have the potential to illuminate EUFP vis-à-vis China and to
explain (part of) these puzzles, including the bureaucratic politics model
(BPM), neorealism, and institutionalism. The BPM emphasizes internal
bargaining within an entity; neorealism stresses that state interests domi-
nate; institutionalism highlights the importance of competences, and EU
law and procedures, which is of particular importance in an EU context
with different procedures per issue area.1 These theories assume universal
applicability, which is problematic in two ways. First, these theories do
not apply equally well to all issue areas. Second, these theories do not
illuminate all stages of the policy-making process, even when we focus on
one issue area; that is, economics. When scholars use theory, there is a
failure to unpack the policy cycle. The universal applicability of theories is
a problematic assumption. Indeed, the contemporary literature’s inability
is that those works that use theory do not test them thoroughly because
they do not focus on the various stages of the policy cycle and do not add
scope conditions. Case studies on the EU and China, as well as studies
more generally, often do not focus on the policy cycle, including issue
identification, decision-making, and policy implementation.2
A more in-depth look into the policy cycle stages provides us with
an analytical tool to gain more specific knowledge to explain the EU
foreign policy-making process and add scope conditions. Scope condi-
tions are universal statements that define the circumstances in which a
theory is applicable (Cohen 1989: 83). As pointed out by Foschi (1997),
they limit the applicability of the relationship proposed in a hypothesis.
Scope conditions constitute the antecedent clause of a conditional state-
ment. If a situation does not meet this, then nothing is being said about
 1 INTRODUCTION 3

that relationship. A scope condition specifies what we can and cannot see
as evidence relevant to the formulated hypothesis by limiting the claim a
statement makes. Given the limits of the existing literature, there is a need
to explore EU foreign policy drivers vis-à-vis the PRC anew. The issue I
argue in this manuscript is not that these existing theories are wrong or
lack potential, but that there is an inadequate appreciation of the fact they
do not apply equally well to all domains.
As discussed in the previous paragraph, there is a need to identify the
range of applicability of these theories. When do they work and when do
they not work? I show this by examining three distinct stages of the policy
cycle in three political-economic cases. My three cases are the EU-China
solar panel dispute, the EU investigation into mobile telecommunication
networks from China, and the EU’s response to China’s rise in Africa
where I look at the European Commission initiated EU-China-Africa
trilateral cooperation initiative. These three cases are hot topics in EU-
China relations, but they also have an apparent political-economic angle.
I argue that neorealism works best to understand the decision-making
stage in the solar and telecommunications trade defense cases, and it was
visible in the background of the decision-making stage of the EU-China-
Africa case. Institutionalism illuminates virtually every stage of every issue
area in EU foreign policy-making. The BPM, for instance, fits the stage
of policy implementation. However, this is predominantly correct when
there is more leeway. When key (bureaucratic) actors leave, then policy
implementation will reflect this.
Two main contributions make this project distinctive. The first one is
my findings of theory scope conditions. The second is my empirical work
because I am studying insufficiently studied cases and using more and
better evidence to evaluate existing arguments and cull out these scope
conditions. In more scientific terms, cutting the dependent variable into
policy stages allows us to see if the independent variables highlighted
by various analytical approaches are equally powerful through all policy
process stages. These findings can provide useful analytical lenses for those
studying EUFP toward other countries, regions, and issues.
The policy relevance lies in predicting what might happen in EU
foreign policy-making and understanding which actors and factors are
most influential in the three distinct stages of the policy process. Readers
will get more clarity about how policy stages affect EU identification
of issues, policy selection, and implementation. Given the peculiar insti-
tutional framework of the EU, this is highly important. It is all about
4 B. HOOIJMAAIJERS

competences. Also, all three cases are part of a more significant challenge
for the EU, which is how to deal with emerging powers in general and
China in particular (see also Hooijmaaijers 2015, 2018, 2019; Keukeleire
and Hooijmaaijers 2014; Hooijmaaijers and Keukeleire 2020). The first
two cases enlighten the readers on the internal workings of EU trade
defense policy, the evolving nature of Sino-European trade relations, and,
more generally, the current challenges to globalization and the inter-
national trading order. The EU-China-Africa case illuminates the EU’s
internal workings against the backdrop of a new party with its view
on development with a focus on trade, investment, and infrastructure
entering the African stage.
This chapter will continue as follows. The next section provides an
introduction to EU–China relations and the EU’s China policy, which
serves as a background for a better understanding of their relations. A
section that focuses on the limitations of current academic approaches
to EU-China relations will follow this. The subsequent section discusses
several potential theoretical candidates for analyzing EU foreign policy-
making. After that, I will set out the research design, methodology, and
case selection, followed by this manuscript’s main findings and the theo-
retical and policy implications of these findings. This introduction chapter
ends with an outline of the entire manuscript.

An Introduction to EU–China
Relations and the EU’s China Policy
Over the past decades, EU-China relations have developed rapidly. There
are various stages in the relationship, including the period of no diplo-
matic relations from the late 1940s until 1974, the period of mutual
disregard (1975–1994), the period of mutual attraction (1995–2002),
and the subsequent honeymoon period (2003–2004/2005), followed
by a period of reflection and adjustment that started in 2005. Equally
important is the move of the Commission and the High Representative
of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of
the European Commission (HR/VP) in 2019. Against the backdrop of
China’s growing economic power and political influence, they reviewed
the EU-China relations and the related opportunities and challenges and
called for a more realistic approach. In their Joint Communication, the
EU side mentioned that “China is simultaneously a cooperation partner
with whom the EU has closely aligned objectives, a negotiating partner,
 1 INTRODUCTION 5

with whom the EU needs to find a balance of interests, an economic

competitor in pursuit of technological leadership, and a systemic rival
promoting alternative models of governance” (European Commission
2019).3 It is, however, important to emphasize that the systemic rival
label is not official. The EU has and continues to designate the PRC as
a strategic partner. The Commission called it something else but did not
change the EU’s formal position. Still, the EU is in the nascent stages
of a new debate about China. The Commission paper labeling China as
a systemic rival reflected a sharp change in its balance of assumptions
about EU-China affairs, and the recent COVID-19 pandemic is tilting
that balance further (Small 2020).
The EU and China established bilateral relations in May 1975, with
Christopher Soames being the first European Commissioner to visit
China, in line with the country opening up. There were limited develop-
ments from 1975 until 1995 (though the EU and China signed a trade
agreement in 1978), because both parties were more inward-looking, due
to ongoing reforms in China and European integration. The year 1995
marks a change because, in that year, the EU’s first policy paper on China
titled a long term policy for China-Europe relations was issued. The 1985
Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) is the principal legal frame-
work for the relations between both parties.4 Nevertheless, it was only in
1998 that meetings of both parties’ leaders became institutionalized, and
the first EU-China Summit took place. This first bilateral summit was de
facto an offspring of the growing European and Asian interest in mutual
interregional interaction. It was organized back-to-back with the second
Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) Summit in London (Bersick, 2015).
In 2003, the EU and China launched a strategic partnership to
upgrade the status of their relationship.5 Both sides mutually recog-
nized each other as a strategic partner in 2003, and the EU was on
the receiving end of a “sticks and carrot” approach by Beijing to get to
that point. The development of the Sino-European strategic partnership
in the 2000s suits the broader context of the deepening of integration
in the EU, including the establishment of the EU’s Common Foreign
and Security Policy (CFSP) as well as China opening up and reforming
and its subsequent rise (see Cottey and Gottwald 2010; Keukeleire and
Delreux 2014). The 2003–2005 period was the honeymoon period in
Sino-European relations. 2003, in particular, can be seen as the best time
in the parties’ bilateral relationship because frictions between the EU and
6 B. HOOIJMAAIJERS

the US over the latter’s invasion of Iraq created an opening for the estab-
lishment of an EU-China strategic partnership. 2005 brought about a
change in Sino-European relations due to a textile dispute, and the EU’s
decision not to lift the arms embargo against China (see Eckhardt 2010;
Zhang 2014).
In the 2006–2010 period, it became clear that the atmosphere had
changed. The EU was again inward-looking with the 2009 Lisbon
Treaty and the subsequent establishment of the European External Action
Service (EEAS), leading to internal EU changes. The EEAS now became
in charge of organizing the EU-China Summit. Over the last decade,
particularly in the economic field, the balance of power has changed
dramatically. China’s agreement in June 2012 to contribute $43 billion to
the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) $430 billion bailout fund for
the southern European countries illustrated this. Apart from the Euro-
zone crisis, the more recent migrant crisis, and the Ukraine crisis has made
Brussels “less capable of providing global leadership” (Zeng 2017: 1173).
After an upgrade in 2010, the EU-China strategic partnership now
involves foreign affairs, security matters, and international challenges such
as climate change and global economic governance. The 2013 EU-
China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership has continued developing
and diversifying from its original economic focus, creating opportuni-
ties for businesses and contributing to international security, environ-
mental protection, and academic exchanges. Today, over 60 high- and
senior-level dialogues are in place.6 The EU-China dialogue architec-
ture comprises three pillars, including the High-Level Strategic Dialogue,
the High-Level Economic and Trade Dialogue, and the People-to-People
Dialogue (see Burnay et al. 2014).
Since 2016, the EU’s China policy is defined by the Elements for
a new EU Strategy on China that, together with the Council Conclu-
sions EU Strategy on China, forms the EU Strategy on China, with the
jointly signed 2013 EU -China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation
being a critical policy document. Even after the 2019 review of the
Sino-European relations, this remains the cornerstone of the EU’s policy
vis-à-vis China. In 2015, the EU-China Connectivity Platform was estab-
lished to strengthen connections between Europe and Asia. However,
in the Platform, little coordination and cooperation occur due to the
differences between China and the EU.
The importance of Sino-European bilateral relations is manifest in
the fact that the EU is China’s largest trading partner, while on the
 1 INTRODUCTION 7

other hand, China is the EU’s most significant source of imports and its
second-biggest two-way trading partner. There are extensive dialogues,
too, in the economic realm like the annual High-Level Economic and
Trade Dialogue established in 2009 and the sectoral dialogues such as
the Economic and Trade Joint Committee, Trade and Investment Policy
Dialogue, Economic and Trade Working Group, Dialogue on Intellectual
Property, and Trade Defence Instruments Working Group. Moreover, at
the 16th EU-China Summit in 2013, both parties announced that negoti-
ations on an EU-China bilateral investment agreement—formally called a
Comprehensive Agreement on Investments (CAI)—were to be launched.
However, thus far, finding mutual agreement on the CAI has proven to
be challenging. In part, the diverging interests and systems of both parties
explain this. One key issue for the EU in the CAI is market access. This
relates to a lack of reciprocity in EU-China relations. The EU wants China
to treat the European companies in the PRC the same way that the Euro-
peans treat Chinese firms in Europe. Another issue is how to deal with
Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs).
Cooperation and dialogue between the EU and China go beyond bilat-
eral trade and investment and include policy areas such as foreign policy
and security, energy and environment, global economic governance, and
human rights. The rise of China is one of the main developments in inter-
national relations over the past few decades, not only in the economic
field, but also in climate change, on the African continent, and concerning
Asian security. This highlights the multiple dimensionalities of China as
an international actor as well as its relations with the EU and its member
states as they also have established bilateral relations with the Chinese,
which makes that they meet on multiple locations and multiple levels,
including on the multilateral, regional, trilateral and bilateral level.
However, as also argued by Chang and Pieke (2018), the EU’s China
policy as a whole, and of its member states is not principally about the
PRC. Due to its starting point not laying in China, but in confronting
challenges in Europe itself, the EU’s policy vis-à-vis China is first and
foremost “a matter of choices about the future of European coopera-
tion and union.” On a related note, a senior EU official described the
EU’s relations with its then 28 member states as “having 28 mothers in
law” (Interview senior EU official, June 14, 2018). This reality points
out the challenges the EU is facing internally due to its hybrid nature,
with Europe’s divided response to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
8 B. HOOIJMAAIJERS

and increasing Chinese outward foreign direct investment (COFDI) in

Europe just being two recent examples.
The EU has been grappling on how to deal with China’s massive foot-
print in diverse sectors and locations. The EU aims at encompassing a
strategic partnership with China. However, the member states are simul-
taneously sidelining Brussels by concluding bilateral agreements with the
PRC (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014). The EU member states’ tendency
to pursue bilateral agreements with China and China’s ability to use the
EU’s internal disagreement is frequently brought forward as the primary
explanation for the EU’s lack of strategic edge (Michalski and Pan 2017).
In a 2009 power audit of the EU-China relations, Fox and Godement
showed that the then 27 EU member states hold diverging positions over
two main issues, including how to manage Beijing’s impact on the Euro-
pean economy and how to engage the PRC politically. The authors argued
that “collectively as well as individually” the EU member states will fail
to get more from the PRC unless they manage to find a way to over-
come their internal divisions and “leverage their combined weight into
a strengthened bargaining position” (Fox and Godement 2009: 7). The
new HR/VP Josep Borrell admitted the EU had been naive about aspects
of the PRC but stated this was now coming to an end. He urged more
collective discipline toward China (The Guardian 2020).
On the issue-level, numerous frictions are bedeviling bilateral relations.
One is the EU’s enormous trade deficit with China. Beijing had pledged
to ease market access significantly, however many on the European side
argue that Beijing is very slow to address these obstacles. The earlier
mentioned lack of reciprocity is relevant here. Furthermore, COFDI in
Europe has recently increasingly drawn attention because of the opaque
state-sponsored Chinese firms (or a suspected state-firm link), COFDI’s
targeted sectors including technology and infrastructure, the sudden-
ness of COFDI, the sensitivity coming with China’s continuing political
rise, and, again, the lack of reciprocity, with the KUKA case, in partic-
ular, being a watershed moment (Hooijmaaijers 2019). One should see
the developments regarding COFDI in the EU and Huawei 5G mobile
telecommunication networks that recently attracted much attention from
both politicians and the public in this broader context.
In late 2018, the European Commission, the Council, and the Euro-
pean Parliament reached a political agreement on the EU framework for
screening FDI, and there has been a reform of TDI. These developments
illustrate that a reality shift has become visible regarding the EU’s trade
 1 INTRODUCTION 9

policy and can be seen as two steps forward to a different EU policy

vis-à-vis China.
In the field of trade, there have been numerous disputes and inves-
tigations relating to solar panels, telecommunications, steel, and wine,
with both parties calling for punitive tariffs. The fundamental differences
between their legal frameworks and their different values and levels of
development and the structural characteristics of their economic models
complicate matters (Hallinan 2016). Another thorny issue is China’s
market economy status (MES). Also, when China pressed the EU to
launch a strong joint statement during the 2018 EU-China Summit
against US President Donald Trump’s trade policies, Europe resisted. The
EU shared the US’ assessment of China when it comes to, for instance,
subsidies and Intellectual Property Rights (IPR). However, at the same
time, it felt that by the way the US is doing it, it was destroying the multi-
lateral order. Combining these factors makes the EU-China economic
relationship, “an uneasy partnership” (Farnell and Irwin Crookes 2016).
The 16+1 (or after Greece joining in 2019 17+1) policy of China with
the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) potentially chal-
lenges EU unity. Somewhat related to 17+1, the BRI that was launched
in 2013 causes “a great deal of confusion” for the EU member states and
Brussels (Yu 2018: 232). Beyond the trade statistics and new (proposed)
railway connections, the role of Xi Jinping’s globalization project “is
not yet entirely clear” for Europe. However, various member states have
pledged their support for it (Yu 2018: 232).
Moreover, problematic is the EU arms embargo against China that
flowed from the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown. The internal situation
in China, particularly on human rights and the situation in Tibet and
Xinjiang, also causes friction in the EU-China relations. Also, against the
backdrop of the imposition of the Hong Kong national security law in
June 2020, EU concerns had intensified over the erosion of the “one
country, two systems” principle and Hong Kong’s autonomy. The EU
decided to limit exports of surveillance equipment to Hong Kong over
concerns about this controversial new law, leading to Beijing’s warning
not to interfere in Hong Kong matters (Euronews 2020a).
Even though since the mid-1990s, a bilateral Human Rights Dialogue
is in place, in the bilateral relationship between the EU and the PRC, the
issue of human rights remains secondary to economic and geopolitical
interests (Kaya 2014). Internal divisions among the member states play a
role as well, as a recent report revealed that the EU member states adopt
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 CO-OPERATION AS WE KNOW IT.
When or where Co-operation, in the sense in which the word is
used to-day, first came into being there is no means of knowing. Mr
Maxwell, in his “History of Co-operation in Scotland,” tells the story
of the old society originated by the weavers of Fenwick one hundred
and fifty years ago, before Robert Owen was born; but, although this
is the oldest Co-operative society of which any record remains, it by
no means follows that others did not exist even earlier. Indeed, Mr
Maxwell himself mentions that traditions of other old societies exist
in various parts of the country. Of these, no records remain. It is only
ten years since there vanished from the ken of the people of Govan a
society which kept proudly painted over its door a record of the fact
that it was established in 1777—eight years later than Fenwick. There
still exists in Glasgow a society which dates back to the first year of
the nineteenth century, and the Lennoxtown Society celebrated its
centenary seven years ago. All over Scotland there exist societies
which are nearing a century of life, and Mr Maxwell has rescued from
oblivion the names, and sometimes part of the records, of others
which long ago disappeared.
In their practice these old-time societies differed in material points
from the practice which takes its name from the Lancashire weaving
town where it originated—Rochdale—but the spirit which inspired
those pioneers and the broad principles of self-help in Co-operation
under which they worked, are the spirit and principles of the Co-
operators of to-day. They were, in fact, the spirit and principles
which combine to make progress possible, and in the absence of
which come stagnation and decay.
 CO-OPERATIVE BAKERIES.
Like the inception of Co-operation itself, the beginnings of baking
Co-operatively are lost in the misty past. Where the first Co-
operative bakery was started, or when, there is no means of knowing.
Research has shown that, in the early years of last century, bread
was being produced and distributed by Co-operative bakeries in
Glasgow, but how many in number these bakeries were, where
exactly they were situated, or what turnover they had it is not
possible to discover; indeed, it is probable that we should never have
known of their existence, except as a tradition, had it not been for the
fact that a Glasgow writer, who published in 1816 a book in two
volumes dealing with the affairs of Glasgow, thought it necessary to
defend the private bakers of the city at that time against any possible
accusation of overcharging for bread, by describing the methods
which were adopted by the Co-operative societies, and emphasising
the fact that they sold bread at the cost of production, and only to
their own members.
This Glasgow author, Mr Cleland by name, had been describing
the means which had been taken by the Governments of George II.
and George III. to regulate the price of bread in accordance with
price of wheat. His description is very interesting, if only for the fact
that it shows that steps had to be taken to regulate the exactions of
the profiteer, even in those early days. It shows, also, that the
methods of our various “Controllers,” “Food Committees,” etc., are
not new, but are very much along the same lines as those devised to
keep down the price of bread a century and a half ago. The price of
bread was regulated in accordance with the price of wheat, and the
baker was allowed a fixed sum per sack of flour for his expenses of
baking and distributing.
In the various cities and towns the application of this Act was in
the hands of the magistrates; and, in Glasgow, bread prices were
fixed at various intervals until 1800, when it was decided at the last
Bread Court held to cease the practice, as, in the opinion of the
magistrates, such a course was unnecessary; but the weight of loaves
continued to be standardised at 4 lbs. 5 oz. 8 drams for the quartern
loaf, and 2 lbs. 2 oz. 12 drams for the half-quartern loaf. In view of
the price of bread to-day, it is interesting to note that the price of the
half-quartern loaf was fixed by the last Glasgow Assize, held in 1800,
at 10d. for fine wheaten bread and 7½d. for household bread, which
was evidently of a much coarser and poorer quality.
Some of the Bread Assize regulations were peculiar. For instance,
the baker had to produce eighty loaves from the sack of flour, and
sell these eighty loaves at the exact price which they cost him, in
accordance with the cost of flour. “As, however,” says Mr Cleland,
“they usually were able to get two loaves more from the sack, and
these two loaves were clear profit, the price at which they were sold
was a consideration.” At the beginning of the nineteenth century the
expenses per sack allowed to the bakers were 14/, but by 1816 this
sum had been increased to 16/9.
It was within the right of any two bakers to call the attention of the
magistrates to the fact that the price of bread or flour had risen or
fallen, and to offer proof. When this was done the magistrates or
Justices of the Peace were obliged to take evidence as to the current
prices, and, if they found any variation from the last price fixed,
“they shall immediately set a new price, which shall remain
unaltered until a new Assize has been held.” One wonders whether
the magistrates of those days were as difficult to convince that any
alteration was necessary as have been the Food Control officials
during the last year of the war.
“In 1801 no Assize was held, and it was left to the bakers to sell
bread at such price as they could afford.” It is probable that in the
results of this decision the reason for the starting of Co-operative
societies is to be found, for human nature and the practices of the
times being what they were, we may be sure that the bakers saw to it
that, however much their profits might increase, they did not go
down at all.
Mr Cleland goes on to say:—
“During the last fifteen years, when no Assize has been fixed in Glasgow, the
bakers have uniformly proportioned the price of bread to the price of wheat,
similarly to what it would have been had the Assize been sitting. There are
instances, however, of individual bakers selling their bread somewhat lower
than the general run of the trade; and baking societies have been established
 in the suburbs who uniformly sell their bread one penny, twopence, and
sometimes even threepence on the quartern loaf lower than the bakers’ price.
These societies do not sell their bread to anyone but their own members; they
give no credit and receive neither profit from the concern nor interest on their
capital; besides, the members are subjected to the risk of loss incident to the
breach of trust in their servants. The greater part of these societies make no
household or coarse bread, and no loaf less than quartern; by which
arrangement it is evident the lower classes are excluded, as they neither can
advance their share of capital nor at all times purchase a quartern loaf.
Moreover, the bakeries belonging to these societies being all situated outside
the royalty, the flour is exempt from ‘multures,’ a tax to which the flour baked
within the royalty is subject, amounting to one eighty-fourth of the whole. As
the Assize laws wisely determined (for the sake of the lower classes of the
people) that bread shall be baked from a peck loaf down to a quarter-quartern
loaf, in exact proportion, and that the twopenny and penny loaves shall be of a
weight exactly corresponding to the price of the quartern loaf, it is evident that
the person who manufactured the small and the coarse bread, from which the
labouring classes of the community are generally supplied, all bearing the
same proportion to the wheaten quartern loaf, cannot sell so cheap as the
societies; among other reasons because the additional labour is very
considerable, and in weighing out the aliquot parts, unless some allowance is
made in the dough, the small bread will be deficient in weight when it comes
out of the oven; besides, the regular baker must support his family, pay his
business, and pay local taxes; he has also to run the risk attending credit, and
frequently to give one penny to the shilling discount to chandlers who retail
his bread.”
The above is the sum of our knowledge of these early Glasgow
baking societies, but the fact that they were able to sell their bread a
penny to threepence per quartern loaf below the prices charged by
the private bakers, at a time when the quartern loaf cost 1/8 and 1/3,
is significant. It meant that the baker was getting from 6/8 to 20/ per
sack of flour over the cost of production of the societies, and that,
therefore, the cost to the consumer was extortionate. Doubtless, also,
the conditions which led to the formation of Co-operative societies in
Glasgow prevailed elsewhere, and it is quite likely that baking
societies existed at that early date in other parts of Scotland, had
their day, and passed out of existence without a trace remaining.
Even of those of the existence of which we do know particulars are
absent; in most cases the name alone remains, and often not even
that but only a tradition.
 STIRLINGSHIRE AND HILLFOOTS
SOCIETIES.
Early in the nineteenth century Co-operation found a home in
Stirlingshire. In the thirtieth year of the century the Bannockburn
Co-operative Society came into being as the result of a lecture on
“Co-operation,” which was given by Mr William Buchanan, a resident
medical man. So impressed were members of his audience with what
they had heard that a committee was formed immediately to draft
rules and take the steps necessary for the formation of a society. The
rules were agreed to at a meeting which was held on 27th November
1830. Bannockburn Society still exists and flourishes to-day, after an
unbroken career of eighty-nine years.
About the same time—it may have been earlier or a little later, for
no information about its beginning can be found—a baking society
was formed in Bannockburn, and continued to flourish for a number
of years. Of the fact that the members of the other Bannockburn
Society were interested in the doings of the baking society evidence is
given in a minute of that society in the early ’thirties, in which it is
noted that the baking society had agreed to supply Alva Society with
bread. Incidentally, this entry would seem to fix a period at which the
Alva Baking Society was not in existence. The Bannockburn Baking
Society was amalgamated with the Bannockburn Society in 1846.
In the year 1847 one of the most flourishing baking societies in the
country came into existence, for on the 23rd June in that year the
Bainsford and Grahamston Baking Society was formed.
Notwithstanding that general societies have grown up all round the
town of Falkirk, this society continues to maintain a separate and
flourishing existence, its latest balance-sheet showing a membership
of 4,733 and an average output of 371 sacks per week.
Other baking societies were formed in the same district. Quite
recently one of these, Stenhousemuir Baking Society, was
amalgamated with the Stenhousemuir Equitable Society, after a
separate existence of many years. Another baking society was
situated in the little village of Carronshore. In the Hillfoots district
some time in the late ’forties baking societies came into existence at
Alva and Tillicoultry. The baking society at Tillicoultry amalgamated
with the Tillicoultry Society in 1905, and the Alva Society with the
Alva Bazaar Society a few years later.
 BAKING SOCIETIES IN FIFE AND THE
NORTH.
In Fifeshire, also, baking societies were coming into being; indeed,
the earliest baking society whose name is known was formed at
Leven in 1828. In 1840 Kingskettle Baking Society was formed, and
it remains strong and vigorous to-day. It is one of the few of these
early baking societies about which it is possible to give a little
information. The society was only a small affair at the beginning;
indeed it is not very large even to-day; but what it lacked in size it
made up for in vigour, and since its formation it has never looked
back. It is recorded that in its early days the bread was delivered by
the aid of a donkey cart; to-day the society has several vans on the
road and supplies a population of several thousands with bread.
Somewhat earlier than the formation of the society in Kingskettle a
baking society was formed in the village of Leslie, situated a few
miles from Kirkcaldy. The reason for its formation was the same as
that responsible for the formation of others in these early days—
small wages and the extortionate charges for their bread made by the
local bakers. The success which attended the baking venture led in
1840 to the formation of a general society. In later years this society
split over the question of adopting the Rochdale system of disposing
of the surpluses, and a new society was formed which continues
strong and vigorous; and with this new society the baking society
finally amalgamated. Later still a society was formed in Dunfermline,
which in 1866 showed a surplus on working of £493.
Meantime Co-operation was going ahead in the North. Societies
had been formed in Kirriemuir, Brechin, Arbroath, and Forfar, and
very early in its history Kirriemuir took up the baking of bread.
Arbroath West Port Association began the baking of bread in 1846,
while in the year immediately preceding—1845—Arbroath Guthrie
Port Association, in altering their rules, placed first in the list of the
objects of the society “to make bread and to deal in bread,” so that it
is evident that the society was then baking or had baking in
contemplation. This is the society which is now known by the name
of Arbroath Equitable Society.
 BAKING IN THE BORDERLAND.
Co-operation does not seem to have found a footing in the South
quite as early as it did in the North and West, but the Borderers were
not far behind, and they have proved that having once started they
believed in perseverance. It was in 1839 that Galashiels Store
Company was formed, and the question of bread supply was soon
under consideration. In its earliest years the society seems to have
had considerable difficulty in getting a satisfactory supply of bread,
with the result that by 1844 they had established a bakery of their
own. An interesting fact which is related by Mr Maxwell in his
“History of Scotland” is that they applied for information about
baking to two societies, long disappeared, Coupar Angus and Alyth.
Probably some one connected with the society was a native of
Forfarshire, and, knowing that these societies had bakeries,
suggested that information be got from them. The number of these
efforts to cheapen the staff of life must have been very great, for
references to them keep cropping up in old newspapers and
pamphlets, showing that Co-operative activity, much of it inspired
doubtless by the teachings of Owen, was widespread in Scotland.
Hawick Store Company began a few months later than the
Galashiels venture, but it was not until 1851 that the members added
baking to the list of their enterprises.
 GLASGOW SOCIETY.
Turning again to Glasgow, where the first Co-operative bakeries of
which there is any record were established, we find that many
attempts had been made in the interval to establish Co-operative
trading on a firm foundation, but in vain. How many of these early
Co-operative failures were due to the fact that the surpluses accruing
from the trading transactions were divided in proportion to the
capital held, without any regard being paid to the trade done with the
society by the holders of the capital, it is not possible to say, but the
system was bound to have a disturbing effect on the minds of those
members who, although too poor to invest much capital, were loyal
purchasers from the store.
However that may be, after a lecture by Holyoake, a fresh attempt
to establish Co-operation in the city was made, and for a time the
new venture seemed to flourish, only to perish eventually like its
predecessors. What makes this society interesting at this point is that
of it is recorded the fact that it possessed “a modern baking
department,” and is said to have supplied the neighbouring societies
with bread. The society came to an end in 1865, and with it ended
Co-operative baking in the city for the time being. When next we
hear of it it is in a new, and as it turned out, a stabler and more
permanent form.
At this point it may be interesting to note some particulars of the
Co-operative baking societies in existence in Scotland in 1866, as
taken from the returns sent in to the Registrar of Friendly Societies
in Scotland. It is probable that the list is far from complete, and it
takes no account of the societies having bakeries of their own who
dealt in other goods as well. These societies were:—
 Value of Property. Profits.
Airdrie Bread No property. £252
Alva Baking £l,184 331
Bainsford and Grahamston 1,484 788
Coatbridge Bread 857 466
Dalry Baking 20 50
Dunfermline Baking 116 493
Edinburgh Bread 422 271
Leven Baking 200 120
Roslin Baking 82
Stenhousemuir Baking 782 350

A notable absentee from the above list is the name of Kingskettle

Baking Society.
 THE FIRST FEDERATED BAKERY.
As it was in Ayrshire, in the little village of Fenwick, that, so far as
is known, the first Co-operative society was established, so also to
Ayrshire belongs the honour of having established the first federated
bakery. Co-operation in Fenwick had died in 1801 with the demise of
the old Meal Society, and it was not until 1840, when Darvel
Industrial Society was founded, that it again secured a footing in the
land of Burns. The society founded 79 years ago continues to
flourish, but for the first twenty years it had to flourish alone. Then,
in 1860, Kilmarnock Society was founded, and following it there
came in quick succession Crosshouse, Auchinleck, Mauchline,
Galston, Newmilns, and Catrine. In 1867 five of these societies—
Kilmarnock, Crosshouse, Galston, Mauchline, and Newmilns—
combined to form a baking society, while three other societies—
Troon, Catrine, and Darvel—although not members, took bread from
the federation. In 1870 premises were built for the federation, and
the trade increased steadily. Gradually, however, the more distant
societies began to erect bakeries of their own, and in the early
’nineties of last century the bakery was taken over by Kilmarnock
Society, who erected a new and up-to-date bakery for themselves on
the site of the old one.
COBURG STREET PREMISES

ST JAMES STREET PREMISES

M‘NEIL STREET PREMISES (1886–1890)

M‘NEIL STREET PREMISES (1890–1894)

 CHAPTER III.
THE FIRST YEAR.

GLASGOW IN THE ’SIXTIES—THE SOCIETY FORMED—MEN

WHO WROUGHT—THE FIRST BAKERY—STARTING
BUSINESS—A DISASTER AVOIDED—BETTER PROSPECTS
—A MANAGER APPOINTED—LARGER PREMISES WANTED
—SOMETHING ATTEMPTED, SOMETHING DONE.

In the ’sixties of last century Glasgow was not a pleasant place for
working men to live in. The city was contained in the four parishes of
Barony, City, Govan, and Gorbals; only a small proportion of its
population being resident in the last-named parish, however. The
conditions of life for the workers were not good. Houses were small
and inconvenient, disease was rampant, and poverty the common
lot. There were 87,604 inhabited houses in the city in the year 1864,
and of these 35,788 were rented at £5 per annum, or under; the
average rental being £3, 7s. 3d. Other 35,393 houses had rentals of
between £5 and £10, the average rental being £6, 17s. 3d., and the
average rental of these 71,181 houses, forming 81·75 per cent. of the
total housing accommodation of the city, was £5, 5s. per annum.
Further light is thrown on the housing conditions by the fact that,
while the aggregate rental for these 71,181 houses was £373,441, the
aggregate rental for the remaining 16,423 houses was £502,687; an
average rental per house of £30, 10s. The proportions of these lowly-
rented houses were fairly equal in all four parishes, and even when
allowance is made for the fact that rents were much lower in those
days than they have been in recent years for similar accommodation
it is evident that the housing conditions left much to be desired, and
that the “homes of the people” must have been veritable hotbeds of
disease. In the statistics consulted the proportion of one-apartment
houses is not given, but in view of the whole-hearted condemnation
of such houses voiced by Dr Russell, Medical Officer of Health for
Glasgow, twenty years later, and the large proportion of Glasgow’s
citizens who were then living in houses which were kitchen, parlour,
bedroom, and washhouse all in one, it is easy to believe that the
houses of the earlier period were no better than the low rentals
would warrant.
Further evidence of the correctness of this assumption is found in
the vital statistics of the period. In 1864 the deaths of children under
five years of age were 46·93 per cent. of the total deaths; in 1862 they
had been 48·85 per cent. of the total. In those years the children were
dying at the rate of one in every nine of the population, a deathrate
nearly equal to that of the British Army during the four years of war.
The effects of poverty and bad housing on the health of the
population were further evidenced by the number of deaths of
children under five from tubercular diseases. In 1863 these were 381;
in 1864, 378; while the total deaths from tuberculosis were 1562 and
1763 respectively for the same years. In his report to the Corporation
for the year 1864, Mr Watson, Town Chamberlain, points out that
there was ample scope in the statistics he had compiled for showing
the need for benevolence “in alleviating the character of the
dwellings of the very poor,” and he urged the need which existed to
provide other and better houses. At the same time he notes that
employment generally was good in this year. In 1868, 786 children
under five died from consumption, and in 1869 the total infantile
deathrate (children under one year) was 48·20 per 1,000. In the
Clyde area it was 56·81 per 1,000.
It was in a city in which the conditions of the people were such as
the figures quoted above reveal that, on the last Monday in January
1869, what was destined in the course of fifty years to become the
largest business of its kind in the world opened its doors for trade.
For six years the idea of the federation of Co-operative societies for
trading purposes had been occupying the minds of the Co-operators
of Scotland, keenly interested as they were in the progress of the
North of England Co-operative Wholesale Society. Only a little over
two years before, also, those of them in the West who took an
interest in the affairs of their Co-operative neighbours had seen the
Co-operative societies of Ayrshire join together to form a baking
association for the purpose of supplying themselves with bread; and
in September 1868 the Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society had
been safely launched, after several years of anxious consultation and
consideration. No sooner had the S.C.W.S. been sent on its way than
the stalwarts of the West turned their attention to yet another
venture. Since the collapse of the second Glasgow Society there had
been no Co-operatively-produced bread in the city. The price which
was being charged for bread by the private bakers was considered too
high, and yet not one of the societies thought itself strong enough to
finance a bakery of its own.
They had faith in the Co-operative principle, however, and what
they could not do as individuals they fancied they would be able to do
in combination. They reasoned that, if a number of people by
combining together could procure the goods they needed more
cheaply than any one of them alone could do, there was no good
reason why a number of societies by combining together could not do
what no one of them acting alone was strong enough to do.
It is to Mr Gabriel Thomson of St Rollox Society, then treasurer of
the newly formed S.C.W.S., that the honour of first bringing the idea
of a federated bakery publicly before the co-operators of the West
belongs. The first idea was that the work should be undertaken by
the recently-formed Wholesale Society, but a little consideration
showed that this plan was hardly feasible. It was thought that it
would scarcely be right to adventure the capital of societies scattered
all over Scotland in an undertaking from which many of them could
not possibly derive any direct benefit, and so this idea was dropped,
and finally it was decided to start a federated baking society.
In the new venture St Rollox Society was the prime mover. In
those days the men who controlled St Rollox Society believed in the
infinite possibilities of the application of Co-operative principles.
They were joined with other Glasgow societies in a drapery
federation. They took up shares in the St Rollox Cooperage Society,
in the Ironworks, and in the Oakmill Society, each as it arose, and to
Co-operation they looked for escape from the exactions of the master
bakers of Glasgow. A meeting was convened by them in the month of
October 1868, and to that meeting Mr Gabriel Thomson read a paper
on “Federation,” in which he dealt at length with the principle as it
could be applied to the baking of bread. This paper so strongly
influenced the delegates that there and then they approved of the
principle, and went back to their societies to report. In a few weeks
another meeting was called, which was attended by representatives
from Barrhead, St Rollox, Paisley Provident, Paisley Equitable,
Glasgow Eastern, Anderston, Parkhead, Johnstone, Howwood,
Glasgow Southern, Motherwell, Lennoxtown, and others. At this
meeting the proposal was discussed further, and at the close the
delegates pledged themselves to go back to their societies and do all
in their power to get these to take part in the formation of the
federation.
 THE SOCIETY FORMED.
A third meeting was held a fortnight later, and at this meeting
eight societies intimated their willingness to join in forming the
Federation. These were Anderston, Barrhead, Cathcart, Johnstone,
Lennoxtown, Motherwell, St Rollox, and Thornliebank. An interim
committee was formed, consisting of Messrs Gabriel Thomson and
John West (St Rollox), James Borrowman and Alexander Douglas
(Anderston), James Ferguson and Alexander Johnstone (Barrhead),
and Joseph Gibb and Donald Cameron (Thornliebank). Three of
their number—Messrs Thomson, Borrowman, and Cameron—were
appointed a sub-committee to look out for suitable premises,
consider the working of the bakery and the delivery of the bread, and
report to a future meeting.
No better men could have been selected for the task. Mr Thomson
was the originator of the scheme, and was also the treasurer of the
S.C.W.S. Mr Borrowman had already made a name for himself as the
most powerful advocate of Co-operation that Scotland had produced.
He had taken a leading part in establishing the S.C.W.S., and was
now its manager; while Mr Cameron was not only a shrewd and
earnest Co-operator, but appears also to have had some knowledge
of the baking trade. We can well imagine the zeal and earnestness
with which they set about their task. They knew that they were
setting out on a journey along an untrodden path, but they had a
faith which lighted up the dark places before them, and a
determination to see the mission on which they had entered, the first
step to the fulfilment of their hopes, accomplished as soon as
possible. Inside two weeks they were back to the parent committee,
their task accomplished, bringing with them particulars of a
bakehouse which they thought would suit the requirements of the
new society, a scheme for carrying on the business, and particulars
about methods of delivery. Their report was approved, the bakery at
52 South Coburg Street was leased, and instructions were given for
its immediate repair.
 The minute of committee, the first minute of the new Society, is as
follows:—
“16th January 1869.

“A meeting was convened to-day to hear the report of the committee in the
office of the Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society. At this meeting the
following societies were represented—Barrhead, St Rollox, Anderston,
Eastern, Motherwell, Dalziel, Cadder, and Thornliebank. A report was
submitted by the committee stating that premises had been secured and that
they were convinced that the business would pay well, and recommended an
immediate start. The report was accepted and the following sub-committee
was appointed to carry out the resolution—viz., Gabriel Thomson, president;
John West, treasurer; James Borrowman, secretary; and Alexander Douglas.
Same committee to get the rules printed in accordance with the alterations
made on the Ayrshire United Co-operative Societies Baking Association, and
submit the same to the general meeting of the delegates before registration.”
All that now remained to be done was to get the bakery into
working order, and ten days sufficed to have this work completed.
Meantime, however, the committee were not idle. Vans had to be
procured and other details of the work inside and outside seen to,
and bakers had to be employed. The committee met on 23rd
January, and appointed a Mr Currie as foreman baker, while on 6th
February they decided to purchase a second van at a cost of £18 and
a horse for a similar sum. A vanman was also engaged at a wage of
20/ a week.
These little details are all in the minutes, but no mention of the
situation of the bakery appears therein, nor is there any mention
made of the date of beginning business. These old-time Co-operators
were so engrossed in the work they were doing that they had no
thought for the people who would come after them, eager for
information about what they had done and how they had done it. It
would appear from the minute book itself that it was written up at a
date later than the beginning of the Society, probably from notes
made by Mr Borrowman at the time, and this may account for the
omission of any mention of the date of beginning business or of the
location of the bakery.
We know, however, that the bakery was situated in South Coburg
Street, a street which connected Bedford Street with Norfolk Street,
parallel with and immediately behind Eglinton Street. The buildings