Educational Justice: Liberal Ideals,

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Educational Justice
Liberal Ideals,
Persistent Inequality,
and the Constructive Uses of Critique

Michael S. Merry
Educational Justice
 Michael S. Merry

Educational Justice
Liberal Ideals, Persistent Inequality,
and the Constructive Uses of Critique
Michael S. Merry
Departments of Education
and Philosophy
University of Amsterdam
Amsterdam, The Netherlands

ISBN 978-3-030-36022-1 ISBN 978-3-030-36023-8 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-36023-8

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Education, like religion, is conservative. It makes haste slowly only,
and sometimes not at all.
—Carter Woodson, The Miseducation of the Negro (1933)
 Once more, for
Nicholas, Sophia and Peter
 Foreword

In Educational Justice, Michael Merry challenges taken-for-granted

views about what constitutes a just school system. The book is impres-
sive not only in the clarity and forcefulness of his arguments but also in
the wealth of empirical, especially sociological, knowledge he brings to
bear on his philosophical thinking. This gives his work a rootedness in
the actualities of educational institutions that philosophy of education of
a more self-contained sort lacks.
The challenges he introduces are especially directed at egalitarian
liberal positions, many of which he sees as unreflectingly reproducing
received opinion about such things as public education, inclusion, diver-
sity, selection, and religious schools. As a philosophical liberal myself, I
have found Merry’s general approach and many of his specific arguments
of great interest since they sometimes question beliefs I have held in
these areas for a long time. It is not often that philosophers of education
cast radical doubt on the paradigms within which people think. What
enables Michael Merry to do this is to no small extent his immersion in
the messy, empirical realities. His method of challenging egalitarian lib-
eral views of a more dogmatic sort about education involves mounting
conceptual critiques on the one hand, and confronting defenders of an
idealized ‘public school’ with a battery of facts about school systems and
about students’ and parents’ experience of them on the other.
I will say more about Merry’s challenges in a moment. Although
his Educational Justice is a very different kind of book from David
Runciman’s recent How Democracy Ends (Profile Books 2018), it has

ix
x FOREWORD

struck me, having recently read both works, that they share something
in common. In his book, Runciman reveals his doubts about the survival
of democracy over the longer term. Among his reasons is that people in
older democracies in North America, Europe and elsewhere have, over
the last century, become so used to this form of politics that they take its
continuing existence for granted. This has put them less on their guard
than they should be in dealing with new forces that may be undermining
it, whether social, like disaffection with the political system, economic,
like powerful internet-based corporations such as Facebook, or technolog-
ical, like the growth of intelligent and perhaps uncontrollable machines.
Like Runciman, Merry jolts us out of habitual ways of looking at
things. But while Runciman’s concern is with factual matters—how
democracies die and whether their death is inevitable, Merry’s is with
the philosophical question of how best to conceive a just school system.
To answer it, he claims, we need a radical critique of some beliefs that
many egalitarian liberals among us hold. Among these is the belief that
ordinary, public—in the American sense of non-private—schools are best
suited to further the democratic ideal of justice. Much of Merry’s book
submits this kind of educational stance—about the public school as the
key to fair educational provision—to stringent critique. Here are three
illustrations.
Defenders of the public school want to preserve it from privatization,
arguably exemplified by charter schools in the United States and acade-
mies in England. Only the public school, they believe, can form students
as good citizens, is capable of democratic governance, offers equality of
opportunity, etc. Merry’s target is ‘the “faith” in public schooling that
refuses critique’. While he himself favors public schooling provided that
it does in fact deliver an equitable and worthwhile education, he is fully
aware, in a way that ideological defenders in his view are not, of the
shortcomings of public schools as they are in reality and not in some nos-
talgic or utopian vision.
One of the foremost arguments for public schools, not least in the
United States, is that in promoting racial and social class integration they
help to bring about a more just democratic society. Once again, Merry
forces the reader to reconsider that claim. While a minority of disadvan-
taged students benefit from being taught alongside more privileged class-
mates, get to university, and do well in life, the evidence suggests that
integrated schools fall far short of what many want to believe to be the
case.
 FOREWORD xi

This theme overlaps with Merry’s views on religious schools. His

focus here is the antipathy that many liberals feel toward them, since the
education they provide is likely to be indoctrinatory. Yet again he aims
to shake us out of our dogmatic slumber. He accepts the charge of likely
indoctrination, but then asks whether indoctrination is always, all things
considered, something to be avoided. He takes as his focus Islamic
schools. Like some racial minority or working-class students, many
Muslim students feel more comfortable and secure learning in the com-
pany of young people like themselves. Based on telling evidence of the
stigmatic harm that many Muslims suffer in ‘integrated’ schools, Merry’s
view is that indoctrination may well be the lesser evil.
These three examples give a flavor of the approach Michael Merry
adopts throughout this book. For me, the latter also prompts more gen-
eral reflections about egalitarian liberals in education. An implication of
his argument is that these cover a spectrum of different positions. Some
have an ideological prejudice in favor of the common or public school
that blinds them to its institutional defects. Others—and here I hope I
can include myself—are strongly inclined in favor of it, but in a less dog-
matic way. Yet others, including, I think, Merry himself, believe that edu-
cational justice often requires a more pragmatic approach, marked by a
minimal initial predisposition toward a ‘common school’ ideal, without
failing to recognize that this ideal often fails to satisfy the necessary con-
ditions for justice, particularly for the more marginalized and vulnerable.

John White
Emeritus Professor
University of London
London, UK
 Acknowledgements

I owe a debt of gratitude to a number of individuals who either read

individual chapters, or, in a few cases, the entire manuscript. Krista
Goldstine-Cole, Enzo Rossi, Sally Scholz, Jeffrey Brown, Chris Turner,
Jessica Payton, Gijs Donselaar, Robbie McClintock, John White, Clive
Harbor, Veit Bader, Tommie Shelby, Andrew Mason, Don Weenink,
Yossi Dahan, Bart van Leeuwen, Lucas Swaine, Anders Schinkel, Darren
Chetty and Ron Sundstrom. I owe Bill New a special debt of gratitude
for our brainstorming sessions a few years back, and also for his support-
ive role during the early phases of the writing. A very warm thanks to
you. I also owe a special thanks to Richard Arum, for his co-authoring
the material in Chapter 8. I am also grateful to Taylor & Francis for per-
mission to reuse material from ‘Is the Liberal Defence of Public Schools
a Fantasy?’ Critical Studies in Education 58, 3: 373–389; ‘Can Schools
Teach Citizenship?’ Discourse 41, 1; ‘Do Inclusion Policies Deliver
Educational Justice for Autistic Students?’ Journal of School Choice
14, 1; Wiley for permission to reuse material from ‘Is Diversity Necessary
for Educational Justice?’ Educational Theory 64, 3: 205–225; and Sage
for permission to reuse material from ‘Indoctrination, Islamic schools
and the Broader Scope of Harm’. Theory and Research in Education
16, 2: 162–178 and ‘Can Schools Fairly Select Their Students?’ Theory
and Research in Education 16, 3: 330–350. I also am particularly grate-
ful to various audiences where I presented some of this work and where
I received helpful feedback from those present: New York University,

xiii
xiv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Columbia University, Open University (Tel Aviv), University of

Amsterdam, University of Birmingham, Oxford University, Harvard
University, Dartmouth College, Warwick University, Exeter University,
Groningen University, Leiden University, and the University of San
Francisco.
 Contents

Part I Educational Justice: Preliminaries

1 Introduction 3

2 Justice and Education 21

Part II Educational Justice: Appraising Three Liberal

Commitments

3 Educational Justice and the Public School 55

4 Educational Justice and Citizenship 89

5 Educational Justice and Diversity 123

Part III Educational Justice: Exclusion, Ethics,

and the Pragmatic Alternative

6 Educational Justice and Inclusion 153

7 Educational Justice and Religious Schools 187

xv
xvi CONTENTS

8 Educational Justice and Selection 217

9 Educational Justice and Tentative Hope 245

Bibliography 255

Index 283
 PART I

Educational Justice: Preliminaries

 CHAPTER 1

Introduction

In his seminal book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,1 Thomas

Kuhn argued that even when our beliefs may be warranted and our
methods sound, much of the time our knowledge and understanding
is tethered to a dominant ideology—or paradigm—that may prevent us
from drawing the right kinds of inferences from the data we have. And
because most of us are uncritically socialized into one or more dominant
ideologies, we usually fail to notice how they imperceptibly influence
the subject matter we study, the questions we think it important to ask,
and the theoretical frames we use to interpret our experience. Relatedly,
we often fail to recognize how prone we are to discount evidence,
and perhaps even competing evidentiary standards, that conflicts with
our present knowledge and understanding. And while improved and
more accurate understandings are certainly possible within a dominant
ideology, new theoretical insights are improbable so long as accepted
orthodoxies hold sway.
Many of our beliefs about education are like this. As such, an
improved understanding concerning our current and future educational
predicaments may require a critical analysis concerning what many of
us have long taken for granted. This analysis, I submit, requires that
we first identify what the underlying beliefs are, and why they may be
problematic for what they fail to consider. The analysis further requires
that we have the intellectual courage to question the veracity of some
of our beliefs, given how prone to error all intellectual endeavors are.
And finally, the analysis requires that we not refuse to consider pragmatic

© The Author(s) 2020 3

M. S. Merry, Educational Justice,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-36023-8_1
4 M. S. MERRY

alternatives to our preferred strategies for fear of what our ideological

adversaries might think. The demands of justice2 should not be circum-
scribed by partisan politics.
But identifying which of our beliefs is problematic is particularly dif-
ficult to do given that much of the time these lay hidden from view. As
unexamined assumptions, they steer how we think, which questions we
ask, which methods of inquiry we choose, which institutions we favor,
and which policies we think it best to pursue. And in unwittingly fall-
ing back on these unexamined assumptions, what we are willing to
entertain as a path forward risks being bounded by that which is com-
fortably familiar. And thus as it concerns many of our policies aimed at
fostering greater educational justice, Becky Francis and Martin Mills
have observed that many of our favored initiatives ‘are well-intentioned
but must inevitably be undermined by the primacy of the model in which
they are enacted.’3
One way to extricate ourselves from this predicament is to reassert the
value of critique, in particular critique of some of the most basic assump-
tions that motivate philosophers and empirical researchers but also poli-
cy-makers and practitioners, who care about educational justice. For by
refusing to critically examine some of our own most cherished beliefs, we
not only risk misconceiving the challenges we face; we may find that even
our best attempts to remedy educational injustice are doomed to yield
the same disappointing results.
But even if we are theoretically open to the value of critique, for
many of us there is an almost predictably restive agitation that ensues:
‘Criticism is easy’ we say; ‘better to focus on making things better than
telling us what is wrong.’ ‘We know what you’re against; now tell us
what you’re for’ is another common reply, as is ‘It’s all well and good to
stand back and criticize but what alternatives can you offer?’ And it is not
unreasonable to prefer resolution to conflict, optimism to cynicism, or
solutions to despair. I, too, am not enamored of the armchair critic who
prefers to castigate the views of others while offering nothing in the way
of constructive argument.
But neither do I take such a dim view of critique. Indeed critique
serves a number of important, even constructive, epistemological func-
tions. First, with its aim of offering a detailed analysis, critique can assist
us in exposing, and in some cases even dislodging, bias. It is the very
nature of bias that it inclines us to assume, think, and behave in ways
about which we largely are unaware. Biases are notoriously difficult to
 1 INTRODUCTION 5

detect owing to their largely unconscious influence on our thinking, atti-

tudes, and behavior. They powerfully influence our ability to hear, let
alone accept, ideas we find strange or unpleasant. Moreover, biases gen-
erally incline us to ignore, or downplay, contradictory evidence we do
not want to consider, even when intellectual honesty should compel us
to evaluate all the evidence.4
When biases harden into inflexible convictions about ‘the way the
world is,’ such that these convictions have the ring of unquestioned
truth, we can even speak of dogma. Essentially an article of faith, dogma
refers to those things we believe to be true, even when the preponder-
ance of evidence points in the opposite direction, and even when those
we aim to ‘help’ tell us that our thinking is misguided. Hence to sub-
scribe to a dogma is to espouse beliefs that are impervious to challenge.
The outcome of years of socialization, much of it occurring directly via
the school, dogma—or what sociologist Pierre Bourdieu referred to as
doxa—is the cumulative result of experience by which ‘the natural and
social world appears as self-evident.’5 And when dogma influences a con-
ceptual framework through which the world is viewed (echoing Kuhn’s
understanding of a paradigm), its influence, as we have just seen, deter-
mines both the questions it is permissible to pose and the conclusions
it is tolerable to permit. Dogma thus assumes the appearance of estab-
lished fact, something thought heretical to question, akin to a Catholic
approaching the Eucharist only to impugn the efficacy of the sacrament.
Critique has a second function, which is to expose and unsettle the
workings of cognitive dissonance. Cognitive dissonance (CD) refers to the
unconscious habit of concurrently espousing contradictory beliefs, val-
ues, or understandings, where one belief, value, or understanding of an
empirical reality must be downplayed so that another, more fundamental,
belief, or value might prevail. To take an educational example, cognitive
dissonance describes both the acknowledgement that the empirical facts
concerning how school systems function are consistently and reliably
true (say, with respect to how labelling, discipline, and tracking mech-
anisms disproportionately harm poor, minority pupils in ‘integrated’
schools6), and at the same time accommodate the belief that ‘integrated’
school environments will lead to fairer outcomes for these same pupils.
In the struggle to reconcile one’s beliefs to the empirical realities, either
the belief must be jettisoned, or the contradiction must be rationalized,
for instance by reading all contradictory evidence in a way that reaf-
firms one’s preferred belief.7 Each of us is prone to do this at one time
6 M. S. MERRY

or another. But in the illustration above, it is the latter belief that must
­prevail for the majority of liberal educational scholars, even when—as
I discuss later in Chapter 58—the bulk of the evidence generally points
away from this belief.
Hence in the quest for educational justice, critique can be a valuable
method in helping us to recognize, on the one hand, the inclination to
downplay contradictory evidence, and on the other hand, in helping us
better understand how bias prevents our knowledge and understanding
from altering our beliefs and behaviors. Therefore I submit that in the
absence of critique, cognitive dissonance may be preventing us from rec-
ognizing how an unconscious unwillingness to critically examine some of
our most cherished beliefs can actually exacerbate educational injustice.
This brings me to a third important function of critique, which is that
it can help us to get clear about the injustices that matter most, what
their causes might be, but also what it is realistic to expect under con-
ditions of persistent inequality. Though few are naïve concerning the
redoubtable challenges we face in seeking to mitigate educational injus-
tice—both inside and outside of schools—many liberal philosophers,
researchers, and ordinary citizens exhibit a strange optimism9 concern-
ing the ability of institutionalized education to compensate for these
persistent inequalities. But Terry Eagleton has observed that optimists,
ultimately

are conservatives because their faith in a benign future is rooted in their

trust in the essential soundness of the present. Indeed, optimism is a typi-
cal component of ruling-class ideologies…Bleakness, by contrast, can be a
radical posture. Only if you view your situation as critical do you recognize
the need to transform it. Dissatisfaction can be a goad to reform. The san-
guine, by contrast, are likely to come up with sheerly cosmetic solutions.
True hope is needed most when the situation is at its starkest, a state of
extremity that optimism is generally loath to acknowledge.10

Forsaking unwarranted optimism is not a counsel of despair; nor does it

entail denying the many benefits that a school can provide; nor, finally,
does it require that we ought to portray casualties of the school system
solely in terms of victimhood, as though underprivileged persons possess
no intelligence, agency, or responsibility to respond to the unjust circum-
stances in which they find themselves.11 But it does mean that we ignore
at our own peril what decades of educational research has had to say not
 1 INTRODUCTION 7

only about the (in)ability of our present school systems to deliver justice
much of the time but indeed about the many harmful effects of institu-
tional schooling simpliciter, most especially for the disadvantaged.
Now of course critique cannot be the whole story. Mills and Francis
elsewhere remind us: ‘There remains a moral imperative for those of
us committed to the pursuit of [justice] in education to offer poten-
tial alternatives as well as critique of existing models.’12 Hence taking
educational justice seriously does not permit cynical resignation to our
present state of affairs. As a constellation of ideals about how things can
improve—predicated on the substantive hope that improvement is possi-
ble—justice demands that we push beyond what we have accomplished,
knowing that we never finally arrive. In other words, there are myriad
ways to promote justice, as it were, with a small ‘j.’ As such, my plea
would be that we be open to pragmatic alternatives when our preferred
route has yielded modest results, only works some of the time, or isn’t a
realistic possibility to begin with.
Being open to pragmatic alternatives is not defeatist. Defeatism would
entail abandoning the pursuit of worthy ideals. And thus by recommend-
ing that we be open to pragmatic alternative paths to educational justice
I am not advocating that we ought to dismantle state school systems or
prefer privatization schemes. Indeed, as I aim to show, some of these prag-
matic alternatives can be pursued within the school systems we have. But as
I demonstrate in each of the subsequent chapters, the systems we have—
be they in Delaware, Denmark, or the Dominican Republic—are far
from the best we can do. And in a world of profound structural inequal-
ity, where school-focused proposals for ameliorating educational injustice
too often succumb to a sincere, if misguided, appeal for remedies that
effectively leave everything just as it is (a scenario all too familiar to expe-
rienced teachers in large school districts accustomed to the ephemeral
educational policies introduced by each new superintendent), an open-
ness to pragmatic alternatives means that we cannot rule anything out in
advance. Refusing to be open to pragmatic alternatives, I argue, makes us
complicit with educational injustice. Yet whether the available alternatives
are in fact justice-enhancing will depend on more than the inadequacy of
the local state-public school options; they also turn on the superior abil-
ity of an educational alternative to respond to the needs of the commu-
nity or to the more specific needs of the individual learner.
Whatever strategy one prefers, the pursuit of educational justice
is dependent upon many different actors: e.g., parents, social workers,
8 M. S. MERRY

teachers, administrators, coaches, tutors, and policy-makers. Yet because

both educational philosophers and empirical researchers produce most
of what is written about educational justice, in this book I principally
limit my attention to their work. Philosophers are adept at identifying
and delineating what the relevant principles of justice are or ought to
be. They further are adept at helping us to think through the kinds of
inequalities that matter from a moral point of view. But so long as philos-
ophers exhibit little interest in examining the empirical realities that per-
sistently thwart our best attempts to imagine a more just state of affairs,
philosophy’s contribution to educational justice is, at best, slight.
For their part, empirical researchers are adept at documenting,
describing, and measuring inequalities of various kinds. Further, using
rigorous evidence they can highlight which interventions seem to be
working. But so long as many of these studies lack the theoretical tools
necessary to adequately explain or predict the reasons for various meas-
ured outcomes; so long as many of the most pressing issues pertaining
to educational injustice—e.g., stigma and racism—are not even consid-
ered as relevant variables in education research; and moreover, so long as
researchers exhibit an unwillingness to consider pragmatic alternatives for
reducing intractable inequality, the contribution of empirical research to
the pursuit of educational justice, too, is slight at best.
We need both a theoretically and empirically informed account of
educational justice, one that both can take measure of what the issues
are, as it were ‘on the ground,’ while at the same time not flinching
from the conviction that we can do better. This book represents a mod-
est attempt to do just that. But by arguing that we can do better, I will
not be introducing a novel theory; nor will I be introducing new empir-
ical data. We have enough of each. Instead, I endeavor only to apply
the tools of critique and ethical analysis to the arguments and evidence
that currently underwrite some of our most cherished beliefs vis-à-vis
education.
Hence my aim is not to criticize schools per se, let alone those whose
vocation is to work in schools. Rather it is to examine the beliefs con-
cerning what schools ought to be doing, or indeed what it is even possible
for schools to do. In that endeavor, I will be asking whether these beliefs
are, in fact, justice-enhancing. If and when they are, I offer no rebut-
tal. But if and when they are not, I submit that the beliefs in question
may be ill-conceived, or else that they incline us to ignore contradic-
tory evidence, leaving us right where we started. Educational justice,
 1 INTRODUCTION 9

I will argue, always permits multiple strategies. Yet some of these may sit
uncomfortably alongside our prior commitments, such as the widely held
belief I examine in Chapter 7 that religious schools have no role to play
in the quest for greater educational justice. Further, as I argued earlier,
in the face of many unyielding obstacles, pragmatic alternatives may be a
necessary plan of action in seeking to realize our best ideals.
As I proceed I chiefly fix my attention on liberal philosophical beliefs.
I am aware that no broad consensus among philosophical liberals exists
apart from items like the importance of moral individualism, the equal-
ity of persons, and the distinction between public and private spheres.
Indeed, philosophical liberals routinely debate questions such as where
the thresholds of equality should be drawn, how principles like respect
ought to be balanced against freedom of expression or whether tol-
erance ought to be accorded greater weight than attempts to pro-
mote ­anti-discrimination. This dissensus makes it difficult to paint, in
broad strokes, a portrait of ‘liberalism’—philosophical or otherwise.
Accordingly, where appropriate, I single out particular authors, or else
point to an established consensus, as it concerns positions defended by a
variety of philosophical liberals.
However, I also use ‘liberal’ to capture those—in countries on all
continents—whose political beliefs are, roughly speaking, ‘center left,’
and, hence where the topics of this book are concerned, where the indi-
vidual self-identifying as liberal holds certain things to be true about
education, or at least essential: for instance, the importance of state-
funded public education, the role of the school in promoting citizenship,
a learning environment that is diverse and inclusive, etc. And thus, unless
specified, it is around a lose constellation of liberal beliefs and positions
concerning education that I address my arguments.
The decision to direct much of my critique against liberal positions
will puzzle, and perhaps irritate, some readers fatigued by the cur-
rent political climate, one in which any criticism of liberalism—perhaps
especially in Europe, given the current fragility of the EU—is viewed
as a gift either to conservatives or rightwing populists. But I focus on
well-established liberal views for the following three reasons. First,
conservatives rarely foreground their favored positions in the educa-
tional domain in terms of justice. Liberals, on the other hand, typi-
cally champion justice as their core business. Second, and certainly
in the academy—where most educational philosophy and empirical
research is produced—liberal theories and ideals remain dominant.
10 M. S. MERRY

Indeed irrespective of the views circulating on main street, liberal views

in educational scholarship approximate what I earlier referred to as
‘accepted orthodoxies.’
These orthodoxies, which prevail in tertiary faculties of education (not
exclusively but especially in North America), as well as in a great many
educational theory and research journals, tend toward the opinion that
liberal views are self-evident, if not unassailable. And this opinion has
inclined apologists to deflect, dismiss, or completely ignore perspectives
that deviate from liberal pieties. As I discuss in Chapter 3, these pieties
include a belief in an unadulterated ‘public’; or, as I discuss in Chapter 4,
the belief that one of the school’s core purposes is to promote ‘citizen-
ship’; or as I discuss in Chapters 5 and 6, the belief that educational envi-
ronments conducive to justice should be ‘diverse’ and ‘inclusive’ in all
the ways that matter.
But there is another reason why I restrict my attention to liberal per-
spectives in education, and that is the curiously trusting view of the state
that many liberals espouse. In contrast, the Old Left—the pre-1960s
political left in the Western world—knew that for all the state could be
compelled under pressure to do for the people, or the public interest,
the state was not benign but rather instantiated a potentially oppressive
concentration of power. As such, for various self-serving reasons elected
officials—even if they are members of the Labor Party, the Greens, or
the Socialists—seem quite prepared to collude with others in the polit-
ical and corporate sector, with the (perhaps unintentional) result that
the ‘public domain’ and even the ‘public interest’ is circumscribed by an
increasingly shrinking number of voices.13
It has been my experience that except when it is conservatives or fas-
cist despots irresponsibly wielding political power, liberals look askance
at radical critiques of the state—including where these concern state sys-
tems of education—as obsolete for having relied upon what they view as
an outmoded revisionist history. I do not share this view. Rather my own
intuitions come much closer to those of Louis Althusser, whose com-
ments below were penned a half century ago, yet are still relevant today:

one ideological State apparatus certainly has the dominant role, although
hardly anyone lends an ear to its music: it is so silent! This is the school
[…] the Church has been replaced today in its role as the dominant
Ideological State Apparatus by the school.14
 1 INTRODUCTION 11

It is false reassurance to dismiss radical leftist critiques such as Althusser’s

as passé. If anything, the sentiment behind his remarks has gained
momentum, even if it is not explicitly premised on Marxist axioms but
rather has splintered into copious different literatures, including postco-
lonial, feminist, critical race, disability studies, etc. Either way, the point I
am stressing here is this: there is more than ample ideological space to the
left of mainstream liberalism to take up the cause of educational justice.
And it is not only these more ‘radical’ literatures that continue to
document the various harms perpetuated by state systems of education.
Indeed the sub-discipline of sociology of education has never deviated
from documenting the structural inequalities of school administration,
financing, pupil tracking, and various other mechanisms deployed by
state education systems that maintain and perpetuate, rather than mit-
igate, educational injustice. Even John Dewey, certainly no radical, at
times expressed suspicion concerning the state’s role in education. ‘Is it
possible,’ he queried, ‘for an educational system to be conducted by a
national state and yet the full social ends of the educative process not
be restricted, constrained, and corrupted?’15 Dewey’s rhetorical question
invites precisely the kind of critique that any healthy democratic society
needs, including the view that the school, in addition to being part of
the solution to educational injustice, is also part of the problem.

Outline of the Book

Every scholarly undertaking requires that one set parameters, and this
book is no exception. In no way do the topics that I address exhaust all
that there is to say about educational justice.16 Yet to the extent possible,
I have tried to focus on topics within the educational domain that argua-
bly have received less critical attention.
The book is roughly divided into three sections: (1) basic consider-
ations for educational justice, (2) liberal educational commitments,
and (3) educational ethics. To lay some of the foundations for the rest
of the book, in the next chapter I canvas some of the basic features of
justice, with especial attention to the equality principle, before turn-
ing to consider its relevance in the educational domain. I highlight, on
the one hand, the importance of ideals, and the honest pursuit of those
ideals. Yet on the other hand, I also argue that justice requires that we
make a comparative empirical analysis concerning both the quality of
schools that children attend, as well as the circumstances that profoundly
12 M. S. MERRY

influence children’s lives outside of school. In large part owing to the

vast inequalities that obtain outside of the school, I demonstrate why
there always will be irresolvable tensions inherent to the pursuit of edu-
cational justice, or justice tout court.
In the subsequent three chapters, I focus my attention on three prom-
inent liberal beliefs. Each of these beliefs is interrelated rather than dis-
tinct and—as I further elucidate in the following chapter—perhaps best
corresponds to this egalitarian idea: a democracy consists in relations
of social equality, where citizens of different backgrounds (ought to)
engage in free, cooperative interaction in a shared public space. In any
case, I aim to show that while each liberal belief represents an attrac-
tive ideal, realizing these ideals remains improbable in most schools and
school systems so long as we refuse to come to terms with their many
internal contradictions. None of this means that the ideals themselves are
unimportant or that we ought to cease caring about them. I want to be
clear about that. At the same time, however, I argue that to conflate any
one of them with educational justice is to substitute a false proxy.
Now because there may be some confusion about this choice of
vocabulary, let me pause here to explain what I mean. A proxy is under-
stood to be an approximation of something else. Proxies are commonly
used in, say, physics, in order to reasonably conjecture about phe-
nomena (e.g., the location of electrons) that we cannot (yet) directly
observe; instead, we rely upon the ‘behavior’ of phenomena that we can
observe—and even that only with the aid of a powerful microscope. But
proxies become highly tenuous once we step into the social realm. To
a coach looking for new recruits, being quick-footed may seem to be a
proxy for athleticism, just as a sharp-witted individual to a comedy club
manager may appear to be a proxy for a great humorist. But of course
plenty of individuals who match either description are ill-suited to a
career in sports or comedy.
Social scientists, too, use proxies all the time, typically as a way to
measure something. Researchers may conjecture something about
how ‘religious’ someone is by whether or not they hold an official
church membership, or by counting how often they attend religious
services. Or they may conjecture how ‘politically involved’ persons
may be by asking folks how many times they have voted in elections or
joined a community service project. But these proxies, too, are often
false: they may tell us next to nothing about how religious or polit-
ically engaged someone is. More worryingly, we may even transpose
 1 INTRODUCTION 13

the proxy for the ideal itself, investing our time and resources improv-
ing (and defending) the proxy, rather than the goal that we’re after.
And that, in short, is exactly what I will argue about the three liberal
beliefs that I examine in Chapters 3–5. To be clear: nowhere in this book
will I argue against the importance of state-public education, or the cultiva-
tion of citizenship, or the potential benefits of diversity in the educational
domain. What I will contest, however, is that any of these is a reliable proxy
for educational justice. Moreover, to the extent that these beliefs, for some,
have hardened into dogmas, the prospects for educational justice remain
circumscribed so long as we fail to differentiate the ideal from the real, and
so long as doing that prevents us from disrupting the status quo.
And so, in Chapter 3 I examine the belief that schools should be public, in
particular the belief that an education that satisfies the public condition is
one best suited to deliver educational justice. I largely restrict my attention
to the non-denominational state-public school, as it is perhaps best under-
stood in the North American context. But in examining liberal defenses of
the state-public school, I suggest that the standard arguments employed
by mainstream liberal defenders are generally inadequate because they fail
to provide a credible representation of their historical object, let alone
effective remedies to our current problems. Indeed, many of these narra-
tives, in my view, are grounded in fantasies about what state-public schools
or teaching and learning, are or could be, as much as they are grounded
in the historical realities of state-public schools or the realities of so-called
privatization. I speculate whether the self-identification of the proponents
of this cause as ‘progressive’ is not part of this ideological construction and
if the underlying political agenda is not in fact more conservative.
In Chapter 4, I examine what for many readers will be the most
deeply held belief of them all, viz., that schools ought to foster citizen-
ship. It is a belief now sustained by decades of theoretical defense in the
respective disciplines of political science, political philosophy, and phi-
losophy of education. I scrutinize the liberal faith in the efficacy and
morality of traditional citizenship education, and in particular the idea
that citizenship education is likely to foster educational justice. In doing
this, I discuss how citizenship education has been, and continues to be,
practiced in most state schools and on youth. In challenging the liberal
notion of citizenship education, I also challenge the liberal understand-
ings of what it means to be a citizen, and how the social and political
world of citizens is constituted. The first step will be to show that, his-
torically, citizenship education has served mostly the unapologetic, and
14 M. S. MERRY

often coercive, function of assimilating ‘non-standard’ children to the

common culture, while confirming the values and lifeways of children
whose cultural belonging is not in question. And understanding what
schools are actually like is a necessary context for understanding norma-
tive theories in the liberal vein that seek to educate citizens and explain
their relations to democracy.
In Chapter 5, I examine the belief that schools must be diverse. In par-
ticular I challenge the liberal notion that diversity serves as a good proxy
for educational justice. First, I maintain that the story about how diversity
might be accomplished and what it might do for students and society is
internally inconsistent. Second, I argue that a disproportionate share of
the benefits that might result from greater diversity often accrues to those
already advantaged. Finally, I propose that many of the most promising
and pragmatic remedies for deep structural injustice are often rejected by
liberal proponents of ‘diversity first’ in favor of remedies that in most cases
are practically impossible, and often problematic on their own terms. I
argue that schools that are by geography and demography not ethnically
or socioeconomically diverse still can successfully confront the obstacles
that their students face in creating a life they have reason to value.
In the third section of the book, I continue with a critical examina-
tion of liberal beliefs but I pivot away from constructive critique toward
an ethical analysis of specific issues, where the tensions can perhaps
most vividly be seen. Each chapter is unique, both in terms of the sub-
ject matter, as well as with respect to how the relevant criteria I aim to
apply. Accordingly, how I run out the ethical analysis in each chapter will
be somewhat different in each case; the possibilities available to us may
be more circumscribed by educational policies (as in Chapter 6), whereas
others may allow more room for reasoned speculation (as in Chapter
8). The overriding goal in Chapters 6 and 7 will be to determine what
the pursuit of educational justice under non-ideal circumstances might
include, where both the evidence and arguments allow that alternate paths
be taken. Conversely, in Chapter 8 I use constructed typologies to exam-
ine a more principled ethical dilemma, before turning to a hard empirical
case. Though each case is ethically distinct and complex, what they share
in common is a counterintuitive assessment whose implications are likely
to be at odds with the conventional liberal wisdom.
I begin the ethical analysis in Chapter 6 by asking what educational jus-
tice might require for children with autism in schools where inclusion is
normative. I argue that inclusion, in order to be meaningful, must do more
than provide physical access; it must offer value to the person in question,
 1 INTRODUCTION 15

facilitate a sense of belonging, and be conducive to a child’s overall well-­

being. I argue that when we attempt to answer this question we pay espe-
cial attention to the specific dimensions of well-being conducive to the
inclusion of autistic children, especially those concerning the risk of sensory
overload and safety. I further argue, with respect to autism, that though
they be fallible actors, parents in most cases are still better placed to know
what is in their own child’s interest, and that pragmatic alternatives must be
available to procure educational justice for autistic children.
In Chapter 7, I consider another pragmatic alternative and ask
whether (some) religious schools may have a role to play in the promo-
tion of educational justice. In the philosophical literature, more often
than not religious schools are viewed as corrosive to educational justice.
While there are many complaints levied against religious schools, I prin-
cipally concern myself with a charge most often brought against them,
viz., that they are guilty of indoctrinatory harm. Without minimizing
the harms of indoctrination, I nevertheless postulate that there are other
harms for many individuals that are more severe outside the religious
school. Accordingly, the full scope of harm should be taken into account
when evaluating the indoctrinatory harm that some religious schools do.
Once we do that, I suggest, justice not only may require that we choose
the lesser harm but that we come to appreciate the justice-promoting
role that many religious schools can play. To simplify matters, I focus my
attention on the stigmatic harm done to Muslim children, and the role
that Islamic schools might be expected to play in mitigating that harm.
In Chapter 8, I tackle a particularly contentious issue as it concerns
educational justice: school selection. I ask whether it ever can be equita-
ble for schools to select their own students. Educational justice ordinarily
requires that children not have their educational experiences or oppor-
tunities determined by morally arbitrary features of their background.
Indeed educational opportunities determined by unearned advantage or
disadvantage offends against the equality principle, i.e., basic notions of
fairness. But the question driving this ethical analysis is whether state-­
public schools are ever permitted to select their students, and if so,
whether it is possible to structure selection procedures such that they aim
to achieve equitable ends. I delineate, describe and defend what I believe
the essential features of selection are, and also why we need to pay equal
attention to both the outcomes as well as the processes leading to those
outcomes. Provided the selection is motivated and guided by the right
reasons, as well as appropriately monitored, I argue that selection can be
equity promoting. I conclude by testing the theory with an empirical case.
16 M. S. MERRY

Finally, in the short and concluding chapter, I return to my original

plea, which is that we need to be more critical concerning certain beliefs
we espouse that may prevent us from making more progress, without
refusing to affirm the many ways in which schools can indeed be more
justice-enhancing. I further emphasize the importance of opening our-
selves to multiple paths to achieve greater educational justice, when and
where the best empirical evidence consistently suggests that doing so is
both reasonable and wise.

Notes
1. Kuhn 1962.
2. I shall have much more to say about justice in the next chapter.
3. Francis & Mills 2012, p. 158.
4. The field of education is not unique but as we will see throughout the
book, it is a field that is indubitably susceptible to research (questions/
methods/results) being guided by the strong beliefs of the researchers.
Concerning this tendency, educational philosophers Phillips & Burbules
(2000, p. 3) enjoin their readers: ‘If researchers are to contribute to the
improvement of education – to the improvement of educational policies
and educational practices – they need to raise their sights a little higher
than expressing their fervent beliefs or feelings of personal enlighten-
ment, no matter how compelling these beliefs are felt to be.’
5. Bourdieu & Passeron 1977, p. 164.
6. See for example Darby & Rury 2018.
7. A related notion is called belief polarization, where the available evidence
merely reinforces the prior beliefs of the individuals reviewing it.
8. But for a more detailed analysis of the subject, see Merry 2013.
9. Of course not every philosopher who writes on educational justice suffers
from unwarranted optimism. Late in his philosophical career, Brian Barry
(2005, p. 41) ruefully observed that ‘children start with, and grow up
with, an enormous variety of different resources. On the basis of just a
few facts about a child, such as its social class and its race or ethnicity, we
can make a good prediction of where it will finish up in the distribution
of earnings, the likelihood that it will spend time in jail, and many other
outcomes, good and bad.’ And whether the focus is on education, or
health, labor, media, or politics, Barry was more candid than most con-
cerning the plethora of intractable problems likely to beset any theory of
justice, including his own. Indeed the tone of his last major book, Why
Social Justice Matters (2005), is the philosophical analogue to Beckett’s
Waiting for Godot: justice never comes.
 1 INTRODUCTION 17

10. Eagleton 2015, pp. 4–5.

11. ‘One possible explanation,’ Bernard Boxill (2010, p. 8) writes, ‘of the
apparently widespread tendency to ignore the responsibility of the
oppressed to resist their oppression is the equally widespread tendency to
profoundly underestimate the human resourcefulness of the oppressed.’
12. Francis & Mills 2012, p. 253.
13. Cf. Mills 1956.
14. Althusser 1971, pp. 260–261.
15. Dewey 1916, p. 97.
16. The panoply of topical candidates is broad but include—to name only
a few—educational aims (White 2003; Whitehead 1967); teaching
(Hostetler 2011; Strike & Soltis 2015); patriotism (Archard 1999; Merry
2019); child-rearing (Archard 2014; LaFollette 2010); moral educa-
tion (Haydon 2006; Peters 1981); university admissions (Fullinwider
& Lichtenberg 2004; Kotzee & Martin 2013); school choice (Clayton
& Stevens 2004; Swift 2003); homeschooling (Dwyer & Peters 2019;
Glanzer 2008); high stakes testing (Norris et al. 2004; Schrag 2004);
grading and assessment (Close 2009; McCrickerd 2012); and curricular
content (Pennock 2001; Hand 2008).

References
Althusser, L. 1971. Lenin and philosophy and other essays. New York: Monthly
Review Press.
Archard, D. 1999. Should we teach patriotism? Studies in Philosophy and
Education 18: 157–173.
Archard, D. 2014. Children: Rights and childhood. London: Routledge.
Barry, B. 2005. Why social justice matters. Cambridge: Polity.
Bourdieu, P. & Passeron, J.C. 1977. Reproduction in education, society and cul-
ture, vol. 4. New York: Sage.
Boxill, B. 2010. The responsibility of the oppressed to resist their own oppres-
sion. Journal of Social Philosophy 41 (1): 1–12.
Clayton, M. & Stevens, D. 2004. School choice and the burdens of justice.
Theory and Research in Education 2 (2): 111–126.
Close, D. 2009. Fair grades. Teaching Philosophy 32 (4): 361–398.
Darby, D. & Rury, J. 2018. The color of mind: Why the origins of the achievement
gap matters for justice. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Dewey, J. 1916. Democracy and education. New York: Macmillan.
Dwyer, J. & Peters, S. 2019. Homeschooling: The history and philosophy of a con-
troversial practice. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Eagleton, T. 2015. Hope without optimism. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Another random document with
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would unquestionably be soon absorbed, while the ultimate result
might be the partition of all South America between the
various European Powers. …

"The people of the United States have learned in the school of

experience to what extent the relations of States to each
other depend not upon sentiment nor principle, but upon
selfish interest. They will not soon forget that, in their
hour of distress, all their anxieties and burdens were
aggravated by the possibility of demonstrations against their
national life on the part of Powers with whom they had long
maintained the most harmonious relations. They have yet in
mind that France seized upon the apparent opportunity of our
Civil War to set up a Monarchy in the adjoining State of
Mexico. They realize that, had France and Great Britain held
important South American possessions to work from and to
benefit, the temptation to destroy the predominance of the
Great Republic in this hemisphere by furthering its
dismemberment might have been irresistible. From that grave
peril they have been saved in the past, and may be saved again
in the future, through the operation of the sure but silent
force of the doctrine proclaimed by President Monroe. …

"There is, then, a doctrine of American public law, well

founded in principle and abundantly sanctioned by precedent,
which entitles and requires the United States to treat as an
injury to itself the forcible assumption by an European Power
of political control over an American State. The application
of the doctrine to the boundary dispute between Great Britain
and Venezuela remains to be made, and presents no real
difficulty. Though the dispute relates to a boundary-line,
yet, as it is between States, it necessarily imports political
control to be lost by one party and gained by the other. The
political control at stake, too, is of no mean importance, but
concerns a domain of great extent—the British claim, it will
be remembered, apparently expanding in two years some 33,000
square miles—and, if it also directly involves the command of
the mouth of the Orinoco, is of immense consequence in
connection with the whole river navigation of the interior of
South America. It has been intimated, indeed, that in respect
of these South American possessions, Great Britain is herself
an American State like any other, so that a controversy
between her and Venezuela is to be settled between themselves
as if it were between Venezuela and Brazil, or between
Venezuela and Colombia, and does not call for or justify
United States intervention. If this view be tenable at all,
the logical sequence is plain. Great Britain as a South
American State is to be entirely differentiated from Great
Britain generally; and if the boundary question cannot be
settled otherwise than by force, British Guiana with her own
independent resources, and not those of the British Empire,
should be left to settle the matter with Venezuela—an
arrangement which very possibly Venezuela might not object to.
But the proposition that an European Power with an American
dependency is for the purposes of the Monroe doctrine to be
classed not as an European but as an American State will not
admit of serious discussion. If it were to be adopted, the
Monroe doctrine would be too valueless to be worth asserting.
…

"The declaration of the Monroe Message—that existing Colonies

or dependencies of an European Power would not be interfered
with by the United States—means Colonies or dependencies then
existing with their limits as then existing. So it has been
invariably construed, and so it must continue to be construed,
unless it is to be deprived of all vital force. Great Britain
cannot be deemed a South American State within the purview of
the Monroe doctrine, nor, if she is appropriating Venezuelan
territory, is it material that she does so by advancing the
frontier of an old Colony instead of by the planting of a new
Colony. The difference is matter of form, and not of
substance, and the doctrine if pertinent in the one case must
be in the other also. It is not admitted, however, and
therefore cannot be assumed, that Great Britain is in fact
usurping dominion over Venezuelan territory. While Venezuela
charges such usurpation Great Britain denies it, and the
United States, until the merits are authoritatively
ascertained, can take sides with neither. But while this is
so—while the United States may not, under existing
circumstances at least, take upon itself to say which of the
two parties is right and which wrong—it is certainly within
its right to demand that the truth shall be ascertained. …

"It being clear, therefore, that the United States may

legitimately insist upon the merits of the boundary question
being determined, it is equally clear that there is but one
feasible mode of determining them, viz., peaceful arbitration.
The impracticability of any conventional adjustment has been
often and thoroughly demonstrated. Even more impossible of
consideration is an appeal to arms—a mode of settling national
pretensions unhappily not yet wholly obsolete. If, however, it
were not condemnable as a relic of barbarism and a crime in
itself, so one-sided a contest could not be invited nor even
accepted by Great Britain without distinct disparagement to
her character as a civilized State. Great Britain, however,
assumes no such attitude. On the contrary, she both admits
that there is a controversy, and that arbitration should be
resorted to for its adjustment. But, while up to that point
her attitude leaves nothing to be desired, its practical
effect is completely nullified by her insistence that the
submission shall cover but a part of the controversy—that, as
a condition of arbitrating her right to a part of the disputed
territory, the remainder shall be turned over to her. If it
were possible to point to a boundary which both parties had
ever agreed or assumed to be such either expressly or tacitly,
the demand that territory conceded by such line to British Guiana
should be held not to be in dispute might rest upon a
reasonable basis. But there is no such line. The territory
which Great Britain insists shall be ceded to her as a
condition of arbitrating her claim to other territory has
never been admitted to belong to her.
{687}
It has always and consistently been claimed by Venezuela. Upon
what principle—except her feebleness as a nation—is she to be
denied the right of having the claim heard and passed upon by
an impartial Tribunal? No reason or shadow of reason appears
in all the voluminous literature of the subject. …

"In these circumstances, the duty of the President appears to

him unmistakable and imperative. Great Britain's assertion of
title to the disputed territory, combined with her refusal to
have that title investigated, being a substantial
appropriation of the territory to her own use, not to protest
and give warning that the transaction will be regarded as
injurious to the interests of the people of the United States,
as well as oppressive in itself, would be to ignore an
established policy with which the honour and welfare of this
country are closely identified. While the measures necessary
or proper for the vindication of that policy are to be
determined by another branch of the Government, it is clearly
for the Executive to leave nothing undone which may tend to
render such determination unnecessary. You are instructed,
therefore, to present the foregoing views to Lord Salisbury by
reading to him this communication (leaving with him a copy
should he so desire), and to reinforce them by such pertinent
considerations as will doubtless occur to you. They call for a
definite decision upon the point whether Great Britain will
consent or will decline to submit the Venezuelan boundary
question in its entirety to impartial arbitration. It is the
earnest hope of the President that the conclusion will be on
the side of arbitration, and that Great Britain will add one
more to the conspicuous precedents she has already furnished
in favour of that wise and just mode of adjusting
international disputes. If he is to be disappointed in that
hope, however—a result not to be anticipated, and in his
judgment calculated to greatly embarrass the future relations
between this country and Great Britain—it is his wish to be
made acquainted with the fact at such early date as will
 enable him to lay the whole subject before Congress in his
next Annual Message."

Great Britain, Parliamentary Publications

(Papers by Command:
United States Number 1, 1896, pages 13-21).

VENEZUELA: A. D. 1895 (November).

The British Guiana boundary question.
Replies of Lord Salisbury to Secretary Olney.

The reply of Lord Salisbury was not written until the 26th of
November. It was then given in two despatches, bearing the
same date,—one devoted entirely to a discussion of "the Monroe
doctrine" and of the argument founded on it by Mr. Olney; the
other to a rehearsal of the Venezuela controversy from the
standpoint of the British government. In the communication
first mentioned he wrote:

"The contentions set forth by Mr. Olney in this part of his

despatch are represented by him as being an application of the
political maxims which are well known in American discussion
under the name of the Monroe doctrine. As far as I am aware,
this doctrine has never been before advanced on behalf of the
United States in any written communication addressed to the
Government of another nation; but it has been generally
adopted and assumed as true by many eminent writers and
politicians in the United States. It is said to have largely
influenced the Government of that country in the conduct of
its foreign affairs; though Mr. Clayton, who was Secretary of
State under President Taylor, expressly stated that that
Administration had in no way adopted it. But during the period
that has elapsed since the Message of President Monroe was
delivered in 1823, the doctrine has undergone a very notable
development, and the aspect which it now presents in the hands
of Mr. Olney differs widely from its character when it first
issued from the pen of its author. The two propositions which
in effect President Monroe laid down were, first, that America
was no longer to be looked upon as a field for European
colonization; and, secondly, that Europe must not attempt to
extend its political system to America, or to control the
political condition of any of the American communities who had
recently declared their independence. The dangers against
which President Monroe thought it right to guard were not as
imaginary as they would seem at the present day. … The system
of which he speaks, and of which he so resolutely deprecates
the application to the American Continent, was the system then
adopted by certain powerful States upon the Continent of
Europe of combining to prevent by force of arms the adoption
in other countries of political institutions which they
disliked, and to uphold by external pressure those which they
approved. … The dangers which were apprehended by President
Monroe have no relation to the state of things in which we
live at the present day. … It is intelligible that Mr. Olney
should invoke, in defence of the views on which he is now
insisting, an authority which enjoys so high a popularity with
his own fellow-countrymen. But the circumstances with which
President Monroe was dealing, and those to which the present
American Government is addressing itself, have very few
features in common. Great Britain is imposing no 'system' upon
Venezuela, and is not concerning herself in any way with the
nature of the political institutions under which the
Venezuelans may prefer to live. But the British Empire and the
Republic of Venezuela are neighbours, and they have differed
for some time past, and continue to differ, as to the line by
which their dominions are separated. It is a controversy with
which the United States have no apparent practical concern. It
is difficult, indeed, to see how it can materially affect any
State or community outside those primarily interested, except
perhaps other parts of Her Majesty's dominions, such as
Trinidad. The disputed frontier of Venezuela has nothing to do
with any of the questions dealt with by President Monroe. It is
not a question of the colonization by a European Power of any
portion of America. It is not a question of the imposition
 upon the communities of South America of any system of
government devised in Europe. It is simply the determination
of the frontier of a British possession which belonged to the
Throne of England long before the Republic of Venezuela came
into existence.

{688}

"But even if the interests of Venezuela were so far linked to

those of the United States as to give to the latter a 'locus
standi' in this controversy, their Government apparently have
not formed, and certainly do not express, any opinion upon the
actual merits of the dispute. The Government of the United States
do not say that Great Britain, or that Venezuela, is in the
right in the matters that are in issue. But they lay down that
the doctrine of President Monroe, when he opposed the
imposition of European systems, or the renewal of European
colonization, confers upon them the right of demanding that
when a European Power has a frontier difference with a South
American community, the European Power shall consent to refer
that controversy to arbitration; and Mr. Olney states that
unless Her Majesty's Government accede to this demand, it will
'greatly embarrass the future relations between Great Britain
and the United States.' Whatever may be the authority of the
doctrine laid down by President Monroe, there is nothing in
his language to show that he ever thought of claiming this
novel prerogative for the United States. … I will not now
enter into a discussion of the merits of this method of
terminating international differences. It has proved itself
valuable in many cases; but it is not free from defects, which
often operate as a serious drawback on its value. It is not
always easy to find an Arbitrator who is competent, and who,
at the same time, is wholly free from bias; and the task of
insuring compliance with the Award when it is made is not
exempt from difficulty. …

"In the remarks which I have made, I have argued on the theory
that the Monroe doctrine in itself is sound. I must not,
however, be understood as expressing any acceptance of it on
the part of Her Majesty's Government. It must always be
mentioned with respect, on account of the distinguished
statesman to whom it is due, and the great nation who have
generally adopted it. But international law is founded on the
general consent of nations; and no statesman, however eminent,
and no nation, however powerful, are competent to insert into
the code of international law a novel principle which was
never recognized before, and which has not since been accepted
by the Government of any other country. … Though the language
of President Monroe is directed to the attainment of objects
which most Englishmen would agree to be salutary, it is
impossible to admit that they have been inscribed by any
adequate authority in the code of international law; and the
danger which such admission would involve is sufficiently
exhibited both by the strange development which the doctrine
has received at Mr. Olney's hands, and the arguments by which
it is supported, in the despatch under reply. In defence of it
he says: 'That distance and 3,000 miles of intervening ocean
make any permanent political union between a European and an
American State unnatural and inexpedient will hardly be
denied. But physical and geographical considerations are the
least of the objections to such a union. Europe has a set of
primary interests which are peculiar to herself; America is
not interested in them, and ought not to be vexed or
complicated with them.' … The necessary meaning of these words
is that the union between Great Britain and Canada; between
Great Britain and Jamaica and Trinidad; between Great Britain
and British Honduras or British Guiana are 'inexpedient and
unnatural.' President Monroe disclaims any such inference from
his doctrine; but in this, as in other respects, Mr. Olney
develops it. He lays down that the inexpedient and unnatural
character of the union between a European and American State
is so obvious that it 'will hardly be denied.' Her Majesty's
Government are prepared emphatically to deny it on behalf of
both the British and American people who are subject to her
Crown."

In his second despatch, Lord Salisbury drew the conclusions of

his government from the facts as seen on the English side, and
announced its decision, in the following terms: "It will be
seen … that the Government of Great Britain have from the
first held the same view as to the extent of territory which
they are entitled to claim as a matter of right. It comprised
the coast-line up to the River Amacura, and the whole basin of
the Essequibo River and its tributaries. A portion of that
claim, however, they have always been willing to waive
altogether; in regard to another portion, they have been and
continue to be perfectly ready to submit the question of their
title to arbitration. As regards the rest, that which lies
within the so-called Schomburgk line, they do not consider
that the rights of Great Britain are open to question. Even
within that line they have, on various occasions, offered to
Venezuela considerable concessions as a matter of friendship
and conciliation, and for the purpose of securing an amicable
settlement of the dispute. If as time has gone on the
concessions thus offered diminished in extent, and have now
been withdrawn, this has been the necessary consequence of the
gradual spread over the country of British settlements, which
Her Majesty's Government cannot in justice to the inhabitants
offer to surrender to foreign rule, and the justice of such
withdrawal is amply borne out by the researches in the
national archives of Holland and Spain, which have furnished
further and more convincing evidence in support of the British
claims.

"Her Majesty's Government are sincerely desirous of being in

friendly relations with Venezuela, and certainly have no
design to seize territory that properly belongs to her, or
forcibly to extend sovereignty over any portion of her
population. They have, on the contrary, repeatedly expressed
their readiness to submit to arbitration the conflicting
claims of Great Britain and Venezuela to large tracts of
territory which from their auriferous nature are known to be
of almost untold value. But they cannot consent to entertain,
or to submit to the arbitration of another Power or of foreign
jurists, however eminent, claims based on the extravagant
pretensions of Spanish officials in the last century, and
involving the transfer of large numbers of British subjects,
who have for many years enjoyed the settled rule of a British
Colony, to a nation of different race and language, whose
political system is subject to frequent disturbance, and whose
institutions as yet too often afford very inadequate
protection to life and property. No issue of this description
has ever been involved in the questions which Great Britain
and the United States have consented to submit to arbitration,
and Her Majesty's Government are convinced that in similar
circumstances the Government of the United States would be
equally firm in declining to entertain proposals of such a
nature."
Great Britain, Papers by Command:
United States Number 1, 1896, pages 23-31.

{689}

VENEZUELA: A. D. 1895 (December).

Message of President Cleveland to the United States Congress
on the Guiana boundary dispute.

As the replies given by Lord Salisbury showed no disposition

on the part of the British government to submit its dispute
with Venezuela to arbitration, President Cleveland took the
subject in hand, and addressed to Congress, on the 17th of
December, 1895, a special Message which startled the world by
the peremptoriness of its tone.

"In my annual message addressed to the Congress on the 3d

instant," he said, "I called attention to the pending boundary
controversy between Great Britain and the Republic of
Venezuela and recited the substance of a representation made
by this Government to Her Britannic Majesty's Government
suggesting reasons why such dispute should be submitted to
arbitration for settlement and inquiring whether it would be
so submitted. The answer of the British Government, which was
then awaited, has since been received, and, together with the
dispatch to which it is a reply, is hereto appended. Such
reply is embodied in two communications addressed by the
British prime minister to Sir Julian Pauncefote, the British
ambassador at this capital. It will be seen that one of these
communications is devoted exclusively to observations upon the
Monroe doctrine, and claims that in the present instance a new
and strange extension and development of this doctrine is
insisted on by the United States; that the reasons justifying
an appeal to the doctrine enunciated by President Monroe are
generally inapplicable 'to the state of things in which we
live at the present day,' and especially inapplicable to a
controversy involving the boundary line between Great Britain
and Venezuela.

"Without attempting extended argument in reply to these

positions, it may not be amiss to suggest that the doctrine
upon which we stand is strong and sound, because its
enforcement is important to our peace and safety as a nation
and is essential to the integrity of our free institutions and
the tranquil maintenance of our distinctive form of
government. It was intended to apply to every stage of our
national life and can not become obsolete while our Republic
endures. If the balance of power is justly a cause for jealous
anxiety among the Governments of the Old World and a subject
for our absolute non-interference, none the less is an
observance of the Monroe doctrine of vital concern to our
people and their Government. Assuming, therefore, that we may
properly insist upon this doctrine without regard to 'the
state of things in which we live' or any changed conditions
here or elsewhere, it is not apparent why its application may
not be invoked in the present controversy. If a European power
by an extension of its boundaries takes possession of the
territory of one of our neighboring Republics against its will
and in derogation of its rights, it is difficult to see why to
that extent such European power does not thereby attempt to
extend its system of government to that portion of this
continent which is thus taken. This is the precise action
which President Monroe declared to be 'dangerous to our peace
and safety,' and it can make no difference whether the
European system is extended by an advance of frontier or
otherwise.

"It is also suggested in the British reply that we should not

seek to apply the Monroe doctrine to the pending dispute
because it does not embody any principle of international law
which 'is founded on the general consent of nations,' and that
'no statesman, however eminent, and no nation, however
powerful, are competent to insert into the code of
international law a novel principle which was never recognized
before and which has not since been accepted by the government
of any other country.' Practically the principle for which we
contend has peculiar, if not exclusive, relation to the United
States. It may not have been admitted in so many words to the
code of international law, but since in international councils
every nation is entitled to the rights belonging to it, if the
enforcement of the Monroe doctrine is something we may justly
claim, it has its place in the code of international law as
certainly and as securely as if it were specifically
mentioned; and when the United States is a suitor before the
high tribunal that administers international law the question
to be determined is whether or not we present claims which the
justice of that code of law can find to be right and valid.

"The Monroe doctrine finds its recognition in those principles

of international law which are based upon the theory that
every nation shall have its rights protected and its just
claims enforced. Of course this government is entirely
confident that under the sanction of this doctrine we have
clear rights and undoubted claims. Nor is this ignored in the
British reply. The prime minister, while not admitting that
the Monroe doctrine is applicable to present conditions,
states: 'In declaring that the United States would resist any
such enterprise if it was contemplated, President Monroe
adopted a policy which received the entire sympathy of the
English Government of that date.'

"He further declares: 'Though the language of President Monroe

is directed to the attainment of objects which most Englishmen
would agree to be salutary, it is impossible to admit that
they have been inscribed by any adequate authority in the code
of international law.'

"Again he says: 'They [Her Majesty's Government] fully concur

with the view which President Monroe apparently entertained,
that any disturbance of the existing territorial distribution
 in that hemisphere by any fresh acquisitions on the part of
any European State would be a highly inexpedient change.'

"In the belief that the doctrine for which we contend was
clear and definite, that it was founded upon substantial
considerations, and involved our safety and welfare, that it
was fully applicable to our present conditions and to the
state of the world's progress, and that it was directly
related to the pending controversy, and without any conviction
as to the final merits of the dispute, 'but anxious to learn
in a satisfactory and conclusive manner whether Great Britain
sought under a claim of boundary to extend her possessions on
this continent without right, or whether she merely sought
possession of territory fairly included within her lines of
ownership, this Government proposed to the Government of Great
Britain a resort to arbitration as the proper means of
settling the question, to the end that a vexatious boundary
dispute between the two contestants might be determined and
our exact standing and relation in respect to the controversy
might be made clear.
{690}
It will be seen from the correspondence herewith submitted
that this proposition has been declined by the British
Government upon grounds which in the circumstances seem to me
to be far from satisfactory. It is deeply disappointing that
such an appeal, actuated by the most friendly feelings toward
both nations directly concerned, addressed to the sense of
justice and to the magnanimity of one of the great powers of
the world, and touching its relations to one comparatively
weak and small, should have produced no better results.

"The course to be pursued by this Government in view of the

present condition does not appear to admit of serious doubt.
Having labored faithfully for many years to induce Great
Britain to submit this dispute to impartial arbitration, and
having been now finally apprised of her refusal to do so,
nothing remains but to accept the situation, to recognize its
plain requirements, and deal with it accordingly. Great
Britain's present proposition has never thus far been regarded
as admissible by Venezuela, though any adjustment of the
boundary which that country may deem for her advantage and may
enter into of her own free will can not of course be objected
to by the United States. Assuming, however, that the attitude
of Venezuela will remain unchanged, the dispute has reached
such a stage as to make it now incumbent upon the United
States to take measures to determine with sufficient certainty
for its justification what is the true divisional line between
the Republic of Venezuela and British Guiana. The inquiry to
that end should of course be conducted carefully and
judicially, and due weight should be given to all available
evidence, records, and facts in support of the claims of both
parties. In order that such an examination should be
prosecuted in a thorough and satisfactory manner, I suggest
that the Congress make an adequate appropriation for the
expenses of a commission, to be appointed by the Executive,
who shall make the necessary investigation and report upon the
matter with the least possible delay. When such report is made
and accepted it will, in my opinion, be the duty of the United
States to resist by every means in its power, as a willful
aggression upon its rights and interests, the appropriation by
Great Britain of any lands or the exercise of governmental
jurisdiction over any territory which after investigation we
have determined of right belongs to Venezuela.

"In making these recommendations I am fully alive to the

responsibility incurred and keenly realize all the
consequences that May follow. I am, nevertheless, firm in my
conviction that while it is a grievous thing to contemplate
the two great English-speaking peoples of the world as being
otherwise than friendly competitors in the onward march of
civilization and strenuous and worthy rivals in all the arts
of peace, there is no calamity which a great nation can invite
which equals that which follows a supine submission to wrong and
injustice and the consequent loss of national self-respect and
 honor, beneath which are shielded and defended a people's
safety and greatness."

United States, Message and Documents

(Abridgment, 1895-1896).

The recommendations of the President were acted upon with

remarkable unanimity and promptitude in Congress, a bill
authorizing the appointment of the proposed commission, and
appropriating $100,000 for the necessary expenditure, being
passed by the House on the day following the Message (December
17), and by the Senate on the 20th.

See (in this volume)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1895 (DECEMBER).

VENEZUELA: A. D. 1895-1896 (December-January).

Feeling in England and the United States
over the boundary dispute.

See (in this volume)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
A. D. 1895-1896 (DECEMBER-JANUARY).

VENEZUELA: A. D. 1896-1899.
Appointment of the United States Commission to investigate
the boundary question.
Reopening of negotiations between the United States
and Great Britain.
The solution of the main difficulty found.
Arbitration and its result.

The Commission authorized by the Congress of the United States

to investigate and report on the true divisional line between
British Guiana and Venezuela was named by the President of the
United States, on the 1st of January, as follows:
David J. Brewer, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
of the United States;
Richard H. Alvey, Chief Justice of the Court of Appeals in
the District of Columbia;
Andrew D. White, ex-President of Cornell University,
and ex-Minister to Germany and Russia;
Daniel C. Gilman, President of Johns Hopkins University;
Frederick H. Coudert, of New York.

The Commission was organized on the 4th by the election of

Justice Brewer to be its President. Mr. S. Mallet Prevost was
subsequently appointed Secretary. One of the first proceedings
of the Commission was to address a letter to the Secretary of
State, suggesting a friendly intimation to the governments of
Great Britain and Venezuela that their assistance to it, in
procuring unpublished archives and the like evidence, would be
highly acceptable, and that "if either should deem it
appropriate to designate an agent or attorney, whose duty it
would be to see that no such proofs were omitted or
overlooked, the Commission would be grateful for such evidence
of good will." This overture was well received in England, and
had an excellent effect. It was responded to by Lord
Salisbury, with an assurance that Her Majesty's government
would readily place at the disposal of the President of the
United States any information at their command, and would
communicate advance copies of documents soon to be published
on the subject of the boundary line. Before the close of
January the Commission had organized its work, with several
experts engaged to assist on special lines. Professor Justin
Winsor, Librarian of Harvard University, had undertaken to
report on the early maps of the Guiana-Venezuela country.
Professor George L. Burr, of Cornell University, was making
ready to examine the Dutch archives in Holland, and Professor
J. Franklin Jameson, of Brown University, was enlisted for
other investigations.

Before these labors had gone far, however, the two

 governments, of Great Britain and the United States, were
induced to reopen a discussion of the possibility of an
arbitration of the dispute. On the 27th of February, Mr.
Bayard, the Ambassador of the United States at London,
conveyed to Lord Salisbury a proposal from his government
"that Her Majesty's Ambassador at Washington should be
empowered to discuss the question at that capital with the
Secretary of State," and that "a clear definition of the
'settlements' by individuals in the territory in dispute,
which it is understood Her Majesty's Government desire should
be excluded from the proposed submission to arbitration,
should be propounded."
{691}
Lord Salisbury assented so far as to telegraph, on the same
day, to Sir Julian Pauncefote: "I have agreed with the United
States' Ambassador that, in principle, the matter may be
discussed between the United States Government (acting as the
friend of Venezuela) and your Excellency." But, a few days
later (March 5), the British Premier and Foreign Secretary
gave a broader range to the discussion, by recalling a
correspondence that had taken place in the spring of 1895
between the then American Secretary of State, Mr. Gresham, and
the British Ambassador, in contemplation of a general system
of international arbitration for the adjustment of disputes
between the two governments. Reviving that project, Lord
Salisbury submitted the heads of a general arbitration treaty
between the United States and Great Britain, which became a
subject of discussion for some weeks, without offering much
promise of providing for the settlement of the Venezuela
dispute. In May, the correspondence returned to the latter
subject more definitely, Lord Salisbury writing (May 22):

"From the first our objection has been to subject to the

decision of an Arbiter, who, in the last resort, must, of
necessity, be a foreigner, the rights of British colonists who
have settled in territory which they had every ground for
believing to be British, and whose careers would be broken,
and their fortunes possibly ruined, by a decision that the
territory on which they have settled was subject to the
Venezuelan Republic. At the same time, we are very conscious
that the dispute between ourselves and the Republic of
Venezuela affects a large portion of land which is not under
settlement, and which could be disposed of without any
injustice to any portion of the colonial population. We are
very willing that the territory which is comprised within this
definition should be subjected to the results of an
arbitration, even though some portion of it should be found to
fall within the Schomburgk line." He proposed, accordingly,
the creation of a commission of four persons, for the
determination of the questions of fact involved, on whose
report the two governments of Great Britain and Venezuela
should endeavor to agree on a boundary line; failing which
agreement, a tribunal of arbitration should fix the line, on
the basis of facts reported by the Commission. "Provided
always that in fixing such line the Tribunal shall not have
power to include as the territory of Venezuela any territory
which was bona fide occupied by subjects of Great Britain on
the 1st January, 1887, or as the territory of Great Britain
any territory bona fide occupied by Venezuelans at the same
date."

Objections to this proposal, especially to its final

stipulation, were raised by the government of the United
States, and the negotiation looked unpromising again for a
time; but at length, on the 13th of July, Mr. Olney made a
suggestion which happily solved the one difficulty that had
been, from the beginning, a bar to agreement between the two
governments. "Can it be assumed," he asked, in a letter of
that date, "that Her Majesty's Government would submit to
unrestricted arbitration the whole of the territory in
dispute, provided it be a rule of the arbitration, embodied in
the arbitral agreement, that territory which has been in the
exclusive, notorious, and actual use and occupation of either
party for even two generations, or say for sixty years, shall
be held by the arbitrators to be the territory of such party?
In other words, will Her Majesty's Government assent to
unrestricted arbitration of all the territory in controversy,
with the period for the acquisition of title by prescription
fixed by agreement of the parties in advance at sixty years?"
Lord Salisbury assented to the principle thus suggested, but
proposed a shorter term of occupation than sixty years.
Finally the term of fifty years was accepted on both sides,
and from that point the arrangement of a Treaty of Arbitration
between Great Britain and Venezuela went smoothly on. The good
news that England and America were practically at the end of
their dispute was proclaimed by Lord Salisbury, on the 9th of
November, in a speech at the Lord Mayor's banquet, in London,
when he said: "You are aware that in the discussion had with
the United States on behalf of their friends in Venezuela, our
question has not been whether there should be arbitration, but
whether arbitration should have unrestricted application; and
we have always claimed that those who, apart from historic
right, had the right which attaches to established
settlements, should be excluded from arbitration. Our
difficulty for months has been to define the settled
districts; and the solution has, I think, come from the
suggestion of the government of the United States, that we
should treat our colonial empire as we treat individuals; that
the same lapse of time which protects the latter in civic life
from having their title questioned, should similarly protect
an English colony; but, beyond that, when a lapse could not be
claimed, there should be an examination of title, and all the
equity demanded in regard thereto should be granted. I do not
believe I am using unduly sanguine words when I declare my
belief that this has brought the controversy to an end."

On the 10th of November, the Secretary of the United States

Commission appointed to investigate the disputed boundary
published the following: "The statements of Lord Salisbury, as
reported in the morning papers, make it probable that the
boundary dispute now pending between Great Britain and Venezuela