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Boards of Appeal of EU Agencies
Boards of Appeal of
EU Agencies
Towards Judicialization of
Administrative Review?
Edited by
M E R I J N C HA M O N , A N NA L I S A VO L PAT O,
A N D M A R IO L I NA E L IA N T O N IO
1
3
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Foreword
In America, a famous saying indicates that those paying taxes should have a say in
the deliberations where decisions are taken on taxes: no taxation without repre-
sentation. The same could be said, probably, about the relationship between power
and control. In democracies, power should never be entrusted to people or insti-
tutions without establishing as a corollary a mechanism ensuring that the exer-
cise of that power can be controlled. Democracies are not compatible with power
concentration.
That issue is central in the book timely edited by Merijn, Annalisa, and
Mariolina, to whom I am extremely grateful for devoting part of their undoubtedly
very valuable time as scholars, teachers, and maybe partner, father and/or mother,
to the important issue of judicial control in the European Union.
As is successively pointed out in the contributions published in the opus, a major
development, in the history of the EU, has been the progressive creation of robust,
powerful agencies capable of carrying out missions in the fields where the Union
has competences and responsibilities. That development corresponded to a desire,
on the part of competent authorities, to have available high-quality personnel able
to think through important social, economic, and environmental challenges. It
also provided opportunities to disseminate administrative bodies throughout the
territory—thereby contributing to the construction of a Union where, whenever
possible, analysis is carried out and decisions are taken close to citizens.
Indeed, the proximity the Union seeks to build with its citizens should not be
underestimated. In that regard, it should be reminded that the Union has been the
first international body to create judicial remedies for legal and natural persons
within its organization in a context where the latter did not exist, to state it bluntly,
under international law. For the first time, provisions enshrined in an international
Treaty allowed such persons to challenge institutions on the legality of acts adopted
by them, their failure to act or the damages they may have caused illegally.
Explicitly established in the Treaty, that system found a complement in the in-
dication, by the Court of Justice, that the provisions contained in the (EEC, EC,
EU) Treaties, whenever they would be self-executing, created, beyond the Member
States inter se, rights and obligations which legal and natural persons could seek to
enforce in national courts.
Pursuing that path for more judicial protection, the Member States created a
Court of First Instance, that would later become the General Court, with a view to
vi Foreword
allocate, to a specific body, the task of reviewing the behaviour of the organization
in situations where, among others, legal and natural persons could be involved.
In that context, the decision recently taken by Council to increase the number
of judges on the General Court is greeted with enthusiasm in this book as, for the
authors concerned, it increased the capacity of EU courts to decide more efficiently
the cases submitted to them and increase the quality of their judgment. At the same
time, it is noted that that decision has produced consequences on the organization
of litigation in the EU. Under the Nice Treaty, there was a project to create spe-
cialized courts issuing rulings that would be appealed before the General Court
deciding in last resort. That project was in substance abandoned in 2015, together
with the idea that the Court of Justice would then be in a position to focus on mat-
ters with a ‘constitutional’ dimension.
As the situation has improved at the General Court, the risk now is that the
Court of Justice finds itself overwhelmed by the appeals formed against a more dy-
namic first instance jurisdiction, to be added to the increasing numbers of prelim-
inary references addressed to Luxembourg by national courts gaining confidence
in the system.
This is where the development discussed in this book, i.e. the emergence of a
more pronounced jurisdictional function for appeal boards, or at least some
of them, comes forth, at a moment where ideas are explored on how the burden
weighing on the Court could be alleviated. In a number of administrations, ap-
peal boards review complaints brought by legal and natural persons against acts
adopted by their administration. With the modification brought to the Statute, the
idea was to limit the number of cases reaching the Court of Justice—thereby re-
turning de facto to the idea of the General Court carrying out in most cases a con-
trol in last resort.
At this stage, it is too early to evaluate the system although clarity emerges as to
what is deemed essential to ensure a justice of quality.
One principle is that a certain measure of specialization is needed where the
decisions taken by the institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies of the Union are
technical in their nature. In that regard, the possibility to bring cases, in the areas
concerned, to appeal boards consisting of specialists, is greeted with satisfaction,
as is the fact that, within the General Court, areas of specialization are created and
cases are allocated in a way ensuring that similar cases will be handled by the same
chambers and/or persons.
Another principle is that, when it comes to justice, independence cannot be
considered a luxury but appears on the contrary to be a necessity. At the outset of
this preface, it was submitted that power must go hand in hand, in democracies,
with control. This in turn implies the independence of those exercising control.
There can be no justice, in the true sense of the word, if those reviewing the acts are
bound by those who adopted them. In our context, it will be for the administrations
Foreword vii
The chapters of this book are based on the contributions presented by their authors
in an academic conference organized by the Globalisation and Law Network held
on 21–22 September 2020 at Maastricht University, Campus Brussels. The con-
ference and the publication were made possible by the funding provided by the
Sectorplan Social Sciences and Humanities of the Dutch Ministry of Education,
Culture, and Science; by the Limburg University Fund (SWOL); and by the Science
Committee of the Faculty of Law at Maastricht University. The editors would like
to express their gratitude to these institutions, as well as to the contributors for
their commitment and collaboration in realizing this project. They are also grateful
to the Academic Research Network on EU Agencies (TARN) and its members
for their support. Special thanks go to Martin Maguire for his thorough language
revision, and to Eleni Kamari, student-assistant to the Chair of European and
Comparative Administrative Law and Procedure at Maastricht University, for her
diligent and patient work in the formatting and editing of the book. The publi-
cation process was facilitated by the smooth cooperation with Anthuvan Arokia
from Newgen KnowledgeWorks, Imogen Hill and Rebecca Lewis from Oxford
University Press.
Table of Cases
Dominik Hanf is Head of Litigation Service (a.i.) at the European Union Intellectual
Property Office and Visiting Professor at the College of Europe (Bruges)
Marco Stefan is Research Fellow in the Justice and Home Affairs Unit at CEPS
One of the most significant institutional developments in EU law over the past
decades has been the agencification of the EU administration.1 This phenomenon
may be defined as (EU) agencies taking up an increasingly important role in (EU)
administration both in a qualitative and a quantitative sense.2 The latter is cap-
tured most easily: not only is the number of agencies growing, the total number
of civil servants working at EU agencies and the total combined budgets of the
EU agencies are also continuously increasing.3 Admittedly, the qualitative dimen-
sion is more difficult to capture, but that increasingly important powers and tasks
are conferred on EU agencies is evident when looking at recent developments in
policy fields as diverse as financial regulation, border control, and public health.
Indeed, in new institutionalist terms, a logic of appropriateness, rather than a logic
of consequences,4 has appeared: today the EU legislature does not simply seem to
establish and empower EU agencies because they are a rational response to policy
challenges, but instead because the ‘appropriate’ way to tackle almost any type of
policy crisis or priority at EU level seems to be to (further) empower independent
bodies.5
1 See generally Wolfgang Weiß, ‘Dezentrale Agenturen in der EU- rechtsetzung’ (2016) 51
Europarecht 6, 631–5; Rostane Mehdi, ‘Le pouvoir de décision à l’épreuve de “l’agenciarisation” de
l’Union—Quelques questions constitutionnelles’ in Fabrice Picod, Brunessen Bertrand, and Sébastien
Roland (eds), L’identité du droit de l’Union européenne: Mélanges en l’honneur du Doyen Cl. Blumann
(Bruylant 2015) 698–713; Herwig Hofmann and Alessandro Morini, ‘Constitutional Aspects of the
Pluralisation of the EU Executive through “Agencification” ’ (2012) 37 ELRev 4, 419–43.
2 See Merijn Chamon, EU Agencies: Legal and Political Limits to the Transformation of the EU
International Studies 3, 66–7. Applied to the EU agencies, see Merijn Chamon, ‘The European Railway
Agency under the Fourth Railway Package: A Political and Legal Perspective’ in Cécile Rapoport (ed),
L’espace ferroviaire unique européen: Quelle(s) réalités (Bruylant 2015) 173.
5 For instance, to make the EU more social, then Commission President Juncker in his 2017 State of
the Union Speech proposed a ‘European Social Standards Union’ and pushed the establishment of a new
agency, the European Labour Authority. See Bart Vanhercke, Sebastiano Sabato, and Dalila Ghailani,
‘Conclusions: The European Pillar of Social Rights as a game changer’ in ETUI Nineteenth Annual
Report, Social policy in the European Union: state of play 2018, 160. In the wake of the COVID-19 pan-
demic, the European Commission proposed to beef up the European Centre for Disease Prevention and
Control, see European Commission, COM(2020) 726 final. The European Supervisory Authorities in
turn were established in the wake of the financial crisis (see also Chapter 1 by Chamon and Fromage in
this volume). For earlier examples, see Marc Blanquet and Nathalie de Grove-Valdeyron, ‘Le recours à
Merijn Chamon, Annalisa Volpato, and Mariolina Eliantonio, Introduction In: Boards of Appeal of EU Agencies. Edited
by: Merijn Chamon, Annalisa Volpato, and Mariolina Eliantonio, Oxford University Press. © Merijn Chamon, Annalisa Volpato,
and Mariolina Eliantonio 2022. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192849298.003.0001
2 Merijn Chamon, Annalisa Volpato, and Mariolina Eliantonio
des agences de l’Union en réponse aux questions de sécurité’ in Joël Molinier (ed), Les agences de l’Union
européenne (Bruylant 2011) 103.
6 The body of literature on EU agencies has become too vast, but ex multis, see inter alia Dorothee
Fischer-Appelt, Agenturen der Europäischen Gemeinschaft (Duncker & Humblot 1999) 609 (here-
after Fischer-Appelt, Agenturen); Edoardo Chiti, Le agenzie europee—Unità e decentramento nelle
amministrazioni comunitarie (Cedam 2002) 514 ; Giacinto Della Cananea (ed), European Regulatory
Agencies (Éditions Rive Droite, 2005) 199; Joël Molinier (ed), Les agences de l’union européenne
(Bruylant 2011) 268; Nicolas Raschauer (ed), Europäische Agenturen (Jan Sramek Verlag 2011) 253;
Michelle Everson, Cosimo Monda, and Ellen Vos (eds), European Agencies in between Institutions
and Member States (Kluwer Law International 2014) 312; Merijn Chamon, EU Agencies: Legal and
Political Limits to the Transformation of the EU Administration (OUP 2016) 432 (hereafter Chamon,
Limits to the Transformation of the EU Administration); Carlo Tovo, Le agenzie decentrate dell’Unione
europea (Editoriale Scientifica 2016) 474 (hereafter Tovo, Le agenzie); Andreas Orator, Möglichkeiten
und Grenzen der Einrichtung von Unionsagenturen (Mohr Siebeck 2017) 549; Jacopo Alberti, Le
agenzie dell’Unione europea (Giuffrè 2018) 490 p.; Natalia Kohtamäki, Theorising the Legitimacy of EU
Regulatory Agencies (Peter Lang 2019) 429 (hereafter Kohtamäki, Theorising the Legitimacy).
7 Marta Simoncini, Administrative Regulation beyond the Non-Delegation Doctrine. A Study on EU
Einführung eines Widerspruchskammermodells für die Europäische Kommission (Mohr Siebeck 2016) 48.
9 The first edition of the EPO’s overview of the case law of its Boards of Appeal notes that the very
EPO BoA decision was adopted on 1 March 1979, see EPO, Case Law of the Boards of Appeal of the
European Patent Office 1987–1992, München, EPO, p 12.
10 See Regulation (EC) 881/2004 establishing a European Railway Agency [2004] OJ L164/1.
11 See Regulation (EU) 2016/796 on the European Union Agency for Railways [2016] OJ L138/1.
12 See also Chapter 2 by Tovo in this volume.
Introduction 3
comply with the requirement that they must be able to review all relevant questions of fact and law,
see Terra Woningen v the Netherlands App no 20641/92 (ECtHR, 17 December 1996), para 52. On
the (sometimes erratic) jurisprudence of the ECtHR, see Miriam Allena and Francesco Goisis, ‘ “Full
Jurisdiction” under Article 6 ECHR: Hans Kelsen v. the Principle of Separation of Powers’ (2020) 26
EPL 2, 287–306.
16 Under the European Court of Human Rights’ (ECtHR) jurisprudence, this is indeed acceptable
and compatible with the idea of full jurisdiction. This is because the latter does not impose a single
uniform standard but only that ‘sufficient review’ is exercised whereby what is sufficient may vary
depending on several factors, such as when the dispute concerns ‘a specialised issue requiring profes-
sional knowledge or experience and whether it involved the exercise of administrative discretion and
if so, to what extent’. See Fazia Ali v the United Kingdom App no 40378/10 (ECtHR, 20 October 2015),
para 78.
17 This is because under the ECtHR’s jurisprudence, even when a body like a Board of Appeal might
not meet the requirements under Article 6 ECHR this can be remedied if that body’s proceedings are
subject to a subsequent appeal before a judicial body that does have full jurisdiction. See Bryan v the
United Kingdom App no 19178/91 (ECtHR, 22 November 1995), para 40. In contrast, Coutron suggests
that both before the Boards of Appeal and the EU Courts, Article 6 ECHR is respected. See Laurent
Coutron, ‘L’infiltration des garanties du procès équitable dans les procédures non juridictionnelles’ in
Caroline Picheral (ed), Le droit à un procès équitable au sens du droit de l’Union européenne (Anthemis
2012) 186 (hereafter Coutron, ‘L’infiltration’). Whether that is the case for the Boards of Appeal de-
pends, inter alia on whether they can be qualified as independent tribunals which does not seem to be
the case for most Boards of Appeal as transpires from the case studies in the first part of this volume.
4 Merijn Chamon, Annalisa Volpato, and Mariolina Eliantonio
before Boards of Appeal are also much more speedy than proceedings before the
Courts18 and they are subject to much less cumbersome or strict procedural re-
quirements, as they for instance do not require parties to be represented by quali-
fied lawyers and lodging an appeal may often be done simply by email. In addition
to these features that are especially interesting for litigants, one ‘systemic’ added
value is that the Boards of Appeal may fulfil a filtering function, sieving cases be-
fore they are lodged before the EU Courts. The Boards of Appeal have become a
characteristic feature of the agencification phenomenon and while the process of
EU agencification itself is characterized by ad hocery,19 the EU legislature has been
remarkably consistent in ‘equipping’ all agencies that have been granted decision-
making powers20 with a Board of Appeal.
So far, so good. But this specific characteristic feature of EU agencification raises
a host of questions from both a theoretic and practical perspective which are only
now starting to be systematically analysed.21 Are the Boards of Appeal judicial
bodies or are they an integral part of the agency in which they were established
and thus administrative in nature? Or are they to be considered an additional layer
of the judicial system? The distinction is not trivial since the standards, in terms
of organization and functioning, which they will have to comply with will be dif-
ferent depending on which ‘branch of government’ they form part of. At least ori-
ginally, some regarded the Boards of Appeal as exercising a judicial function,22 but
the more recent Boards of Appeal function differently from the original Boards
of Appeal of the EUIPO and CPVO,23 suggesting that they are administrative
bodies. This has led commentators to qualify them as ‘quasi-judicial bodies’,24 ‘not
courts . . . but not merely administrative bodies either’.25 It is precisely this ‘quasi’,
which denotes a hybridity, that raises the question on the nature of the Boards of
Appeal. From this fundamental question follows a plethora of more practical ques-
tions: if Boards of Appeal are equipped with technical expertise, do they also rely
on that expertise and offer applicants greater legal protection? Which type of par-
ties have recourse to the Boards of Appeal? What is the scope of review exercised by
18 Between 2015 and 2019, the average length of proceedings (resulting in both orders and judg-
ments) before the General Court was 18.5 months (own calculations based on Cour de Justice de
l’Union européenne, Rapport annuel 2019, Luxembourg, 2020, p 297).
19 Michelle Everson, Cosimo Monda, and Ellen Vos, ‘European Agencies in between Institutions and
Member States’ in Michelle Everson, Cosimo Monda, and Ellen Vos (eds), European Agencies in be-
tween Institutions and Member States (Kluwer Law International 2014) 4.
20 Kohtamäki, Theorising the Legitimacy (n 6) 108.
21 For earlier research on the Boards of Appeal, see n 26–28.
22 Marcus Navin- Jones, ‘A Legal Review of EU Boards of Appeal in Particular the European
Chemicals Agency Board of Appeal’ (2015) 21 European Public Law 1, 158 (hereafter Navin-Jones, ‘A
Legal Review’).
23 For the first dedicated work on the Boards of Appeal, which, however, only related to the EUIPO
and CPVO, see Amina Dammann, Die Beschwerdekammern der Europäischen Agenturen (Peter Lang
2003) (hereafter Dammann, Die Beschwerdekammern)
24 Fischer-Appelt, Agenturen (n 6) 314.
25 Navin-Jones, ‘A Legal Review’ (n 22) 144–5.
Introduction 5
the Boards of Appeal? What procedure applies before them? And, from an analyt-
ical perspective and squaring the circle, what do the answers to the latter questions
tell us in turn about the nature of the Boards of Appeal?
So far, the topic of the Boards of Appeal has not yet been explored and researched
in depth. There are some case studies dedicated to specific Boards of Appeal;26
while in some general studies on EU agencification27 or on legal protection vis-à-
vis agencies,28 some attention is being devoted to the mechanism of the Board of
Appeal. Very few specific studies on the Boards of Appeal have been conducted.29
Yet, no study has examined in an overarching and coherent manner how the Board
of Appeal as a mechanism should be conceptualized and how it should be assessed
in light of its rationale. This is a clear gap in current research and literature which
this volume aims to fill.
Some of the abovementioned questions are addressed in the first part of this
volume which brings together case studies of the Boards of Appeal. As editors we
made the conscious decision to include these case studies, since even if all Boards
of Appeal share some communalities, the above noted ad hocery in agencification
has also meant significant differences in the area of legal protection as there are
no two Boards of Appeal that function in the same way. In every case study the
above-noted questions are then tackled both in deductive and inductive fashion.
26 Navin- Jones, ‘A Legal Review’ (n 22) 143–68; Régis Vabres, ‘La commission de recours des
autorités européennes de surveillance’ (2012) Bulletin Joly Bourse 1, 4–5; William Blair, ‘Board of
Appeal of the European Supervisory Authorities’ (2013) 24 European Banking Law Review 2, 65–171;
Théophile Margellos, ‘La pratique du règlement négocié auprès des Chambres de recours de l’Office de
l’Harmonisation dans le Marché Intérieur’ (2013) RAE 2, 299–308; David Thomas, ‘European Chemical
Agency Board of Appeal Decisions in Honeywell and Dow Chemicals’ (2013) 20 MJ 4, 609–22; Marco
Lamandini, ‘The ESAs’ Board of Appeal as a Blueprint for the Quasi-Judicial Review of European
Financial Supervision’ (2014) 4 European Company Law 6, 284–90; Eléonore Mullier and Ruxandra
Cana, ‘The ECHA Board of Appeal and the Court of Justice: Comparing and Contrasting Chemicals
Litigation’ (2018) 1 International Chemical Regulatory and Law Review 3, 105–13; Marco Lamandini
and David Ramos Munoz, ‘Law and Practice of Financial Appeal Bodies (ESAs’ Board of Appeal, SRB
Appeal Panel): A View from the Inside’ (2020) 57 CMLRev 1, 119–60; Luca Bolzonello, ‘Independent
Administrative Review within the Structure of Remedies under the Treaties: The Case of the Board
of Appeal of the European Chemicals Agency’ (2016) 22 EPL 3, 569–81; Manuel Cienfuegos Mateo,
‘El control de las agencias del Sistema Europeo de Supervisión Financiera por la Sala de Recurso y el
Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea’ (2018) 110 Revista Vasca de Administración Pública, 215–65.
27 See inter alia Fischer-Appelt, Agenturen (n 6) 313–16; Chamon, Limits to the Transformation of the
Peraldi Leneuf and Jacques Normand (eds), La légistique dans le système de l’Union européenne: quelle
nouvelle approche (Bruylant 2012) 150–53; Merijn Chamon, ‘Les agences décentralisées et le droit
procédural de l’UE’ (2016) 52 Cahiers de droit européen 2, 555–61; Katharina Pabel, ‘Europäische
Agenturen: Rechtsschutz’ in Nicolas Raschauer (ed), Europäische Agenturen (Jan Sramek Verlag 2011)
76–81 ; Jules David, ‘Les recours administratifs contre les actes des agences européennes’ (2016) Revue
trimestrielle de droit européen 2, 275–92; Barbara Marchetti (ed), Administrative Remedies in the
European Union (Giappichelli Editore 2017) 320.
29 Dammann, Die Beschwerdekammern (n 23) 230; Paolo Chirulli and Luca De Lucia, ‘Specialised
Adjudication in EU Administrative Law: The Boards of Appeal of EU Agencies’ (2015) 40 European Law
Review 6, 832–57; Estanislao Arana Garcia, Los recursos administrativos en la Unión Europea: Hacia
un modelo común de justicia administrative, (2015) Working Papers IDEIR 27.
6 Merijn Chamon, Annalisa Volpato, and Mariolina Eliantonio
in 2019. Through Regulation 2019/629,33 an Article 58a was added to the Statute
which makes the possibility of introducing an appeal against a judgment of the
General Court, where the latter ruled on a decision of an ‘independent Board of
Appeal’ of the EUIPO, CPVO, ECHA, EASA or any decision-making agency estab-
lished in the future, subject to the approval by the Court of Justice. The many ques-
tions which this amendment raised are analysed in the chapter by De Lucia (8). To
better understand the potential and possible future evolution of the EU Boards of
Appeal, Oosterhuis and Widdershoven explore the counterparts of the EU BoAs in
a selection of national legal orders (9). Muzi in her chapter addresses the question
what kind of parties make use of the review procedures offered by the Boards of
Appeal (10). Subsequently, Alberti, starting from the theoretic and practical conse-
quences of the elusive notion of ‘functional continuity’, looks at how the recent re-
form of the Statute of the Court of Justice has impacted the Boards’ independence
(and how, arguably, that independence should be further enhanced) (11). Next,
Krajewski scrutinizes the promise of the main added value which Boards of Appeal
may theoretically offer: the more in-depth scrutiny of technically complex deci-
sions compared to the scrutiny offered by EU Courts (12). Finally, Ritleng investi-
gates how the Boards of Appeal should be assessed from the perspective of Article
47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR) (13). In a final Chapter we present
a conclusion and identify a future research agenda based on the chapters of Parts
I and II.
33 Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2019/629 amending Protocol No 3 on the Statute of the Court of Justice
1.1 Introduction
In response to the Great Financial Crisis of 2008, the European System of Financial
Supervision (ESFS) was established in 2010. Under this System, macro and
micro prudential supervisory powers were conferred on European bodies for
the first time. In line with Article 2(2) of the European Supervisory Authorities
Regulations (ESAs Regulations),1 the ESFS is composed of the European Systemic
Risk Board (ESRB) in charge of macro financial supervision; the three European
Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) (the European Banking Authority (EBA), the
European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) and the European Insurance
and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA)) in charge of the micro pruden-
tial supervision of banks, markets, and insurance, respectively; the ESAs Joint
Committee which ensures the necessary coordination between the ESAs (and
which is headed by the chairpersons of the ESAs); and the competent national
authorities.2
Soon after its establishment, the ESFS demonstrated certain limitations
prompting Euro area Member States to establish the European Banking Union
(EBU) in 2012.3 The EBU is composed of three pillars: the Single Supervisory
* Diane Fromage acknowledges that her contribution to this chapter is the outcome of research con-
ducted in the framework of the research project IMPACTEBU, a project that received funding from the
European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Sklodowska-
Curie grant agreement No 895841.
1 Regulation (EU) 1093/ 2010 establishing the European Banking Authority [2010] OJ L331/12,
Regulation (EU) 1094/2010 establishing the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority
[2010] OJ L331/48, and Regulation (EU) 1095/2010 establishing the European Securities and Markets
Authority [2010] OJ L 331/84 (hereafter ESAs Regulations).
2 For general information on the EFSF, ESRB, and the ESAs, see Gianni Lo Schiavo and Alexander
Türk, ‘The Institutional Architecture of EU Financial Regulation: The Case of the European Supervisory
Authorities in the Aftermath of the European Crisis’ in Leila Simona Talani (ed), Europe in Crisis: A
Structural Analysis (Palgrave Macmillan 2016) 89–121.
3 European Commission, Communication on Completing the Banking Union, COM(2017) 592
final, 3.
Merijn Chamon and Diane Fromage, Between Added Value and Untapped Potential: The Boards of Appeal in
the Field of EU Financial Regulation In: Boards of Appeal of EU Agencies. Edited by: Merijn Chamon, Annalisa
Volpato, and Mariolina Eliantonio, Oxford University Press. © Merijn Chamon and Diane Fromage 2022.
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192849298.003.0002
Between Added Value and Untapped Potential 9
Mechanism (SSM), within which, essentially, the European Central Bank (ECB) is
in charge of the prudential supervision of credit institutions; the Single Resolution
Mechanism (SRM) which consists of the establishment of a common mechanism
for the orderly resolution of credit institutions and which is headed by an EU
agency, the Single Resolution Board (SRB); and a European Deposit Insurance
Scheme (EDIS) which still has to be established.4 The creation of the ESFS and the
EBU has thus brought about important changes to the institutional system of the
EU. These have included the creation of new agencies, as well as a far-reaching re-
form of the ECB within which a ‘Chinese wall’ had to be erected to separate its or-
gans in charge of conducting the monetary policy function of the European Union
(EU) from those in charge of financial supervision.5
One of the features of this new institutional landscape is the possibility of in-
ternal review for the decisions adopted by the ECB and the agencies. While these
review mechanisms will be studied in the present chapter to contribute to an-
swering the overall research question of this volume, that is to determine the na-
ture of the Boards of Appeal (BoAs) and the type of review they offer, it should be
noted that the Joint Board of Appeal (JBoA) of the ESAs and the Appeal Panel (AP)
of the SRB on the one hand, and the Administrative Board of Review (ABoR) of the
SSM on the other, operate rather differently. Among other things, the ABoR pro-
vides ‘solely’ the possibility for review, resulting in a non-binding opinion for the
ECB. By contrast, the decisions of the JBoA and the AP are binding, and follow ap-
peal procedures that need to be exhausted before going to the EU Courts.6 Owing
to these differences and to the focus on EU agencies in this volume, this chapter
will not consider the ABoR.7 Instead, it will provide a comparative analysis of the
JBoA and the AP with a view to assessing their suitability in providing an effective
and swift remedy to individuals, and with a view to identifying any potential need
for reform.
4 For general information on the EBU, see Giuseppe Boccuzzi, The European Banking
Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions [2013] OJ L287/
63 (hereafter SSM Regulation). See on this separation, Matthias Goldmann, ‘United in Diversity? The
Relationship between Monetary Policy and Prudential Supervision in the Banking Union’ (2018) 14
European Constitutional Law Review 2, 283–310.
6 However, two parallel procedures may be launched where they do not overlap. See Case 21/18, para
34 of the AP.
7 On the ABoR see for instance, William Blair, ‘The ABoR and the Role of Independent Panels
This chapter first introduces the main features of these bodies (Section 1.2), be-
fore their corpus of decisions to date is examined (Section 1.3). The conclusion
offers an assessment, and discusses potential avenues for reform (Section 1.4).
This sub-section presents the main features of these bodies by first comparing the
provisions defining their establishment and composition (Section 1.2.1). Second,
their competences and the procedures before them are compared (Section 1.2.2).
The establishment and functioning of the JBoA are laid down in Articles 58 to 61 of
the ESAs Regulations, whilst the AP is defined in Article 85 of the SRM Regulation.8
The differences and similarities in their composition and their functioning, as de-
fined in the establishing regulations, are highlighted in Table 1.1 below.
Table 1.1 clearly shows that the provisions of the AP were very much inspired by
those of the older JBoA.9 At the same time, however, the provisions applicable to
the JBoA are more elaborate than those of the AP, though this is partially the result
of the reform of the ESAs Regulations conducted in 2019. Indeed, on that occasion,
the requirements were added in relation to members’ international experience and
knowledge of EU law, nationality of the members and their knowledge of EU lan-
guages, and the involvement of the European Parliament in the appointment of the
members. Unlike the BoAs of other agencies, the JBoA and AP may adopt their
own rules of procedure, and no power is granted to the Commission to adopt ter-
tiary law on the composition or functioning of the JBoA or AP. Whereas, for in-
stance, the qualifications of the members of the BoA of the European Chemicals
Agency (ECHA) and the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) are
detailed in acts of the Commission,10 the ESAs and the SRM Regulations only
8 Regulation (EU) 806/2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution
of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism
and a Single Resolution Fund [2014] OJ L 225/1 (hereafter SRM Regulation).
9 As also noted by Lamandini and Ramos Muñoz, see Marco Lamandini and David Ramos Muñoz,
‘Appeal Bodies of EU Financial Regulatory Agencies: Are We Where We Should Be?’ in ECB, Building
Bridges: Central Banking Law in an Interconnected World. ECB Legal Conference 2019, 386 (hereafter
Lamandini and Ramos Muñoz, ‘Appeal Bodies of EU Financial Regulatory Agencies’).
10 See Commission Regulation 104/2004 laying down rules on the organisation and composition of
the Board of Appeal of the EASA [2004] OJ L16/20 and Commission Regulation 1238/2007 on laying
down rules on the qualifications of the members of the Board of Appeal of the ECHA [2007] OJ L280/
10.
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
“I consecrate this interesting piece of furniture to American
Science, and to the Philosophical Society of Philadelphia: willing,
however, that in consideration of the high esteem I bear to you
personally, you should have the custody and use of it in your own
house, during your life; producing it only to the Society for the use of
the Secretary, when you think proper. I have subjoined by way of
postscript to this letter, some particulars relating to the Residence of
Copernicus, and his Tomb; which I wish you to communicate to our
Society.[287]
Buchan.”
“Dear Sir,
....[290]
“Th. Jefferson.
“David Rittenhouse.”
At this time, Dr. Rittenhouse still held the Directorship of the Mint,
though he resigned it a few months after; and from that period, his
health being then much on the decline, he seemed to be desirous of
passing the remainder of his days in tranquillity, and an abstraction
from all business and severe studies, in the society of his family and
a few particular friends. He now received numerous proofs of the
affectionate respect and high consideration, in which his person and
character were held; both among his own countrymen and in foreign
nations. Many of his fellow-citizens were assiduous in their attentions
to him: they frequently visited him; and, when he was suffering in his
health, he experienced repeated acts of friendship and kindness:—
President Washington often made calls upon him, and enquiries
concerning his health; and among his other friends, the late Mr.
Henry Hill and Mr. Robert Morris manifested towards him the kindest
attentions.
In the spring of the year 1795, our amiable Philosopher was
admitted a member of the Royal Society of London. He was apprized
of this new mark of distinction conferred on him, by the following
note, addressed to him by Phineas Bond, Esq. late the British
Consul, resident in Philadelphia.
“Mr. Bond has the honour to inform Mr. Rittenhouse, that he has
received a letter from his friend Mr. George Chalmers, of the office of
the Lords of the Committee of Council for Trade, &c. at White-hall, in
which he requests him to apprize Mr. R. of his election as a Fellow of
the Royal Society of London, which took place on the 23d of April.
It was not until towards the close of the summer, that Dr.
Rittenhouse received the certificate of his Fellowship, in the Royal
Society. His Diploma, for this honour, bears date the 16th of April,
1795;[291] and was accompanied by the following letter:
“Sir,
“It is a long time, my dear Associate, since I have heard from you:
but Mr. Adet, our worthy ambassador, will probably procure for me
that satisfaction. You will see by the little history which I send you,
that the troubles of the revolution have not impaired my labours; and
that I have, now, twenty-seven thousand stars, observed.
“What has given me still greater pleasure, is, that the duration of
the ring, as you observed it, agrees very well with the diameters of
the Sun and of the Moon, which T have adopted in the third edition
of my Astronomy (1792), and the diminutions that I there propose for
eclipses; viz. 3″½ to be taken from the diameter of the Sun, and 2″
from that of the Moon.[293]
“I pray you to make many compliments for me, to the astronomers
whom I know, in your country, Mr. Willard at Beverley and Mr.
Williams at Cambridge: Is there any other astronomer, now, who
applies himself seriously to astronomy? I greet you with health and
brotherhood.
“Lalande.
“Professor of Astronomy, and Inspector of the
College of France,[294] Cambray Place.“
“Dear Sir,
“David Rittenhouse.[296]
(Superscribed.)
“Hon. Thomas M‘Kean, LL. D.
Chief Justice of Pennsylvania.”
The affectionate regard and high respect which Professor Barton
uniformly cherished for the person and character of this worthy
relative,—who, on all occasions, evinced himself to be his sincere
friend,—cannot be better manifested, than by citing his own words.
In his dedication to Dr. Rittenhouse, of a dessertation, entitled, A
Memoir concerning the fascinating faculty which has been ascribed
to the Rattle-Snake and other American Serpents, is this passage
—“In inscribing this Memoir to you, dear sir, I follow the regular
course of my feelings, which, when I have received acts of friendship
or kindness, ever lead me to acknowledge them. Whilst your
example early implanted in me an ardent love of science, the
assistance which you afforded me, by removing many of the
obstacles that have opposed my advancement in life, has enabled
me to devote a portion of my time to the cultivation of science; and
thereby to increase the quantity of my happiness:” This was written
just four months before the decease of our Philosopher. And in a
subsequent inscription by the same gentleman,—that of his New
Views of the Origin of the Tribes and Nations of America,—dedicated
to Mr. Jefferson, and dated about a year after that event, he says:
“The only dedications I ever wrote, were to two persons[297] whom I
greatly esteemed and loved; the last, to a common friend, whose
virtues and science endeared him to his country, and whose removal
from us, we shall long have reason to deplore.”
The scanty remnant of life that yet remained to the great American
Astronomer and Mathematician, was neither uselessly, nor
altogether unpleasantly employed. In this interval of time, short as it
was, such portions of it as afforded him some respite from sickness
and pain, were either devoted to the society of his family and friends,
or occupied in study. From these sources of rational enjoyment, be
derived much comfort; and the solace he drew from them, was
greatly heightened by the endearing attentions, which, amidst the
rapid decline of his health and strength, he experienced, in an
eminent degree, in the bosom of his affectionate family and some
surrounding relatives. He was fully sensible of the approaching crisis
of his disease; and he appeared to be quite prepared to meet the
awful stroke, with the fortitude which a retrospective view of a well-
spent life would naturally inspire; as well as with the resignation,
which an entire confidence in the goodness, the wisdom, and the
mercy of his omnipotent Creator, taught him to be a duty. His
elevated conceptions of the Deity, together with his decided belief of
the immortality of the soul, according at the same time with the
doctrines of a pure religion, animated him with the stedfast hope of
an happy futurity, worthy of a Christian and a Philosopher. His
intimate knowledge of the sublimest works of creation, rendered him
highly sensible of the wisdom and power of the Great Supreme;
while that knowledge, aided by the lights furnished by the Christian
dispensation, led him to ascribe suitable attributes to the Author of
Nature,—a Being infinitely good, as well as perfect: for, as he once
familiarly expressed himself,[298] he was “firmly persuaded, that we
are not at the disposal of a Being, who has the least tincture of ill-
nature, or requires any in us.”[299]
“The last visit I ever received from Mr. Rittenhouse was about the
middle of June, 1796. He called at my humble habitation in Fifth
street, to inquire about my health, and to learn from me the result of
the experiments and inquiries in which he knew I was, at this time
engaged, concerning the mode of generation and gestation of our
opossum, an animal to whose economy and manners he had himself
paid some attention, and whose history he justly considered one of
the most interesting in the whole range of zoology.
“It was on this occasion, that our excellent friend first informed me,
that he had received a diploma from the Royal Society. He observed,
with a tone of voice and with a certain expression of countenance,
which were not calculated to afford me any pleasure, “that a few
years ago, such a mark of respect from that illustrious body would
have been received by him with pleasure and with pride.”
“In fact, Mr. Rittenhouse, now and for some months past, was
strongly impressed with the idea, that his career of usefulness and
virtue was nearly at an end. He had several times, during the
preceding part of the spring and summer, intimated to me (and
doubtless to others of his friends) his impressions on this head. In
what precise condition of his system, whether physical or intellectual,
these impressions were founded, I have only been able to form a
distant, and unsatisfactory conjecture.
“A few days after this interview, viz. on the 22d of June, I was sent
for to visit Mr. Rittenhouse. I found him in his garden, where he loved
to walk, and soon learned that he laboured under a severe attack of
cholera, accompanied, however, with more fever than we generally
find with this disease; and with a great increase of that violent pain
and sense of oppression at the region of his stomach, to which he
had been subject for at least thirty years. Notwithstanding his age,
the debility of his system, and the unfavourable state of the season, I
ventured to flatter myself, that the attack would not prove mortal. On
the following day, however, finding him no better, but rather worse, I
requested permission to call in the aid of another physician; and
having mentioned the name of Dr. Adam Kuhn, that gentleman
accordingly visited our friend, in company with me, during the
remainder of his illness.
“There can be no doubt, I think, that Mr. Rittenhouse, from the first
invasion of his disease, or at least from the day when he was
confined to his bed or room, entertained but little hopes of his
recovery. He signed his will in my presence. He discovered no more
solicitude about his situation, than it is decorous and proper in every
good or great man to feel, when in a similar situation. During the
greater part of his illness, he manifested the most happy
temperament of mind: and it was only in the last hour or two of his
life, that his powerful intellects were disturbed by a mild delirium.
About eight hours before he died, the pain in the region of his
stomach being unusually severe, a poultice composed of meal and
laudanum was applied to the part. In less than two hours after the
application, I called to see him, and upon asking him if he did not feel
easier, he calmly answered, in these memorable words, which it is
impossible for me to forget,—for they were the last he ever distinctly
uttered, and they make us acquainted with the two most important
features in his religious creed,—“Yes, you have made the way to
God easier!”
155. On the 4th of Feb. 1770, he mentioned to Mr. Barton his then
contemplated removal into that city, in these terms—“Dr. Smith, to
whom I am indebted for many kindnesses, is very urgent to have me
come to Philadelphia to reside, which it is probable I may do shortly:
but I am not yet determined. If I live to write again, you shall know
more of my mind; in the mean time, I shall be glad to have your
opinion of the matter.”
156. Since writing the above the author has ascertained, that
towards the close of April, 1770, the orrery was purchased for the
college of New-Jersey. On the 23d of that month, Dr. Witherspoon,
then the president of that college, accompanied by some gentlemen,
went to Norriton for that purpose, and it appears that the orrery was
then nearly finished.
157. The following extract of a letter from Dr. Smith to Mr. Barton,
written the day after Mr. Rittenhouse’s on the same subject, will
further explain the embarrassing circumstances that attended this
transaction, and the delicate situation in which Mr. Rittenhouse,
particularly, was placed.
“You will think, by all this, that I am offended with him, and that our
friendship may hereby be interrupted: Far from it—I went to see him,
the day the newspaper announced the affair. I soon found that I had
little occasion to say any thing: he was convinced, before I saw him,
that he had gone too far. But still, as no time was fixed for delivering
the Orrery, I was glad to find he had concluded that it should not be
delivered till next winter; against which time, he said, he could have
a second one made, if this one staid with him for his hands to work
by. As I love Mr. Rittenhouse, and would not give a man of such
delicate feelings a moment’s uneasiness, I agreed to wave the
honour of having the first Orrery, and to take the second.”
In fact, the Orrery was not at that time finished; for Mr. Rittenhouse
then informed Dr. Smith, that he was under the necessity of waiting
for brass from England, to enable him to complete it. “The result
(continued the Doctor) will be, I think, that he will keep his Orrery till
towards winter; and should they not then receive it, in the Jersies,
they will take it at New-York.”
On the 7th of the following month, Dr. Smith wrote thus finally, to
Mr. Barton, on this subject—“Your and my friend, Mr. Rittenhouse,
will be with you on Saturday. The Governor says, the Orrery shall not
go: he would rather pay for it, himself. He has ordered a meeting of
the Trustees on Tuesday next; and declares it as his opinion, that we
ought to have the first Orrery, and not the second,—even if the
second should be the best.”
158. The Rev. Dr. Peters wrote thus to Mr. Barton, under the date
of March 22, 1771—“Dr. Smith has done wonders in favour of our
friend Rittenhouse. His zeal has been very active: he has got enough
to pay him for a second orrery; and the assembly has given him
300l. The Doctor, in his introductory lecture, was honoured with the
principal men of all denominations, who swallowed every word he
said, with the pleasure that attends eating the choicest viands; and in
the close, when he came to mention the orrery, he over-excelled his
very self!”—“Your son will acquaint you with all the particulars
respecting it. The lectures are crowded by such as think they can,
thereby, be made capable of understanding that wonderful machine:
whereas, after all, their eyes only will give them the truth, from the
figures, and motions, and places, and magnitudes of the heavenly
bodies.”
160. In a letter from Dr. Smith to Mr. Barton, dated March 23,
1771, is this paragraph:—
“I have been so busy these two months past, that I could not find a
moment’s leisure to write. A good deal of time was to be given to the
public lectures, the Orrery, and the getting our dear friend
Rittenhouse brought into as advantageous a light as possible, on his
first entrance into this town as an inhabitant; all which has
succeeded to our utmost wishes; and the notice taken of him by the
province, is equally to his honour and theirs. The loss of his wife has
greatly disconcerted him; but we try to keep up his spirits, under it.”