‭Rudolph‬‭1‬

‭Examining the Bush Administration in Somalia: Humanitarian?‬

‭American involvement in Somalia (1992-94) was an‬‭entirely un-humanitarian mission,‬

‭marked by political motivations, bureaucratic structure, and economic desire. The U.S.‬

‭government’s decisions surrounding the response to the mass starvation and civil war in Somalia‬

‭reflected the political timetable in Washington and the impending election of 1992. Additionally,‬

‭Pentagon officials did not have moral concerns on their mind, rather, more mundane and‬

‭pragmatic matters such as the efficacy of American withdrawal and the subsequent handoff to‬

‭the United Nations Security Council. It is important to recognize that the claim of humanitarian‬

‭motivations in American foreign policy decisions is often a facade to disguise less moral‬

‭incentives and garner public support. This burden – to appease the public when the president‬

‭makes decisions – is a critical component of American foreign policy in the modern age.‬

‭In 1991, Somalia plunged into a violent civil war after the U.S. stopped funding militia‬

‭leader Siad Barre. Funding for Barre originated from Cold War tensions in a, by now, highly‬

‭conventional story in which the U.S. propped up a militia leader to stymie the elusive spread of‬

‭Communism.‬‭1‬ ‭The U.S’. negligence directly led to this conflict, because as the money dried up,‬

‭warring factions wrecked most of Somalia's agriculture, sending the country into famine. Thus,‬

‭later involvement, often cast as humanitarian work, could arguably be nothing more than‬

‭immorally cleaning up a mess, even though the U.S. did not sell it to the rest of the world as‬

‭such. The United Nations and other aid organizations responded by pouring money and resources‬

‭into Somalia in an attempt to feed the starving.‬‭2‬ ‭Much of this aid, however, could not reach the‬

‭people who needed it the most, as belligerent parties stole the food to gain an upper hand over‬

‭1‬
‭Elizabeth Chamberlain, "Operation Restore Truth,"‬‭The Humanist,‬‭1994, 27.‬
‭https://www.proquest.com/magazines/operation-restore-truth/docview/235269280/se-2?accountid=36629.‬
‭2‬
‭Stefano Recchia, "Pragmatism over Principle: US Intervention and Burden Shifting in Somalia, 1992–1993."‬
‭Journal of Strategic Studies‬‭43, no. 3 (February 28,‬‭2018): 341-65. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2018.1441712.‬
 ‭Rudolph‬‭2‬

‭their opponents. At what many consider the height of the crisis in July of 1992,‬‭3‬ ‭the U.N.‬

‭pressured the Bush administration to lead a mission to provide aid for Somalia. President George‬

‭H.W. Bush resisted involvement in this tragedy, instead waiting until August when he announced‬

‭Operation Provide Relief on the eve of the 1992 Republican National Convention when the peak‬

‭of the tragedy had likely passed.‬‭4‬ ‭The most plausible‬‭explanation as to why Bush withheld‬

‭support for so long was his political standing. In this election, Bush ran against Bill Clinton, a‬

‭tough opponent whose campaign motto was “It’s the economy, stupid,” a pejorative certainly‬

‭meant to deride the current president on what the public saw as his lack of domestic action‬

‭during an economic downturn.‬‭5‬ ‭This sentiment likely‬‭caused Bush to be more deliberate as he‬

‭carried out his foreign policy agenda, directly impacting the chronology of Somalian‬

‭involvement. A senior official inside the Bush administration admitted this, adding that‬

‭campaign aides were “fearful of accusations that all the president cared about was foreign‬

‭policy,” and “strongly urged him to take a lower public profile on all foreign issues until after the‬

‭election.”‬‭6‬ ‭Looking at the behavior of the president‬‭through a historical lens, it becomes apparent‬

‭that Bush’s foreign policy regarding Somalia in the summer of 1992 was entirely distorted by the‬

‭internal political climate. Foreign policy determined by a political clock within the White House‬

‭is characteristically un-humanitarian. For a deed to be humanitarian, its effect must not only be‬

‭considered but its motivations too. In this case, while‬‭some‬‭starving civilians were certainly fed‬

‭after Operation Provide Relief was executed, perhaps more could have been saved if moral, not‬

‭political, concerns had been the top priority for the Bush administration.‬

‭3‬
‭Matthew Baum A. "How Public Opinion Constrains the Use of Force: The Case of Operation Restore Hope."‬
‭ residential Studies Quarterly‬‭34, no. 2 (2004): 187-226.‬‭http://www.jstor.org/stable/27552585, 210; see also,‬
P
‭Chamberlain, 27.‬
‭4‬
‭Recchia,‬‭Pragmatism over Principle,‬‭345.‬
‭5‬
‭Baum,‬‭How Public Opinion Constrains,‬‭202.‬
‭6‬
‭Michael Wines. "Mission to Somalia: Aides Say U.S.‬‭Role in Somalia Gives Bush a Way to Exit in Glory."‬‭The‬
‭New York Times‬‭, December 6, 1992, International, 14.‬
 ‭Rudolph‬‭3‬

‭Operation Provide Relief was largely a failure, falling prey to the problems previously‬

‭plaguing attempts at aid: the food simply could not get to the hungry because fighting parties‬

‭stole it.‬‭7‬ ‭In December of 1992, after losing the election,‬‭Bush launched Operation Restore Hope,‬

‭a large-scale military operation that provided troops to get food through to the people of Somalia.‬

‭The timing of this was no accident on Bush’s part. Without any electoral encumberments after‬

‭losing the election to Clinton in the fall of 1992, Bush turned his attention more keenly to‬

‭Somalia, but not for any moral or altruistic reasons. This is true because had Bush’s personal‬

‭convictions been the true motivator, he would have gotten involved earlier. As Mathew Baum‬

‭points out, “If intervening in Somalia was ‘the right thing to do’ in November 1992, then it was‬

‭certainly also the right thing to do the previous January, or even in the latter part of 1991.”‬‭8‬ ‭Thus,‬

‭despite what some believed at the time, even if Bush was “personally affected by the‬

‭humanitarian tragedy,”‬‭9‬ ‭his decision-making remains‬‭squarely un-humanitarian, owing to his‬

‭prior inaction. Instead, a possible motivation of Bush’s was his legacy and maintaining his‬

‭reputation as a president who mastered foreign policy. Aides and friends of Bush added that it‬

‭was “no coincidence” that “Bush [left] office with a show of American might.”‬‭10‬ ‭After all, if‬

‭short-term political motivations did not matter anymore, the likely next goal was long-term‬

‭political motivations.‬

‭The decision to get involved militarily in December of 1992 did not fall solely on‬

‭President Bush’s shoulders, however. Between August, when Operation Provide Relief was‬

‭initiated, and December, when Operation Restore Hope was launched, Bush remained opposed to‬

‭military involvement. While military decisions such as these outwardly belonged solely to the‬

‭7‬
‭ ecchia,‬‭Pragmatism Over Principle,‬‭348.‬
R
‭8‬
‭Baum,‬‭How Public Opinion Constrains,‬‭210.‬
‭9‬
‭Recchia,‬‭Pragmatism Over Principle‬‭, 341.‬
‭10‬
‭Wines,‬‭Aids Say U.S. Role‬‭, 14.‬
 ‭Rudolph‬‭4‬

‭president, aides and members of the National Security Council logically had sway. Professor‬

‭Stefano Recchia asserts that Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell and‬

‭other military leaders were the predominant force pushing Bush towards his ultimate decision to‬

‭intervene militarily.‬‭11‬ ‭Recchia goes on to argue that‬‭military leaders were therefore able to push‬

‭some of their preferences into the operation, one of those being the use of an overwhelming‬

‭“decisive force” tactic.‬‭12‬ ‭Previously used in the Gulf‬‭War in 1991, this tactic entails large troop‬

‭deployment to intimidate and overwhelm adversaries.‬‭13‬ ‭Additionally, leaders put stipulations in‬

‭place to force a handoff to U.N. peacekeeping forces following a brief period of American‬

‭military presence.‬‭14‬ ‭Arguably, the main motive behind‬‭these stipulations was the limitation of‬

‭U.S. accountability. Politicians and military leaders feared that if the situation escalated or if‬

‭American troops got too entangled in Somalia, the U.S. would be further drawn into an unwanted‬

‭foreign conflict.‬‭15‬ ‭Overwhelming force, Powell argued,‬‭would “intimidate the Somali militias,”‬

‭keeping “expectations of U.S. casualties… low.”‬‭16‬ ‭Moreover,‬‭a transition to United Nations‬

‭peacekeeping forces would prevent long-term military entanglement in Somalia. Leaders also‬

‭sought to prevent dangerous confrontations with the Somali militias and demanded that engaging‬

‭or neutralizing any Somali parties was not a part of the official mission.‬‭17‬ ‭Whatever the‬

‭motivations, it is evident that the military’s responsibility lay in either protecting troops or‬

‭preventing escalation of conflict. Regardless of these tactics’ efficacy, the motivations behind‬

‭them remained logically and morally sound, as the military pursued the most feasible and‬

‭11‬
‭ ecchia,‬‭Pragmatism Over Principle,‬‭352-254.‬
R
‭12‬
‭Recchia,‬‭Pragmatism Over Principle,‬‭353.‬
‭13‬
‭Francis G. Hoffman.‬‭Decisive Force – The New American‬‭Way of War?‬‭Newport, RI: Government Publishing‬
‭Office, 1994. Accessed May 17, 2023. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA283762.‬
‭14‬
‭Recchia,‬‭Pragmatism Over Principle,‬‭356.‬
‭15‬
‭Recchia,‬‭Pragmatism Over Principle,‬‭352-356.‬
‭16‬
‭Recchia,‬‭Pragmatism Over Principle,‬‭354.‬
‭17‬
‭Joint History Office.‬‭The Effort to Save Somalia.‬‭By Walter S. Poole. Washington DC: Office of the Chairman of‬
‭the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2005, 23.‬
 ‭Rudolph‬‭5‬

‭efficient tactic that limited casualties. Nevertheless, to call this forceful type of involvement‬

‭humanitarian would be incorrect, and a dangerous exaggeration. Even though the military’s‬

‭intentions were arguably morally purer than Bush’s political motivations, neither party was‬

‭motivated to help starving people in Somalia, the necessary stipulation for a humanitarian‬

‭demarcation. With a view of the response to this humanitarian crisis, patterns begin to emerge.‬

‭At the heart of the decision-making process lay two parties: Bush and his staff and the military.‬

‭Both were highly interconnected but military officials’ pursuits varied markedly from the‬

‭presidential incentive to appeal to the public during campaign season. These overlapping motives‬

‭produced an interesting result: an intervention on Bush’s timeline, but with the details and‬

‭execution influenced by the military. Overall, the amalgamation of agendas created an‬

‭un-humanitarian foreign policy that ended up backfiring.‬

‭Interests in Somalian intervention stretched further than Bush and military leaders,‬

‭however. As is common throughout modern American history, oil additionally complicated this‬

‭geopolitical crisis. U.S. interest in Somalia had been almost completely dictated by oil before the‬

‭1990s, as Mogadishu and coastal towns served as vital ports close to Red Sea shipping lanes and‬

‭the Bab-el-Mandeb strait, a geographic feature seen as “the lifeline of Western Europe,” during‬

‭the Cold War.‬‭18‬ ‭This interest was heightened during‬‭the 1970s following the OPEC oil embargo‬

‭during that decade.‬‭19‬ ‭After Barre, the Somali leader‬‭supplied with American money to preserve‬

‭oil interests during the Cold War, was deposed, longtime political dissident Mohammed Farah‬

‭Aideed rose to power.‬‭20‬ ‭Aideed welcomed U.S. connections,‬‭likely due to his ties to the‬

‭American-based Continental Oil Company (Conoco), and thus embraced American participation‬

‭18‬
‭David N. Gibbs. "Realpolitik and Humanitarian Intervention:‬‭The Case of Somalia." International Politics 37‬
(‭ March 2000): 43-44. Accessed May 17, 2023.‬
‭https://dgibbs.faculty.arizona.edu/sites/dgibbs.faculty.arizona.edu/files/somalia.pdf.‬
‭19‬
‭Gibbs, “Realpolitik and Humanitarian Intervention,”‬‭44.‬
‭20‬
‭Chamberlain, "Operation Restore Truth," 27.‬
 ‭Rudolph‬‭6‬

‭in Operation Restore Hope, expecting he could still reap the benefits from a relationship with‬

‭American oil corporations.‬‭21‬ ‭Oddly enough, Aideed still‬‭clashed with U.N. peacekeeping troops,‬

‭those who were participating in Operation Restore Hope alongside the U.S.‬‭22‬ ‭Therefore, the U.S.‬

‭cooperated with a separatist leader who was part of the problem in the first place, attacking the‬

‭food supplies intended for hungry people. Moreover, a nearby Conoco compound served as the‬

‭headquarters for the Somali ambassador to America, Robert Oakley, and the “‬‭de facto‬‭U.S.‬

‭embassy,”‬‭23‬ ‭making it hard to distinguish between Big‬‭Oil‬‭24‬ ‭and the American government,‬

‭setting a dangerous precedent.‬‭25‬ ‭Blurring the lines‬‭between private industry and government is‬

‭risky, especially when the lives of American troops are involved. Without a distinction between‬

‭government and industry, it is unclear for which party the military fights. With this, the classic‬

‭American quandary once again emerges: does the government have the duty to protect the‬

‭American people or private industry? Ostensibly, democracies exist to serve the people, however,‬

‭this is often not the case. In the case of Somalia, America once again diverges from the‬

‭democratic high road, protecting private enterprise over the people and putting troops’ lives at‬

‭risk. Big Oil had much to gain from a peaceful resolution, as Conoco, Amoco, Chevron, and‬

‭Phillips were granted nearly two-thirds of Somali oil allocation prior to the fall of Barre.‬‭26‬ ‭Thus,‬

‭any notion of humanitarianism on the U.S’. part was likely a pretext for the protection of‬

‭American business interests. Peace sought for economic motivations can never truly be‬

‭humanitarian, as someone profits from the lack of conflict. While the evidence is not clear if‬

‭21‬
‭ ibbs, “Realpolitik and Humanitarian Intervention,”‬‭45‬
G
‭22‬
‭Gibbs, “Realpolitik and Humanitarian Intervention,”‬‭45.‬
‭23‬
‭Gibbs, “Realpolitik and Humanitarian Intervention,”‬‭48.‬
‭24‬
‭Largest oil companies in the United States at the‬‭time, Conoco being one of them.‬
‭25‬
‭Worth noting, additionally, that President Bush was‬‭a former Texas oilman, perhaps very sympathetic to Big Oil.‬
‭26‬
‭Chamberlain, "Operation Restore Truth," 27; see also,‬‭Fineman, Mark. "The Oil Factor in Somalia: Four‬
‭American petroleum giants had agreements with the African nation before its civil war began. They could reap big‬
‭rewards if peace is restored."‬‭The Los Angeles Times‬‭,‬‭January 18, 1993, World & Nation. Accessed May 18, 2023.‬
‭https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1993-01-18-mn-1337-story.html.‬
 ‭Rudolph‬‭7‬

‭Conoco and other large oil companies encouraged Bush to get involved militarily, once‬

‭American troops were on the ground, Conoco and other companies were certainly‬‭involved.‬

‭Ultimately, American taxpayer dollars funded a warlord and helped massive oil companies‬

‭expand their domain, both of which are immoral, un-democratic, and un-humanitarian pursuits.‬

‭Looking at American foreign policy in Somalia during the early 1990s, several patterns‬

‭emerge. First and foremost, parties with their own agendas each wanted to manipulate American‬

‭involvement in their way. From political incentive to economic desire, these motivations were‬

‭similar in that none of these parties focused on the needs of the Somali people. Humanitarian aid‬

‭from a government can perhaps never truly be humanitarian, as the decision-makers will always‬

‭have responsibilities to parties other than the one truly in need of aid. Historically, tragedy can‬

‭open the door to greed, because when a country or people are at their lowest, exploiting them is‬

‭easier. The case of Somalia is no different, considering that although people were fed as a result‬

‭of the intervention, the focus was never to do so. Thus, any benefits were likely a mere‬

‭byproduct of selfishness. Even if any selfish motivations were forgotten, aid in Somalia could‬

‭not have been humanitarian simply for the fact that the U.S. effectively ignored the genocide in‬

‭Rwanda a year later. To be truly humanitarian, to seek the improvement of people’s lives, one‬

‭can not pick and choose which battles will be most advantageous to themselves. This raises the‬

‭question as to whether the U.S. has a responsibility to provide aid across the world. Perhaps the‬

‭answer is yes, particularly in places where politicians have previously meddled, as any country‬

‭carries a moral burden to right previous wrongs. To ethically provide aid, however, it must be‬

‭isolated from any other political or economic agendas, reverting aid to its true form, rather than‬

‭the typical extraction of resources through modern imperialism.‬

 ‭Rudolph‬‭8‬

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 ‭Rudolph‬‭9‬

‭Recchia, Stefano. "Pragmatism over Principle: US Intervention and Burden Shifting in Somalia,‬
‭1992–1993."‬‭Journal of Strategic Studies‬‭43, no. 3‬‭(February 28, 2018): 341-65.‬
‭https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2018.1441712.‬

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