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Jesus As Philosopher: The Moral Sage
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OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 29/3/2018, SPi
J ES U S A S PH IL O S O P HE R
Jesus as Philosopher
The Moral Sage in the Synoptic Gospels
RUNAR M. THORSTEINSSON
1
3
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Acknowledgements
This study is the main result of a research project initiated at the

Centre for Theology and Religious Studies at Lund University in
2011. The project was financed by the Swedish Research Council
(Vetenskapsrådet). I am grateful to the Council for this opportunity,
as well as to the Centre for Theology and Religious Studies at Lund
University for providing me with the necessary locus and tools to
work on the project. I am also grateful to the Theological Research
Institution at the University of Iceland (Guðfræðistofnun HÍ) for a
grant enabling a linguistic revision of the study. I thank Anna Benassi
for greatly improving its language. Needless to say, any errors that
remain are my own.
I wish to express my gratitude to the Senior New Testament Seminar
at Lund University for commenting on Chapter 4 as well as on the
project as a whole at its very beginning. I also wish to thank the Senior
New Testament Seminar at the University of Copenhagen for a helpful
discussion of Chapter 3. I am particularly grateful to Troels Engberg-
Pedersen for detailed comments on that chapter. I give my thanks to
the Faculty of Theology and Religious Studies at the University of
Iceland for giving me the opportunity to continue to work on the
project, and for granting me research leave during the autumn of
2016 to complete it.
Finally, I am deeply grateful to Oxford University Press for accept-
ing this work for publication. I wish to thank the staff of the Press for
working with me to complete the work. I am thankful as well to the
anonymous readers for the Press who commented on the final draft
and made many helpful suggestions.
I wish to dedicate this book to my mother, Rut Meldal Valtýsdóttir.
Runar M. Thorsteinsson
Reykjavik
June 2017
Contents
Abbreviations ix
Introduction: Purpose and Approach 1

The Purpose and Aim of the Study 1
What Is Addressed and What Is Not? Jesus of the Gospels
and the Historical Jesus 3
Moral Character, Classical Virtue Theory, and
Early Christianity 11
1. Philosophy and Philosophical Sages in the
Graeco-Roman World 15
Philosophy as a Way of Life 15
The Philosophical Sage 21
2. Jesus as Philosopher in the Gospel of Mark 33
‘Take nothing for the journey except a staff ’:
Ascetic Appearance 35
‘We have left everything and followed you’: Abandoning
One’s Family 38
The Camel and the Needle: Attitude towards Material
Possessions and Outward Appearance 46
The Divine Mission: Jesus and the Philosophers as
Messengers of God 51
‘What is this sophia that has been given to him?’ The Wisdom
of Jesus 55
A Tranquil Mind—or Not: The Philosopher’s Emotions 62
The Example of Socrates: The Philosopher’s Suffering and Death 68
Summary 71
3. Jesus as Philosopher in the Gospel of Matthew 72
The Cynic Image: Ascetic Appearance 73
The Socratic Gadfly: Abandoning One’s Family 74
Treasure in Heaven: Attitude towards Material Possessions
and Outward Appearance 75
‘Be perfect’: Jesus as a Teacher of Ethics 78
Theory and Action: The Congruence between
Words and Deeds 101
viii Contents
The House on Rock: The Wisdom of Jesus 107
We Shall Overcome: The Philosopher’s Emotions 119
Enduring till the End: The Philosopher’s Suffering and Death 122
Summary 124
4. Jesus as Philosopher in the Gospel of Luke 125
The Wandering Philosopher: Ascetic Appearance 127
Redefining a Concept: Abandoning One’s Family 131
Losing and Gaining: Attitude towards Material Possessions and
Outward Appearance 134
The Reformer of Sinners: Jesus as a Teacher of Ethics 143
The Master of Reasoning and Debate: The Wisdom of Jesus 152
The Call to Metanoia: Jesus and the Philosophers as Messengers
of God 160
Jesus the Stoic: The Philosopher’s Emotions 165
The Innocent Martyr: The Philosopher’s Suffering and Death 170
Summary 177
Conclusion 178
Bibliography 185
Index of Modern Authors 195
Index of Ancient References 197
Abbreviations
AB Anchor Bible
ABRL Anchor Bible Reference Library
ANRW Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt: Geschichte und
Kultur Roms im Spiegel der neueren Forschung. Edited by
H. Temporini and W. Haase. Berlin/New York, 1972–
ANTC Abingdon New Testament Commentaries
BNTC Black’s New Testament Commentaries
CBET Contributions to Biblical Exegesis and Theology
CQ Classical Quarterly
EC Early Christianity
FRLANT Forschungen zur Religion und Literatur des Alten und Neuen
Testaments
HDR Harvard Dissertations in Religion
HSCP Harvard Studies in Classical Philology
ΗΝΤ Handbuch zum Neuen Testament
HTKNT Herders theologischer Kommentar zum Neuen Testament
HTR The Harvard Theological Review
ICC International Critical Commentary
JBL Journal of Biblical Literature
JR The Journal of Religion
JSNTSup Journal for the Study of the New Testament: Supplement Series
JTS The Journal of Theological Studies
KNT Kommentar till Nya testamentet
LCL Loeb Classical Library
LNTS The Library of New Testament Studies
LSJ Liddel, H. G., R. Scott, H. S. Jones, A Greek–English Lexicon.
9th edn with revised supplement. Oxford, 1996
NCBC New Century Bible Commentary
NIGTC New International Greek Testament Commentary
NovT Novum Testamentum
NovTSup Supplements to Novum Testamentum
NRSV New Revised Standard Version
NTS New Testament Studies
OSAP Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy
SBLAB Society of Biblical Literature Academia Biblica
SBLDS Society of Biblical Literature Dissertation Series
SBLSBS Society of Biblical Literature Sources for Biblical Study
SCHNT Studia ad corpus hellenisticum Novi Testamenti
x Abbreviations
SNTSMS Society for New Testament Studies Monograph Series
STAC Studien und Texte zu Antike und Christentum/Studies and
Texts in Antiquity and Christianity
SVF Stoicorum veterum fragmenta. H. von Arnim. 4 vols. Leipzig,
1903–24
TDNT Theological Dictionary of the New Testament. Edited by G. Kittel
and G. Friedrich. Translated by G. W. Bromiley. 10 vols. Grand
Rapids, 1964–76
ThH Théologie Historique
THKNT Theologischer Handkommentar zum Neuen Testament
TLNT Theological Lexicon of the New Testament. C. Spicq. Translated
and edited by J. D. Ernest. 3 vols. Peabody, MA, 1994
WBC Word Biblical Commentary
YCS Yale Classical Studies
ZNW Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft
Introduction
Purpose and Approach
The words of Socrates, for some strange reason, still endure and
will endure for all time, though he himself did not write or leave
behind him either a treatise or a will.
(Dio Chrysostom, Or. 54.4)
THE PURPOSE AND AIM OF THE STUDY
Largely due to the age-old Judaism/Hellenism divide and the distinc-

tion traditionally made between theology and philosophy, Jesus of
Nazareth, as a Jew and ‘son of God’, is usually associated with Jewish/
theological as opposed to Hellenistic/philosophical thought and way
of life. Recent research has shown that this ‘Jerusalem vs. Athens’
distinction is highly misleading and results in some very unfortunate
invitations to anachronism. Long before the time of Jesus, large areas of
Palestine/Israel/Judea were deeply influenced by Hellenistic thought
and way of life, as were most areas around the Mediterranean, and the
distinction between theology (or religion) and philosophy is by and
large a modern phenomenon, virtually alien to the ancients. However,
while many, if not most, New Testament scholars would probably agree
with these new insights, few have fully brought them into play with
respect to the person of Jesus. As literature, most of the New Testament
writings have been well studied in their Graeco-Roman context, but
when it comes to the portrayal of Jesus himself in these writings,
especially in the Synoptic Gospels, the scholarly landscape proves to
be quite different. It appears that the closer one gets to the person of
Jesus, the stronger the grip of the traditional Judaism/Hellenism divide
2 Jesus as Philosopher
and the stronger the denial that early Christianity had anything to do
with philosophy.
To be sure, there are some valuable studies available related to the
subject of Jesus and ancient philosophy, but these are relatively few
and some of them rest on rather weak methodological foundations.
The problem facing New Testament scholarship in this area is pri-
marily hermeneutical and has to do with the perspective and mind set
of the interpreters themselves who carry out (or do not carry out) the
research. Despite all scholarly willingness to move beyond the trad-
itional Judaism/Hellenism divide, there is still a great reluctance
among scholars to bring philosophy in as a relevant aspect of New
Testament exegesis. And some of those who do bring in philosophy as
such seem rather uncertain about how exactly to approach the sub-
ject. A recent book entitled Jesus and Philosophy (2009) mirrors this
problem well: in his preface to the book, the editor rightly states that
‘no substantial scholarly book has been devoted to the topic of Jesus
and philosophy’.1 The editor then informs his readers that this
particular book ‘fills this gap in the literature of philosophy’ and
‘offers wide-ranging substantial coverage that will be of interest to
philosophers and to other readers, including scholars and students in
theology, religious studies, and history’. And yet, out of five chapters
that deal with ‘Jesus in his first-century thought context’, including
the general introduction of the book, only two chapters really discuss
the topic of Jesus and philosophy.2 Somewhat ironically, not even the
editor’s (primarily historically oriented) introduction, entitled ‘Intro-
duction: Jesus and Philosophy’, deals with the question—it contains
much about Jesus, but not much about Jesus and philosophy.3 There is
clearly a need for further research in this neglected aspect of early
Christianity, research that is open-minded not only towards a ‘theo-
logical Jesus’ but also towards a ‘philosophical Jesus’.
The main purpose and aim of the present study, then, is to make
some contribution to such research by examining the ways in which
early Christian authors may have associated Jesus of Nazareth/Jesus
1
Paul K. Moser (ed.), Jesus and Philosophy: New Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2009), vii.
2
The two chapters are those of Luke Timothy Johnson (see section ‘What Is
Addressed and What Is Not?’) and Paul W. Gooch (who deals with the apostle
Paul’s understanding of Christ).
3
Paul K. Moser, ‘Introduction: Jesus and Philosophy’, in Jesus and Philosophy:
New Essays (ed. P. K. Moser; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 1–23.

Christ with contemporary philosophical schools and figures and used
such associations to persuade their audience that Jesus was not only
on a par with these philosophical figures, but also superior to them:
that Jesus was in every way the ideal human being. The study
concerns both what Jesus did and what he said (or is said to have
said). Rather than simply serving as interesting parallels, the Graeco-
Roman texts referred to and discussed are primarily used as a means
to better understand the Gospels’ portrait of Jesus. The main focus of
attention is pointed at the interpretation of the Synoptic Gospels
themselves. To the best of my knowledge, there is no thorough
study available today that deals with the subject under discussion as
defined in the next section.4
WHAT IS ADDRESSED AND WHAT IS NOT? JESUS

OF THE GOSPELS AND THE HISTORICAL JESUS
But there is another problem facing New Testament scholarship in

this respect, in addition to the underlying hermeneutical problem.
There is also a methodological one, namely, the problem of how to
deal properly with our (lack of ) sources on Jesus. It has to do with the
question of whether we decide to focus on the ‘historical Jesus’ or the
figure of Jesus as narrated in early Christian texts.
One scholar in particular has addressed the question of the rela-
tionship between the historical Jesus and contemporary philosophers.
In a number of studies, F. Gerald Downing has argued that Jesus of
Nazareth, i.e. the historical Jesus, can best be understood in analogy
to the Cynic teacher.5 Pointing to a number of impressive parallels
4
Translations of biblical texts follow (mostly) the NRSV. Unless otherwise noted,
translations of classical texts follow the LCL.
5
See, in particular, F. Gerald Downing, Christ and the Cynics: Jesus and Other
Radical Preachers in First-Century Tradition (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press,
1988); F. Gerald Downing, Cynics and Christian Origins (Edinburgh: Clark, 1992).
See also Bernhard Lang, Jesus der Hund: Leben und Lehre eines jüdischen Kynikers
(Munich: Beck, 2010); F. Gerald Downing, ‘Jesus among the Philosophers: The Cynic
Connection Explored and Affirmed, with a Note on Philo’s Jewish-Cynic Philosophy’,
in Religio-Philosophical Discourses in the Mediterranean World: From Plato, through
Jesus, to Late Antiquity (ed. A. Klostergaard Petersen and G. van Kooten; Ancient
Philosophy & Religion 1; Leiden: Brill, 2017), 187–218; John Moles, ‘Cynic Influence
upon First-Century Judaism and Early Christianity?’ in The Limits of Ancient
between the sayings of Jesus and the sayings of Cynic philosophers,
and providing a helpful overview of the (potential) presence of
Cynicism in and around Galilee at the time of Jesus, Downing has
contributed much to the scholarly discussion. However, as Hans
Dieter Betz has rightly pointed out, there are several serious meth-
odological shortcomings in Downing’s studies, among which are our
lack of sources on Cynicism, as well as the tendency of Downing to
co-opt any text that mentions the Cynics with approval as a pristine
specimen of Cynicism (e.g. Dio Chrysostom, Epictetus).6 An even
larger problem, I would add, has to do with the sources on the
historical Jesus. Like Socrates, the philosophical sage par excellence,
Jesus did not write anything himself (as far as we know). Instead, our
knowledge of him is intimately bound to the ancient Christian writ-
ings and authors who tell his story, a story that is deeply shaped by the
authors’ own faith in him as the promised Messiah and ‘son of God’.
That does not necessarily mean that we cannot know anything about
the historical Jesus. There are indeed some criteria in use in New
Testament scholarship that may help us draw some plausible conclu-
sions about his actual words and way of life.7 Also, the question of
Jesus’ social context—and especially his relationship to neighbouring
philosophical schools—is highly germane to the present study. How-
ever, the difficulties involved in attempting to determine which say-
ings do or do not come from Jesus himself, and exactly how he lived,
are enormous.8 The collections of sayings that we find, for instance, in
the Synoptic Gospels, which are arguably the best sources available in
this respect, are not easily removed from their narrative context, which
in turn is determined by the text’s overall purpose and argumentative
structure. Hence, while certainly worth carrying out, undertakings
Biography (ed. B. McGing and J. Mossman; Swansea: The Classical Press of Wales,
2006), 89–116. Cf. also the independent but in many ways similar approach in Burton
L. Mack, A Myth of Innocence: Mark and Christian Origins (Philadelphia: Fortress,
1988).
6
Hans Dieter Betz, ‘Jesus and the Cynics: Survey and Analysis of a Hypothesis’, JR
74 (1994): 453–75.
7
See, e.g. John P. Meier, A Marginal Jew: Rethinking the Historical Jesus, Volume 1:
The Roots of the Problem and the Person (ABRL; New York: Doubleday, 1991); Gerd
Theissen and Dagmar Winter, The Quest for the Plausible Jesus: The Question of
Criteria (trans. M. E. Boring; Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2002).
8
See, e.g. the critical discussion in Luke Timothy Johnson, The Real Jesus: The
Misguided Quest for the Historical Jesus and the Truth of the Traditional Gospels (New
York: HarperOne, 1996).

such as Downing’s studies of Jesus and the Cynics remain rather
speculative in substance. A more methodologically sound and thus
more promising approach is to focus on the philosophical context of
the ‘literary’ or ‘narrative’ Jesus; that is, Jesus as portrayed by, in this
case, the Synoptic Gospels.
Luke Timothy Johnson has recently suggested four appropriate
ways to approach the topic of Jesus (of the canonical Gospels) and
philosophy, depending in part on the question of what is meant by
‘philosophy’ (what is meant by ‘philosophy’ in the present study is
discussed in Chapter 1).9 One approach is what he terms ‘the histor-
ical Jesus as sage’, which corresponds closely to the approach taken by
Downing and others, in which Jesus is considered as a historical
figure whose sayings in the Gospels are used as a basis for comparing
him with contemporary philosophical sages (Johnson himself is scep-
tical towards this approach, precisely for the methodological reasons
mentioned above). Another approach is to focus on how the Gospel
narratives render the character of Jesus, especially in relation to the
question of how he embodies his own teaching, and how he thus
becomes an example to the readers and hearers of the text. In this
way, the Gospel narratives are read as vehicles of ‘character ethics’,
comparable to the sort of ethics taught in the philosophical schools.
Johnson calls this approach ‘the narrative Jesus as moral exemplar’.
The third approach, ‘the narrative Jesus as revealing God’, concen-
trates less on Jesus’ humanity (as in the first two approaches) and
more on that aspect of his character that transcends ordinary
humanity—his ‘divinity’ or divine characteristics, according to the
Gospel narratives. This approach takes seriously the larger ‘mythic’
story of Jesus, whether explicit or implicit in the texts, and reads it in
the context of contemporary philosophy. In the fourth approach,
which is labelled ‘Jesus and narrative ontology’, the focus is aimed
at the nature of the Gospel narrative itself as narrative, and the
‘ontological implications of reading’, where ‘ontological’ refers to
the way in which the narrative composition and performance brings
into existence something that ‘previously did not exist’, and ‘the
peculiar sort of presence it thereby establishes in the world’ (Johnson
9
Luke Timothy Johnson, ‘The Jesus of the Gospels and Philosophy’, in Jesus and
Philosophy: New Essays (ed. P. K. Moser; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2009), 63–83.
admits that he is ‘only at an early stage of thinking about this
perspective’).10
Johnson’s suggestions are very helpful in providing an overview of
some of the ways in which the topic in question can be approached.
Given my methodological preference to focus on the ‘narrative Jesus’
rather than on the ‘historical Jesus’, the present approach broadly
corresponds to Johnson’s second approach. Moreover, ancient Greek
philosophy was commonly divided into ethics, physics, and logic,
where ‘physics’ referred to the study of the nature of the world and
included subjects like theology, cosmology, and cosmogony. In sim-
plified terms, if the first two of Johnson’s approaches are taken
together, one could say that they correspond roughly to the field of
ethics, while the third approach, involving the ‘mythic’ dimension,
finds correspondence in physics (Johnson’s fourth approach need not
concern us here). The aim of the present study is to deal primarily
with the first field of philosophical inquiry, viz. ethics. But it should be
noted that the division between ethics and physics is not always that
clear-cut in Graeco-Roman philosophy. In Stoicism, for instance,
physics, including theology and cosmology, was typically considered
the very foundation of ethics, and the latter was in a constant dialogue
with the former. This means that the ethical aspect tends to hold
hands with the (meta)physical aspect. My intention is to concentrate
primarily on the former, although the latter may occasionally come
into view.
The aim, then, is not to engage in the search for the ‘historical
Jesus’, although the study may certainly have some implications for
that enterprise. Rather, it is the Jesus of the Gospels who is under
discussion, and particularly the question of how the Gospel authors
portray the person of Jesus in comparison to portrayals of leading or
ideal figures in the philosophical schools, whether historical (e.g.
Socrates or Diogenes) or not (e.g. the ideal Stoic sage). Stoic philosophy
appears to be of particular importance here, as ‘[t]he Stoic doctrine of
the wise man was famous—indeed notorious—throughout the Helle-
nistic period’.11 In fact, in a recent article Stanley K. Stowers suggests
that Jesus in the Gospel of Matthew is a figure largely shaped by the Stoic
10
Johnson, ‘Jesus of the Gospels’, 79–80.
11
George B. Kerferd, ‘The Sage in Hellenistic Philosophical Literature (399 B.C.E.–
199 C.E.)’, in The Sage in Israel and the Ancient Near East (ed. J. G. Gammie and
L. G. Perdue; Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 1990), 320.

idea of the sage.12 According to Stowers, Matthew drew upon Stoic
ethics because he ‘inherited’ a Jesus who was known as a teacher but did
not have any clear and elaborated ethical teachings that would make
him similar to—or rather, superior to—other prominent teachers of
Graeco-Roman culture. Stowers’s arguments and conclusions are of
great interest to the present study, and his approach is a good example,
albeit still quite a rare one, of the scholarship needed to fruitfully bring
(back) together the theological and the philosophical in New Testament
exegesis. Earlier research has certainly paid some attention, for instance,
to the parallels between the figure of Socrates and the figure of Jesus,13
but not from the perspective of bringing in philosophy in this way,
namely, as an inherent part of the process by which the writings of the
New Testament were formed.
Questions that will be raised in this study include the following:
How does the author in question speak of Jesus in relation to con-
temporary philosophy? Do we see Jesus take on a certain ‘philosoph-
ical’ role in the Gospels, through either his statements and reasoning
or his way of life? In other words, do we see him ‘philosophize’ in a
way similar to the philosophers? Were the Gospel authors inspired by
descriptions of ideal philosophers in their own descriptions of Jesus?
In what way is Jesus’ conduct analogous to that of leading philosoph-
ical figures in Graeco-Roman antiquity, according to these texts?
Conversely, in what way does his conduct differ from theirs? In
general, what is the significance of Graeco-Roman philosophy for
the early Christian understanding, narrative, and image of Jesus?
While a number of Graeco-Roman sources are presented and dis-
cussed in the study, the emphasis is on the interpretation of the
Gospel texts and their portrayals of the figure of Jesus.
It can and should be expected that different writings give rise
to different answers to these and other related questions. Careful
attention must therefore be paid to the peculiar features and setting
of each writing, including close awareness of the writing’s historical
context—if we can say anything reasonable about that—as well as
12
Stanley K. Stowers, ‘Jesus the Teacher and Stoic Ethics in the Gospel of Matthew’, in
Stoicism in Early Christianity (ed. T. Rasimus, T. Engberg-Pedersen, and I. Dunderberg;
Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2010), 59–75.
13
Ernst Benz, ‘Christus und Sokrates in der alten Kirche’, ZNW 43 (1950–1):
195–224; Klaus Döring, Exemplum Socratis: Studien zur Sokratesnachwirkung in der
kynisch-stoischen Popularphilosophie der frühen Kaiserzeit und im frühen Christentum
(Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1979).
its argumentative structure, ethical teaching, and theology, especially
in relation to the figure of Jesus. In this study I have chosen to confine
my treatment of ancient portrayals of Jesus to the Synoptic Gospels
of the New Testament, Mark, Matthew, and Luke (including some
portions of Acts). The reason for not including the Gospel of John is
this: I think I will surprise no one by claiming that, of all the canonical
Gospels, the relationship between Jesus and ancient philosophy is
most lucid in the Gospel of John, which in turn explains why there
has indeed been some research on that Gospel in this respect, not least
in relation to its prologue.14 I, on the other hand, wish to deal with
early Christian narratives of Jesus whose philosophical context is less
apparent and has not received scholarly attention of any similar
scope. What has been undertaken in this respect for the Gospel of
John has been left undone for the Synoptic Gospels.
As the discussion above indicates, the present study is inspired by
narrative criticism of the Gospels. The study does certainly not claim
to be a ‘narrative-critical’ study. It merely seeks aid from this
approach when appropriate for present purposes, including the ana-
lysis of the characterization of Jesus and the emphasis on reading each
Gospel separately, in its own right. It should also be clear that I will
not address the so-called ‘Synoptic problem’15 in this study, but
whenever it comes to the question of the relationship between the
Synoptic Gospels I will join most scholars in assuming Matthew’s and
14
See, e.g. the references in Harold W. Attridge, ‘An “Emotional” Jesus and Stoic
Tradition’, in Stoicism in Early Christianity (ed. T. Rasimus, T. Engberg-Pedersen, and
I. Dunderberg; Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2010), 77; George van Kooten, ‘The
“True Light Which Enlightens Everyone” (John 1:9): John, Genesis, the Platonic
Notion of the “True, Noetic Light,” and the Allegory of the Cave in Plato’s Republic’,
in The Creation of Heaven and Earth: Re-interpretations of Genesis 1 in the Context of
Judaism, Ancient Philosophy, Christianity, and Modern Physics (ed. G. van Kooten;
Themes in Biblical Narrative 8; Leiden: Brill, 2005), 149–94. For more recent litera-
ture, see Troels Engberg-Pedersen, John and Philosophy: A New Reading of the Fourth
Gospel (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017); George van Kooten, ‘The Last Days
of Socrates and Christ: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, and Phaedo Read in Counterpoint
with John’s Gospel’, in Religio-Philosophical Discourses in the Mediterranean World:
From Plato, through Jesus, to Late Antiquity (ed. A. Klostergaard Petersen and G. van
Kooten; Ancient Philosophy & Religion 1; Leiden: Brill, 2017), 219–43.
15
On the ‘Synoptic problem’, see, in particular, the thorough studies of Delbert
Burkett, Rethinking the Gospel Sources: From Proto-Mark to Mark (New York: T&T
Clark, 2004); Delbert Burkett, Rethinking the Gospel Sources, Volume 2: The Unity and
Plurality of Q (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2009). A fine, briefer overview
can be found in Mark Goodacre, The Synoptic Problem: A Way Through the Maze
(The Biblical Seminar 80; London: Sheffield Academic Press, 2001).

Luke’s dependency on Mark. Other source-critical questions, such as
that of the existence of ‘Q’, do not have direct bearing on the study:
the main attention is paid to the narrative form of each Gospel in its
own right; that is to say, the nature of each author’s portrayal of the
character of Jesus, most often irrespective of the source-critical con-
text, although, when appropriate, the relationship between Matthew
and Luke, on the one hand, and their source, Mark, on the other, are
touched on occasionally. Given the nature of the Synoptic Gospels as
‘synoptic’ (‘seen together’), some repetition is necessary. As a rule,
I do not discuss the relationship between the Gospels’ portrayals of
Jesus and the possible words and actions of the historical Jesus.
Inspired by the narrative approach, I treat the Gospels first and
foremost as literary works. Also, the choice of topics discussed is
based on my assessment of relevant passages in the three Gospels.
The choice of Graeco-Roman sources is important as well. Since we
are dealing with the characterization of a certain person in the (late)
first century CE, it seems most appropriate to consult Graeco-Roman
sources from roughly the same period in order to see how the
philosophical sage was perceived and characterized in that period.
This includes in particular the sources of late Stoicism—in this case,
Stoics in the first and early second century CE (often referred to as
Roman Stoicism). But other (roughly) contemporary Graeco-Roman
sources are consulted as well.
It should be noted at the outset that this study does not argue that
the Gospel authors necessarily knew the writings and/or teaching
lessons of the Graeco-Roman philosophers under discussion. The
possibility that this was the case is not excluded, but it is not argued
for or presumed. Rather, it is presumed that the Gospel authors were
in one way or another familiar with Graeco-Roman traditions, literary
or oral, in which they engaged on their own premises. Needless to say,
the Gospels and their authors were firmly rooted in Jewish teaching,
belief, and way of life. But they were also part of their Graeco-Roman
context, whether lingual, literary, ideological, or social. To begin with,
the authors all wrote in Greek, the international language of the time,
not in Aramaic. Obviously, their audience, whether Jews or Gentiles,
also spoke or knew Greek and were probably located in the diaspora,
i.e. in a Graeco-Roman environment, perhaps Rome or Antioch.16
16
See the discussions in Adela Yarbro Collins, Mark: A Commentary (Hermeneia;
Minneapolis: Fortress, 2007), 96–102; Ulrich Luz, Matthew 1–7: A Commentary
Teresa Morgan has recently pointed out that, although there were
certainly differences between philosophical doctrines and popular
ethics,17 the relationship between the two seems to have been closer
than scholars have often assumed:
It is clear that some ‘literary’ works, though written by members of the
social and cultural elite, had a mass audience from at least the sixth
century BCE well into late antiquity. Foremost among them is Homer,
followed by new comic playwrights, especially Menander, Plautus and
Terence, farces and mimes. Oratory of all kinds was delivered to mass
audiences in lawcourts, public assemblies and town councils. During
the principate, epideictic oratory, delivered on behalf of a town in
honour of visiting dignitaries, to honour local benefactors and politi-
cians, or to mark a special occasion of almost any kind, by rhetors who
were often paid by cities of emperors themselves to practise and teach
their skill, was a prime form of public entertainment. In a least some
places and times, it was common for the works of historians to be
publicly read and honoured in their native or adopted towns. Even
philosophers could become local celebrities.18
This applied to figures like Diogenes the Cynic and Socrates: ‘[I]t
seems likely that high philosophy and the culture in which it lived
shared many of their hero-figures and ethical concerns, and that
characters like the Seven Sages, Socrates or Diogenes did not have
to move from one part of the culture to another, because they were
always common to all.’19 Moreover,
Most important of all, the worlds of popular ethics and high philosophy
were not segregated, any more than the worlds of proverbs or fables and
high literature were. The best we can do to characterize the relationship
is probably to say that in high philosophy and popular ethics we find
two streams of culture, ultimately rising from many of the same sources,
which sometimes mingle, each influencing the other, and sometimes
run separately, along roughly parallel terrain. Even when they do not
mingle, they are closer in some ways than we might expect, a vivid
reminder that our scholarly distinction between popular and high
(trans. J. E. Crouch; Hermeneia; Minneapolis: Fortress, 2007); François Bovon, Luke 1:

A Commentary on the Gospel of Luke 1:1–9:50 (trans. C. M. Thomas; Hermeneia;
Minneapolis: Fortress, 2002), 8–10.
17
Teresa Morgan, Popular Morality in the Early Roman Empire (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 333–40.
18 19
Morgan, Popular Morality, 4. Morgan, Popular Morality, 283.

culture is probably often too sharp, and that the landscape of ethics in
the Roman Empire is ultimately one landscape.20
Having noted this, it is important to stress that the present study is
not so much concerned with the question if the audience of the
Gospel authors were in some ways familiar with philosophical teach-
ings and ideas. Rather, it is the Gospel authors themselves that are
primarily under consideration in this regard, that is to say, the
question whether they were familiar with and made use of philosoph-
ical ideas to portray the person of Jesus. It seems very unlikely that
they would have been unacquainted with some of the philosophical
traditions of their closest environment. Luke, for one, was at least
familiar with the Stoics and Epicureans (Acts 17.18), some of whom
seem to have converted to Christianity (v. 34), and he knew of
Seneca’s younger brother, Gallio (18.12–16). It seems fair to assume
that Luke also knew some of the philosophers’ teachings and tradi-
tions. Given their close correspondence—literarily, ideologically, and
historically—it also seems fair to assume that the authors of Mark and
Matthew enjoyed a similar, if not as outspoken, frame of reference,
including some traditions about the philosophical sage.
MORAL CHARACTER, CLASSICAL VIRTUE

THEORY, AND EARLY CHRISTIANITY
A study of how each Gospel author portrays the character of Jesus

clearly benefits from the approach of narrative analysis, which focuses
on the literary character of Jesus. But there is another form of
character in the context of which each literary character of Jesus is
analysed, namely, character as a cross-literary and cross-cultural idea:
the ideal moral person. The present discussion focuses on the ideal
person or character as developed and accounted for in ancient philo-
sophical theory and literature. This falls under the category of ethics,
which, as I noted above, is the philosophical field with which we are
primarily concerned. In this regard I also referred above, more
specifically, to ‘character ethics’ relating to one of Luke Timothy
Johnson’s methodological suggestions of approaching the subject of
20
Morgan, Popular Morality, 299.
‘Jesus and philosophy’, using Johnson’s own terminology in that
respect. However, in order to avoid confusion, it should be noted
here that I will not make further use of this terminology, due to its
rather unclear frame of reference in the scholarly discussion. To be
sure, the term ‘character ethics’ has been in some use in recent biblical
scholarship, especially within the Society of Biblical Literature group
of ‘Character Ethics and Biblical Interpretation’, as well as in the
group’s published products,21 where the term appears to be applied
as some kind of alternative to the more widely used philosophical
concept of ‘virtue ethics’, with a distinct religious-communal flavour.
But while it is evidently used as a term for ethics that in one way or
another focuses on the role of character, there is a remarkable lack of
clear definition of what is meant by the term in these publications,
and its precise relation to virtue ethics is not explained (although it
should be).22 For this reason, I do not use the term ‘character ethics’
in the following discussion.
It is rather the field of virtue ethics that provides the proper ethical
framework for the present study; that is, insofar as ‘virtue ethics’
refers to ancient virtue theory and not its modern counterpart,23 the
latter of which certainly involves a return to ancient Greek ethics but
naturally expands it in accordance with modern knowledge and
needs, and is in constant dialogue with other modern ethical theories.
Generally speaking, this was in fact the only kind of ethics in Graeco-
Roman antiquity. As Julia Annas explains, ‘In the tradition of Western
21
William P. Brown (ed.), Character and Scripture: Moral Formation, Community,
and Biblical Interpretation (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002); M. Daniel Carroll R. and
Jacqueline E. Lapsley (eds), Character Ethics and the Old Testament: Moral Dimen-
sions of Scripture (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2007); Robert L. Brawley
(ed.), Character Ethics and the New Testament: Moral Dimensions of Scripture (Louisville:
Westminster John Knox Press, 2007).
22
None of the introductions to the works cited in the previous note includes any
clear definition or explanation of the term ‘character ethics’. Unless I am mistaken, the
only attempt to define the concept at the beginning of each work is found in the
foreword of Character Ethics and the Old Testament, written not by the editors
themselves but by Walter Brueggemann, whose definition is actually quite ambiguous,
leaving unclear the ‘character’ part of the concept: ‘ “Character ethics” refers to a way
of thinking about and interpreting the moral life in terms of a particular vision of and
a passion for life that is rooted in the nurture, formation, and socialization of a
particular self-conscious community’ (p. vii).
23
On the modern version of virtue ethics, see Michael Slote, From Morality to
Virtue (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue
Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

philosophy since the fifth century BC, the default form of ethical theory
has been some version of what is nowadays called virtue ethics; real
theoretical alternatives emerge only with Kant and with consequen-
tialism.’24 Aristotle was the first to clearly formulate the structure of
classical virtue ethics, but the theory was far from being confined to
Aristotelian philosophy, for it was basic to ancient Greek ethics in
general.25 Its main emphasis was not so much on individual moral
precepts or the identification of universal principles applicable in any
situation as it was on the life of each human being as a whole. In other
words, instead of single actions, it was the agent him- and herself who
was the primary concern. The theory thus emphasizes being rather
than doing. The starting point of all ancient ethical theory was the
question of what kind of person and character one is, which in turn
determines how one acts in a given situation. In modern terms,
classical virtue theory might therefore be described as a ‘top-down’
approach, from the whole to the parts, where the ‘whole’ stands for the
person’s life and character and the ‘parts’ apply to individual actions
determined by the ‘whole’. The question of character is therefore
essential to ancient Greek ethics.
In classical virtue theory, virtue is a state of being, a disposition to
act in accordance with right reason. A virtuous person is thus a
person who possesses ideal character traits and acts accordingly in
any given situation—not by habit, but rather by way of conscious and
continuous reflection upon his or her life as a whole. Virtue has an
affective as well as an intellectual aspect, and it always involves an
appeal to reason, i.e. to phronēsis or ‘practical reason’. In effect, this
means that the virtuous person does the right thing for the right
reason and has the right feelings and emotions about it.26 Having
phronēsis, which underlies all the other virtues, means to have the
disposition and ability to make the right judgement about the appro-
priate way to act and to live and to understand fully the reasons and
principles underlying that judgement. To receive such an understand-
ing and ability is a matter not just of natural traits but also of a progress
of intellectual development and practical training. It is a matter of
24
Julia Annas, ‘Virtue Ethics’, in The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory (Oxford
Handbooks in Philosophy; ed. D. Copp; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 515.
25
See the discussion in Julia Annas, The Morality of Happiness (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1993), 3–24.
26
Annas, Morality, 55–6. See also Annas, ‘Virtue Ethics’, 516–17.
degree, which explains why most ancient philosophers take the fully
virtuous person, the perfect moral being, to be an ideal (with very few
exceptions). In the following discussion, we shall see that the philo-
sophers made much use of ideal characters as a means of guiding their
audience towards the goal of becoming fully virtuous beings. It should
be noted that ‘virtue ethics’ is modern terminology and was not used
by the ancients themselves. As we shall see, although the Gospel
authors do not use the word ‘virtue’ (aretē), let alone ‘virtue ethics’,
their discussion and presentation of Jesus indicates that their moral
values and teachings, inspired by a Hellenistic frame of reference, were
partly shaped by ancient virtue ethics.
While the Hebrew scriptures pay more attention to individual
moral commandments and hardly contain such a thing as an overall
or unified theory of virtue, they do include significant presentations
of the ideal moral character, especially in the wisdom literature.27 It is
one of the theses of this study that in addition to the moral demands
of Jewish writings and traditions, the Synoptic Gospel authors drew
more or less on ancient virtue theory in their attempt to interpret
and present the moral message and character of their ideal figure,
Jesus Christ.28
Unless otherwise noted, translations of classical texts are from the
Loeb Classical Library. Translations of New Testament texts are
sometimes my own, but most often they are from the New Revised
Standard Version.29
27
As is rightly pointed out in Jean Porter, ‘Virtue Ethics’, in The Cambridge
Companion to Christian Ethics (ed. R. Gill; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2001), 99.
28
It goes without saying that it may also have been among the goals of Jesus
himself to bring in some of the basics of classical virtue theory (even if he did not
recognize or identify them as such), but that is a question that does not concern
us here.
29
For consistency, I have changed US spelling in the NRSV into British spelling.
Philosophy and Philosophical Sages

in the Graeco-Roman World
PHILOSOPHY AS A WAY OF LIFE
Very much unlike the modern conception, in the first century CE

philosophy was considered, above all, a way of life. Whatever the
differences between the ancient philosophical schools, they all shared
the basic purpose of trying to establish a bond between philosophical
discourse and way of life.1 It was mainly Plato, with his highly
successful portrait of Socrates, who set the stage for this development
in ancient philosophy. According to Plato’s portrait, knowledge is
not something purely theoretical; it is first and foremost a virtue
embodied by a certain way of life. As Pierre Hadot explains, ‘Doing
philosophy no longer meant, as the Sophists had it, acquiring know-
ledge, know-how, or sophia; it meant questioning ourselves, because
we have the feeling that we are not what we ought to be.’2 On this
point, Aristotle agreed with his mentor: ‘In the practical sciences the
end is not to attain a theoretic knowledge of the various subjects, but
rather to carry out our theories in action. If so, to know what virtue is
is not enough; we must endeavour to possess and to practise it, or in
some other manner actually ourselves to become good’ (Eth. nic.
10.9.1–2 [1179a33–b4]).3 From Hellenistic times onwards, this was
a basic understanding that was shared by Platonists, Peripatetics,
1
Pierre Hadot, What Is Ancient Philosophy? (trans. Michael Chase; Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2002), 55.
2
Hadot, What Is Ancient Philosophy? 29.
3
ἢ καθάπερ λέγεται, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς τέλος τὸ θεωρῆσαι ἕκαστα καὶ
γνωναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ πράττειν αὐτά; οὐδὲ δὴ περὶ ἀρετῆς ἱκανὸν τὸ εἰδέναι, ἀλλ’ ἔχειν
καὶ χρῆσθαι πειρατέον, ἢ εἴ πως ἄλλως ἀγαθοὶ γινόμεθα.
Epicureans, Cynics, and Stoics alike, especially in the imperial period.
Drawing a comparison between the practice of statesmanship and
philosophy, Plutarch clarifies that
statesmanship consists, not only in holding office, being ambassador,
vociferating in the assembly, and ranting round the speakers’ platform
proposing laws and making motions. Most people think all this is part
of statesmanship, just as they think of course that those are philo-
sophers who sit in a chair and converse and prepare their lectures
over their books; but the continuous practice of statesmanship and
philosophy, which is every day alike seen in acts and deeds, they fail
to perceive. . . . Now being a statesman is like being a philosopher.
Socrates at any rate was a philosopher, although he did not set out
benches or seat himself in an armchair or observe a fixed hour for
conversing or promenading with his pupils, but jested with them, when
it so happened, and drank with them, served in the army or lounged in
the market-place with some of them, and finally was imprisoned and
drank the poison. He was the first to show that life at all times and in all
parts, in all experiences and activities, universally admits philosophy.
(An seni 796C–E)4
Seneca, too, strongly emphasizes that ‘the living voice and the intim-
acy of a common life will help you more than the written word. You
must go to the scene of action’ (Ep. 6.5).5 Written philosophy is
inferior to lived philosophy. In fact, according to him, philosophy
teaches one not to speak (dicere) but to act (facere) (Ep. 20.2). Citing
the Cynic teacher Demetrius, Seneca observes that it is far better to
possess only a handful of philosophical maxims that one continually
follows and puts into practice than to have a vast and thorough
knowledge of philosophy that is rarely or never used (Ben. 7.1.3).
4
οὐκ ἔστι πολιτεύεσθαι μόνον τὸ ἄρχειν καὶ πρεσβεύειν καὶ μέγα βοᾶν ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ καὶ
περὶ τὸ βῆμα βακχεύειν λέγοντας ἢ γράϕοντας, ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ τοῦ πολιτεύεσθαι νομίζουσιν,
ὥσπερ ἀμέλει καὶ ϕιλοσοϕεῖν τοὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ δίϕρου διαλεγομένους καὶ σχολὰς ἐπὶ βιβλίοις
περαίνοντας. ἡ δὲ συνεχὴς ἐν ἔργοις καὶ πράξεσιν ὁρωμένη καθ’ ἡμέραν ὁμαλῶς πολιτεία
καὶ ϕιλοσοϕία λέληθεν αὐτούς. καὶ γὰρ τοὺς ἐν ταῖς στοαῖς ἀνακάμπτοντας περιπατεῖν
ϕασιν, ὡς ἔλεγε Δικαίαρχος, οὐκέτι δὲ τοὺς εἰς ἀγρὸν ἢ πρὸς ϕίλον βαδίζοντας. ὅμοιον δ’
ἐστὶ τῷ ϕιλοσοϕεῖν τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι. Σωκράτης γοῦν οὔτε βάθρα θεὶς οὔτ’ εἰς θρόνον
καθίσας οὔθ’ ὥραν διατριβῆς ἢ περιπάτου τοῖς γνωρίμοις τεταγμένην ϕυλάττων, ἀλλὰ
καὶ συμπαίζων, ὅτε τύχοι, καὶ συμπίνων καὶ συστρατευόμενος ἐνίοις καὶ συναγοράζων,
τέλος δὲ καὶ δεδεμένος καὶ πίνων τὸ ϕάρμακον, ἐϕιλοσόϕει. πρῶτος ἀποδείξας τὸν βίον
ἅπαντι χρόνῳ καὶ μέρει καὶ πάθεσι καὶ πράγμασιν ἁπλῶς ἅπασι ϕιλοσοϕίαν δεχόμενον.
5
Plus tamen tibi et viva vox et convictus quam oratio proderit. In rem praesentem
venias oportet.
Philosophical Sages in the Graeco-Roman World 17

This clarifies Seneca’s advice to Lucilius: ‘Choose as a guide one
whom you will admire more when you see him act than when you
hear him speak’ (Ep. 52.8).6 Such a person is the true sage whom one
should follow. Similarly, Musonius Rufus held that whereas philo-
sophical theory must necessarily come first, practice ought to take
precedence over theory (Lutz 5.50.30–52.4).7 It matters more what
one does than what one theorizes about what should and should not
be done. Musonius himself was widely regarded as a moral sage in
antiquity.8 According to one of his students, Musonius was ‘always
earnestly urging those who were associated with him to make practical
application of his teachings’ (6.52.7–8),9 for without such practical
application, the Stoic teacher said, philosophical education is of no
avail (1.36.10–12); philosophy is in fact nothing but ‘training in
nobility of character’ (4.48.25–6)10 and ‘the pursuit of ideal good
(kalokagathias)’ (8.66.1;11 cf. also 11.82.33–4; 14.96.6–7). In other
words, philosophy is first and foremost the means by which people
reach a certain way of life. Another student of Musonius’, Epictetus,
followed in the footsteps of his teacher by explaining to his own
students that the task of philosophy was truly ‘to examine and to
establish the standards; but to go ahead and use them (chrēsthai) after
they have become known is the task of the good and excellent man’
(Diss. 2.11.24–5).12 Philosophy for him was simply ‘the art of living’
(hē peri bion technē, Diss. 1.15.2).13
To adhere to a specific philosophical school or teaching, then, was
not simply to philosophize and give thoughts to certain teachings, but
to live those teachings, to embody them in one’s being and way of life.
And to change one’s adherence from one philosophical school to
6
Eum elige adiutorem, quem magis admireris, cum videris quam cum audieris. See
also Ep. 16.3; 20.1; 24.15; 34.4; 89.14–15.
7
The references to Musonius follow Lutz’s collection and translation (Cora
E. Lutz, ‘Musonius Rufus: “The Roman Socrates” ’, YCS 10 [1947]: 32–145), referred
to by number of discourse, page number(s), line(s).
8
Dio Chrysostom, Or. 31.122; Pliny, Ep. 3.11; Justin, 2 Apol. 8.1–2; Philostratus,
Vit. Apoll. 4.46; Origen, Cels. 3.66.
9
παρώρμα δὲ πρὸς ἄσκησιν τοὺς συνόντας ἐντεταμένως ἀεὶ τοιοῖσδέ τισι λόγοις
χρώμενος.
10
ἐπειδὴ καὶ ϕιλοσοϕία καλοκἀγαθίας ἐστὶν ἐπιτήδευσις καὶ οὐδὲν ἕτερον.
11
τὸ ϕιλοσοϕεῖν καλοκἀγαθίας ἐπιτήδευσίς ἐστιν.
12
ἐπισκέπτεσθαι καὶ βεβαιοῦν τοὺς κανόνας, τὸ δ’ ἤδη χρῆσθαι τοῖς ἐγνωσμένοις
τοῦτο τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ ἀγαθοῦ ἔργον ἐστίν.
13
See also, e.g. Diss. 2.1.29–31; 2.9.13; 3.21.1–7.
another was no trivial thing when properly conducted; rather, it
required a transformation not only of one’s understanding of philo-
sophical theory but also, and more importantly, of one’s whole being
and way of life. One might therefore liken such a change to what we
nowadays refer to as ‘religious conversion’. For to become a Platonist
or a Stoic or whatever had much in common with modern religious
conversion and commitment. The ‘convert’ to Platonism, for example,
thus adopted the Platonic philosophical bios. To put it differently,
‘[s]uch is the lesson of ancient philosophy: an invitation to each
human being to transform himself. Philosophy is a conversion, a
transformation of one’s way of being and living, and a quest for
wisdom.’14 In fact, as Hadot convincingly points out, the very fact
that Christianity, at least from the second century on,15 presented
itself as a philosophy confirms that the ancients conceived of philoso-
phy as a way of life.16
One could say that what differentiates ancient from modern philosophy
is the fact that, in ancient philosophy, it was not only Chrysippus or
Epicurus who, just because they had developed a philosophical dis-
course, were considered philosophers. Rather, every person who lived
according to the precepts of Chrysippus or Epicurus was every bit as
much of a philosopher as they. A politician like Cato of Utica [Cato the
Younger] was considered a philosopher and even a sage, even though he
wrote and taught nothing, because his life was perfectly Stoic.17
It was not necessary for people to write extensive philosophical
discourses in order to be and be regarded as philosophers; it was
enough to live according to one’s philosophical precepts.
A basic motif among all the philosophical schools was the motif of
change, for all of them advocated a change in one’s way of life,
whether in social, political, or religious terms. Ideological, psycho-
logical, and intellectual self-examination and change should result in
such a change in one’s way of life. Common to all the philosophical
14
Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to
Foucault (ed. with an introd. by A. I. Davidson; trans. M. Chase; Malden: Blackwell,
1995), 275.
15
Justin Martyr was one of the first Christians to refer explicitly to Christianity as
‘philosophy’. For further discussion, see Runar M. Thorsteinsson, ‘By Philosophy
Alone: Reassessing Justin’s Christianity and His Turn from Platonism’, EC 3 (2012):
492–517.
16
Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, 269.
17
Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, 272.
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Glycosuria, hepatic, ii. 973
Gnats, iv. 733
Goitre, iii. 974
exophthalmic, iii. 761
Gout, ii. 108
Graves' disease, iii. 761
Great Vessels and Heart, Congenital Anomalies of, iii. 687

Guinea-worm, iv. 732
H.
Hæmatoma of the dura mater, v. 707
Hæmaturia, iv. 104
Hæmoglobinuria or Hæmatinuria, iv. 104
Hæmopericardium, iii. 788

Hæmophilia, iii. 931
Hæmoptysis, iii. 266
Hæmothorax, iii. 582
Hair, atrophy of, iv. 682
blanching of, iv. 678
Harvest mite, iv. 731
Hay Asthma, iii. 210

Headache, v. 402, 1216, 1230
Heart, adventitious products of, iii. 637
aneurism of, iii. 636
atrophy of, iii. 618
dilatation of, iii. 630
diseases of substance of, iii. 601
fibroid, iii. 607
hypertrophy of, iii. 619
malformations of, affecting primarily left side of, iii. 707
malformations of, affecting primarily right side of, iii. 702

malpositions of, iii. 601
murmurs, iii. 651
neuroses of, iii. 747
spontaneous rupture of, iii. 617
Valvular Diseases of, iii. 639
and Great Vessels, Congenital Anomalies of, iii. 687
clot, iii. 718
muscle, degeneration of, iii. 609
Heart's action, functional disorders of, iii. 747

Heat, Acute Affections produced by, v. 387
Hemorrhoids, ii. 882
Hepar adiposum, ii. 1046
Hepatic artery, aneurism of, iii. 840
calculi, ii. 1058
colic, ii. 1058
glycosuria, ii. 973
Hepatitis, interstitial, ii. 990

suppurative, ii. 1002
Hernia, cysto-vaginal, iv. 377
pudendal, iv. 398
recto-vaginal and entero-vaginal, iv. 378
Herpes iris, iv. 609
simplex, iv. 607
zoster, iv. 610
Hirsuties, iv. 669

Hodgkin's disease, iii. 921
Hydatid tape-worm, ii. 943
Hydatids of liver, ii. 1101
pulmonary, iii. 466
Hydrocele or cyst of the canal of Nuck, iv. 397
Hydrocephalus, chronic, v. 704
Hydro-nephrosis, iv. 56
Hydro-pericardium, iii. 789
Hydrophobia and Rabies, i. 886
Hydrothorax, iii. 570
Hygiene, i. 173
Hymen, atresia of, iv. 374
Hyperidrosis, iv. 583
Hypertrichosis, iv. 669

Hypertrophy, v. 1271
Hypnotism, v. 373
Hypochondriasis, v. 154
Hypostatic Pneumonia, iii. 258
Hysteria, v. 205
Hystero-epilepsy, v. 288
I.
Ichthyosis, iv. 666
Icterus, ii. 975
Idiocy, v. 138
Imbecility, intellectual, v. 138
Impetigo, v. 651, 652
Indigestion, ii. 436

intestinal, ii. 620
Infantile Spinal Paralysis, v. 1113
Inflammation, i. 37; v. 1273
Influenza, i. 851
Insanity, v. 99
from gross lesions of the brain, v. 202
specific poisons, v. 175
Insanities, complicating, v. 174

Insomnia, v. 379
Intercranial hemorrhage, etc., v. 917
Intermittent fever, i. 592
Intestinal Affections of Children in Hot Weather, ii. 726
catarrh, acute, ii. 667
chronic, ii. 699
colic, ii. 658
indigestion, ii. 620

obstruction, ii. 830
ulcer, ii. 823
worms, ii. 930
Intestines, Cancer of, ii. 868
Lardaceous Degeneration of, ii. 874
Intussusception and invagination, ii. 844
Ixodes, iv. 733

J.
Jaundice, ii. 925
K.
Katatonia, v. 166
Keloid, iv. 685
Keratosis pilaris, iv. 660
Kidneys, abnormalities of, in shape, size, position, etc., iv. 19
Bright's disease of, iv. 72

chronic congestion of, iv. 69
cysts of, iv. 63
diseases of parenchyma of, iv. 69
floating, iv. 21
malignant growths of, iv. 60
parasites and tuberculosis of, iv. 64
and Pelvis, Diseases of, iv. 19
Kleptomania, v. 147
L.
Labia, furuncles of, iv. 362
majora, phlegmonous inflammation of, iv. 391
Labio-glosso-laryngeal Paralysis, Progressive, v. 1169
Laryngismus stridulus, iii. 70
Laryngitis, Acute Catarrhal (False Croup), iii. 92
chronic, iii. 121
Pseudo-membranous (True Croup), iii. 100

Laryngoscopy and Rhinoscopy, iii. 19
Larynx, anæsthesia of, iii. 65
chorea of, iii. 76
Diseases of, iii. 109
disorders of motion of, iii. 69
hyperæsthesia of, iii. 62
morbid growths of, iii. 127
neuroses of, iii. 59
œdema of, iii. 112
paræsthesia of, iii. 63

paralysis and paresis of, iii. 78
perichondritis and chondritis of, iii. 117
spasm of, in children, iii. 70
Lead-poisoning, Chronic, v. 678
Lentigo, iv. 658
Leprosy, i. 785
Leptomeningitis, v. 716
Leptus, iv. 731
Lethargy, v. 384
Leucoderma, iii. 908
Leukæmia, iv. 697
Lichen ruber and scrofulosus, iv. 623, 624
Lithæmia, ii. 968
Liver, abscess of, ii. 1002

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Jesus As Philosopher: The Moral Sage

in the Synoptic Gospels Runar M.

This study is the main result of a research project initiated at the

Introduction: Purpose and Approach 1

THE PURPOSE AND AIM OF THE STUDY

Largely due to the age-old Judaism/Hellenism divide and the distinc-

Introduction: Purpose and Approach 3

WHAT IS ADDRESSED AND WHAT IS NOT? JESUS

But there is another problem facing New Testament scholarship in

Introduction: Purpose and Approach 5

Introduction: Purpose and Approach 7

Introduction: Purpose and Approach 9

(trans. J. E. Crouch; Hermeneia; Minneapolis: Fortress, 2007); François Bovon, Luke 1:

Introduction: Purpose and Approach 11

MORAL CHARACTER, CLASSICAL VIRTUE

A study of how each Gospel author portrays the character of Jesus

Introduction: Purpose and Approach 13

Philosophy and Philosophical Sages

PHILOSOPHY AS A WAY OF LIFE

Very much unlike the modern conception, in the ﬁrst century CE

Philosophical Sages in the Graeco-Roman World 17

Gnats, iv. 733

Goitre, iii. 974

exophthalmic, iii. 761

Gout, ii. 108

Graves' disease, iii. 761

Great Vessels and Heart, Congenital Anomalies of, iii. 687

Hæmatoma of the dura mater, v. 707

Hæmaturia, iv. 104

Hæmoglobinuria or Hæmatinuria, iv. 104

Hæmopericardium, iii. 788

Hæmoptysis, iii. 266

Hæmothorax, iii. 582

Hair, atrophy of, iv. 682

blanching of, iv. 678

Harvest mite, iv. 731

Hay Asthma, iii. 210

Heart, adventitious products of, iii. 637

aneurism of, iii. 636

atrophy of, iii. 618

dilatation of, iii. 630

diseases of substance of, iii. 601

fibroid, iii. 607

hypertrophy of, iii. 619

malformations of, affecting primarily left side of, iii. 707

malformations of, affecting primarily right side of, iii. 702

murmurs, iii. 651

neuroses of, iii. 747

spontaneous rupture of, iii. 617

Valvular Diseases of, iii. 639

and Great Vessels, Congenital Anomalies of, iii. 687

clot, iii. 718

muscle, degeneration of, iii. 609

Heart's action, functional disorders of, iii. 747

Hemorrhoids, ii. 882

Hepar adiposum, ii. 1046

Hepatic artery, aneurism of, iii. 840

calculi, ii. 1058