Professional Documents
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The Prehistory of Fair Use
The Prehistory of Fair Use
The Prehistory of Fair Use
2011
Recommended Citation
Matthew Sag, The Prehistory of Fair Use, 76 Brook. L. Rev. (2011).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr/vol76/iss4/3
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The Prehistory of Fair Use *
Matthew Sag†
INTRODUCTION
*
© 2011 Matthew Sag. All rights reserved.
†
Associate Professor, Loyola University Chicago School of Law. Thanks to
Oren Bracha, Chris Buccafusco, Andrew Gold, H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui, Justine
Hughes, Tonja Jacobi, Pamela Samuelson, Josh Sarnoff, Stephen Siegel, and Rebecca
Tushnet for their comments and suggestions. Thanks to Joshua McIntyre and Michael
Schiffer for their assistance with research.
1
Technically, the fair use doctrine renders certain otherwise infringing
actions relating to copyrighted works noninfringing. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (“[T]he fair
use of a copyrighted work . . . is not an infringement of copyright.”).
2
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (2005) (internal
quotation omitted).
3
Paul Goldstein, Fair Use in Context, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 433 (2008).
1371
1372 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:4
4
Author’s Guild v. Google, Inc., Civil Action No. 05-CV-8136-JES (S.D.N.Y.
filed Sept. 20, 2005) (class-action suit); McGraw-Hill, Inc. v. Google, Inc., Civil Action
No. 05-CV-8881-JES (S.D.N.Y. filed June 9, 2006) (a suit on behalf of the Association of
American University Publishers, the McGraw-Hill Companies, Pearson Education,
Penguin Group (USA), Simon & Schuster, and John Wiley & Sons). The dispute looks
set to continue. See Author’s Guild v. Google, Inc., No. 05 Civ. 8136(DC), 2011 WL
986049 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2011) (rejecting proposed class-action settlement).
5
Answer and Affirmative Defenses of Defendant Google, Inc. to the First
Amended Complaint, Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. Ct. Pleadings
8136A, at 9 (S.D.N.Y. July 26, 2006); see also Matthew Sag, The Google Book
Settlement and the Fair Use Counterfactual, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 19 (2010).
6
Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
7
See Tresa Baldas, Copyright Law Put to Test in Google Case, NAT’L L.J.,
Oct. 3, 2005, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1128416712706.
8
Defendant RDR Books’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs’
Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, Warner Bros. Entm’t v. RDR Books, No. 07-9667
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2008).
9
See generally Justin Hughes, Copyright and Incomplete Historiographies: Of
Piracy, Propertization, and Thomas Jefferson, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 993 (2006) (summarizing
and challenging historical claims that copyright has become increasingly “propertized”).
10
9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
2011] THE PREHISTORY OF FAIR USE 1373
11
See infra Part I.
12
Statute of Anne, 8 Ann., c. 19 (1710) (Eng.).
13
The prehistory of fair use coincides with premodern copyright, as the
expression is used by Sherman and Bently. Sherman and Bently draw the distinction
between modern and premodern copyright, using 1850 as a rough dividing line. For ease
of reference, this article refers to the period between 1710 and 1841 as the premodern era
of copyright. The premodern-modern distinction is useful in this context, as the categories
of intellectual-property law were quite fluid up until the mid-nineteenth century. And
only after the mid-1800s did the drive to internationalize copyright (a movement that
culminated in the Berne Convention) significantly influence copyright law. See BRAD
SHERMAN & LIONEL BENTLY, THE MAKING OF MODERN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW:
THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE, 1760-1911, at 3 (1999).
1374 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:4
14
Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19, § 1 (Eng.).
15
See infra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
16
See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
17
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
2011] THE PREHISTORY OF FAIR USE 1375
18
WILLIAM W. STORY, REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE
CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT: 1812-1875, at 100-19
(1853). The Story Reports of the decision in Folsom v. Marsh contain a summary of the
master’s report. It is here that we learn that Charles Folsom was the principle plaintiff.
19
Id.; see also R. Anthony Reese, The Story of Folsom v. Marsh:
Distinguishing Between Infringing and Legitimate Uses, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
STORIES 259, 269 (Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2006).
20
STORY, supra note 18, at 100-19.
21
The special master appointed to review the facts concluded that 319 pages
had been copied, but note that sixty-four of those pages were official documents that
should not have been subject to any copyright claim. See L. Ray Patterson, Folsom v.
Marsh and Its Legacy, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 431, 433 (1998). Note also that the
defendant’s work did not reproduce any original writing by Sparks. Id. Justice Story’s
conclusion that Folsom somehow held the copyright to the words of President
Washington after their publication was probably erroneous at the time and would
certainly be wrong now. Id. at 436. We must suspend disbelief on this point in order to
comprehend the remainder of Justice Story’s decision.
22
Bela Marsh was the main defendant. See supra note 18.
23
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
24
Reese, supra note 19, at 280.
25
See infra Part II.
26
Gyles v. Wilcox, (1740) 26 Eng. Rep. 489 (Ch.). See infra notes 102-14 and
accompanying text.
1376 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:4
27
Strahan v. Newbery, (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 913 (K.B.) 913-14. The work in
question, generally referred to as Hawkesworth’s Voyages, was the first authorized
account of Captain Cook’s circumnavigation of the globe. The longer title was An
Account of the Voyages Undertaken by the Order of His Present Majesty, for Making
Discoveries in the Southern Hemisphere, and Successively Performed by Commodore
Byron, Captain Wallis, Captain Carteret, and Captain Cook, in the Dolphin, the
Swallow, and the Endeavour . . . by John Hawkesworth, printed for W. Strahan and T.
Cadell, 1773. The defendant’s work, Journal of the Resolution’s Voyage on Discovery to
the Southern Hemisphere, &c. Also a Journal of the Adventure’s Voyage, &c. with an
Account of the Separation of the Two Ships, and the Most Remarkable Incidents that
Befel Each, although extolled by the court, was reviewed as “hastily written, and
hastily printed.” 45 GENTLEMAN’S MAG. 591 (1775); see also Mark Leeming,
Hawkesworth’s Voyages: The First ‘Australian’ Copyright Litigation, 9 AUSTL. J. LEGAL
HIST. 159 (2004) (an excellent history of the copyright litigation in relation to
Hawkesworth’s Voyages).
28
Strahan v. Newbery, (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 913 (K.B.) 913-14.
29
Dodsley v. Kinnersley, (1761) 27 Eng. Rep. 270 (Ch.). For further
discussion of Dodsley, see infra Part III.
30
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 345 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
2011] THE PREHISTORY OF FAIR USE 1377
42
Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591 (1834).
43
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
44
In addition to Wheaton and Folsom, see Gray v. Russell, 10 F. Cas. 1035
(C.C.D. Mass. 1839) (No. 5728); Wheaton v. Peters, 29 F. Cas. 862 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1832)
(No. 17,486); Clayton v. Stone, 5 F. Cas. 999 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1829) (No. 2872); Blunt v.
Patten, 3 F. Cas. 763 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1828) (No. 1580); Ewer v. Coxe, 8 F. Cas. 917
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1824) (No. 4584); Binns v. Woodruff, 3 F. Cas. 421 (C.C.D. Pa. 1821) (No.
1424). For the English copyright cases most frequently cited by U.S. courts at this time,
see Beckford v. Hood, (1798) 101 Eng. Rep. 1164 (K.B.); Blackwell v. Harper, (1740) 26
Eng. Rep. 458 (Ch.); Donaldson v. Beckett, (1774) 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (H.L.); Bramwell v.
Halcomb, (1836) 40 Eng. Rep. 1110 (Ch.); Millar v. Taylor, (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201
(K.B.) 226; Pope v. Curl, (1741) 26 Eng. Rep. 608 (Ch.); and Tonson v. Collins, (1761) 96
Eng. Rep. 169 (K.B.).
45
See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES
TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 19
(2004) (stating that the historical “distinction between republishing someone’s work on
the one hand and building upon or transforming that work on the other” has been lost);
Craig Joyce & L. Ray Patterson, Copyright in 1791: An Essay Concerning the Founders’
View of the Copyright Power Granted to Congress in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the
1380 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:4
U.S. Constitution, 52 EMORY L.J. 909, 915 (2003) (concluding that the copyright
holder’s rights under the Statute of Anne were limited to printing and vending copies
of the work).
46
See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
47
Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19, § 1 (Eng.).
48
While some authors regard the passage of the Statute of Anne as marking
a shift from a regime of censorship and trade regulation to one of property rights,
others see the act primarily in terms of trade regulation. Compare Mark Rose, supra
2011] THE PREHISTORY OF FAIR USE 1381
debate, there can be little doubt that the Act’s drafters had one
particular problem in mind: rivalrous republication of identical
books.49 By omission or design, the Statute of Anne did not
address fractional copying or the similarity threshold for works
based on original works with minor textual differences. Under
the statute, “the author of any book or books already printed”
or his assignees, was entitled to “the sole right and liberty of
printing such book and books for the term of one and twenty
years.”50 Construed literally, the Act regulated only exact and
entire reprinting.51
Subsequent legislative history might also indicate a
narrow construction of the Statute of Anne. Although the Act
was enacted in response to sustained lobbying by the London
bookselling trade, that same group ultimately regarded it as
unsatisfactory.52 Consequently, a number of London booksellers
began to lobby for significant changes to the 1710 Act a mere
twenty years after its enactment.53 In particular, a bill was
introduced in the House of Commons on March 3, 1737,54 that
would have made it unlawful to “print, publish, import, or sell
any abridgement of [a copyrighted work], or any translation
thereof . . . without the consent of the author or proprietor first
obtained in writing” within the first three years of the work’s
publication.55 The fact that booksellers found it necessary to
make their monopoly over abridgments and translations
explicit suggests that this right was not perceived as part of the
note 1, at 48, with L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF
COPYRIGHT: A LAW OF USERS’ RIGHTS 27-29 (1991). There is also disagreement as to
whether the act was primarily drafted in service of the London booksellers, or whether
it embodied a new social bargain between authors, booksellers, and the reading public.
Compare JOHN FEATHER, A HISTORY OF BRITISH PUBLISHING 75 (Routledge 1988), with
RONAN DEAZLEY, ON THE ORIGIN OF THE RIGHT TO COPY: CHARTING THE MOVEMENT OF
COPYRIGHT LAW IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN (1695-1775) 46 (2004).
49
ISABELLA ALEXANDER, COPYRIGHT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY 29 (2010).
50
Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19, § 1 (Eng.).
51
Richard Godson, the author of an early treatise on patent and copyright
law, notes that consistent with its Saxon origins, the word book may be applied to any
writing, whether bound or unbound, or consisting of one sheet or many. RICHARD
GODSON, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS AND OF
COPYRIGHT: WITH AN INTRODUCTORY BOOK ON MONOPOLIES 219-20 (1823).
52
See DEAZLEY, supra note 48, at 94-96.
53
Id.
54
Journal of the House of Commons, vol. 22, Mar. 3, 1737, at 769.
55
An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, 1737, BL 357, c.7. § 41, cl. 22,
reprinted in PRIMARY SOURCES ON COPYRIGHT (1450-1900) (L. Bently & M. Kretschmer
eds., 2008), available at www.copyrighthistory.org. (emphasis added). This article uses
the modern spelling of abridgment except when quoting directly from original sources.
1382 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:4
56
While some have argued that the terms of royal printing patents before
and after the Statute of Anne’s enactment bear on its construction, the evidence here is
inconclusive. Ronan Deazley has recently reviewed a large number of printing patents
granted in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. He notes that although some
prominent royal licenses specifically included an exclusive right with respect to
printing abridgments and/or translations, the majority did not. DEAZLEY, supra note
48, at 94-96 (citing Shef Rogers, The Use of Royal Licences for Printing in England,
1695-1760, in 1 THE LIBRARY 133, 133-92 (2000)).
57
(1721) 35 Eng. Rep. 1008 (Ch.). Thanks to Tomás Gómez-Arostegui for
alerting me to the fact that, despite common citation to the contrary, this case occurred
in 1721, not 1720.
58
For a detailed discussion of Burnett v. Chetwood, see Stephen A. Siegel,
Injunctions for Defamation, Juries, and the Clarifying Lens of 1868, 56 BUFF. L. REV.
655, 684 (2008).
59
Id. Although decided in 1721, Burnett v. Chetwood was only reported
sometime between 1817 and 1819 as a note to Chancellor Eldon’s decision in Southey v.
Sherwood, (1817) 35 Eng. Rep. 1006 (Ch.) (citing Burnett v. Chetwood, (1817) 35 Eng.
Rep. 1008 (Ch.)). We know, however, that the outcome of Burnett v. Chetwood was
known to many in the eighteenth century because it is mentioned in the 1752 case of
Tonson v. Walker, (1752) 36 Eng. Rep. 1017, 1020 (Ch.) (discussing earlier cases). As
Siegel notes, reference to unreported cases in the Register’s Book was commonplace in
the era before official court reporting. Siegel, supra note 58, at 687. But that record
would not have contained the rationale for enjoining the translating or printing of the
Archoeologia Philosophica. Id.
60
Burnett v. Chetwood, (1817) 35 Eng. Rep. 1008 (Ch.).
61
Id.
62
Id. at 1009. Although this part of the decision is dicta, Robert Maugham,
the author of what is arguably the first copyright treatise, reports this passage of
Burnett v. Chetwood as though it were the holding. ROBERT MAUGHAM, TREATISE ON
THE LAWS OF LITERARY PROPERTY 89 (Longman, Rees, Orme, Brown, & Green, 1828).
2011] THE PREHISTORY OF FAIR USE 1383
63
Burnett v. Chetwood, (1817) 35 Eng. Rep. 1008 (Ch.) 1009.
64
2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 405-06
(1766).
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
MAUGHAM, supra note 62, at 126; GODSON, supra note 51, at 215; ISAAC
ESPINASSE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF ACTIONS ON STATUTES, REMEDIAL AS WELL AS
PENAL, IN GENERAL (1824). Although Godson adopts Blackstone’s language and agrees
that the transcription “of nearly all the sentiments and language of a book” would
amount to “a glaring piracy,” he also adds that “[t]o copy part of a work, either by
taking a few pages verbatim, where the sentiments are not new, or by imitation of the
principle ideas, although the treatises are in other respects different, is also to be
illegal.” GODSON, supra note 51, at 215. This statement is actually quite a broad
formulation of copyright’s reach into partial similarity.
1384 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:4
68
See supra note 27 (discussing Strahan v. Newbery). Blackstone assisted
Lord Chancellor Apsley in his decision in Strahan v. Newbery, (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 913
(K.B.). According to the case report, the two men spent some hours discussing the
matter, and they agreed that an abridgment such as Newbery’s was an allowable and
meritorious new work and not an infringement. Id.
69
Millar v. Taylor, (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B.) 226.
70
Id. at 257 (discussing Donaldson v. Beckett, (1774) 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (H.L.)).
71
Id. at 226.
72
GODSON, supra note 51, at 238.
2011] THE PREHISTORY OF FAIR USE 1385
73
Ronan Deazley, Commentary on Gyles v. Wilcox (1741), in PRIMARY SOURCES
ON COPYRIGHT (1450-1900) (L. Bently & M. Kretschmer eds., 2008), available at
http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cgi-bin/kleioc/0010/exec/ausgabecom/%22uk_1741%22.
74
Dr. Samuel Johnson, Considerations on the Case of Dr T[rapp]’s Sermons,
Abridged by Mr. Cave, 1739, 57 GENTLEMAN’S MAG. (1787), reprinted in ARTHUR
MURPHY, THE WORKS OF SAMUEL JOHNSON 547 (1st ed. 1837). It can hardly be
overlooked that Samuel Johnson was employed by the very same magazine that had
abridged Dr. Trapp’s sermons.
75
Id.
76
Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.). The long title of the Statute of
Anne is An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed
Books in the Authors or Purchasers of Such Copies, During the Times Therein
Mentioned. Id.
77
JOHNSON, supra note 74; see also GODSON, supra note 51, at 238 (noting
that “[m]any valuable works are so voluminous that abridgments of them are
extremely useful”).
1386 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:4
78
For a history of the evolution of the Transactions of the Royal Society, see
Adrian Johns, Miscellaneous Methods: Authors, Societies and Journals in Early
Modern England, 33 BRIT. J. HIST. SCI. 159, 159-86 (2000).
79
Johnson, supra note 74.
80
Id. Later in the same article, Johnson also stated that “there are few books
of late that are not abridged.” Id.
81
Id.
82
MAUGHAM, supra note 62, at 126.
83
Id. Godson illustrates the import of the law with an example: “[O]ne man
may compose a work, for instance in the Latin language, another abridge it, a third
translate it, a fourth write annotations upon it; and every one of them will acquire a
copyright in the product of his own ingenuity and labour.” GODSON, supra note 51, at
344; see also ESPINASSE, supra note 67, at 78.
84
Id.; see also ESPINASSE, supra note 67, at 77-78.
85
GODSON, supra note 51, at 238.
2011] THE PREHISTORY OF FAIR USE 1387
86
Id. at 129.
87
Id. (citing Gyles v. Wilcox, (1741) 26 Eng. Rep. 489 (Ch.)).
88
MAUGHAM, supra note 62, at 132.
89
Id.
90
Id.
1388 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:4
91
DANIEL DEFOE, AN ESSAY ON THE REGULATION OF THE PRESS 25 (Blackwell
1958) (1704); see also JOHN DUNTON, THE LIFE AND ERRORS OF JOHN DUNTON, CITIZEN
OF LONDON 52 (1818) (complaining of the prevalence of abridgment by “a whole army of
Hackney Authors that keep their grinders moving by the travail of their pens”).
92
See generally ROBERT D. MAYO, THE ENGLISH NOVEL IN THE MAGAZINES
1740-1815 (1962) (concluding that epitomes and abridgments were widely employed as
alternative to wholesale piracy).
93 r
Austen v. Cave, C33/371, f. 493 (Ch. 1739).
94
Deazley, supra note 73.
95
Compare JOSEPH TRAPP, THE NATURE, FOLLY, SIN, AND DANGER OF BEING
RIGHTEOUS OVER-MUCH (Austen 1739), available at http://books.google.com/books?id=
LGU3AAAAMAAJ, with The Nature, Folly, Sin and Danger of Being Righteous Over-
Much, 9 GENTLEMAN’S MAG., June 1739, at 288-92 (on file with author).
96
Johnson, supra note 74.
97 r
Austen v. Cave, C33/371, f. 493 (Ch. 1739).
98
See ALEXANDER, supra note 49.
2011] THE PREHISTORY OF FAIR USE 1389
99
See id.
100
But note that four years later, the same publisher successfully answered a
similar claim of copyright infringement in relation to an abridgment of Memoirs of an
Unfortunate Young Nobleman that appeared in his magazine. See Cogan v. Cave,
(1743) Eng. Rep. (Ch.); 13 GENTLEMAN’S MAG., Feb. 1743, at 93-94; id. at 204-05; 13
GENTLEMAN’S MAG., June 1743, at 305-06.
101
Lord Hardwicke’s statements in Gyles are not surprising, as the lord
chancellor himself dismissed the significance of decisions made on motion where he
ruled “without much consideration.” See Gyles v. Wilcox, (1741) 26 Eng. Rep. 489
(discussing Read v. Hodges, a 1740 case involving the abridgment of John Motley’s The
History of the Life of Peter the First Emperor of Russia). Note that the litigation in
Gyles actually commenced in November 1737, before Austen v. Cave. See Ronan
Deazley, The Statute of Anne and the Great Abridgement Swindle (working paper 2010)
(on file with the author).
102
Gyles v. Wilcox, (1741) 26 Eng. Rep. 489; see also Barnardiston, Report of
Gyles v. Wilcox (London 1741), available at http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cgi-bin/
kleioc/0010/exec/ausgabe/%22uk_1741b%22. As reported, the decision is inconsistent as
to whether the work in question is the more abbreviated Pleas of the Crown or the more
expansive Historia Placitorum Coronæ, first published in 1736. The court may have
regarded these two works as merely different versions of the same work. Maugham
appears to regard it as the latter, but again without differentiation. SIR M. HALE,
HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONÆ: THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN (1736).
103
P. R. Glazebrook, Introduction, in 1 SIR MATTHEW HALE, PLEAS OF THE
CROWN: A METHODICAL SUMMARY 1678, at iii (1971).
104
Gyles, 26 Eng. Rep. at 490. The defendant’s work was also referred to in
the original bill of complaint to the Court of Chancery as A Treatise of Modern Crown
Law. See Deazley, supra note 101.
1390 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:4
105
Gyles, 26 Eng. Rep. at 489.
106
Statute of Anne, 8 Ann., c. 19 (1710) (Eng.).
107
Gyles, 26 Eng. Rep. 489.
108
Id. at 490.
109
Id.
110
Id. (emphasis added).
2011] THE PREHISTORY OF FAIR USE 1391
111
Les Journals des Scavans was the French equivalent of the Transactions of
the Royal Society. What is curious about Hardwicke’s comment is that the French
journal, in any event, would not have been subject to copyright protection in England
at the time. The Statute of Anne did not “prohibit the importation, vending, or selling
of any books in Greek, Latin, or any other foreign language printed beyond the
seas . . . .” Statute of Anne, 8 Ann., c. 19, § 7 (1710) (Eng.).
112
Gyles, 26 Eng. Rep. at 419.
113
This is made clear in the discussion of Gyles v. Wilcox in Tonson v. Walker,
(1752) 36 Eng. Rep. 1017 (Ch.).
114
Id.
115
See ROBERT BURRELL & ALLISON COLEMAN, COPYRIGHT EXCEPTIONS: THE
DIGITAL IMPACT 255-56 (2005) (arguing that the Statute of Anne was subject to broad
purposive reading almost from its inception).
116
See id.
117
Butterworth v. Robinson, (1801) 31 Eng. Rep. 817 (Ch.).
118
Id.
1392 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:4
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
Id. In his treatise, Maugham takes issue with this decision: “Yet a selection
of what is material from a large body of Reports, commodiously arranged, whether
alphabetical or systematic, seems an original work. Indeed the right is undisputed of
selecting passages from books and reports (including entire judgments) in treatises on
particular subjects.” MAUGHAM, supra note 62, at 132.
122 r
For example, the defendant was enjoined in Austen v. Cave, C33/371, f. 493
(Ch. 1739), in Butterworth v. Robinson, (1801) 31 Eng. Rep. 817, and in Wilkins v. Aikin,
(1810) 34 Eng. Rep. 163. In addition, recent historical research by Tomás Gómez-
Arostegui shows that, although unreported, Tonson v. Baker, C9/371/41 (Ch. 1710), was
the first lawsuit filed under the Statute of Anne. See H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui, The
Untold Story of the First Copyright Suit Under the Statute of Anne in 1710, 25 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1247 (2010). In that case, Tonson was able to secure an ex parte temporary
restraining order despite his acknowledgment that the defendant’s book was not identical
to his own; he merely argued that it was the “Same in Substance & Effect.” Id.
123
GODSON, supra note 51, at 215-16.
2011] THE PREHISTORY OF FAIR USE 1393
A man may fairly adopt part of the work of another; he may so make
use of another’s labours for the promotion of science, and the benefit
of the public: but having done so, the question will be—Was the
matter so taken fairly with that view, and without what may be
termed the animus furandi [intention to steal]?124
A. Case-by-Case Analysis
The modern law of fair use is often assailed for its fact-
intensive, case-by-case, and consequently unpredictable
124
Id.
125
Compare Gyles v. Wilcox, (1741) 26 Eng. Rep. 489 (Ch.), with Folsom v.
Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 345 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
126
See infra Part III.A.
127
See infra Part III.B.
128
See infra Parts III.C-D.
1394 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:4
129
Even copyright minimalist Lawrence Lessig disparages fair use on this
ground, arguing that fair use is so uncertain that it is merely “the right to hire a
lawyer.” LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND
THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 187 (2004); see also
Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087, 1090 (2007).
130
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994). Still, as
Pamela Samuelson argues, despite the necessity of case-by-case analysis, fair use law
is probably “more coherent and more predictable than many commentators have
perceived once one recognizes that fair use cases tend to fall into common patterns.”
Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2542 (2009).
131
MAUGHAM, supra note 62, at 126; see also Dodsley v. Kinnersley, (1761) 27
Eng. Rep. 270 (Ch.) 271 (“No certain line can be drawn, to distinguish a fair
abridgment; but every case must depend on its own circumstances.”); Wilkins v. Aikin,
(1810) 34 Eng. Rep. 163 (Ch.) (Fair quotation is “in all cases very difficult to define.”).
The same sentiment is expressed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Campbell, 510 U.S. at
577, and in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985).
132
MAUGHAM, supra note 62, at 132.
133
In the 1761 case Dodsley v. Kinnersley, Sir Thomas Clarke, the master of
the rolls, noted that “the subject matter of this suit has been so often before the Court
upon other occasions, that when a case of this kind comes to be litigated, little more is
2011] THE PREHISTORY OF FAIR USE 1395
B. Amount Copied
necessary than to see whether it is adapted to the rules and principles before laid
down.” 27 Eng. Rep. at 271.
134
17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2006). This inquiry can be traced to Justice Story’s
original formulation of the fair use doctrine in Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1841) (No. 4901). In that case, Justice Story was concerned with protecting the
“chief value of the original work” against the extraction of its “essential parts” through
the mere “facile use of scissors” or its intellectual equivalent. Id. at 345.
135
(1761) 27 Eng. Rep. 270 (Ch.) 271. Ironically, the author of the work
allegedly copied in Dodsley was none other than Samuel Johnson—the same Samuel
Johnson whose resounding defense of abridgment is noted supra Part II.A. See supra
note 74 and accompanying text.
136
Nancy A. Mace, What Was Johnson Paid for Rasselas?, 91 MODERN PHILOLOGY
455, 458 (1994) (clarifying a discrepancy between Boswell’s account and the evidence that
the booksellers presented at trial to establish their ownership of the copyright).
137
Dodsley, 27 Eng. Rep. 270, 270.
138
Id.
1396 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:4
149
Id. In his discussion of compilations in general, Godson notes that the
authors of encyclopedias “have generally taken from the works of others with
unsparing hands.” GODSON, supra note 51, at 233.
150
Roworth, 170 Eng. Rep. at 890.
151
Id.
152
Id.
153
Id. He also noted that “[h]ere 75 pages have been transcribed out of 118,
and that which the plaintiff sold for half-a-guinea may be bought of the defendant for
eightpence.” Id. at 889-90.
154
Id. at 891. The jury found separate damages for the letterpress and the
prints—£70 for the former and £30 for the latter. Id. at 891.
155
Wilkins v. Aikin, (1810) 34 Eng. Rep. 163 (Ch.).
156
Id.
1398 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:4
157
Id.
158
Id.
159
Id.
160
The cases referred to are Carnan v. Bowles, (1786) 29 Eng. Rep. 45 (Ch.);
Cary v. Faden, (1799) 31 Eng. Rep. 453 (Ch.); and Cary v. Longman, (1801) 102 Eng.
Rep. 138 (K.B.).
161
Wilkins, 34 Eng. Rep. 163.
162
Id. But rather than enjoining the defendant’s publication, the court issued
an injunction permitting the work to be sold subject to the defendant undertaking to
account according to the result of the action.
2011] THE PREHISTORY OF FAIR USE 1399
163
Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 609-10 (2d
Cir. 2006).
164
Id. at 613.
165
487 F.3d 701, 721 (9th Cir. 2007), aff’d in part on reh’g, 508 F.3d 1146 (9th
Cir. 2007).
166
336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003).
167
Perfect 10, 487 F.3d at 721; Kelly, 336 F.3d at 822. For a detailed
discussion of Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., and Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp. as
illustrations of the interaction between copyright law and copy-reliant technology, see
Matthew Sag, Copyright and Copy-Reliant Technology, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1607 (2009).
168
See supra note 167.
169
GODSON, supra note 51, at 216-17.
1400 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:4
C. Market Effect
170
Dodsley v. Kinnersley, (1761) 27 Eng. Rep. 270 (Ch.).
171
Roworth v. Wilkes, (1807) 170 Eng. Rep. 889 (K.B.). For another case of
excessive copying, see Macklin v. Richardson, (1770) 27 Eng. Rep. 451 (Ch.).
172
As Lord Chancellor Cottenham noted in Bramwell v. Halcomb,
176
Id. at 517.
177
See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
178
See, e.g., Edward Lee, Warming up to User-Generated Content, U. ILL. L.
REV. 1459, 1529 (2008) (discussing a television network’s demands that two
presidential candidates remove copyrighted footage of a presidential debate from their
campaign videos and the prospects of a fair use defense); see also MasterCard Int’l, Inc.
v. Nader 2000 Primary Comm., Inc., No. 00 Civ. 6068 (GBD), 2004 WL 434404
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2004).
179
See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2007).
180
MAUGHAM, supra note 62.
181
Id. at 132-33 (emphasis added); see also GODSON, supra note 51, at 247
(noting that “no one is allowed, under the pretence of quoting, to publish either the
whole or the principle part of another man’s composition; and therefore a review must
not serve as a substitute for the book reviewed”) (citations omitted).
182
GODSON supra note 51, at 216-17.
1402 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:4
192
Wilkins, 34 Eng. Rep. at 165. Lord Chancellor Eldon continued the interim
injunction and directed that an action be brought immediately. Wilkins, 34 Eng. Rep. 163.
But no action appears to have been brought. See ALEXANDER, supra note 49, at 184.
193
Roworth v. Wilkes, (1807) 170 Eng. Rep. 889 (K.B.). See MAUGHAM, supra
note 62, at 130 (“On the other hand, in the case of the Encyclopedia Londinensis, in which
a large part of a treatise on fencing was transcribed, though there might have been no
intention to injure its sale, yet as it might serve as a substitute for the original work, and
was sold at a much lower price, it was held actionable, and damages were recovered.”).
194
Roworth v. Wilkes, (1807) 170 Eng. Rep. 889 (K.B.).
195
Id.
196
Id.
1404 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:4
197
MAUGHAM, supra note 62, at 130.
198
Id.
199
Id.
200
Id.
201
For example, in Campbell, the Supreme Court explained that
when a lethal parody, like a scathing theater review, kills demand for the
original, it does not produce a harm cognizable under the Copyright Act.
Because parody may quite legitimately aim at garroting the original,
destroying it commercially as well as artistically, the role of the courts is to
distinguish between biting criticism that merely suppresses demand and
copyright infringement, which usurps it.
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591-92 (1994) (quoting Fisher v.
Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1986); KAPLAN, supra note 36, at 69) (internal
quotation marks and alterations omitted).
202
17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2006).
203
Id. § 101 (defining “derivative work”).
204
Caffey v. Cook, 409 F. Supp. 2d 484, 496 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); 1-3 DAVID
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 3.01 (2010). See generally Naomi Abe Voegtli,
2011] THE PREHISTORY OF FAIR USE 1405
Rethinking Derivative Rights, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 1213 (1997) (reviewing the history of
the derivative right in the United States).
205
Dodsley v. Kinnersley, (1761) 27 Eng. Rep. 270 (Ch.).
206
On the defendant’s side, it could be argued that they had merely
“retrenched the unnecessary and uninteresting” parts of the text “which rather deaden
the narration.” This was Apsley’s conclusion in Strahan v. Newbery, (1775) 98 Eng.
Rep. 913 (Ch.).
207
Dodsley, 27 Eng. Rep. 270; see also GODSON, supra note 51, at 238 (“In
general, an abridgment tends to the advantage of the author, if the composition be
good; and may serve the end of an advertisement. The inquiry whether the work is
prejudiced by the manner of making the abridgment cannot be entertained.”).
208
Dodsley, 27 Eng. Rep. 270.
209
The court did not regard these trade customs as binding, but it noted that
it ought to “take notice of the springs flowing from trade” and consider their
consequences. Id.
210
Id. The exact words of the master of the rolls were
1406 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:4
D. Transformative Use
[w]hat I materially rely upon is, that it could not tend to prejudice the
plaintiffs, when they had before published an abstract of the work in the
London Chronicle. If I was to determine this to be elusory, I must hold every
abridgment to be so; and that, from its extensive consequence, would
prejudice the plaintiffs.
Id.
211
Id.
212
Id.
213
A similar shift on market conception is evident in trademark law. See
generally Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839 (2007).
2011] THE PREHISTORY OF FAIR USE 1407
214
This is not intended as an exhaustive statement of the boundaries of
transformative use.
215
MAUGHAM, supra note 62, at 130.
216
Id. at 126.
217
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
1408 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:4
218
Gyles v. Wilcox, (1741) 26 Eng. Rep. 489 (Ch.) 490 (emphasis added); see
also MAUGHAM, supra note 62, at 129.
219
GODSON, supra note 51, at 230.
220
Strahan v. Newbery, (1775) 98 Eng. Rep. 913 (Ch.).
221
Id.
222
Wilkins v. Aikin, (1810) 34 Eng. Rep. 163 (Ch.) 165.
223
This problem applies with equal force to modern fair use cases. See Sag,
supra note 41.
2011] THE PREHISTORY OF FAIR USE 1409
CONCLUSION
224
(1721) 35 Eng. Rep. 1008 (Ch.).
225
Id. at 1009.
226
Id.
227
Classic works encompassing these events include KAPLAN, supra note 36;
L. RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1968); HARRY H. RANSOM,
THE FIRST COPYRIGHT STATUTE (1956); and MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE
INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT (1993).
228
See, e.g., Joyce & Patterson, supra note 45.
229
An important exception is WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON FAIR USE (2009).
For a rare comparative survey, see Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights:
Literary Property in Revolutionary France and America, 64 TUL. L. REV. 991 (1990).
1410 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:4
230
See, e.g., Notice of Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, Warner Bros.
Entm’t v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (No. 07 Civ. 9667 (RPP)),
2007 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions 79667.
231
Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 477-78 (1984)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
232
Jane C. Ginsburg, Authors and Users in Copyright, 45 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y
U.S.A. 1, 15 (1997) (emphasizing the “redistribution” of value from copyright owners to
preferred classes of users); Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright, Common Law, and Sui
Generis Protection of Databases in the United States and Abroad, 66 U. CIN. L. REV.
151, 169 (1997) (viewing fair use as a subsidy from copyright owner in favor of uses
with public benefits); see also Robert P. Merges, The End of Friction? Property Rights
and Contract in the “Newtonian” World of On-Line Commerce, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
115, 134-35 (1997).
2011] THE PREHISTORY OF FAIR USE 1411
233
See supra Part III.B.
1412 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:4
234
Just how far the pendulum had swung by the time of Folsom v. Marsh can
be seen in the staunch criticism that George Ticknor Curtis leveled at the
jurisprudence of the English courts in his 1847 treatise. Curtis’ rather extreme, almost
hyperbolic, position was that the copyright owner’s rights covered “the whole book and
every part of it . . . the style, or language, and expression; the learning, the facts, or the
narrative; the sentiment and ideas, as far as their identity can be traced; and the form,
arrangement and combination which the author has given to his materials.” GEORGE
TICKNOR CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT 273 (1847).