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Community Development and Other Extra Religious Functions of Islamic Schools A Contemporary Perspective From The Voices of Stakeholders in Two
Community Development and Other Extra Religious Functions of Islamic Schools A Contemporary Perspective From The Voices of Stakeholders in Two
Community Development and Other Extra Religious Functions of Islamic Schools A Contemporary Perspective From The Voices of Stakeholders in Two
To cite this article: Omer Aijazi & Leonora C. Angeles (2014) Community development and
other extra-religious functions of Islamic schools: a contemporary perspective from the voices
of stakeholders in two madrassas in Pakistan, Community Development, 45:5, 490-506, DOI:
10.1080/15575330.2014.955513
Introduction
Contributors to a special issue of Community Development on social capital (Flora &
Allen, 2006) agree that community development depends on embedded or emergent
characteristics of social interactions. Following Bridger and Alter’s (2006) argument that
community development occurs more frequently through opportunistic combinations of
local and extra-local structures and interactional fields that form and reform according
to particular issues or external pressures, we examine the emergence of madrassa com-
munities as a field of social interaction embedded in enduring networks that generate
community development functions and outcomes beyond its obvious religious and
instructional roles.
Although there is great variety in the form, structure, and affiliation of madrassas, a
madrassa, translated as “a place of learning” in Arabic, is basically a religious institution
with part-time or full-time students (both genders), with or without boarding privileges,
who are taught subjects as diverse as memorization of the Quran to partial or complete
coverage of a religious curriculum prescribed by an independent accreditation body.
Based in both urban and rural areas, they commonly attract students from low-income
socioeconomic groups, although a number of religious middle-class families have also
preferred a madrassa education for their children (boys and girls). Besides offering an
Islamic education, they charge lower costs, provide social support, and incentives, such
as supplemental clothing and feeding programs, making them attractive choices for
disadvantaged households (Berkey, 2007; Evans, 2008; McClure, 2009).
Christian, Jewish, Buddhist, and other religious groups’ engagement in education
and community development work (seen as acts of charity or compassion) are widely
accepted and seldom contested or challenged. Their mainstream involvement in charita-
ble or development work (e.g. De Temple, 2006; Hefferan, 2007) has been explored
within broader interests in the role of “world religions,” “religious-scapes,” “geographies
of religion,” and the secular work of faith-based organizations (FBOs) (e.g. Kong, 2010;
Stump, 2008; Ver Beek, 2002). However, the same acceptance has not taken root for
Muslim/Islamic organizations such as the madrassa, for example. Protestant and Catho-
lic schools, colleges, and universities have also found commonplace acceptance unlike
Islamic schools and universities. Religious education in Pakistan (more specifically
Islamic education) has failed to gain the same level of official respectability as secular
private schools in the country.
Using Clarke’s (2006) typology of FBOs, the madrassa is a cross between a
faith-based charitable or development organization, which funds/manages programs to
address poverty or social exclusion by mobilizing the faithful; and a faith-based socio-
political organization, which organizes communities for religious education to promote
faith-based identities and practices (Clarke, 2006, p. 840). Here, we examine how the
madrassa mission and mandate intersect with community development goals and the
national project of development and modernity (such as high literacy and employment)
by creating linkages and multiplier effects within local culture and institutions, particu-
larly in the absence of social support services. Despite their inability to attract a large
percentage of the student population (Cockcroft et al., 2009), madrassas’ community
development function can be interpreted as a marginalized population’s localized effort
to collectively organize and overcome the limitations of the national development pro-
ject and exclusionary practices of globalization. Our paper aims to problematize the dis-
course surrounding madrassas and challenges the position that religious institutions are
anachronistic to the rise of the modern developmental state. We investigate these con-
cerns within the context of present day Pakistan, revealing the important roles madrassas
play against a backdrop of inaccessible social support services and ongoing debates on
madrassa reform and modernization. We argue that madrassas should not be under-
mined, erased, or ignored in Pakistan’s wider struggle towards development. Therefore,
the paper addresses the following questions: What community development roles are
madrassas currently playing in the Pakistani context as gleaned from the voices of stake-
holders in two madrassa communities? How are madrassas being strategically used and
modified within larger social development and mainstream community development
efforts?
Methods
The study is essentially exploratory in nature, employs a qualitative research paradigm,
and is shaped as an institutional ethnography (IE), a method of inquiry that allows peo-
ple to explore the social relations that structure their everyday lives. First developed as
“sociology for women” by Smith (1986), researchers currently use IE in the social sci-
ences, education, human services, and policy research. Interviews, surveys, and partici-
pant observations are used to illustrate the “interface between individual lives and some
492 O. Aijazi and L.C. Angeles
chosen madrassas. The specific educational board that each madrassa prescribes to sets
madrassa curricula. The most popular syllabus/curriculum used is the eight-year curricu-
lum known as the Dars-i-Nizami that was being used in both study sites. An exploration
of the Dars-i-Nizami curriculum requires a simultaneous exploration of the epistemic
and ontological underpinnings of Islamic knowledge systems. Also necessary to such an
exploration is examination of the region’s colonial past that sought to dismantle reli-
gious curriculums. These conversations are beyond the scope of this study. However,
we do recognize the important linkages between curriculum and community develop-
ment, as demonstrated by existing scholarship on community-engaged learning (e.g.
Meurer et al., 2011; Smyth, Angus, Down, & McInerney, 2008). Thirdly, we did not
explicitly explore our chosen madrassas in relation to Islamic militancy. Keeping in
mind the broader national context in which this research took place (i.e. the global War
on Terror and ongoing military incursions against Pakistani Taliban in the north), an
awareness of the possible linkages between madrassas and militancy did inform our
interviews. We found that even though we did not pose dedicated questions on mili-
tancy, our research participants themselves chose to articulate their points of departure
from mainstream representations of madrassas by repeatedly distancing themselves from
militant ideology. We are cognizant of the need to closely examine possible connections
between madrassa curriculums and Islamic militancy.
How many mosques … [are] there in the country to accommodate all these millions of stu-
dents as Imams? – Pervaiz Musharraf (former President of Pakistan).
The madrassa is contested internationally, deemed responsible for radicalizing youth and
threatening global security, as well internally, concerning the institution’s usefulness for
addressing Pakistan’s needs (Malik, 2008). Graduates are perceived as narrowly edu-
cated, suited only for limited religious roles in the mosque (e.g. Imam,1 Muezzin,2
Khadim,3) who mediate certain life events,4 or as teachers in other madrassas (Rahman
& Bukhari, 2006). Madrassas are viewed as archaic, medieval, substandard, and myste-
rious locations of religious learning and socialization that teach an outdated syllabus
inappropriate for modern times (Ali, 2009, p. 2). This raises interesting questions about
what forms of knowledge are legitimized as “useful” and “appropriate” for national
needs, what kinds are dismissed, and who is involved in this legitimization process.
As both the international and national media are the key sources of information on
madrassas, our all-male student interviewees had internalized the skeptical ambiguity,
characteristic of media coverage of the madrassa system. Another important information
source about madrassas was word of mouth, mostly from female household domestic
workers. To understand how madrassas are imagined, strategically used, and modified
within the larger social development agenda, we first investigate what the madrassa rep-
resents to a typical elite male resident.5
Khan has been a resident of Islamabad, Pakistan, for nearly two decades. He lives
in an affluent section of the city, which hosts at least five madrassas of various sizes
and levels of organization. The JAB is situated a short distance from his residence.
Khan attended a private British school in Islamabad and obtained his engineering degree
from a prominent Canadian university. At the time of this interview, he was employed
by a European oil company in the city. Khan is skeptical of madrassas and is unaware
of their ideological commitments or contributions.
Furthermore, his interactions with madrassa students are limited to just three occa-
sions: (1) weekly visits to the mosque for Friday afternoon prayers (weekly, congrega-
tional, community prayers) where he often notes young men in traditional clothing and
beards, whom he assumes are madrassa students; (2) monthly visits to the madrassa
nearest his home, to which he donates meat6; and (3) occasionally, during walks in
parks and market places. Khan admits he has never held a meaningful dialog with
Community Development 495
Students admitted that their interactions with those outside the madrassa were typi-
cally limited. Madrassa management argued that the social isolation experienced by their
students and graduates is rooted within historical experiences of colonialism that sys-
tematically created prejudice against local knowledge and those who dared to pursue
it.11 Still, based on participant observations, we were able to identify at least one oppor-
tunity for youngsters from the madrassa to freely interact and mingle with those on the
outside. This was during evening games of cricket.
Cricket is Pakistan’s national sport and enjoys immense popularity within the coun-
try. It is played as a collective requiring up to 22 participants at any given time. Stu-
dents at JAB regularly play cricket in the evening in a parking lot adjacent to their
building. Other youngsters, employees of surrounding businesses, and university stu-
dents freely join these games. Madrassa students shared that they had made numerous
friends during these games and enjoyed a sense of camaraderie with other youngsters
their age.12 While relationships between these two groups is often friendly and cordial,
a few madrassa students reported being harassed by their non-madrassa peers who
would call them names such as “fundos” or “terrorists”.13
The madrassa educational experience is essentially centered on preserving and dis-
seminating Islamic knowledge as well as socializing students within an Islamic moral
framework.14 Based on the premises that an Islamic moral framework has to be experi-
enced within the materiality of everyday life, students are encouraged to adopt a wide
variety of careers outside traditional religious ones.15 Madrassas strive to achieve this
by focusing on the development and enhancement of their students’ literacy skills along-
side a religious curriculum. The Director of Education at JAB gave us an example:
We have one student, who is 23 years old from Lahore. He has only studied up till grade
three in his village school. So we teach him Hifz [memorization of the Quran] and side-by-
side try to bring his schooling up to grade eight. We want him to at least have grade eight
when he leaves.16
Madrassas allow their students regional mobility as certifications are widely accepted
throughout the country.22 This is particularly attractive for students from small rural
locations who are interested in the economic, social, and cultural opportunities offered
by urban centers.23 A good percentage of the student body at JAB and SIS are residents
of various rural regions across Pakistan.24 Madrassa graduate Azam explained why he
enrolled in JAB all the way in Islamabad from his small village hundreds of kilometers
away. In his modest hometown, madrassa students are idealized as role models and
praised for their mannerisms and etiquettes:
I would notice some youngsters from our village who were studying in various madrassas
in Islamabad. They would come home for the summer. [Their mannerism and etiquettes],
the way they would conduct themselves, met and greeted others compared to the rest of us
was very sober [and impressive]. They would lead prayers in the mosque and even the
Tarawih [special night prayers in Ramadan]. So I thought I should also go and understand
the Quran, learn it, and acquire a religious education.25
by the earthquake (ERRA, 2006a). Similarly, at least 853 teachers were reported dead
and a large number of teachers pulled out of the workforce to deal with personal loss
and trauma, further exacerbating the ongoing shortage of teachers (ERRA, 2006a).
According to field surveys, at least 1,700 children lost both parents, 18,800 lost their
fathers, and another 22,000 lost their mothers (ERRA, 2006b).
Pakistan has an inadequate foster care system and child adoption is an uncommon
practice (Ali & Sami, 2007; Graham, Al-Krenawi, & Zaidi, 2007). The sheer conse-
quences of the earthquake severely paralyzed extended family networks that are typi-
cally mobilized in times of need. Relief agencies scrambled to locate family networks
for orphaned children or arranged to send them to local institutions such as SOS
villages (UNICEF, 2005). The Pakistani government imposed a complete ban on child
adoption to minimize any exploitation or child trafficking (Walsh, 2005). However,
enforcement was an issue and many children were rumored to have either disappeared
or were illegally adopted (Hamilton & Halvorson, 2007).
Although religious organizations and affiliated political parties actively went into
affected areas to organize relief activities, madrassas formed a passive safety network.26
Madrassas were perceived as supplementing Pakistan’s ailing social welfare infrastruc-
ture by acting as temporary- to medium-term shelters for vulnerable children (boys and
girls) until their communities became ready to accept them back.27 They also provided
an opportunity for male and female children to continue their education in relatively
safe and familiar environments. According to the Principal of JAB, some of these chil-
dren (boys in this context) decided to stay back at their madrassas to complete the
Dars-e-Nizami certification.
Concerned with the overwhelming numbers of vulnerable children after the earth-
quake, madrassas advertised through their communication grapevine that they were will-
ing to enroll affected children (both boys and girls).28 Since typically, a madrassa does
not charge for tuition, room, and board, they were ideal choices for desperate families
and relatives. Some affected children already had their siblings, relatives, or friends
studying in a particular madrassa so their relatives arranged for them to be sent to the
same madrassa to facilitate integration. Current madrassa students volunteering at vari-
ous relief camps also recommended their respective madrassas as possible homes for
affected children.29 Similarly, relief camps managed by faith-based organizations and
Muslim non-governmental organizations often advised desperate families and relatives
to consider enrolling vulnerable children into a reputed madrassa and workers even vol-
unteered to take them to the city themselves.30 Despite a complete ban on adoption,
many orphaned children were adopted albeit unofficially by affording relatives or even
unrelated families.31 Often, these children were forced to drop out of school and enter
the labor force.32 Many such children eventually managed to run away from their
adopted homes or were taken back by concerned relatives and enrolled in a madrassa as
a last resort.33
The earthquake struck in the religious month of Ramadan during which madrassas
are typically closed. Some madrassas opened up their campuses as a gesture of good
will and converted them into temporary shelters for those displaced.34 They acted as
transient shelters until relief agencies shifted them to purpose-built relief camps.35
Madrassas also helped in soliciting donations from communities, and they then
forwarded them to relevant relief organizations.36
A total of 10 madrassa administrators (in addition to JAB and SIS) were surveyed
and requested to comment on any noticeable increase in admission requests after the
2005 Kashmir earthquake. Seven out of these reported receiving additional applications
Community Development 499
We have a student who is taking care of a child orphaned by the earthquake. He brought
him to this madrassa from his village only a few months ago. The child had nowhere to go
and our student is taking care of him in our premises.39
SIS also received a large number of admission requests following the earthquake.40
However, most applicants did not meet the institute’s strict admissions criterion and
only two additional male students were accepted.41 SIS, instead, referred prospective
applicants to other reputed madrassas in the city.42 The institute’s administration cited
lack of sufficient funds as another important reason for turning down students from
earthquake-affected regions.43 SIS requested non-profits and charities referring male stu-
dents to their institution to construct living quarters for these additional students and
pay their expenses, but their proposal was rejected.44
Madrassas are arranged as networks of social relations formed by graduates and cur-
rent students, linked to each other and the larger community, or between one Islamic
scholar and another, from one village mosque to the next. After the 2005 earthquake,
these networks were mobilized and helped shape an organic, grassroots response to the
catastrophe. The madrassa system also enjoyed unofficial support from the Pakistani
Government, which did not object to their relief efforts.45 However, the contributions of
madrassas in relief and recovery efforts were equated with the involvement of other
politically aligned, religious organizations, and interpreted as threatening national and
international security interests. The international media, in particular, understood madr-
assas as opportunistic entities making inroads into devastated communities and opening
spaces for political recruitment. Orphans and destitute children referred to madrassas
were particularly cited in media reports as the “target recruits” of madrassa-affiliated
jihadist groups (Clark, 2006; Qureshi, 2006; The Telegraph Group, 2006).
The negative media coverage of madrassas is indicative of the mainstream discourse
on madrassas that remains usually dismissive of their relational nature and ongoing con-
tributions to social life within Pakistan. This reminds us of the further conceptual work
that must be undertaken to recognize and understand the community development func-
tions of culturally embedded, religious institutions, such as the madrassa. In the next
section, we discuss some of the challenges and obstacles remaining in the way of better
understanding the community development functions of madrassas.
patterns of discrimination against members of the Ahmedyya minority sect. His analysis
reveals that local state authorities and residents denied rescue and relief provisions to
flood survivors affiliated with the Ahmedyya sect, either on account of their own atti-
tudes towards the sect or under instruction from a local religious cleric (Malik, 2011,
p. 71). His paper also delineates decades of historical, social, political, and cultural pro-
cesses that have unfolded in Pakistan that fuelled an almost nationwide resentment and
rejection of the Ahmedyya community (Malik, 2011, pp. 73–75). Therefore, the ques-
tion remains whether such discriminatory behavior and inability to deal with difference
is endemic to madrassa schooling, in particular, or the wider Pakistani society, in gen-
eral. And more importantly, whether the commitments of madrassas towards social jus-
tice and equity (as gleaned from our interviews) can be used to shift these conversations
or are madrassas inherently exclusionary?
An important report by the Sustainable Development Policy Institute in Pakistan
explores these concerns by studying the attitudes of female madrassa teachers towards
issues of religious diversity within their communities. According to the report, madrassa
teachers did not possess sufficient knowledge of the religious practices of non-Muslims
residing in their communities and some even dismissed their practices as being invalid
(Naz, 2011, pp. 9–10). According to the report, the television was the main source of
information on other religions and the madrassa curriculum itself lacked any provisions
for studying other religions (Naz, 2011, p. 9). Many of the study participants (female
madrassa teachers) shared their experiences of interacting with religious minorities, par-
ticipating in their ceremonies and inviting them to their own, while others maintained
more strict social segregation in terms of cultural exchange (Naz, 2011, pp. 11–12). This
did not necessary translate into discrimination against religious minorities as far as citi-
zenship, economic, and social rights are concerned (Naz, 2011, p. 13). According to the
report, while the madrassa through some of its teachers, continued to reproduce social
divisions based on religious differences, it did not advocate for religious minorities to
be denied their economic, social, and political rights. While these findings are hardly
ideal, it is worthwhile to think about whether modest changes in curricula (in partner-
ship with all stakeholders, according to immediate community contexts) or teacher train-
ings can help alleviate some of these tensions. For example, success stories have been
reported from communities in India, where inter-ethnic conflict between Muslims and
Hindus is rife, of Hindu students enrolling in madrassas to access education services
(Rahman, 2013).
Madrassas in Pakistan have an unfortunate history of instrumentalization by political
parties, the state, and other ideological groups to advance partisan agendas. According
to one theory, madrassas grew in numbers and popularity during the Soviet–Afghan war
in the mid-1970s, when a large number of madrassas were reported to be training and
indoctrinating “freedom fighters” for combating Russian troops in Afghanistan (Anzar,
2003, p. 18). After the dissolution of the Soviet Empire, madrassas attracted the atten-
tion of other partisan agendas such as the Wahabi and Salafi movements of Saudi
Arabia, other Islamic militant groups, and charities vested in conflict-ridden regions of
the Muslim world such as Bosnia, Chechnya, and Afghanistan. Madrassas were also
considered responsible for training a new generation of Taliban from amongst Afghan
refugees living in camps in neighboring Pakistan (Singer, 2001; Stern, 2000). From such
an analysis of madrassas in Pakistan, it appears that the very ability of the madrassa to
access the politically, economically, and socially marginalized (such as refugees) is sus-
ceptible to exploitation. Keeping in mind the results of our field research with two
madrassas in Pakistan, in our opinion, the question then that needs urgent attention is
Community Development 501
how can the madrassa’s ability to reverberate with marginalized groups be safeguarded
from political instrumentalization? Further empirical research on madrassas can break
new ground in this area.
In Pakistan, madrassas continue to walk a fine line between state approval and rejec-
tion, undermining the possibility of a synergistic partnership. In the mid-1980s, the
Pakistan Government experimented with converting some madrassas into “mosque pri-
mary schools” by introducing secular subjects such as Urdu and mathematics into their
curriculums (Anzar, 2003, p. 14). The intervention was largely considered a failure
because of the lack of academic preparation of local Imams and madrassa teachers
(Anzar, 2003, p. 14), raising concerns about teacher training rather than the unsuitability
of madrassas for a modern Pakistani state. In more recent times, the madrassa reform
debate has taken on added political dimensions from the persistent global War on Terror,
as well as more liberal concerns of human security and conflict. For example, the most
recent madrassa reform plan announced by the Pakistan Government aims to bring
madrassas under the umbrella of the national education system as part of its first
“National Internal Security Policy” (Al Jazeera, 2014). Rooted in a history of dishonest
and unfair policy transactions between Pakistan’s madrassa system and government,
antagonism and mistrust continue to prevent any meaningful dialog across relevant
stakeholders. Undemocratic, top-down, technical approaches to madrassa reform seem to
prevail within policy discourse. For example, the Brookings Doha Center, an affiliate of
the Brookings Institute of Washington, in its study “Pakistan’s madrassas: The need for
internal reform and the role of international assistance” claims:
Madrassas have a noble history of use in furthering the cause of science and learning in
medieval Islam, but that tradition has been largely forgotten in Pakistan because of a rela-
tively uneducated theological establishment taking over the administration of most madras-
sas. (Ali, 2009, p. 6)
At the same time, jaded by history, madrassa administrators refuse to further engage
with the Pakistani state in fear that their institutions will once again be manipulated to
fit some new vision of a modern Pakistan undermining the integrity of their institutions.
Concluding remarks
Our study indicates that madrassas in Pakistan have important religious as well extra-
religious functions. These include but are not limited to provision of a rigorous religious
education, socialization to Islamic norms, and the individual or collective reaffirmation
of an Islamic identity (Park & Niyozov, 2008). Additionally, madrassas provide alternate
routes to education and socialization, especially for those who may not have an opportu-
nity to access the public schooling system. Increasingly, madrassas have started to inte-
grate secular education into their curricula and their role in general education provision
is expected to increase. A madrassa diploma allows graduates regional mobility and
access to a variety of roles in the formal as well as the informal economy. Our study
revealed that increasing numbers of madrassa students were interested in gaining
employment outside the traditional “religious” sector. This is made possible by the
nationwide recognition of madrassa certifications and the possibility of upgrading the
diploma into a BA in Islamic Studies, opening the possibility of applying for a wide
variety of graduate programs.
502 O. Aijazi and L.C. Angeles
Critics of the madrassa system argue that madrassas do not encourage critical think-
ing and instead, rely heavily on memorization. Madrassa students are indeed required to
memorize Quranic texts and Hadith (oral traditions of Prophet Muhammad). We are,
however, hesitant to describe memorization practices as undermining critical thinking.
Islamic scholarship is firmly rooted within oral traditions, and the function of memory
has been historically crucial for the inter-generational preservation and transmission of
religious texts. Rather, memorization practices reflect an “embodiment of knowledge,”
as sacred knowledge takes on a material form in the body of a believer. We maintain
that there are other indicators and measures that can help verify whether madrassas fos-
ter critical thinking amongst their students or not, such a discussion though is beyond
the scope of this paper.
Madrassas contribute to disaster relief and recovery activities either by sending their
students and staff to volunteer in various organizations or by directly intervening. Direct
forms of interventions include serving as temporary shelters in times of crisis and
accepting vulnerable children as students. Students are typically offered free room and
board for the entire duration of madrassa education. Madrassa often have better reach
than most other social welfare institutions in the country, due to their relational and net-
worked nature. This is supported by a study conducted by John Hopkins University that
documents madrassas as the largest group of non-profit providers in Pakistan (Pasha,
Haroon, & Iqbal, 2002; Pasha, Pasha, & Iqbal, 2002).
In our study, students and graduates demonstrated a commitment towards social jus-
tice and were aware of systemic forms of oppression and inequity in their immediate
social worlds. This was often internalized as an integral component of an Islamic educa-
tion. Several interview respondents made linkages between Pakistan’s underdevelopment
and rampant poverty with societal apathy and inaction brought on by the abandonment
of Islamic ethical principles.
A madrassa certification provides its recipients added social and cultural capital, but
not necessarily upward socioeconomic mobility. Unlike other forms of social and cul-
tural capital that may require high input costs, a madrassa education is relatively cheap
to acquire. Therefore, for a certain strata of Pakistani society, a madrassa education pro-
vides a rare opportunity to positively contribute to one’s community and gain their
respect and recognition.
Madrassas in Pakistan are currently responding to three competing narratives: (1)
the state’s desire to closely regulate and synchronize grassroots organizations with its
unitary vision of state building and national development, (2) increasing demands of
governmentality imposed by the global War on Terror, and (3) policy pressure from the
Bretton Woods institutions (e.g. World Bank, International Monetary Fund) to scale
back state involvement within social service provisioning. Further, our research indicates
that community development contributions of madrassas need to be understood in rela-
tion to broader changes in national characters, such as changing values, shifting public
morality, social economic inequity, and global Islamic resurgence.
Based on our interviews with various stakeholders, we have attempted to sculpt out
an appropriate vocabulary for theorizing madrassas and their contributions to public and
social life within Pakistan. We have argued for a more nuanced and socially grounded
analysis of madrassas that has the potential to reconfigure the way they are understood
within policy and academic circles. However, further conceptual and empirical work
needs be conducted to adequately theorize the madrassa system as an intricate network
of grassroots organizations with the ability to access those surviving on the margins of
society.
Community Development 503
Notes
1. Person who leads the congregation prayers in the mosque.
2. Person who sounds the Azan or call for prayer in the mosque.
3. A secretary to the Imam who helps in the day-to-day running of the mosque including main-
tenance.
4. Such as offering prayers on someone’s death, marriage, birth, etc.
5. This section is based on interviews with two western educated, elite male residents of
Islamabad, Pakistan. Interviews were conducted on 2 August 2009.
6. Sacrificing an animal and then donating the meat to a deserving organization or household is
a common cultural/religious practice in Pakistan.
7. Annual religious festivals.
8. Mandatory charitable payments made by affording Muslims at pre-set rates. They can be
paid to any deserving community member or institution, not necessarily a madrassa.
9. A “moulvi sahib” is the common way of referring to a madrassa graduate (usually, but not
exclusively) who teaches young children how to recite the Quran and other important reli-
gious matters such as prayers. In Pakistan, religious knowledge and teachings are passed to
successive generations through an externally hired moulvi sahib. The moulvi sahib is remu-
nerated for his services, often minimally.
10. Based on the author’s observations.
11. Interviews with Qureshi (male), Director of Education at JAB conducted on 15 July 2009.
12. Interview with Anwar (male), current student at JAB, conducted on 15 July 2009; interview
with Shafiq (male), current student at JAB, conducted on 25 July 2009.
13. Interview with Shafiq (male), current student at JAB, conducted on 25 July 2009.
14. Interview with Haider (male), Principal of JAB, conducted on 20 July 2009; interview with
Qadir (male), teacher at JAB, conducted on 15 July 2009; interview with Qureshi (male),
Director of Education at JAB, conducted on 15 July 2009; interview with Hussnain (male),
Vice President of SIS, conducted on 13 June 2009.
15. Interview with Qureshi (male), Director of Education at JAB, conducted on 15 July 2009;
interview with Hussnain (male), Vice President of SIS, conducted on 13 June 2009.
16. Interview with Qureshi (male) Director of Education at JAB conducted on 15 July 2009.
17. Interview with Azam (male), former student of JAB, conducted on 26 July 2009.
18. Interview with Nasser (male), current student at SIS, conducted on 14 June 2009.
19. Interview with Jamil (male), current student at SIS, conducted on 14 June 2009.
20. Interview with Bashir (male), former student of SIS, conducted on 14 June 2009.
21. Interview with Junaid (male), former student of SIS, conducted on 13 June 2009.
22. Interview with Haider (male), Principal of JAB, conducted on 20 July 2009.
23. Interview with Haider (male), Principal of JAB, conducted on 20 July 2009.
24. Interview with Haider (male), Principal of JAB, conducted on 20 July 2009, interview with
Hussnain (male), Vice President of SIS, conducted on 13 June 2009.
25. Interview with Azam (male) former student of JAB conducted on 26 July 2009.
26. Interview with Syed (male), Principal of SIS, conducted on 13 June 2009.
27. Interview with Haider (male), Principal of JAB, conducted on 20 July 2009.
28. Interview with Waseem (male), a teacher at a madrassa other than JAB and SIS and a relief
camp volunteer after the 2005 Kashmir earthquake, conducted on 25 August 2009.
29. Interview with Qadir (male), teacher at JAB, conducted on 15 July 2009.
30. Interview with Qadir (male) teacher at JAB conducted on 15 July 2009.
31. Interview with Jabbar (male), teacher at a madrassa other than SIS and JAB and earthquake
relief camp volunteer, conducted on 15 August 2009.
32. Interview with Jabbar (male), teacher at a madrassa other than SIS and JAB and earthquake
relief camp volunteer, conducted on 15 August 2009.
33. Interview with Jabbar (male), teacher at a madrassa other than SIS and JAB and earthquake
relief camp volunteer, conducted on 15 August 2009.
34. Interviews with Haider (male), Principal of JAB, conducted on 20 July 2009.
35. Interview with Jabbar (male), teacher at a madrassa other than SIS and JAB and earthquake
relief camp volunteer, conducted on 15 August 2009.
36. Interview with Jabbar (male), teacher at a madrassa other than SIS and JAB and earthquake
relief camp volunteer, conducted on 15 August 2009.
37. Interview with Qadir (male), teacher at JAB, conducted on 15 July 2009.
504 O. Aijazi and L.C. Angeles
38. Interviews with Haider (male), Principal of JAB, conducted on 20 July 2009.
39. Interview with Qadir (male) teacher at JAB conducted on 15 July 2009.
40. Interview with Hussnain (male), Vice President of SIS, conducted on 13 June 2009.
41. Interview with Hussnain (male), Vice President of SIS, conducted on 13 June 2009.
42. Interview with Khalid (male), graduate from and teacher at SIS, conducted on 15 June 2009.
43. Interview with Hussnain (male), Vice President of SIS, conducted on 13 June 2009.
44. Interview with Hussnain (male), Vice President of SIS, conducted on 13 June 2009.
45. Interview with Haider (male), Principal of JAB, conducted on 20 July 2009.
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