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Political Law Reviewer Bar 2019 Par 2 V 21 by Atty Alexis Medina Pup Law Review PDF Free
Political Law Reviewer Bar 2019 Par 2 V 21 by Atty Alexis Medina Pup Law Review PDF Free
POLITICAL LAW
PART II.
STATE POWERS
POLICE POWER
The laws on discounts for senior citizens and PWDs meet the requirements of
a valid exercise of police power - lawful subject and lawful means: The laws
mandating a 20% discount on purchases of medicines made by senior citizens and PWDs meet
the two requirements for a valid exercise of police power: (a) the interests of the public
generally require the interference of the State; and (b) the means employed are reasonably
necessary to the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful
subject and a lawful method. In this case, the well-being of senior citizens and PWDs is a lawful
subject of legislation. The means employed to achieve the purpose of legislation – which is to
impose discounts on the medical services and purchases of senior citizens and PWDs and to
treat the said discounts as tax deduction rather than tax credit – is also lawful. (Southern Luzon
Drug v. Department of Social Welfare and Development, G.R. No. 199669, April 25, 2017)
1 This collection of summaries or capsules of recent jurisprudence is a work in progress (v 21), subject to continuing
revision and updating. Reproduction for purely academic purposes with due attribution to the author is permitted.
2 AB Political Science, University of the Philippines (UP), Diliman; Order of the Purple Feather (OPF), UP, College of Law; Valedictorian,
San Sebastian College-Recoletos, Manila, College of Law; Philippine Representative to the World Trade Organization (WTO) Trade
Facilitation Preparatory Committee Meeting for Legal Review (Geneva, Switzerland, 2014); Philippine Representative, Senior
Officials’ Meeting, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), 2015; Transaction Adviser on Public Private Partnerships (PPPs); Litigation
lawyer; formerly with the Ponce Enrile Reyes & Manlastas Law Offices (Pecabar); Teaches Constitutional Law at San
Sebastian College- Recoletos, Manila, College of Law, and Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP), Manila, College of Law;
Taught Constitutional Law at New Ear University, College of Law; Partner, Libra Law
PUP LAW REVIEW 2019 Bar Review Notes (Part II) by Atty. Alexis F. Medina pg. 1
expectation of profits, which may not even occur. There can be no taking of a contingency or of
a mere possibility. Also, the supposed taking is not permanent because establishments are not
prevented from adjusting their prices to accommodate the effects of the granting of the
discount, and thus, losses are not inevitable. (Southern Luzon Drug v. Department of Social
Welfare and Development, G.R. No. 199669, April 25, 2017)
The law mandating senior citizens’ discount is not a taking of private property
without just compensation, as the regulation affects only the seller's right to profit,
not earned profits: The laws mandating a 20% discount for senior citizens’ and PWDs are not
confiscatory as no private property is taken without just compensation. The subject provisions
only affect the petitioner's right to profit, and not earned profits. The right to profit is not a
vested right but an inchoate right, a mere expectation, which may or may not come into
existence. (Southern Luzon Drug v. Department of Social Welfare and Development, G.R. No.
199669, April 25, 2017)
Property rights must bow to the primacy of police power because property
rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare. The regulation of a
profession, calling, business or trade has always been upheld as a legitimate exercise of police
power. Thus, the law requiring real estate developers to employ licensed real estate brokers to
sell, market and dispose of their properties is a valid exercise of police power. (Remman
Enterprises v. Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service, G.R. No. 197676,
February 4, 2014)
The rational relationship test for a valid exercise of police power: (1) the interests of
the public generally require its exercise and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary
for the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Lacking these two requisites, the
police power measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights and a
violation of the due process clause. (Fernando v. St. Scholastica’s College, G.R. No. 161107,
March 12, 2013)
Example of means employed not reasonably related to the purpose of the law:
The ordinance -- which requires property owners to (1) demolish their existing concrete wall,
(2) build a fence (in excess of one meter) which must be 80% see-thru, and (3) build the said
fence six meters back in order to provide a parking area – is invalid. Providing for a parking
area has no logical connection to, and is not reasonably necessary for, the accomplishment of
prevention of concealment of unlawful acts and "un-neighborliness.” (Fernando v. St.
Scholastica’s College, G.R. No. 161107, March 12, 2013)
Limiting the height of fences of private properties to one meter and requiring fences in
excess of one meter to be at least 80% see-thru has no reasonable relation to its purpose of
ensuring public safety and security. Such exposed premises could even entice and tempt would-
be criminals to the property. The ordinance is thus an invalid exercise of police power.
(Fernando
v. St. Scholastica’s College, G.R. No. 161107, March 12, 2013)
EMINENT DOMAIN
Meaning of “taking”: "Taking" of property takes place when: (1) the owner is actually
deprived or dispossessed of his property;(2) there is a practical destruction or a material
impairment of the value of his property; (3) the owner is deprived of the ordinary use of the
PUP LAW REVIEW 2019 Bar Review Notes (Part II) by Atty. Alexis F. Medina pg. 2
property, or (4) when he is deprived of the jurisdiction, supervision and control of his property.
(Republic of the Philippines v. Mupas, et al. G.R. No. 181892, 209917, 209696, 8 September
2015)
Moreover, the State may not, under the guise of police power, permanently divest
owners of the beneficial use of their property solely to preserve or enhance the aesthetic
appearance of the community. The ordinance will substantially divest property owners of the
beneficial use of their property solely for aesthetic purposes. (Fernando v. St. Scholastica’s
College, G.R. No. 161107, March 12, 2013)
Just compensation: Full and fair equivalent of the property taken: Fair market
value as standard: Just compensation means the full and fair equivalent of the property taken
from its owner by the expropriator. The standard value is the "fair market value" of the
property at the time of the filing of the complaint for expropriation or at the time of the taking
of property, whichever is earlier. (Republic v. Mupas, et al. G.R. No. 181892, 209917, 209696, 8
September 2015)
Interest as part of just compensation: When the taking of the property precedes
the filing of the complaint for expropriation, the Court orders the condemnor to pay the full
amount of just compensation from the date of taking whose interest shall likewise commence
on the same date. (Republic v. Mupas, G.R. No. 181892, September 8, 2015)
Just compensation: Interest must be paid in case of delay, to be computed from the
time the property is taken to the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited with the
court. (Land Bank of the Philippines v. Santiago, G.R. No. 182209, October 3, 2012)
Legal interest shall be pegged at the rate of 12% interest per annum (p.a.). from the
time of taking until June 30, 2013 only. Thereafter, or beginning July 1, 2013, until fully paid,
the just compensation due the landowners shall earn interest at the new legal rate of 6%
interest p.a. in
PUP LAW REVIEW 2019 Bar Review Notes (Part II) by Atty. Alexis F. Medina pg. 3
line with the amendment introduced by BSP-MB Circular No. 799,58 series of 2013.59.
(Department of Agrarian Reform v. Spouses Sta. Romana, G.R. No. 183290, July 9, 2014)
Actions for just compensation are not barred by laches: An action for payment of
just compensation is not barred by laches. Laches as a doctrine of equity does not apply
because law and equity dictate payment of just compensation. Thus, even after the lapse of
more than 50 years, a property owner may still file a claim to demand just compensation for the
taking of his property without the benefit of expropriations proceedings. (Secretary of the
Department of Public Works and Highways v. Spouses Tecson, G.R. No. 179334, July 1, 2013)
Actions for just compensation are not barred by prescription: An action for
payment of just compensation does not prescribe. If private property is taken by the
Government for public use without expropriation proceedings or negotiated sale, the owner’s
action to recover the land or the value thereof does not prescribe. (Secretary of the
Department of Public Works and Highways v. Spouses Tecson, G.R. No. 179334, July 1, 2013)
The Bill of Rights cannot be invoked against the actions of private individuals:
The Bill of Rights does not govern relationships between individuals; it cannot be invoked
against the acts of private individuals. Thus, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of
the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, and without the
intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be
invoked, for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. The protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private
individuals. (Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 209387, January 11, 2016)
Barangay tanods and barangay chairmen are considered law enforcers for
purposes of the prohibitions in the Bill of Rights: Barangay tanods and barangay
chairmen can be deemed law enforcement officers for purposes of the application of the Bill of
Rights. Similarly, port security personnel’s functions having the color of state-related functions
are deemed agents of government for purposes of the application of the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. (Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 209387, January 11, 2016)
Bantay Bayan civilian volunteers are deemed law enforcers for purposes of the
prohibitions in the Bill of Rights: The acts of the Bantay Bayan - or any barangay-based or
other civilian volunteer organizations in the nature of watch groups - relating to the
preservation of peace and order in their respective areas have the color of a state-related
function. As such, they should be deemed as law enforcement authorities for the purpose of
applying the Bill of Rights. Consequently, evidence obtained by them during an illegal search is
inadmissible as evidence pursuant to the exclusionary rule under the Constitution. (Miguel v.
People, July 31, 2017, G.R. No. 227038)
The Bill of Rights cannot be invoked against the action of a political party,
which is a private organization: The right to due process guards against unwarranted
encroachment by the state into the fundamental rights of its citizens. It cannot be invoked in
private controversies involving private parties. A political party is still a private organization, not
a state instrument. The discipline of members by a political party does not involve the right to
life, liberty or property within the meaning of the due process clause. (Atienza v. Commission
on Elections, G.R. No. 188920, February 16, 2010)
RIGHT TO LIFE
An ordinance that promotes economic benefits over the very basic rights to
life, security and safety -- is invalid: An ordinance to promote the constituents’ general
welfare in terms of economic benefits cannot override the very basic rights to life, security and
safety of the people. In the absence of any convincing reason that the life, security and
safety of the
PUP LAW REVIEW 2019 Bar Review Notes (Part II) by Atty. Alexis F. Medina pg. 4
inhabitants of Manila are no longer put at risk by the presence of the oil depots in Pandacan,
Ordinance No. 8187 in favor of the retention of the oil depots is invalid and unconstitutional.
(Social Justice Society Officers v. Lim, G.R. No. 187836, November 25, 2014)
DUE PROCESS
Substantive and procedural due process: Due process of law has two aspects:
substantive and procedural. In order that a particular act may not be impugned as violative of
the due process clause, there must be compliance with both the substantive and the procedural
requirements thereof. Substantive due process refers to the intrinsic validity of a law that
interferes with the rights of a person to his property. Procedural due process, on the other
hand, means compliance with the procedures or steps, even periods, prescribed by the statute,
in conformity with the standard of fair play and without arbitrariness on the part of those who
are called upon to administer it. (Alliance for the Family v. Garin, G.R. No. 217872, August 24,
2016)
Procedural due process: When the lack of prior notice and hearing is not
necessarily a violation of due process -- clamping of illegally parked vehicles: Notice
and hearing are the essential requirements of procedural due process. Yet, there are many
instances under our laws in which the absence of one or both of such requirements is not
necessarily a denial or deprivation of due process. Immobilization of illegally parked vehicles by
clamping the tires is not a violation of due process, despite the lack of a trial-type hearing prior
to the clamping. The immobilization of illegally parked vehicles by clamping the tires is
necessary because the transgressors are not around at the time of apprehension. Under such
circumstance, notice and hearing would be superfluous. Moreover, the transgressors have the
chance to reverse the apprehensions through a timely protest which procedure equally satisfies
the need for a hearing. In other words, the prior intervention of a court of law is not
indispensable to ensure a compliance with the guaranty of due process. (Legaspi v. City of
Cebu, G.R. No. 159110, December 10, 2013)
Although the FDA is the primary agency that determines whether a contraceptive drug
or certain device has no abortifacient effects, the FDA should allow its findings and conclusion
to be questioned and those who oppose the same must be given a genuine opportunity to be
heard. (Alliance for the Family v. Garin, G.R. No. 217872, August 24, 2016)
The FDA certified, procured and administered such contraceptive drugs and devices,
without the observance of the basic tenets of due process, without notice and without public
hearing, despite the constant opposition from the petitioners. Thus, the certifications/re-
certifications and the distribution of the questioned contraceptive drugs by the FDA should be
struck down as violative of the constitutional right to due process. A decision rendered in
disregard of the right to due process is void for lack of jurisdiction. (Alliance for the Family v.
Garin, G.R. No. 217872, August 24, 2016)
Due process requires opportunity to be heard: What the law prohibits is not the
absence of previous notice but its absolute absence and lack of opportunity to be heard. The
opportunity to be heard through motion for reconsideration is sufficient compliance with due
process. Any initial defect in due process, if any, is cured by availing of this remedy. (Shu v.
Dee, G.R. No. 182573, April 23, 2014)
PUP LAW REVIEW 2019 Bar Review Notes (Part II) by Atty. Alexis F. Medina pg. 6
proceedings, due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and
given an opportunity to explain or defend oneself. The essence of due process, therefore, as
applied to administrative proceedings, is an opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity
to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. (Office of the Ombudsman v.
Conti, G.R. No. 221296, February 22, 2017)
Meaning of “to be heard”: “To be heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in
court; one may be heard also through pleadings. (Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25,
2013)
Void-for-vagueness doctrine and due process: Vague laws are void because first,
these violate due process for failure to accord persons fair notice of the conduct to avoid;
second, these leave law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions. (Imbong v.
Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014)
PUP LAW REVIEW 2019 Bar Review Notes (Part II) by Atty. Alexis F. Medina pg. 7
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as
to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects: (1) it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the
conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its
provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle." Petitioners must
properly identify
a) any provision in the law, which, because of its vague terminology, fails to provide fair
warning and notice to the public of what is prohibited or required so that one may act
accordingly; or b) an ambiguous provision in the law that allows enforcement authorities to
second-guess if a particular conduct is prohibited or not prohibited. (Samahan ng mga
Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017)
Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial
sense. In administrative proceedings, due process entails "a fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. Thus, a denial of a respondent’s motion to avail of discovery procedures to
obtain evidence in her defense is not a violation of due process if she was afforded the
opportunity to be heard and to explain her side before the administrative body and was allowed
to submit her answer and all documents in support of her defense. (Sibayan v. Alda, G.R. No.
233395, January 17, 2018)
EQUAL PROTECTION
The equal protection clause requires a valid classification: The guaranty of equal
protection envisions equality among equals determined according to a valid classification. If the
groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class
may be treated and regulated differently from another. In other words, a valid classification
must be:
(1) based on substantial distinctions; (2) germane to the purposes of the law; (3) not limited to
PUP LAW REVIEW 2019 Bar Review Notes (Part II) by Atty. Alexis F. Medina pg. 8
existing conditions only; and (4) equally applicable to all members of the class. (Mosqueda v.
Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Association, Inc., G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016)
The requirements for a valid and reasonable classification are: (1) it must rest on
substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it must not be
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the same
class. The law may, therefore, treat and regulate one class differently from another class
provided there are real and substantial differences to distinguish one class from another.
(Ferrer v. Bautista, G.R. No. 210551, June 30, 2015)
When to apply the tests: Rational basis scrutiny for economic and social
welfare laws, intermediate scrutiny for classifications based on gender or illegitimacy
and strict scrutiny for laws that affect fundamental right or operates to the peculiar
class disadvantage of a suspect class: The rational basis scrutiny (also known as the
rational relation test or rational basis test) demands that the classification reasonably relate to
the legislative purpose. The rational basis test often applies in cases involving economics or
social welfare, or to any other case not involving a suspect class. When the classification puts a
quasi- suspect class at a disadvantage, it will be treated under intermediate or heightened
review. Classifications based on gender or illegitimacy receives intermediate scrutiny. To survive
intermediate scrutiny, the law must not only further an important governmental interest and be
substantially related to that interest, but the justification for the classification must be genuine
and must not depend on broad generalizations. The strict scrutiny review applies when a
legislative classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or
operates to the peculiar class disadvantage of a suspect class. The Government carries the
burden to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest, and
that it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest. (Mosqueda v. Pilipino Banana
Growers & Exporters Association, Inc., G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016)
Valid classification: Real property owner and informal settler for purposes of
the socialized housing program: For the purpose of urban development and housing
program, the disparities between a real property owner and an informal settler as two distinct
classes are too obvious. The differentiation is not discriminatory within the meaning of the
Constitution. Thus, a socialized housing tax on real property owners to provide funds for the
housing of informal settler is a not class legislation that violates the equal protection clause.
(Ferrer v. Bautista, G.R. No. 210551, June 30, 2015)
PUP LAW REVIEW 2019 Bar Review Notes (Part II) by Atty. Alexis F. Medina pg. 9
Valid classification: Judges with over 5 years of experience and judges with
less for purposes of nomination by the JBC: The policy of JBC requiring 5 years of service
as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicant to second-level courts does
not violate the equal protection clause. There is a substantial distinction between judges with 5
years of experience and those with less than 5 five years. The classification is reasonable and
relevant to its legitimate purpose of selecting those with proven competence, integrity, probity
and independence. (Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 211833, April 7, 2015)
Invalid classification: PUV owners and private vehicle owners for purposes of
posting election campaign materials on vehicles. Prohibiting owners of Public Utility
Vehicles (PUVs) and transport terminals from posting election campaign materials violates the
equal protection clause. If owners of private vehicles and other properties are allowed to
express their political ideas and opinion by posting election campaign materials on their
properties, there is no cogent reason to deny the same preferred right to owners of PUVs and
transport terminals. (1-United Transport Koalisyon [1-Utak] v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 206020, April 14, 2015)
PUP LAW REVIEW 2019 Bar Review Notes (Part II) by Atty. Alexis F. Medina pg. 10
The Constitutional guarantee does not prohibit all forms of searches and seizures. It is
only directed against those that are unreasonable. Conversely, reasonable searches and
seizures fall outside the scope of the prohibition and are not forbidden. As a general rule,
searches conducted with a valid are reasonable. (Veridiano v. People, June 7, 2017, G.R. No.
200370)
PUP LAW REVIEW 2019 Bar Review Notes (Part II) by Atty. Alexis F. Medina pg. 11
the said law such as manipulation of security prices, insider trading, acting as dealer or broker
without being registered with the SEC, use of unregistered exchange, use of unregistered
clearing agency, and violation of the restrictions on borrowings by members, brokers, and
dealers among others. Moreover, the violation of the SRC and estafa are offenses entirely
different from each other and neither one necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the
other. (People v. Pastrana, G.R. No. 196045, February 21, 2018)
To be valid, a search warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and
the things to be seized. One of the tests to determine the particularity in the description of
objects to be seized under a search warrant is when the things described are limited to those
which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued. If the search
warrant does not state the specific offense committed, it is not possible for the issuing judge as
well as the applicant to determine that the items sought to be seized are connected to any
crime. Thus, a search warrant for violation R.A. 8799 and (The Securities Regulation Code) and
Estafa and ordering the seizure of telephone bills showing the companies’ calls to clients
abroad; list of brokers and their personal files; incorporation papers of all these companies,
sales agreements with clients; copies of official receipts purposely for clients; fax messages
from the clients; company brochures; letterheads -- is null and void for having been issued for
more than one offense and for lack of particularity in the description of the things sought for
seizure. The terms used in this warrant were too all-embracing, thus, subjecting all documents
pertaining to the transactions of respondents, whether legal or illegal, to search and seizure.
(People v. Pastrana,
G.R. No. 196045, February 21, 2018)
Description of the area to be searched: The specific area to be search inside a
large compound need not be identified in the warrant: A description of a place to be
searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can ascertain and identify with reasonable
effort the place intended, and distinguish it from other places in the community. The search
warrant identifying the place to be searched, as (1) the house of Jaylord Dimal and (2)
the palay warehouse in the premises of the Felix Gumpal Compound at Ipil Junction, Echague,
Isabela – without identifying the two houses, one nipa hut, two external bathrooms, one
garage, one warehouse utilized as a palay depot, and one warehouse for a palay drying
machinery inside the compound -- sufficiently describes the place to be searched. (Castillo v.
People, G.R. No. 216922, April 18, 2018)
Description of items to be searched: Items must bear direct relation to the
offenses for which the warrant is being issued: A search warrant may be said to
particularly describe the things to be seized (1) when the description therein is as specific as
the circumstances will ordinarily allow; or (2) when the description expresses a conclusion of
fact - not of law by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the search and seizure;
(3) and when the things to be described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the
offenses for which the warrant is being issued. The purpose for this requirement is to limit the
articles to be seized only to those particularly described in the search warrant in order to leave
the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what items they shall seize, to the end that
no unreasonable searches and seizures will be committed. Only objects that are (a) subject of
the offense; (b) stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; or (c) those
used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense, can be the proper subject
of a search warrant. Having no direct relation to the crime of kidnapping with homicide, the
1,600 sacks of palay that were supposedly sold by the victims to the accused and found in his
warehouse, cannot be a proper subject of a search warrant. (Castillo v. People, G.R. No.
216922, April 18, 2018)
The seizure of goods not described in the warrant does not render the whole seizure
illegal, and the seizure is illegal only as to those things which was unlawful to seize; and (2) the
fact that the officers, after making a legal search and seizure under the warrant, illegally made
a search and seizure of other property not within the warrant does not invalidate the first
search and seizure. (Castillo v. People, G.R. No. 216922, April 18, 2018)
A lawful arrest must precede the search; the process cannot be reversed: A
search incidental to a lawful arrest requires that there must first be a lawful arrest before a
search is made. Otherwise stated, a lawful arrest must precede the search; "the process cannot
be reversed." (Veridiano v. People, G.R. No. 200370, 07 June 2017)
PUP LAW REVIEW 2019 Bar Review Notes (Part II) by Atty. Alexis F. Medina pg. 12
Grounds for a valid warrantless arrest: A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense
has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the
person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where
he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another. (Veridiano v. People, G.R. No.
200370, 07 June 2017)
Reliable information alone is insufficient to support a warrantless arrest absent any overt
act from the person to be arrested indicating that a crime has just been committed, was being
committed, or is about to be committed. The warrantless arrest cannot likewise be justified as a
hot pursuit arrest if the law enforcers had no personal knowledge of any fact or circumstance
indicating that petitioner had just committed an offense. A hearsay tip by itself does not justify
a warrantless arrest. Law enforcers must have personal knowledge of facts, based on their
observation, that the person sought to be arrested has just committed a crime. (Veridiano v.
People, G.R. No. 200370, 07 June 2017)
Over act requirement: The mere act of leaving a residence of a known drug
peddler is not sufficient for a valid arrest: The mere act of leaving a residence of a known
drug peddler is not sufficient for a valid arrest, unless there is an overt manifestation that the
person had just engaged in, was actually engaging in or was attempting to engage in the
criminal activity of illegal possession of shabu. (Sanchez v. People, G.R. No. 204589, November
19, 2014)
Overt act requirement: The act of walking while reeking of liquor per se
cannot be considered a criminal act that justifies an in flagrante delicto arrest. The
mere act of a person who smells of liquor in passing by police officers without acting
suspiciously or doing anything wrong is not an overt act that shows that she has just
committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime to justify a warrantless in flagrante
delicto arrest. The act of walking while reeking of liquor per se cannot be considered a criminal
act. (Reyes v. People, G.R. No. 229380, June 06, 2018)
Requirements for a valid hot pursuit arrest: Law enforcers need not personally
witness the commission of a crime. However, they must have personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances indicating that the person sought to be arrested committed it. (Veridiano v.
People, G.R. No. 200370, 07 June 2017)
An informant’s tip that a pot session is going on inside a house is not sufficient
justification for police officers to enter such house to effect an arrest and seizure without a
warrant. Personal knowledge of facts in arrests without warrant must be based upon probable
cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. (People v. Martinez,
G.R. No. 191366, December 13, 2010)
Police presence during the commission of the offense is not required for a hot
pursuit arrest: In a hot pursuit arrest, police presence at the scene while the crime was being
committed is not required. It is enough that evidence of the recent commission of the crime is
patent and the police officer has probable cause to believe, based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances, that the person to be arrested has recently committed the crime. Thus,
if the police officers respond to the scene of the crime in less than one hour and talked to the
bloodied mauling victim who identified his attackers in the same neighborhood, and these
alleged attackers did not deny the incident but had a different version – the police officers had
personal knowledge to justify the warrantless arrest of the alleged attackers. (Pestilos v.
Generoso, G.R. No. 182601, November 10, 2014)
The arrest of a person who had presented himself before the police station to clear his
name and prove that he was not the accused -- was not valid, as he was neither committing
nor attempting to commit an offense, and the police officers had no personal knowledge of any
offense that he might have committed. (In the Matter of Petition for Habeas Corpus of
Datukan Malang Salibo, v. Warden, Quezon City Jail, G.R. No. 197597, April 8, 2015)
The apprehending police officer must have a genuine reason, in accordance with his
experience and the surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person to be held has
weapons concealed about him. (Sanchez v. People, G.R. No. 204589, November 19, 2014)
PUP LAW REVIEW 2019 Bar Review Notes (Part II) by Atty. Alexis F. Medina pg. 14
police officer should properly introduce himself and make initial inquiries, approach and restrain
a person who manifests unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to check the latter’s outer
clothing for possibly concealed weapons. The apprehending police officer must have a genuine
reason, in accordance with his experience and the surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief
that the person to be held has weapons concealed about him. (Sanchez v. People, G.R. No.
204589, November 19, 2014)
Contraband lying outside of a suspect’s house and exposed to the sight of police officers
serving a search warrant can be seized under the plain view doctrine. (Crescencio v People,
G.R. No. 205015, November 19, 2014)
When items not described in the search warrant may be seized under the
plain view doctrine: Under the plain view doctrine, during the conduct of the search, objects
falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in a position to have that view are
subject to seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence. For the
"plain view doctrine" to apply, it is required that the following requisites are present: (a) the law
enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a
position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of evidence in plain view is
inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be
evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. (Castillo v. People, G.R. No.
216922, April 18, 2018)
The items supposedly seized in plain view must be confiscated in relation to
the seizure of the items identified in the search warrant: Other items subsequently
found cannot be admitted: The plain view doctrine cannot apply if it is not clear whether the
items supposedly seized in plain view were confiscated in relation to the seizure of the items
identified in the search warrant -- whether prior to, contemporaneous with or subsequent to
such seizure. The "plain view doctrine" can no longer provide any basis for admitting the other
items subsequently found. (Castillo v. People, G.R. No. 216922, April 18, 2018)
Immediately apparent test: Items not inherently unlawful cannot be seized
under the plain view doctrine: The "immediately apparent" test only require there is a
probable cause to associate the property with a criminal activity. The plain view doctrine cannot
justify seizure of items the possession thereof is not inherently unlawful. Thus the following
items not described in the warrant but also seized are inadmissible: (a) 3 torn cloths; (b) black
bag pack; (c) a piece of gold-plated earing; (d) a suspected human hair; (e) a piece of
embroidered cloth; (f) 3 burned tire wires; (g) empty plastic of muriatic acid; and (h) white t-
shirt. (Castillo v. People, G.R. No. 216922, April 18, 2018)
PUP LAW REVIEW 2019 Bar Review Notes (Part II) by Atty. Alexis F. Medina pg. 15
just open it,” there is consent to the search of the contents of the bag. (People v. Cogaed, G.R.
No. 200334, July 30, 2014)
Reasonable Search:
Airport Security Search
Reasonable Search:
Seaport Security Search
Reasonable Search:
PUP LAW REVIEW 2019 Bar Review Notes (Part II) by Atty. Alexis F. Medina pg. 16
Reasonable Search:
Public Bus Search: Guidelines, Limitations, Application
The State can impose non-intrusive security measures and filter those going
in a public bus. A bus, a hotel and beach resort, and a shopping mall are all private property
accessible to the public. The State, much like the owner, can impose non-intrusive security
measures and filter those going in. A person's expectation of privacy is diminished whenever he
or she enters private premises that arc accessible to the public. Thus, a bus inspection at a
military checkpoint constitutes a reasonable search. (Saluday v. People, April 3, 2018, G.R. No.
215305)
Prior to entry, passengers and their bags and luggages can be subjected to a routine
inspection akin to airport and seaport security protocol. Metal detectors and x-ray scanning
machines can be installed at bus terminals. Passengers can also be frisked. In lieu of electronic
scanners, passengers can be required instead to open their bags and luggages for inspection, in
the passenger's presence. Should the passenger object, he or she can validly be refused entry
into the terminal. (Saluday v. People, April 3, 2018, G.R. No. 215305)
While in transit, a bus can still be searched by government agents or the security
personnel of the bus owner in the following three instances. First, upon receipt of information
that a passenger carries contraband or illegal articles, the bus where the passenger is aboard
can be stopped en route to allow for an inspection of the person and his or her effects. This is
no different from an airplane that is forced to land upon receipt of information about the
contraband or illegal articles carried by a passenger onboard. Second, whenever a bus picks
passenger en route, the prospective passenger can be frisked and his or her bag or luggage be
subjected to the same routine inspection by government agents or private security personnel as
though the person boarded the bus at the terminal. This is because unlike an airplane, a bus is
able to stop and pick passengers along the way, making it possible for these passengers to
evade the routine search at the bus terminal. Third, a bus can be flagged down at designated
military or police checkpoints where State agents can board the vehicle for a routine inspection
of the passengers and their bags or luggages.
In both situations, the inspection of passengers and their effects prior to entry at the
bus terminal and the search of the bus while in transit must also satisfy the following
conditions to qualify as a valid reasonable search. First, as to the manner of the search,
it must be the least intrusive and must uphold the dignity of the person or persons being
searched, minimizing, if not altogether eradicating, any cause for public embarrassment,
humiliation or ridicule. Second, neither can the search result from any discriminatory motive
such as insidious profiling, stereotyping and other similar motives. In all instances, the
fundamental rights of vulnerable identities, persons with disabilities, children and other similar
groups should be protected. Third, as to the purpose of the search, it must be confined to
ensuring public safety. Fourth, as to the evidence seized from the reasonable search, courts
must be convinced that precautionary measures were in place to ensure that no evidence was
planted against the accused.
The search of persons in a public place is valid because the safety of others may be put
at risk. Given the present circumstances, the Court takes judicial notice that public transport
buses and their terminals, just like passenger ships and seaports, are in that category.
Aside from public transport buses, any moving vehicle that similarly accepts passengers
at the terminal and along its route is likewise covered by these guidelines. Hence, whenever
compliant with these guidelines, a routine inspection at the terminal or of the vehicle itself while
in transit constitutes a reasonable search. Otherwise, the intrusion becomes unreasonable,
thereby triggering the constitutional guarantee under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution.
To emphasize, the guidelines do not apply to privately-owned cars. Neither are they
applicable to moving vehicles dedicated for private or personal use, as in the case of taxis,
which are hired by only one or a group of passengers such that the vehicle can no longer be
flagged down by any other person unti1 the passengers on board alight from the vehicle.
(Saluday v. People, April 3, 2018, G.R. No. 215305)
FREE SPEECH
PUP LAW REVIEW 2019 Bar Review Notes (Part II) by Atty. Alexis F. Medina pg. 17
Void-for-Vagueness
Overbreadth and vagueness doctrines, as facial challenges, apply only to free speech
cases, not for testing the validity of penal statutes. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No.
203335, February 18, 2014)
The law penalizing “aiding and abetting” the commission of internet libel is
void for being vague and overbroad: The law penalizing “aiding and abetting” the
commission of internet libel is void for being vague and overbroad. The terms "aiding or
abetting" unnecessarily sweep broadly, thereby invading the area of protected freedoms,
generating a chilling effect on those who express themselves in cyberspace. Also, netizens are
not given "fair notice" or warning as to what is criminal conduct and what is lawful conduct. Its
vagueness also causes a chilling effect on the freedom of expression. (Disini v. Secretary of
Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014)
The tarpaulins are political advocacy of private individuals and not election
propaganda subject to Comelec regulation: Speech with political consequences enjoys a
high degree of protection. Tarpaulins put up by private individuals that contain statements of
their approval or criticisms of public officials’ vote on the RH Law, as part of these private
individuals’ advocacy campaign against the RH Law, and not paid for by any candidate or
political party – are not election propaganda subject to Comelec regulation.
PUP LAW REVIEW 2019 Bar Review Notes (Part II) by Atty. Alexis F. Medina pg. 18
Regulation of speech in the context of electoral campaigns made by non-candidates or
who do not speak as members of a political party which are principally advocacies of a social
issue during elections -- is unconstitutional. Regulation of election paraphernalia involving
speech of persons who are not candidates is valid, if what is regulated is declarative speech
that, taken as a whole, has for its principal object the endorsement of a candidate only. The
regulation (a) should be provided by law, (b) reasonable, (c) narrowly tailored to meet the
objective of enhancing the opportunity of all candidates to be heard and considering the
primacy of the guarantee of free expression, and (d) demonstrably the least restrictive means
to achieve that object. The regulation must only be with respect to the time, place, and manner
of the rendition of the message.
The Comelec’s general role includes ensuring equal opportunities and reduce spending
among candidates and their registered political parties. It is not to regulate or limit the speech
of the electorate in the electoral exercise. Expression by the electorate on contemporary issues
is a form of speech protected as a fundamental and primordial right by our Constitution.
Restriction on freedom of speech and of the press: The Comelec’s rule -- limiting
the broadcast and radio advertisements of candidates and political parties for national election
positions to an aggregate total of one hundred twenty (120) minutes and one hundred eighty
(180) minutes for political campaigns or advertisements -- is unreasonable and arbitrary, as it
unreasonably restricts the freedom of speech and of the press. It unduly restricts and
constrains the ability of candidates and political parties to reach out and communicate with the
people.
Violation of the right to suffrage: The COMELEC’s aggregate time-limit rule [rule
limiting the broadcast and radio advertisements of candidates and political parties for national
election positions to an aggregate total of one hundred twenty (120) minutes and one hundred
eighty (180) minutes for political campaigns or advertisements] violate the people’s right to
suffrage by restricting the right of the people to be adequately informed for the intelligent
exercise of their right to determine their own destiny. (GMA Network v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 205357, September 2, 2014)
No captive audience: Prohibiting owners of PUVs and transport terminals from posting
election campaign materials cannot be justified under the captive-audience doctrine. The
commuters are not forced or compelled to read the election campaign materials posted on PUVs
and transport terminals, nor are they incapable of declining to receive the messages contained
therein. (1-United Transport Koalisyon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 206020, April 14,
2015)
Election surveys may tend to shape voter preferences. When published, election surveys
partake of the nature of election propaganda subject to Comelec regulation. The requirement of
disclosing the names of subscribers to election surveys is valid regulation of declarative speech
by private entities in the context of an election campaign because 1) it has basis in a statute, 2)
it furthers not just an important or substantial state interest but even a compelling one, which is
to guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and 3) narrowly tailored to meet
the objective and is least restrictive means to achieve that objective.
The Comelec rule on mandatory right to reply is valid: The Constitution itself
mandates the right to reply. Moreover, radio and TV broadcasting companies do not own the
airwaves but are merely given the temporary privilege of using them. The exercise of the
privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of
public service. (GMA Network v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205357, September 2,
2014)
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
Under the Establishment Clause, the State is prohibited from sponsoring any religion or
favoring any religion as against other religions. (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, 8 April
2014)
It is a grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the
Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of a party from registration. The government must
act for secular purposes. (Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
190582, April 8, 2010)
A 2010 CHED Memorandum has imposed a positive duty on all Higher Education
Institutions (HEIs) to exempt students, as well as faculty members, from academic activities in
case such activities interfere with their religious obligations. Thus, HEI officials are duty bound
to enforce the 2010 CHED Memorandum insofar as it requires the exemption of students who
are Seventh-Day Adventists from academic responsibilities that conflict with the schedule of
their Saturday worship. (Almores v. Achacoso, July 19, 2017, G.R. No. 217453)
That a student is being made by a state university to choose between honoring his
religious obligations and finishing his education is a patent infringement of his religious
freedoms. (Almores v. Achacoso, July 19, 2017, G.R. No. 217453)
Why the holding of religious rituals such as Catholic masses at the basement
of any hall of justice may be allowed
The State recognizes the inherent right of the people to freely exercise their
religion: Allowing religion to flourish is not contrary to the principle of separation of
Church and State: Allowing the practice does not violate the principle of separation of Church
and State. The State recognizes the inherent right of the people to freely exercise their religion.
Our very own Constitution recognizes the religiosity of our people. Allowing religion to flourish is
not contrary to the principle of separation of Church and State.
PUP LAW REVIEW 2019 Bar Review Notes (Part II) by Atty. Alexis F. Medina pg. 21
Allowing the holding of Catholic masses at the basement of the QC Hall of
Justice is not a case of establishment, but merely accommodation: Allowing the
holding of Catholic masses at the basement of the QC Hall of Justice is not a case of
establishment, but merely accommodation. To give life to the constitutional right of freedom of
religion, the State adopts a policy of accommodation. Benevolent neutrality allows
accommodation of religion under certain circumstances. Accommodations are government
policies that take religion specifically into account, not to promote the government's favored
form of religion, but to allow individuals to exercise their religion without hindrance. Their
purpose or effect therefore is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person's or
institution's religion. (In re: Holding of Religious Rituals at the Hall of Justice Building in
Quezon City, A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017)
RIGHT TO PRIVACY
Meaning of the right to privacy: The right to privacy is the right to be let alone.
Right to privacy may extend to places where one has the right to exclude the public or deny
them access, such as a business office. (Spouses Hing v. Choachuy, G.R. No. 179736, June 26,
2013)
There are the three strands of the right to privacy: (1) locational or situational
privacy; (2) informational privacy; and (3) decisional privacy. The right to informational privacy
is usually defined as the right of individuals to control information about themselves. (Vivares v.
St. Theresa’s College, G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014)
An ordinance requiring property owners to expose their property by limiting the height
of fences to one meter and requiring fences in excess of one meter to be at least 80% see-
thru is a violation of the right to privacy of the property owners. (Fernando v. St. Scholastica’s
College, G.R. No. 161107, March 12, 2013)
LIBERTY:
Waiver under Art. 125 of RPC: Not a license to detain a person indefinitely:
The waiver of Article 125 of the RPC does not vest upon the DOJ, PPO, BJMP, and PNP the
unbridled right to indefinitely incarcerate an arrested person and subject him to the whims and
caprices of the reviewing prosecutor of the DOJ. The waiver of the effects of Article 125 of the
RPC is not a license to detain a person ad infinitum. Every person's basic right to liberty is not
to be construed as waived by mere operation of Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. A
detainee must be promptly released to avoid violation of the constitutional right to liberty,
despite a waiver of Article 125, if the 15-day period (or the thirty 30- day period in cases of
violation of R.A. No. 91659) for the conduct of the preliminary investigation lapses. This rule
also applies in cases where the investigating prosecutor resolves to dismiss the case, even if
such dismissal was
PUP LAW REVIEW 2019 Bar Review Notes (Part II) by Atty. Alexis F. Medina pg. 22
appealed to the DOJ or made the subject of a motion for reconsideration, reinvestigation or
automatic review. (Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Department of Justice, G.R. No.
232413, July 25, 2017)
A person is illegally arrested and detained because of a mistaken identity can avail
himself of a petition for habeas corpus. (In the Matter of Petition for Habeas Corpus of
Datukan Malang Salibo, v. Warden, Quezon City Jail, G.R. No. 197597, April 8, 2015)
Nature of the Writ of Amparo: Protection of the right to life, liberty, and
security: The protective writ of amparo is a judicial remedy to expeditiously provide relief to
violations of a person's constitutional right to life, liberty, and security, and more specifically, to
address the problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
(Callo
v. Commissioner Morente, G.R. No. 230324, September 19, 2017)
Meaning of extralegal killings: Killings committed without due process of law, i.e.,
without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings. (Callo v. Commissioner Morente, G.R. No.
230324, September 19, 2017)
In the proceedings under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, the guilt or innocence of the
respondents is not determined, and no penal sanctions are meted. The proceedings only
endeavor to give the aggrieved parties immediate remedies against imminent or actual threats
to life, liberty or security. (Republic v. Cayanan, November 7, 2017, G.R. No. 181796)
The failure of the police to conduct a fair and effect investigation may amount
to a violation of or threat to the rights to life, liberty and security of a person: The
failure of the police and military authorities to conduct a fair and effect investigation amounted
to a violation of or threat to the rights to life, liberty and security of a person who claims to
have been abducted and tortured by the military. The right to security of a person includes the
positive obligation of the government to ensure the observance of the duty to investigate. The
Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered
ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights especially when they are
under threat. Protection includes conducting effective investigations. The duty to investigate
must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality preordained to be
ineffective. An investigation must have an objective and be assumed by the State as its own
legal duty. (Rodriguez v. Macapagal Arroyo, G.R. No. 191805, November 15, 2011)
The writ of habeas data is a remedy in case a person’s right to privacy in life, liberty or
security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee,
or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. It
is designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an
individual or a person’s right to control information regarding oneself. (Gamboa v. Chan, G.R.
No. 193636, July 24, 2012)
Writ of habeas data: There must be a nexus between the right to privacy on
the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other for the writ to be
granted: Writ of habeas data: There must be a nexus between the right to privacy on the one
hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other for the writ to be granted. Thus, the
existence of a person’s right to informational privacy and a showing, at least by substantial
evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of
the victim are indispensable before the privilege of the writ may be extended. (Vivares v. St.
Theresa’s College, G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014)
The petitioner must show that the supposed dissemination of a sex video will
violate his right to privacy in life, liberty or security: The petition must adequately show
that there exists a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life,
liberty or security on the other. The allegations in the petition must be supported by substantial
evidence. Thus, it must be shown that the supposed reproduction and threatened dissemination
of the subject sex video will violate the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the
petitioner. (Lee v. Ilagan, October 8, 2014, G.R. No. 203254)
PUP LAW REVIEW 2019 Bar Review Notes (Part II) by Atty. Alexis F. Medina pg. 24
The writ of habeas data, however, can be availed of as an independent remedy to
enforce one’s right to privacy, more specifically the right to informational privacy. The remedies
against the violation of such right can include the updating, rectification, suppression or
destruction of the database or information or files in possession or in control of respondents.
(Vivares v. St. Theresa’s College, G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014)
An application for a writ of habeas data may be denied if the right to privacy in life,
liberty or security must yield to an overriding legitimate state interest, such as dismantling of
private armed groups (PAGs). The state interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the alleged
intrusion on the private life of Gamboa. Thus, the act of the police in collecting information on
individuals suspected of maintaining PAGs, such as Gamboa, and in sharing and forwarding
such information to a government body tasked to investigate PAGs was not an unlawful act that
violated or threatened her right to privacy in life, liberty or security. The fact that the PNP
released information to the government investigating commission without prior communication
to Gamboa and without affording her the opportunity to refute the same cannot be interpreted
as a violation or threat to her right to privacy since that act is an inherent and crucial
component of intelligence- gathering and investigation. (Gamboa v. Chan, G.R. No. 193636,
July 24, 2012)
LIBERTY OF ABODE
The law allows evictions and demolition without any court order in cases
where persons occupy danger areas or areas where government infrastructure
projects are about to be implemented but the prescribed procedure must be
followed: The Constitution provides that urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor
their dwelling demolished, except in accordance with law and in a just and humane manner. RA
7279 allows summary evictions and demolition in cases where persons or entities occupy
danger areas (such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines,
waterways) and when persons occupy areas where government infrastructure projects with
available funding are about to be implemented. To ensure that evictions and demolitions are
conducted in a just and humane manner, RA 7279 requires compliance with a prescribed
procedure in executing eviction and/or demolition orders, including prior 30-day notice and
adequate consultation. Evictions and demolitions without any court order under RA 7279 are
valid. (Kalipunan Ang Damay Ang Mahihirap v. Robredo, G.R. No. 200903, July 22, 2014)
TRAVEL
Power of the Supreme Court to curtail the right to travel of members of the
judiciary and court personnel: The Supreme Court, under its power of administrative
supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof, has the power to oversee all matters
relating to the effective supervision and management of all courts and personnel under it,
including the rules and regulations on their foreign travels. (Leave Division v. Heusdens, Dec 13,
2011, AM No. P-11-2927)
The Supreme Court regulations on foreign travels of members of the judiciary and court
personnel is necessary for the orderly administration of justice. If judges and court personnel
can go on leave and travel abroad at will and without restrictions or regulations, there could
be a disruption in the administration of justice. (Leave Division v. Heusdens, Dec 13, 2011, AM
No. P-11-2927)
PUP LAW REVIEW 2019 Bar Review Notes (Part II) by Atty. Alexis F. Medina pg. 25
"national security, public safety, or public health" and "as may be provided by law." (Genuino v.
De Lima, April 17, 2018, G.R. No. 197930)
The right to travel is not absolute. As the 1987 Constitution itself reads, the State may
impose limitations on the exercise of this right, provided that they: (1) serve the interest of
national security, public safety, or public health; and (2) are provided by law. (Samahan ng
mga Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017)
Our legal system is replete with laws emphasizing the State's duty to afford special
protection to children. Article 139 of PD 603 explicitly authorizes local government units,
through their city or municipal councils, to set curfew hours for children. PD 603 provides
sufficient statutory basis - as required by the Constitution - to restrict the minors' exercise of
the right to travel. (Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon City, G.R. No.
225442, August 8, 2017)
The DOJ cannot keep an individual within the Philippine jurisdiction so that
he may not be able to evade criminal prosecution: That there is a risk of flight does not
authorize the DOJ to take the situation upon itself and draft an administrative issuance to keep
the individual within the Philippine jurisdiction so that he may not be able to evade criminal
prosecution and consequent liability. It is an arrogation of power it does not have; it is a
usurpation of function that properly belongs to the legislature. (Genuino v. De Lima, April 17,
2018, G.R. No. 197930)
Why the State may restrict the right to travel of minors: The restrictions on the
right to travel that apply solely to minors are likewise constitutionally permissible. Minors do
possess and enjoy constitutional rights, but the exercise of these rights is not co-extensive as
those of adults. They are always subject to the authority or custody of another, such as their
parent/s and/or guardian/s, and the State. As parens patriae, the State regulates and restricts
the minors' exercise of their rights, such as in voting, executing contracts, employment, and
travelling. The differential treatment of the minors' constitutional rights is justified by: first, the
peculiar vulnerability of children; second, their inability to make critical decisions in an informed
and mature manner; and third, the importance of the parental role in child rearing. (Samahan
ng mga Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017)
What the government must show to validly restrict a fundamental right, such
as the right to travel: The strict scrutiny test - Compelling state interest and least
restrictive means: Limitations on the fundamental right to travel of minors are constitutionally
permissible if these pass the strict scrutiny test. Under the strict scrutiny test, a legislative
classification that interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the
disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional. Thus, the government has the
burden of proving that the classification (1) is necessary to achieve a compelling State interest,
and (2) is the least restrictive means to protect such interest or the means chosen is narrowly
tailored to accomplish the interest. (Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon City,
G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017)
PUP LAW REVIEW 2019 Bar Review Notes (Part II) by Atty. Alexis F. Medina pg. 26
Restricting the right to travel: The compelling state interest requirement of
the strict scrutiny test: Compelling State interests include constitutionally declared policies.
That children's welfare and the State's mandate to protect and care for them as parens patriae
constitute compelling interests to justify regulations by the State. In this case, respondents
have sufficiently established that the ultimate objective of the Curfew Ordinances is to keep
unsupervised minors during the late hours of night time off of public areas, so as to reduce - if
not totally eliminate - their exposure to potential harm, and to insulate them against criminal
pressure and influences. (Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon City, G.R. No.
225442, August 8, 2017)
Restricting the right to travel: The least restrictive means requirement: While
fundamental rights may be restricted, the restrictions must be minimal or only to
the extent necessary to achieve the State's compelling interest: While fundamental
rights may be restricted, the restrictions must be minimal or only to the extent necessary to
achieve the purpose or to address the State's compelling interest. When it is possible for
governmental regulations to be more narrowly drawn to avoid conflicts with constitutional
rights, then they must be so narrowly drawn. The curfew ordinances, in restricting the right to
travel, must also sufficiently protect the minors' rights of association, free exercise of religion,
travel, to peaceably assemble, and of free expression. (Samahan ng mga Progresibong
Kabataan v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017)
Curfew ordinances must provide for exemptions that allow the exercise of the
rights to association, free exercise of religion, travel, peaceably assemble, and free
expression: The curfew ordinances, in restricting the right to travel, must also sufficiently
protect the minors' rights of association, free exercise of religion, travel, to peaceably assemble,
and of free expression. The Navotas and Manila curfew ordinances protect the rights to
education, to gainful employment, and to travel at night from school or work. However, even
with those safeguards, the Navotas Ordinance and, to a greater extent, the Manila Ordinance
still do not account for the reasonable exercise of the minors' rights of association, free exercise
of religion, rights to peaceably assemble, and of free expression, among others. (Samahan ng
mga Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017)
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION
The Miranda doctrine requires that: (a) any person under custodial investigation has
the right to remain silent; (b) anything he says can and will be used against him in a court of
law;
(c) he has the right to talk to an attorney before being questioned and to have his counsel
present when being questioned; and (d) if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided
before any questioning if he so desires. (People v. Chavez, G.R. No. 207950, September 22,
2014)
Miranda rights apply only during a custodial investigation: Miranda rights apply
only during a custodial investigation, when the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry
into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the
police who starts the interrogation and propounds questions to the person to elicit incriminating
statements." Custodial investigation shall include the practice of issuing an "invitation" to a
person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed.
(People v. Cabanada, July 19, 2017, G.R. No. 221424)
Confession to the police when the person was not yet a suspect – admissible
as evidence because he was not yet under custodial investigation: An uncounseled
confession elicited during the initial police interview at the residence of an alleged theft victim
at the time when the person confessing was not yet identified by the police as a suspect -- is
admissible as evidence against that person, because the person was not yet under custodial
investigation. However, a subsequent confession to the police after being brought to the police
PUP LAW REVIEW 2019 Bar Review Notes (Part II) by Atty. Alexis F. Medina pg. 27
station is inadmissible because her appearance before the police station already falls within the
definition of custodial investigation. (People v. Cabanada, July 19, 2017, G.R. No. 221424)
The lawyer must be competent: The lawyer who will assist the accused should be
competent, independent and prepared to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the
accused, as distinguished from one who would merely be giving a routine, peremptory and
meaningless recital of the individual's constitutional rights. A lawyer is not vigilant in protecting
the rights of the accused, if during the course of the custodial investigation, he allows the
accused to answer each question without reminding him that he can refuse to answer and/or
remain silent. (People
v. Paris, G.R. No. 218130, February 14, 2018)
SELF-INCRIMINATION
Paraffin test without a lawyer is valid: The right against self-incrimination extends
only to testimonial compulsion, and not when the body of the accused is examined. (People v.
Fieldad, G.R. No. 196005, October 1, 2014)
BAIL
Purpose: Bail protects the right of the accused to due process and to be presumed
innocent. (Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 213847, August 18, 2015)
Who are entitled to bail: The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before being
convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense,
or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence
of his guilt is strong. (Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 213847, August 18, 2015)
When bail may be allowed regardless of the crime charged and independently
of the merits of the charge: When the incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious
to his health or to endanger his life: Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused,
regardless of the crime charged, should be allowed independently of the merits of the
charge, provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to
endanger his life. The objective of bail is to ensure the appearance of the accused during the
trial. (Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 213847, August 18, 2015)
PUP LAW REVIEW 2019 Bar Review Notes (Part II) by Atty. Alexis F. Medina pg. 28
SPEEDY TRIAL &
Under the “balancing test,” in the determination of whether that right has been violated,
the factors that may be considered and balanced are as follows: (1) the length of delay; (2) the
reason/s for the delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4)
the prejudice caused by the delay. (People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 232197-98, April 16,
2018)
Example of violation of the right: Pre-trial was not held for more than 1 year-
after the arrest; the prosecution failed to present any evidence during the 4 settings
with any justifiable reason; the accused was in detention during the trial; and the
accused moved for the dismissal of the case for violation of his right to a speedy
trial: In this case, all the factors showing a violation of his right are present: (a) length of
delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the defendant's assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice
to the defendant. (People v. Domingo, G.R. No. 204895, March 21, 2018)
The court must consider the length of delay and the reason for the delay: The
more than eight years it took the Rizal Provincial Prosecutor to resolve a rather
routine issue (like venue in libel cases) is inordinate, unreasonable and unjustified:
The length of delay must be commensurate with the reason thereof. The more than eight years
it took the Rizal Provincial Prosecutor to resolve a rather routine issue (like venue in libel cases)
is clearly inordinate, unreasonable and unjustified. Furthermore, the silence of the accused
during such period could not be viewed as an unequivocal act of waiver of their right to speedy
determination of their cases. That the accused could have filed a motion for early resolution of
their cases is immaterial. The more than eight years delay the Rizal Provincial Prosecutor
incurred before issuing his resolution of the complaints is an affront to a reasonable
dispensation of justice and such delay could only be perpetrated in a vexatious, capricious and
oppressive manner. (People v. Macasaet, G.R. No. 196094, March 05, 2018)
PUP LAW REVIEW 2019 Bar Review Notes (Part II) by Atty. Alexis F. Medina pg. 29
process during the two-year period before the filing of the proper Informations. (People v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 232197-98, April 16, 2018)
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Requirements for jeopardy to attach: The first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a
valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has
been entered; and (e) when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed
or otherwise terminated without his express consent. (Jamaca v. People, G.R. No. 183681, July
27, 2015)
If the accused were never arraigned in lower court, and the criminal case was dismissed
upon the order of the Supreme Court, a first jeopardy never attached. (Ocampo v. Abando,
G.R. No. 176830, February 11, 2014)
Double jeopardy may be invoked only for the same offense or identical
offenses: Where two different laws (or articles of the same code) defines two
crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other,
although both offenses arise from the same fact, if each crime involves some
important act which is not an essential element of the other: The protection against
double jeopardy may be invoked only for the same offense or identical offenses. Where two
different laws (or articles of the same code) defines two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of
them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the same
fact, if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of the other.
There is nothing common or similar between the essential elements of the crimes of falsification
of private document under Article 172 (2) of the RPC and that of violation of Section 46 of RA
6938, as alleged in the Informations filed against petitioner. As neither of the said crimes can
be said to necessarily include or is necessarily included in the other, the third requisite for
double jeopardy to attach— a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first—is,
therefore, absent. (Assistio v. People, G.R. No. 200465, April 20, 2015)
Provisional dismissal is not an acquittal; hence, jeopardy will not attach: The
provisional dismissal of the case does not operate as an acquittal since its dismissal is made
with the express consent of the accused; thus, double jeopardy does not attach. (Saldariega v.
Panganiban, G.R. Nos. 211933 & 211960, April 15, 2015)
CONFRONTATION
PUP LAW REVIEW 2019 Bar Review Notes (Part II) by Atty. Alexis F. Medina pg. 30
INFORMATION
Right to information and the State’s duty of full public disclosure: The people’s
constitutional right to information is intertwined with the government’s constitutional duty of full
public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest. The people have the right to access
the papers and documents relating to the company profile and legal capacity of the winning
bidder for a government project. (Initiatives for Dialogue and Empowerment Through
Alternative Legal Services, Inc. v. Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management
Corporation, G.R. No. 192088, October 9, 2012)
PUP LAW REVIEW 2019 Bar Review Notes (Part II) by Atty. Alexis F. Medina pg. 31
which are "predecisional" and "deliberative" in nature - part of or related to the deliberative
process, i.e., notes, drafts, research papers, internal discussions, internal memoranda, records
of internal deliberations, and similar papers - are protected and cannot be the subject of a
subpoena. (Department of Foreign Affairs v. BCA International, June 29, 2016, G.R. No.
210858)
The reasons for the deliberative process privilege: first, the privilege protects
candid discussions within an agency; second, it prevents public confusion from premature
disclosure of agency opinions before the agency establishes final policy; and third, it protects
the integrity of an agency's decision; the public should not judge officials based on information
they considered prior to issuing their final decisions. (Department of Foreign Affairs v. BCA
International, June 29, 2016, G.R. No. 210858)
PUP LAW REVIEW 2019 Bar Review Notes (Part II) by Atty. Alexis F. Medina pg. 32