Soft Computing

The Security Scheme and Assessment System Deployment of The Internet of Drones
Based on Hybrid-Mode Inverse Time Domain Algorithm
--Manuscript Draft--

Manuscript Number: SOCO-D-23-07015

Full Title: The Security Scheme and Assessment System Deployment of The Internet of Drones
Based on Hybrid-Mode Inverse Time Domain Algorithm

Article Type: Original Research

Keywords: Internet of Drones (IoD); Hybrid-Mode Inverse Time Domain (HMITD) Algorithm;
Identity Authentication; vulnerability detection; Anti-Interference

Corresponding Author: Chenglei ZHANG, Ph.D.

Linyi University
Linyi Cit, Shandong CHINA

Corresponding Author Secondary

Information:

Corresponding Author's Institution: Linyi University

First Author: Jiajia LIU, Ph.D.

First Author Secondary Information:

Order of Authors: Jiajia LIU, Ph.D.

EDI SYAMS ZAINUDIN, Phd

AZIZAN BIN AS'ARRY, Ph.D

MOHD IDRIS SHAH BIN ISMAI, Ph.D

Chenglei ZHANG, Ph.D

Funding Information: Natural Science Foundation of Shandong Dr. Chenglei ZHANG

Province
(No. ZR2019PEE019)
Natural Science Foundation of Shandong Dr. Chenglei ZHANG
Province of China
(No. ZR2021ME109)

Abstract: In the contemporary landscape of ubiquitous drone integration, security challenges

necessitate meticulous scrutiny. Particularly pronounced are the vulnerabilities
associated with signal interference and the security apprehensions, which underscore
the imperative to investigate anti-interference for enhancing security. This research is
expressly directed toward the IoD, to explore anti-interference while concurrently
evaluating the security attributes inherent in the HMITD authentication scheme
bespoke to drones. The framework encompasses the proposition of both anti-
interference and HMITD authentication schemes. Furthermore, the security
assessment system is articulated and devised to furnish risk evaluation. A notable
facet entails the deployment of an anti-error signal interference system, characterized
by the heartbeat packet status verification, which implementation seeks to mitigate the
deleterious effects of erroneous signal interference, thereby fortifying the security of
drones. In security evaluation, the study introduces a symbolexecution-based detection
algorithm, fine-tuned for lightweight IoD applications. The algorithm demonstrates
adept overflow detection mechanisms, contributing to the overall robustness of the
proposed framework. Culminating the discourse is the introduction of a protection
status verification algorithm, subjected to rigorous experimental validation, thereby
elucidating the robustness and efficacy of the proposed algorithms. Empirical findings
from the experimentation phase showcase minimal fluctuations in response time,
affirming the high stability of the devised system. The HMITD authentication scheme
emerges as a vanguard in augmenting both anti-interference resilience and
authentication security within the IoD. The demonstrated accuracy, effectiveness, and
robustness of the detection algorithm collectively position it as an efficacious approach
for vulnerability detection and IoD security.

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1
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The Security Scheme and Assessment System
5
6 Deployment of The Internet of Drones Based on
7
8
9
Hybrid-Mode Inverse Time Domain Algorithm
10
11 Jiajia LIU a,b,c, EDI SYAMS ZAINUDIN a*, AZIZAN BIN AS'ARRY a, MOHD IDRIS SHAH BIN ISMAI a , Chenglei
12 ZHANG b,c*
13 a
Department of Mechanical and Manufacturing Engineering, Faculty of Engineering, Universiti Putra Malaysia, UPM Serdang, Selangor Darul Ehsan,
14
Malaysia;
15
b
16 School of mechanical and vehicle engineering, Linyi University, Linyi 276000 CHINA
c
17 Institute of Industrial Design and Intelligent Manufacturing, Linyi University, Linyi 276000 CHINA
18
19 Corresponding author: Chenglei ZHANG (e-mail: zhangchenglei@lyu.edu.cn) & EDI SYAMS ZAINUDIN (e-mail: edisyam@upm.edu.my).
20
21
22  unprecedented challenges, notably in the realms of
23 Abstract—In the contemporary landscape of ubiquitous drone cybersecurity and authentication mechanisms [1]. The security
24 integration, security challenges necessitate meticulous scrutiny. of drones is intrinsically tied to the stability and reliability[2] of
Particularly pronounced are the vulnerabilities associated with industrial applications, particularly when these autonomous
25
signal interference and the security apprehensions, which
26 systems operate beyond human intervention, presenting a
underscore the imperative to investigate anti-interference for
27 enhancing security. This research is expressly directed toward the critical concern due to potentially irreversible consequences
28 IoD, to explore anti-interference while concurrently evaluating the arising from unforeseen events or malevolent interventions.
29 security attributes inherent in the HMITD authentication scheme Consequently, there is a pressing need for research in anti-
30 bespoke to drones. The framework encompasses the proposition of interference technologies and advanced authentication
31 both anti-interference and HMITD authentication schemes. mechanisms[3] to fortify the security paradigm. This paper
32 Furthermore, the security assessment system is articulated and
systematically delves into the security intricacies within the
33 devised to furnish risk evaluation. A notable facet entails the
deployment of an anti-error signal interference system, Internet of Drones (IoD) network, concentrating on anti-
34
characterized by the heartbeat packet status verification, which interference technologies, hybrid inverse-time domain
35
36 implementation seeks to mitigate the deleterious effects of authentication protocols, and security vulnerability detection.
erroneous signal interference, thereby fortifying the security of The primary objective is to furnish innovative solutions to
37 drones. In security evaluation, the study introduces a symbol-
38 bolster the security framework of drone applications.
execution-based detection algorithm, fine-tuned for lightweight
39 IoD applications. The algorithm demonstrates adept overflow A. Definition of Research Challenges
40 detection mechanisms, contributing to the overall robustness of
41 Within the realm of industrial automation, the Internet of
the proposed framework. Culminating the discourse is the
42 introduction of a protection status verification algorithm, Drones (IoD)[4] confronts formidable challenges,
43 subjected to rigorous experimental validation, thereby elucidating encompassing anti-interference[5] strategies, robust
44 the robustness and efficacy of the proposed algorithms. Empirical authentication[6] methodologies, and vigilant security
45 findings from the experimentation phase showcase minimal vulnerability[7] management. To unlock the full potential of
46 fluctuations in response time, affirming the high stability of the IoD networks, this study rigorously formulates critical
devised system. The HMITD authentication scheme emerges as a inquiries: How can the anti-interference resilience of IoD
47 vanguard in augmenting both anti-interference resilience and
48 authentication security within the IoD. The demonstrated
networks be augmented? What methodologies can be
49 accuracy, effectiveness, and robustness of the detection algorithm devised to architect authentication systems that are not only
50 collectively position it as an efficacious approach for vulnerability impervious but also reliable? Moreover, how can effective
51 detection and IoD security. protocols for security vulnerability detection be established
52 to preempt potential threats?
53 Index Terms—Internet of Drones (IoD), Hybrid-Mode Inverse
54 Time Domain (HMITD) Algorithm, Identity Authentication, B. Positioning of the Gap
55 vulnerability detection, Anti-Interference In recent years, significant strides have been made in
56 researching drone security, particularly in the domains of
57 I. INTRODUCTION signal interference and authentication. However,
58

T HE relentless advancement of drones has led to their comprehensive investigations into HMITD authentication
59 schemes and exhaustive security assessments within the
pervasive integration across diverse domains, posing
60 IoD environment remain somewhat limited. The subsequent
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 1
2 section will meticulously survey relevant literature to the security infrastructure of the Internet of Drones (IoD).
3 address this scholarly void. Notwithstanding the commendable strides witnessed in
4 the domain of IoD security, scrupulous analysis of the
5
II. RELATED WORK literature reveals conspicuous limitations that warrant
6
In the realm of drones and the Internet of Drones (IoD), discerning consideration. Foremost among these is the
7
8 the issue of security assumes paramount significance. This imperative to reinforce extant research in the realm of IoD
9 literature review systematically dissects prevailing research, identity authentication, with a view to amplifying credibility,
10 employing terminologies such as Internet of Drones (IoD), mitigating computational overhead, and fortifying
11 drone, UAV, security assessment, security detection, robustness. Additionally, the extant body of scholarship
12 password authentication, identity authentication, tends to afford only cursory scrutiny to the nuanced domain
13 vulnerability detection, and Encryption algorithms, pertinent of automated vulnerability detection within the IoD.
14 to our investigation. A meticulous exploration across diverse Furthermore, select research endeavors exhibit Encryption
15 databases was executed to procure pertinent literature, Algorithms characterized by suboptimal timeliness, thereby
16 meticulously categorizing it into four pivotal thematic engendering plausible security vulnerabilities.
17 domains: security authentication, lightweight authentication,
18 C. Articulation of Problems
vulnerability detection, and Encryption Algorithm. The focal points of this research revolve around mitigating
19
Exemplary works were judiciously selected and interference challenges, enhancing authentication security,
20
encapsulated. and addressing security vulnerabilities prevalent in
21
22 A. Definition of Research Challenges unmanned drones navigating within the Internet of Drones
23 Within the realm of industrial automation, the Internet of (IoD) milieu. The research aims to fortify drone systems
24 Drones (IoD)[4] confronts formidable challenges, against diverse signal interferences through anti-interference
25 technology. Simultaneously, the formulation of a hybrid
encompassing anti-interference[5] strategies, robust
26 inverse-time domain authentication scheme seeks to ensure
authentication[6] methodologies, and vigilant security
27 robust identity verification and is resilient against threats
28 vulnerability[7] management. To unlock the full potential of
IoD networks, this study rigorously formulates critical such as identity forgery. Furthermore, the research is
29 attentive to a holistic evaluation of system security, inclusive
30 inquiries: How can the anti-interference resilience of IoD
networks be augmented? What methodologies can be of vulnerability detection and remediation.
31
devised to architect authentication systems that are not only The core objective of this paper is to propose a
32
impervious but also reliable? Moreover, how can effective comprehensive solution that accommodates the security
33
34 protocols for security vulnerability detection be established considerations inherent in IoD networks. This entails
35 to preempt potential threats? innovating anti-interference technologies to heighten the
36 stability of IoD networks concerning wireless
37 B. Positioning of the Gap communication and navigation. Additionally, through
38 In recent years, significant strides have been made in hybrid inverse-time domain authentication and automated
39 researching drone security, particularly in the domains of vulnerability detection, potential security vulnerabilities
40 signal interference and authentication. However, within the IoD network can be identified and rectified,
41 comprehensive investigations into HMITD authentication thereby fortifying the overall system robustness.
42 schemes and exhaustive security assessments within the IoD
43 environment remain somewhat limited. The subsequent D. Impetus, Truth, and Objectives
44 section will meticulously survey relevant literature to The impetus for this research emanates from a profound
45 address this scholarly void. concern for security issues within IoD networks, with the
46 Considerable scholarly discourse has been devoted to overarching aim of ensuring trustworthy safety in drone
47 deliberating security authentication[8-24] challenges systems during automated operations. The research
48 intrinsic to the Internet of Drones (IoD), each endeavoring to endeavors to address pivotal security issues within IoD
49 proffer bespoke security protocols or solutions in alignment networks through innovative technological methodologies.
50 Specific objectives include enhancing the anti-interference
with its unique investigational milieu. Notably, a
51 capabilities of IoD networks, designing more secure
preponderance of researchers has converged upon adopting
52 authentication systems, and formulating effective protocols
53 lightweight security paradigms[8] [11] [14] [16] [17] [18]
[19] [20] [21] [22] [24]as the de facto modus operandi. for vulnerability detection.
54
55 Furthermore, our survey of the extant literature underscores
56 a pervasive inclination among scholars to engage with the
57 intricacies of defending against attacks[8] [9] [11] [13] [14]
58 [15] [16] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22], yielding commendable
59 outcomes that fortify IoD's resilience against malicious
60 incursions. A nuanced analysis of the corpus reveals
61 instances where researchers have proffered Encryption
62 Algorithms [11] [13] [15] [17] [19], efficaciously bolstering
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2 TABLE 1.
3 LITERATURE TABLE
4
5 Authors Security Lightweight Defend against Encryption Descriptions
6 Authentication Authenticated Attacks Algorithm
7
8 (Wazid, M., et al.)[8] ✔ ✔ ✔ ✘ The literature proposes an IoD lightweight user authentication scheme to resist several
9 known attacks.

10 (Tanveer, M., et al.)[9] ✔ ✘ ✔ ✘ The literature proposes a privacy protection scheme for IoD.

11 (Jan, S.U., I.A. Abbasi ✔ ✘ ✘ ✘ The literature proposes a robust public key-based authentication IoD environment scheme.
12 and F. Algarni)[10]

13 (Jan, S.U., F. Qayum ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ The literature proposes a lightweight authentication protocol based on the Hash Message
and H.U. Khan)[11] Authentication Code/Secure Hash Algorithm (HMACSHA1) for protecting IoD.
14
15
(Jan, S.U. and H.U. ✔ ✘ ✘ ✘ The literature proposes IoD security verification of designs using 2 models.
Khan,)[12]
16
17
(Tanveer, M., et ✔ ✘ ✔ ✔ The literature uses elliptic curve cryptography, symmetric encryption, and hash functions to
al.)[13] propose an IoD user authentication mechanism.
18 (Srinivas, J., et al.)[14] ✔ ✔ ✔ ✘ proposes a novel anonymous lightweight user authentication mechanism for IoD,
19
20
(Tanveer, M., et al)[15] ✔ ✘ ✔ ✔ The literature proposes an authentication framework for IoD that uses chaotic mapping in
combination functions.
21 (Yu, S., et al.)[16] ✔ ✔ ✔ ✘ proposes a secure and lightweight authentication protocol for IoD.
22
23
(Tanveer, M., N. ✔ ✔ ✘ ✔ The literature proposes a protocol (RAMP-IoD) based on authenticated encryption
Kumar and M.M. primitives elliptic curve encryption and hash function lightweight encryption.
24 Hassan)[17]
25 (Tanveer, M., et ✔ ✔ ✔ ✘ The literature proposes a lightweight AKE protocol for the IoD environment (LAKE-IoD).
26 al.)[18]
27 (Tanveer, M., et ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ The literature proposes an IoD authentication scheme utilizing lightweight hash functions
28 al.)[19] and authenticated cryptographic primitives.
29 (Lei, Y., et al.)[20] ✔ ✔ ✔ ✘ The literature proposes a lightweight identity security authentication protocol (ODIAP).

30 （Zhang, Y., et al.） ✔ ✔ ✔ ✘ The literature proposes a lightweight AKA scheme with only a secure one-way hash function
31 [21] and bitwise XOR operation and resists various known attacks.
32 （Pu, C., et al.）[22] ✔ ✔ ✔ ✘ The literature proposes a lightweight and privacy-preserving mutual authentication and key

33 agreement protocol PMAP and shows resilience against various security attacks.

34 （Selvi, P.T., et al.） ✔ ✘ ✘ ✘ The literature proposes a Chebyshev polynomial source authentication scheme based on
[23] elliptic curve encryption.
35
36 (Yu, S., et al.)[24] ✔ ✔ ✘ ✘ The literature proposes a secure and lightweight authentication protocol SLAP-IoD.

37 2) Innovative Encryption Algorithm: The introduction of

38 E. Significance and Advantages of the Study a dynamic one-time asymmetric encryption algorithm
39 The principal goal of this research is to proffer a with hybrid inverse-time domain characteristics. The
40 comprehensive solution for anti-interference technology and security system includes an emergency response
41 hybrid inverse-time domain authentication in drones within component to promptly implement security strategies
42 the IoD environment. Additionally, an associated security when security threats arise, potentially supporting
43 assessment system will be established. Through these effective security operations in complex IoD
44 innovative solutions, the study aims to elevate the stability, environments.
45 anti-interference capabilities, and authentication security of 3) Automated Vulnerability Detection: The proposal of
46 drone systems, providing a viable technological scaffold for
47 an automated vulnerability detection solution tailored
the future security of IoD networks. for lightweight Linux applications. This scheme, based
48
49 F. Contributions of the Paper on symbolic execution, facilitates automated testing,
50 This study delves into the Internet of Drones (IoD) domain, and analysis of firmware in the overall application
51 with a primary focus on hybrid inverse-time domain system, including automated vulnerability detection,
52 authentication schemes, asymmetric encryption algorithms, encryption vulnerability detection, and detection of
53 and security vulnerability detection within drone networks. security protection status. This provides reliable
54 In this context, the main contributions of this paper can be technical support for the security of IoD applications.
55 summarized as follows:
56 G. Arrangement of the remaining sections
1) Security Enhancement: The paper proposes a In contemplation of the aforementioned lacunae, the
57
cryptographic security solution, emphasizing a high ensuing sections of this manuscript are meticulously
58
59 level of trustworthiness and robust identity structured. Section III is devoted to a comprehensive
60 authentication, providing a new perspective for IoD explication of security considerations in the Internet of
61 network identity verification. Drones (IoD), proffering a cogent security paradigm.
62 Section IV introduces a discerningly crafted security
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2 assessment system premised on an overarching design employment of radio frequency (RF) interference devices
3 framework underpinned by Angr. Section V provides a during this process has the potential to engender profound
4 granular exposition of the implementation of a symbolic disruptions[26] to the standard control signals of drones.
5
execution detection algorithm. Section VI comprehensively This arises from the heightened intensity inherent in RF
6
elucidates the intricacies of experimental testing and data interference signals within the same frequency band,
7
8 analysis. The denouement of this exposition, encapsulated in precipitating significant errors and perturbations in the
9 section VII, serves to distill the principal contributions of normal control signals. The resultant safety hazards
10 this discourse while concurrently delineating salient encompass drone signal disarray and potential crashes.
11 trajectories for prospective research endeavors. Furthermore, during flight, drones frequently depend on the
TABLE 2. preeminent GPS geographical location signal sources[27].
12
ABBREVIATIONS AND NOMENCLATURE IN THIS PAPER：
13 This susceptibility renders drones susceptible to ground-
Notations Description
14 based fabrication of high-intensity GPS signals, leading to
IoD Internet of Drones
15 IoT Internet of Things the subversion of geospatial signals emanating from the
16 HMITD hybrid-mode inverse-time domain Communication, Navigation, and Surveillance System
17 UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (CNSS) [28]in space, with conceivable consequences of
18 CNSS Communication, Navigation, and Surveillance System diverting drones to erroneous locations. Additionally, the
19 GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System
RF radio frequency
specter of hacker attacks looms large, representing a
20 DoS Denial of Service substantive menace[29] through the exploitation of
21 MITM Man-in-the-Middle vulnerabilities intrinsic to drone flight control systems.
22 Techniques such as password guessing are wielded to
23 III. PROPOSED SECURITY SCHEME AND HYBRID-MODE potentially commandeer drones[14], thereby precipitating
24 INVERSE TIME DOMAIN (HMITD) IDENTITY AUTHENTICATION disruptions.
25 ALGORITHM FOR IOD 2) Imperative of Employing Password Authentication
26
Algorithms
27 A. Security Threat Analysis
28 Amidst the pervasive proliferation of 5G networks, the
1) Security Threats in Drone Operations
29 expeditious evolution of mobile interconnectivity within the
In the operational deployment scenarios of drones within
30 Internet of Things (IoT)[14] paradigm unveils opportunities.
automated workflows, ensuring the secure and stable
31 Nevertheless, the extant disparate stages and developmental
functioning of these systems constitutes a pivotal research
32 tiers in IoT application device endeavors beget pronounced
challenge. The discernible vulnerabilities and imminent
33 disparities in the protocols, standards, and frameworks
security threats are graphically depicted in Figure 1.
34 embraced by myriad mobile IoT products. This incongruity
Consequently, the visual representation underscores that
35 renders the assurance of data security in mobile
even when exclusively considering scenarios influenced by
36 interconnection IoT applications a formidable challenge.
37 wireless interference attacks, the resulting repercussions
Evidently, safeguarding the security of interconnected IoT
38 possess the potential to inflict incalculable harm. Hence, it is
devices in mobile applications stands as an issue of
39 imperative to conduct a comprehensive analysis of security
paramount import that demands meticulous consideration.
40 threats associated with drones.
In light of the aforementioned security exigencies,
41 realizing authentic automation in drone operations
42 necessitates conscientious attention to the security dynamics
43 inherent in the application scenario. A judicious and
44
expeditious stratagem in this milieu involves the
45
implementation of password authentication algorithms at the
46
data transmission stratum, augmenting the security posture
47
48 of data control processes. Propounding a lightweight
49 password authentication algorithm tailored to drone
50 industrial control systems assumes heightened necessity.
51 Concomitant with the technological strides in the
52 information security domain, wherein cryptography emerges
53 as a pivotal bastion for data protection, There witnessed the
54 predominance of identical and equivalent methods called
55 symmetric encryption methodologies[30] for a long time.
56 Fig. 1. Conceptual Diagram of Wireless Security Threats in the Internet Symmetric encryption, wherein the encryption and
57 of Drones (IoD) decryption operations hinge on identical symmetric
58 Specifically, drones conventionally rely on remote control processes, inherently falters in guaranteeing data
59 signals propagated wirelessly from terrestrial stations[25] transmission security in instances of key compromise. The
60 and leverage the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) watershed year of 1976 marked the advent of asymmetric
61 for geospatial positioning signals[26], thereby effectuating encryption algorithms, as posited by Whitfield Diffie and
62 coordinate localization for flight control. However, the
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2 Martin Hellman[31]. Asymmetric encryption bequeaths two the nx with the corresponding random identifier.
3 distinct keys[32], designating the facet utilized for data Simultaneously, the chosen small odd integers ex(e0、e1 ..
4 encryption as the public key, disseminated openly[33]. The
5 e999) and private key parameters dx(d0 、 d1 .. d999) are
recipient effectuates decryption by leveraging the private collectively inscribed into the password book, establishing a
6
key, undisclosed, and thus safeguarding communication correlation based on the aforementioned parameter
7
8 security to a certain degree in a non-disclosure milieu. In identifiers（nx、ex、dx）to derive the calling identifiers for
9 summation, the selected cryptographic authentication the public key G and private key S:
10 paradigm corresponds to the asymmetric algorithm[34].
𝐺 = (𝑒𝑥 , 𝑛𝑥 ), 𝑆 = (𝑑𝑥 , 𝑛𝑥 ) (6)
11 The public key is disclosed in identifier form during
B. Hybrid Mode Inverse Time Domain (HMITD) Identity
12 transmission, resistant to security vulnerabilities such as
Authentication Algorithm
13 factorization or common security attacks against the
1) Algorithmic Framework
14
The proposed HMITD identity authentication algorithm modulus nx. This fundamentally withstands attacks in the
15
introduces a bidirectional authentication mechanism number field sieve.
16
17 between the client and server, featuring a one-time, one- In the encryption process, denoting m as plaintext and C
18 secret paradigm. Notably, temporal validity checks are as ciphertext, the following conditions are satisfied:
19 incorporated into the verification process to ensure the 𝐶 = 𝑚𝑒𝑥 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛𝑥
20 security of identity authentication within a one-time, one- { 𝑚 = 𝑐 𝑒𝑥 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛𝑥 (7)
21 secret validation instance. In the realm of encryption and (0 ≤ 𝑚 ≤ 𝑛)
22 decryption algorithms, a non-symmetric encryption Within this encryption algorithm, the ciphertext generated
23 algorithm is crafted, leveraging randomly assigned by the encryption side undergoes temporal verification when
24 identifiers for cryptographic parameter invocation. The transmitted to the decryption side. If the ciphertext is not
25 dynamically generated public key enhances security[35] and deciphered and the correct status information is not fed back
26 exhibits expeditious execution, rendering it suitable for to the encryption side within a certain time frame, the
27 applications in identity authentication within the mobile verification key is redistributed. This scheme ensures the
28 interconnected Internet of Things (IoT) devices. This holds security of one-time, one-secret authentication interactions.
29 particular relevance in providing a secure operational 2) Theoretical Model Probability Derivation
30 framework for drones as envisaged in this paper. Consider a random dynamic variable mic and the product
31
Attention is meticulously given to both the speed and of large primes p and q as nx :
32 𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑚𝑖𝑐
security facets in the design of the encryption algorithm.
33
34 Tailored for application in mobile interconnected identity 𝑛𝑥 = 𝑝 × 𝑞 => ∑ × ∑ (1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥 ) (8)
35 authentication systems, the algorithm establishes a 𝑝𝑖 =1 𝑞𝑖 =1
36 connection between the server and client terminal for the Here, randomness is introduced in each construction of n,
37 generation of cryptographic parameters. Within this design and the overall sample X exhibits a probability trend:
38 schema, a random identifier denoted as x is generated for
𝑋~𝑃(𝜆) (9)
39 subsequent parameter computation. Prime factors p and q are
40 selected, where p in each computational set adheres to the The joint probability density of samples X1 、 X2 、
41 relation: X3…..Xn is given by:
42 𝑝𝑥 ∙ 𝑞𝑥 = 𝑛𝑥 (1) 𝑃{𝑋1 = 𝑥1 , 𝑋2 = 𝑥2 … … 𝑋𝑛 = 𝑥𝑛 } (10)
43 This representation, in binary format, exceeds 256 bits. 𝜆𝜉 −𝜆
44 Subsequently, the Euler's totient function nx is computed 𝑃{𝑋 = 𝜉} = 𝑒 , 𝜉 = 0,1,2 … 𝑛 (11)
45 𝜉!
as:
46 Hence:
∅(𝑛𝑥 ) = ∅(𝑝𝑥 ) × ∅(𝑞𝑥 ) = (𝑝𝑥 − 1) × (𝑞𝑥 − 1) (2)
47 𝑃{𝑋1 = 𝑥1 , 𝑋2 = 𝑥2 … … 𝑋𝑛 = 𝑥𝑛 } (12)
Concurrently, an integer ex, coprime to ex, is carefully
48 𝑛 𝑛
𝜉𝑖
selected. The inverse element dx with respect to ex modulo 𝜆
49
φ(nx) is expressed as: = ∏ 𝑃{𝑋𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖 } = ∏ ( 𝑒 −𝜆 )
50 𝑥𝑖 !
𝑖=1 𝑖=𝜆
51 𝑒𝑥 × 𝑑𝑥 = 𝑚𝑜𝑑∅(𝑛𝑥 ) (3)
𝜆 ∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝑥𝑖 −𝑛𝜆 𝑥𝑖 = 0,1,2,3 … 𝑛;
52 𝑑𝑥 = 〖(𝑒〗𝑥 − 1)𝑚𝑜𝑑(𝑝𝑥 − 1)(𝑞𝑥 − 1) (4) = 𝑛 𝑒 ,{ (13)
53 ∏𝑖=1 𝑥𝑖 𝑖 = 1,2,3,4 … 𝑛;
54 The ensuing algorithm produces parameters nx, ex, and dx.
55 In the implementation, 1000 sets of test data are generated Sample x takes a value, and the overall distribution rate is:
56 for encryption and decryption computations: 𝐷 = {(𝑝, 𝑞)|0 ≤ 𝑝 ≤ 𝑛, 0 ≤ 𝑞 ≤ 𝑛} (14)
57 𝑝𝑥 ∙ 𝑞𝑥 = 𝑛𝑥 (0 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 999) (5)
58 In the devised scheme of this study, the generated modules
59 𝑛=𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑛=𝑚𝑖𝑐
nx(n0, n1, ..., n999) are stored in a data list, referred to as the 𝑝𝑖 𝑞𝑖
60
cryptographic key table. During encryption and decryption ∑ ∑ 𝑓( , ) /𝑝𝑞
61 𝑛 = 𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑛 = 𝑚𝑖𝑐
computations, the calculation is undertaken by incorporating 𝑝𝑖 =0 𝑞𝑖 =0
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2 forge identifiers, access to the password repository remains
3 = ∬ 𝑓(𝑝, 𝑞)𝑑𝜎 (15)
elusive. Thus, stratagems involving impersonation and
4 deception to intercept user communication are rendered
5 C. Security Analysis of the Proposed Cryptographic Algorithm inefficacious.
6 This section delves into a meticulous examination of the 7) Prevention of Replay Attacks:
7 security considerations inherent in the cryptographic
8 Authentication within the cryptographic scheme is
algorithm put forth in this study, systematically dissecting augmented with timestamped information[39] during
9
ten prevalent security risk scenarios. transmission, serving as a temporal marker. Even in
10
11 1) Authentication Sans Passwords for Users: instances where attackers manipulate this timestamp, the
12 Within the devised cryptographic framework, users server discerns and authenticates replay attacks through
13 undertake the localized generation of a cryptographic scrutiny of received information, including random numbers,
14 repository on their mobile terminals via private key effectively thwarting replay attacks.
15 operations[36]. Authentication transpires through the 8) Immunity Against Privilege Escalation Attacks:
16 reception of a dynamically assigned identifier from the During user identity authentication across distinct servers,
17 server, alleviating users from the onus of memorizing the cryptographic scheme employs discrete public and
18 passwords and mitigating associated risks tied to password private key pairs[40] for cipher generation. Consequently,
19 breaches. even system administrators with privileged access, armed
20 2) User Identity Impersonation Mitigation: with plaintext information from user authentication, are
21 The cryptographic scheme adeptly fortifies itself against precluded from reverse computation to obtain user private
22 identity impersonation threats. Authentication requests keys, preserving the confidentiality of user-secret
23 undergo dual-layered security measures, encompassing information.
24 digital signatures from the sender and encryption utilizing 9) Forward Secrecy Integration:
25 the recipient's public key. Impersonators, in their endeavors, The cryptographic scheme ensures elevated security by
26 are met with a random identifier[37] post-server generating unique random numbers on each occasion,
27
authentication, bereft of the password repository, rendering attaining the pinnacle of one-time, one-secret security.
28
any attempts at decryption futile. Sensitive information undergoes encryption before
29
30 3) Terminal Loss Safeguards: transmission, preventing the compromise of prior
31 Within the cryptographic scheme, a server-initiated communication contents and averting session key leaks.
32 dynamic encryption cipher is deployed, following a "ten 10) Preservation of Key Security:
33 seconds, one secret" protocol. Failure to receive User private keys, integral to the cryptographic scheme,
34 confirmation data from the mobile terminal within a undergo local generation and remain unarchived on
35 stipulated ten-second timeframe or receipt of erroneous data servers[41]. Users encrypt and store these keys solely on
36 triggers the dispatch of a novel cipher. Persistent tripartite terminal devices for digital signatures and data encryption.
37 failures to obtain confirmation or reception of inaccuracies This approach eliminates the risk of key exposure and
38 designate the mobile terminal as lost, prompting a cessation safeguards against potential theft.
39 of services to preserve user information security.
40 4) Counteraction of Eavesdropping Attacks: IV. AUTOMATED EQUIPMENT SECURITY ASSESSMENT SYSTEM
41 The cryptographic scheme's data packets incorporate
42 random identifiers that harmonize with the password A. Contextual Framework of Security Evaluation System
43 repositories on both the mobile terminal and server. This Design
44 implementation achieves the epitome of security through a The extant anticipations regarding the functionality of
45 one-time, one-secret paradigm. Despite the potential automated operational equipment, typified by the pervasive
46 interception of network packets, extracting meaningful application of drones, transcend the mere substitution of
47 intelligent tasks for human labor[42]. However, such
information remains elusive for adversaries.
48 conceptualizations should not singularly serve as the
5) Mitigation of Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks:
49 foundational rationale for the judicious design of these
50 Stringent time intervals govern the random number
generator within the cryptographic scheme, curtailing the systems. Fundamentally, the contemporary milieu of
51
frequent generation of random numbers within predefined automated operational equipment is a byproduct of the post-
52
time limits. Concurrently, the scheme disallows users with internet epoch[43]. The utilization of existing mechanical
53
identical identity identifiers from submitting repetitive frameworks as substrates unequivocally underscores the
54
55 requests within short intervals, mitigating undue strain on persistent influence of physical constraints within the
56 authentication servers and effectively preventing potential material realm on automated operational equipment.
57 DoS attacks. Consequently, the approach leveraging computational
58 6) Resilience Against Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) directives through intelligent control systems to propel the
59 Attacks: stable functioning of associated automated operational
60 The cryptographic scheme strategically adopts a equipment constitutes a universalized model within the
61 bidirectional authentication[38] paradigm grounded in Internet of Things (IoT)[44]. The functional modules
62 identifier cryptography. Even if malicious actors manage to inherent in the operational system expounded in this
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2 manuscript bear semblance to a generalized IoT architecture, a sequence of program statements, wherein
3 manifesting themselves as physical firmware embedded functionality encapsulates sequential code fragments.
4 within the system. Nevertheless, for the IoT, particularly in The interconnections between code fragments are
5
the context of the Internet of Drones as explicated in this determined by the control transfer process engendered
6
treatise, one of the most formidable perils arises from by branch statements.
7
8 security vulnerabilities[45]. 2) The feasibility of the path pertains to the existence of
9 Security vulnerabilities have become a seminal wellspring numerical values for program input variables. This
10 posing a threat to the security of the Internet of Things value range should satisfy at least one set of values,
11 (IoT)[46], including the Internet of Drones. In recent years, constituting a feasible scenario. Conversely, the path
12 various testing methodologies have arisen, seeking to is deemed “infeasible”if no such set of values exists.
13 proactively unveil and rectify vulnerabilities, thereby The outcomes of executing the aforementioned process
14 mitigating security threats. Among these methodologies, the are output on the path.
15 predominant approaches encompass static analysis[47], 3) The conceptualization of "symbolic representation"
16 dynamic analysis[48], taint tracking[49], symbolic within the application domain should be construed as
17 execution[50], and fuzz testing[51]. With the advent of a specialized variable. This variable is injected into
18 black-box fuzzing[52], a semi-automated paradigm has the program during runtime, and under the influence
19 supplanted manual methods[53]. Notably, static symbolic of the program's branching structure, instigates
20 execution[54] technology has garnered recent research variations in the runtime outcomes of the variable,
21 attention. Considering the imperatives of secure data constituting a process termed as a "path."
22 transmission in IoT applications, the reliability of program 4) Within the Angr framework, the term "constraint
23 encryption verification[55] assumes paramount significance. solver" denotes a mathematical constraint model. This
24 Structural inadequacies in encryption algorithms can model delineates how the framework navigates
25
precipitate severe vulnerabilities[56]. Addressing these towards the anticipated execution path or circumvents
26
concerns, this scholarly contribution proposes a methodical undesired execution paths, ultimately yielding post-
27
28 security testing implementation plan within the automated execution results.
29 operational equipment system. The overarching objective is The automated security detection system devised in this
30 to ensure the effectiveness and trustworthiness of system study distinguishes itself through the incorporation of the
31 security. The chosen method for vulnerability detection is symbolic constraint development library, angr. This library
32 symbolic execution, presenting an innovative approach to encompasses pivotal workflow processes integral to
33 scrutinizing vulnerabilities in encryption algorithms. symbolic execution, including constraint resolution, path
34 determination, memory representation, and concurrent
35 B. Architectural Framework of the Security Assessment System processing. Following the establishment of the symbolic
36 Implementation execution model, the system interfaces with the testing target,
37 The designated detection tool in this scholarly work
introducing functional test processes. It systematically
38 adopts Python as the development language, consolidating
conducts security vulnerability testing by resolving
39 functional modules within the overarching program structure.
constraints and assessing the constrained states encountered
40 This section elucidates the comprehensive logical structure,
within the specified processes.
41 fundamental operational principles of the angr module[57],
42 principles underlying the automated detection of program D. The Overarching Design Framework Based on Angr:
43 stack overflow vulnerabilities[58], principles of detecting The vulnerability detection methodology devised in this
44 vulnerabilities in program encryption algorithms[59], and paper is applied within the Linux platform. The designed
45 principles pertaining to the detection of program protection program autonomously realizes three functionalities:
46 status[59]. Furthermore, pivotal methods and techniques are overflow vulnerability detection, encryption weakness
47 propounded from a programmatic design standpoint. This detection, and verification of the execution program
48 exhaustive analysis is generalized for application in the protection status. Figure 2 illustrates the overall design
49 dissection of firmware functional modules in unmanned workflow.
50 aerial vehicles deployed for automated operations, thereby
51
furnishing adept security assessment capabilities.
52
53 C. Theoretical Underpinnings of “Angr”Symbolic Execution
54 The testing library methodology selected for this scholarly
55 inquiry is founded on angr, a binary program analysis
56 framework rooted in the Python language. The core
57 functionality harnessed in the design and development of this
58 scholarly work is symbolic execution, substantiated by angr.
59
In the foundational tenets of dynamic analysis, the primary
60
process encompasses the following facets:
61
62 1) The entry point of the program “path”is configured as
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2 A. Design of Stack Overflow Vulnerability Detection
Start
3 We have engineered a detection algorithm
4 Get the status of a Load pwntoolsELF Load Explain loading Define accommodating diverse architectures, specifically tailored
5 protected attribute analyzer test program target program initialization state
for scenarios in the Linux environment's ELF files. This
6
selection is substantiated by our system firmware's
7 Detection of Enter Stack overflow Convert state
program
detection vulnerability parameters into operational context, confined within high-performance
8 protection turned
on parameters detection module objects

9 Linux terminal systems. The crux of stack overflow

10 pretty_dict
Pass in the desired vulnerability detection hinges upon the utilization of the
path byte stream Crypto

11
function
recursively
parameters and
program starting
vulnerability
detection module
Program
architecture
32/64-bit register
feature detection
symbolic execution approach articulated in this research.
traverses judgment
12
address
The assessment of the terminal constraints of the symbolic
13 Symbolic Symbolic
vector discerns the characteristics of vulnerabilities. This
Initialize
simulation simulation
14 analysis status
execution execution characteristic emanates from the necessity to allocate
15 Symbolic stack Desired path appropriate system resources for the execution of various
traversal detection traversal probe
16 functionalities within the application system. The
Symbolized
17 register walk
Symbolic memory
traversal detection
Unconstrained state
judgment
foundational tenet in computer operating system principles
detection
18 underscores that allocating an appropriately sized stack
19 Solve constraints space to an executing functional module provides a requisite
20 data operating space. Inadequate space allocation gives rise
Protection Stack overflow
21 status
Encryption
reliability
vulnerability
to unconstrained states in program segments, constituting a
detection detection
test results
22 results results
pivotal condition for triggering overflow vulnerabilities.
23 Real-time acquisition of overflow vulnerability detection
End
24 information mandates the construction of stack pointer status
25 Fig. 2. Proposed Comprehensive Design Workflow
storage, traversal of different entry functions, and
26 In this design workflow, the symbolic execution entity is
synchronous realization of symbolic vector traversal
27 abstractly described as a symbolic vector imbued with variable
constraint states.
28 states. Throughout the system's operation, this variable
29 traverses the program path, with the traversal process The specific approach unfolds as follows: Set the stack
30 revealing anomalous states in the sequence of language space allocation status for the functional function, detect its
31 constructs. The traversal is governed by the program's control assembly instructions for characteristic requests, and capture
32 transfer within the branching statement structure. By features such as 'push ebp; mov esp, ebp;' to assess the
33 introducing different command parameters, distinct execution opening of a stack space segment. Filter characteristic
34 flows and feedback states can be discerned. This facilitates the instructions such as 'leave; ret;' to ascertain the conclusion
35 achievement of three primary functions: protection status of the execution function. The programming implementation
36 assessment, stack overflow vulnerability detection, and for detecting the aforementioned features involves the
37 encryption vulnerability detection. The primary criteria for following method to collect the status of program flow
38 judgment involve analyzing the simulated states of symbolic assembly instructions:
39 constraints and determining whether the constraints can be state.project.factory.block(state.addr).capstone.insns. To
40 resolved to achieve a congruent implementation. implement multiple-path traversal, the following conditional
41 judgment needs to be added: if regs0=="push" and
42 V.DEVELOPMENT OF SYMBOLIC EXECUTION DETECTION regs1=="ebp" and ress2=="mov" and regs3=="ebp" and
43 ALGORITHM regs4=="esp"; The primary criteria for assessing stack
44 overflow vulnerabilities include whether the values stored in
45 This section expounds upon the algorithmic formulation
within our automated detection system, elucidating critical the pop ebp and pop eip registers can be symbolically
46
principles and implementation strategies. The schematic modified. If modification is feasible, it indicates an
47
48 depiction of the program's design logic is presented in Figure inconsistency in the stack structure. During traversal, the
49 3, providing a comprehensive visualization of the method involves storing the content of the ebp pointer each
50 concretization of symbolic execution design intricacies: time: state.globals['ebp_list']={}; Subsequently, detect and
51 traverse all paths' unconstrained states. In the x64
52 architecture, ebp, esp, eip, and other pointers need to be
53 converted to register names such as rbp, rsp, rip, and
54 differentiate register passing differences.
55 To determine whether the target firmware path has been
56 symbolically modified, the specific method is: state.regs.ebp
57 is used to capture the validation value target register
58 parameter. Using a bitwise feature comparison scheme,
59 obtain end-of-program information parameters and use
60 Endness.LE to match whether it is little-endian. The method
61 is as follows: state.memory.load(ebp,
62 Fig. 3. Schematic Representation of Program Design Logic
endness=angr.archinfo.Endness.LE), finally, distinguish the
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2 unconstrained state resolved in the symbolic execution target program's execution flow, an enhanced
3 simulation process, where the activation state simulation detection method has been introduced with the aim of
4 method is: simgr.active, concluding with simgr.step(). augmenting the coverage of this automated detection
5
tool and subsequently enhancing detection accuracy.
6 B. Implementation Principle of the Program Encryption 3) Symbolic Stack: This expanded detection capability
7 Vulnerability Detection
8 focuses on programs where algorithmic functions
This paper introduces an innovative encryption reliability directly process parameters in the stack during
9 detection algorithm based on symbolic execution. The
10 program flow. In scenarios where angr cannot directly
design principle addresses the restoration of parameters for handle function calls, this method can be employed to
11 authentication parameter verification during the execution of
12 initialize stack registers symbolically. Simulated
program encryption algorithms. The specific method parameters are then injected into the program's
13
formulates a simulated symbolic vector traversing the execution flow for detection within the symbolic stack.
14
15 program's branching structure paths. The simulation of the This detection method, aside from introducing
16 symbolic vector ultimately results in only two symbolic stack registers, mirrors the anticipated path
17 distinguishable outcomes in the branching structure: the exploration method mentioned in section (2). The
18 expected path and the unexpected path. The construction of approach to utilizing symbolic stack registers involves:
19 logical constraints in the path logic during the execution of state = p.factory.blank_state() and state.regs.ebp =
20 the symbolic vector involves if the constraints on the state.regs.esp. Symbolic parameters are instantiated
21 expected path can be solved. If so, the verification using the functionality provided by the Claripy library,
22 parameters of the encryption algorithm can be solved, thus implemented as follows: pass0 = claripy.BVS('pass0',
23 deeming the tested program's encryption scheme unreliable; 32/64).
24 otherwise, it is considered reliable. The specific 4) Symbolic Registers: Similar to the conceptual
25 implementation of this design principle is outlined below:
26 framework of the symbolic stacks outlined above,
1) Initialization Setting: The objective of this setting is to
27 symbolic registers are applicable in scenarios
load the target program, detect program entry point
28 involving multiple parameters. In accordance with the
information, present it in an initialized state, and
29 calling conventions of parameters in the stack,
transform this state into an object parameter. The
30 symbolic registers can be instantiated to facilitate the
purpose of these schemes is to facilitate the analysis of
31 detection of input symbolic vectors. The method for
planned route realization. The implementation method
32 symbolic registers is: state.regs.eax (register name) =
for creating the initialization is provided below:
33 claripy.BVS('pass0', 32/64).
34 p = angr.Project(filename,auto_load_libs=False)
5) Symbolic Memory: Symbolizing memory involves
35 state=p.factory.entry_state()
symbolically addressing memory locations used for
36 simgr =
parameter transmission. In the implementation process,
37 p.factory.simulation_manager(state,save_unconstrained=T
employing a scheme that statically analyzes to
38 rue)
determine the program's start address enhances the
39 2) Detection of Anticipated Pathways: This subsection
efficiency of the detection program. The start address
40 elucidates the exploration of expected paths by
needs to precede the symbolization of memory
41 distinctively defining functions for unexpected and
addresses to ensure that the corresponding parameters
42 expected path returns. The initialization object is
can be read before symbolic simulation execution. To
43 utilized as an input parameter to traverse the program's
44 create the symbolic vector required here, symbolic
execution flow. Employing the simgr.explore method
45 parameters for memory need to be set first, with the
resolves the expected constraint conditions, and
46 creation method as follows: p0 =
subsequently, the posix.dumps(0) method is employed
47 state.memory.store(address0, size0). Here, address0
to output the echo content of the resolved path,
48 represents the address of the symbolized memory, and
denoted as simgr.found[0]. This signifies that, within
49 size0 denotes the size of a program's memory space in
programs featuring encryption algorithms, the content
50 bits. For instance, in a 32-bit program, where one word
correctly output by the program through static analysis
51 is 8 bytes in size, and one byte is 8 bits, the size
is transmitted as the expected address string output
52 parameter here would be 8 * 8. Subsequently,
53 into the function responsible for expected path returns.
outputting the simulated execution detection results
54 The program's ability to traverse the expected address
for the expected path is performed after symbolic
55 during the traversal process indicates that, after
execution detection. The output method is:
56 solving symbolic constraints, it can output the
solution_state.se.eval(p0, cast_to=str). It is
57 encryption parameters verified by the encryption
imperative to note the conversion of data in memory
58 algorithm. Failure to traverse the expected address
to a string type for output.
59 implies that the tested program can evade symbolic
60 execution detection, thus demonstrating commendable C. Design Principle for Detection of Enabled Protection
61 security. Recognizing that the constraint detection Vulnerability mitigation is a pivotal component of
62 capability in this detection segment is ill-suited to the fortifying programs and stands as the primary means to
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2 address security issues. The protection mechanism initiates a connection with the server, effecting data
3 validation scheme designed in this study achieves the interaction over the Internet. Subsequently, the state flag
4 verification of the target program's protection-enabled status. parameter is scrutinized. This parameter, generated by the
5
The specific approach utilizes the ELF file interpreter for micro-control unit, verifies alterations in the drone's
6
parsing, with parsing conducted through the checksec communication status log, determining whether the drone is
7
8 method within the pwntools library. This method can in a stable flight control state. If anomalous, the flag is set to
9 recognize attributes such as got, nx, pie, aslr, arch, canary, 1, initiating the program flow into the exceptional state
10 plt, and relro. The states of the traversed results are detection phase. Under normal conditions, the flag is set to
11 sequentially stored in a dictionary for recursive validation 0, leading the program into a loop. The loop body process
12 output. Consequently, potential security vulnerabilities in repeats at three-second intervals. On the server side, stable
13 the tested program can be assessed based on its protection condition verification engenders state parameters. If the flag
14 status, allowing for targeted reinforcement measures and is set to 1 under abnormal conditions, the program transitions
15 effectively enhancing the security of firmware programs. to the exceptional state detection phase. If the flag is set to 0
16 under normal conditions, the program enters the loop body.
17 VI. THE EXPERIMENTAL TESTING AND DATA ANALYSIS In the loop structure, the client generates a random number
18 The investigational inquiry into the HMITD drone featured to offer an effective message authentication scheme,
19 ensuring a unique verification value for each interaction,
a comprehensive tripartite evaluation. This assessment
20 authenticating the interaction, and elevating the system's
encompassed the delineation of the drone's operational
21 efficacy.
22 equipment system, the formulation of a safety-oriented
situational awareness framework, and the establishment of Moreover, the client dispatches a heartbeat packet with
23 state information, including the latest duration of connection
24 an automated safety assessment system for operational
equipment. Following this meticulous evaluative process, an to the server. Simultaneously, upon initialization, the server
25
exhaustive analysis of the acquired data was undertaken, receives the heartbeat packet message from the client and
26
ultimately yielding an objectively formulated feasibility outputs it, thereby disseminating state information to the
27
28 assessment. control end. Subsequently, the client transmits a random
29 number to the server. Upon receiving the random number,
30 A. drone Operational Situational Awareness Defense Testing the server performs a conditional check. If no random
31 1) drone Anti-Interference Attack Experimental Design number is received, it enters the exceptional state detection
32 To appraise the real-time status of drone flight, the phase. If the state is normal, the server disseminates the
33 proposed state monitoring system in this study is random number to the control end after verification and
34 compartmentalized into client and server components. The returns it to the client. The client receives and verifies the
35 client, situated within the drone's body, houses a micro- returned random number against the sent random number. If
36 control unit that interfaces through a wireless network the verification result is incorrect, it enters the exceptional
37 module linked to the mobile network. The system is state detection phase. The aforementioned exceptional state
38 instantiated within a Linux environment. The micro-control detection, both on the client-side and the server-side,
39 unit establishes a connection with the drone's flight control includes Internet connectivity checks and drone API
40 system API, facilitating real-time access to the drone's interface connection log state checks on the client-side, and
41 connection status and activating the drone's protective mode Internet connectivity checks and client access state checks
42 in exceptional circumstances. On the server side, deployed on the server-side. If the random number verification is
43 on a cloud server to ensure stable network access, the client correct on the client-side, a complete client-server
44
establishes a connection through the Internet for heartbeat interaction process is concluded.
45
packet communication, thereby enabling real-time message 2) Robustness Evaluation and Interference Resilience
46
interaction. The interactional sequence between the server Analysis
47
48 and client is elucidated in Figure 4. Employing the real-time state detection paradigm
49 delineated in this investigation, we conducted a
50 comprehensive robustness assessment at ten predefined
51 geographical coordinates. This endeavor aimed to scrutinize
52 the stability of the model against the dynamic states
53 encountered during drone flights. The testing protocol
54 encompassed both static and mobile assessments, effectively
55 simulating the diverse operational states of drones. The
56 resultant dataset, reflective of the model's application
57 performance, was derived from meticulous data collection at
58 each test point, involving the execution times of both the
59 system client and server across 100 iterations.
60
61 Fig. 4. Interaction Flow between System Client and Server
62 In this interactional flow, the client domiciled on the drone
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2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31 Fig. 6. Simulated Dynamics of Mobile Testing
32 The outcomes of the testing phase, predicated on the
33 devised state detection model, are depicted in Figure 5.
34 During the normal operation of the client-server dyad, a
35 periodic heartbeat packet interaction was conducted at three-
Fig. 5. Laboratory Simulation Test Outcomes
36
second intervals. The response times for each of these
37
interactions are delineated in Figure 5(a). Over sustained
38
39 testing periods exceeding 300 seconds, the response times
40 consistently fell within the range of 1 to 2 milliseconds.
41 Some instances exhibited response times within the bracket
42 of 2 to 3 milliseconds, and below 1 millisecond. The
43 maximum delay observed was 2.732 milliseconds, while the
44 minimum delay was 0.956 milliseconds, resulting in a
45 differential of 1.776 milliseconds. This collectively signifies
46 a commendable level of stability. The controlled laboratory
47 conditions, characterized by a stable network infrastructure
48 and high-performance testing equipment, significantly
49 mitigated the impact of network quality and hardware
50 performance on the observed outcomes.
51 To gauge the variability of the interaction model, the
52 coefficient of variation for response times of heartbeat
53 packet interactions in the controlled laboratory environment
54 was computed, as portrayed in Figure 5(b). The outcomes
55 exhibit a coefficient of variation primarily distributed
56
between 0.1 and 0.4, presenting a pattern akin to a sinusoidal
57
function curve. The diminutive numerical value of the
58
59 coefficient of variation suggests that, within the controlled
60 laboratory environment, the interaction system maintains
61 commendable stability, largely alleviating influences
62 stemming from network stability and hardware performance.
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2 Employing a microprocessor unit as the hardware substrate, triggering position of the vulnerability, and offset
3 application testing ensued to assess the collaborative information. The left side of Figure 7 presents the detection
4 mobility of drones based on this state detection model. The outcomes for two sets of vulnerabilities, affirming the
5
response outcomes, as depicted in Figure 6(a), reveal that, precise identification of pertinent information and
6
during the sustained interaction process lasting 300 seconds, underscoring the commendable accuracy of the detection
7
8 heartbeat packet durations predominantly ranged from 1.5 to algorithm.
9 2.5 milliseconds. In comparison to laboratory data, an 2) Detection of Encryption Vulnerabilities
10 increase of approximately 0.5 milliseconds in response time The algorithm designed for detecting encryption
11 was observed, signifying heightened response times in actual reliability in this study achieved the desired path tracing and
12 environments due to hardware limitations and network symbolic exploration of stacks, registers, and memory
13 stability disparities. segments. This encompassed critical scenarios involving
14 Comparing data from two locations, primarily distributed fundamental data interactions during program execution. In
15 between 0.1 and 0.4, and showing similarity to laboratory the path tracing phase, functions returning expected and
16 testing data, the two sets of data exhibited minimal unexpected paths were expressly defined. The detection
17 differences in fluctuation, indicating the robust stability of process entailed the static analysis of content branching
18 the state detection model. The relatively small variations in along expected paths, serving as the expected address input
19 the numerical values of the coefficient of variation, reflected into path-returning functions. Successful traversal of the
20 in Figure 6(b), signify that the state detection model expected path address prompted the matching output,
21 maintains good usability during practical application testing. validated by the encryption algorithm and employed as the
22 Additionally, Figure 6(b) provides a comparison of the encryption key. Should the program's encryption strategy
23 average, median, and maximum values of data for mobile evade symbolic execution detection, it indicates robust
24 testing over a distance of up to 3.6 km. All three data sets security against such scrutiny. Experimental testing on an
25
fall within the range of 1.6 milliseconds to 2.6 milliseconds, illustrative encrypted program is showcased on the right side
26
displaying minimal differences and affirming the reliable of Figure 7. The results affirm the algorithm's ability to
27
28 performance of the state detection system under normal retrieve encrypted ciphertext by traversing the expected path,
29 drone mobile flight conditions. highlighting the unreliability of the encryption method
30 employed by the target program. Consequently, measures to
B. Automated Security Evaluation Testing fortify security are recommended.
31
In order to ascertain the effectiveness and resilience of the 3) Robustness Testing of Program Execution
32
symbolically executed testing algorithm propounded herein, This section delves into the robustness analysis of the
33
34 a suite of C language programs manifesting vulnerabilities symbolically executed detection algorithm proffered in this
35 was meticulously crafted. Subsequently, these programs, study, incorporating two sets of target programs with diverse
36 serving as subjects for empirical investigation, underwent characteristics. The testing scenarios encompass expected
37 compilation into ELF executable files using the GCC path detection, multi-parameter detection, and symbolic
38 compiler. Figure 7 articulates the outcomes of the tests, memory scenarios. The methodology involved the analysis
39 delineating the findings pertaining to vulnerabilities and of response times across ten consecutive detection processes.
40 encryption susceptibilities.
41
42
43
44
45
46 Fig. 7. Detection Outcomes for Vulnerabilities and Encryption
Vulnerabilities
47
48 1) Automated Detection of Overflow Vulnerabilities
49 To scrutinize the precision of the fuzz testing
50 methodology applied to overflow vulnerabilities, two
51 functions with vulnerabilities were deliberately incorporated
52 into the target test program. The vulnerabilities were induced
Fig. 8. Robustness Testing for Encryption Vulnerabilities
53 by the erroneous allocation of stack space. Functionality of
Figure 8 delineates the outcomes of the robustness
54 the vulnerable program involved conventional input and
analysis. In basic testing, the fluctuation across ten data sets
55 output operations, with finite stack space allocated for input
primarily ranged from 2.72 seconds to 2.75 seconds, with a
56 variables. Notably, the read function was assigned a length
57 minimal difference of 2.935 milliseconds between the
exceeding the allocated variable space. Consequently,
58 maximum and minimum values. In multi-parameter
inputting data surpassing the allocated space resulted in the
59 symbolic detection, the fluctuation across ten data sets
overflow of adjacent stack space, giving rise to a buffer
60 primarily ranged from 1.73 seconds to 1.79 seconds, with a
overflow. The experiment entailed the detection of this
61 minimal difference of 6.4 milliseconds between the
vulnerable program, encompassing parameters such as the
62 maximum and minimum values. Comparative results
byte stream length of the vulnerability, the specific
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2 underscore that the detection time for target programs substantive repairs to the target program. The results affirm
3 exhibits minimal sensitivity to the number of detection the precision, effectiveness, and robustness of the detection
4 parameters and the disparities in symbolic representation. algorithms. The response time variations in the exemplary
5
The primary factor influencing the time consumption of the tests are minimal, attesting to high stability. Analysis
6
detection algorithm is likely the complexity of branching discerns the designed detection algorithm as a potent method
7
8 structures within program paths. Additionally, trend analysis for program vulnerability detection, evincing efficiency
9 was conducted on ten data sets for two target programs, minimally affected by the parameters under scrutiny. The
10 revealing a nearly normal distribution curve for both tested tested data results validate the research's effectiveness,
11 program data sets. The similar curvature of the two data sets realizing the intent of enhancing drone security and
12 indicates the robustness of the detection algorithm in the providing a robust foundation for subsequent in-depth
13 encryption reliability domain. research and implementation. The proffered anti-
14 In the robustness analysis of the overflow vulnerability interference technology and authentication scheme hold
15 detection algorithm, the methodology involved the analysis significant implications for the stability and security of drone
16 of response times across ten consecutive detection processes systems, with prospective ramifications for advancing the
17 for target detection programs with 32-bit and 64-bit technological landscape in the IoD domain and proffering
18 architectures. For the 32-bit program's vulnerability more dependable security assurances for drone applications.
19 detection process, the time consumption primarily ranged
20 from 0.76 seconds to 0.82 seconds, with minimal differences. B. Future Work:
21 The 64-bit program's vulnerability detection time Future research trajectories could encompass refining the
22 distribution ranged from 0.69 seconds to 0.71 seconds, with efficiency of detection algorithms and delving deeper into
23 very little difference. The results underscore that the security design aspects. Subsequent investigations may
24 architecture of the target program minimally influences the focus on further optimizing HMITD identity authentication
25 schemes to amplify system anti-interference resilience.
robustness of the overflow vulnerability detection algorithm
26 Simultaneously, exploring additional security design and
advanced in this study, thereby manifesting commendable
27 testing methodologies for lightweight IoD applications is
28 robustness.
warranted to enhance drone security comprehensively.
29
30 VII. CONCLUSION:
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8
9 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
10 Funding: This work is supported by the Natural Science
11 Foundation of Shandong Province of China under Grant (No.
12 ZR2019PEE019) and the Natural Science Foundation of
13 Shandong Province of China under Grant (No. ZR2021ME109).
14
15 DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
16
17 No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
18
19 DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
20 The datasets generated during and/or analyzed during the
21 current study are available from the corresponding author upon
22 reasonable request.
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