GEORGE KENNAN: “THE SOURCES OF SOVIET

CONDUCT” (1947)
In January 1947 the journal Foreign Affairs published an article titled “The Sources of
Soviet Conduct”. It was published anonymously and attributed to ‘X’, but in fact was
written by diplomat George Kennan, who had previously authored the ‘Long
Telegram‘. In “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” Kennan paints a grim picture of US-
Soviet relations. He suggests that American policy should aim to contain and
moderate the Soviet state, rather than to overthrow it:
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“The political personality of Soviet power as we know it today is the product of ideology
and circumstances: ideology inherited by the present Soviet leaders from the movement
in which they had their political origin, and circumstances of power which they now have
exercised for nearly three decades in Russia… Of the original ideology, nothing has been
officially junked. Belief is maintained in the basic badness of capitalism, in the
inevitability of its destruction, in the obligation of the proletariat to assist in that
destruction and to take power into its own hands. But stress has come to be laid
primarily on those concepts which relate most specifically to the Soviet regime itself: to
its position as the sole truly Socialist regime in a dark and misguided world, and to the
relationships of power within it.

The first of these concepts is that of the innate antagonism between capitalism and
socialism. We have seen how deeply that concept has become embedded in foundations
of Soviet power. It has profound implications for Russia’s conduct as a member of
international society. It means that there can never be on Moscow’s side any sincere
assumption of a community of aims between the Soviet Union and powers it regards as
capitalist. It must invariably be assumed in Moscow that the aims of the capitalist world
are antagonistic to the Soviet regime, and therefore to the interest of the peoples it
controls…

This brings us to the second of the concepts important to contemporary Soviet outlook:
the infallibility of the Kremlin. The Soviet concept of power, which permits no focal
points of organisation outside the party itself, requires that the party leadership remain
in theory the sole repository of truth. For if truth were to be found elsewhere, there
would be justification for its expression in organised activity. But it is precisely that
which the Kremlin cannot and will not permit. The leadership of the Communist Party is
therefore always right and has been always right – ever since in 1929 Stalin formalised
his personal power by announcing that decisions of the Politburo were being taken
unanimously…
It is clear that the United States cannot expect in the foreseeable future to enjoy political
intimacy with the Soviet regime. It must continue to regard the Soviet Union as a rival,
not a partner, in the political arena. It must continue to expect that Soviet policies will
reflect no abstract love of peace and stability, no real faith in the possibility of a
permanent happy coexistence of the Socialist and capitalist worlds, but rather a cautious,
persistent pressure toward the disruption and weakening of all rival influence and rival
power.

Balanced against this are the facts that Russia, as opposed to the Western world in
general, is still by far the weaker party, that Soviet policy is highly flexible, and that
Soviet society may well contain deficiencies which will eventually weaken its own total
potential. This would of itself warrant the United States entering with reasonable
confidence upon a policy of firm containment, designed to confront the Russians with
unalterable counter-force at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the
interests of a peaceful and stable world.

But in actuality, the possibilities for American policy are by no means limited to holding
the line and hoping for the best. It is entirely possible for the United States to influence
by its actions the internal developments, both within Russia and throughout the
international communist movement, by which Russian policy is largely determined… It
would be an exaggeration to say that American behaviour unassisted and alone could
exercise a power of life and death over the communist movement and bring about the
early fall of Soviet power in Russia. But the United States has it in its power to increase
enormously the strains under which Soviet policy must operate, to force upon the
Kremlin a far greater degree of moderation and circumspection than it has had to
observe in recent years…

Thus the decision will really fall in large measure in this country itself. The issue of
Soviet-American relations is, in essence, a test of the overall worth of the United States
as a nation among nations. To avoid destruction the United States need only measure up
to its own best traditions and prove itself worthy of preservation as a great nation.
Surely, there was never a fairer test of national quality than this…”

The USA fought the Cold War following the theoretical framework
postulated by George Kennan in this highly influential article. It is
justifiably called a founding document in American foreign policy
after World War II. Confirming their fears about the USSR’s
hegemonic designs, it tried to provide an intellectual underpinning to
the American response to the containment of the USSR, which was
already in the making on similar lines.

This article summarizes the gist of his ideas, along with their context
and implications.

Introduction

George Kennan, an American diplomat to the Soviet Union in the

1940s and 1950s, is considered one of the most influential post-WW2
visionaries whose ideas were instrumental in shaping American foreign
policy in the post-WW2 Cold War. And by default, global politics is due
to the preeminence of the USA in the world.

By the time he assumed his appointment as the chief of mission and

Ambassador Averell Harriman’s consultant in the mid-1940s, George
F. Kennan was considered an expert on the USSR and fluent in the
Russian language and its affairs. Consequently, in 1946, when the
United States government asked its Embassy in Moscow why the
Soviets were not supporting the newly created World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund, Kennan wrote the now-famous The
Long Telegram, outlining his views about Soviet Russia and a set of
guidelines to counter its rise as a global power.

The essence of Kennan’s telegram was published in Foreign Affairs in

1947 as The Sources of Soviet Conduct and circulated everywhere. The
article was signed by “X” although everyone knew that it was authored
by Kennan. It is considered one of the most influential memos ever
written in the history of international relations for its far-reaching
global consequences.

According to George F. Kennan, the mindset of Soviet policymakers

was the product of communist ideology and the circumstances in
which they found themselves. Regarding the first, he mentioned the
following as the outstanding features of Communist thought:

1. Society’s Character is Determined by Economic

Activities: The central factor in the life of man, the factor that
determines the character of public life and the “physiognomy of
society,” is the system by which material goods are produced and
exchanged.
2. Capitalistic Mode of Production is inherently
Exploitative: The capitalist system of production inevitably leads
to the exploitation of the working class by the capital-owning class
and is incapable of developing the economic resources of society or
of fairly distributing the material goods produced by human labour;
3. Capitalism is doomed for Failure: Consequently, capitalism
contains the seeds of its destruction and must, given the inability of
the capital-owning class to adjust itself to economic change,
eventually and inescapably result in a revolutionary transfer of
power to the working class
4. Imperialism is Capitalism at the Global level; Imperialism
IS the final phase of Capitalism and leads directly to war and
revolution”.

Based on these, he opined, the Soviet leadership believed that the

1. The unevenness of economic and political development is an

inflexible law of capitalism. It follows from this that the victory of
Socialism may come originally in a few capitalist countries or even
in a single capitalist country.
2. The victorious proletariat of that country, having expropriated the
capitalists and organized Socialist production at home, would rise
against the remaining capitalist world, drawing to itself in the
process the oppressed classes of other countries.

According to Kennan, for 50 years before the outbreak of the

Revolution, this pattern of thought had exercised a great fascination
for the members of the Russian revolutionary movement who were
frustrated with the Tsarist political system, found in Marxist theory a
highly convenient rationalization for their instinctive desires.

Regarding circumstances that were instrumental in the Soviet conduct

of their internal and external policies, George F Kennan maintained
that
1. Dictatorship is Essential for the Survival of the Soviet
State: The circumstances of the immediate post-revolution period
— the existence in Russia of civil war and foreign intervention,
together with the obvious fact that the Communists represented
only a tiny minority of the Russian people — made the
establishment of dictatorial power a necessity
2. Power-sharing is anathema to Soviet Leadership: Their
particular brand of fanaticism, unmodified by any of the Anglo-
Saxon traditions of compromise, was too fierce and too jealous to
envisage any permanent sharing of power. In the Russian-Asiatic
world from which they had emerged, they carried with them a
scepticism as to the possibilities of permanent and peaceful
coexistence of rival forces. Easily persuaded of their own
doctrinaire “rightness,” they insisted on the submission or
destruction of all competing powers.
3. Capitalism abroad is an easy Scapegoat. Since capitalism no
longer existed in Russia and since it could not be admitted that
there could be serious or widespread opposition to the Kremlin
springing spontaneously from the liberated masses under its
authority, it became necessary to justify the retention of the
dictatorship by stressing the menace of capitalism abroad.
4. This Scapegoat is needed to Control Society. But there is
ample evidence that the stress laid in Moscow on the menace
confronting Soviet society from the world outside its borders is
founded not in the realities of foreign antagonism but in the
necessity of explaining away the maintenance of dictatorial
authority at home.
After outlining the reasons for the Soviet conduct, Kennon advised the
USA that the main element of any United States policy toward the
Soviet Union must be that of long-term, patient but firm and vigilant
containment of Russian expansive tendencies.

Kennan advocated the superiority of the Western way of life over the
collective ideals of Soviet communists, which needed to be countered
by force and contained by anti-Soviet Union alliances. For him, the
Cold War gave the United States a historic opportunity to assume
leadership of what would eventually be described as the “free world.

Impact of Kennan’s Article

These views of Kennan became the foundation blocks of the post-WW2

phase of the Cold War strategy of the USA. The USA fought the Cold
War following the theoretical framework postulated by George Kennan
in this highly influential article. It is justifiably called a founding
document in American foreign policy for its seminal contribution to
the understanding of post-World War II Soviet behaviour by the
leadership and policymakers in the USA. Confirming their fears about
the USSR’s hegemonic designs, it tried to provide an intellectual
underpinning to the American response, which was already in the
making on similar lines.

President Truman tasked one of his senior advisers, Clark Clifford, to

prepare a policy document regarding USA-USSR relations. He and his
colleagues used the inputs provided in the Long Telegram, the
precursor of Article X, and submitted a comprehensive report entitled
“American Relations with the Soviet Union”, which suggested
confinement and containment of the USSR as the cornerstone of the
USA's policy towards the USSR. This policy remained in operation
until the USSR collapsed under its weight.

Interestingly, his Long Telegram and its print version in the form of
the above essay exercised profound influence because of their timing.
Shortly before, Winston Churchill delivered a very scathing speech
against the USSR in March 1946 in Fulton, Missouri, stating that an
‘iron curtain’ had descended across the centre of post-war Europe.

Soon came the Long Telegram, wherein Kennan used extremely

emotional prose consisting of a mixture of hyperbolic adjectives,
scientific jargon, historical analogies, and specific evidence to sway his
readers. This was music to a receptive American public and
policymakers.

Together, these two texts were a lethal combination, used by the anti-
USSR lobby to convince the American administration to shun notions
of cooperation with the USSR and to challenge the Soviets in Eastern
Europe, pointing bluntly to the reality of Russian expansionism if the
West did not react.

Within four months of its transmission, Kennan returned to

Washington, headed the new Policy Planning office, and left no stone
unturned in the task of converting containment from concept to policy.
Because of this intense activity came all manner of large initiatives: the
Marshall Plan, NATO, and early experiments with covert dirty tricks
for which the CIA is known all over the world.

Critique of Kennan’s Thesis

All great ideas, books, and personalities are invariably controversial,

which makes them great. Thus, Article X, soon after its publication,
initiated an intense debate about the likely post-World War II
scenarios and became a recommended read for anyone interested in
understanding international politics. The main strength of Kennan’s
thesis was its simplicity and internally consistent framework of
analysis, making it easy for the Western political elite to comprehend
complex global politics and take action.

And it still rightly occupies a prominent place in this genre of

discussion because of its in-depth analysis of the complex situation and
the kaleidoscopic reach of his conclusions. Articulating a theoretical
framework for analyzing post-Cold War global politics, he provided a
strong perspective for taking policy actions by some of the leaders in
the world.

With its publication, he not only provided an intellectual basis for the
policies adopted by the USA and its allies to deal with post-World War
2 global politics but also cemented the Cold War mentality of the
policymakers in these countries.
While George F. Kennan’s article “Sources of Soviet Conduct” played a
significant role in shaping U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War, it is
not without its critical flaws and raises significant concerns and
limitations that warrant a critical evaluation. In his zeal to postulate a
grand general theory of post-World War II international relations, he
tried to oversimplify a complex situation by selectively applying facts
and figures that he felt substantiated his views.

And it was a logically consistent framework only if one agreed with the
assumptions he stated or took for granted. For example, if you believe
in his implied assumption that the march of history is unidirectional
and is synonymous with that of Western civilization, then there is no
point in countering it, at least, on the theoretical plane.

One of the primary criticisms of Kennan’s article is its reductionist

view of Soviet behavior. Kennan’s argument revolves around the idea
that the Soviet Union’s expansionist tendencies were a result of an
inherent and unchanging ideological drive. This oversimplification
ignores the complex factors that shaped Soviet actions, such as
historical context, domestic politics, and the influence of individual
leaders. By attributing all Soviet behavior to a singular “Soviet
character,” Kennan overlooks the nuances of geopolitics and the
potential for evolving strategies.

Furthermore, Kennan’s article suffers from a lack of empirical evidence

to support his claims. While he asserts that the Soviet Union’s actions
are driven by a desire for security and the need to spread its ideology,
he fails to present concrete examples or historical instances that
directly correlate with his theory. This raises questions about the
validity of his arguments and the extent to which his views are
grounded in empirical reality rather than subjective interpretation.

Another significant flaw in Kennan’s article is his disregard for the

internal dynamics of the Soviet Union. He portrays the Soviet
government as a monolithic entity with unchanging objectives, failing
to recognize the internal power struggles, ideological shifts, and policy
debates that occurred within the Soviet leadership. This
oversimplification undermines a comprehensive understanding of
Soviet behavior and limits the effectiveness of his proposed policy of
containment.

Kennan’s advocacy for a policy of containment also has its drawbacks.

While containment may have been successful in preventing the direct
expansion of Soviet influence, it led to a series of proxy conflicts and
destabilization in various regions around the world. Critics argue that a
more nuanced approach that took into account local contexts and
sought diplomatic solutions could have yielded better outcomes
without the devastating consequences of conflicts like the Vietnam
War.

Moreover, Kennan’s article assumes a level of ideological consistency

within the United States government that was often lacking in reality.
Policymakers frequently interpreted and implemented containment in
divergent ways, leading to inconsistent and, at times, contradictory
actions. This highlights the impracticality of basing policy solely on a
single theoretical framework.

Tailpiece

Soon after the Long Telegram was sent by the American Ambassador
in the USSR to his headquarters in the USA, the Soviet Ambassador in
Washington, Nikolai Novikov, sent a similar telegram in September
1946 to Moscow. Stressing the dangers of possible U.S. economic and
military dominance worldwide, Novikov, in this telegram known as the
Novikov Telegram, attempted to interpret U.S. foreign policy for his
superiors, much the same way George F. Kennan had done in his “Long
Telegram. It portrayed the US as being in the grip of monopoly
capitalists who were building up military capability “to prepare the
conditions for winning world supremacy in a new war”.