20240425-Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. To Buloke Shire Council & Ors-Issues To Consider

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1
2
3 Buloke Shire Council & Ors 25-4-2024
4 buloke@buloke.vic.gov.au
5
6 Cc: Cr Alan Getley (Mayor) crgetley@buloke.vic.gov.au
7 Cr David Pollard crpollard@buloke.vic.gov.au
8 Cr Carolyn Stewart crstewart@buloke.vic.gov.au
9 Cr Bernadette Hogan crhogan@buloke.vic.gov.au
10 Cr Graeme Milne (Deputy Mayor) crmilne@buloke.vic.gov.au
11 Cr Bronwyn Simpson crsimpson@buloke.vic.gov.au
12 Cr Daryl Warren crwarren@buloke.vic.gov.au
13 Penelope Grant Revenue Officer buloke@buloke.vic.gov.au
14 Sir/Madam,
15 before Buloke Shire Council yet again pursues to litigate it may do wiser to consider
16 why should Buloke Shire Council do so instead of the State of Victoria? After all, if it is about
17 enforcing State legislation then why not let the State doing it?
18 As I indicated would Buloke Shire Council institute legal proceedings against me that I would
19 not hesitate to file a NOTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS and that would then be
20 served upon all 9 Attorney-Generals also. Meaning, the State of Victoria Attorney-General
21 would be involved as it was in the AEC v Schorel-Hlavka in which I represented myself and
22 successfully appealed both cases.
23
24 I understand that way back in 2013 Buloke Shire Council engaged lawyers to litigate against me
25 but seemed to have abandoned this when likely the lawyers realized that the notice was invalid
26 because Buloke Shire Council, as I made clear, had no legal authority to require me to mowe the
27 nature strip. Years later, in subsequent legal proceedings Buloke Shire Council was ordered by
28 the court to provide me with a copy of the Brief, however I was with a purported 2013 Brief.
29 I have raised numerous issues which Buloke Shire Council, so its lawyers, may have held
30 irrelevant and so ignored it all, however for a court (if it were to determine to have jurisdiction –
31 this I do not seek to imply it has) the issue would be if those issues are correlation or causation
32 issues.
33
34 CORRELATION:
35 Mr Jones steps out of his car and it starts to rain and he becomes wet. While Mr Jones did
36 become wet because of the rain the issue must be if because Mr Jones stepped out of the
37 car caused to rain or that it just was coincidental that Mr Jones happen to step out of the car
38 when it started to rain. If at other times Mr Jones step out of his car and it doesn’t then start
39 to rain then clearly it was a correlation rather than a causation that it started to rain.
40
41 CAUSATION:
42
43 I have never planted any seed on my Berriwillock property, and yet wheat has been grown
44 year in year out. There is a silo opposite to my property and grains are blown by the wind
45 onto my property and then this causes wheat to grow onto my property. This then can be
25-4-2024 Page 1 © Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.

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1 deemed “causation” because was it not for the grain to be blown onto my property the
2 wheat would not grow on my property.
3
4 Despite my complaints to Buloke Shire Council about this to my knowledge it never took any
5 action as to pursue the silo property owner (I understand is Buloke Shire Council) to erect
6 fencing that will to a great deal seek to avoid the grain to be blown onto my FEE SIMPLE
7 property. However, as with Banyule City Council and I understand with numerous other councils
8 they employ people who are not given any appropriate training and just exercise “power”
9 regardless if this is legally justified or not.
10
11 https://www.craigmurray.org.uk/archives/2019/10/assange-in-court/comment-page-1/#comments
12 Tom Welsh October 22, 2019 at 20:55
13 The resemblance to a Soviet show trial is breathtaking. As Russia and China have become
14 freer and more prsoperous, Britain is rapidly becoming Airfield One. And we must all
15 remember O’Brien’s conclusion.
16 “The Party seeks power entirely for its own sake. We are not interested in the good of
17 others; we are interested solely in power. Not wealth or luxury or long life or happiness;
18 only power, pure power. What pure power means you will understand presently. [He
19 means Room 101]. We are different from all the oligarchies of the past in that we know
20 what we are doing. All the others, even those who resembled ourselves, were cowards and
21 hypocrites. The German Nazis and the Russian Communists came very close to us in their
22 methods, but they never had the courage to recognize their own motives. They pretended,
23 perhaps they even believed, that they had seized power unwillingly and for a limited time,
24 and that just round the corner there lay a paradise where human beings would be free and
25 equal. We are not like that. We know that no one ever seizes power with the intention of
26 relinquishing it. Power is not a means; it is an end. One does not establish a dictatorship in
27 order to safeguard a revolution; one makes the revolution in order to establish the
28 dictatorship. The object of persecution is persecution. The object of torture is torture. The
29 object of power is power. Now do you begin to understand me?”
30 – George Orwell (O’Brien to Winston Smith, “1984”)
31
32 For example, Banyule City Council without ever having obtained a WARRANT blatantly and
33 repeatedly despite our signs of ENTRY PROHIBITED (citing numerous High Court of Australia
34 decisions) by climbing over the fence repeatedly trespassed upon our property. Also vandalizing
35 my wife’s station wagon that was lawfully parked in front of our property. After that claiming
36 there was an alleged Fire Rescue Victoria report, albeit in the end there wasn’t any. Then it
37 started with NOTIFICIATION TO NOTIFY TO ENTER on various occasions, this even so such
38 purported NOTIFICATION had no legal basis. Then on 29 November 2023 by trespassing and
39 my wife unaware who was banging on the backdoor, then got the fright of her life as to her
40 someone was trying to break into our property. She was known to Banyule City Council to suffer
41 from heart failure and other comorbidities and as such this illegal conduct of trespassing to then
42 result in my wife’s blood pressure to go from 72 to 122, which could have caused her death,
43 means that this council seeks to unlawfully exercise powers and the fact that my wife from that
44 moment lost her ability to walk unaided and now need to use a wheelchair clearly means that the
45 “causation” of the banging on the backdoor can be established.
46
47 As I recall it Banyule City Council provided about $10,000 to a club to renovate its kitchen,
48 albeit to go to the club to watch any games I understand one has to pay entry fee. As such, it was
49 not at all for “public purposes”. Likewise, many councils, if not most councils are providing
50 funds for non-public purposes.
51
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1 Long before federation the Framers of the Constitution made very clear that municipal
2 corporations referred to as “councils” were operating and in The Municipal of Sydney v
3 Commonwealth 1904 the High Court of Australia made clear that municipal corporations could
4 NOT legislate. Hence, any land taxation was to be by the States. However, on 11 November
5 1910 the Commonwealth commenced its exclusive “land taxation” powers and from that
6 moment all and any State legislation (as like the income tax legislation) that used to be exercised
7 as “concurrent” legislative powers was no more. The State of Victoria in about 1926 nevertheless
8 commenced to legislate for land taxation and I understand did so ever since. Likewise, other
9 States did so. However doing an unconstitutional act does not make it lawful.
10
11 There can be no doubt that I on numerous occasions for decades raised this issue but politicians
12 and their officials couldn’t care less. Indeed, Buloke Shire Council legal representatives rather
13 than to engage in communication about this ignored it. Instead of Buloke Shire Council, and so
14 other councils, seeking to resolve this constitutional dilemma they simply blatantly disregarded
15 it. And well, now faced that I not only continue my objection but also am entitled to have all
16 unconstitutional purported “State land taxation” referred to as “council rates” refund it somehow
17 pursues as if it still can extort the unconstitutional “land taxation” from me.
18
19 https://www.westernjournal.com/email-hidden-5-years-declared-hunter-biden-undercut-us-
20 efforts-fight-ukraine-corruption-report/?ff_source=Email&ff_medium=conservative-brief-
21 WJ&ff_campaign=dailypm&ff_content=western-journal
22 Email Hidden for 5 Years Declared Hunter Biden 'Undercut' US Efforts to Fight Ukraine
23 Corruption - Report
24 QUOTE
25 “The United States Supreme Court in the Brady decision ruled that when a defendant
26 is on trial, the prosecutors cannot withhold evidence that could be exculpatory, or in
27 any way helpful to the defendant,” Dershowitz said.
28 “And obviously, that has to apply to impeachment proceedings even more so,” he
29 said. “Because in impeachment proceedings, the American public has the right to
30 know all the evidence. And if the people who impeached President Trump —
31 obviously I was one of the lawyers on the other side — were aware of exculpatory
32 evidence or evidence that would in some way mitigate the charges, they had an
33 obligation to turn it over to us so that we could use this information in defending our
34 client.”
35 END QUOTE
36
37 When did Buloke Shire Council put to a court that I am the victim of invasion of my FEE
38 SIMPLE rights to have the property owner with the silos denying me my rights to use the
39 property as I am legally entitled upon by their grains being caused upon my property t5o result in
40 unwanted wheat growing?
41
42 The Courts cannot assign legislative powers to the States which belong exclusively to the
43 Commonwealth. There are legal processes such as “referendum” powers to address such issues
44 where the States may not desire for the Commonwealth to exercise its constitutional power of
45 exclusive legislative powers as to certain subjects provided to the Commonwealth in the
46 constitution. But 2 failed referendums to recognise “councils” as “local government” failed.
47
48 https://www.westernjournal.com/state-supreme-court-overrules-hands-big-win-
49 voters/?utm_source=Email&utm_medium=newsletter-
50 CT&utm_campaign=dailypm&utm_content=conservative-tribune
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1 State Supreme Court Overrules Itself and Hands a Big Win to Voters
2 QUOTE
3 Chief Justice Paul Newby said the court had overstepped the bounds of its authority to rule
4 on alleged gerrymandering.
5 “The will of the people is achieved when each branch of government performs its
6 assigned duties,” Newby wrote in an opinion. “When, however, one branch grasps a
7 task of another, that action violates separation of powers.”
8 Later in the opinion, Newby noted, “Our constitution expressly assigns the redistricting
9 authority to the General Assembly subject to explicit limitations in the text. Those
10 limitations do not address partisan gerrymandering.”
11 “Policy decisions belong to the legislative branch, not the judiciary,” he added.
12 Bottom of Form
13 Ultimately, Newby viewed the decision as reining in judicial overreach and ensuring the
14 branches of government operate as intended.
15 “This case is not about partisan politics but rather about realigning the proper roles
16 of the judicial and legislative branches,” Newby wrote. “Today we begin to correct
17 course, returning the judiciary to its designated lane.”
18 END QUOTE
19
20 And:
21
22 http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/sinodisp/au/cases/wa/WASC/2012/270.html
23 KRYSIAK -v- McDONAGH [2012] WASC 270 (26 July 2012)
24 QUOTE
25 Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 78B notices
26 26 As is apparent, several of the proposed grounds of appeal invoke alleged rights or
27 protections of the applicant under the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900
28 and also rely on laws of the Commonwealth, including the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) and
29 the Currency Act 1965 (Cth). Among the provisions of the Constitution or its principles
30 which are sought to be invoked by the applicant are the protections for the freedom of
31 interstate trade and commerce contained in s 92 of the Constitution; the doctrine of federal
32 separation of powers requiring courts exercising federal jurisdiction to satisfy the
33 requirements of chapter III of the Constitution Kable v DPP (1996) 189 CLR 51; [1996]
34 HCA 24 and an attempted reliance on s 115 of the Constitution which provides that a State
35 shall not coin money nor make anything but gold and silver coin a legal tender in payment
36 of debts. The latter submission also sought to rely upon s 106 and s 109 of the Constitution
37 and Covering Clause 5.
38 27 In the matters of SJA 1083 of 2012 (Krysiak v McDonagh) and SJA 1085 of 2012
39 (Krysiak v Barnes) the applicant alleged that the learned magistrate had erred in law by
40 failing to comply with the provisions of s 78B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) in
41 proceeding with the prosecution without notice of a matter arising under the Constitution
42 or involving its interpretation being the subject of a notice as required by that section being
43 given to the attorneysgeneral of the Commonwealth, the States and Territories. He further
44 submitted that the learned magistrate erred in law and denied justice by breaching chapter
45 III of the Constitution by not referring the matter to the original jurisdiction of the High
46 Court for determination of constitutional matters which he had raised.
47 28 There can be no doubt that by relying upon and invoking the provisions of the
48 Constitution and other laws of the Commonwealth, no matter that there was no real basis to
49 do so and no foundation upon which such arguments could be successfully maintained, the
50 applicant did raise a question or questions which invoked federal jurisdiction: Hume v
51 Palmer [1926] HCA 50; (1926) 38 CLR 441, 451 (Isaacs J); Moorgate Tobacco Co Ltd v
52 Philip Morris Ltd [1980] HCA 32; (1980) 145 CLR 457 and Agtrack (NT) Pty Ltd (2005)
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1 223 CLR 251; [2005] HCA 38, 261 [26]. Accordingly, so the applicant submitted, it was
2 necessary that s 78B notices be given. It is notable that neither before the Magistrates
3 Court nor in this court did Mr Krysiak himself take any steps to prepare and serve a s 78B
4 notice himself on any of the attorneysgeneral.
5 29 However, it is by now sufficiently well established that on an occasion when a notice
6 under s 78B of the Judiciary Act which must be given where it appears to the court that the
7 proceedings 'involve a matter arising under the Constitution or involving its interpretation'
8 it is for the court to be satisfied that the case involves such a cause. The section does not
9 operate simply because some party asserts that the Constitutional matter is relevant to the
10 proceedings. In Amrit Lal Narain v Parnell (1986) 9 FCR 479, 486 489 Burchett J
11 examined at some length the obligations cast upon any court by s 78B of the Judiciary Act
12 and examined a series of cases in which the extent of the obligation was examined,
13 including Re an Application by Public Service Association of NSW; and; Re The
14 Industrial Union of Employees (Commissioned Police Officers) Award (1947) 75 CLR
15 430; [1947] HCA 31. That case dealt with an application for removal into the High Court
16 under s 40 of the Judiciary Act. At 489 Burchett J concluded that on the basis that the
17 alleged Constitutional point depended entirely upon an erroneous construction of a federal
18 statute, the cause pending in the court at first instance did not 'really and substantially'
19 involve a matter arising under the Constitution or involving its interpretation. Similarly, in
20 Re Finlayson; Ex parte Finlayson (1997) 72 ALJR 73 Toohey J, sitting as single justice
21 in the High Court, addressed an argument that no s 78B notice had been given in an appeal
22 to the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia in which it had been submitted that there
23 had been an impermissible mixture of judicial and nonjudicial functions imposed on that
24 court. At page 74 his Honour said:
25 In terms of s 78B, a cause does not 'involve a matter arising under the Constitution or
26 involving its interpretation merely because someone asserts that it does. That is not to say
27 that the strength or weakness of the proposition is critical: Green v Jones [1979] 2
28 NSWLR 812 at 817 818. But it must be established that the challenge does involve a
29 matter arising under the Constitution. The applicant's argument is based on a
30 misunderstanding of the structure of the Family Court ...
31 30 Other cases in which the obligation to give s 78B notices has been examined include
32 Boath v Wyvill (1989) 85 ALR 621, 634 and Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Ltd
33 [1999] FCA 1363. I referred to these cases in Pennicuik v City of Gosnells [2011] WASC
34 63 [17] [22]. There I considered that where arguments about validity sought to rely on a
35 Constitutional provision there would be no real or legitimate Constitutional point requiring
36 an issue of s 78B notices unless the court itself was satisfied that the point did really and
37 substantially involve a matter arising under the Constitution or involving its interpretation.
38 I adhere to that approach and, because I am satisfied the points sought to be relied upon by
39 the applicant are entirely spurious, there was no need for any s 78B notice in either of these
40 two applications.
41 END QUOTE
42
43 As the High Court of Australia made clear that the States could not continue to legislate as to
44 income taxation once the Commonwealth commenced to do so, then the same applies to “land
45 taxation” and this therefore is a constitutional issue where the States nevertheless continue to
46 legislate as to “state land taxation”.
47
48 While ordinary the State would be entitled to legislate as to land owners to pay for fire insurance
49 it is however different when the fire insurance premium is based upon the value of the land as
50 then it is actually a “State land taxation”. As a matter of fact, any form of charges based upon the

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1 value of the land can be deemed to be an unconstitutional “State land taxation”. It is the State
2 that determines the value of land for taxation purposes and so unconstitutionally!
3
4 Despite my extensive writings to politicians and their officials and even when writing to councils
5 providing copies to the State of Victoria, such as the Premier, the Attorney-General, etc,
6 nevertheless no dialog eventuated from any of them as they hold they can and do persist in their
7 unconstitutional conduct.
8 Yet, the States unconstitutionally now legislate, etc, for Aboriginals as if their land rights are
9 above that of the ordinary land ownership, despite that the High Court of Australia in The
10 Municipal of Sydney v Commonwealth 1904 made clear that FEE SIMPLE was the highest
11 form of land ownership. Moreover the Aboriginal related legislation defies the exclusive
12 legislative powers of the Commonwealth, in Subsection 51(xxvi) which the Framers of the
13 Constitution made clear was limited that it could not be used against the “general community”.
14
15 Fancy, having the purported land rights for Aboriginals which in real terms prevent Aboriginals
16 to purchase this land for private usage and as such they are actually robbed of the very legal
17 rights they have when residing ordinary outside the alleged land right properties. Those land
18 right properties are as I view it scams, so certain Aboriginals can scam the profits while real in
19 need Aboriginals are left without.
20
21 For any farmer, etc, their FEE SIMPLE rights are also robbed as now (albeit unconstitutionally)
22 they are forced to pay huge sums of moneys to Aboriginals for being permitted to put a post at a
23 certain depth, clearly violating the Commonwealth v New South Wales [1923] HCA 34 (1923)
24 33 CLR 1 (9 August 1923) decision as to FEE SIMPLE right
25
26 https://constitutionwatch.com.au/fee-simple/ttps://constitutionwatch.com.au/fee-simple/
27 Commonwealth v New South Wales [1923] HCA 34 (1923) 33 CLR 1 (9 August 1923)
28 HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
29 KNOX C.J., ISAACS, HIGGINS, GAVAN DUFFY AND STARKE JJ.
30 THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA PLAINTIFF against
31 THE STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES AND ANOTHER DEFENDANTS
32 1920-1923: SYDNEY, Dec. 1-3, 1920; Mar. 21-29, 1922; Aug. 9, 1923 33 CLR 1
33 Extracts from Commonwealth Law Reports Volume 33 / 33 CLR 1:- (1920) 33 CLR 1 at 42
34 QUOTE
35 “It confers, and since the beginning of legal history it always has conferred, the lawful
36 right to exercise over, upon, and in respect to, the land, every act of ownership which
37 can enter into the imagination, including the right to commit unlimited waste; and,
38 for all practical purposes of ownership, it differs from the absolute dominion of a
39 chattel, in nothing except the physical indestructibility of its subject.”
40 “Besides these rights of ownership, a fee simple at the present day confers an absolute
41 right, both of alienation inter vivos and of devise by will.”
42 END QUOTE
43 And
44 QUOTE
45 ISAACS J. In Challis's Real Property, 3rd ed., p. 218,
46 it is stated with perfect accuracy:—
47 “In the language of the English law, the word fee signifies an estate of inheritance as
48 distinguished from a less estate; not, as in the language of the feudists, a subject of tenure
49 as distinguished from an allodium.”
50 “Allodium being wholly unknown to English law, the latter distinction would in fact have
51 no meaning.” “A fee simple is the most extensive in quantum, and the most absolute in
52 respect to the rights which it confers, of all estates known to the law.”
53 END QUOTE
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1
2 Again
3
4 “A fee simple is the most extensive in quantum, and the
5 most absolute in respect to the rights which it confers, of
6 all estates known to the law.”
7
8 Here we had Mr Wayne Wall, himself during cross-examination admitting he was not given
9 proper training, going about “fire dangers” while admitting that the property containing the silos,
10 across my property, had fire danger. Also admitting that he didn’t follow up any fire dangers
11 with VicRoads. Surely, Buloke Shire Council should have ensured to employ a person who if not
12 having the proper training be trained to understand what is relevant to any fire danger before
13 letting lose to inflict tyranny upon private land holders? In particularly when employing a person
14 from ano0ther state whom laws might differentiate!
15
16 Held that a State Court exercising federal jurisdiction when it erroneously applies
17 Commonwealth Act to subject matter before the Court. Commonwealth v Cole, (1923) 32
18 C.L.R. 602 and Commonwealth v Dalton, (1924) 33 C.L.R.. 452; 30 A.L.R. 85
19
20 While the authorities below are USA Authorities, the legal concepts nevertheless are of a general
21 nature that can be applied within the Commonwealth of Australia.
22 .
23 QUOTE
24 JURISDICTION the power to hear and determine a case. 147 P.2d 759, 761. This power
25 may be established and described with reference to particular subjects or to parties who fall
26 into a particular category. In addition to the power to adjudicate, a valid exercise of
27 jurisdiction requires fair notice and an opportunity for the affected parties to be heard.
28 Without jurisdiction, a court's judgment is void. A court must have both SUBJECT
29 MATTER JURISDICTION and PERSONAL JURISDICTION (see below). See also
30 territorial jurisdiction; title jurisdiction."
31 END QUOTE
32 And .
33 QUOTE
34 SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION refers to the competency of the court to hear and
35 determine a particular category of cases. Federal district courts have "limited" jurisdiction
36 in that they have only such jurisdiction as is explicitly conferred by federal statutes. 28
37 U.S.C. §1330 [EDITOR'S NOTE: see also 40 U.S.C.S. §255] et seq. See LIMITED
38 [SPECIAL] JURISDICTION. Many state trial courts have "general" jurisdiction to hear
39 almost all matters. The parties to a lawsuit may not waive a requirement of subject matter
40 jurisdiction.
41 END QUOTE
42
43 Yet, Carmody J instead of ordering a “jurisdiction hearing” simply claimed that because I had
44 filed an appeal then this provided jurisdiction. The truth is far from it. The moment there was an
45 OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION the court no longer had this power to hear and determine
46 the appeal, unless and until it could find on the basis of the submissions and evidence provided
47 during a “jurisdiction hearing” that the court could invoke jurisdiction.
48 In my view Counsel for Buloke Shire Council should have objected and explained to Carmody J
49 that unless there was a proper “jurisdiction hearing” the court couldn’t proceed with hearing any

Page 8
1 matters. This however Counsel failed to do. No proper jurisdictional hearing eventuated and
2 hence no valid appeal hearing resulted.
3
4 QUOTE Re: Sidebotham (1880) 14 Ch D 458 James LJ
5 A person aggrieved must be a man who has suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom
6 a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or
7 wrongfully refused him something, or wrongfully affected his title to something.
8 END QUOTE
9
10 Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally; Re Wakim; Ex parte Darvall; Re Brown; Ex parte Amann; Spi [1999] HCA
11 27 (17 June 1999)
12 QUOTE
13 For constitutional purposes, they are a nullity. No doctrine of res judicata or issue
14 estoppel can prevail against the Constitution. Mr Gould is entitled to disregard the
15 orders made in Gould v Brown. No doubt, as Latham CJ said of invalid legislation, "he
16 will feel safer if he has a decision of a court in his favour". That is because those relying
17 on the earlier decision may seek to enforce it against Mr Gould.
18 END QUOTE
19
20 As I had OBJECTED TO THE JURISDICTION of the Magistrates Court who then ignored
21 this (and did not invoke jurisdiction) and issued orders nevertheless (later found upon
22 false/misleading evidence) then my Appeal was rightly instituted to have the Court declare that
23 the Magistrates Court orders were issued without jurisdiction, and had no legal validity and as
24 such my Appeal against the orders could not proceed because there were no valid legal orders to
25 appeal against.
26
27 QUOTE Duncan v Queensland (1916) 22 CLR 556, 582 (per Griffith C.J.)
28 That case (a previous decision of the High Court, Foggit, Jones & Co v NSW (1915)
29 21 CLR 357) was very briefly, and I regret to say, insufficiently argued and
30 considered on the last day of the Sydney sitting..... The arguments which now
31 commend themselves to me as conclusive did not find entrance to my mind. In my
32 judgment that case was wrongly decided, and should be overruled.
33 END QUOTE
34 .
35 QUOTE Australian Agricultural Co Ltd. v F.E.D.F.A of Australasia (1913) 17 CLR 261 and
36 278
37 The oath of a justice of this court is ' to do right to all manner of people according to law'
38 Our sworn duty is to the law itself and to the organic nature of the constitution first of all.
39 If, then, we find the law to be plainly in conflict with what we or any of our predecessors
40 errornously thought it to be, we have, as I conceive no right to choose between giving
41 effect to the law, and maintaining an incorrect interpretation, It is not, in my opinion,
42 better that the court should be persistently wrong than that it should be ultimately right..
43 Whatever else may be said with respect to previous decisions - and it is necessary here to
44 consider the principals upon which a court should act in particular cases - so much at
45 least emerges as is undoubtedly beyond challenge, that where a former decision is clearly
46 wrong, and there are no circumstances countervailing the primary duty of giving effect to
47 the law as the court finds it, the real opinion of the court should be expressed.
48 END QUOTE
49
50 Hansard 2-2-1898 Constitution Convention Debates (Official Record of the Debates of the National Australasian
51 Convention)
52 QUOTE Mr. DEAKIN (Victoria).-

Page 9
1 The record of these debates may fairly be expected to be widely read, and the observations to which I
2 allude might otherwise lead to a certain amount of misconception.
3 END QUOTE
4
5 Hansard 1-2-1898 Constitution Convention Debates (Official Record of the Debates of the National
6 Australasian Convention),
7 QUOTE Mr. OCONNER (New South Wales).-
8 Because, as has been said before, it is [start page 357] necessary not only that the administration of
9 justice should be pure and above suspicion, but that it should be beyond the possibility of suspicion;
10 END QUOTE
11
12 DPP v Field [2001] VSC 472 (29 November 2001)
13 QUOTE
14 24. Section 35 of the Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984 provides that in the interpretation
15 of the provision of an Act consideration may be given to any matter or document that is
16 relevant, including reports of proceedings in any House of the Parliament. The section
17 further provides that a construction that would promote the purpose or object underlying an
18 Act is to be preferred to a construction that would not promote that purpose or object. Those
19 provisions are well known.
20 QUOTE
21
22 Hansard 20-4-1897 Constitution Convention Debates
23 QUOTE Mr. HIGGINS:
24 I think it is advisable that private people should not be put to the expense of having
25 important questions of constitutional law decided out of their own pockets.
26 END QUOTE
27
29 QUOTE
30 Mr. BARTON: Yes; in cases that come before a Court having jurisdiction under these
31 judicial powers so defined. The question which seriously exercises my mind is whether we
32 are not giving sufficient jurisdiction to the Supreme Court in this clause.
33 Mr. SYMON: It is not jurisdiction.
34 Mr. BARTON: It is a definition of the judicial powers.
35 Mr. SYMON: Parliament has no right to alter that.
36 Mr. BARTON: I am not saying that it has, and therefore Mr. Symon was right in his
37 interjection that this amendment was moved in the wrong place. The judicial power, which
38 includes the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, is sufficient for the cases we have defined.
39 We have a provision here dealing with the jurisdiction which may be conferred upon other
40 courts. We have it in clause 74 that:
41 Within the limits of the judicial power of the High Court the Parliament may from time to
42 time: Define the jurisdiction to be exercised by the Federal Courts other than the
43 High Court: Prescribe whether the jurisdiction of the Federal Courts shall be
44 exclusive of, or concurrent with, that which may belong to or be vested in the courts
45 of the States, and invest the courts of the [start page 965] States with federal jurisdiction
46 within such limits, or in respect of such matters, as it thinks fit.
47 END QUOTE
48
49 I repeat:
51 QUOTE Mr. BARTON
52 Define the jurisdiction to be exercised by the Federal Courts other than the High
53 Court: Prescribe whether the jurisdiction of the Federal Courts shall be exclusive of,
54 or concurrent with, that which may belong to or be vested in the courts of the States,
55 END QUOTE
Page 10
1
2 Yet, what was found was that despite the High Court of Australia having “original jurisdiction”
3 in Schorel-Hlavka v Commonwealth 2001 then the matters were directed to the Federal Court of
4 Australia instead of being heard in the High Court of Australia! Which created an added layer of
5 litigation not at all permitted or included in the constitution.
6
7 While we have a “responsible Minister” in the “separation of powers” governing a government
8 the purported “local government” meaning then “councils” there is no such person who is
9 “responsible” for whatever a council is doing wrong. The claim of having a Minister for Local
10 government” in reality means a Minister for the State government, this as constitutionally the
11 Federal government is the “Central Government” and the State government is the “Local
12 Government”.
13
14 With the 2008 GFC it was reported that numerous councils (in Australia) had lost millions of
15 dollars, in what I view was gambling, in investing in insurance policies etc, in the USA and
16 elsewhere. In South Australia a council discovered to have for more than 20 years $36 million
17 dollars they had been unaware off. This underlines that it is all out of control. They are municipal
18 councils and cannot exercise any legislation as to Appropriation Bills (Acts) how monies can be
19 drawn from the State Consolidated Revenue Funds or other forms of taxation. The State
20 government can only permit “councils” to collect taxation on its behalf and not collect taxation
21 without any control of spending, etc. Municipal corporations are simply “corporations” without
22 any legislative powers! If any State corporations to charge taxes then it really violates the
23 sovereign rights of the State as only the “sovereign” can apply taxation.
24
25 The meaning of “sovereign” has many different statuses:
26
27 The sovereignty of a citizen exist because they and only they can approve any amendment
28 of a State or Federal constitution. It doesn’t mean they are themselves above the law as
29 each “sovereign” citizen must act within (constitutional) valid legislation. A “sovereign”
30 may elect to leave the relevant jurisdiction albeit subject to (constitutional) valid legislation
31 and any court order that may apply.
32
33 A “sovereign” entity is the Parliament House and other buildings used for and by the
34 legislature of a State/Commonwealth but it is and remains subject to the constitution and
35 such laws as are constitutionally validly enacted.
36
37 A “sovereign” entity is the judiciary (Courts) State/Commonwealth but it is and remains
38 subject to the constitution and such laws as are constitutionally validly enacted.
39
40 A “sovereign” entity is the State/commonwealth executive to manage the
41 State/Commonwealth by its governing powers State/Commonwealth but it is and remains
42 subject to the constitution and such laws as are constitutionally validly enacted.
43
44 A “sovereign” entity is a state that is able to exercise within its borders the provisions of
45 the State constitution and any valid legislation but subject to the Federal constitution.
46
47 A “sovereign” entity is the Commonwealth able to exercise constitutional granted
48 legislative including executive and administrative powers within its borders albeit subject
49 to any United Kingdom amendment of the federal constitution as well as any valid laws
50 enacted.
51
Page 11
1 When it came to the “covid scam” the Commonwealth first threatening to enforce the jabbing of
2 Australians then discovering it had no such legal powers enlisted the States/Territories (quasi
3 States) to do the dirty work for it. After all, while claiming the FAKE covid-19 vaccine were
4 “safe and effective” in reality is where a variety of different concoctions of “gene therapy”
5 DEPOPULATION “bioweapon” to which the States/Territories had absolutely no legislative,
6 executive and/or administrative power. Nevertheless, councils were enforcing this
7 unconstitutional conduct to essentially mass murder Australians besides inflicting considerable
8 harm all because it was somehow obligated by the State to do so. If “councils” were a level of
9 Government then where was its authority to enforce such genocide upon Australians merely to
10 suit foreign enemies like the UN, WHO, W.E.F., etc? Where was the councils “responsible
11 Minister” to be held legally accountable for this mass murder, etc? Are we to accept that
12 “councils” were in a sense condemning residents to a life of long term harm and even death but
13 you cannot hold them legally accountable as then well they are not the kind of “responsible
14 government” as it enshrined in the legal provisions embedded in the Commonwealth of
15 Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK)?
16 Let us not ignore that “councils” were in fact violating the Biosecurity Act 2015 (Cth) when they
17 were enforcing the unconstitutional State/Territories mandates to have residents jabbed with this
18 poisonous “gene therapy” DEPOPULATION “bioweapon”!
19 “Councils” were using monies they unconstitutionally extorted from private property owners to
20 fund this kind of unconstitutional conduct!
21 Buloke Shire Council was in tandem with others, preventing me to travel to my Berriwillock
22 property to attend to it as I desired.
23
24 Hansard 7-2-1898 Constitution Convention Debates (Official Record of the Debates of the National Australasian
25 Convention)
26 QUOTE Mr. BARTON (New South Wales).-
27 I do not think the word quarantine, for instance, which is used in the sub-section of the 52nd
28 clause, is intended to give the Commonwealth power to legislate with regard to any
29 quarantine. That simply applies to quarantine as referring to diseases among man-kind.
30 END QUOTE
31
32 And now we had pm Scott Morrison claiming that the usage of taxpayers monies for secret
33 agreements with pharmaceutical companies was because of “NATIONAL SECURITY”. Well
34 there is no such thing as a provision for “NATIONAL SECURITY” in the constitution. It is
35 made up by politicians to hide their unconstitutional/unlawful conduct. But the councils were all
36 in it as after all they as I understand it were provided with monies to participate in the rot to
37 exterminate as many Australians as possible. Well, there is no such thing as a “responsible
38 government” when “councils” claiming to be (albeit unconstitutionally) a local government but
39 not responsible for its participation of the maiming and killings that occurs with their
40 participation.
41
42 http://www.downtoearth.org.in/full6.asp?foldername=20081015&filename=led&sec_id=3&sid=1
43 QUOTE
44 Travesty of public purpose
45
46 State governments offer incredulous incentives to lure Tata
47
48 IN THE last few days Maharashtra and West Bengal witnessed two diametrically opposite
49 developments. In Maharashtra, for the first time in the history of this country, affected
50 farmers voted in a referendum on the upcoming Reliance special economic zone (SEZ).
51 Initial results suggest that the majority voted against the SEZ. In Singur, Tata’s plans kept
52 slipping into a deeper imbroglio by the day. Several state governments lined up to lure the
53 company as Tata seriously considered moving out—each one trying to outdo each other in
Page 12
1 terms of offering incentives and freebies. Soon as West Bengal made some parts of the
2 ‘secret’ deal between the state and the company public, Tata Motors moved the High Court
3 obtaining a restraining order.
4
5 Tata’s lawyers argued that basically the agreement between them and the state government
6 was a trade secret. This means that the Nano project is private commercial venture.
7 Ironically the state government had acquired land for the project invoking the “public
8 purpose” law. The state government and company will have to come clean about what
9 exactly is the Nano project. If it is a commercial venture the company must directly need
10 And if it is indeed a project meant to
deal with the farmers.
11 serve the public purpose, details of the agreement
12 must be immediately made public.
13
14 What is clear from the deal between the West Bengal government and Tata motors is that
15 state government are trying to outdo each other to attract investments. This is a race right
16 to the bottom. The moment Tata Motors threatened to walk away from Singur, several state
17 governments came forward. The lure of big-ticket project is such that governments are
18 willing to forgo taxes, forcibly acquire land, give subsidized water and electricity, give
19 capital subsidies and put thousands of security personnel to man the project. In all this,
20 industries are having free ride on public money. This is cheap industrialization. Where
21 not only states are giving fiscal subsidies, they are subsidizing the natural resources—
22 land, water, and energy. In a single economic entity that India is, competition
23 between states, by the way of subsidizing industrialization, is neither good for
24 economy nor is it good for environment. And it surely is not for ‘public purpose’.
25 END QUOTE
26
27 I may add that I view toll roads that are for private gain but using public build roads must be
28 deemed unconstitutional;
29
30 http://supreme.justia.com/us/83/678/case.html
31 Olcott v. Supervisors, 16 Wall. 678 U.S. Supreme Court Olcott v. The Supervisors, 83 U.S.
32 16 Wall. 678 678 (1872) Olcott v. The Supervisors 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 678
33 ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
34 QUOTE
35 What was considered was the uses for which taxation generally, taxation by any government, might
36 be authorized, and particularly whether the construction and maintenance of a railroad, owned by a
37 corporation, is a matter of public concern. It was asserted (what nobody doubts), that the taxing
38 power of a state extends no farther than to raise money for a public use, as distinguished from
39 private, or to accomplish some end public in its nature, and it was decided that building a railroad, if
40 it be constructed and owned by a corporation, though built by authority of the state, is not a matter
41 in which the public has any interest, of such a nature as to warrant taxation in its aid.
42 Page 83 U. S. 690
43 For this reason it was held that the state had no power to authorize the imposition of
44 taxes to aid in the construction of such a railroad, and therefore that the statute giving
45 Fond du Lac County power to extend such aid was invalid.
46 END QUOTE
47
49 U.S. Supreme Court Olcott v. The Supervisors, 83 U.S. 16 Wall. 678 678 (1872)
50 QUOTE
51 In 1870, that is to say, subsequent to the issue of these orders, though prior to the trial of this case in
52 the court below, the Supreme Court of the State of Wisconsin, in the
53 Page 83 U. S. 680
Page 13
1 case of Whiting v. Fond du Lac County, [Footnote 1] held this act to be void, upon the ground that the
2 building of a railroad, to be owned and worked by a corporation in the usual way, was not an object
3 in which the public were interested, and therefore that the act in question was void, for the reason
4 that it authorized the levy of a tax for a private and not a public purpose. The court there said:
5 "The question is as to the power of the legislature to raise money or to authorize it to
6 be raised, by taxation, for the purpose of donating it to a private corporation. We
7 held, in Curtis v. Whipple, [Footnote 2] that the legislature possessed no such power, and
8 the conclusion in that case we think follows inevitably in this, from the principles stated in
9 the opinion.
10 END QUOTE
11
12 Seems to me the reported $50+ million dollars to stage the Albert Park Grand Prix racing at
13 Melbourne is a payment to a private corporation that cannot be deemed to be for “public
14 purposes”, where entry is to pay for entry.
15
17 U.S. Supreme Court Olcott v. The Supervisors, 83 U.S. 16 Wall. 678 678 (1872)
18 QUOTE
19 Page 83 U. S. 693
20 "The legislature cannot create a public debt, or levy a tax, or authorize a municipal
21 corporation to do so, in order to raise funds for a mere private purpose. It cannot,
22 in the form of a tax, take the money of the citizen and give it to an individual, the
23 public interest or welfare being in no way connected with the transaction. The objects
24 for which the money is raised by taxation must be public, and such as subserve the
25 common interest and wellbeing of the community required to contribute. . . . To
26 justify the court in arresting the proceedings and declaring the tax void, the absence
27 of all possible public interest in the purposes for which the funds are raised must be
28 clear and palpable; so clear and palpable as to be perceptible by every mind AT THE
29 FIRST BLUSH."
30 All these expositions of the law of the state were made by its highest court before the
31 county orders now in suit were issued. They certainly did assert that building a railroad,
32 whether built by the state or by a corporation created by the state for the purpose, was a
33 matter of public concern, and that because it was a public use, the right of eminent
34 domain might be exerted or delegated for it, and taxation might be authorized for its aid.
35 It was the declared law of the state, therefore, when the bonds now in suit were issued,
36 that the uses of railroads, though built by private corporations, were public uses, such as
37 warranted the exercise of the public right of eminent domain in their aid, and also the
38 power of taxation.
39 We are not, then, concluded by a decision, made in 1870, that such public uses are
40 not of a nature to justify the imposition of taxes. We are at liberty to inquire what
41 are public uses, and what restrictions, if any, are imposed upon the state's taxing
42 power.
43 It is not claimed that the Constitution of Wisconsin contains any express denial of power
44 in the legislature to authorize municipal corporations to aid in the construction of
45 railroads, or to impose taxes for that purpose. The entire legislative power of the state is
46 confessedly vested in the General Assembly. An implied inhibition only is asserted.
47 Page 83 U. S. 694
48 It is insisted that, as the state cannot itself impose taxes for any other than a public
49 use, so the legislature cannot empower a municipal division of the state to levy and
50 collect taxes for any other than such a use,
51 END QUOTE
52

Page 14
1 My position is that because of the “separation of powers” and to avoid fraud, and misuse of
2 public monies all and any purported monies collected for and on behalf of the State must be
3 drawn by a specific Appropriation Act and not otherwise.
4 We had recently a revelation that the Commonwealth paid an about 4 persons company hundreds
5 of million dollars to engage in a project it had absolutely no experiences in. This underlines that
6 even with a “responsible government” system such blatant violation exist. With councils I view
7 that there is nothing to stop one of more councils to get together say for applying for a road
8 contract and then the State Minister for Roads can then pursue a Appropriation Bill for the
9 relevant councils, if their offer is deemed legitimate and in the best interest of Victorians. Not
10 that some council let a friend to the work and then allow a systematic rip off where the work
11 could have been performed better for the taxpayers.
12 We have constantly that projects are claiming to be over budget. What really is claimed they
13 were grossly incompetent? This as any project should be so to say set in concrete that the
14 company or companies engaged each will perform their services, etc, within the contract price
15 agreed upon by all parties.
16 We have this North Eastern Freeway (Through Banyule) that I recall was proposed to cost about
17 $6 Billion or thereabouts, while not it already is going to cost about $26 Billion. Clearly
18 something was drastically wrong, as likely the final cost might be perhaps $50 billion or more.
19
20 My wife and I are limited to what we can spend and we need to budget for our expenditure and
21 yet we have councils to pursue increases of up to 3.5% or more when in fact interest rates might
22 have been near zero but they simply desire to waste monies on projects that they use to glorify
23 themselves. It underlines there is no legitimate “responsible government” within any council
24 structure.
25
26 QUOTE Australian Agricultural Co Ltd. v F.E.D.F.A of Australasia (1913) 17 CLR 261 and
27 278
28 The oath of a justice of this court is ' to do right to all manner of people according to law'
29 Our sworn duty is to the law itself and to the organic nature of the constitution first of all.
30 If, then, we find the law to be plainly in conflict with what we or any of our predecessors
31 errornously thought it to be, we have, as I conceive no right to choose between giving
32 effect to the law, and maintaining an incorrect interpretation, It is not, in my opinion,
33 better that the court should be persistently wrong than that it should be ultimately right..
34 Whatever else may be said with respect to previous decisions - and it is necessary here to
35 consider the principals upon which a court should act in particular cases - so much at
36 least emerges as is undoubtedly beyond challenge, that where a former decision is clearly
37 wrong, and there are no circumstances countervailing the primary duty of giving effect to
38 the law as the court finds it, the real opinion of the court should be expressed.
39 END QUOTE
40 And
41 QUOTE Australian Agricultural Co Ltd. v F.E.D.F.A of Australasia (1913) 17 CLR 261 and 278
42 In my opinion, where the prior decision is manifestly wrong, then, irrespective of the
43 consequences, it is the paramount and sworn duty of this court to declare the law truly....
44 END QUOTE
45
46 QUOTE Duncan v Queensland (1916) 22 CLR 556, 582 (per Griffith C.J.)
47 That case (a previous decision of the High Court, Foggit, Jones & Co v NSW (1915) 21
48 CLR 357) was very briefly, and I regret to say, insufficiently argued and considered on the
49 last day of the Sydney sitting..... The arguments which now commend themselves to me as
50 conclusive did not find entrance to my mind. In my judgment that case was wrongly
51 decided, and should be overruled.
52 END QUOTE
Page 15
1
2 QUOTE Re: Sidebotham (1880) 14 Ch D 458 James LJ
3 A person aggrieved must be a man who has suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom
4 a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or
5 wrongfully refused him something, or wrongfully affected his title to something.
6 END QUOTE
7
8 It must be very clear that the purported decision of Carmody J never was a legal valid judgment
9 and orders, as he never invoked jurisdiction.
10
11 When a Court has an OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION it has to hold a “jurisdictional
12 hearing” in which both parties present their case. This may include calling witnesses, etc.
13 After the Court has decided in a case that it can invoke jurisdiction then both parties can again
14 present the same as well as other submissions and evidence.
15
16 A court cannot hear both the “jurisdictional hearing” and the case itself at the same time. It must
17 hold separate hearings.
18
19 What we have is that all my objections against the validity of certain legislation have never been
20 disposed of, and that also for this Buloke Shire Council cannot enforce alleged legislative
21 provisions which are all along ULTRA VIRES. There would be no legitimacy to engage any
22 debt collecting agency either. And Buloke Shire Council ought to make clear to its lawyers that
23 if they recommend to litigate they be responsible for any cost were the court defeat their case(s).
24 But Buloke Shire Council might just hold that the matters would be best pursued by the State of
25 Victoria itself as after all it is to pursue purported State legislative provisions which have been
26 contested upon constitutional grounds. As it would affect all councils why should Buloke Shire
27 Council be out on a limb to face another disastrous cost when in reality it is the State legislation
28 that is in question!
29
30
31
32 We need to return to the organics and legal principles embed in of our federal constitution!
33
34 This correspondence is not intended and neither must be perceived to state all issues/details.
35 Awaiting your response, G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. (Gerrit)
36 MAY JUSTICE ALWAYS PREVAIL®

37 (Our name is our motto!)


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36 MAY JUSTICE ALWAYS PREVAIL®

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