jbiwñ

A Bill of Rights is a list of the most important rights of citizens.

- The Bill of Rights establishes the relationship of the individual to the State and defines
the rights of the individual by limiting the lawful powers of the State as we have stated in
this one. We have learned that the idea of the government is brought about by two social
values. Power and Freedom. You might have notice that the Constitution concerns of
two values. It is always like that from the beginning to the end of the Constitution
especially when you go to the Bill of Rights and then governance, therefore becomes the
delicate art of balancing the power of government and the freedom of the govern. It is the
story of governmental power and the constitutional limits on it found in the Bill of Rights.
The first coded of the Bill of Rights is England in 1689 although it already had its MAGNA
CARTA as early as 1215. The United States had its Bill of Rights only in 1776.

- The BoR of the United States was the one inherited by the Philippines.

The purpose is to protect these rights against infringement by the state. - from
there alone, you can conclude that these rights are directed against the state, It is a
protection from the state because we have learned that the state is so powerful. It has
inherent rights, powers like police power, power of eminent domain and power of taxation.
It is a limitation on the intrusion on these right by the state.
-It means to say that the state may intrude into these rights and that the Bill of Rights -
list of rights, contains provisions, or parts that would limit the intrusion by the State on
these rights.

Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 104768, July 21, 2003. - it

provides knowledge or approaches to the Bill of Rights, it tells us that you have rights
even if there’s no Bill of Rights, even if there’s no Constitution. [this is what is interesting

READ in this case.] Especially with respect to the separate concurring opinion of Former Chief
Justice Puno.

The majority opinion was written by Justice Carpio and then there was a separate
concurring opinion given by former Chief Justice Puno. - In the majority opinion, Carpio
holds that the Bill of Rights was not operative during the interregnum thus Dimaano
cannot invoke the right against unreasonable search and seizure and the exclusionary
right as her house was search and their property seized on March 3, 1986. - This case
involves the former general Josefus Ramas who was a very soldier of Marcos, when the
people power happened, a few days after, the house of Dimaano was raided. You would
notice that March 3, 1986, was within the interregnum. Intelligence reports would come
out in the records of the case that Dimaano was a friend of Josefus Ramas, in fact, it is
in the records of the case that many times, Ramas frequented the house of Dimaano.
And then in that case, after it was raided, there were items that was taken from the house
of Dimaano, firearms, cash, dollar, billions of pesos worth of currency and then the house
was search and these items were taken. - The case was brought to Sandiganbayan
and the Sandiganbayan ruled that there was an illegal search and seizure of the items
confiscated and then the Republic government or state appealed the case until it reached
the Supreme Court that’s why it’s Republic of the Phils versus Sandiganbayan. - The
government appealed the ruling of the Sandiganbayan that there was an illegal search
and seizure of the items confiscated, the state said that the Sandiganbayan erred in ruling
there was an illegal search, they based their arguments on the fact that there cannot be
an illegal search because there was no Constitution, and since there was no constitution,
there was no Bill of Rights. - In so far as the majority opinion as the issues would be,
1. whether the protection accorded to individuals under the International Covenant and
Civil and Political Rights, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights remained in
effect during the interregnum. So even when there was no Bill of Rights, there was the
universal declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant and Civil and
Political Rights. 2. and second issue is whether the evidence seized must be excluded.

The approach of the majority written by Carpio is different from the approach of Puno.

The approach of the majority is that it also says that there was no Constitution and there
was no Bill of Rights however, still Dimaano had her rights under the International
Covenant and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. And then, there was this
issue of whether the seizure was illegal and if it is illegal, whether the item confiscated
should be given back to Dimaano.

Puno also had his own way of saying that even if there was no Constitution, and Bill of
Rights during the interregnum, still Dimaano is protected. By what?
natural law
________________. Also, Puno said that the items confiscated were illegally search,
there was illegal seizure and therefore, it must be given back to Dimaano.

Puno differed his justification of why the items seized must be given back to Dimaano. -
The exclusion is based on the Bill of Rights of the Freedom Constitution which was
already effective when Dimaano petitioned for exclusion.
excluded by exclusionary right.
In the separate concurring opinion of Puno, he agrees that the Bill of Rights was not
operational, but he disagrees with the conclusion of the majority that Dimaano has lost
and cannot invoke her right against unreasonable search and seizure.

a) Was the Bill of Rights, in general, and the right against unreasonable search and
seizure and the exclusion of illegally seized evidence, in particular, not availing from
February 25 to March 26, 1986? (the interregnum) - The interregnum is that part of our
history where there was no constitution at all. During the EDSA Revolution , Corazon
Aquino did away from the 1973 Constitution, she did not want to be governed by the 1973
Constitution, among others for practical purposes because she cannot be declared as
President if she will follow the 1973 Constitution because under the 1973 Constitution,
Congress declared Marcos as the President , as the winner of the snap elections in 1986,
so she had to cast that away, she had to turn her back using the language of Fr. Joaquin
Bernas. We call that part of our history, the interregnum. There was no Constitution at all.
From February 25 to March 26, 1986.

b) Is a Bill of Rights or a Constitution necessary in order that a person may exercise

and be protected by his rights?
 - No, because people have their natural right. So even when there was no Bill of Rights, no BOR or consti
there was the universal declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on
natural law
Civil and Political Rights. -

Other rights? Yes. The approach of the majority is that it also says that there was no
Constitution and there was no Bill of Rights however, still Dimaano had her rights under Freedom Constitution ni Tita Cory

the International Covenant and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

SECTION 1 Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the law.
There are 2 mandates in Section 1: The protection of a person’s life, liberty, or property
without due process of law.
1. Due process of law clause 2. Equal protection of the laws clause Bill of Rights
contain mandates against the state. Why?

QUIZ on THURSDAY - Well said that the Bill of Rights contain mandates against the State. Why? Because the
Bill of Rights is a protection for the citizen. The Bill of Rights is a restriction on the great

2/8/24
powers of the government. It is a protection against abuse of power.
-

Does not govern relations between private persons.

i. AN did the Carpio justify the exlvsionay right? - As a general rule, the Bill of Rights does not govern relations between private
persons The restrictions found in the Bill of Rights are directed against the State, they
punI do not govern relations between private persons, however, almost all the protection
against the State found in the Bill of Rights have been made applicable as Civil Law to
* Just read the case relations between private persons through Article 32 of the Civil Code.

As a general rule, the Bill of Rights applies to Filipino citizens and aliens alike.
Exception? - Section 7 of the Bill of Rights applies only to Filipino Citizens. - Section 7
has something to do with the right to public information. whether alien or not

Again, to review, the totality of the governmental power is contained in three great powers:
Police power, power of the eminent domain and power of taxation.
These powers are not granted by the Constitution but are inherent powers of government
without which, no government can exist and that a constitution can only define and limit
these power and allocate their exercise among various government agencies.

Police power has been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent, and the
least limitable of powers extending as it does “to all the great public needs.”
Police power. (Ermita Hotel and Motel Operators v. Mayor of Manila, GR No. L-24693,
July 31, 1967).
- Police power is defined in the case of Ermita Hotel and Motel Operators versus Mayor
of Manila. Police power is “that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it
to prohibit all that is hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.” That is the
definition of Police Power.
- Police Power rests on public necessity and upon the right of the State of the public to
self-protection.

May be delegated to local governments. (Legaspi vs City of Cebu, GR 15911,

December 10, 2013) - It may be delegated to local governments as in the case of Legaspi
vs City of Cebu. Police Power is exercised by the national government thru the legislative
department. - It may also be delegated within limits to local governments.

Test of a valid Ordinance. (Fernando vs. St. Scholastica’s College, GR. No. 161107,
March 12, 2013)

The exercise of police power by the LGU’s test of a valid ordinance, it is stated in For Ordinance
Fernando vs St. Scholastica’s College. Police power has been used to justify such public i. must not be contrary
safety measures as in building regulation, regulations on the carrying of deadly weapons, must not be Unfair
partial /discrimination

f. ÷:i÷m
gasoline stations and movie houses. Police power has been used to justify public health
measures as in compulsory connection to a city sewerage system and regulation of cattle
imports. general consistent

In the field of public morals, police power has been used as basis for judicial approval
of legislation, punishing vagrancy, prohibiting gambling, regulating the operation of dance
halls, motels, and hotels.

Cannot go beyond mere regulation into prohibition. (De la cruz v. Judge Paras, GR
No. 42571-71, July 25, 1983)
- where a municipality refuse to give any permit for night clubs and any license for
professional dancers. The Court declared the ordinance of that municipality
unconstitutional as going beyond mere regulation into prohibition of a profession or calling
which properly regulated can be legitimate.

Local governments cannot contravene the judgment of congress not to prohibit

gambling. (Magtajas v. Price Properties, 234 SCRA 255, 268 (1994).
- which says that while gambling may be prohibited, when it is allowed, the courts may
not pass judgment on the choice of Congress, the morality of gambling is not a justiciable
issue. Gambling is not illegal per se, while it is generally inimical to the interest of the
people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing
gambling or for that matter even mentioning it at all nor may local governments in-spite
of local autonomy contravene the judgement of Congress not to prohibit gambling. -
Police Power has been used to justify measures for the general welfare such those
regulating the slaughter of Carabaos, regulating nuisances, laying down the rules for the
deportation of the aliens, anti-graft laws. In the area of labor, agricultural tenancy and
social legislation. There has been a significant change of direction away from laissez faire.
Police power has been used even in the phase of apparent conflict with both the freedom
of contract and the sacred task of contractual obligations.

Rights protected under the due process clause of the constitution.

-

Equal law
- The Bill of Rights is the right to life, right to property, right to liberty.

The exercise of police power is subject to judicial inquiry.

- The exercise of police power insofar as it affects life, liberty or property of any person is

•"
subject to judicial inquiry.

The principal yardstick against which the exercise of police power may be due process of
principal yardstick •
-

police power
measured. (US vs. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85, 1910.) - Defined in this case - when said that
police power must be exercise within the limit set by the Constitution. In the words of the
leading case of US v Toribio, the legislative “determination as to what is a proper exercise
of its police powers is not final or conclusive but is subject to the supervision of the courts”
and the principal yardstick against which such exercise must be measured are the due
process clause and the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Principal yardstick - because the power, police power for example is subject to judicial
inquiry, what would the courts use to measure whether the exercise of Police Power is
prohibited or not, whether it is beyond what is allowed under the Constitution or not. So
what does the Court use to measure an exercise before it strikes it down as
Unconstitutional - that yardstick would be the due process clause and the equal protection
clause of the Constitution.
- The reach of due process and equal protection clause touch all persons, be they citizens
or aliens, natural or corporate.

The extent of the right to life that is protected by the constitution.

- is not confined to just a protection to be alive, or to the security of one’s limb against
physical harm, the right to life is also the right to a good life.

The right to liberty is not simply freedom from bodily restraint. - How about the
right to liberty? What is the extent of the right to liberty that is protected? The right to
liberty is not simply the freedom from bodily restraint, protected liberty includes not merely
freedom from body restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in
any common occupation, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and
bring up children and to worship God according to the dictates of one’s conscience.

The extent of the right to property that is protected by the constitution. - Protected
property includes all kinds of property found in Civil Code. It has been deemed to include
vested rights such as a perfected mining claim, or a perfected homestead or a final
judgement or a perfected lease contract.

Hierarchy of rights protected by the constitution. - The 1971 Constitution

Convention deliberations clearly recognized that the social character of private property
definitely place property in a position inferior to life or liberty. So immediately, under the
1971 Constitutional Convention Deliberations, it was understood that property is number
three, number 1 and 2 would be life and liberty. - In the case of Arroyo vs De Lima,
the Supreme Court in granting the temporary restraining order in favor of the petitioner,
adverted to the right to life, as the most important right protected by the Constitution. This
was the time when De Lima was the Secretary of Justice and Arroyo was already former
President. Arroyo was trying to go out of the country allegedly to seek medical attention
and there was a hold order issued by De Lima and Arroyo went to the Supreme Court
and the Supreme Court deciding in favor of Arroyo said that they adverted to the right to
life as the most important right protected by the Constitution.

Primacy of human rights over property rights demonstrated. Philippine

Blooming Mills Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., 50 → read this case

SCRA 189, 1973. - It demonstrates the primacy of human rights over property rights.
- The primacy of human rights over property rights is recognized. - The superiority of
these freedoms over property rights is underscored by the fact that a mere reasonable or
rational relation between the means employed by the law and its object or purpose - that
the law is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive - would suffice to validate
law which restricts or impairs property rights. On the other hand, a constitutional or valid
infringement of human rights requires a more stringent, stricter criterion, namely existence
of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to
prevent.

Two aspects of due process of law: the procedural and substantive aspects.
Substantive due process as the trace connotes, as whether the government has an
adequate reason for taking away a person’s life, liberty, or property. In other words,
substantive due process looks to whether there is sufficient justification for a
government’s action. It is a prohibition of arbitrary laws, because if all that the due process
clause required were proper procedure, then the life, liberty and property could be
destroyed arbitrarily provided proper formalities are observed.

Procedural due process is a guarantee of procedural fairness. - As a procedural

requirement, it relates chiefly to the mode of procedures that the government agencies
must follow. Before it deprives a person of life, liberty or property, classical procedural
due process issues are concerned with that kind of notice and what form of hearing the
government must provide when it takes a particular action.

Procedural due process is a guarantee of procedural fairness. - Due process is

more clearly intended the general law, a law which hears before it condemns, which
proceeds upon enquiry, and renders judgment only after trial.
- In the early history of the due process in American History, due process was
understood to relate chiefly to the mode of procedure which government agencies must
follow; it was understood as a guarantee of procedural fairness. due • process

- As defined by Mr. Daniel Webster said in his arguments before the Supreme Court of
the United States in the famous Dartmouth College case, "is more clearly intended the
general law, a law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon enquiry, and
renders judgment only after trial.

There are different sets of requirements of procedural due process in judicial

proceedings, in administrative proceedings and even in student discipline
 Q
cases. - Why are there separate set of requirements for judicial proceedings,
A
administrative proceedings and student discipline case? - Because what is due process
of law depends upon the circumstances, It varies with the subject matter and the
necessities of the situation.

Requirements of procedural due process in judicial proceedings: Banco Espanol

Filipino v. Palanca, 37 Phil 921 (1918). - In this case, As applied to judicial
proceedings ... it may be laid down with certainty that the requirement of due process is
satisfied if the following conditions are present, namely: (1) There must be a court or
tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (2) Read for Rent
jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property
which is the subject of the proceedings. (3) the defendant must be given an opportunity
to be heard; and (4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.

- Aside from Bernas, and Isagani Cruz, try Suarez, Nachura (books)

The requirements of procedural due process of law in administrative proceedings.

Ang Tibay v. CIR, 69 Phil 635 (1940). - For the purpose of this essay, however, suffice it
here to summarize what the leading case of Ang Tibay v Court of Industrial Relations has
called the “cardinal primary” requirements in administrative proceedings. - These
requirements Justice Laurel gleaned from an array of American decisions. They are: (1)
The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's case and submit evidence
in support thereof. (2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented. (3) The
decision must have something to support itself. (4) The evidence must be substantial.
Substantial evidence means such reasonable evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. (5) The decision must be based on the
evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to
read for rent
the parties affected. (6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept
the views of a subordinate. (7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions,
render its decision in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various
issues involved, and the reason for the decision rendered. - Whether in judicial or
administrative proceedings, therefore, the heart of procedural due process is the need for
notice and an opportunity to be heard. Moreover, what is required is not actual hearing
but a real opportunity to be heard. Thus, one who refuses to appear at a hearing is not
thereby denied due process if a decision is reached without waiting for him. Likewise, the
requirement of due process can be satisfied by subsequent due hearing.

- This has also been the gist of later decisions. It is a rule that guarantees fairness in
the enforcement of laws which effect deprivation. As a rule of fairness, procedural due
process helps achieve two purposes. Instrumentally, it contributes to accuracy and thus
minimizes errors in deprivations. More intrinsically to the person who is the subject of de-
privation, it gives him a sense of rational participation in a decision that can affect his
destiny and thus enhances his dignity as a thinking person.
 The requirements of procedural due process in student discipline cases. Guzman

QVippgqre.at
v. National University, 142 SCRA 699 (1986). - when a student commits a serious
breach of discipline or fails to maintain the required academic standards of the school,
the student forfeits his rights, and the courts are not at liberty to reverse the discretion of
university authorities in this matter.
esp the case of
Magtibay vs Garcia - Magtibay was a 1st class cadet officer in the University of the
Philippines ROTC, for some reason, the commandant Santiago Q. Garcia called his

Magtitayvs
attention for some misdemeanors in the parade grounds in the Sunken Garden in the UP.
That started it all until Garcia dismissed Magtibay although it was already the second . Garcia
semester, a few weeks before graduation. Magtibay would have graduated already for
his 4-year degree of advanced ROTC, but he was dismissed by Garcia until it reached
the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court decided in favor of Garcia and it said that if the
students fail to maintain the required academic standards of the school, the student
forfeits his rights and the courts are not at liberty to reverse the discretion of university
authorities in this matter. - It was particularly painful to Magtibay because he was not
allowed to graduate the UP advanced ROTC Course, and more importantly he was not
allowed to enter the UP-vanguard fraternity which is a fraternity of all graduates of UP
ROTC program.

Considered the heart of due process. - Whether in judicial or administrative Always remember

proceedings, the heart of procedural due process is the need for notice and an
opportunity to be heard. (If you comply with need for notice and an opportunity to be
heard, then you have substantially complied with the requirements) - Moreover, what
is required is not actual hearing but a real opportunity to be heard. Thus, one who refuses
to appear at a hearing is not thereby denied due process if a decision is reached without
waiting for him. Likewise, the requirement of due process can be satisfied by subsequent
due hearing. - The due process clause must be understood to guarantee not just
forms of procedure but also the very substance of life, liberty and property. It must be
interpreted both as a procedural and as a substantive guarantee. Due process must be a
guarantee against the exercise of arbitrary power even when the power is exercised
according to proper forms and procedure. Although it was frequently invoked as a protest
against arbitrariness in legislation, substantive due process was rarely invoked with
success. The Supreme Court gave generous latitude to legislation designed to promote
public health, public safety, or public welfare. So that the heart of substantive due process
is the requirement of "reasonableness" or absence of the exercise of arbitrary power.
The heart of substantive due process is the requirement of "reasonableness" or STUDI .

absence of the exercise of arbitrary power. US v. Toribio, 15 Phil 85 (1910). -

where a statute regulating the slaughter of large cattle, a measure designed to preserve
work animals needed for agriculture, it was challenged as unlawful deprivation of
property. The Supreme Court sustained the statute as it held that the State may interfere
wherever the public interest demands it, and in this particular a large discretion is
necessarily vested in the legislature to determine, not only what the interests of the public
require, but what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests.
1910 Case.

chimaera
Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 659, 1987. - This case, it is similar
with US v Toribio, it pertains to large cattle, an executive order was issued by Marcos,
amending EO 626 that is the executive order that was sustained by the Supreme Court
in US v Toribio prohibiting not only the slaughter of large cattle but prohibiting the
transportation of Carabao from one province to another. Any carabao, under the penal
clause, shall be confiscated. The amendment is not valid says the Court. Outright
confiscation of carabaos illegally transported is unduly oppressive.

Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil 660 (1919). - a law creating reservations
for the Mangyan tribes and prescribing penalties for the Mangyan non-conformists was
challenged as deprivation of liberty without due process of law. The Supreme Court held
that the law was justified by the demands of general welfare and public interest. (Humbly
thing)

Villavicencio v Lukban - Where the Mayor and the Chief of police of Manila herded
together the prostitutes of Manila and shipped them to the distant province of Davao. The
Supreme Court granted a writ of habeas corpus and ordered the return of the deportees.

People v Fajardo - Here, a building permit was denied to an owner of a piece of land
on the ground that the proposed construction would block the view from the highway
towards the municipal plaza. The Court said that the ordinance is unreasonable and
oppressive in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their
own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of
appellant's property without just compensation.

The principle of presumed validity of statutes. Ermita Malate Hotel and Motel
Operators, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila, 20 SCRA 849 (1967)
- there was an ordinance designed in part to curb the rampant use of hotels and motels
as places of illicit assignation. When Ermita questioned the ordinance of the City of
Manila, they were not able to present enough evidence to overturn the ordinance. And
therefore, the Supreme Court sustained the ordinance, that is the principle of presumed
validity of the statutes.

Publication and clarity of laws as a requirement of due process: Tanada v. Tuvera,

GR No. 63915, December 29 1986. - The central issue in Tanada v. TuveraTM was the
meaning to be given to the Civil Code's requirement of publication. Article 2 of the Code
says: "Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication
in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. ..." The Court said that the phrase
"unless it is otherwise provided" refers not to the need of publication in the Official Gazette
but to the requirement of "fifteen days." The fifteen days can be lengthened or shortened
but not to the point of allowing no publication at all.

The rule requiring publication for the effectivity of laws applies not only to laws
passed by congress. (Republic v. Pilipinas Shell, GR No. 173918, April 8, 2008). - the
rule that requires publication for the effectivity of laws applies not only to statutes but also
 to presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise
Review all and quiz
of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at cases
for recit
.

present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must
also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to
a valid delegation.

Void for vagueness rule. (People v. Nazario, 165 SCRA 186 (1988) - A law that is utterly
vague is defective because it fails to give notice of what it commands. (Anti-terror law)

When is a law vague? (Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 148560, November 19, 2001)
- In here, it defines when a law vague. A statute or act may be said to be vague when it
lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess
at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to
the Constitution in two respects — (1) first, it violates due process for failure to accord
persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and,
(2)second, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.

A criminal statute that 'fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his
contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute,' or is so indefinite that 'it encourages
arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions,' is void for vagueness. People v. de la Piedra
Equal protection clause
The guarantee of equal protection. (Tolentino v. Board of Accountancy, 90 Phils 83
,1951) - simply means "that no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same
protection of the laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same
place and in like circumstances.

The equal protection clause recognizes the power of the state to act upon factual
differences between individuals.
- It recognizes that inherent in the right to legislate is the right to classify.
Factual differences must be
The problem, thus, in equal protection cases is one of determining the validity of recognized
the classification made by law. -The equal protection clause is a specific
constitutional guarantee of the Equality of the Person. The equality it guarantees is "legal
equality or, as it is usually put, the equality of all persons before the law. It does not deny
to the state the power to recognize and act upon factual differences between individuals
and classes.

People v Cayat - It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of

the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable
classification.

Requirements for a reasonable classification: (1) must rest on substantial Lala bas daw sa

Exams
distinction; (2) must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.
 Q .
Hindi bait violations a equal protection
clause?

Fariñas v. Executive Secretary, GR No. 147387, Dec. 10, 2003. - where the Supreme
Court decided that elective and appointive officials are not of the same class. The Fair
elections act provides that elective officials are not deemed resigned upon the filing of
their certificate of candidacy: this is not the case for appointive officials. Is this not a
violation of the equal protection clause? The provision in the Fair Elections Act was held
by the supreme Court not to be applicable to appointive officials running for public office
because they are not of the same class.

Tiu v. CA, GR No. 127410, January 20, 1999. The constitution does not require absolute

]
equality among residents. - R.A. No. 7227 was challenged as violative of equal protection
ito
because it granted tax and duty incentives only to businesses and residents within the yung subic
"secured area" of the Subic Special Economic Zone and denied them to those who lived
within the Zone but outside such "fenced-in" territory. The Court justified the classification
saying that the Constitution does not require absolute equality among residents.

International School Educators v. Quisumbing, GR No. 128845, June 1, 2000. Equal

pay, equal work. - the practice of the International School of giving higher salary for
foreign hires than Filipinos of equal rank was declared unconstitutional. The Court argued
that the principle of "equal pay for equal work." required that persons who work with
substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions
should be paid similar salaries.

Smith, Bell and Co. v. Natividad, 40 Phil 136 (1919). Alienage as basis of classification.
-The issue is: Did the statute which required domestic ownership, that is, ownership by
either Filipino or American citizens, in order to be able to obtain a certificate of Philippine
registry of a vessel for coastwise trade, violate the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Philippine Bill? The classification “with reference to the evil to be prevented”
is a practical question “dependent upon experience”. " While the apparent purpose of
the Legislature is seen to be to enact an anti-alien shipping act," the "ultimate purpose of
the Legislature is to encourage Philippine shipbuilding. The Court concluded, the
challenged law did "not belong to that vicious species of class legislation which must
always be condemned.

Li Seng Giap and Co. v. Director of Lands, - a law prohibiting aliens from acquiring
certain public lands was challenged as discriminatory. The Court rejected the contention
by appealing to the right of the state "to the integrity of its territory and the exclusive and
peaceable possession of its dominions.
- Asserting the principle already used in the pre-Commonwealth case of Li Seng Giap v.
Director ofLands that the Constitution itself may contain exceptions to the equal protection
clause, the Court declared the measures constitutional. Public markets, according to the
Court, are public services or utilities, the operation of which is re- served by the
Constitution to Filipinos or corporations sixty per centum of which is owned by Filipinos

Ichong v. Hernandez; King v. Hernaez

 - was whether the prohibition, under the Anti-Dummy Law, of the employment of aliens in
control and non-control positions in a retail establishment or trade was constitutional.

Villegas v. Hiu Chiong

- also invalidated on equal protection grounds at Manila ordinance imposing a uniform
license fee of fifty pesos on all aliens as a precondition for accepting employment. The
decision is interesting not because it concerns an alienage law but because it teaches
that a law can offend against equal protection not only when it classifies but also when it
fails to classify.

Gumabon v Director of Prisons

- petitioners had been sentenced to life imprisonment for the complex crime of rebellion
with murder. Subsequently, People v . Hernandez, negated the existence of such
complex offense. Petitioners asked for release invoking the equal protection clause.
Granting the petition, the Court said: "The continued incarceration after the twelve-year
period when such is the maximum length of imprisonment in accordance with our
controlling doctrine, is fraught with implications at war with equal protection.

Himagan v. People, 237 SCRA 538, (1994). - the Court also allowed different treatment
for accused police officers. the National Police Law, allows suspension of a policeman to
continue beyond 90 days until the case against him is terminated. Whereas under the
anti-graft and corrupt practices, the suspension cannot go beyond 90 days.

- The question has been asked "whether the command implicit in equal protection
constitute merely a ban on the creation of inequalities by the state or a command, as well,
to eliminate inequalities existing without direct contribution thereto by state action." does
the equal protection clause merely prohibit the state from institutionalizing inequality, or
does it command the state to take positive measures to eradicate inequalities that have
arisen not necessarily through state action?
The doctrinal supports in the constitution to achieve a reasonable measure of Q .
are the doctrinal support ?
equality: the Preamble proclaims equality as an ideal; the command to promote social
justice in Article II, Section 10, and Art XIII. - What then or are there doctrinal support?
- Yes, there are. No less than the preamble proclaims equality as an ideal, the command
to promote social justice in Article II, Section 10, and Art XIII.

The Commission on Elections is given broad powers in order to implement laws

seeking to equalize political opportunities.
- so is the command of the constitution to prohibit political dynasties.

Article III, Section 11, expressly guarantees free access to the courts; and Article
XIV commands the state to make quality education accessible to all.

SECTION 2 Section 2. The right of the people to be secured in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable search and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable,
 Purpose: To protect the privacy and sanctity of the person and his house and other list down the process of
possessions against the arbitrary intrusions of the state; ...and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by securing a warrant of arrest
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
person or things to be seized.

Purpose: Provides for the conditions under which a valid intrusion maybe made, as it
spells out the requisites of a valid warrant.
(1) it must be issued upon probable cause; 2) probable cause must be determined
personally by the judge; (3) such judge must examine under oath or affirmation the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce; (4) the warrant must particularly describe
the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized.
In the 1987 provision, the requirements for a valid warrant of arrest and the requirements
for a valid search warrant are now the same.

May a private person or entity be held liable for illegal search under Section 2, •

Republic of the Philippines

Article III. Silahis International v. Soluta, GR No. 163087, February 20, 2006. - A private
entity or person may be held liable for illegal search under Article 32 of the Civil Code but
vs
Sandiganbayan
not under Section 2 Article III because again, the Bill of Rights are directed against the GR No 104768
State. If the person violating the right is the State or the agent of the State, the Bill of
Rights is applicable. If they are private individuals, it does not mean that can run free,
they can be liable under Article 32 of the Civil Code. - The provision is not a prohibition
-

July 20oz
against all searches and seizure, it is only applicable to unreasonable searches and
seizures with warrant or none. -

may right bn?

- As a general rule, searches and seizures are unreasonable unless authorized by a
validly issued search warrant.

At what point does an inspection (say in a check point) become a search in the
sense of Section 2. Valmonte v. Villa, 185 SCRA 665 (1990); People v. Escano, GR No.
129756, January 28, 2000. - The Court held that there is as yet no cause for the
application of the constitutional rule when what are involved are routine checks consisting
of "a brief question or two. For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants
subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search,
said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individual's right against
unreasonable searches and seizures.

People vs Sapla (2014). A text message from an anonymous person is not probable
READ cause for a conduct of an intrusive, warrantless search. - A car was in a checkpoint.
Somebody texted the people at the checkpoint and said that there was a contraband in
the car and because of the text message, they forced the applicant to open the car. The
 Supreme Court said that they cannot do that. A text message from an anonymous person
is not probable cause for a conduct of an intrusive, warrantless search.

2 kinds of search:

Visual search - no necessity for probable cause

Intrusive search - there must be probable cause

Probable cause (In general). Probable cause is such facts and circumstances
antecedent to the issuance of a warrant that is in them sufficient to induce a cautious man
to rely upon them and act in pursuance thereof.

Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest / search warrant.

- Such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man
to believe that an offense has been committed AND the objects sought in connection with
the offense are in the place sought to be searched [Burgos v. Chief of Staff, G.R. No. L-
64261 (1984)]. Read
The quantum of evidence needed to establish probable cause is probability, not
absolute or even moral certainty. Microsoft v. Maxicorp, GR No. 140946,
September 13, 2004.
- Probable cause for a search warrant need not point to a specific offender. But it
must point to some specific violation of our criminal law.

Probable cause for a warrant of arrest must point to a specific offender.

v. De Leon, GR No. 121234, August 23, 1995. Stonehill v. Diokno, GRL-19550, June
Webb Read
19 1976. The description of the offense simply as "violation of the Central Bank Laws,
Tariff and Customs Laws" made it impossible for finding probable cause. - a given
provision of our criminal law." The Court, in invalidating the warrant issued in the case,
said that the description of the offense simply as "violation of the Central Bank Laws,
Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code and Revised Penal Code" made it
"impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of
probable cause.” In other words, "probable cause" means probable cause of something
specific. - The Court said that the establishment of the existence of probable cause
"presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought
has performed particular acts or committed specific omissions violating a given provision
of our criminal law." The Court invalidated the warrant issued. - Under Section 3 Rule
126 - it is now provided that the search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause
in connection with one specific offense and that no search warrant shall be issued for
more than one specific offense.
Read
Central Bank v. Judge Morfe, GR L-20119, June 30, 1967. The failure of the witness
to mention particular individuals did not necessarily prove that he had no personal
knowledge of specific illegal transaction.
Under the 1987 constitution, only a judge may determine probable cause for the
purpose of issuing a warrant.
judicial determination
The 1973 Constitution, Article III, Section 2, says that probable cause is "to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce." The provision then poses two
questions: (1) Who may determine probable cause? (2) What procedure must be followed
in determining probable cause?

Under Article III, Section 1 (3), of the 1935 Constitution, probable cause could be
determined only by a judge and by no other officer.
When a case is filed before the fiscal, the fiscal shall determine the probable cause for
the purpose of filing an information. That is another kind of determination of probable
cause, it is an administrative determination by the fiscal.
The prosecution determines probable cause for the purpose of filing an information.

People v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 126005, January 21, 1999. - The determination
of probable cause during preliminary investigation is an administrative or executive
function.
Must the Judge personally examine the complainant and his witnesses? - The word
"personally" defines determination of probable cause by the judge, not his examination of
witnesses. - the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his
determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest.

Soliven v. Judge Makasiar, 167 SCRA 988) (the Luis Beltran case) - this case was
originally filed by President Aquino, the late Luis Beltran - in one of the cue that was
launch by President Aquino, Malacañang was buzzed by a jet plane and in the morning
after, Luis Beltran said in his column that the President hid under her bed, it was meant
to be a light banter on the part of Luis Beltran but the President did not take it as such,
she took it as an insult to her presidency so she sued Luis Beltran and Maxx Soliven who
was then the publisher of the yellow paper Philippine Star and it reached the Courts and
Judge Makasiar, as an RTC Judge in Manila, he convicted Soliven and Beltran of Libel.
And Soliven and Beltran brought their case to the Court of Appeals.eventually, the case
was dismissed. Four instances where probable cause is needed to be determined:
(1) In Sections 1 and 3 of Rule 112: By the investigating officer; (2) In Sections 6 and 9
of Rule 112: By the judge; (3) In Section 5(b) of Rule 113: By a peace officer or a private
person; (4) In Section 4 of Rule 126: By the judge; ..."personally" The word
"personally" defines determination of probable cause by the judge, not his examination of
witnesses. - the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his
determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest.

Soliven v Makasiar - In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the
complainant and his wit- nesses. What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and
personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable
cause.

Lim v Felix - We reiterate the ruling in Soliven v. Makasiar that the Judge does not have
to personally examine the complainant and his wit- nesses. The Prosecutor can perform
the same functions as a commissioner in the taking of evidence. However, there should
be a report and necessary documents supporting a Fiscal's bare certification. All of
these should be before the Judge.

Purpose of requiring particularity of description in a search warrant. Uy Kheytin v

Villareal - The evident purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit the things to be
seized to those, and only those, particularly described in the search warrant — to leave
the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they shall seize, to the
end that unreasonable searches and seizures may not be made, — that abuses may not
be committed.

Uy Kheytin v. Villareal, 42 Phil 886 (1920). - The Court said that the "oath
required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner
or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate,
not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the
existence of probable cause." The test of sufficiency, according to the Court, was
“whether it had been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and
affiant be held liable for damages caused." The rule that searches and seizure must
be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule. As a general rule: “In order that
a search or warrant must be legal, there must be a warrant issued by a judge”

- General rule, not absolute. What the provision prohibits are unreasonable search
and seizures.

Warrantless search and seizure may be allowed (1) search incidental to an arrest;
(2) search of moving vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) customs
searches; (5) where there is waiver of the right; Also rule on exigent circumstance
and the stop and frisk rule.

Search incidental to an arrest. Moreno v. Ago Chi, 12 Phil 439 (1909). -An officer
making an arrest may take from the person arrested any money or property found upon
his person which was used in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime or
which might furnish the prisoner with the means of committing violence or escaping, or
which may be used in evidence in the trial of the cause.

Search incidental to an arrest cannot be made in a place other than where the
suspect is arrested. Nolasco v. Pano, 147 SCRA 509 (1987). - The arrest had
been made while Nolasco was riding in a jeepney and the search was made in her house
several blocks away from the place of arrest.
- The original Court ruling under the authoritarian rule had justified the search as one
incidental to an arrest. Nolasco reversed the rule.Chief Justice Teehankee in his
concurring opinion said: and established rule is a strict application of the exception
provided in Rule 126, Sec. 12 and that is to absolutely limit a warrantless search of a
person who is lawfully arrested to his or her person at the time of and incident to his or
her arrest and to 'dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of the offense.' Such warrantless search obviously cannot be made in a place
other than the place of arrest.

Search of moving vehicles. Papa v. Mago, GR No. L-27360, February 28, 1968.
- warrantless search of moving vehicles is authorized "where it is not practical to secure
a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in
which the warrant must be sought”. (For practical purposes)

Search of moving vehicles: Extensive search without warrant could only be resorted
to if there is probable cause.

Aniag v. Commission on Elections, 237 SCRA 424 (1994). - Before the election of
1992 - the search of a car made by police officers twenty meters from the entrance to
the Batasan complex was not justified by any earlier confidential report nor by the
behavior or appearance of the motorist. - In this case, the Court held that “An extensive
search without warrant could only be resorted to if the officers conducting the search had
reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that either the motorist was a
law offender or that they would find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to the
commission of a crime in the vehicle to be searched”. The existence of probable cause
justifying the warrantless search is determined by the facts of each case. Thus, we upheld
the validity of a warrantless search in situations where the smell of marijuana emanated
from a plastic bag owned by the accused, or where the accused was acting suspiciously,
and attempted to flee.

Written investigation report - can be a basis for probable cause.

People vs. Tabar, 222 SCRA 144 (1993). Where marijuana sticks fall before the
eyes of a police officer. -Thus, where marijuana sticks fall before the eyes of a police
officer from an object a person is carrying, seizure of the stick does not require a
warrant.”

Requirements for a warrantless search and seizure of evidence in plain view.

People v. Evaristo, 216 SCRA 413,1992. (1) there must be a valid prior intrusion in
to a place; (2) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the
right to be where they are; (3) the illegality of the evidence must be immediately
apparent; (4) it is noticed without further search.
The discovery must be inadvertent. People v. Musa, 217 SCRA 597 (1993). - To
come under the exception, the recovery of the evidence must be inadvertent. There was
no poking around, they just saw it there. - If an officer encounter prohibited objects on a
place only after poking around, the discovery would not be inadvertent.

Customs inspections: - It has also been traditionally understood that customs officers
or border officers may search incoming persons and goods to look for either goods
concealed to avoid duties or other illegal materials.

Requirements of a warrantless search and seizure to constitute as waiver of the

constitutional right.
De Gracia v. Locsin, 65 Phil 689, reiterated in People v. Barros, 231 SCRA 557 (1994).
- The Court said “
It is well-settled that to constitute a waiver of a constitutional right, it must appear,
first, that the right exists; secondly, that the person involved had knowledge, either actual
or constructive, of the existence of such right; lastly, that said person had an actual
intention to relinquish the right. “
- In any event, the failure on the part of the petitioner and her bookkeeper to resist or
object to the execution of the warrant does not constitute an implied waiver of
constitutional right.
- De Gracia failure to object or resist to an objectionable warrant.

Implied conformity is not consent. People v. Compacion, GR 124442, July 20,

2001. - The act of the accused-appellant in allowing the members of the military to enter
his premises and his consequent silence during the unreasonable search and seizure
could not be construed as voluntary submission or an implied acquiescence to
warrantless search and seizure especially so when members of the raiding team were
intimidatingly numerous and heavily armed. - His implied acquiescence, if any, could
not have been more than mere passive conformity given under coercive or intimidating
circumstances and is, thus, considered no consent at all within the purview of the
constitutional guarantee.

Spouses Veroy v. Layague, GR 95632, June 18, 1992. - It should finally be noted that
the waiver must be understood to cover only what is included within the terms of the
language. A permission granted for officers to enter a house to look for rebel soldiers
does not include permission for a room to room search of firearms.

-“Qualified consent” - The permission to enter a house and search for persons and effects
may be qualified, and the searching officer may not act in excess of the authority granted
to him.

The waiver must be understood to cover only what is included within the terms of
the language.
Warrantless search and seizure: Exigent circumstances: - Furthermore, under the
situation then prevailing, the raiding team had no opportunity to apply for and secure a
search warrant from the courts.
- The trial judge himself manifested that on December 5, 1989 when the raid was
conducted, his court was closed. - Under such urgency and exigency of the moment, a
search warrant should lawfully be dispensed with."

Warrantless search and seizure: Stop and frisk rule: - "Where a police officer
observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his
experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the person with whom he is dealing
may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigation of this
behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where
nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his
own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area
to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt
to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is reasonable
search under the Fourth Amendment ..."

Posadas v. CA, 188 SCRA 288 (1990). Malacat - the Court said that: "while
probable cause is not required to conduct a 'stop and frisk,' it nevertheless holds that
mere suspicion, or a hunch will not validate a 'stop and frisk.' A genuine reason must
exist, in light of the police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the
belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him.

Same requirements for search warrants and warrant of arrest. (1987)

Amarga v. Abbas, 98 Phil 739 (1956). - held that both search warrants and warrants
of arrest must satisfy the same requirements as to probable cause and the manner of its
determination. Both the 1973 and the 1987 texts removed any doubt about the
correctness of the Amarga decision since the new provision now specifically imposes the
same requirements for both search warrants and warrants of arrest. Hence, what has
been said about probable cause and particularity of description in the discussion of search
warrants can with equal truth be said of warrants of arrest, and little need be said on these
two subjects.

A John Doe warrant of arrest is valid provided it satisfies the requirement of particularity
of description.

People v. Veloso, 48 Phil 169, 1925. - the legality of a John Doe warrant of arrest was
questioned.
- The Court concluded “ [A] is invariably recognized that the warrant for the apprehension
of an unnamed party is void, "except in those cases where it contains a descriptio
personae such as will enable the officer to identify the accused”. The description must be
sufficient to clearly indicate the proper person upon whom the warrant is to be served.
A warrant of arrest against 50 John Does is not valid.

Pangandaman v. Casar, 159 SCRA 599, 1988. - The Court said “a warrant for the arrest
of fifty John Does is of the nature of a general warrant which does not satisfy the
requirement of particularity of description”.

Warrantless arrest is generally illegal. The cases when a person may be arrested
even without a warrant is summarized under Rule 113, Section 5, Rules of Court:
Flagrante delicto rule.

- Sec. 5. Arrest without a warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or attempting to commit an offense; (b)
When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to
be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he
is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.

People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 (1968). - a. The Court said that "the officer arresting a
person who has just committed, is committing, or about to commit an offense must have
personal knowledge of that fact. The offense must also be committed in his presence or
within his view."
- b. an offense had in fact just been committed, and the officers had personal knowledge
of the facts indicating that the accused had committed it. (Where, however, while
patrolling in their car, policemen received a radio message from their camp directing them
to proceed to Ihaw-Ihaw where there had been a shooting, went to to the place and there
saw the victim and bystanders pointing to the accused fleeing from the scene)

A warrantless arrest cannot be effected three months or even six days after the
commission of the crime. People v. Salvatierra, GR 104663, July 24, 1967. - But
a warrantless arrest effected three months after the commission of the crime was
invalidated.

Entrapment may or may not be allowed depending upon the

circumstances. People v. Doria, GR 125299, January 22, 1999. - The type of
entrapment the law forbids is the inducing of another to violate the law, the 'seduction' of
an otherwise innocent person into a criminal career. - Where the criminal intent
originates in the mind of the entrapping person and the accused is lured into the
commission of the offense charged in order to prosecute him, there is entrapment, and
no conviction may be had. Where, how- ever, the criminal intent originates in the mind of
the accused and the criminal offense is completed, the fact that a person acting as a
decoy for the state, or public officials furnished the accused an opportunity for commission
of the offense, or that the accused is aided in the commission of the crime in order to
secure the evidence necessary to prosecute him, there is no entrapment and the accused
must be convicted.

A buy bust operation is a form of entrapment.

- People v. de la Cruz, GR 83260, April 18, 1990. - A buy bust operation is a form
of entrapment. The method is for an officer to pose as a buyer. He neither instigates nor
induces the accused to commit a crime because in these cases the "seller" has already
decided to commit a crime.

When the validity of an arrest challenged. - "Any objection involving a warrant of

arrest or procedure in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of the
accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed
waived."
- The accused must move for the quashing of the information against him before
arraignment. Otherwise, he is estopped from questioning the validity of the arrest.
Arraignment - is a process at the beginning of the trial of the case- where the criminal
complaint against the accused is read to him in a language that he understands by the
Court and then he is asked how he enters his plea, whether guilty or not guilty, the
accused may refuse at all to make a plea. (I did that before the Sandiganbayan- Atty Lara
- not guilty will be entered by the Court as they did in his plea)

(People v. Cabiles, GR 112035, January 16, 1998). An application for bail not
considered a waiver of the right of an accused to question the legality of his arrest.

Okabe v. Judge De Leon, GR No. 150185, May 27, 2004. - Section 26, Rule 114
of the Revised Rules in Criminal Procedure says that an application for bail or the
admission to bail by an accused is not considered a waiver of his right to assail the warrant
issued for his arrest or the legalities or irregularities thereof.

Stonehill v Diokno case - also clearly affirmed that "the legality of a seizure can be
contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the
objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of
by third parties."

The right to privacy is the right to be left alone.

Hing vs. Choachuy, GR 179736, June 26, 2013 - The right to privacy under Article
26(1) of the Civil Code covers business offices where the public are excluded therefrom,
and only certain individuals are allowed to enter.

Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable

except upon lawful orders of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise
as prescribed by law.
- GENERAL RULE - It may be infringed, or the State may impose its power under certain
circumstances. - exceptions: "The privacy of communication and correspondence shall
be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court." or when public safety or order requires
otherwise as prescribed by law. - so, it is not absolute

Q: Is the privacy of communication absolute? Or is there a way that the privacy of

communication and correspondence can be violated by the State? May the State do
something to look up the privacy of communication and correspondence of its citizen.

A: Yes, it may be done. By its exceptions. It may be done upon lawful orders of the court,
or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this, or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
- Exclusionary rule: historical development.

The privacy of communication and correspondence is not absolute. Section 3

allows intrusion into the privacy of communication and correspondence. What are the
conditions for such allowable intrusion?
- upon lawful orders of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as
prescribed by law.

- WORRISOME: “Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012” [ Republic Act No. 10175]

SEC. 12. Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data. — Law enforcement authorities, with due
cause, shall be authorized to collect or record by technical or electronic means traffic data
in real-time associated with specified communications transmitted by means of a
computer system.

The court may order intrusion based on the requirements of probable cause in Section 2
(Art. III). (Because the intrusion into communication and correspondence is one kind of
search) - ONLY if there is probable cause.

The implementing statute on the subject is RA 4200 known as the Anti

Wiretapping Law, as amended by the Human Security Act of 2007 (RA 9372). -
repealed by Anti-Terrorism Act. - similar to the provisions.
- only for terrors.

Meaning of the exclusionary rule under paragraph 2, Section 3. - The exclusionary

rule bars admission of illegally obtained evidence for any purpose and in any
proceeding. - The inadmissibility of the evidence, however, does not mean that it must
be returned where it came from. If the object is not a prohibited object, it must be
returned." But if contraband, it can be confiscated. - "the illegality of the search and
seizure should first have been directly litigated and established by a motion made before
trial, for the return of the things seized”.

RP V SANDIGANBAYAN - items seized were returned except the contraband.

The exclusionary rule bars admission of illegally obtained evidence. The second
paragraph of Section 3, Article III makes the rule applicable to evidence obtained under
both Section 2 and Section 3(1).

How evidence declared inadmissible disposed of. (Alih v. Castro, 151 SCRA 279
(1987) - The inadmissibility of the evidence, however, does not mean that it must be
returned where it came from. If the object is not a prohibited object, it must be returned."
But if contraband, it can be confiscated.
Exclusionary rule: Evidence unlawfully obtained by private individuals does not come
under the exclusionary rule.

People v. Andre Marti, 193 SCRA 57 (1991). In the absence of governmental

interference, the constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be
invoked against the state. - The Bill of Rights is applicable only against the agents of the
State. - The Bill of Rights are rights of the citizens against the State.

Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression

or of the press, or the right of the people to peaceably assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances.
Freedom of expression: The foundation of our free, open, and democratic society.
(Carpio) - The Supreme Court has ruled that even if the Constitution is abolished
by a revolutionary government, our fundamental rights, which include freedom of
expression, cannot be taken away because they form part of customary international law
under the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights which are binding on any government, whether constitutional or
revolutionary. Freedom of expression, which includes freedom of speech and
freedom of the press, is the foundation of our free, open, and democratic society. Without
freedom of expression, all our other freedoms—civil and political rights — cannot exist.
Freedom of expression is the freedom to engage in full, spirited, and even contentious
discussion of all social, economic, and political issues. Freedom of expression is
guaranteed under the Constitution, which mandates that “no law shall be passed
abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or the press.” A state of martial law does
not suspend freedom of expression.

Speech, expression, and press include every form of expression, whether oral,
written, tape or disc recorded. - it also includes movies, symbolic speech, such as
wearing arm bands. The two prohibitions on the abridgment (curtailment) of the
freedom of speech, of expression or of the press. Prohibition of prior restraint
and prohibition of subsequent punishment. Prior restraint. - means official
governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in advance of actual
publication or dissemination. - before dissemination, before actual publication. (PRIOR
or advanced) - Its most blatant form is a system of licensing administered by an
executive officer.
- Movie censorship, although not placed on the same level as press censorship, also
belongs to this type of prior restraint. Also similar to the licensing system is judicial prior
restraint which takes the form of an injunction against publication.

- Equally objectionable as prior restraint are license taxes measured by gross receipts for
the privilege of engaging in the business of advertising in any newspaper or flat license
fees for the privilege of selling religious books.

Unconstitutional prior restraint. (Chavez v. Gonzales, GR No. 168338, February 15,

2008).
- It was where, The writs of certiorari and prohibition are issued, nullifying the official
statements made by respondents on June 8, and 11, 2005 warning the media on airing
the alleged wiretapped conversation between the President and other personalities, for
constituting unconstitutional prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech and of
the press.

-In the aftermath of the 2004 elections when there was wide talk about election cheating,
one of the topics that hugged the headlines was the alleged telephone conversation
between President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and Election Commissioner Garcillano. The
government warning addressed to media against airing the alleged wiretapped
conversation was deemed by the Court to constitute unconstitutional prior restraint on the
exercise of freedom of speech and of the press.
- Chavez was the late lawyer - Gonzales was the secretary of Justice during the time
of Gloria.

Subsequent punishment: The mere prohibition of government interference before

words are spoken or published would be an inadequate protection of the freedom of
expression if the government could punish without restraint after publication.
- after publication
- the guarantee of freedom of expression also means a limitation on the power of the state
to impose subsequent punishment.

Media and Judicial Process: When the right to free speech and of the press collides
with the right of the accused to a fair trial. AM 01-4-03-SC Re: Sec. of Justice v.
Sandiganbayan, June 29, 2001. - A case of first impression in Philippine Jurisprudence
was Secretary of Justice v. Sandiganbayan, the case involved a petition to allow live
television coverage of the trial of former President Estrada. It involves the weighing out
of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public information,
on the one hand, and the fundamental rights of the accused, on the other hand, along
with the constitutional power of a court to control its proceedings in ensuring a fair and
impartial trial. - When these rights race against one another, jurisprudence7 tells us that
the right of the accused must be preferred to win.
- In denying the petition, Court said that television coverage of judicial proceedings
involves an inherent denial of the due process rights of a criminal defendant. AM 10-11-
5-SC Re: Petition for Radio and TV Coverage of the Maguindanao Massacre Cases,
June 14, 2011.
- The indication of "serious risks" posed by live media coverage to the accused's right to
due process, left unexplained and unexplored in the era obtaining in Aquino and Estrada,
has left a blow to the exercise of press freedom and the right to public information.
- One apparent circumstance that sets the Maguindanao Massacre cases apart from
the earlier cases is the impossibility of accommodating even the parties to the cases - the
private complainants/families of the victims and other witnesses - inside the courtroom.

- The ruling is pro hac vice the live broadcasting by radio and television of the
Maguindanao Massacre cases, - the Court resolved to PROHIBIT live radio and
television coverage of court proceedings. Video footages of court hearings for news
purposes shall be limited and restricted as above indicated. Considering the prejudice, it
poses to the defendant's right to due process as well as to the fair and orderly
administration of justice, and considering further that the freedom of the press and the
right of the people to information may be served and satisfied by less distracting,
degrading and prejudicial means, live radio and television coverage of court proceedings
shall not be allowed.

Media and the right to privacy: Ayer Productions v. Capulong, 160 SCRA
861 (1988). -The case involved the production of "The Four Day Revolution," a movie
account of the bloodless coup that toppled the Marcos regime. Juan Ponce Enrile, a
principal actor in the historic event, sought to enjoin the use of his name or of any member
of his family. - The interest, Enrile sought to be protected by the right of privacy is the
right to be free from unwarranted publicity, from the wrongful publicizing of the private
affairs and activities of an individual which are outside the realm of legitimate public
concern.
- Petitioners' claim that in producing and "The Four Day Revolution," they are exercising
their freedom of speech and of expression protected under our Constitution. Private
respondent, upon the other hand, asserts a right of privacy and claims that the production
and filming of the projected mini-series would constitute an unlawful intrusion into his
privacy which he is entitled to enjoy.
- Against freedom of expression, however, must be balanced the right of privacy which
is recognized by law as the "right to be left alone."
The Court said: A limited intrusion into a person’s privacy has long been regarded as
permissible where that person is a public figure and the information sought to be elicited
from him or to be published about him constitute matters of a public character. Succinctly
put, the right of privacy cannot be invoked to resist publication and dissemination of
matters of public interest. The interest sought to be protected by the right of privacy is the
right to be free from 'unwarranted publicity, from the wrongful publicizing of the private
affairs and activities of an individual which are outside the realm of legitimate public
concern.'"
The freedom of speech is not absolute.
Freedom of speech may lawfully be impinged or restrained. There must be
standards for the lawful restraint of the freedom of speech.

Requirements: The acceptable standards for the restraint: 1.the dangerous tendency
rule, 2. the clear and present danger rule and 3. the balancing of interest rule.

The dangerous tendency rule: Speech can be curtailed or punished when it creates a
dangerous tendency to bring about the evil which the state has the right to prevent. -
DANGEROUS - far away from happening. - In the early stages of Philippine
jurisprudence, the accepted rule was that speech may be curtailed or punished when it
"creates a dangerous tendency which the State has the right to prevent.
- All it requires, for speech to be punishable, is that there be a rational connection
between the speech and the evil apprehended. In other words, under this rule, the
constitutionality of a statute curtailing speech is determined in the same manner that the
constitutionality of any statute is determined, namely, by answering the question whether
a statute is "reasonable.

The clear and present danger rule: - It is founded on whether the words used are used
in such circumstances and are of such nature as to create a clear and present danger
that they will bring about the evils that congress has a right to prevent.

- In American jurisprudence, chiefly through the efforts of Justice Holmes, the "dangerous
tendency" rule yielded to the "clear and present danger" test, a standard which serves to
emphasize the importance of speech to a free society without sacrificing other freedoms
essential to a democracy.

- It is a question of proximity and degree. - Although, like the "dangerous tendency"

rule, the "clear and present danger" test evolved in the context of prosecutions for crimes
involving overthrow of the government, the test can be applied to other substantive evils
which the State has the right to prevent even if these evils do not clearly undermine the
safety of the Republic. However, since the test is "a question of proximity and degree"
and since not all evils easily lend themselves to measurement in terms of proximity and
degree, the test cannot always be conveniently applied to all types of encroachment
on freedom of expression.

The balancing of interests test: - The function of the Court is to balance the interests
served by legislation against the freedoms affected by it. - It rests on the theory that it
is the Court's function in the case before it when it finds public interests served by
legislation on the one hand, and First Amendment freedoms affected by it on the other,
to balance the one against the other and to arrive at a judgment where the greater weight
shall be placed. If on balance it appears that the public interest served by restrictive
legislation is of such a character that it outweighs the abridgment of freedom, then the
Court will find the legislation valid.
- Professor Kauper
 Freedom of expression is not absolute. (Justice Carpio, Inq., April 9,2020) - Four
exceptions when the State may impose prior restraint, or subsequent punishment, on the
exercise of freedom of expression, namely: pornography, false or misleading
advertisement, advocacy of imminent lawless action, and danger to national security.
The very high bar or standard to hurdle before the State can successfully invoke these
exceptions. The State must establish that the expression creates a clear and present
danger of an evil that the State has a right and duty to prevent. The danger from the
expression must be extremely imminent, and the evil must be substantive and extremely
serious.

Diocese of Bacolod vs. Commission on Elections (GR No. 205728, January 21,
2015): - The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) does not have the competence to
limit expressions made by the citizens — who are not candidates — during elections. -
Regulation of speech in the context of electoral campaigns made by persons who are not
candidates or who do not speak as members of a political party which are, taken as a
whole, principally advocacies of a social issue that the public must consider during
elections is unconstitutional.

Why regulation is unconstitutional? - Regulation is inconsistent according to fullest

opinion and debate by the electorate. -Such regulation is inconsistent with the
guarantee of according the fullest possible range of opinions coming from the electorate
including those that can catalyze candid, uninhibited, and robust debate in the criteria for
the choice of a candidate.

- Declarative speech is a specie of speech by a private citizen who is not a candidate

that may be validly regulated by law. - Regulation of election paraphernalia will still be
constitutionally valid if it reaches into speech of persons who are not candidates or who
do not speak as members of a political party if they are not candidates, only if what is
regulated is declarative speech that, taken as a whole, has for its principal object the
endorsement of a candidate only.

Requisites of a valid regulation. The regulation (a) should be provided by law, (b)
reasonable, (c) narrowly tailored to meet the objective of enhancing the opportunity of
all candidates to be heard and considering the primacy of the guarantee of free
expression, and (d) demonstrably the least restrictive means to achieve that object.
- The regulation must only be with respect to the time, place, and manner of the rendition
of the message. In no situation may the speech be prohibited or censored on the basis of
its content. For this purpose, it will not matter whether the speech is made with or on
private property. This is not the situation, however, in this case for two reasons. First,
as discussed, the principal message in the twin tarpaulins of petitioners consists of a
social advocacy. Second, as pointed out in the concurring opinion of Justice Antonio
Carpio, the present law — Section 3.3 of Republic Act No. 9006 and Section 6(c) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 — if applied to this case, will not pass the test of
reasonability. A fixed size for election posters or tarpaulins without any relation to the
distance from the intended average audience will be arbitrary. At certain distances,
posters measuring 2 by 3 feet could no longer be read by the general public and, hence,
would render speech meaningless. It will amount to the abridgement of speech with
political consequences.

COMELEC may not order petitioners, who are private citizens, to remove the
tarpaulin from their own property. - Respondents ordered petitioners, who are private
citizens, to remove the tarpaulin from their own property. The absurdity of the situation is
in itself an indication of the unconstitutionality of COMELEC’s interpretation of its powers.

- Freedom of expression can be intimately related with the right to property. - There may
be no expression when there is no place where the expression may be made.
COMELEC’s infringement upon petitioners’ property rights as in the present case also
reaches out to infringement on their fundamental right to speech.

The message in the tarpaulin does not constitute religious speech the prohibition
of which is a violation of religious freedom. - The tarpaulin does not convey any
religious doctrine of the catholic church. - That the position of the Catholic church
appears to coincide with the message of the tarpaulin regarding the RH Law does not, by
itself, bring the expression within the ambit of religious speech. On the contrary, the
tarpaulin clearly refers to candidates classified under "Team Patay" and "Team Buhay"
according to their respective votes on the RH Law.

The expression on the tarpaulin is not an ecclesiastical matter. - The position of

the Catholic religion in the Philippines as regards the RH Law does not suffice to qualify
the posting by one of its members of a tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such basis.
- The position of the Catholic religion as regards the RH Law does not suffice to
qualify the posting as religious speech.

Unprotected speech: Freedom of expression has never been understood to be an

absolute right. Some forms of speech are not protected.

Two types of unprotected speech: libel and obscenity. A libel is a public and
malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice, or a defect, real or imaginary, or any act,
omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or
contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is
dead. To be liable for libel, the following elements must be shown to exist: (1) the
allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another; (2) publication of the
charge; (3) identity of the person defamed; and (4) existence of malice. The speech
is libelous when the imputation is public and malicious.

The imputation is public when the defamatory statement is made known to someone other
than the person to whom it is written. It is malicious when the author of the imputation
is prompted by ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty but merely to injure the
reputation of the person who claims to have been defamed. If a speech is not
malicious, even if defamatory, it is privileged.

(Alonzo v. CA, 241 SCRA 51 (1995). - "The rule on privileged communication is that a
communication made in good faith on any subject matter in which the communicator has
an interest, or concerning which he has a duty, is privileged if made to a person having a
corresponding interest, although it contains incriminatory matter which, without the
privilege, would be libelous and actionable.
Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be untrue if no good
intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown.

Are pleadings privileged? Under what condition may it be privileged? (Armovit v.

Judge Purisima, GR No. 39258, November 15, 1982). - The prevailing rule is that
parties, counsels, and witnesses are exempted from liability in libel or slander for words
otherwise defamatory published in the course of judicial proceedings provided the
statements are relevant to the case.
- Pleadings in court, to be privileged, must be relevant to the case.

When may criticisms of a public figure constitutionally protected? When not

protected? When the object of criticism is his strictly private life, defamatory
imputations are not constitutionally protected expression. When, however, his public acts
are the object of criticism, constitutional immunity applies.

The right to assembly and petition may be impaired. What are the allowable
standards for its impairment? Since the right to assembly and petition is equally
fundamental as freedom of expression, the standards for allowable impairment of speech
and press are also those for assembly and petition.

US v. Apurado, 7 Phil 422 (1907).

- case which involved a spontaneous gathering of some five hundred men to demand the
ouster of certain municipal officials. No permit was involved. But the significant point was
that, in a prosecution for sedition, the Court, invoking the right of assembly and petition,
was willing to allow for a certain amount of disorder.

Evangelista v. Earnshaw, 57 Phil 255 (1932), the dangerous tendency rule.

- In this case, the limit to the tolerable amount of disorder was set. - This is the first leading
case on public meetings, Evangelista, a Communist leader, had requested permission to
hold a meeting in Plaza Moriones in Manila. The meeting was to be followed by a parade
and the delivery to the Governor-General of a message from labor. Earnshaw, the city
Mayor, refused permission and prohibited all Communist meetings. Previous to this,
meetings had been had with prior permission "in which seditious speeches were made
urging the laboring class to unite by affiliating to the Communist Party of the Philippines
in order to be able to overthrow the present government, and stirring up enmity against
the insular and local police forces by branding the members thereof as the enemies of
the laborers and as tools of the capitalists and imperialists for oppressing the said
laborers.
- In upholding the Mayor’s refusal, The Court said “ [It] must be considered that the
respondent mayor, whose sworn duty it is "to see that nothing should occur which would
tend to provoke or excite the people to disturb the peace of the community or the safety
or order of the Government," did only the right thing under the circumstances.. Instead of
being condemned or criticized, the respondent mayor should be praised and commended
for having taken a prompt, courageous, and firm stand towards the said Communist Party
of the Philippines before the latter could do more damage by its revolutionary
propaganda, and by the seditious speeches and utterances of its members. Then the
Court cited with approval the following quotation from People v Perez: [W]hen the
intention and effect of the act is seditious the constitutional guaranties of freedom of
speech and press and of assembly and petition must yield to punitive measures designed
to maintain the prestige of constituted authority, the supremacy of the constitution and the
laws, and the existence of the State.

Primicias v. Fugoso, 80 Phil 71 (1948), the clear and present danger rule. - marked
the 1st case on public meetings decided under the 1935 Constitution. - Mayor Fugoso
refused to give a permit for a rally alleging that, "there was a reasonable ground to believe,
that similar speeches will be delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence of
the people in their government. The Mayor rejected the contention. - In rejecting the
mayor’s contention, The Court said, to justify suppression of free speech there must be
reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There
must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. There
must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one ..."

JBL Reyes v. Mayor Bagatsing, GR 65366, October 25, 1983. The Court adopted the
clear and present danger test. - "the right of the people peaceably to assembly" in order
to "petition the government” must be discussed in relation to Section 18, Article 2 under
the declaration of principles, Article III, Section 8 and Section 3, Article XIII, Section 2
(5B) Article 9 in so far as government employees are concerned.

The right to peaceably assemble and petition must be discussed in relation to Sec. 18,
Art. II; Sec 8, Art III; Sec 3, Art XIII; and also Sec 2 (5) B, Art IX. Section 8, Art III -
refers to the right of labor, peaceably concerted activities. Sec. 18, Art. II - refers to the
protection by the State of the rights of workers and promotion of their welfare.
Sec 3, Art XIII - refers to Sec 2 (5) B, Art IX - right to government employees to self-
organization.

SECTION 4: Question: Which rule is more in keeping with the spirit of the constitutional
guarantees of free expression, of peaceful assembly and petition, Is it the dangerous
tendency rule or the clear and present danger rule? - Between these two rules, it is the
clear and present danger rule. Although, like the "dangerous tendency" rule, the "clear
and present danger" test evolved in the context of prosecutions for crimes involving
overthrow of the government, the test can be applied to other substantive evils which the
State has the right to prevent even if these evils do not clearly undermine the safety of
the Republic. However, since the test is "a question of proximity and degree" and since
not all evils easily lend themselves to measurement in terms of proximity and degree, the
test cannot always be conveniently applied to all types of encroachment on freedom of
expression.

In American jurisprudence, chiefly through the efforts of Justice Holmes, the "dangerous
tendency" rule yielded to the "clear and present danger" test, a standard which serves to
emphasize the importance of speech to a free society without sacrificing other freedoms
essential to a democracy.

Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or

prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship, without discrimination or preference shall forever be allowed. No
religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
On the first sentence - there are two mandates already: (1) Non-establishment clause:
that no law shall be made to establish a religion (2) Free exercise clause : which allows
mandate, that no law shall be made to prohibit a free exercise of religion.
- Under the Spanish Constitution of 1876, Catholicism was the state religion and
Catholics alone enjoyed the right of engaging in public ceremonies of worship. -
Catholicism was the state religion in the Philippines. - One of the immediate
effects of the advent of the American constitutional system in the Philippines was the
denial to the Catholic church of the privileged position it occupied under Spanish
sovereignty. - corollary to this was the recognition of the equal position of other
religions.
The free exercise of religion was guaranteed under the 1935 Constitution.

Q: How did the guarantee of religious freedom find its way to the Constitution of 1935,
followed in 1973 and 1987?
A: The free exercise of religion was guaranteed under Section 10 of the Treaty of Paris.
Section 10 of the treaty of Paris - merely implemented Article X of the Treaty of Paris
guaranteeing that the territories ceded to the United States "shall be secured in the free
exercise of religion."
Another effect of the new system was the elimination of any institution which
savored of union of church and state.

The text of the section is the same in the 35, 73 and 87 constitutions.

The twin mandates of the constitutional provision: The non-establishment clause and
the free exercise clause.
- The twin clauses of free exercise and non-establishment express an underlying
relational concept of separation between religion and secular government.
- It is related to Section 6 Article 2 - "The separation of Church and State shall be
inviolable."
 The Constitutional provision is a mandate against State intervention. Recently, the
CBCP, speaking thru its spokesperson Fr Jerome Ceciliano, clarified that separation
between Church and State is actually directed at the State. A prohibition against the
government favoring one church over others by establishing a State Religion or by
allocating public funds to favor one church. The theology of liberation annunciated by
CBCP in 1973, after the declaration of Martial Law, clarifies the church's changed
understanding of its vocation in the world today. It expresses the church's concern for
society and for the poor no longer mainly in terms of personal almsgiving or working in
charitable institutions but especially in terms of its duty to participate in the building of a
new social order.

The CBCP especially the Catholic Church, justifies their active role in the formulation of
policies of the State because of the situation during Martial Law. - According to Father
Bernas, this new role of the church enunciates the expanded mission of the Church
because of the expanded provisions of the 1973 Constitution. Martial Law left the
church as the only forum where opposition and criticism could still be openly voiced.

Randy David added his opinion on the matter, quoting Pope Benedict XVI said, “in
modern society where political life is organized under a civil constitution, the Church can
participate only indirectly in the quest for social order leaving this task to Leyte.

To form consciences to be the advocate of justice and truth, to educate in individual and
political virtues that is the vocation of the Church in this area.

The essence of the free exercise clause is the freedom of belief. It is based on the
respect for the inviolability of the human conscience. - Belief cannot be subject to control
because that is the inner feeling of the human being, you can’t control that. The essence
of the free exercise clause is the freedom of belief based on the respect for the inviolability
of the human conscience.

Reynolds v. US, 98 US 145, the free exercise clause completely insulated the realm of
belief from state action, leaving, however, religiously motivated action, including
expression, subject to police power. - The case adopted the rule that the free exercise
clause completely insulated the realm of belief from state action, leaving, however,
religiously motivated action, including expression, subject to police power. The judicial
task in free exercise cases is one of balancing secular interest of the State with the
interest on the religion.

Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 US 296. The constitutional inhibition on legislation on the

subject of religion has a double aspect. - The constitutional inhibition on legislation on
the subject of religion has a double aspect. First, it forestalls compulsion by law of the
acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship. Freedom of conscience
and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of worship as the individual
may choose cannot be restricted by law. Second, it safeguards the free exercise of the
chosen form of religion. Thus, the Amendment embraces two concepts — freedom
to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute, but in the nature of things, the second
cannot be. The absoluteness of the freedom to believe carries with it the corollary
that the government, while it may look into the good faith of a person, cannot inquire into
a person's religious pretensions. The moment, however, belief flows over into action,
it becomes subject to government regulation. It does not follow that "because no mode of
worship can be established or religious tenets en- forced in this country, therefore ... any
tenets, however destructive of society, may be held and advocated, if asserted to be part
of the religious doctrine of those advocating and practicing them. While legislation for the
establishment of religion is forbidden, and its free exercise is permitted, it does not follow
that everything which may be so called can be tolerated.

Crime is not the less odious because sanctioned by what any particular sect may
designate as religion.

One classic example:

Fr Balueg - activist priest / rebel leader in the Cordilleras.
He was merely trying to form the consciences of the people in the Cordilleras from the
teachings of religion, but when he started to hold an armalite and used force in a physical
way to make the government answer for injustices. It is no longer a freedom of belief. This
freedom of belief was already brought to action. The government answered and he was
out load. No matter how his words are given, the State cannot intervene.

People v. Fabillar, 68 Phil. 584 (1939). - where Section 34 of the old Marriage Law,
which empowered the Director of the National Library to satisfy himself whether the
"church, sect or religion of the applicant [for license to perform marriage] operates in the
Philippine Islands and is in good repute," was challenged as unconstitutional on the
ground that it in effect empowered the Director to enquire into the organization and
doctrine of the church or sect.

- The Court defended the statute as merely an instance of the exercise of police power.

American Bible Society v. City of Manila, 101 Phil. 386 (1957).

- where American Bible Society is a religious missionary corporation which in the course
of its ministry sold bibles and gospel portions of the bible and the City of Manila attempted
to compel the plaintiff or ABS to obtain both a Mayor's permit and a municipal license
required of those who are engaged in the business of general merchandise.
- The Court upheld the plaintiff as it ruled that "The constitutional guarantee of the free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries with it the right to
disseminate religious information.
There is an obiter dictum in between Centeno and Villalon: - the Court ruled that
solicitation of contributions in general, which may include contributions for religious
purposes, may be regulated by general law for the protection of the public.

Imposition of civic obligations that conflict with one’s religious beliefs. The
twin clauses of free exercise and non-establishment express an underlying relational
concept of separation between religion and secular government.
Imposition of civic obligations that conflict with one’s religious beliefs. Gerona v.
Sec. of Educ., 106 Phil. 2 (1969). - this involves the imposition of civic obligations that
might conflict with one’s religious beliefs. In Gerona, the case involves Jehovah’s
witnesses, challenging a department of education order requiring the children to attend
compulsory flag ceremonies. - The court said that if the exercise of religious belief
clashes with the established institutions of society and with the law, then religious beliefs
must yield to the law. The government steps in and either restrains said exercise or even
prosecute the one exercising it. 24 years after..

We have the case: Ebralinag v. Div. Sup. Of Schools of Cebu, 219 SCRA 256 (1993).
- where on the same factual basis, also involving Jehovah’s witnesses, the Court
reversed the Gerona case, and said that the freedom of religion requires that protesting
members be exempt from the operation of the law.

The non-establishment clause simply means that the state cannot establish or sponsor
an official religion. - It prohibits the state from passing laws which aid one religion, aid
all religions, or prefer one religion over another.

Austria v. NLRC, GR 124382, Aug 16/99. - where secular authority has no jurisdiction,
- dealt with a pastor of 28 years’ experience who could not account for church tithes and
offerings collected by his wife. He was dismissed. When the dismissal was upheld by the
NLRC, Austria challenged the jurisdiction of the NLRC saying that the matter was an
ecclesiastical affair outside the jurisdiction of the N L R C. The Court disposed of the
objection saying that an ecclesiastical affair is "one that concerns doctrine, creed or form
or worship of the church, or the adoption and enforcement within a religious association
of needful laws and regulations for the government of the membership, and the power of
excluding from such associations those deemed unworthy of membership." The Court
said that what was involved in the case was relationship of the church as an employer
and the minister as an employee, a purely secular matter." It is purely secular and has no
relation whatsoever with the practice of faith, worship or doctrines of the church. The
Court saw the matter as a pure labor case.
- Secular authority has no jurisdiction over ecclesiastical matters.

Aglipay v. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 206. - Justice Laurel, in seeking the true meaning of
separation of church and state in Philippine juris- prudence, had occasion to allude to the
invocation of the "aid of Divine Providence" found in the 1935 Preamble. 1935
Constitution effectively transplanted the American provision and earlier Philippine organic
law and jurisprudence — except to the extent that they are modified, if indeed they are
modified, by the "concessions indiscriminately granted."

Concession on taxes on property used for religious purposes. The condition for
the exemption is not just that the property be used exclusively for religious purposes but
that it be used actually, directly and exclusively for such purpose.
What kind of tax is exempt? Tax exemption of religious property.

Purpose of the provision prohibiting religious test. To allow religious test would have
the effect of formal or practical establishment of a particular religious faith.

The case of conscientious objectors. Can the state compel a person to bear arms in
defense of the country even when bearing arms is contrary to the person's beliefs? The
state may support church social action centers. Requirements: (1) must have a secular
legislative purpose; (2) must have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits
religion; (3) must not require excessive entanglement with recipient institutions.

Estrada v. Escritor, AM No. P-02-1651, 2003, 2004. More delicate was the case of
Estrada v. Escritor. '
-The case was about a clerk of court who was living with a man without benefit of
marriage. Her situation was thought to be incompatible with her office in court and her
dismissal from the service was being sought. The Supreme Court remanded the case to
the Office of the Court Administrator, and the Solicitor General was ordered to intervene
in the case. He was instructed: (a) to examine the sincerity and centrality of respondent's
claimed religious belief and practice; (b) to present evidence on the state's "compelling
interest" to override respondent's religious belief and practice; and (c) to show that the
means the state adopts in pursuing its interest is the least restrictive to respondent's
religious freedom. On reconsideration, the clerk of court's right of the woman was
upheld on the basis of "benevolent neutrality." Section 6. The liberty of abode and
of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except
upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the
interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as maybe provided by law.
- The general rule is: the right to travel can not be impaired.
Is it absolute? NO, It is not. Exception: In the interest of national security, public safety,
or public health, as may be provided by law. (There must be a law providing for such
exception) Freedom of movement involves two rights: The liberty of abode and the
liberty of travel.
1. Liberty of abode - includes the freedom to choose a change one’s place of abode
(A condition imposed by the court in connection with the grant of bail is an example of a
valid limitation to liberty.)

2. Liberty of travel - includes freedom of travel within or outside the country. May be
impaired even without a lawful order of the court
(He can only do so on the basis of “national security, public safety, or public health” and
“as may be provided by law” (e.g. Human Security Act, quarantine)

Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 66(89). The authority to impair the right to travel must
be based on law. The court found this authority in the totality of executive powers, both
stated and unstated in the constitution.
 Section 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and to papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as
basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as
maybe provided by law.

The rights guaranteed by the provision: (1) the right to information on matters of public
concern and (2) the corollary right to access to official records and documents.

These rights are political rights available to citizens only. The right to access
is a self-executory constitutional right.

Chavez v. PEA-AMARI, GR No. 133250, July 9, 2002. - While the evaluation or review
is still on-going, there are no "official acts, transactions, or decisions" on the bids or
proposals. - Recognized limitations to the exercise of the right to information
Section 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and
private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law
shall not be abridged. All it means is that the right to form associations shall not
be impaired without due process of law.

Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions v. Sec. of Labor, 27 SCRA 41 (1969).

The registration prescribed by the law is not a limitation to the right of assembly or
association, which may be exercised with or without said registration.

Government employees' right to form unions is guaranteed by Article III, Section 8,

Article IX, B, Section 2 (5), and Article XIII, Section 3.

Section 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.

The constitutional provisions on eminent domain are Article III, Section 9, Article
XII, Section 18 (public utilities), Article XIII, Section 4 (land reform), and Article XVIII,
Section 22 (idle or abandoned agricultural lands)

The right of eminent domain is understood to be the ultimate right of the sovereign
power to appropriate, not only public but the private property of all citizens for public
purpose.
- It is a power inherent in sovereignty, hence, it is a power which need not be granted by
any fundamental law.

The exercise of the power of eminent domain is by tradition lodged with the
executive. The power, however, must be granted by the legislature.
(The ultimate source is the legislature then it empowers the executive to execute the
power of eminent domain.)
 "Once authority is given to exercise the power of eminent domain, the matter ceases to
be wholly legislative. The executive authorities may then decide whether the power will
be invoked and to what extent."

The power of eminent domain may also be conferred upon municipal governments
and other government entities. As to the legislature, the power is inherent. For
government agencies, local governments, and public utilities, it is only a delegated
power. In the hands of Congress the scope of the power is, like the scope of legislative
power itself, plenary. It is as broad as the scope of police power itself. It thus, can reach
every form of property which the State might need for public use. The delegated
power of eminent domain of local governments is strictly speaking not a power of eminent
but of inferior domain — a share merely in eminent domain. What is meant by inferior
domain? -

City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila, 40 Phil. 349 (1919). - At issue in

the case was authority over a portion of a Chinese cemetery which had been established
under authority of the Spanish Governor-General and "founded and maintained by the
spontaneous and fraternal contribution of their protector, merchants and industrialists." It
was a cemetery "adjusted to the taste and traditional practices of those born and educated
in China" and authorized by the Spanish government as a mark of recognition of the civic
contribution of Chinese nationals." The city was seeking to expropriate a portion of the
property in order to open a street through the cemetery. Did the city have authority to do
it?
- Considering the nature of the property, expropriation was doubtless offensive to the
cultural sensibilities of the Chinese. The Court, while disavowing the belief "that the dead
must not give place to the living, did find a legal solution to what was undoubtedly also a
social dilemma. The Court asserted that a cemetery open to the public was already in
public use "and no part of the ground could be taken for other public uses under a general
authority. And general authority was all that the City of Manila could show. Hence, it was
without authority to expropriate the property. But the Court said that "if the legislature
under proper authority should grant the expropriation of a certain or particular parcel of
land for some specified purpose, the courts would be without authority to enquire into the
purpose of the legislation”. And that is what the legislature did; it authorized the City
of Manila to expropriate the specific parcel of property — which accounts for the
present extension of Rizal Avenue across what once was a portion of the Chinese
cemetery.

- The City of Manila wanted to expropriate the Chinese cemetery for two years as
cemetery. The Supreme Court said that the City of Manila cannot expropriate.

Constitutional limitations on the exercise of the power: public use and just
compensation.

Requisites for the exercise are: (1) there is "taking" of private property; (2) the taking
must be for "public use"; (3) there must be just compensation Public use: Any
appropriating of private property by the state for purposes of great advantage to the
community, is taking for public use. As one court has put it, "public use means public
usefulness, utility, or advantage, or what is productive of general benefit, so that any
appropriating of private property by the state under its right of eminent domain, for
purposes of great advantage to the community, is a taking for public use." - Thus,
what has emerged is a concept of public use which is as broad as public welfare. The
scope of the power of eminent domain has become as broad as the expansive and ever-
expanding scope of police power itself.

Mataas na Lupa Tenants v. Dimayuga, 130 SCRA 30, June 25, 1984. - the taking of
private property for subdivision and resale for land reform is for public use. Land reform
is mandated by the Constitution and that fact already established the public purpose of
the taking for land reform.

Sumulong v Guerrero: Expropriation for socialized housing, for instance, is for public
use.

Coscollueta v CA: So is expropriation for the construction of irrigation systems to

make water available for farmers,” for irrigation canals.

Manisca v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 106440, January 29, 1996. - Expropriation of the
birthplace of Felix Manalo, founder of the "Iglesia ni Cristo," for the purpose of preserving
it as National Historical Landrnark was upheld for public use.

Just compensation: It is the just and complete equivalent of the loss which the owner of
the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation.
- The compensation given to the owner is just if he receives for his property a sum
equivalent to its "market value." "Market value" has been described in a variety of
ways. It is the "price fixed by the buyer and seller in the open market in the usual and
ordinary course of legal trade and competition; the price and value of the article
established or shown by sale, public or private, in the ordinary way of business; the fair
value of property as between one who desires to purchase and one who desires to sell;
the current price; the general or ordinary price for which property may be sold in that
locality.

A statutory determination of just compensation would be only a prima facie

assessment. In the end, the final determination of just compensation will have to be made
by the court. - He added that any law fixing the amount that would constitute just
compensation would not be binding on the courts "because it is a question of fact which
is always subject to review by the courts." "As determined by the proper court."

Who are entitled to just compensation? - It is not the owner alone. - "The defendants
in an expropriation case are not limited to the owners of the property condemned. It
includes all those who have lawful interest in the property to be condemned,
including a mortgagee, a lessee and a vendee in possession under an executory contract.
Every person having an estate or interest at law or in equity in the land taken is entitled
to share in the award.
Entry can be made by the expropriator. Expropriator can enter in the property even
prior to the actual payment of just compensation. What is merely required, is Even
before compensation is given, however, entry may be made upon the property
condemned.

When the filing of the case coincides with the taking, the value of the property
expropriated is determined as of the time of the filing of the complaint for expropriation.
In terms of time, what is the point of reference for assessing the value of a piece of
property? The general rule is that the value must be that as of the time of the filing of the
complaint for expropriation. (Section 4, Rule 67, Rules of Court). The filing of the case
generally coincides with the taking. When, however, the filing of the case comes later
than the time of taking and meanwhile the value of the property has increased because
of the use to which the expropriator has put it, the value is that of the time of the earlier
taking.

Republic v. Sarabia, GR No. 157847, August 25, 2005. - When there is taking before
the filing of the proceedings. compensation for the property expropriated must be
determined as of the time the expropriating authority takes possession thereof and not as
of the time of the institution of the proceedings. - in this case, the taking and the entry
into the property happened first before the filing. In which case, the Court has
consistently ruled that compensation for property expropriated must be determined as of
the time the expropriating authority takes possession thereof and not as of the institution
of the proceedings. - As a concept in the Bill of Rights, just compensation is defined
as the fair or market value of the property as between one who receives, and one who
desires to sell.

DPWH vs. Tecson, GR No.179334, July 1, 2013. - Latches and prescription do not
apply against action for compensation in expropriation proceedings. - Petitioners had
been occupying the subject property for more than fifty years without the benefit of
expropriation proceedings. In taking respondents’ property without the benefit of
expropriation proceedings and without payment of just compensation, petitioners clearly
acted in utter disregard of respondents’ proprietary rights which cannot be countenanced
by the Court.

Republic of the Philippines v. Heirs of Borbon and CA, GR No. 165354, January 12,
2015. - The expropriator who has taken possession of the property subject of
expropriation is obliged to pay reasonable compensation to the landowner for the period
of such possession although the proceedings had been discontinued on the ground that
the public purpose for the expropriation had meanwhile ceased. - If there was taking,
then the time within which the property has taken must be paid for. - Corollarily, if this
particular purpose or intent is not initiated or not at all pursued, and is peremptorily
abandoned, then the former owners, if they so desire, may seek the reversion of the
property, subject to the return of the amount of just compensation received. In such a
case, the exercise of the power of eminent domain has become improper for lack of the
required factual justification. - This should mean that the compensation must be based
on what they actually lost as a result and by reason of their dispossession of the property
and of its use, including the value of the fruit trees, plants and crops destroyed by
NAPOCOR’s construction of the transmission lines. Considering that the dismissal of the
expropriation proceedings is a development occurring during the appeal, the Court now
treats the dismissal of the expropriation proceedings as producing the effect of converting
the case into an action for damages. For that purpose, the Court remands the case to the
court of origin for further proceedings, with instruction to the court of origin to enable the
parties to fully litigate the action for damages by giving them the opportunity to re-define
the factual and legal issues by the submission of the proper pleadings on the extent of
the taking, the value of the compensation to be paid to the respondents by NAPOCOR,
and other relevant matters as they deem fit.

Just compensation in expropriations for land reform can be less than market value.
- It is arguable, however, as will be pointed out under Article XIII, Section 4, that just
compensation in land reform, since expropriation in land reform is both an eminent
domain act and a police power act, can be made less than market value.
- there Is no concrete basis for this except in the deliberation of the Constitutional
Convention in 1971.

Expropriation for resale to landless: The Guido-Baylosis cases under the 1935
Constitution. - Under the 1935 Constitution, In The Guido-Baylosis cases, it was held
that the size of the land expropriated, the large number of people benefited, and the extent
of the social and economic reform secured by the condemnation must be such as to clothe
the expropriation with the character of public interest and public use.
- Such requirement is satisfied when the lands expropriated are "large estates, trusts in
perpetuity, and land that embraces a whole town or city." - The controlling however in
1970 is in the case of Tuason vs. Land Tenure Administration (1970), In Tuason vs.
Land Tenure Administration (1970), the "area test" was rejected.
- The "area test" was rejected in favor of the state's "quest for social justice and peace." -
The Tuason doctrine was carried out under the 1973 Constitution and then under the
1987 Constitution expropriation for resale for the purpose of alleviating the condition of
landless farmers is a state duty in social justice.

Judicial review of the valuation of the property made by assessors is proper.

- Even when there is a statutory determination of just compensation due, the courts may
still review its adequacy of even such determination.
- the statutory determination of the just compensation is merely temporary. What is
controlling is the court’s determination of the adequacy of such determination. The
valuation of the property is always subject to judicial review.

Judicial Review of the exercise of the power of eminent domain:

 Q: May the exercise of the power of the eminent domain be subject to judicial
review? A: It depends on… (1) When expropriation is not done directly by
legislative authority but by another government agency or by a municipal
corporation and in virtue of an act of an authorizing statute which neither specified
the purpose of the taking of the property nor the property to be taken, it is subject
to judicial review. - there should be no doubt but that the courts must come in to perform
its duty of enforcing the provision of the Constitution.

(2) When the expropriation is exercised by the legislature itself and specifies the
taking and singles out the property to be taken, the judgment made by the
legislature is not subject to judicial review. - In Philippine jurisprudence, the
authority of the courts to review the legislative judgment has never been seriously
questioned except in the area of expropriation of land for resale.

Q: May compensation of expropriation be subject to judicial review?

A: Yes. At all times.

Res judicata: The right to exercise the power is absolute and unfettered by a prior
judgment. - the power is absolute.
- the very nature of the power of the eminent domain is an inherent power of the State. It
dictates that the right to exercise be absolute and unfettered by a prior judgment. - When
once the right to expropriate has been denied the state in a specific case, it does not
mean that the state may not come back to the same property. "The very nature of the
eminent domain, as an inherent power of the State, dictates that the right to exercise the
power be absolute and unfettered by a prior judgment or res judicata.

Distinction of regulation and taking: Regulation - by police power, property is

regulated. There is no transfer of ownership. - Regulation is not compensable. Taking
- by eminent domain, property is taken. There is transfer of ownership. - Taking must
be compensated. - An analysis of existing jurisprudence yields the rule that when a
property interest is appropriated and applied to some public purpose, there is
compensable taking. Where, however, a property interest is merely restricted because
continued unrestricted use would be injurious to public welfare or where property is
destroyed because continued existence of the property would be injurious to public
interest, there is no compensable taking.

Didipio Earth Savers v. Secretary, GR No. 157882, March 30, 2006. - The entry
referred to in Section 76 is not just a simple right-of-way which is ordinarily allowed under
the provisions of the Civil Code. Here, the holders of mining rights enter private lands for
purposes of conducting mining activities such as exploration, extraction and processing
of minerals. - There is compensable taking for this, All these will definitely oust the
owners or occupants of the affected areas the beneficial ownership of their lands. Without
a doubt, taking occurs once mining operations commence.
Republic v. Andaya, GR No. 160656, June 15, 2007. - within the right of way issued
enforced by the Statute results in making the adjoining property unusable. Just
compensation is due. - For this reason, in our view, Andaya is entitled to payment of just
compensation, which must be neither more nor less than the monetary equivalent of the
land.13 One of the basic principles enshrined in our Constitution is that no person shall be
deprived of his private property without due process of law; and in expropriation cases,
an essential element of due process is that there must be just compensation whenever
private property is taken for public use. Noteworthy, Section 9, Article III of our
Constitution mandates that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation

NPC v. San Pedro, GR No. 170945, September 26, 2006. - The foregoing facts
considered; the acquisition of the right-of-way easement falls within the purview of the
power of eminent domain. Such conclusion finds support in similar cases of easement of
right-of-way where the Supreme Court sustained the award of just compensation for
private property condemned for public use - In the case at bar, the easement of right-
of-way is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain. Considering the nature
and effect of the installation of the 230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines, the limitation
imposed by NPC against the use of the land for an indefinite period deprives private
respondents of its ordinary use. - Similarly, in this case, the commissioners' observation
on the reported constant loud buzzing and exploding sounds emanating from the towers
and transmission lines, especially on rainy days; the constant fear on the part of the
landowners that the large transmission lines looming not far above their land and the huge
tower in front of their lot will affect their safety and health; and the slim chance that no
one would be interested to buy the remaining portions on each side of the residential lot
affected by the project, to the damage of the landowners, both as to future actual use of
the land and financial gains to be derived therefrom, makes the instant case fall within the
ambit of expropriation.

Salas v. Jarencio, 46 SCRA 734, 1972. - involved such type of land. When R.A. No.
4118 converted the land, which was situated in Manila, into alienable land of the state
and provided for its subdivision and resale to the occupants, the City of Manila objected
to the statute as a deprivation of municipal property without proper compensation. -
Upholding the statute, the Supreme Court, after a narration of the history of communal
lands under Spanish Law, concluded:

Q: If it is municipal property, and it is expropriated by the government? May just

compensation be required?
A: Yes, just compensation is required, because the property is owned by the municipal
property.

Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. City of Zamboanga, 22 SCRA 1334,

1968. - The principle itself is simple: If the property is owned by the municipality
(meaning municipal corporation) in its public and governmental capacity, the property is
public, and Congress has absolute control over it. But if the property is owned in its
private or proprietary capacity then it is patrimonial, and Congress has no absolute
control. The municipality cannot be deprived of it without due process and payment of just
compensation. - however, pointed to the existence of another line of cases which
classified property according to the use to which it is devoted. According to this line of
cases, if the property is devoted to governmental purposes like local administration, public
education, public health, etc., the property is not patrimonial even if it is not
indiscriminately made open to the public.

Q: In this case, may just compensation be required?

A: Since the property is patrimonial property of the State, Just compensation is no longer
required because it is already their property.

The power of eminent domain by local governments: Section 19 of the Local

Government Code (RA 7160).

The essential requisites of the exercise: (1) there must be an ordinance authorizing
the expropriation; (2) the power must be exercised for public use; (3) with just
compensation and; (4) there must be an offer previously made and the same was not
accepted.

Section 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.

Obligation of Contracts - In all contracts, there is an obligation that is required in the
contract.
What the provision envisions are laws passed by governmental law making
bodies. The law relating to the obligation of contracts does not prohibit every change
in existing laws. - To fall within the prohibition the change must impair the obligation of
the existing contract, and the impairment must be substantial.

- If there is a change, the change must impair the obligation of the existing contract. and
the impairment must be SUBSTANTIAL. What precisely such substantial impairment
must be was stated in Demons v Nolting: [a] law which changes the terms of a legal
contract between parties, either in the time or mode of performance, or imposes new
conditions, or dispenses with those expressed, or authorizes for its satisfaction something
different from that provided in its terms, is law which impairs the obligation of a contract
and is therefore null and void...

Manila Trading Co. v. Reyes, 62 Phil. 461 (1935). What the Constitution prohibits is
the substantial impairment of the obligation in the contract. - In this case, the Court
applied the rule that what the contract prohibits is substantial impairment of the obligation
in contracts. A mere change therefore in procedural remedies which does not diminish
substantive rights or increase substantive obligations does not violate the guarantee. The
Court said that "parties have no vested right in particular remedies or modes of procedure,
and the legislature may change existing remedies or modes of procedure without
impairing the obligation of contracts, provided an efficacious remedy remains for
enforcement." Jurisprudence has established that a valid exercise of police power is
superior to the obligation of contracts.

Pangasinan Transportation Co. v. Public Service Commission - “statutes

enacted for the regulation of public utilities, being a proper exercise by the state of its
police power, are applicable not only to those public utilities coming into existence after
its passage, but likewise to those already established and in operation”.

Abe v. Foster Wheeler Corporation

- upholding a statute granting to workers rights which they did not have under existing
contracts, the Court said that "the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment ... is limited
by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety,
morals and general welfare."
The power of the legislature to change existing remedies and modes of procedures
rests on police power.
Jurisprudence has established that a valid exercise of police power is superior to the
obligation of contracts.

Quoting the book of Fr. Bernas “with the acceptance of the superiority of the police
power over contract. The contract clause now has very limited usefulness, it can
even be removed from the Constitution without substantial loss.” - it’s saying even
if Section 10 is not provided in the Constitution, the remedy or protection accorded by
Section 10 will still be there because of police power.
Fr. Bernas continues, “the non-impairment clause is a superfluity, when it has
accomplished nothing which the due process clause could not have accomplished, and it
has prevented nothing which the due process clause could not have prevented.
There has been a distinct acknowledgement of the expansiveness of police power which
the contract clause alone cannot curtail. The most significant decisions on the
contract clause, however, were those which emphasized the superiority of police power
over the sanctity of contracts

Any law which enlarges, abridges, or in any manner changes the intention of the parties,
necessarily impairs the contract itself.

Q: How does the obligation in the contracts impaired?

A: It is impaired by any law which enlarges, abridges, or in any manner changes the
intention of the parties, necessarily impairs the contract itself

La Insular v. Machuca, 39 Phil. 567, 1919. To come under the constitutional prohibition,
the law must effect a change on the rights of the parties with reference to each other and
not with reference to non-parties. - Thus, when a law is passed, an additional tax imposed
upon goods already contracted to be sold does not impair the contract between buyer
and seller. What the prohibition envisions are enactments passed by a governmental law-
making body.
- If the change in the obligation involves a non-party, then La Insular is controlling.
Lim v. Secretary, 34 SCRA 751, 1970. - The non-impairment clause is a limit on the
exercise of legislative power and not of judicial or quasi-judicial power. - Thus, when a
court nullifies or interprets a contract, in such a way as to affect the contractual of relation
of the parties to the contract, there is no impairment of the obligation of contracts in the
constitutional as provided in Section 10. - For it is well-settled that a law within the
meaning of this constitutional provision has reference primarily to statutes and ordinances
of municipal corporations. Executive orders issued by the President whether derived from
his constitutional power or valid statutes may likewise be considered as such. It does not
cover, therefore, the exercise of the quasi-judicial power of a department head even if
affirmed by the President. The administrative process in such a case partakes more of an
adjudicatory character. It is bereft of any legislative significance. It falls outside the scope
of the non-impairment clause.

Casanovas v. Hord, 8 Phil. 125 (1907). - This case involves the decision extended the
constitutional protection to a tax exemption embodied in a Spanish royal decree of May
14, 1867, granting a mining concession. The decree was considered a contract between
plaintiff and the Spanish government and the law abolishing the tax exemption was
declared an unconstitutional impairment of the contract.

Reservation clause: Second Sentence, Section 11, Article XII. - Neither shall any such
franchise or right be granted except under the condition that it shall be subject to
amendment, alteration, or repeal by the National Assembly when the public interest so
requires." - However, with or without the reservation clause, franchises are subject to
alteration through a reasonable exercise of the police power.
- Fr. Bernas quoted “that Section 10 is a superfluity, they are also subject to alteration by
the power to tax, very much likely the police power, which cannot be contracted away.

Section 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal
assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty.

An indigent - is one who has no visible means of income or whose income is insufficient
for the subsistence of his family. The provision is the basis for Rule 5, Section 17 of
the New Rules of Court allowing litigation in forma pauperis.

Legislation incorporating the concept: RA 6033 - An Act Requiring Courts to Give

Preference to Criminal Cases Where the Party or Parties Involved are Indigents (1969);
RA 6034 - An Act Providing Transportation and Other allowances for Indigent Litigants
(1969); RA 6035 - An Act Requiring Stenographers to Give Free Transcript of
Stenographic Notes to Indigent and Low Income Litigants (1969).

The transcript of Stenographic notes is very important because after a trial, you must have
a copy of stenographic notes especially for purposes of (1) cross examination and 2
(second), you have to do memorandum before submission to the courts, you have to be
able to say for instance, or cite testimonies that are found only in the transcript
stenographic notes. (Quite expensive)

Section 12.
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right
to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel,
he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel. - rights of the person under investigation for the commission of an
offense. - He shall have the right to remain silent and to have competent counsel
preferably of his own choice so that if he cannot afford the services of a counsel, the
government or investigators must provide him with one. - These rights cannot be waived
except in writing. - It is not absolute, it can be waived - however, in order to waive it, it
must have to go through a very stringent condition, that the waiver must be in writing and
in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the
free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or
other similar forms of detention are prohibited. - All of these rights are accorded to person
under investigation. (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this, or
section 17 hereof (right against self-incrimination) shall be inadmissible in evidence
against him. (4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violation of this
section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar
practices, and their families.

Philippine jurisprudence followed the Miranda and the Escobedo decisions. It used to be
Sec. 20, Article IV, of the 1973 constitution. Now Sec. 12, Article III, of the 1987
constitution. The 1987 Constitution has separated the traditional right against self-
incrimination and placed it as Section 17.

The provision is based from US supreme court decisions - the Escobedo v. Illinois
(378 US 478, 1964) and Miranda v. Arizona (384 US 436, 1966).

Escobedo spoke of the rights of a person under “custodial investigation” and specified
custodial investigation as the time when "the investigation is no longer a general inquiry
into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has
been taken into police custody. the police carry out a process of interrogations that
lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements.”

Miranda enumerated the rights that were available to a person under custodial
investigation, and which must be made known to the suspect. - otherwise any evidence
obtained as a result of the interrogation cannot be used against the accused.
Miranda for its part enumerated the rights that were available:
(1) The person in custody must be informed at the outset in clear and unequivocal terms
that he has a right to remain silent. (2) After being so informed, he must be told that
anything he says can and will be used against him in court.
(3) He must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have
the lawyer with him during the interrogation. He does not have to ask for a lawyer. The
investigators should tell him that he has the right to counsel at that point.
(4) He should be warned that not only has he the right to consult with a lawyer but also
that if he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him.
(5) Even if the person consents to answer questions without the assistance of counsel,
the moment he asks for a lawyer at any point in the investigation, the interrogation must
cease until an attorney is present.
(6) If the foregoing protections and warnings are not demonstrated during the trial to have
been observed by the prosecution, no evidence obtained as a result of the interrogation
can be used against him.

Philippine jurisprudence followed the Miranda and the Escobedo decisions with some
modifications.

Even if we follow the Escobedo and Miranda decision. Here in the Philippines, We do not
follow the US version that the rights are available when the person is under custodial
investigation. We went a step better than the Escobedo and Miranda.
In Escobedo case:
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION - as the time when "the investigation is no longer a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect,
the suspect has been taken into police custody. And the police carry out a process
of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements.”

- Here in the Philippines, even a mere invitation, apprehension of a suspect, the rights
under Section 12 already sets in to protect the suspect.

1st QUESTION: For whom do the rights are available?

A: The rights are available to any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense.
- the person does not need to be in custody. - Investigation in this section was defined
by the 1971 Constitutional Convention as "investigation conducted by the police
authorities which will include investigations conducted by the municipal police, the PC
and the NBI and such other police agencies in our government."

People v. Gamboa, GR No. 91374, February 25, 1991. These constitutional rights
extend only to testimonial compulsion. - In this case, it states other investigatory
situations where Section 12(1) does not apply.

Subjection to paraffin test is one because it is not communicative action or

testimonial compulsion.
People v. Olvis, 154 SCRA 525, 1987. While the provision is a protection against
testimonial compulsion, it is extended to any evidence communicative in nature.

- The rule applies to participation in a re-enactment of the crime.

- This constitutional privilege has been defined as a protection against testimonial
compulsion, but this has since been extended to any evidence "communicative in nature"
acquired under circumstances of duress. Essentially, the right is meant to "avoid and
prohibit positively the repetition and recurrence of the certainly inhuman procedure of
competing a person, in a criminal or any other case, to furnish the missing evidence
necessary for his conviction." This was the lesson learned from the ancient days of the
inquisition in which accusation was equivalent to guilt. Thus, an act, whether testimonial
or passive, that would amount to disclosure of incriminatory facts is covered by the
inhibition of the Constitution.

Gutang v. People, GR No. 135406, July 11, 2001. Urine sample is admissible. - In
here, what the Constitution prohibits is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communication from the accused, but not an inclusion of his body in evidence, when it
may be material. In fact, an accused may validly be compelled to be photographed or
measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to move his body to enable
the foregoing things to be done, without running afoul of the proscription against
testimonial compulsion.

People v. Jungco, 186 SCRA 714, 1990. - Photos of reenactment are not admissible
where accused was not provided with counsel. - The pictures taken during the re-
enactment of the crime, are inadmissible in evidence since the re-enactment was based
upon the defendants' inadmissible extra-judicial confessions. Pictures re-enacting a crime
which are based on an inadmissible confession are themselves inadmissible.
A person in a police line-up does not enjoy Section 12(1) rights, unless there is a move
on the part of investigators to elicit admissions or confessions, but a person already under
custodial investigation who is placed in a police line-up is entitled to Section 12 rights.

(People v Macam)
People v. Ordono, GR No.132154, June 29, 2000. These rights do not cover the
verbal confessions to a radio announcer.
- We have held that statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on
a televised interview are deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence. - Sections
12, pars. (1) and (3), Art. III, of the Constitution do not cover the verbal confessions of
the two (2) accused to the radio announcer. - What the Constitution bars is the
compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The rights enumerated under
Sec. 12, Art. III, are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as
would lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and
voluntarily telling the truth.

People v. Endino, GR No. 133026, February 20, 2001. An interview recorded on video
showing the accused unburdening his guilt is admissible. - a case same as Ordono -
The interview was recorded on video, and it showed accused-appellant unburdening his
guilt willingly, openly, and publicly in the presence of newsmen. Such confession does
not form part of custodial investigation as it was not given to police officers but to media
men in an attempt to elicit sympathy and forgiveness from the public.

Tanenggee v. People, GR No. 179448, June 26, 2013. No violation of Section 12 if the
questioning was not done by law enforcement officers but by a bank employee. The
written admission given is admissible. - In the present case, while it is undisputed that
petitioner gave an uncounseled written statement regarding an anomaly discovered in the
branch he managed, the following are clear: (1) the questioning was not initiated by a law
enforcement authority but merely by an internal affairs manager of the bank; and, (2)
petitioner was neither arrested nor restrained of his liberty in any significant manner
during the questioning. Clearly, petitioner cannot be said to be under custodial
investigation and to have been deprived of the constitutional prerogative during the taking
of his written statement.

- it must be remembered that the right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights
is meant to protect a suspect during custodial investigation. Thus, the exclusionary
rule under paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions made
in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation. -
Here, petitioner’s written statement was given during an administrative inquiry conducted
by his employer in connection with an anomaly/irregularity he allegedly committed in the
course of his employment. No error can therefore be attributed to the courts below in
admitting in evidence and in giving due consideration to petitioner’s written statement as
there is no constitutional impediment to its admissibility.

2nd QUESTION: When the rights begin to be available?

A: People v. Marra, 236 SCRA 565 (1994), follows Escobedo in that the rights begin to
be available only when the person is already in custody. - This is a 1994 case
wherein the 1973 Constitution was already in. The rights of the person under investigation
was already provided in the 1973 Constitution. And yet, in people v Marra, 1994 case, it
says that the rights under Section 12 is available only when a person is already in custody.
The 1973 Constitution does not mention a person under custody - it merely says a
person under investigation. - Section 12(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides
that "(a)ny person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. . . . ." The critical inquiry then is whether or not
Marra was under custodial investigation when he admitted the killing but invoked self-
defense. We believe that he was not so situated.
The Supreme Court said: Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by
law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived
of his freedom of action in any significant way. It is only after the investigation ceases to
be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus on a particular suspect,
the suspect is taken into custody, and the police carries out a process of interrogations
that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements that the rule begins to operate.
Galman v. Pamaran, 138 SCRA 294 (1985). The SC sustained General Ver that the
provision covered even persons NOT YET in custody. - This case happened in 1985.
This happened when General Ver who was under investigation by the Agrava
Commission. — In 1983, The Agrava Board was created as an independent ad hoc
fact finding board to determine all the facts and circumstances surrounding the
assassination of former Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. on August 21, 1983. It was
given plenary powers to allow for a free, unlimited and exhaustive investigation into all
the aspects of said tragedy. It was given the power to issue subpoena or subpoena duces
tecum and "other compulsory processes" requiring the attendance and testimony of
witnesses and the production of any evidence relative to any matter under investigation
by said Board. - General Ver testified, eventually by virtue of the Agrava Commission
recommendation, General Ver was indicted as an accomplice. - General Ver used
Section 12, indeed Section 12 does not say under custody, it merely says under
investigation for the commission of a crime.

The Court in Pamaran case, departed from this rule. The Supreme Court sustained
the contention of General Ver that the provision covered even persons not yet in
custody but already under investigation.
- Thus, if one puts the Galman case together with the 1986 deliberations, the conclusion
that comes out is that the rights are available if a person is already in custody as a
suspect, or if the person is the suspect, even if he is not yet deprived in any significant
way of his liberty.

Therefore, it contradicts People v Marra - because in People vs Marra, it says that

the right of a person under investigation under Section 12 is available only when a person
is already in custody. Now, In Galman vs Pamaran, a case decade earlier or 9 yrs earlier,
it says that the provision covered even persons not yet in custody.

The 1986 Constitutional Commission debates manifest the intent to expand the
coverage of the right to situations when a person under investigation is NOT YET in
custody. - Moreover, the text of the 1987 Constitution has preserved the phrase "person
under investigation" without the word "custodial."

People v. Maqueda, GR No. 112983 (1995). - In an obiter dictum, Justice Davide

adverted to the view in the Constitutional Commission that the rights are available even
to one who is not yet in custody. - It is not part of an issue that is squarely decided by the
Court, it is not a jurisprudence, it’s merely an opinion.

People v. Domantay, GR No. 130612 (1999); People v. Principe, GR 135862 (2002).

RA 7438 has extended the guarantee to situations in which an individual has not been
formally arrested but has merely been invited for questioning. - Both of these cases do
not refer to Constitutional provision, it refers to RA 7438 which guarantees the right of a
person under investigation.
RA 7438 (April 27, 1992) – It is an Act defining certain rights of persons arrested,
detained or under custodial investigation. There is therefore a statutory guarantee
broader than the constitutional provision.
To answer the question, Are the rights in Section 12 applicable to a person NOT
YET in custody or merely one under investigation? - you answer that by citing the
provision of Section 12 which says it is available to persons under investigation for the
commission of an offense and you also cite the case of People v Domantay and People
v Principe citing RA 7438. - All of these says that the Section 12 rights of a person is
available even if he was only under investigation.

Answer: Yes, the rights in Section 12 are applicable to a person NOT YET in custody
or merely one under investigation. - Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution provides
that “The rights are available to any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense and the person does not need to be in custody.” - Also, as provided in the case
of People v Domantay and People v Principe citing RA 7438 - It says that this provision
applies to the stage of custodial investigation, that is, when the investigation is no longer
a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a particular person as a
suspect. R.A. No. 7438 has extended the constitutional guarantee to situations in which
an individual has not been formally arrested but has merely been invited for
questioning. - All of these says that the rights of a person is available even if he was
only under investigation.

People v Rapeza (2007)

- In this case, the appellant did not voluntarily surrender to the police but was "invited" by
SPO2 Gapas to the police station. There he was detained from 11 o’clock in the morning
of 22 October 1995 up to the morning of 23 October 1995 before his extrajudicial
statement was allegedly taken. The appellant should have been informed of his
constitutional rights as he was already considered a suspect, contrary to the finding of the
trial court that the mandatory constitutional guidelines only attached when the
investigators started to propound questions to appellant.
(This is to clarify again when the rights are made available)

What rights are made available: (1) Right to remain silent; (2) the right to counsel; (3)
the right to be informed of such rights.

Right to remain silent: Under Section 17 (right against self-incrimination): An accused;

a witness. - Under the right against self-incrimination in Section 17, only an accused
has the absolute right to remain silent. - the accused need not even take the witness’
stand even if he’s called to witnesses’ stand on the ground that whatever he will say might
tend to incriminate him.
- On the other hand, a person who is not an accused, like a witness, may assume the
stance of silence only when ask an incriminating question. So, the witness, not an
accused may not refuse to take the witness stand but may refuse to answer an
incriminating question when already in the witness stand.
The comparison of the right to remain silent under Section 17 and Section 12. In
section 17, we are talking about the accused, In Section 12, we’re talking about a person
under investigation, he also has the right to refuse to answer any question. That is his
right to remain silent. Right to counsel: The counsel made available to the
person under investigation must not only be competent and independent but also
preferably be of his choice.

Q: What if there is no counsel available, may that excuse the law enforcement officer in
proceeding with the investigation without violating the right to counsel?
A: No, they must look for a counsel. Absolutely, you cannot investigate, you cannot
propound questions to the accused without the presence of a counsel because of this
right.

People v. Mojello, GR No. 145566, March 9, 2004. - A lawyer provided by the

investigators is deemed engaged by the accused when he does not raise any objection
against the counsel's appointment during the course of the investigation, and the accused
thereafter subscribes to the veracity of the statement before the swearing officer.

Right to be informed of such rights: (right to remain silent & right to counsel) -
the right of a person under investigation 'to be informed' implies an obligation on the part
of the police investigator to explain to him (person under investigation) his rights and its
effect in practical terms.

When do the rights cease to be available: The rights under Section 12 (1) are available
when the inquiry is under the control of police officers. Beyond that, the rights are no
longer available. Q: If these rights under Section 12 paragraph 1 is no longer available,
what happens to the accused? A: The implication is that the rights are no longer available
when the police are done with the investigation. When they are done with the
investigation, they are now filing the case in court and therefore, after the charges are
filed in court, during the preliminary investigation, during the trial of the case, Sections 14
and 17 applies, not Section 12.

Waiver of the rights: Only if the waiver is in writing and done in the presence of
counsel.

People v Ayson - Section 12 paragraph 1 does not apply to preliminary investigation or

already charged in court for a crime and therefore already under the protection of the
court.
- It seems quite evident that a defendant on trial or under preliminary investigation is not
under custodial interrogation. His interrogation by the police, if any there had been would
already have been ended at the time of the filing of the criminal case in court (or the public
prosecutors' office). Hence, with respect to a defendant in a criminal case already pending
in court (or the public prosecutor's office), there is no occasion to speak of his right while
under "custodial interrogation" laid down by the second and subsequent sentences of
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, for the obvious reason that he is no longer
under "custodial interrogation."

Q: May rights under Section 12 be waived?

A: Under the provisions of Section 12, It may be waived (1) Only if the waiver is in writing
and (2) done in the presence of counsel.

People v. Galit, 135 SCRA 465, 1985. - The rights provided in Section 12 paragraph 1
may be waived only if the waiver is in writing and done in the presence of a counsel. The
implication of this rule is that, in localities where there are no lawyers, the State must
bring the individual to a place where there is one or bring counsel to the place where the
person is held”. - In this case, the court reiterate: At the time a person is arrested, it
shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he
must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional
rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be
used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his
lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means — by telephone
if possible — or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer
to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless
it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his
behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone
on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid
unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of
the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part,
shall be inadmissible in evidence.
- Nevertheless, as People v. Jara * said: Whenever a protection given by the
Constitution is waived by the person entitled to that protection, the presumption is always
against the waiver. Consequently, the prosecution must prove with strongly convincing
evidence that indeed the accused willingly and voluntarily submitted their confessions and
knowingly and deliberately manifested that they were not interested in having a lawyer to
assist them during the taking of the confession.

Exclusionary rule: Any confession or admission obtained in violation of Section 12 (1)

and Section 17 shall not be admissible in evidence against "him". - “Him” is the person
making the confession. He is the person under investigation.

People v. Balisteros, 237 SCRA 499, 1994. Against him. The source of the confession
or admission. - Illegal confessions or admissions are inadmissible against him. (The
source of the confession or admission) - The text makes them inadmissible "against
him," that is, against the source of the confession or admission. And it is he alone who
can ask for exclusion. It is admissible against the person who has violated the
Constitutional prohibition. - So, it is not admissible against him. Him as the person who
made the confession but is admissible against the one who has violated the Constitution
prohibition, meaning to say the Police Officers.
This is different from the exclusionary rule in searches and seizures in Article 2. And
privacy in communication in Article 3 where evidence obtained shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding.

Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua where the evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as maybe provided by law. The right
to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.

- As a general rule: All persons are entitled to bail.

- Exception: except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua where
the evidence of guilt is strong.

Q: Are all persons charged with offenses entitled to bail?

A: Yes, as a general rule.

Q: Are all persons charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua before
conviction entitled to bail?
A: Yes.

Q: Are all persons charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua where the
evidence of guilt is strong before conviction be entitled to bail?
A: No. The condition present that the evidence of guilt must be strong is provided.

Bail: is a mode, short of confinement, which would insure the attendance of the accused
at his trial.

The right to bail is corollary to the right to be presumed innocent. - the right to be
presumed innocent supposed to be entitled to the right to bail. - It is, like the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, another means of immediately obtaining liberty.
Q: What is the relation between the right to be presumed innocent to the right to be
entitled to bail? A: The right to be presumed innocent supports the right to be entitled to
bail.

All persons charged with an offense, before conviction, shall have the right to
bail. Where the accused is charged with a capital offense, a hearing is
mandatory. - it is automatically done by the court.

The burden of proof. - The burden of proof is on the prosecution to show that the
evidence meets the required quantum of evidence. Q: What is the quantum of
evidence required? A: The quantum of evidence needed in order to deny an accused
the right to bail is described by the text simply as "strong evidence," - This has been
construed to mean "proof evident" or "presumption great." "Proof evident" or "evident p r
o o f in this connection means clear, strong evidence which leads a well-guarded
dispassionate judgment to the conclusion that the offense has been committed as
charged, that accused is the guilty agent, and that he will probably be punished capitally
if the law is administered. "Presumption great" exists when the circumstances testified to
are such that the inference of guilt naturally to be drawn therefrom is strong, clear, and
convincing to an unbiased judgment and excludes all reasonable probability of any other
conclusion. Even though there is a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of accused, if on an
examination of the entire record the presumption is great that accused is guilty of a capital
offense, bail should be refused.

- The test is not whether the evidence establishes guilt beyond reasonable doubt but
rather whether it shows evident guilt or a great presumption of guilt.

Strong evidence. - the quantum of evidence needed must be strong evidence, it means
presumption.

The person claiming the right to bail must be under actual detention or under the
custody of the law.

Paderanga v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 115407, August 28, 1995. - one is under the
custody of the law either when he has been arrested or has surrendered himself to the
jurisdiction of the court, as in the case where through counsel petitioner for bail who was
confined in a hospital communicated his submission to the jurisdiction of the court.

Govt. of Hong Kong v. Olalia, GR 153675 (April 19, 2007), The right to bail in extradition
proceedings. - Bail in extradition - where the Government of Hong Kong sought to
extradite Olalia - It reached the SC whether Olalia is entitled to bail. - The issue before
the Supreme Court is “Is the person under extradition proceedings entitled to
bail?” - The Supreme Court said: the right to bail is available to respondents in
extradition proceedings and in this case, the Court ruled: that an extradition proceeding,
while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal process. -While our
extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no
provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under
the Constitution.
- If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not
also be allowed in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where
the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.

Comendador v. Villa, 200 SCRA 80 (91) - also held that the right to bail has traditionally
not been recognized and is not available in the military, for which reason the right to
speedy trial is given more emphasis.

People v. Divina, 221 SCRA 209 (1993). - After conviction by the trial court where
presumption of innocence terminates, the Constitutional right to bail should also
terminate. - Moreover, in the case of one punishable by death or reclusion perpetua,
the conviction by the trial court is indication that the evidence of guilt is strong. This must
be taken in the context of the nature of the case.

- Pursuant to the aforecited provision, an accused who is charged with a capital offense
or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, shall no longer be entitled to bail as a
matter of right even if he appeals the case to this Court since his conviction clearly imports
that the evidence of his guilt of the offense charged is strong." (Emphasis
Supplied.) Accused Belarmino Divina was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of the
crime of murder which is an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua. Pursuant to SC
Administrative Circular No. 2-92, he is no longer entitled to bail even if he appeals to Us
since his conviction clearly imports that the evidence of his guilt is strong. - The other
innovation introduced by the 1987 Constitution is the rule that the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not suspend the right to bail.

Dissenting opinion of Justice Marvic Leonen: Enrile bail a ‘special accommodation,’

says SC Justice. (Tetch Torres-Tupaz, Inquirer, Aug 20, 2015)
- bail has been granted. - read the original case. - take note if the grant of bail is
constitutionally feasible. Humanitarian consideration as a basis even under the
Constitution.

- Senator Juan Ponce Enrile’s bail that the Supreme Court has granted was seen as a
“special accommodation” and could set a dangerous precedent. The warning was
contained in the 29-page dissenting opinion of Associate Justice Marvic Leonen who
added that the decision “has perilously set an unstated if not ambiguous standard
for the special grant of bail on the ground of medical conditions.” He said the
humanitarian consideration used as basis by majority of the high court in granting bail has
no legal basis. “Bail for humanitarian considerations is neither presently provided in
our Rules of Court nor found in any statute or provision of the Constitution,” Leonen said,
adding that “the Constitution and our rules require that bail can only be granted after
granting the prosecution the opportunity to prove that evidence of guilt is strong. The
special grant of bail, due to medical conditions, is unique, extraordinary, and
exceptional. ”While the high court cited the testimony of a doctor from the Philippine
General Hospital (PGH) who said that Enrile’s health condition is fragile and requires
special treatment, he should have been presented as an expert witness and subjected to
both direct and cross-examination before the Sandiganbayan. However, Enrile’s
motion to fix bail, Leonen said, was anchored on other ground, not on his medical
condition. “This will usher an era of truly selective justice not based on clear legal
provisions, but one that is unpredictable, partial and solely grounded on the presence or
absence of human compassion on the day that justices of this court deliberate and vote,”
Leonen said.

Enrile v Sandiganbayan (2015) - In this case, the Office of the Ombudsman charged
Enrile and several others with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of their
purported involvement in the diversion and misuse of appropriations under the Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF). - Enrile respectively filed his Omnibus Motion 5

and Supplemental Opposition, praying, among others, that he be allowed to post bail
6

should probable cause be found against him.

- The Sandiganbayan issued its resolution denying Enrile’s motion, particularly on the
matter of bail, on the ground of its prematurity considering that Enrile had not yet then
voluntarily surrendered or been placed under the custody of the law. Accordingly, the
Sandiganbayan ordered the arrest of Enrile. - On the same day that the warrant for his
arrest was issued, Enrile voluntarily surrendered to Director Benjamin Magalong of the
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) and was later on confined at the
Philippine National Police (PNP) General Hospital following his medical examination. -
Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital , and his
11

Motion to Fix Bail, both dated July 7, 2014, which were heard by the Sandiganbayan on
July 8, 2014.
- In support of the motions, Enrile argued that he should be allowed to post bail
because: (a) the Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence of his guilt was
strong; (b) although he was charged with plunder, the penalty as to him would only be
reclusion temporal , not reclusion perpetua ; and (c) he was not a flight risk, and his age
and physical condition must further be seriously considered. - The Sandiganbayan
issued it’s resolution to deny Enrile’s motion for reconsideration. - Enrile then, raises the
following grounds in support of his petition for certiorari. - The SC ruled that the petition
for certiorari is meritorious. (1) Bail protects the right of the accused to due process and
to be presumed innocent (2) Bail may be granted as a matter of right or of discretion (3)
Admission to bail in offenses punished by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion
perpetua is subject to judicial discretion (3.1) Enrile’s poor health justifies his admission
to bail - The SC conclude that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail
to ensure the appearance of the accused during the trial; and unwarrantedly disregarded
the clear showing of the fragile health and advanced age of Enrile.

As such, the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying Enrile’s Motion to
Fix Bail. Grave abuse of discretion, as the ground for the issuance of the writ of certiorari,
connotes whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment as is equivalent to excess, or
lack of jurisdiction. - WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for certiorari

Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due
process of law. The due process clause in paragraph (1), Section 14, is understood
to be criminal due process. - a criminal due process clause of the Bill of Rights
presupposes that the penal law being applied satisfies substantive requirement of due
process, such that the criminal due process under Section 14 is specifically applicable to
criminal proceedings as against due process of law in Section 1 which strips of due
process in general. - Section 14 is more specific treatment of due process in judicial
proceedings as applied to criminal cases.

Criminal due process in Section 14 as against due process in Section 1 of the Bill
of Rights. After the investigation, when the case is filed, Section 14 sets in.
Q: What is the difference between the two since both speaks of Due process?
A: The due process clause in paragraph (1), Section 14, is understood to be criminal due
process as against to due process in Section 1 which is due process clause in general.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy,
impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and .... ...and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of
evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the
absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear
is unjustifiable. - paragraph 2 contains the rights of the accused in criminal
prosecution. - The rights of the accused guaranteed under Section 14 paragraph 2 are
rights in all criminal prosecution.

When do these rights become available to the accused: From arraignment to rendition
of judgment.
- Arraignment is the time where the criminal complaint is read to the accused in open
court. - These rights are available from arraignment to rendition - meaning to say, every
step in the trial in criminal prosecution.

The specific rights of the accused in criminal prosecutions:

Right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved: - Under the principle of
presumption of innocence, U.S. v. Luling, taught that the state is merely required to
establish a prima facie case, after which the burden of proof shifts to the accused.

- To establish a prima facie case means to prove the act or acts that constitute a crime
of the so-called elements of the crime.
-It will then be the duty of the accused to prove that the act or acts are innocent and are
not committed with any criminal intent or intention. - While that is the rule, many of the
States have established a different rule and have provided that certain facts only shall
constitute prima facie evidence, and that then the burden is put upon the defendant to
show or to explain that such facts or acts are not criminal. - In the Philippine Islands no
act is a crime unless it is made so by statute. The state having the right to declare what
acts are criminal, within certain well-defined limitations, has a right to specify what act or
acts shall constitute a crime, as well as what proof shall constitute prima facie evidence
of guilt, and then to put upon the defendant the burden of showing that such act or acts
are innocent and are not committed with any criminal intent or intention. - This, however,
must be understood to simply mean that if the accused fails to present evidence creating
reasonable doubt, there would be enough ground for conviction. It is the conviction that
can terminate the presumption. But if the initial conviction is appealed, the presumption
remains.
The Court enumerated the elements that the prosecution must do before there can be
a conviction: First, the accused enjoys the constitutional presumption of innocence until
final conviction; conviction requires no less than evidence sufficient to arrive at a moral
certainty of guilt, not only with respect to the existence of a crime, but, more importantly,
of the identity of the accused as the author of the crime. Second, the prosecution's case
must rise and fall on its own merits and cannot draw its strength from the weakness of
the defense.

Malana v. People, GR No. 173612, March 26, 2008. The "equipoise rule" - Finally,
related to presumption of innocence is what is called the "equipoise" rule which says that
where the evidence of the parties in a criminal case is evenly balanced, the constitutional
presumption of innocence should tilt the scales in favor of the accused. Clearly, however,
there is no equipoise if the evidence is not evenly balanced. The equipoise rule cannot
be invoked where the evidence of the prosecution is overwhelming.

Gonzaga v. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 96131, September 6, 1991. Preventive

suspension pendente lite - Preventive suspension pendente lite or the pendency of the
proceedings, does not violate the rights to be presumed innocent because preventive
suspension is not a penalty. Q: Why does a preventive suspension even if a
government employee is suspended and not provided with salaries and others, why is
this not unconstitutional? Why is this constitutional? A: Because, preventive suspension
is not a penalty, a person under preventive suspension, especially in a criminal action,
remains entitled to the constitutional presumption of innocence as his culpability must still
be established

Right to be heard by himself or counsel: 3 specific rights - (1) right to present

evidence and to be present at the trial; (2) right to be assisted by counsel;
(3) right to compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his behalf

The right to present evidence includes the right to testify in one's favor and the right to
be given time to call witnesses. - An important facet of the right to be heard is the right
to be present at the trial. "In all criminal prosecutions the accused has an absolute right
to be personally present during the entire proceedings from arraignment to sentence if
he so desires.

Q: Why do we add “if he so desires”?

A: Because under the new provision of the Rules of Court or even the Constitution, where
trial in absentia is allowed, the accused has the option not to attend the trial of his case
except during arraignment when the criminal complaint is read to him and at the time of
judgment or at the time the decision is read to him in open court.

Under the right to counsel in Section 14 (2), counsel need not be one who is the choice
of the accused. - The guarantee of the right to counsel serves to minimize the imbalance
in the adversary system. Q: What does this means? - It means that the accused is alone,
It embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does
not have the professional skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power
to take his life or liberty, wherein the prosecution is presented by an experienced and
learned counsel.

- In an adversarial system, the parties, acting independently and in a partisan fashion,

are responsible for uncovering and presenting evidence before a passive and neutral trial
judge or jury. The difference from Section 12 which says one of the rights of the person
is to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. to
Section 14 paragraph 2 which says counsel need not be one who is the choice of the
accused. - the difference here is the counsel is not given in the same terms as that
found in Section 12. - the counsel that is given to the accused may be given by the Court.
It need not be a counsel of his own choice, the preference in the choice of counsel
pertains more uply and specifically under a person under investigation under Section 12
paragraph 1 rather the one who is the accused in a criminal proceeding.

Amion v. Judge Chiongson, AM RTJ-97-1371, January 22, 1999.

- In this case, the accused cannot contend that the appointment by the trial court judge of
a counsel de oficio deprived him of his constitutional right to be defended by counsel of
his own choice, The claim of accused-complainant that respondent judge’s appointment
of a counsel de oficio constitutes a clear violation of his right to due process and a
deprivation of his constitutional right to be defended by counsel of his own choice cannot
be countenanced by this Court. - An examination of related provisions in the
Constitution concerning the right to counsel, will show that the "preference in the choice
of counsel" pertains more aptly and specifically to a person under investigation
rather than one who is the accused in a criminal prosecution.

May the right to counsel be waived?

A: Yes, according to Bernas.
A: No, according to Lara. (:D)
- The cases cited by Bernas to support his contention are cases decided in 1912, 1915
and1955. It must be pointed out that In the language of the provision, right to counsel like
the other rights guaranteed thereon appears to be mandatory, - If the right to counsel
may be waived, may the right to be heard, the right to be informed, the right to present
evidence be also waived? - Moreover, will a waiver be practical considering the
adversarial nature of the criminal proceedings?

At what point in the criminal proceeding is the accused entitled to counsel: from
arraignment to rendition of judgment. - As already pointed out above, the rights
enumerated in Section 14(2) are rights "in all criminal prosecutions" and "criminal
prosecution” which covers the period from arraignment to rendition of judgment. - The
right to counsel exists only during that period.
- It has been shown, however, that under the circumstances of Section 12(1) a right to
counsel also exists before arraignment.
Right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him: - This
is the arraignment: where the accused is informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him in open court.
The purpose: first, is to inform the accused of the charge against him as will enable him
to make his defense; and second, to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for
protection against a further prosecution for the same cause; and third, to inform the court
of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a
conviction, if one should be had. - The cardinal requisite is that the accused be
informed of facts that are imputed to him. To satisfy this requisite, the information
must describe the act with sufficient particularity. The right to assail the
sufficiency of the information or the admission of evidence may be waived by the accused
if he fails to object to its sufficiency during the trial and the deficiency is cured by
competent evidence presented therein.

“Let’s say nakalusot” There are elements of the crime, that were not alleged in the
information. “Hindi nakita ng counsel o husgado”. Now, if the accused does not assail
the sufficiency of the information, then that is deemed waived. Then he is deemed to have
waived the deficiency in the information. Now, if he fails to object to it during the trial,
when the prosecution presents evidence to prove that the particular element of the crime
which was not alleged on the information, then the deficiency is cured by competent
evidence.

When is the right to avail the sufficiency or validity of information?

The right to assail starts during arraignment. The accused must raise the issue of
defective information in a motion to quash or in a motion for a bill of particulars.
Speedy, impartial, and public trial. The right to a “speedy trial” prohibits
unreasonable delays. The right may be waived. But waiver is not to be inferred from
mere failure of the accused to urge the trial of the case. Such waiver or abandonment
may be presumed only when the postponement of the trial has been sought and
obtained by the accused himself or by his attorney.
- the accused cannot question the delay.
The remedy an accused has for violation of his right to speedy trial is dismissal of the
case and, if he is under detention, release by habeas corpus. Moreover, dismissal for
violation of the right to speedy trial is equivalent to acquittal and is therefore a bar
to subsequent prosecution for the same offense. - it is equivalent to acquittal.
Speedy Trial Act of 1998 (R.A. 8493) - It provides that the arraignment of the accused
shall be held within 30 days from the filing of the information and after arraignment, trials
are commenced within 30 days from arraignment.
- Under the new guidelines issued by the Supreme Court, a case must be raffled off to a
trial court 3 days from the filing of the criminal information. The arraignment must take
place within 10 days from the date of the raffle. - A trial must take place within 30 days
after the pre-trial conference.
- Regular trials must be completed in 180 days while trials on judicial affidavits must be
resolved after 60 days. Atty Lara: This is a dream of the judicial system, It’s more of an
exception rather than the general rule. It is not happening on our judicial system,
unfortunately. The Speedy Trial Act is a very good law, only if it will be followed. Any delay
or violation of the schedules that are provided by the law for the courts may cost the
dismissal of the case and the dismissal is failure to prosecute. It is a dismissal with
prejudice, it cannot be re-filed.

If the accused is not brought to trial within the time limit provided by the Act, upon
motion of the accused, the information shall be dismissed (Sec. 13). - provided
under Section 13 of the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 (R.A. 8493). Right to public trial:
- A trial is public when anyone interested in observing how a judge conducts the
proceedings in his courtroom may do so. There is to be no ban on such attendance. His
being a stranger to the litigants is of no moment. No relationship to the parties need be
shown."

Right of confrontation: Means the right to meet the witnesses face to face. The right
has a twofold purpose: 1) to afford the accused an opportunity to test the testimony of
the witness by cross examination. 2) to allow the judge to observe the deportment of the
witness. - how he acts, his body language, is he telling the truth, does his body language
tells that he’s telling the truth. - “to confront and cross-examine the witness against him
at the trial.

Testimony not subjected to cross examination must be excluded. - a witness

testifies in court through postponement. If there was no cross examination
-that testimony must be excluded from the record. It can never be used if there was no
cross examination.

Dying declarations is an exemption. - declaration of a dying person - However, if

cross-examination actually commenced, but, for lack of material time, was not completed,
and the witness in the meantime died before cross-examination could be resumed, so
much of the testimony as had already been covered by cross-examination is admissible.

Estrada vs. Bersamin, et.al., GR No 212140-41, Jan. 21, 2015. - It is a fundamental

principle that the accused in a preliminary investigation has no right to cross examine the
witnesses which the complainant may present. - the right of confrontation is not
available during preliminary investigation. the 1987 Constitution can be read as
supporting Justice Tuason's view because Section 12(1), in its enumeration of the rights
that are constitutionally guaranteed during investigation, does not include the right of
confrontation. - However, Later decisions have adhered to this doctrine, although a
statutory right of confrontation is recognized during preliminary investigation proper but
not during preliminary examination.
Compulsory process: to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of
evidence in his behalf. - Equally important as the right to counsel is the right to
compulsory process for the attendance of witnesses. - Right of the accused under
Section 14(2) - The 1935 Constitution guaranteed the right "to have compulsory
process to secure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf."
- The 1973 provision, and now the 1987, has modified the guarantee slightly by adding
the right to have compulsory process to also secure "the production of evidence in his
behalf."

Trial in absentia: It is a situation where the trial of the accused may proceed even when
he is absent.

May occur in two instances; must have been arraigned; must be present during
promulgation. Situation may appear in two instances:
First instance, Trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided
that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable."
Second instance, Trial in absentia can also take place when the accused voluntarily
waives his right to be present. - There are, however, restrictive conditions for allowing
waiver. The right may be waived "provided that after arraignment he may be compelled
to appear for the purpose of identification by the witnesses of the prosecution, or
provided he unqualifiedly admits in open court after his arraignment that he is the person
named as the defendant in the case on trial.

In both cases - the accused must have already been arraigned. In either case, the
accused is also allowed to be present during the promulgation.

Section 15. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended
except in cases of invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it.

Q: What is a writ of habeas corpus?

A: Writ of habeas corpus is an order to produce the body. It is defined as a writ directed
to the person detaining another, commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner
at a designated time and place, with the day and cause of his caption and detention, to
do, submit to, and receive whatever the court or judge awarding the writ shall consider in
that behalf. From the very nature of the writ, a prime requisite for its availability is
actual deprivation of personal liberty.

Q: What is the privilege of the writ?

A: The privilege of the writ is the privilege to be brought to court for the immediate
determination of the legality of the deprivation of physical liberty.

Q: What is suspended? Is it the writ of habeas corpus or is it the privilege of habeas

corpus?
A: It should be emphasized that what is suspended by the Executive is not the writ
but the privilege of the writ. Because the writ always issues as a matter of course and
the officer to whom it is directed is bound to honor it. If, however, a person is detained on
reasonable belief of participation in a crime covered by the suspension of the privilege,
the officer shall state such fact in his "Answer and Return" and asks the court to proceed
no further. What happens after such return and answer, however, is hazy.
- In Lansang v. Garcia (1971 case) the Court said, without argument or authority, that the
next step is for the court or for a court appointed commissioner to receive evidence on
such stated reasonable belief.
- The suggestion of the Court in Lansang is impractical because it defeats the very
purpose of the suspension of the privilege which is to keep the person under custody
without judicial inquiry. Furthermore, the situation may never happen because the
respective provisions of the 1987 Constitution on the suspension of the writ and the
declaration of Martial Law. [Article VII Section 18].
- The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged
for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion. During the
suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be
judicially charged within three days, otherwise, he shall be released.

The function of the writ of habeas corpus... - The function of the writ of habeas corpus
is to achieve immediate determination of the legality of a detention.

The effect of the suspension of the privilege of the writ... - The effect of the
suspension of the privilege of the writ is to prevent courts, temporarily, from enquiring into
the legality of the detention.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ is subject to judicial review. ...under
the express provision of the Section 18, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution. - that is
why the cases cited by Bernas are no longer applicable. (Barcelon v Baker 1905,
Montenegro v Castaneda 1952, Lansang v Garcia 1971, Padilla v Garcia) because of
the restrictive provisions of the 1987 Constitution.

Under the express provisions of Section 13, Article III, in relation to Section 18, Article
VII, a person accused (detained) for an offense covered by the suspension of the writ is
entitled to be released on bail. - the heart of the suspension of the privilege - is
to freeze temporarily inquiry into the justification of the detention. Notwithstanding that
under Section 13, Article III, the right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege
of the writ is suspended.

However, there is still a necessity for the filing of the charges in court first conformably
with Section 18 Article VII before the bail can be granted. - Once formal charges are
filed bail becomes available under Section 13. - Filing of formal charges entails
executive waiver of the effects of the suspension of the privilege.

The law on the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has
undergone radical changes in the 1987 constitution: the doctrine on the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ, on the grounds for suspension, on the termination of the
suspension, on judicial review, and on the scope and effects of the suspension. - The
power to suspend the privilege has ceased to be an almost exclusively executive affair.

The President may suspend to privilege for a period of not exceeding sixty days.
Ground for suspension: Under both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, the President
could suspend the privilege of the writ in "case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or
imminent danger thereof, when public safety requires it”. Congress is given the power
to revoke the suspension and the President may not set aside such revocation. Congress,
upon the initiative of the President, may also extend the suspension. - This interplay
between the President and Congress will be discussed more under Article VII, Section
18.
- The Supreme Court, upon the initiative of any citizen, may review the "sufficiency of the
factual basis" of the suspension and "must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty
days from its filing."

The scope of the suspension of the privilege has also been severely limited by Article
VII, Section 18, which says: "The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only
to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected
with invasion."

Atty. Lara: [Review it and examine] if the suspension of the privilege of the writ is still
applicable as a tool of the State to protect itself. When you study Section 18 Article VII
- it must be understood as provisions for protection of the State.

Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases
before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. - speaks of disposition of
cases.
- The provision guarantees the right to a speedy disposition of cases. It covers the
periods before, during and after trial. - It gives broader protection than Section 14(2)
which guarantees merely the right to a speedy trial. - It is also broader than the
protection given by Article VIII, Section 15 which covers merely the period after the
submission of a case. - The right may be obtained by a petition for mandamus.
Speedy trial in Sec 14 covers only trial phase. - it covers only trial aspect of the
case whereas Section 16 covers all phases of judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative
proceedings. There is a new doctrine inordinate delay, it has been a problem in the
Ombudsman, where because of the delay in the disposition of a case, when it reaches
the Sandiganbayan, some cases were dismissed on the ground of the inordinate delay.
- The ruling is seen to reduce the number of Ombudsman cases that get dismissed due
to inordinate delay.
CAGANG v SANDIGANBAYAN
- The concept of inordinate delay was introduced in Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, where the
Supreme Court was constrained to apply the "radical relief' of dismissing the criminal
complaint against an accused due to the delay in the termination of the preliminary
investigation. - In People v. Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, The ruling that fact-finding
investigations are included in the period for determination of inordinate delay is
ABANDONED. - The period for the resolution of graft cases starts with the preliminary
investigation phase in the Office of the Ombudsman. The justices upheld the position of
the Office of the Ombudsman that the reckoning period for the right to speedy trial does
not start with the fact-finding investigation. - The Court interpreted reckoning period for
the right to speedy disposition of cases under Article III Section 16 - to start from the
preliminary investigation of cases and not before the preliminary investigation and not
from the fact-finding stage. - The Constitution guarantees the right to speedy disposition
of cases. Under Article III, Section 16:

Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before
all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. The right to a speedy trial is invoked
1awp++i1

against the courts in a criminal prosecution. The right to speedy disposition of cases,
however, is invoked even against quasi-judicial or administrative bodies in civil, criminal,
or administrative cases before them

Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Right

against self-incrimination — The guarantee of the right against self-incrimination is
justified on the grounds of public policy and humanity.

Public policy because if the party is required to testify, it would place him under the
greatest temptation to commit perjury.

Humanity because it would prevent the extorting of confessions under duress.

- An accused may not be compelled to take the witnesses’ stand; he may refuse to be
a witness altogether.

- A mere witness who is not an accused, in order to avail himself of his right, must await
the incriminating question.

- Recent jurisprudence, moreover, has extended this right of the accused to respondents
in administrative investigations partaking of the nature of a criminal proceeding or
analogous to a criminal proceeding.

- A procedure for the forfeiture of property under the Anti-Graft Law was deemed criminal
and the respondent was accorded the right to refuse to take the witness stand, To
violate the right, it is not necessary that a categorical admission of a specific
offense be sought.
- To violate the right, it is not necessary that a categorical admission of a specific offense
be sought. “The right include refusal to testify to a fact which would be necessary link
in a chain of evidence to prove the commission of a crime by a witness.” - The meaning
of this is, it doesn’t necessarily mean that if a witness is asked a direct question like “Did
you kill one?” That would be incriminating. It also covers questions which would later on
tend to go to that question like “Where you in the house?” Where you in the same room
with the victim? Do you own a gun? etc. - Those are facts that would necessarily link in
a chain of evidence to prove the commission of the crime. So you may not have been
asked a direct question like “Did you kill one?” but instead you were asked several
questions which would lead to that. That would still be incriminating, and the witness may
refuse to answer.
 What is prohibited is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communication - It was held early in Philippine jurisprudence that what is prohibited
by the constitutional guarantee is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communication from the witness, not an inclusion of his body in evidence, when it may
be material.

Beltran v.Samson, 53 Phil 570 (1929). - In this case, It was held that, since witnesses
in a preliminary investigation are protected by the prohibition, they may not be compelled
to take a dictation in order to compare their handwriting with that found in a supposedly
falsified document.

When the accused voluntarily answers an incriminating question he is deemed to

have waived his right.
- Again, defense counsels must be always on their toes. They must be attentive to the
question of the adversary, the prosecution for example because once the accused
answered, then that cannot be taken back, you can no longer object to a question that
has already been answered. - The privilege against self- incrimination “is a personal
one, applying only to natural individuals.”

Section 18. (1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs
and aspirations. (2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a
punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.
Paragraph 1: - The guarantee does not add anything substantive to the due process
clause, nor to the guarantee of freedom of speech, press and expression. Paragraph
2: - that involuntary servitude may exist only when it is a punishment for a crime for
which the party is convicted.

Return to work order: may it be challenged as being violative of the constitutional

prohibition against involuntary servitude. - In a return-to-work order or in a strike, there is
usually a negotiation for the return to work of the striking employees. Then after the
negotiations, depending on the expediencies of the business or entities where there is a
strike. A return-to-work order may be issued.

Q: May a return-to-work order be challenged as being violative of the constitutional

prohibition against involuntary servitude? Since there is a government order for them to
return to work, Is that involuntary servitude?
A: It’s not. A return-to-work order is not involuntary servitude because the workers may
voluntarily submit themselves to arbitration.

Take note of Sec 3, Art. XIII, where voluntary modes of settling disputes is preferred.
Although compulsory arbitration shall still be had. - "The principle of shared
responsibility between workers and employers and the preferential use of voluntary
modes in settling disputes, including conciliation" and to "enforce their mutual compliance
therewith to foster industrial peace." The paragraph establishes a preferential bias for
voluntary modes of settling disputes.

Aclaracion v. Gatmaitan, 64 SCRA 131 (1975). - This is a case of a former Court

stenographer who was being compelled, under pain of contempt, to transcribe his
stenographic notes that he failed to attend to while he was still in the service. - The Court
said that such compulsion is not "condition of enforced, compulsory service"
referred to by the Constitution. - Aclaracion’s contention that to compel him to transcribe
his stenographic notes would constitute involuntary servitude is not tenable. Involuntary
servitude denotes a condition of enforced, compulsory service of one to another. But
as Justice Fernando noted in his concurrence, the matter could become tricky should a
stenographer stubbornly refuse to obey, and the court insist on keeping him in jail. The
detention could then become punitive and could give rise to the issue of involuntary
servitude.

Section 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading, or inhuman
punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes, the congress hereinafter provides for it. Any death
penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. (2) The employment
of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee, or
the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall be
dealt with by law.

Cruel, unusual, degrading, inhuman as prohibited punishment under the 1935, 1973
and 1987 constitutions.
1935 constitution prohibits "cruel and unusual punishment".
- to be prohibited by the provision, the punishment must not only be unusual, but it must
also be at the same time cruel because of the conjunctive “and”.

1973 constitution, the phrase became "cruel or unusual punishment". - If it's

cruel, it’s violative of the Constitution. If it’s unusual, it’s still violative of the Constitution.
It is either of the two. - The interpretation is that the provision prohibits unusual
punishment even if it’s not cruel. 1987 constitution, the text is "cruel, degrading
or inhuman punishment “ - The punishment is prohibited if it is either cruel, degrading
or inhuman. The Abolition of death penalty in the 1971 Convention, made clear that
there was no intention to pass judgment on capital punishment as cruel and unusual. It
said that the matter should be left to legislative discretion.

- The 1986 Constitutional Commission went ahead to abolish the death penalty but left
the matter open for Congress to revive capital punishment at its discretion "for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes."
- Congress revived capital punishment in 1993 through R.A. No. 7659, the Death Penalty
Law. - However, in 2006, under RA 9346, it prohibited the imposition of the Death
Penalty because it has not proven to be deterring to crime.

People v. Mercado, GR No. 116239, November 29, 2001. - In 2001 decision,

Lethal injection is not a cruel and unusual punishment. It was allowed by the Constitution.
- The death penalty per se is not a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment. - The
Court held that punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but
the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the
Constitution. Unconstitutional punishment implies something inhuman and barbarous,
something more than the mere extinguishment of life.' That is why they discontinued the
death by electrofusion because they found out that the one being electrocuted does not
die immediately, he has to suffer before he dies. That is where the lethal injection was
invented. Heinous crimes. - R.A. No. 7659, the Death Penalty Law; provides that
crimes are heinous "for being grievous, odious, and hateful offenses and which, by reason
of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are
repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality
in a just, civilized and ordered society."

Paragraph (2) concerns itself with the manner of treating prisoners in

detention. When confinement amounts to cruel and unusual punishment... -
Confinement itself within a given institution may amount to cruel and unusual punishment
prohibited by the Constitution where the confinement is characterized by conditions and
practices that are so bad as to be shocking to the conscience of reasonably civilized
people.

Facilities must be to a level of constitutional tolerability.

- Unless facilities of the penitentiary are brought up to a level of constitutional tolerability,
they should not be used for the confinement of prisoners at all. Courts in other jurisdictions
have ordered the closure of substandard and outmoded penal institutions. All these
require judicial orders in the absence of implementing laws to provide direct measures to
correct violations of human rights or institute alterations in the operations and facilities of
penal institutions...

Section 20. No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of poll tax. - It
Simply means that no person may be imprisoned for debt in virtue of an order in a civil
proceeding. Either as a substitute for satisfaction of debts or as a means of compelling
satisfaction.
- But a person may be imprisoned as penalty for a crime arising from a contractual
debt imposed in a criminal proceeding.
- Thus, the conversion of a criminal fine into a prison term does not violate the provision
because in such a case imprisonment is imposed for a monetary obligation arising not ex
contractu but ex delicto.
Q: What is a poll tax?
A: A poll-tax or a cedula tax is a capitation tax imposed on all persons of a certain age.
At present it is the tax one pays for his or her residence certificate which generally serves
as a personal identification instrument.
- The provision is a reaction to the administrative code which authorizes imprisonment
for non-payment of poll tax.

Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.
If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.

Meaning of jeopardy - It is being placed in danger of punishment or annoyance and

vexation of a criminal prosecution. - One who is prosecuted before a criminal offense is
put in danger of being punished for the same.

The provision consists of two parts:

The first sentence deals with prosecution for the same offense. The second sentence
deals with prosecution for the same act.

Requisites to raise the defense of double jeopardy: (1) a first jeopardy must have
attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have terminated; (3) the second
jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first. First requisite: Jeopardy
attaches: it must be: (1) upon a good indictment; (2) before a competent court; (3)
after arraignment; (4) after plea.

Good indictment means that there must be a valid complaint or information or other
formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction. - so that under a
defective information, the accused can never be convicted and, hence, he cannot be said
to have been in jeopardy of punishment because there cannot be a second jeopardy.

Competent court means a court that has jurisdiction over the offense charged or that it
has territorial jurisdiction over the crime committed. - There are two jurisdictions. First, is
jurisdiction over the offense charged. Second, territorial jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction over the offense charged - may be either jurisdiction of Regional Trial Court
and as against the jurisdiction of a municipal trial court. If it is a case that should be within
the jurisdiction of a RTC and it was filed in a MTC, then the MTC lacks jurisdiction, there
can never be double jeopardy. Territorial jurisdiction - if the offense happened in Aparri,
you cannot file the case in Tuguegarao, that is because Tuguegarao has no territorial
jurisdiction over the offense charge which happened in Aparri.

Arraignment and plea are the final steps in the commencement of jeopardy.

Second requisite: the first jeopardy must have been terminated –

Bulaong v. People, GR No. L- 19344, July 17, 1966.
- In this case, two informations were filed on the same day against the same
accused, one in the CFI of Laguna for rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal
Code and the other in the CFI of Manila for subversion under the Anti-Subversion Act.
On appeal of the Laguna case to the Supreme Court, the accused raised the defense of
double jeopardy on the ground that rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code
was but a lesser cognate offense to that defined in the Anti-Subversion Act under which
he had a case pending in the CFI of Manila. The Court rejected this defense because
neither of the two cases had as yet been terminated. In a footnote, the Court added:
"Appellant should direct his plea to the CFI of Manila, for his final conviction in the case
at bar would preclude his further prosecution there, assuming that the charge therein is
indeed for a lesser cognate offense to that alleged in the pending case therein. Second
requisite: the first jeopardy must have been terminated –

Termination of jeopardy may be by conviction or acquittal. - There is acquittal

when the case is terminated upon the merits of the issue, as when there is a
pronouncement that the evidence does not show the guilt of the accused beyond a
reasonable doubt.

Termination may also be by “dismissal".

- There is dismissal, in the sense of the rule on jeopardy, when the case is terminated
otherwise than upon the merits thereof, as when the dismissal is based on the allegation
that the Court has no jurisdiction either over the subject matter or over the territory, or on
any other ground that does not decide the merits of the issue as to whether the accused
is or is not guilty of the offense charged.

Without the consent of the accused:

- Dismissal, even if not on the merits, if done without the consent of the accused is a bar
to subsequent prosecution. - Termination if based on the merits even with or without the
consent of the accused, is a bar to further prosecution, because such termination is, in
fact, an acquittal.

People v. Velasco, GR 140633, February 4, 2002. - demurrer to evidence on the

ground of insufficiency of evidence was considered dismissal on the merits and a bar to
a motion for reconsideration by the prosecution

With the consent of the accused: - Even if the dismissal is definite, if made with the
consent of the accused, it would not be a bar to subsequent prosecution. The consent of
the accused to the dismissal of his case works as a waiver. - Upon reconsideration,
however, the Court said that the words "provisional" and "definite" in a dismissal are a
surplus age: what determines the effect of a dismissal is its nature, not its
label. Provisional dismissal - in order for it to be in the context of double jeopardy, the
accused has to secure a final or permanent dismissal of the case.
Based on speedy trial: - If the dismissal is predicated on the right of the accused to a
speedy trial, the dismissal is on the merits.
Suggested procedure: that if the defense wants to exercise the constitutional right to a
speedy trial, it should not ask for dismissal outright but for immediate trial.
- If the court grants immediate trial and the prosecution is not prepared, then the court
must dismiss the case. Such dismissal would amount to an acquittal.

Third requisite: the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as the first. - In
order to determine whether the two charges are identical, one test used is what is
sometimes referred to as "the same evidence test"
- Same evidence test: whether the evidence needed in one case will support a conviction
in the other. - The test is whether one offense is identical with the other or whether it is
an attempt or frustration of the other or whether one offense necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the other.
- It is necessary, however, that one offense is completely included in the other.
- Thus, while physical injury is not identical with attempted homicide, for purposes of
double jeopardy physical injury is "the same" as attempted homicide because physical
injury is necessarily included in such attempted homicide.

Same act (actually mean the same physical act) that is punished by an Ordinance and
statute.

People v. Jovelo, 101 Phil. 1213 (1957). - In this case, where the accused was
prosecuted in the Justice of the Peace Court for violation of an ordinance prohibiting the
carrying of deadly weapons. The case was dismissed over the objections of the accused.
Subsequently, he was prosecuted for the same act under Section 26 of Act No. 1780 for
having carried in his possession a deadly weapon while attending a meeting of the board
of canvassers. - The Supreme Court upheld the lower court ruling that the second
prosecution would place the accused in double jeopardy because it is based on the
same act.

Yap v. Lutero, GR 12669, April 30, 1959. - In this case, it said that under the second
clause of the jeopardy provision, there is double jeopardy "even if the offenses charged
are not the same. ... If the two charges are based on one and the same act, conviction or
acquittal under either the law or the ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the other."

Q: What is the rule when one act violates two different statutes?
A: The rule in such a case is that if the one act results in two distinct offenses, prosecution
under one is a bar to prosecution under the other.

Rule when one act violates two different statutes or two different provisions of a
statute: If the one act results in two distinct offenses, prosecution under one is a bar to
prosecution under the other.
- Clearly meant one juridical act, that is, one offense.
- BP 22 and Estafa are not the same - it is not a single act. There are elements that are
not present on the other crime. If the single criminal act is impelled by a single
criminal intent, the resultant harm cannot be split into different offenses.

Rule on new supervening fact: Melo v. People, 85 Phil. 766 (1950). - "[W]here after the
first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the defendant is responsible, which
changes the character of the offense and together with the facts existing at the time,
constitutes a new and distinct offense, the accused cannot be said to be in second
jeopardy if indicted for the new offense."
- This time Chief Justice Moran wrote for the majority. He said that the rule for the
determination of identity of offenses "did not apply . . . when the second offense was not
in existence at the time of the first prosecution, for the simple reason that in such a case
there is no possibility for the accused, during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an
offense that was then inexistent.”

Example: The subject of sameness of offense is also affected by the rule that one is not
in jeopardy for an offense which is not in existence at the time of the filing of the charge.
The situation is illustrated by the early case of US. v. Diaz. * Diaz was convicted of
misdemeanor for physically maltreating another. Subsequent to the conviction, the victim
died. Prosecuted for homicide, Diaz raised the defense of double jeopardy. The
Philippine Supreme Court rejected this defense saying that Diaz had not been previously
in jeopardy of conviction for homicide because the Justice of the Peace Court which tried
him for misdemeanor had no jurisdiction over the crime of homicide. On appeal, the U.S.
Supreme Court sustained the Philippine decision saying: "The death of the injured
person was the principal element of the homicide but was no part of the assault and
battery. At the time of the trial for the latter, the death had not ensued, and not until it did
ensue was the homicide committed. Then, and not before, was it possible to put the
accused in jeopardy for that offense."

Appeals: The protection against second jeopardy not only means that an accused cannot
be prosecuted a second time for the same offense but also that the prosecution cannot
appeal a judgment of acquittal.
- A judgment on acquittal rendered within a court’s jurisdiction, even if erroneous, ends
the case finally. Provided that the judge considered the evidence, even if his appreciation
of the evidence leading to acquittal is erroneous, an appeal or motion for reconsideration
by the prosecution will not be allowed.
- It should be noted, however, that when a judgment of acquittal or dismissal on the
merits is void for lack of jurisdiction, the judgment cannot be a base for a plea of double
jeopardy.

Galman v. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 43 (1986).

- In here, there was a first trial that was conducted in 1986 on the Aquino-Galman case.
- Some of the accused in this case were convicted and some are acquitted. - Justice
Pamaran's ponencia (despite reservations expressed by Justice Amores who wanted to
convict some of the accused) granted all 26 accused total absolution and pronounced
them "innocent of the crimes charged in the two information, and accordingly, they
incur neither criminal nor civil liability," notwithstanding the evidence on the basis of which
the Fact Finding Board had unanimously declared the soldiers' version of Galman being
Aquino's killer a "perjured story, given deliberately and in conspiracy with one another."
- When Corazon Aquino became the President, there was a move to re-open the case.
- The jurisprudence then was a case that has become final and executory can no longer
be reopened. - They said that the reopening rested on the premise that the proceedings
in the Sandiganbayan were characterized by grave abuse of discretion amounting to loss
of jurisdiction. - Respondents-accused’s contention that the Sandiganbayan judgment of
acquittal ends the case which cannot be appealed or re-opened, without being put in
double jeopardy was forcefully disposed of by the Court in People vs. Court of Appeals,
which said as follows: "That is the general rule and presupposes a valid judgment. As
earlier pointed out, however, respondent Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a void
judgment for having been issued without jurisdiction. No double jeopardy attaches,
therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all By it no rights are
divested. Through it, no rights can be attained. Being worthless, all proceedings founded
upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts performed under
it and all claims flowing out of it are void. - This principle was the foundation for the
reopening of the case against the soldiers accused of the murder of Benigno Aquino,
Jr.
- Hence, the proceedings were invalid, and the "acquittal" did not really acquit and
therefore did not terminate the case. Moreover, even the offended party may raise the
dismissal on certiorari on the ground of denial of due process. - ACCORDINGLY,
petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is granted. - The court’s judgment hereby
rendered nullifying the proceedings in respondent Sandiganbayan and its judgment of
acquittal in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 entitled "People of the Philippines vs.
Gen. Luther Custodia et al." and ordered a re-trial of the said cases.
atty Lara: I once one of the defense counsel, I represented Gen. Olivas.
Appeal by the accused: - when an accused appeals his conviction he waives his right
to the plea of double jeopardy. - The appellate court will impose a penalty higher than
that of the original conviction could be imposed on him.

In double jeopardy, the prosecution cannot appeal an acquittal of the accused but the
accused can appeal his case of conviction. If he does that, he waives his right to double
jeopardy and in waiving his right to jeopardy, the appellate court could impose a penalty
higher.
- It does not necessarily have to be in the same court, in could be in other courts. -
the defense of double jeopardy may still be available. Provided, the elements of jeopardy
are there.
- Section 22. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.

An ex post facto law is one: (1) Which makes an action done before the passing of the
law, which was innocent when done, criminal, and punishes such action; (2) Which
aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was committed; (3) Which changes
the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when
it was committed; (4) Which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different
testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to
convict the defendant. (5) Which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but
in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of right; and, (6) Which deprives a person
accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as
the protection of a former acquittal or conviction or amnesty proclamation.

Ex post facto laws embrace only criminal or penal statutes. - The constitutional
doctrine that outlaws an ex post facto law prohibits the retrospectivity of penal laws. Penal
laws are those acts of the legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties
for their violations; or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their
punishment
- This condemnation of retroactive penal legislation dates back to the Code of Justinian
and is embodied in the words: Nulla poena sine lege. - The same principle is also
embodied in Article 21 of the Revised Penal Code: "No crime or misdemeanor shall be
punished by a penalty which was not established by law prior to its commission."
- the prohibition applies only to criminal legislation which affects the substantial rights of
the accused.
(1) When is a law penal in nature? - It emerges from the first three types of ex post
facto laws enumerated by Calder v. Bull all of which have the common element of applying
a criminal penalty. Thus, the question reduces itself to asking whether what the law
imposes is a criminal penalty or not. When the law in question has to be enforced
through criminal prosecution, there is little problem in identifying the nature of a statute.
But when the proceeding required for the application of the statute is civil in form, it
becomes necessary to determine whether in fact the proceeding results in the imposition
of a criminal penalty.

(2) When may procedural law be considered retrospective penal law?

- It is answered by the fourth category in the enumeration of Calder v. Bull: when the law
"alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law
required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the
defendant. However, it is now well settled that statutory changes in the mode of trial or
the rules of evidence, which do not deprive the accused of a defense, and which operate
only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage, are not prohibited. -
The test in procedural matters is "whether particular statutes by their operation take from
an accused any right that was regarded, at the time of the adoption of the Constitution,
as vital for the protection of life and liberty, and which he enjoyed at the time of the
commission of the offense charged against him."

Bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without judicial trial. - The
same case, however, also affirmed that, "Within the meaning of the Constitution, bills of
attainder include bills of pains and penalties.”
Legislative acts, no matter what their form, that apply either to named individuals, or to
easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them
without trial are bills of attainder prohibited by the constitution.
People v. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382 (1972). At issue is the Anti-subversion Act (RA 1700). -
In the case at bar, the lower court declared the law as a bill of attainder because it "tars
and feathers the Communist Party of the Philippines" and thereby congress usurped the
powers of the judge and assumed judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CPP
without any of the forms or safeguards of a judicial trial. As far as individuals accused
under the law were concerned, according to the lower court, "the law is still a bill of
attainder because it has expressly created a presumption of organizational guilt which the
accused can never hope to overthrow."

Velasco, Karmina B.