POLITICAL LAW REVIEW

KA-POLI NOTES (6.) Section 17 – Right against self-incrimination

The SC explained that the concept of limited government

always included the idea that governmental powers are
stopped short at certain intrusions into the private life of the
individual. This is one of the distinctions between an absolute
and limited government.

Do other laws create zones of privacy as well?

Yes, take for example the Civil Code, the Revised Penal Code,
the Intellectual Property Code, the Bank Security Law, the
Anti-Wiretapping Act, and the Data Privacy Act, among
others.

Are recorded lectures of professors, without their permission,

actionable against the anti-wiretapping act?
No, because there are other persons inside the room (or in the
current situation, Zoom video call/chat), and the
communication cannot be considered private.

This reviewer is made out of love and fear for the law. Please
What are the 3 conditions that must be complied with in order
do not hesitate to share this material because sharing is caring
that the government can compel the disclosure of personal
and karma always has its ways. #NoToCrabs
information?
(1.) There must be a compelling interest involved in the
BILL OF RIGHTS disclosure;
(2.) The law must not be narrowly drawn; and
Article III, Section 3. (3.) There must be a rational connection between the
(1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall objective of the law and the disclosure.
be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when
public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. Is right to privacy a constitutional right?
No, it is only a statutory right.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding
section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any What is the essence of right to privacy as per Disini vs.
proceeding. Secretary of Justice?
The right to privacy, or the right to be let alone, was
institutionalized in the 1987 Constitution as a facet of the right
PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION AND CORRESPONDENCE
protected by the guarantee against unreasonable searches
and seizures. But the Court acknowledged its existence as
What are the zones of privacy in the Constitution?
early as 1968 in Morfe v. Mutuc, it ruled that the right to
Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws.
privacy exists independently of its identification with liberty; it
Within these zones, any form of intrusion is impermissible
is in itself fully deserving of constitutional protection.
unless excused by law and in accordance with customary legal
process.
Relevant to any discussion of the right to privacy is the
concept known as the "Zones of Privacy." The Court explained
The meticulous regard we accord to these zones arises not
in "In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas
only from our conviction that the right to privacy is a
Corpus of Sabio v. Senator Gordon" the relevance of these
"constitutional right" and "the right most valued by civilized
zones to the right to privacy: Zones of privacy are recognized
men," but also from our adherence to the Universal
and protected in our laws. Within these zones, any form of
Declaration of Human Rights which mandates that, "no one
intrusion is impermissible unless excused by law and in
shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy"
accordance with customary legal process.
and "everyone has the right to the protection of the law
against such interference or attacks."
What are the two constitutional guarantees create these
zones of privacy?
(1.) Section 1 – Due process
(1.) The right against unreasonable searches and seizures,
(2.) Section 2 – Unreasonable searches and seizures
which is the basis of the right to be let alone, and
(3.) Section 3 – Privacy of communication and
(2.) The right to privacy of communication and
correspondence
correspondence.
(4.) Section 6 – Liberty of abode and travel
(5.) Section 8 – Right to Association

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 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
Note: In assessing the challenge that the State has
impermissibly intruded into these zones of privacy, a court
must determine whether a person has exhibited a reasonable
expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that expectation has
been violated by unreasonable government intrusion.
What are the two tests in order to determine the
reasonableness of expectation of privacy?
(1.) Subjective test – A person has exhibited an actual
expectation of privacy; and
(2.) Objective test – The expectation is one that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable.
Why did Justice Brandeis say that right to privacy is the most
valued right in civilized men?
Because the meticulous regard we accord to these zones
arises not only from our conviction that the right to privacy is
a "constitutional right" and "the right most valued by civilized
men," but also from our adherence to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights which mandates that, "no one
shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy"
and "everyone has the right to the protection of the law
against such interference or attacks."
Two categories in right to privacy?
(1.) Informational Privacy – This is the interest in avoiding
disclosure of personal matters.
 The right not to disclose personal information or
information about private matters; and
 The right to live freely without the surveillance and
the interference.
(2.) Decisional privacy – The independence in making certain
important decisions. Here, the Government cannot
interfere in the decision-making process of an individual.
What did the Vivares case add?
Situational privacy – The information about the location of a
particular person. (According to Atty. Gabriel’s lecture, this can
be considered embraced in informational privacy)
What does “reasonableness of expectation of privacy” mean?
The reasonable expectation of privacy is an element of privacy
law that determines in which places and in which activities a
person has a legal right to privacy. Sometimes referred to as
the "right to be left alone," a person's reasonable expectation
of privacy means that someone who unreasonably and
seriously compromises another's interest in keeping her
affairs from being known can be held liable for that exposure
or intrusion.
POLI RECIT Qs / ARTICLE III, SECTION 3
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Is there a reasonable expectation of privacy in online
networking sites?
➔ US v. Gines-Perez – A person who places a photograph
on the Internet precisely intends to forsake and renounce
all privacy rights to such imagery, particularly under
circumstances such as here, where the Defendant did not
employ protective measures or devices that would have
controlled access to the Web page or the photograph
itself.
➔ United States v. Maxwell – The more open the method of
transmission is, the less privacy one can reasonably
expect. Messages sent to the public at large in the chat
room or e-mail that is forwarded from correspondent to
correspondent loses any semblance of privacy.
Ople vs. Torres
G.R. No. 127685. July 23, 1998
Facts:
➔ Administrative Order No. 308, entitled "Adoption of a
National Computerized Identification Reference
System," was issued by the President on December 12,
1996.
➔ Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of said
Administrative Order on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) it is
a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate; and
(2) its impermissibility intrudes on our citizenry's
protected zone of privacy. Petitioner contends that the
Administrative Order is not a mere administrative order
but a law and, hence, beyond the power of the President
to issue. He further alleges that said Administrative
Order establishes a system of identification that is all-
encompassing in scope, affects the life and liberty of
every Filipino citizen and foreign resident, and more
particularly, violates their right to privacy.
Issue: Whether or not AO 308 violates the constitutionally
mandated right to privacy.
Held: YES. IT CANNOT PASS CONSTITUTIONAL MUSTER AS
AN ADMINISTRATIVE LEGISLATION BECAUSE FACIALLY IT
VIOLATES THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY.
Assuming, arguendo, that A.O. No. 308 need not be the
subject of a law, still it cannot pass constitutional muster as an
administrative legislation because facially it violates the right
to privacy. The essence of privacy is the "right to be let alone.
REASON:
The potential for misuse of the data to be gathered under A.O.
No. 308 cannot be underplayed as the dissenters do.
Pursuant to said administrative order, an individual must
present his PRN everytime he deals with a government agency
to avail of basic services and security. His transactions with the
government agency will necessarily be recorded — whether it
be in the computer or in the documentary file of the agency.
The individual's file may include his transactions for loan
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
availments, income tax returns, statement of assets and
liabilities, reimbursements for medication, hospitalization, etc.
The more frequent the use of the PRN, the better the chance
of building a huge and formidable information base through
the electronic linkage of the files. The data may be gathered
for gainful and useful government purposes; but the existence
of this vast reservoir of personal information constitutes a
covert invitation to misuse, a temptation that may be too
great for some of our authorities to resist.
TO GUARD AGAINST LEAKAGE OF INFORMATION
Well to note, the computer linkage gives other government
agencies access to the information. Yet, there are no controls
to guard against leakage of information. When the access
code of the control programs of the particular computer
system is broken, an intruder, without fear of sanction or
penalty, can make use of the data for whatever purpose, or
worse, manipulate the data stored within the system.
The lack of proper safeguards in this regard of A.O. No. 308
may interfere with the individual's liberty of abode and travel
by enabling authorities to track down his movement; it may
also enable unscrupulous persons to access confidential
information and circumvent the right against self-
incrimination; it may pave the way for "fishing expeditions" by
government authorities and evade the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
THE USE OF BIOMETRICS AND COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY
DOES NOT ASSURE THE INDIVIDUAL OF A REASONABLE
EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY.
We reject the argument of the Solicitor General that an
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard
to the National ID and the use of biometrics technology as it
stands on quicksand.
The reasonableness of a person's expectation of privacy
depends on a two- part test: (1) whether by his conduct, the
individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2)
whether this expectation is one that society recognizes a
reasonable. The factual circumstances of the case determine
the reasonableness of the expectation. However, other factors,
such as customs, physical surroundings and practices of a
particular activity, may serve to create or diminish this
expectation.
The use of biometrics and computer technology in A.O. No.
308 does not assure the individual of a reasonable expectation
of privacy. As technology advances, the level of reasonably
expected privacy decreases. The measure of protection
granted by the reasonable expectation diminishes as relevant
technology becomes more widely accepted. The security of
the computer data file depends not only on the physical
inaccessibility of the file but also on the advances in hardware
and software computer technology.
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The essence of privacy is the right to be let alone. The right to
privacy is recognized and enshrined in several provisions of
the Constitution.
Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our
laws. Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that
the right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the
Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show
that A. O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state
interest and that it is narrowly drawn. What is not arguable is
the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of A. O. No.
308 which if implemented will put our people's right to
privacy in clear and present danger.
It is debatable whether these interests are compelling enough
to warrant the issuance of A.O. No. 308. BUT WHAT IS NOT
ARGUABLE IS THE BROADNESS, THE VAGUENESS, THE
OVERBREADTH OF A.O. NO. 308 WHICH IF IMPLEMENTED
WILL PUT OUR PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN CLEAR AND
PRESENT DANGER.
The SC rejected the argument of the Solicitor General that an
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard
to the National ID and the use of biometrics technology as it
stands on quicksand.
THE REASONABLENESS OF A PERSON'S EXPECTATION OF
PRIVACY DEPENDS ON A TWO-PART TEST:
(1) Whether by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an
expectation of privacy; and
(2) Whether this expectation is one that society recognizes
as reasonable. The factual circumstances of the case
determine the reasonableness of the expectation.
However, other factors, such as customs, physical
surroundings and practices of a particular activity, may serve
to create or diminish this expectation. The use of biometrics
and computer technology in A.O. No. 308 does not assure the
individual of a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Lastly, the Solicitor General urges the SC to validate A.O. No.
308's abridgment of the right of privacy by using the rational
relationship test. He stressed that the purposes of A.O. No.
308 are:
(1) To streamline and speed up the implementation of basic
government services,
(2) Eradicate fraud by avoiding duplication of services, and
(3) Generate population data for development planning.
He concludes that these purposes justify the incursions into
the right to privacy for the means are rationally related to the
end. The SC was not impressed by the argument.
In declaring the Administrative Order null and void for being
unconstitutional, the Supreme Court held that the
Administrative Order involves a subject that is not appropriate
to be covered by said administrative order. An administrative
order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
specific aspects in the administrative operation of
government. It must be in harmony with the law and should
be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying
out the legislative policy.
Doctrine: The essence of privacy is the right to be let alone.
The right to privacy is recognized and enshrined in several
provisions of the Constitution. Zones of privacy are likewise
recognized and protected in our laws. Unlike the dissenters,
we prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a
fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is
the burden of the government to show that A. O. No. 308 is
justified by some compelling state interest and that it is
narrowly drawn. What is not arguable is the broadness, the
vagueness, the overbreadth of A. O. No. 308 which if
implemented will put our people's right to privacy in clear and
present danger.
Assuming, arguendo, that A.O. No. 308 need not be the
subject of a law, still it cannot pass constitutional muster as an
administrative legislation because facially it violates the right
to privacy. The essence of privacy is the "right to be let alone.
REASON:
The potential for misuse of the data to be gathered under A.O.
No. 308 cannot be underplayed as the dissenters do. Pursuant
to said administrative order, an individual must present his
PRN everytime he deals with a government agency to avail of
basic services and security. His transactions with the
government agency will necessarily be recorded — whether it
be in the computer or in the documentary file of the agency.
There were no controls provided therein
Is there a constitutional right to privacy?
No.
So, are they only statutory?
No. There is no constitutional right to privacy means that
there is no single provision that guarantees the entire scope
of privacy.
In this case, the SC discussed that there are zones of privacy.
What are the constitutional provisions that create zones of
privacy?
1. Section 1 – Due process
2. Section 2 – Unreasonable searches and seizures
3. Section 3 – Privacy of communication and
correspondence
4. Section 6 – Liberty of abode and travel
5. Section 8 – Right to Association
6. Section 17 – Right against self-incrimination
The SC explained that the concept of limited government
always included the idea that governmental powers are
stopped short at certain intrusions into the private life of the
individual. This is one of the distinctions between an absolute
and limited government.
POLI RECIT Qs / ARTICLE III, SECTION 3
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What is the two-part test in determining the reasonable
expectation of privacy?
1. Subjective test – a person has exhibited an actual
expectation of privacy; and
2. Objective test – the expectation is one that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable.
According to the public respondent, there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy on transactions with the government,
because under the National ID system, information about
transactions of one individual to various government agencies
may be accessed by the processor of the information. There is
no expectation of privacy insofar as this information is
concerned. Did the SC agree?
Even for transactions with the government, individuals also
have a reasonable expectation of privacy. In that regard, the
government must show that information that they process or
that they obtain from individuals must be protected. The SC
said that there are 3 conditions that must be complied with in
order that the government can compel the disclosure of
personal information, which are:
(4.) There must be a compelling interest involved in the
disclosure;
(5.) The law must not be narrowly drawn; and
(6.) There must be a rational connection between the
objective of the law and the disclosure.
Disini vs. Secretary of Justice
G.R. No. 203335. February 11, 2014
Facts:
➔ These consolidated petitions seek to declare several
provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) 10175, the Cybercrime
Prevention Act of 2012, unconstitutional and void.
➔ The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use of
the cyberspace. Because linking with the internet opens
up a user to communications from others, the ill-
motivated can use the cyberspace for committing theft
by hacking into or surreptitiously accessing his bank
account or credit card or defrauding him through false
representations. The wicked can use the cyberspace, too,
for illicit trafficking in sex or for exposing to pornography
guileless children who have access to the internet. For
this reason, the government has a legitimate right to
regulate the use of cyberspace and contain and punish
wrongdoings.
➔ Section 4 (b) (3) provides:
Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. — The following
acts constitute the offense of cybercrime
punishable under this Act:
xxx xxx xxx
b) Computer-related Offenses:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Computer-related Identity Theft. —
The intentional acquisition, use, misuse, transfer,
possession, alteration, or deletion of identifying
information belonging to another, whether natural
or juridical, without right: Provided: that if no
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
damage has yet been caused, the penalty Further, petitioners fear that Section 4 (b) (3) violates the
imposable shall be one (1) degree lower. freedom of the press in that journalists would be hindered
➔ Petitioners claim that Section 4 (b) (3) violates the from accessing the unrestricted user account of a person in
constitutional rights to due process and to privacy and the news to secure information about him that could be
correspondence, and transgresses the freedom of the published. But this is not the essence of identity theft that the
press. law seeks to prohibit and punish. Evidently, the theft of
identity information must be intended for an illegitimate
Issue: W/N Section 4 (b) (3) violates the constitutional rights purpose. Moreover, acquiring and disseminating information
to due process and to privacy and correspondence made public by the user himself cannot be regarded as a form
of theft.
Held: No. Relevant to any discussion of the right to privacy is
the concept known as the "Zones of Privacy." The Court
Contested Provision /
explained in "In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ Court Ruling:
Petitioner’s Contention
of Habeas Corpus of Sabio v. Senator Gordon" the relevance
of these zones to the right to privacy: CONSTITUTIONAL.
Court finds nothing in
Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. Section 4 (a) (1) on Illegal Section 4 (a) (1) that calls
Within these zones, any form of intrusion is impermissible
Access. for the application of the
unless excused by law and in accordance with customary legal Section 4. Cybercrime strict scrutiny standard
process. The meticulous regard we accord to these zones Offenses. — The following since no fundamental
arises not only from our conviction that the right to privacy is acts constitute the offense freedom, like speech, is
a "constitutional right" and "the right most valued by civilized of cybercrime punishable involved in punishing what
men," but also from our adherence to the Universal under this Act: is essentially a
Declaration of Human Rights which mandates that, "no one
(a) Offenses against the condemnable act —
shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy" confidentiality, integrity accessing the computer
and "everyone has the right to the protection of the law and availability of system of another without
against such interference or attacks."
computer data and right.
systems:
Two constitutional guarantees create these zones of privacy: (1) Illegal Access. — The Ethical hackers evaluate the
(a) the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, access to the whole or any target system's security and
which is the basis of the right to be let alone, and (b) the right part of a computer system report back to the owners
to privacy of communication and correspondence. without right. the vulnerabilities they
found in it and give
In assessing the challenge that the State has impermissibly Petitioners of course fear instructions for how these
intruded into these zones of privacy, a court must determine that this section will can be remedied.
whether a person has exhibited a reasonable expectation of jeopardize the work of
privacy and, if so, whether that expectation has been violated
ethical hackers, Besides, a client's
by unreasonable government intrusion.
professionals who employ engagement of an ethical
tools and techniques used hacker requires an
The usual identifying information regarding a person includes by criminal hackers but agreement between them
his name, his citizenship, his residence address, his contact
would neither damage the as to the extent of the
number, his place and date of birth, the name of his spouse if
target systems nor steal search, the methods to be
any, his occupation, and similar data. The law punishes those information. Petitioners used, and the systems to be
who acquire or use such identifying information without right, contend that Section 4 (a) tested. This is referred to as
implicitly to cause damage. Petitioners simply fail to show (1) fails to meet the strict the "get out of jail free
how government effort to curb computer-related identity scrutiny standard required card." Since the ethical
theft violates the right to privacy and correspondence as well of laws that interfere with hacker does his job with
as the right to due process of law. the fundamental rights of prior permission from the
the people and should client, such permission
Also, the charge of invalidity of this section based on the
thus be struck down. would insulate him from
overbreadth doctrine will not hold water since the specific the coverage of Section 4
conducts proscribed do not intrude into guaranteed freedoms (a) (1).
like speech. Clearly, what this section regulates are specific
actions: the acquisition, use, misuse or deletion of personal Section 4 (a) (3) on Data CONSTITUTIONAL.
identifying data of another. There is no fundamental right to Interference. Section 4 (a) (3) does not
acquire another's personal data. (3) Data Interference. — encroach on protected
The intentional or reckless freedoms at all. It simply

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alteration, damaging,
deletion or deterioration
of computer data,
electronic document, or
electronic data message,
without right, including
the introduction or
transmission of viruses.
Petitioners claim that
Section 4 (a) (3) suffers
from overbreadth in that,
while it seeks to
discourage data
interference, it intrudes
into the area of protected
speech and expression,
creating a chilling and
deterrent effect on these
guaranteed freedoms.
Section 4 (a) (6) on Cyber-
squatting.
Petitioners claim that
Section 4 (a) (6) or cyber-
squatting violates the
equal protection clause in
that, not being narrowly
tailored, it will cause a user
using his real name to
suffer the same fate as
those who use aliases or
take the name of another
in satire, parody, or any
other literary device.
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
punishes what essentially is UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
a form of vandalism, the act But, firstly, the government
of willfully destroying presents no basis for
without right the things holding that unsolicited
that belong to others. electronic ads reduce the
"efficiency of computers."
All penal laws, like the
cybercrime law, have of Secondly, people, before
course an inherent chilling the arrival of the age of
effect, or the fear of computers, have already
possible prosecution that Section 4 (c) (3) of the been receiving such
hangs on the heads of Cybercrime Law penalizes unsolicited ads by mail.
citizens who are minded to the transmission of These have never been
step beyond the boundaries unsolicited commercial outlawed as nuisance since
of what is proper. But to communications, also people might have interest
prevent the State from known as "spam." The in such ads. What matters is
legislating criminal laws Government, represented that the recipient has the
because they instill such by the Solicitor General, option of not opening or
kind of fear is to render the points out that unsolicited reading these mail ads. That
state powerless in commercial is true with spams. Their
addressing and penalizing communications or spams recipients always have the
socially harmful conduct. are a nuisance that wastes option to delete or not to
Here, the chilling effect that the storage and network read them.
results in paralysis is an capacities of internet
illusion since Section 4 (a) service providers, reduces To prohibit the
(3) clearly describes the evil the efficiency of commerce transmission of unsolicited
that it seeks to punish and and technology, and ads would deny a person
creates no tendency to interferes with the owner's the right to read his emails,
intimidate the free exercise peaceful enjoyment of his even unsolicited
of one's constitutional property. commercial ads addressed
rights. to him. Commercial speech
is a separate category of
CONSTITUTIONAL. speech which is not
But there is no real accorded the same level of
difference whether he uses protection as that given to
"Julio Gandolfo" which other constitutionally
happens to be his real guaranteed forms of
name or use it as a pseudo- expression but is
name for it is the evil nonetheless entitled to
purpose for which he uses protection.
the name that the law
condemns. The law is
Doctrine: Two constitutional guarantees create these zones of
reasonable in penalizing
privacy: (a) the right against unreasonable searches and
him for acquiring the
seizures, which is the basis of the right to be let alone, and (b)
domain name in bad faith
the right to privacy of communication and correspondence.
to profit, mislead, destroy
In assessing the challenge that the State has impermissibly
reputation, or deprive
intruded into these zones of privacy, a court must determine
others who are not ill-
whether a person has exhibited a reasonable expectation of
motivated of the rightful
privacy and, if so, whether that expectation has been violated
opportunity of registering
by unreasonable government intrusion.
the same. The challenge to
the constitutionality of
Section 4 (a) (6) on ground
of denial of equal
protection is baseless.
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 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
Vivares vs. St. Theresa’s College
G.R. No. 202666. September 29, 2014
Facts:
➔ Julia Daluz and Julienne Suzara, and their other friends
took pictures of themselves clad only in their
undergarments. These pictures were uploaded by Angela
Tan on her Facebook profile.
➔ Mylene Escudero, a computer teacher at STC, learned
from her students that some seniors at STC posed
pictures of themselves online, depicting themselves from
the waist up, dressed only in brassieres.
➔ Escudero, then, asked her students if they knew who the
girls in the photo were. Her students identified them as
Julia, Julienne, and Chole Taboada.
➔ Using STC’s computers, Escudero’s students logged in to
their respective personal accounts and showed her the
photos of the identified students, which include:
 Julia and Julienne drinking hard liquor and
smoking cigarettes inside a bar; and
 Julia and Julienne along the streets of Cebu
wearing articles of clothing that show virtually the
entirety of their black brassieres.
➔ Escudero’s students claimed that there were times when
access to or the availability of the identified students’
photos were not confined to the girls’ friend list—or
basically was for public consumption.
➔ Escudero reported the matter to STC’s Discipline-in-
Charge for appropriate action. Following an
investigation, STC found the identified students to have
deported themselves in a manner proscribed by the
school’s student handbook.
➔ Julia, Julienne, Angela and the other students in the
pictures claimed that they were castigated and verbally
abused by the STC officials present during the
conference. What is more, they were barred from joining
the commencement exercises.
➔ Angela’s mother filed a petition for injunction and
damages, and further prayed that the students be
enjoined from implementing the sanction that precluded
the students from joining the commencement exercises.
➔ The RTC issued a TRO allowing the students to attend
the graduation ceremony, to which STC filed a motion
for reconsideration. Despite the TRO, STC barred the
sanctioned students.
Issue: W/N the right to privacy of the students were violated.
Held: No. Facebook is armed with different privacy tools
designed to regulate the accessibility of a user’s profile, as
well as the information uploaded by the user. A Facebook user
can regulate the visibility and accessibility by selecting his or
her desired privacy setting as these tools are designed to set
up barriers to broaden or limit the visibility of his or her
specific profile content from another user’s point of view.
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Without these privacy settings, the respondents’ contention
that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in Facebook
would, in context, be correct. However, it was not the case.
It is through the availability of said privacy tools that many
social media users are said to have subjective expectation that
only those whom they grant access to their profile will view
the information that only those to whom they grant access to
their profile will view the information they post or upload.
This, however, does not mean that any Facebook user
automatically has a protected expectation of privacy in all of
his or her Facebook activities.
In this case, it was insisted that Escudero intruded upon the
children’s Facebook accounts, downloaded copies of the
pictures, and subsequently showed them to the Disciplinary
Committee. To them, this was a breach of the minors’ privacy
since their Facebook accounts were allegedly in a “only
friends” setting. However, is was rebutted that there were
times that these photos were for public consumption as they
were not specifically hidden from other Facebook users, which
are not their friends.
Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is
“public”, it can be surmised that these can be viewed by
everyone on Facebook. If such were the case, they cannot
invoke the protection attached to the right to informational
privacy.
Doctrine: A profile, or even a post, with visibility set at “Friends
Only” cannot easily, more so automatically, be said to be “very
private.”
US v. Gines-Perez – A person who places a photograph on the
Internet precisely intends to forsake and renounce all privacy
rights to such imagery, particularly under circumstances such
as here, where the Defendant did not employ protective
measures or devices that would have controlled access to the
Web page or the photograph itself.
United States v. Maxwell – The more open the method of
transmission is, the less privacy one can reasonably expect.
Messages sent to the public at large in the chat room or e-
mail that is forwarded from correspondent to correspondent
loses any semblance of privacy.
What did Alan Westin say about privacy and freedom?
The individual’s desire for privacy is never absolute, since
participation in society is an equally powerful desire. Thus,
each individual is continually engaged in a personal
adjustment process in which he balances the desire for privacy
with the desire for disclosure and communication of himself
to others, in light of the environmental conditions and social
norms set by the society in which he lives.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
What is the writ of habeas data?
The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person
whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or
threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public o cial
or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in
the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information
regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of
the aggrieved party. 11 It is an independent and summary
remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor,
information, and freedom of information of an individual, and
to provide a forum to enforce one's right to the truth and to
informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person's right to
control information regarding oneself, particularly in
instances in which such information is being collected
through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.
What is the nature and/or essence of the writ of habeas data?
It is aimed to protect an individual’s right to informational
privacy, among others. However, the writ will not issue on the
basis merely of an alleged unauthorized access to information
about a person. Availment of the writ requires the existence
of a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and
the right to life, liberty, or security on the other. Further, it was
designed to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the
information age.
What are the three strands of the right to privacy as per Chief
Justice Puno?
(1.) Locational or situational privacy;
(2.) Informational privacy – The right of individuals to control
information about themselves.
(3.) Decisional privacy.
What does “engage”, in the context of this case, mean?
To “engage” in something is different from undertaking a
business endeavor. To “engage” means “to do or take part in
something.” It does not necessarily mean that the activity
must be done in pursuit of a business. What matters is that
the person or entity must be gathering, collecting or storing
said data or information about the aggrieved party or his or
her family. Whether such undertaking carries the element of
regularity, as when one pursues a business, and is in the
nature of a personal endeavor, for any other reason or even
for no reason at all, is immaterial and such will not prevent the
writ from getting to said person or entity.
How does this case connect to Belo-Henares vs. Guevarra?
Atty. Guevarra posed incriminating statements against Dra.
Belo. However, the former suggested that these were private
posts and that was only meant for his Facebook friends. But
the Supreme Court disagreed and anchored the same to the
abovementioned case of Vivares vs. CA. The setup of
Facebook is different because even if a statement is made only
to friends, that friend has also several friends who also has
several friends. Basically, in other words, mabilis kumalat ang
chismis. The Supreme Court said that in order to be entitled
to the right to privacy, the actor must show that he has
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exhibited an expectation of privacy and that expectation of
privacy should be considered as reasonable.
Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 107383. February 20, 1996
Facts:
➔ Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of Dr. Alfredo Martin.
➔ Zulueta entered the clinic of his husband to which was
witnessed by her mother, driver, and her husband’s
secretary.
➔ Zulueta forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her
husband’s clinic, and took 157 documents consisting of
private correspondence; greeting cards, cancelled
checks, diaries, passport, and photographs between her
husband and his alleged paramours.
➔ The documents were seized as evidence in a case for
legal separation and for disqualification from the
practice of medicine, which Zulueta filed against Dr.
Martin.
➔ Dr. Martin brought this action for recovery of the
documents and papers, declaring himself as the capital
and exclusive owner of the abovementioned properties.
Issue: W/N the documents were inadmissible as evidence.
Held: Yes. The constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy
of communication and correspondence to be inviolable" is no
less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself
aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the party against
whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced.
The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if
there is a "lawful order from a court or when public safety or
order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation
of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible
"for any purpose in any proceeding."
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any
one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other
and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital
infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed
his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the
constitutional protection is ever available to him or her. The
law ensures absolute freedom of communication between the
spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife
may testify for or against the other without the consent of the
affected spouse while the marriage subsists. 6 Neither may be
examined without the consent of the other as to any
communication received in confidence by one from the other
during the marriage, save for specified exceptions.
Freedom of communication is one thing; quite another is a
compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the
other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that
each owes to the other.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
Doctrine: The intimacies between husband and wife do not
justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets
of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence
of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does
not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an
individual and the constitutional protection is ever available
to him or her.
Compare this case to Martin vs. Felix Jr.
the acquittal of Atty. Felix, Jr. in the administrative case
amounts to no more than a declaration that his use of the
documents and papers for the purpose of securing Dr.
Martin's admission as to their genuineness and authenticity
did not constitute a violation of the injunctive order of the trial
court. By no means does the decision in that case establish
the admissibility of the documents and papers in question.
Atty. Felix was acquitted only because, at the time he used the
documents and papers, enforcement of the order of the trial
court was temporarily restrained by this Court. The TRO issued
by this Court was eventually lifted as the petition for certiorari
led by petitioner against the trial court's order was dismissed
and, therefore, the prohibition against the further use of the
documents and papers became effective again.
Is there an exception to Article III, Section 3?
Yes, the only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution
is if there is a "lawful order from a court or when public safety
or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law."
Privacy under Section 2 Privacy under Section 3
Cannot be applied against Extends even to private
private intrusions. intrusions.
Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 93833. September 28, 1995
Facts:
➔ A civil case for damages was filed by Petitioner Socorro
D. Ramirez alleging that the private respondent, Ester S.
Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly
vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and
furious mood" and in a manner offensive to the
petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals,
good customs and public policy."
➔ In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim
transcript of the event. The transcript was culled from a
tape recording of the confrontation made by the
petitioner.
➔ As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and
alleging that the said act of secretly taping the
confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a
criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City for violation of Republic Act 4200, Petitioner filed a
Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a
violation of R.A. 4200.
➔ In an order May 3, 1989, the trial court granted the
Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner that 1) the
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facts charged do not constitute an offense under R.A.
4200; and that 2) the violation punished by R.A. 4200
refers to the taping of a communication by a person
other than a participant to the communication.
Issue: Whether or not the applicable provision of Republic Act
4200 does not apply to the taping of a private conversation
by one of the parties to the conversation.
Held: THE ANTI-WIRE TAPPING LAW (R.A. 4200), MAKES NO
DISTINCTION AS TO WHETHER THE PARTY SOUGHT TO BE
PENALIZED OUGHT TO BE A PARTY OTHER THAN OR
DIFFERENT FROM THOSE INVOLVED IN THE PRIVATE
COMMUNICATION.
Section 1 of R.A. 4200entitled, "An Act to Prohibit and Penalize
Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private
Communication and Other Purposes," clearly and
unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized
by all the parties to any private communication to secretly
record such communication by means of a tape recorder.
The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought
to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than
or different from those involved in private communication.
The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to
make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier
"any." Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly
concluded, "even a (person) privy to a communication who
records his private conversation with another without the
knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator" under this
provision of R.A. 4200.
THE NATURE OF CONVERSATION, IMMATERIAL TO A
VIOLATION.
(a.) The nature of the conversation is immaterial to a
violation of the statute.
(b.) The substance of the same need not be specifically
alleged in the information.
What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing,
intercepting or recording private communications by means
of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that
an individual made a secret recording of a private
communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to
constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200.
As the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before
the respondent court: "Nowhere (in the said law) is it required
that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of
the conversation, as well as its communication to a third
person should be professed."
"PRIVATE COMMUNICATION"
Petitioner's contention that the phrase "private
communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include
"private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the
word "communication" to a point of absurdity.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
The word communicate comes from the Latin word
communicate, meaning "to share or to impart." In its ordinary
signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or
imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies the "process by
which meaning or thoughts are shared between individuals
through a common system of symbols (as language signs or
gestures)." These definitions are broad enough to include
verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of
"meanings or thoughts" which are likely to include the
emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988,
between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of
the latter's office.
Any doubts about the legislative body's meaning of the
phrase "private communication" are, furthermore, put to rest
by the fact that the terms "conversation" and
"communication" were interchangeably used by Senator
Tañada in his Explanatory Note to the bill, quoted below:
"It has been said that innocent people have nothing to fear
from their conversations being overheard. But this statement
ignores the usual nature of conversations as well as the
undeniable fact that most, if not all, civilized people have
some aspects of their lives they do not wish to expose. Free
conversations are often characterized by exaggerations,
obscenity, agreeable falsehoods, and the expression of anti-
social desires of views not intended to be taken seriously. The
right to the privacy of communication, among others, has
expressly been assured by our Constitution. Needless to state
here, the framers of our Constitution must have recognized
the nature of conversations between individuals and the
significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his
intellect. They must have known that part of the pleasures and
satisfactions of life are to be found in the unaudited, and free
exchange of communication between individuals — free from
every unjustifiable intrusion by whatever means."
In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, a case which dealt
with the issue of telephone wiretapping, we held that the use
of a telephone extension for the purpose of overhearing a
private conversation without authorization did not violate R.A.
4200 because a telephone extension devise was neither
among those "device(s) or arrangement(s)" enumerated
therein , following the principle that "penal statutes must be
construed strictly in favor of the accused."
The instant case turns on a different note, because the
applicable facts and circumstances pointing to a violation of
R.A. 4200 suffer from no ambiguity, and the statute itself
explicitly mentions the unauthorized "recording" of private
communications with the use of tape-recorders as among the
acts punishable.
Doctrine:
➔ THE ANTI-WIRE TAPPING LAW (R.A. 4200), makes no
distinction as to whether the party sought to be
penalized ought to be a party other than or different
from those involved in the private communication.
10
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➔ Section 1 of R.A. 4200entitled, "An Act to Prohibit and
Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of
Private Communication and Other Purposes," clearly
and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not
authorized by all the parties to any private
communication to secretly record such communication
by means of a tape recorder. The nature of the
conversation is immaterial to a violation of the statute.
➔ The word communicate comes from the Latin word
communicate, meaning "to share or to impart." In its
ordinary signification, communication connotes the act
of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies
the "process by which meaning or thoughts are shared
between individuals through a common system of
symbols (as language signs or gestures)." These
definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-
verbal, written or expressive communications of
"meanings or thoughts" which are likely to include the
emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988,
between petitioner and private respondent, in the
privacy of the latter's office.
Supposing the one who secretly recorded the conversation is
one of the parties to the private communication or spoken
word, is that covered by RA 4200?
Yes. RA 4200 states that it shall be unlawful for any person to
secretly record the private communication or spoken word.
The petitioner contends that what happened between her and
the respondent is not a communication. It was a conversation.
According to her, communication is protected, conversation
not included. Did the SC agree?
No. The word communicate comes from the Latin word
signification, which literally means “to share or impart” as in a
conversation, or the process by which meanings or thoughts
are shared between individuals through a common system of
symbols (as language signs or gestures).
Note: During the deliberation of RA 4200, the SC noted that
the terms conversation and communication were used
interchangeably, which means that the intent of the framers
of the law include conversation, not only communication.
Navarro vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 121087. August 26, 1999
Facts:
➔ Stanley Jalbuena and Enrique "Ike" Lingan, who were
reporters, went to the Entertainment City following
reports that it was showing nude dancers. There, as a
scantily clad dancer began to perform a strip act and
removed her brassieres, Jalbuena brought out his
camera and took a picture.
➔ The floor manager, Dante Liquin, with Sioco, a security
guard, approached Jalbuena and demanded to know
why he took a picture. Jalbuena replied: "Wala kang
pakialam, because this is my job." Sioco pushed Jalbuena
towards the table as he warned the latter that he would
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
kill him. When Jalbuena saw that Sioco was about to pull
out his gun, he ran out followed by his companions.
➔ Jalbuena and his companions went to the police station.
Three of the policemen on duty, including petitioner
Felipe Navarro, were having drinks in front of the police
station, and they asked Jalbuena and his companions to
join them. Jalbuena declined and went to the desk officer
to report the incident. In a while, Liquin and Sioco arrived
on a motorcycle.
➔ Sioco and Liquin were met by petitioner Navarro who
talked with them in a corner for around fifteen minutes.
Afterwards, petitioner Navarro turned to Jalbuena and,
pushing him to the wall, said to him: "Putang ina,
kinakalaban mo si Kabo Liquin, anak yan ni Kabo Liquin,
hindi mo ba kilala?" Petitioner Navarro then pulled out
his firearm and cocked it, and, pressing it on the face of
Jalbuena, said, "Ano, uutasin na kita?"
➔ At this point, Lingan intervened and said to petitioner
Navarro: "Huwag namang ganyan, pumarito kami para
magpa-blotter, I am here to mediate." Petitioner Navarro
replied: "Walang press, press, mag-sampu pa kayo." He
then turned to Sgt. Añonuevo and told him to make of
record the behavior of Jalbuena and Lingan.
➔ This angered Lingan. The two then had a heated
exchange. Finally, Lingan said: "Masyado kang abusado,
alisin mo yang baril mo at magsuntukan na lang tayo."
Petitioner Navarro replied: "Ah, ganoon?"
➔ As Lingan was about to turn away, petitioner Navarro hit
him with the handle of his pistol above the left eyebrow.
Lingan fell on the floor, blood flowing down his face. He
tried to get up, but petitioner Navarro gave him a fist
blow on the forehead which floored him.
➔ Petitioner Navarro turned to Jalbuena and said: "Kita mo
yan ha, buhay kang testigo, si Ike Lingan ang
naghamon." He said to Sgt. Añonuevo: "Ilagay mo diyan
sa blotter, sa harap ni Alex Sioco at Dante Liquin, na si
Ike Lingan ang naghamon." He then poked his gun at the
right temple of Jalbuena and made him sign his name on
the blotter. Lingan died from his injuries.
➔ Unknown to petitioner Navarro, Jalbuena was able to
record on tape the exchange between petitioner and the
deceased.
➔ Petitioner Navarro was charged with Homicide.
Issue: W/N the tape recorded by Jalbuena is admissible in view
of R.A. No. 4200, which prohibits wire tapping
It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or
not in the act or acts penalized in the next preceding sentence,
to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record,
or any other such record, or copies thereof, of any
communication or spoken word secured either before or after
the effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this
law; or to replay the same for any other person or persons; or
to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in
writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete
or partial, to any other person: Provided, That the use of such
record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal
investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section 3
hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition.
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the
existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of
the same or any part thereof, or any information therein
contained obtained or secured by any person in violation of
the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in
evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or
administrative hearing or investigation.
Thus, the law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or
recording of private communications. Since the exchange
between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its
tape recording is not prohibited. Nor is there any question
that it was duly authenticated. A voice recording is
authenticated by the testimony of a witness (1) that he
personally recorded the conversation; (2) that the tape played
in court was the one he recorded; and (3) that the voices on
the tape are those of the persons such are claimed to belong.
In the instant case, Jalbuena testified that he personally made
the voice recording; that the tape played in court was the one
he recorded; and that the speakers on the tape were petitioner
Navarro and Lingan. A sufficient foundation was thus laid for
the authentication of the tape presented by the prosecution.
P.S. Navarro was convicted by the SC of Homicide.
Doctrine: RA 4200 prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or
recording of private communications. Since the exchange
between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its
tape recording is not prohibited.

Held: YES. It is admissible in evidence. R.A. No. 4200 provides:

SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being
authorized by all the parties to any private communication or
spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other
device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or
record such communication or spoken word by using a device
commonly known as a Dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however
otherwise described:

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