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Military Strategy of Great Powers: Managing Power Asymmetry and Structural Change in The Twenty-First Century
Military Strategy of Great Powers: Managing Power Asymmetry and Structural Change in The Twenty-First Century
MILITARY STRATEGY OF
GREAT POWERS
MANAGING POWER ASYMMETRY AND STRUCTURAL
CHANGE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
Typeset in TimesNewRoman
by MPS Limited, Dehradun
Contents
List of illustrations vi
Acknowledgements viii
List of abbreviations ix
Index 253
List of Illustrations
Figures
Tables
We are indebted to our senior editor, Andrew Humphrys, and to our editorial
assistant, Bethany Lund-Yates, for once again wholeheartedly providing their
support for our project. We would also like to express our gratitude to our
colleague, Dr Malin Karlsson, for carefully reading initial drafts of the
manuscript and providing suggestions for improvements. Thank you!
Abbreviations
i. How have the defence strategies of the US developed during the twenty-
first century and do US strategic choices correspond to expectations
drawn from BPT and PTT?
ii. How have China and Russia adjusted their defence strategies in
response to the strategies of the US and changes in the distribution of
power in the international system during the twenty-first century? To
what extent do the strategic choices of these two potentially revisionist
‘secondary major powers’ correspond to the expectations drawn from
BPT and PTT?
iii. How have the UK and France adjusted their defence strategies in
response to the strategies of the US and changes in the distribution of
power in the international system during the twenty-first century? To
what extent do the strategic choices of these two potentially status quo
oriented ‘secondary major powers’ correspond to the expectations
drawn from BPT and PTT?
iv. How do the strategic choices among the five system-determining states
interact and affect stability and change in the international system?
In the next two chapters, we present a framework for analysing the align-
ment and military strategies of great powers in unipolar systems. In the
following three empirical chapters, we systematically map and analyse the
strategies these states have pursued during the twenty-first century using the
method of structured focused comparison based on our definition of mili-
tary strategy. The first empirical chapter focuses on the alignment and
military strategies of the sole superpower. Here, we will present an overview
of the strategies pursued by the three different US administrations during
the twenty-first century. The second chapter focuses on China and Russia,
two potentially revisionist great powers, which are more likely than the
other two great powers to perceive the present unipolar order as a threat to
their great power ambitions and autonomy. The third chapter focuses on the
strategies of France and the UK, two leading Western powers that fought
together with the US in the First (WWI) and Second World War (WWII).
During the Cold War, the two states differed in their support to US lea-
dership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Moreover, they
have mostly displayed different ambitions regarding Europe, with France
generally promoting a stronger and more independent Europe, and the UK
protecting the transatlantic link and using its ‘special relationship’ with the
US to promote its influence in global affairs. However, despite these
The diversity of great powers’ strategies 5
differences between the two Western great powers, both states have gen-
erally supported the post-Cold War order established in the 1990s.
Nevertheless, this does not mean that they will always support the US.
Actions that threaten to undermine multilateral institutions perceived as
important for promoting their national interest may provoke balancing
strategies from these status quo-oriented states. In the concluding chapter,
the results from our empirical chapters are summarised and form a basis for
an analysis of how the different strategies of the sole superpower and the
secondary great powers collectively affect the stability of the present uni-
polar system.
Notes
1 The term ‘system determining states’ was introduced by Robert Keohane in an
article from 1969. Keohane used this term to create a separate category for the first
ranked states whose number determined the polarity of a specific international
system, that is, if the system is uni-, bi- or multipolar (Keohane 1969). Following
Barry Buzan (2004), we will extend the term system determining states to include
both superpowers (which are still seen as determining the general polarity of the
international system) and great powers. The inclusion of different categories of
major powers makes it possible to analyse changes in the distribution of power in
the international system that do not include a change in polarity, for instance,
China’s rise to the status of a potential superpower. For a similar conception of
the present international system, see Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth
(2016a; 2016b).
2 For some of the more recent contributions, see Layne (2012), Nye (2012; 2015),
Wohlforth (2012), Brooks and Wohlforth (2016a; 2016b) and Mearsheimer (2018).
For a survey of the debate, see Monteiro (2014:7–13).
3 Admittedly, there are some theoretically informed studies on how competing
major powers may adjust their strategies for security or influence to manage ne-
gative power asymmetries (see Buzan 2004; Walt 2005; 2009). However, these
studies have not systematically explored and compared the actual strategies pur-
sued by the leading states. Additionally, there are a few examples of comparative
empirical research on strategic responses from both major powers and middle
powers, but this research is not primarily directed towards alignment and military
strategies (see Gilley and O’Neil 2014; Balzacq et al. 2019).
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Brooks, Stephen and William Wohlforth (2016b). America Abroad. Oxford: Oxford
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Buzan, Barry (2004). The United States and the Great Powers. Cambridge: Polity.
Edström, Håkan, Dennis Gyllensporre and Jacob Westberg (2019). Military Strategy
of Small States. Abingdon: Routledge.
6 The diversity of great powers’ strategies
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Comparative Strategy, Volume 39, Issue 2.
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2 Exploring great power strategies
Introduction
The study of International Relations (IR) has always been sensitive to the
overall developments in international politics. IR was introduced as a se
parate academic subject at the end of World War I with the establishment of
the Woodrow Wilson Chair of International Politics and the Department of
International Politics at the University of Aberystwyth in 1919.1 The new
academic discipline was founded to advance knowledge that could con
tribute to avoiding new wars. The solutions that the new discipline came up
with were influenced by ideas that we today would label liberal IR theory or
idealism. The early development of IR research mirrored the successes and
failures of the League of Nations and the political developments in Europe.
As noted by Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen, liberal idealism was not ‘a
good intellectual guide to international relations in the 1930s’ (Jackson and
Sørensen 2007:36).
In the early Cold War era, realism established itself as the dominant
theoretical perspective, focusing on questions related to the competition
between the two superpowers, nuclear deterrence and the stability of the
bipolar order (Waltz 1979; Morgenthau 2006; Waltz 1979; Schelling 2008).
Following the economic crisis in the 1970s, questions relating to
International Political Economy (IPE), interdependence and international
regimes received increased attention, producing a debate between the ‘in
tellectual siblings’ neorealism and neoliberalism (Keohane 1984; Gilpin
1987; Keohane and Nye 2001; Keohane 1984; Gilpin 1987; Lamy 2005).
During the final decade of the Cold War, criticism against structural rea
lism2, and especially its leading theorist Kenneth Waltz, began to grow
(Keohane 1986). After the unexpected and unforeseen ending of the Cold
War, this critique exploded.
In the 1990s, several competing approaches such as constructivism, cri
tical theory, post-structuralism and feminism challenged structural realism
on both epistemological and ontological grounds by questioning its state-
centrism and ‘positivist’ focus on the distribution of material capacities.3
Reflecting on how IR theory and events in international politics have
DOI: 10.4324/9781003157113-2
8 Exploring great power strategies
interacted in previous eras, we expect that realism will find a more fertile
breeding ground in the present post-Cold War era as compared to the 1990s.
However, it is not equally clear whether it is Waltz’s particular version of
realist theory that needs to be resurrected. Waltz developed his theory to
analyse the stability of bipolar and multipolar systems, and to explain how
the international system generally affects states’ interest and strategies. He
did not address questions related to the unipolar system and ‘real world
strategies’ of specific states (Monteiro 2014:28–30). Moreover, some of his
basic assumptions related to states being ‘like units’, even prevented such
analysis. However, in our opinion, some of the insights of structural realism
are worth rescuing. In this chapter, we will present an analytical framework
that integrates elements of structural realism with theories on status com
petition and hegemonic stability, which are better suited when analysing
strategic choices made by individual states and when explaining why states
pursue different strategies.
In the first section, we discuss some of the basic premises of structural
realism including Waltz’s conceptualisation of the international system and
the debate between defensive and offensive realism. This is followed by a
second subsection focusing on the debate on the stability of unipolar sys
tems. Here we conclude that the disagreement among realist scholars in
dicates that BPT will not be able to provide one answer to the question of
the durability or peacefulness of unipolar systems. Moreover, all partici
pants in the debate on unipolarity seem to admit that the durability and
peacefulness of the system are dependent on the strategic choices of the
leading states. Still, the parsimonious analytical framework originally de
veloped by Waltz provides us with little or no guidance as to why states seem
to pursue different strategies, and the assumption of states being like units
does not help us.
In the second section, we discuss a theoretical perspective that is better
suited for the task of explaining why states pursue different strategies, PTT.
This theory is particularly useful for analysing the dynamics of unipolar
systems since its basic conception of the international system includes one
dominating state interacting with two different categories of states: satisfied
and dissatisfied states. The dominating state and the satisfied states are the
guardians of the status quo, and the dissatisfied states are the potentially
revisionist challengers. PTT presents several hypotheses relating to the
leading powers’ behaviour that contradict some of BPT’s basic assumptions.
In the following subsection, we introduce research on status competition.
This research body act as a complement to PTT in analysing how states’
different position in the present system affect their basic strategic choices.
Finally, we conclude this section by presenting our conceptualisation of the
present international system. Accounting for the change of the distribution
of power in the international system during the first decades of the twenty-
first century, we argue that it is necessary to introduce a distinction between
superpowers and great powers in the definition of the structure of the
Exploring great power strategies 9
international system. Inspired by arguments from Barry Buzan (2004) as
well as from Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth (2016a), we argue that
the present international system should be analysed as a 1+1+3 system, with
the US as the sole superpower, China as the sole emerging potential su
perpower and France, the UK and Russia as the three great powers.
Collectively, these states represent the highest category of the state system,
the ‘system-determining states’.4 Other categories of states that we explored
in previous studies include ‘middle powers’ and ‘small states’ (Edström and
Westberg 2020a; 2020b).
Table 2.2 Indicator of the military capability of six potential system-determining powers
The US 6,877
China 1,956
Russia 712
India 551
The UK 540
France 505
Superpower
(The US)
Emergent
Potential superpower
potential superpower
(none)
(China)
Figure 2.1 The structure of the international system in the present 1+1+3 system.
Exploring great power strategies 33
great powers have several options responding to this stratified structure. To
protect themselves against hegemony (as defensive realism teaches), they
may choose to balance against the unipolar power by means of collective
external balancing. However, some great powers may also (in line with the
balance of threat theory) find that their ‘relative position’ is best protected if
they bandwagon with the less threatening unipolar power. Figure 2.1
Notes
1 Regarding the establishment of the Woodrow Wilson Chair, see the homepage of
the Department of International Politics at Aberystwyth (Aberystwyth
University 2019).
2 It is common to refer to this theoretical tradition as ‘neorealist’ to distinguish this
tradition from an older ‘classical’ or ‘political’ realism (for an overview of the
development of the realist tradition in the twentieth century, see Hollis and Smith
1990; Jackson and Sørensen 2007). We prefer the label ‘structural realism’ be
cause it more clearly expresses the defining feature of this tradition: the focus on
the influence and stability of the structure of the international system. ‘Structural
realism’ is also the label used by the founder of the ‘neorealist’ tradition, Waltz
(2000), and contemporary leading theorists working in this tradition; see
Monteiro (2014) and Mearsheimer (2016).
3 For an early and often cited example on constructivist critique focusing on an
alternative explanation of the peaceful ending of bipolarity and the Cold War, see
Alexander Wendt (1992). Other major early constructivist works focusing on
norms and identity in international relations include Onuf (2013); Finnemore
(1996); Katzenstein (1996) and Wendt’s (1999). One of the most celebrated works
in Critical IR-theory is Andrew Linklater (1998). For an introduction to feminist
IR-theory in the early Post-Cold War era, see Tickner (2001). Two early examples
of major works in post-structural IR theory presenting the most radical episte
mological challenges to realism include Walker (1993) and Campbell (1992).
4 The concept ‘system-determining states’ was introduced by Robert Keohane in
the context of a fourfold typology that focused on the systematic role states’
leaders; see their countries play. The system-determining states were the great
powers whose numbers defined the polarity of the system (Keohane 1969).
5 For a prominent work in this tradition, see Gilpin (1987).
6 In the terminology we introduce in the section on alignment strategies of sec
ondary great powers, the strategies of ‘leash-slipping’ and ‘soft balancing’ offer
alternative ways to classify the French strategy.
7 In our extended conceptual toolbox, we would probably classify the Japanese
strategy as an example of ‘regional balancing’ instead (through the effort to
promote the military presence of a friendly great power to balance one or more
threatening great powers). In any case, we agree that neither Germany nor Japan
can be said to be balancing against the US with military means.
8 For a summary of these IR debates see, for example, Keohane (1986),Hollis and
Smith (1990) and Jackson and Sørensen (2007).
9 For further discussion on status as a basic interest of states and status compe
tition as an alternative or complementary source for competition and conflicts in
international relations, see Schweller (1999), Larson and Shevchenko (2010),
Volgy et al. (2011), Wohlforth (2011), Thompson (2014) and Renshon (2017).
10 This more inclusive definition of the structure of the international system is in
spired by Barry Buzan’s conceptualisation of the system structure having a ‘1+X
34 Exploring great power strategies
structure’: one superpower (the US) and the four great powers the EU, China,
Japan and Russia (Buzan 2004:69).
11 The argument in the article is further developed in Brooks and Wohlforth
(2016b). For their other works on this issue, see Wohlforth (1999);Brooks and
Wohlforth (2008; 2011).
12 Brooks and Wohlforth base their argument on this aspect of military power on
Barry Posen’s (2003) influential study. Brooks and Wohlforth’s indicators for
command of the commons included nuclear-powered submarines, aircraft car
riers, cruisers and destroyers, principal amphibious ships, heavy unmanned aerial
vehicles, fourth- and fifth-generation tactical aircraft, attack helicopters, military
satellites and various transport aircraft.
13 Admittedly, in efforts to create a common capability to conduct military op
erations and civilian missions, the EU has introduced three permanent political
and bureaucratic bodies: the EU Political and Security Committee (EUPSC), the
EU Military Committee (EUMC) and the EU Military Staff (EUMS). However,
none of these institutions is supranational. Furthermore, in contrast to NATO,
the EU has not established a permanent Operations Headquarters (OHQ) and –
despite the ambitions regarding collective defence and security in Article 42 in the
Treaty of Lisbon – the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) does not
include territorial defence planning (Edström and Gyllensporre 2014:48–51).
14 According to media reports in January 2018, one out of two Indian SSBNs had
been out of service for ten months after suffering flood damage. The second
SSBN was launched in November 2017. However, construction work has re
portedly already begun on a third and fourth SSBN with expected launch dates in
2020 and 2022 (SIPRI 2018:271).
15 One possible objection to this is that the composition of UNSC reflects the dis
tribution of power in the early decades of the Cold War, rather than the status of
the great powers in the current system. However, the mandate of the UNSC and
the special rights of the permanent five have remained intact and in matters re
lated to international security, the UNSC is still the most prestigious decision-
making institution.
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3 Operationalising the dependent
variable
Introduction
In Theory of International Politics, Waltz argued that states must have their
survival as the most fundamental end. The means for self-preservation falls
into two categories: (i) internal efforts, that is, actions to increase the state’s
military strength and resilience; and (ii) external efforts, that is, actions to
strengthen the own military alliance and/or weaken the opposing ditto
(Waltz 1979:168). Our definition of defence strategy combines these two
categories. Defence strategy is defined as interconnected ideas on how po-
litically defined strategic ends should be achieved through a combination of
alignment strategies and suitable strategic ways of developing and em-
ploying military means. Alignment strategies refer to different ways of in-
teracting on a political level with other states and organisations to promote
the state’s security, influence or status. This aspect of strategy is a part of
states’ external efforts to promote their perceived interest. Examples of
alignment strategies are balance of power, bandwagoning, isolation and
hedging. Military strategy concerns the creation, direction and use of mili-
tary force and focuses on states’ internal efforts to promote their interest by
developing and using the own state’s military resources (Edström et al.
2019:4–5). More specifically, we will approach the concept of military
strategy through the lens of Maxwell Taylor’s definition that frames strategy
as a matching set of ends, ways and means (Lykke 1989). Diplomatic and
economic strategies, which do not concern military power, are not included
in our definition of defence strategy. The defence strategies analysed in this
book are therefore less inclusive than most definitions of grand strategy, but
more inclusive than most definitions of military strategy.
DOI: 10.4324/9781003157113-3
40 Operationalising the dependent variable
In this chapter, we introduce our analytical framework for analysing the
defence strategies of the ‘big five’, that is the five system-determining states.
The first section contains two subsections introducing the different align-
ment strategies of the unipolar power and the secondary great powers. The
second section presents our definition and operationalisation of military
strategy. The last section introduces the research design and the structure of
the book.
1. How does the balance of power between competing major powers affect
the stability of the unipolar system and the unipolar power’s dominant
position?
2. Are unilateral or multilateral strategies the most beneficial and effective
for achieving the unipolar power’s interests?
Cooperative security and PTT answer the first question in a similar manner as
primacy and HST. In unipolar systems and systems in which one state holds a
dominant position in terms of various power capabilities, stability is guar-
anteed by a positive power asymmetry and an imbalance of power in favour of
the leading or dominant state and other status quo powers. However, co-
operative security and PTT give different answers to the second question
compared to primacy and HST. From the perspective of cooperative security,
the positive power asymmetry needed to deter any aggressor from attacking
weaker neighbouring states or to deter a government from using unmotivated
armed force against parts of its own population is related to an established
and well-functioning multilateral system. Initially, the unipolar power will
have to take on great responsibilities in offering unmatched military and
political capabilities, as well as using its soft power and status to establish the
credibility of the new system of cooperative security. However, eventually, the
system will offer a common institutional framework for both burden-sharing
among status quo countries and the spread of norms related to the use of
force. In contrast to cooperative security, PTT has a greater emphasis on
positive power asymmetries between the dominant state and potential com-
petitors. Nevertheless, in analysing the overall balance between satisfied and
dissatisfied states, multilateral institutions and the collective power of the
status quo states are more important to both cooperative security and PTT
compared to primacy and HST. To primacy and HST, multilateral institu-
tions lack independent capacities to intervene in conflicts and their prime
function is to offer a convenient cover for the unipolar state’s interest and to
support the unipolar power’s efforts to appear as a ‘benevolent hegemon’. The
determining factor for the latter two theories is the unilateral power capacities
of the unipolar power.
50 Operationalising the dependent variable
Selective engagement and neo-isolationism, on the other hand, both rely
on the traditional balance of power theory as sources of stability in an-
swering the first question. For selective engagement, the US’s military and
political power should be used actively and proactively, and provide ex-
tended regional deterrence to prevent great power wars in regions where
conflicts may trigger confrontations between great powers. In doing so, the
strategy mainly relies on a traditional balance of power by supporting
weaker states against stronger potential aggressors. Neo-isolationists also
base their strategy on the balance of power. In this perspective, however, the
great powers of the Eurasian continent are supposed to do the initial bal-
ancing among themselves. The US’s military strength and fortunate geo-
graphical position allow it to enter conflicts in a later stage if the Eurasian
states fail to balance each other off. By taking on responsibilities for world
peace, cooperative security and the avoidance of great power wars, the US
instead, according to the proponents of off-shore balancing, let potential
competitors free ride and flourish on the public goods provided by the US’s
economy and military strength. By subsidising international security and
supporting open flows of goods and knowledge, the US also contributes to
the rise of future challengers to its present primacy. Similar to the per-
spectives of cooperative security/PTT and primacy, proponents of selective
engagement and neo-isolationism, therefore, present different answers to the
second question.
An additional difference between the four perspectives concerns status
quo-oriented and potential revisionist strategies. Cooperative security/PTT
and selective (or deep) engagement are all status quo strategies, aiming to
improve and preserve the present US-led liberal international order. Primacy
challenges the multilateral basis for the present order. Depending on the
ideological preferences of the US administrations, primacy may also chal-
lenge the liberal values that the present liberal international order is founded
on. Neo-isolationism, on the other hand, threatens the present order by
withdrawing US power, thereby creating more room for regional power
competition and revisionist great powers. It also weakens the international
institutional framework that the US established for both international se-
curity (UN) and the international economy. In Table 3.1, the four strategies’
answers to the two questions are summarised.
• The values and norms relating to the national culture, mind-set and
rationality.
• The threats and risks emanating from potential enemies, or nature,
preventing them from being realised by deterrence or proactive actions.
• The national dependency and capacity to meet the critical needs of the
nation, material as well as immaterial.
• the vulnerability and resilience of the state regardless of possible
antagonists, including nature herself.
• Forward presence;
• Power projection;
• Rapid response and reinforcement;
68 Operationalising the dependent variable
• Freedom of the sea including protection of sea lines of communication
(maritime supremacy);
• Large-scale expeditionary warfare as well as amphibious and airborne
assault;
• Interdiction, close air support, suppression of enemy air defence as well
as long and intermediate-range air-strikes (multi-mission air opera-
tions) and;
• Non-combatant evacuation, foreign military training, humanitarian
assistance and other peace support activities.
These missions are connected not only to the level of conflict and the ends
but also to the means. Richard Kugler and Hans Binnendijk (2002) stressed
that the priorities given to different aspects of these kinds of missions in-
dicate whether a defensive or an offensive approach to the use of force is
preferred. Gray acknowledged this perpetual dialectic, however, claimed
that offence and defence ‘are matters of such subjective judgement at the
level of policy, and are so closely interwoven and interdependent in tactics,
operations and military strategy, that they have limited merit as the base a
theory’ (Gray 1999:179). Lawrence Freedman also questioned the theore-
tical value of distinguishing the offensive and defensive approaches. He
elaborated upon the elements ends-means-ways and stressed the differences
between high-intensity and low-intensity operations. Referring mainly to the
means, Freedman argued that ‘being truly defensive or offensive tends to be
misleading’ (1998:44). The balance of offensive and defensive capabilities
has been explored quite extensively (see Snyder 1984; van Evra 1999).7
Biddle criticised this literature for focusing almost exclusively on the
consequences of the balance. Instead, he introduced force employment as a
key factor, that is, ‘the way the two sides use the materiel at their disposal
rather than just the nature of the materiel itself’ (Biddle 2001:742). Another
aspect of Biddle’s critique is related to the unit of analysis. While others,
such as Charles Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann (1998), have evaluated the
outcomes of wars, Biddle argued that the military operation constitutes a
more suitable choice. He highlighted that the key variation of force em-
ployment concern:
Håkan Edström (2003) presented a similar approach with four distinct ways
of employing military force in a war-fighting context. The offensive em-
ployment is targeted towards the adversary’s key strategic assets while the
semi-offensive employment is aiming at the adversary’s military resources.
Operationalising the dependent variable 69
Clearly, both approaches to force employments are inspired by the ela-
borations of Basil Liddel-Hart (1975). Edström’s semi-defensive alternative
has similarities with Barry Posen’s (1984) theories on denying an adversary
while the defensive is explicitly based on, amongst other, Edward Luttwak’s
(1976) defence-in-depth.8 While both Biddle and Edström focused on the
war-fighting level, John Mearsheimer (1983) applied the offensive-defensive
dichotomy on the war-preventing level. Deterrence by retaliation or by
punishment serves as offensive alternatives while deterrence by denial serves
as defensive ditto. Since we think that Biddle, Edström and Mearsheimer
have provided valuable theoretical examples, we build on their elaborations
rather than on Gray’s and Freedman’s warnings.
Gray (1998) identified two other perpetual dialectics: fire and movement,
and attrition and manoeuvre warfare. We find the latter dialect fruitful for
the purpose of this project. It has also been expanded upon by, amongst
others, William Lind (1985), Robert Leonard (1991), and Richard Hooker
Jr. (1993).9 Gray, however, introduced a third strategic behaviour in the
latter dialect; control. He argued that while attrition is about exhausting the
enemy, and that manoeuvre warfare is about annihilating, control is in-
tended to paralyse the opponent.
To summarise, when distinguishing between different ways of using the
military force, we will focus on three separate aspects; first, on the different
levels of the escalation spectrum or situation; second, on the different force
employment alternatives; and third, on the operational behaviour.
i. How have the defence strategies of the US developed during the twenty-
first century and do US strategic choices correspond to expectations
drawn from BPT and PTT?
ii. How have China and Russia adjusted their defence strategies in
response to the US strategies of the US and the changes in the
distribution of power in the international system in the twenty-first
century? To what extent do the strategic choices of these two potentially
revisionist ‘secondary major powers’ correspond to the expectations
drawn from BPT and PTT?
iii. How have the UK and France adjusted their defence strategies in
response to the strategies of the US and the changes in the distribution
of power in the international system in the twenty-first century? To what
extent do the strategic choices of these two potentially status quo
oriented ‘secondary major powers’ correspond to the expectations
drawn from BPT and PTT?
iv. How do the strategic choices among the five system-determining interact
and affect stability and change in the international system?
Our answers to questions one to three are presented in three separate em-
pirical chapters where we systematically map and analyse the strategies
pursued by the different system-determining states during the twenty-first
century using the method of structured focused comparison based on the
operationalisation of military strategy presented in section 3.2. The first
empirical chapter, Chapter 4, focuses on the alignment and military stra-
tegies of the sole superpower. Here, we will present an overview of the
strategies pursued by the three different US administrations during the
twenty-first century. Chapter 5 focuses on China and Russia, two potentially
revisionist great powers, which are more likely than the other two great
powers to perceive the present unipolar order as a threat to their own great
power ambitions and autonomy. Chapter 6 focuses on the strategies of
France and the UK, two leading Western powers that are expected to be
generally supportive towards the US-led liberal multilateral international
order that was created during the second half of the twentieth-century and
consolidated within a new unipolar system during the 1990s. The fourth
question is answered in the concluding Chapter 7.
Each country-specific section in Chapters 4 to 6 gives a detailed pre-
sentation of the sources used in our analysis. We have retrieved the empirical
material for the textual analysis solely from primary official sources. The
Operationalising the dependent variable 71
defence decision-making process in each state has served as a guiding tool in
selecting the material. Consequently, we have used materials such as bills,
committee recommendations, commission reports and various documents
relating to each state’s national security or defence strategy. In collecting
information concerning the five states’ military means, this material has been
complemented with data collected from the International Institute of
Strategic Studies (IISS) reports on the military balance.
Since the political decision-making processes are not identical among the
countries, there is a discrepancy between the cases in our selection of key
documents. However, we argue that these differences do not affect the result
of the comparison. Although their roles in the process may differ between
the countries, the Head of State, the Cabinet, the Ministry of Defence
(MoD), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), the Parliament, and its
committees on Defence and Foreign Affairs respectively, as well as the Chief
of Defence (ChoD), play a key role in defining each states national security
priorities. Therefore, it seems reasonable to argue that documents presented
by these key state actors and institutions are representative sources for the
official policy of the respective state. There is always a risk that officially
released strategic documents are declaratory rather than operational in their
nature (see, for example, Edström 2003). We claim, however, that at least in
democracies, these kinds of official documents serve as political guidance
and direction of the armed forces. Consequently, these documents internal
role in this regard would be paradoxical if they are only declaratory.
Furthermore, the documents also have an external role, to signal intentions
and ambitions to other states. However, we would still like to emphasise that
the defence strategies studied in this book concern the public and official
strategies presented by each state. Of course, many aspects of, especially, the
military strategy do not appear in public documents.
In the presentation of our empirical findings, we use the method of
structured focused comparison (SFC). According to George and Bennett,
the research method SFC relies on two major components. First, its
‘structure’ is borrowed from statistical or survey methods and implies a
reliance on ‘asking a set of standardized, general questions to each case’.
These questions should reflect the research objective and theoretical focus
(2005:69–70). Our purpose of using SFC is to obtain systematic, consistent
data on variables that are possible to compare across cases.10 The pre-
sentation of each state’s defence strategy is divided into five subsections. The
first subsection consists of an analysis of the strategic environment. This
subsection is further divided into the three dimensions presented in section
3.1.3 (actors, regions and themes). The second subsection focus on military-
strategic ends which are divided into the categories presented in section 3.2.1
(values, threats, needs and vulnerabilities). The third subsection focuses on
military means, distinguishing between four different kind of means (tradi-
tional, enablers, nuclear and modern) introduced in section 3.2.2. The fourth
subsection concerns military-strategic ways and is, in accordance with the
72 Operationalising the dependent variable
operationalisation in section 3.2.3, divided into three separate parts: situa-
tion, employment and behaviour. Finally, each case study contains a sum-
mary in which our findings on specific states’ alignment strategies and the
military strategies are summarised and related to previous research.
The fourth question is addressed in the final chapter. In answering this
question, we will focus on how different unipolar strategies interact with the
different strategies pursued by secondary great powers. Our arguments on
this issue are based on the findings in the previous chapters. However, we
will also address questions related to possible future developments and
status competition among the five system-determining states. More specifi-
cally, we analyse how different choices of strategies may affect the durability
and peacefulness of the unipolar system of the twenty-first century.
Notes
1 For an extended argument on hegemonic stability, see Gilpin (1981)
2 Contrary to this view, Robert Pape has argued that internal balancing ‘is not a
viable option’ against a unipolar power because no increase in one state’s military
forces or economic strength is adequate to the task (Pape 2005:15). Pape’s ar-
gument may be valid if we were discussing the possibility for one state to
transform the present unipolar system into a bipolar system. As mentioned, we
agree with Brooks and Wohlforth (2016a; 2016b) that China is the only state that
at present has the potential to do this, and it still has a long way to go before it
reaches parity with the US. However, this does not exclude the possibility that
states may choose to pursue strategies that aim to improve the own state’s cap-
ability to resist pressures from the unipolar power and to increase the costs of a
direct attack.
3 See, for example, Brooks and Wohlforth (2005), Pape (2005) and Lieber and
Alexander (2005).
4 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was proclaimed by the General
Assembly of the UN on 10 December 1948.
5 The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, better known as the European Convention on Human Rights, was
adopted in Rome on 4 November 1950.
6 Each of these original documents is found at the website of the US Department
of State (see ‘Treaties and Agreements’ at https://www.state.gov/t/avc/trty/
index.htm).
7 Snyder, for example, argues that a rational strategist’s choice of an offensive or a
defensive strategy depends on the aims of the foreign policy, technological and
geographical constraints, and the military balance rather than on force em-
ployments.
8 Posen distinguishes between offensive operations aiming to disarm the adversary,
that is to destroy his armed forces and defensive operations with the purpose to
deny the adversary the objectives that he seeks.
9 Jan Ångström and Jerker Widén (2015) identify analogies between the dichotomy
manoeuvre-attrition and the division between indirect and direct approach pre-
sented by Liddell-Hart after WWI. Although we do agree with their conclusion,
we rather relate the direct/indirect dichotomy to the two offensive alternatives
when employing force than to behaviour. While Liddell-Harts definition is re-
lative, that is direct approach attacking the enemy’s strength and the indirect
Operationalising the dependent variable 73
approach attacking his weakness, we follow Edström’s example with a more
absolute definition, that is semi-offensive approach attacking the enemy’s mili-
tary forces and the offensive approach attacking his other key strategic assets.
10 Gary King and his colleagues argue similarly that SFC is mainly characterised by
its highly systematic data collection; the same information should be collected
about the same variables in all cases with the guidance of relevant theory. The
goal is a systematic description in order to make the drawing of causal inference
possible (1994:45–46).
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4 The US and the strategy of the
unipole
Introduction
In this chapter, the US strategy is explored. By studying key primary
sources, issued over two decades, we conclude that three presidential ad-
ministrations applied different alignment strategies. Despite this difference,
we argue that the focus on each of the elements of the military strategy has
remained rather constant. This indicates that while the internal efforts tend
to be stable despite changes in the White House, the external efforts are
more dependent on the policy of the administrations.
The empirical material has been retrieved from the processes of the US-
bureaucracy preparing a new administration entering into office and the
cabinet’s formulation of strategy once assuming command. The National
Intelligence Council (USNIC) takes the initial step by presenting a long-term
analysis of potential global trends and developments during the upcoming
decades. This is normally followed by the US Department of Defense
(USDoD) presenting a Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the
President of the United States (POTUS) deciding a new National Security
Strategy (NSS), which is the supreme American strategy. Occasionally
during the four-year term of the administration, the USDoD delivers a
National Defense Strategy (NDS) and/or a Defense Strategic Guidance, and
the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (USJCS) and a National Military Strategy
(NMS). These are the second and third-ranked strategies. Occasionally, a
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) can also be released during the President’s
time in office. Hence, when President George W. Bush was sworn in as the
American President in January 2001, the USNIC had already released its
global trend analysis in December 2000. In September 2001, the USDoD
released a QDR and one year later, President Bush presented a new NSS.
This procedure was followed during President Bush’s second (2005–2008) as
well as during President Barrack Obama’s first (2009–2012) and second
(2013–2016) terms. However, when President Donald Trump issued a new
NSS in December 2017, he did so without having a new QDR to build his
directives on.
DOI: 10.4324/9781003157113-4
The US and the strategy of the unipole 79
4.1 Strategic environment
4.1.1 Actors
In 2000, the USNIC identified four actor-related key drivers that were ex-
pected to shape the world in 2015. The first concerned the global economy.
The globalised economy was expected to be a net contributor to increased
political stability. However, the USNIC warned that a sustained financial
crisis or a prolonged disruption of energy supplies could undo this optimistic
projection. The second driver concerned governance. Notably, the ability of
states to deal with non-state actors and the opportunities for cooperation
between governments and private organisations were considered increas-
ingly important. The growing reach of international criminal and terrorist
networks was perceived as especially worrying. The third driver focused on
future conflicts. The USNIC suggested that asymmetric threats, including
non-state adversaries, constituted a reality. At the same time, Russia and
China were expected to (and potentially North Korea, Iran and Iraq) have
the capability to strike the US with strategic WMD. It was also expected
that both states (and non-state actors) had a growing potential for the un-
conventional delivery of WMD. The fourth and last actor-driven trend
concerned the US itself. The USNIC concluded that ‘[i]n the absence of a
clear and overriding national security threat, the United States will have
difficulty drawing on its economic prowess to advance its foreign policy
agenda’ (National Intelligence Council 2000:12). Some states, adversaries as
well as allies, were, however, expected to test American hegemony. The
growing power of China and the declining ditto of Russia were central in
these elaborations but Brazil, India, Japan, Mexico and the EU were also
considered to be of special importance (National Intelligence Council 2000).
In 2004, the USNIC identified 14 major trends. Five of these trends were
actor-based: rising powers and the changing geopolitical landscape, other
emerging powers, increased pressures on international institutions, the po-
tential for catastrophic terrorism and new challenges to governance. States,
and especially the US, were still considered to have a pivotal role; but other
actors including non-governmental organisations (NGOs) were also re-
cognised as being of great importance. Regarding the rising and emerging
powers, economic power was in focus. Both China and India were predicted
to achieve higher economic growth than Europe and Japan by 2020.
Furthermore, the economies of other developing countries, such as Brazil
and Indonesia, were also believed to be in a position to surpass all but the
largest European economies by that year. In addition to these two countries,
Russia and South Africa were also expected to achieve important economic
growth. In contrast to these rising and emerging powers, there were the so-
called ‘ageing powers’ – Japan and the members of the EU. Growing energy
demands, not least by China and India, were expected to have substantial
impacts on geopolitical relations. Regarding the challenges to governance,
80 The US and the strategy of the unipole
Russia and most of the Central Asian regimes were believed to be slipping
back toward authoritarianism. The USNIC warned that Islamic terrorists’
aspirations of a new Caliphate might not be just a dream in 2020. Finally,
regarding international institutions, the USNIC cautioned that ‘post-World
War II creations as the UN and international financial institutions risk
sliding into obsolescence unless they take into consideration the growing
power of the developing world’ (National Intelligence Council 2004:104).
In 2008, the USNIC predicted that in 2025 the international system would
be multipolar, although not homogeneous. Even if the strategic rivalries
were likely to revolve around trade, rivalry regarding investments, techno-
logical innovation and acquisition, arms races, territorial expansion and
military rivalries were not ruled out. Brazil, Russia, India and China (the
BRICs) were expected to present the greatest growth in economic power.
Both China and India were expected to continue their naval build-ups, de-
veloping blue-water naval capabilities. Iran’s potential acquisition of nuclear
weapons was presented as a source of concern. North Korea was also
mentioned in this context (National Intelligence Council 2008).
In 2012, the USNIC was critical to its previous reports, admitting that
while detailing a gradual ascendance of non-state actors it had not clarified
the role of states versus non-state actors. Consequently, the USNIC an-
nounced its intention to delve more into the dynamics of governance and to
explore the complex relationships among a diverse set of actors. The USNIC
predicted that there would not be a hegemonic power in 2030. Instead,
power would shift to networks and coalitions in a multipolar world. The
Council also admitted that while it had foreseen the direction of the US’s
major competitors – with China increasing and Russia decreasing in terms
of relative power - China’s power had increased faster than expected. The
USNIC predicted that China, India, and Brazil would be the key actors in
addition to the US, while the relative power of the EU, Japan, and Russia
was considered likely to continue to decline. Regarding the risks of conflict,
the USNIC identified three different ‘baskets’ that were considered to have
the potential of conspiring to increase the risk of an outbreak of interstate
conflict. While the first basket elaborated on the changing calculations of
particularly China, India, and Russia, the second focused on the increasing
contention over resources, and the third on the increased accessibility of
instruments of war. Finally, regarding the role of the US, the Council
concluded that even if the era of unrivalled American ascendancy in inter-
national politics was winding down, the multifaceted nature of US power
suggested that the US most likely would be the first among equals alongside
the other great powers in 2030 (National Intelligence Council 2012).
In 2017, the USNIC warned that the risk of conflict between major and
aspiring powers was expected to increase due to diverging interests.
Combined with an expanding terrorist threat, continued instability in weak
states, and the increasing complexity of other emerging global challenges,
the USNIC predicted that countries would cope on an ad hoc basis by
The US and the strategy of the unipole 81
collaborating with regional organisations and non-state actors to target
narrowly defined issues. The USNI predicted that since ‘more actors will
employ a wider range of military and non-military tools’, the line between
war and peace will be blurred, and the old norms of escalation and deter-
rence would be undermined (National Intelligence Council 2017:20).
Notably, not only non-state but also sub-state actors were mentioned in this
context, the latter exemplified with the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant
(ISIL). The Chinese regime’s struggle to maintain legitimacy and political
order was described as a critical driver. Russia’s aspiration to restore its
great power status through nationalism, military modernisation and foreign
engagements was another key driver. The USNIC predicted that recent
Sino-Russian cooperation was likely to return to competition, not least re-
garding influence in Central Asia. The relations between India and Pakistan
also got USNIC’s attention. Pakistan’s attempt to address India’s economic
and conventional military capabilities through asymmetric means was
considered especially problematic.
4.1.2 Regions
In 2000, the USNIC concluded that different drivers would have varying
impacts in different regions. Due to the adverse effects of globalisation and
insufficient attention to reform, the prospects of potentially destabilising
social changes were expected to remain negative for the societies and the
regimes in the Middle East. The spike in oil revenues was predicted to lead
to rising demands for oil from the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC). Still, it was considered unlikely that these revenues
primarily would be directed at core social needs. The projections for Sub-
Saharan Africa were even direr than concluded in previous reports because
of the spread of AIDS, humanitarian crises, political instability, and military
conflict. The USNIC warned that regions feeling left behind the positive
economic developments could face deepening economic stagnation, political
instability and cultural alienation. Consequently, they could foster political,
ethnic, ideological, and religious extremism. Central Asia was described as a
regional hot spot, with occasionally competing for national interests be-
tween not only Russia, China, and India but also of Iran and Turkey. East
Asia was said to be characterised by uneven economic dynamics, within and
between states, as well as by political and national assertiveness, with po-
tentials for strategic tensions. The widening strategic and economic gaps
between India and Pakistan were expected to define the strategic setting of
South Asia. By 2015, many Latin American states were predicted to enjoy
greater prosperity due to factors such as expanding hemispheric and global
economic links, lowered birth rates and progress in democracy building.
However, according to the USNIC, the reversal of democracy in some
countries could lead to insurgencies. Although an ageing population and
low birth rates would become major challenges to European prosperity and
82 The US and the strategy of the unipole
cohesion, most of Europe was expected to be wealthy and peaceful. Notably,
Oceania was not given much attention. Instead, Australia was included in
the analysis of South East Asia (National Intelligence Council 2000).
In 2004, the USNIC calculated that the rising power of China and India
would greatly affect the regional level. In East Asia, some states were ex-
pected to adapt to the new setting by forging closer economic and political
ties with Beijing, while Japan, Taiwan and various Southeast Asian nations,
were said to prefer closer ties with the US and/or India to counterbalance
China’s growing influence. Furthermore, the USNIC argued that the
growing energy requirements would likely prompt China to increase its
global activism in regions such as the Middle East, Africa, Latin America,
and Eurasia. The rise of India was perceived to present strategic compli-
cations not only for Asia as a whole, but especially for Southern and Central
Asia, and potentially also for the Middle East. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the
major risk was considered to be worsening humanitarian emergencies, often
stemming from conflicts. West Africa was projected to become a more im-
portant energy supplier, while vulnerable to intensified Islamic radicalism.
Regarding Europe, attributes and problems related to ‘aging states’ were
again emphasised (National Intelligence Council 2004).
In 2008, the USNIC gave most regional attention to Sub-Saharan Africa,
Latin America and the Middle East. The former was considered the single
most vulnerable region to economic disruption, population stresses, civil
conflict and political instability. The UNSIC warned that there was a risk
that local populations were unlikely to experience significant economic gain
and that instead, the increases in commodity prices might lead to even
greater corruption. Despite the positive developments predicted, several
Latin American countries risked lagging behind or even becoming poorer
and less governable. Drug trafficking organisations, transnational criminal
cartels and local gangs were expected to contribute to making parts of Latin
America among the world’s most violent areas. The USNIC further warned
that small countries in Central America and the Caribbean risked becoming
failed states, and concluded that Latin America ‘will continue to play a
marginal role in the international system, except for its participation in in-
ternational trade and some peacekeeping efforts’ (National Intelligence
Council 2008:15). The USNIC feared that the lack of economic growth
combined with a high degree of youth unemployment in the Middle East
would continue facilitating terrorist organisations’ recruitment of young
people. In addition, the USNIC shed light on the risks of an arms race in the
region involving both nuclear weapons and external actors. Elaborating on
regionalism, the USNIC illuminated the trend towards free trade and
financial clusters that could become quasi-blocs: North America, Europe
and East Asia. The USNIC argued that these blocks, and potentially
other regional clusters, could compete in setting trans-regional standards
not only for products but also for property rights (National Intelligence
Council 2008).
The US and the strategy of the unipole 83
In 2012, the USNIC identified the widened scope of regional instability as
one of the six game-changers. Hence, the focus was on whether instability in
the Middle East and South Asia would spill over and create global in-
security. In the former region, elaborations were concentrated on three main
issues; whether Iran would gain access to nuclear weapons or not, the po-
tential of moderate and democratic governments emerging throughout the
region and the resolving of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In the latter re-
gion, themes related to challenges such as low economic growth, rising food
prices, unemployment, large youth population, lack of infrastructure and
energy shortages. The USNIC warned that combined with conflicting stra-
tegic goals, widespread distrust among neighbouring states and the lack of
an institutionalised regional security framework, these challenges could lead
to the eruption of widespread conflict. Furthermore, the lack of a well-
anchored regional security framework for Asia as a whole constituted one of
the largest global threats according to the UNSIC. The USNIC concluded
that a multipolar regional order combined with rising intrastate tensions,
growing Chinese nationalism and questions about future US engagement
and involvement will most likely increase regional insecurities in Asia.
Further, the USNIC warned that an unstable Asia would cause large-scale
damage to the global economy (National Intelligence Council 2012).
The 2017 USNIC report included an appendix specifically focusing on ten
regions. The regional interactions in East and Southeast Asia were said to be
influenced by the interplay between security competition, regime stability
and economic cooperation. Middle powers and smaller states alike were
expected to seek assurance against Chinese assertiveness. As they were un-
likely to be resolved, the longstanding territorial and maritime disputes in
the region were considered to require the full attention of the ASEAN. The
USNIC argued that the security challenges would motivate continued build-
up and potential use of military instruments in the region. South Asia was
expected to face tremendous internal and external challenges, shaping the
security and political stability in the region. The deepening strategic re-
lationship between the US and India, China’s westward ambitions, the ac-
tivities of ISIL and other terrorist groups, violent extremism, sectarian
divisions, governance shortfalls, environmental concerns, weak health sys-
tems, gender inequality and demographic pressures were all considered
contributing to the extremely complex situation.
The Middle East and North Africa were expected to be characterised by
political upheaval as civil and proxy wars were predicted to continue in
several weak or failed states. The USNIC warned that contests among re-
ligious and political forces combined with low energy prices and weakened
institutions could include security competition among regional actors, but
could also involve the great powers. The USNIC feared that socioeconomic
challenges such as water shortages as well as the global energy demands
would increase the tensions even further. According to the USNIC esti-
mates, Sub-Saharan Africa was likely to suffer from insufficient economic
84 The US and the strategy of the unipole
growth and job creation, hence further overwhelming the abilities of most
governments in the region. The USNIC predicted that lack of infrastructure
and educated workforces could halt the economic growth, and added that as
China’s economy cools down, Chinese aid would most likely decline.
Consequently, the economies in the region would remain weak. Many
Eurasian governments desired control over reforms and suffered poor eco-
nomic performance and corruption. They were therefore also considered
highly vulnerable to Russian influence.
The need to restructure European relations in light of the decision of the
UK to leave the EU was according to the USNIC likely to not only un-
dermine the region’s international clout but could also weaken transatlantic
cooperation. The USNIC expected further assertiveness from Russia and
deliberate attempts to split European solidarity. Naturally, the elaborations
on North America had a clear US-centred perspective. The USNIC pre-
dicted that the issue of immigration from the Caribbean, Central America
and Mexico, combined with continued threats from terrorism could lead to
even tighter border enforcement. Brazil was considered to play a key role in
South America. Together with Argentina, the regional great power could
foster better regional relations and increased regional trade, the USNIC
argued. The Antarctic and the Arctic were believed to have increased eco-
nomic importance, due to the diminishing sea ice. Long-term economic
stakes and opportunities, combined with environmental concerns, were ex-
pected to raise the risk of increased competition between the Arctic and non-
Arctic countries over access to sea routes and resources (National
Intelligence Council 2017).
4.1.3 Themes
In addition to the global economy and globalisation, the USNIC identified
three thematic key drivers in 2000: demography, natural resources and the
environment, and science and technology. Regarding the first driver, the
global population was expected to be 7.2 billion in 2015, compared to the 6.1
billion at the time of the publishing of the report. The USNIC predicted that
about 95 per cent of this increase would be in developing countries, and
nearly all in rapidly expanding urban areas. The consequences of demo-
graphical developments were diverse. In countries where the political sys-
tems are brittle, the combination of population growth and urbanisation
could foster instability. In states with advanced economies and emerging
markets, declining birth-rates and ageing populations could increase the
costs of health care and pensions, while simultaneously reducing the size and
capacity of the workforce. The second thematic driver – natural resources
and the environment – included discussions on the consequences of the over
three billion individuals who were expected to be living in water-stressed
regions, and the implications for conflict. The linkages between the
availability of energy resources, price, and distribution were also more
The US and the strategy of the unipole 85
thoroughly analysed. Despite a 50 per cent increase in global energy de-
mand, energy resources would be sufficient to meet these demands, the
USNIC concluded. Finally, regarding science and technology, the USNIC
paid specific attention to the growing significance of information tech-
nology, biotechnology, materials science, and nanotechnology (National
Intelligence Council 2000).
Even if the USNIC’s report of 2004 did not present an explicit thematic
approach, nine out of the 14 significant characteristics perceived to be
shaping the global future by 2020 were thematic in their character. While
none of these themes concerned environmental issues, two addressed poli-
tical (the contradictions of globalisation and halting democratisation), four
social (a more pervasive sense of insecurity, lingering social inequalities, the
global ageing phenomenon and the spread of radical Islamic ideology), two
economic (the expanding global economy and the accelerating pace of sci-
entific change and the dispersion of dual-use technologies) and one military
(proliferation of WMD) aspects. The USNIC treated not only WMD but
also cyber warfare as central in the elaborations regarding the military
theme. The USNIC concluded:
In the November 2008 report, the USNIC touched upon several thematic
aspects. Resource issues were expected to gain prominence on the interna-
tional agenda. The unprecedented global economic growth was, for ex-
ample, projected to continue to put pressure on several highly strategic
resources, including energy, food, and water. Regarding energy, the pro-
duction of crude oil, natural gas liquids, and tar sands was not expected to
grow at the same rate as demands. The USNIC further argued that as oil
and gas production most likely would be concentrated to unstable areas, this
could result in a fundamental energy transition away from oil, toward
natural gas, coal and other alternatives. In addition, climate change was
expected to exacerbate resource scarcity even further. The USNIC warned
that although the impact of climate change was projected to vary by region,
particularly water scarcity could lead to harmful effects, such as the loss of
agricultural production in several regions.
The USNIC elaborated on social themes related to the risk of global
pandemics, ageing populations in the developed world, the swelling of the
global middle class concurrent with the poor part of the globe’s population
becoming relatively poorer, as well as women’s increasing educational at-
tainment. ‘Shifts in ethno-religious composition resulting from migration’
86 The US and the strategy of the unipole
could, the USNIC warned, ‘fuel political change, particularly where im-
migrants settle in low-fertility industrialized countries’ (National Intelligence
Council 2008:23). The USNIC added that resource scarcities, poor gov-
ernance, ethnic rivalries and/or environmental degradation could also gen-
erate societal disruptions. Referring to the military aspects, the US was
expected to ‘retain unique military capabilities, especially its ability to
project military power globally’. Although ‘the emergence of new nuclear-
weapon states may constrain US freedom of action’, US military superiority
regarding conventional and nuclear weapons as well as missile defence
capabilities was considered being of continued importance ‘deterring openly
aggressive behavior on the part of any new nuclear states’ (National
Intelligence Council 2008:97). the USNIC feared that in addition to ter-
rorists gaining access to advanced weaponry including WMD, some of the
more advanced states could develop capacities needed for conducting
counter-space strikes as well as information warfare including cyber and
network attacks. The continued proliferation of long-range missile systems,
anti-access capabilities, and different forms of WMD including nuclear
weapons, were other risks elaborated upon (National Intelligence
Council 2008).
In its report from December 2012, the USNIC focused on five thematic
aspects; the global economy, technology, individual empowerment, demo-
graphic patterns and growing demands for key resources. However, in its
elaborations on future conflicts, the Council touched upon some key mili-
tary aspects as well. These were precision-strike capabilities, means for cyber
warfare, bioterror weaponry and the proliferation of WMD. Regarding the
global economy, the USNIC predicted that the combined share of the
American, European, and Japanese global income was to fall from 56 per
cent in 2012 to well under half by 2030. China’s and other emerging markets’
shares of financial assets were projected to almost double during the same
period. The USNIC warned that global volatility and imbalances among
actors with different economic interests could result in the collapse of the
current economic order. On the other hand, a greater multipolarity was also
said to have the potential to increase the resiliency of the global economy
(National Intelligence Council 2012).
In 2017, the USNIC presented five overarching trends focused on people:
how people live, how people create and innovate, how people prosper, how
people think, how people govern and how people fight. Regarding pros-
perity, the USNIC saw the economic transition of two of the world’s three
leading economies as worrisome. Finally, regarding fighting future conflicts,
USNIC presented three keywords: diffuse, diverse and disruptive. Future
conflicts were expected to be more diffuse ‘because the greater accessibility
to instruments of war will enable a variety of actors, including states, non-
state and sub-state entities’ such as terrorist groups, criminal networks, in-
surgent forces, mercenaries and private corporations ‘to engage in conflict’.
They were described as diverse ‘because the means of conflict will vary
The US and the strategy of the unipole 87
across a wider spectrum’ ranging from non-military capabilities, such as
‘economic coercion, cyberattacks, and information operations, to advanced
conventional weapons’ and WMD as well as ‘occur in multiple domains, to
include space and cyberspace’. Finally, future conflicts were characterised as
disruptive ‘because of an increasing emphasis by states and terrorist groups,
on disrupting critical infrastructure, societal cohesion and government
functions rather than on defeating enemy forces on the battlefield through
traditional military means’. The USNIC concluded that the proliferation of
cyber capabilities, precision-guided weapons, robotic systems, long-range
strike assets and unmanned-armed vehicles were shifting ‘warfare from di-
rect clashes of opposing armies to more standoff and remote operations,
especially in the initial phases of conflict’ (National Intelligence Council
2017:214–217).
4.2 Ends
4.2.1 Values
In September 2001, shortly after the terrorist attacks, the USDoD issued a
QDR.1 The department declared that the:
4.2.2 Threats
No clear threats were identified in the QDR presented in September 2001.
Instead, the USDoD admitted that the US ‘cannot predict with a high de-
gree of confidence the identity of the countries or the actors that may
threaten its interests and security’ (US Department of Defense 2001:3). Two
of the eight overarching ends presented in the NSS of September 2002 fo-
cused on threat-related aspects. First, to prevent attacks against America
and its friends and to defeat global terrorism, alliances were to be
strengthened. Second, potential enemies were to be prevented from threa-
tening the US as well as its allies and friends with WMD. In the NMS
presented two years later, three military objectives supporting the NDS were
established: (i) protecting the US against external attacks and aggression; ii)
preventing conflict and surprise attack; and (iii) prevailing against adver-
saries (US Joint Chiefs of Staff 2004). In the NDS released in March 2005,
the core ends related to threats were assuring allies and friends, dissuading
potential adversaries, deterring aggression and coercion and defeating ene-
mies. Retaining global freedom of action by securing access to key regions,
lines of communications and the global commons were thus key objectives.
Helping partners to increase not only their ability to defend themselves but
also to contribute to the collective efforts of meeting common threats was
another objective. Establishing favourable security conditions, the depart-
ment intended to honour America’s security commitments, and bring about
a common appreciation of these threats (US Department of Defense 2005).
In February 2006, the USDoD presented two ends associated with the threat
dimension. First, terrorist networks were to be defeated. Second, hostile
states, as well as non-state actors, were to be prevented from acquiring and
using WMD (US Department of Defense 2006). One month later, in March
2006, President Bush announced that the second pillar of the American
strategy was to confront ‘the challenges of our time by leading a growing
community of democracies’. The President included threats such as pan-
demic diseases, the proliferation of WMD, terrorism, and natural disasters
in these challenges. The president concluded that ‘[e]ffective multinational
efforts are essential to solve these problems’ (President of the USA 2006:19).
A spectrum of challenges was in 2008 considered facing the US as well as its
allies and partners. These challenges included: hostile states armed with
WMD, violent transnational extremist networks, rising regional powers,
emerging space and cyber threats as well as natural and pandemic disasters.
In responding to these threats, maintaining, strengthening and even ex-
panding America’s wide range of allies, friends and partners were considered
a capstone of the strategy. The department declared that ‘We cannot prevail
if we act alone’ (US Department of Defense 2008:1). Consequently,
90 The US and the strategy of the unipole
preventing enemies from threatening the US and its allies, and working with
others to defuse regional conflicts were considered important objectives. The
Department announced that ‘We must defeat violent extremism as a threat
to our way of life’ (US Department of Defense 2008:7).
The US was declared a nation at war in the QDR issued in February 2010.
Consequently, disrupting, dismantling and defeating Al Qaeda and the
Taliban were declared key objectives. The proliferation of WMD and other
weapons and technology were considered as direct physical threats to the
US, and protecting the American people was presented as an overarching
end (US Department of Defense 2010a). In the NSS released in May 2010,
President Obama identified Al-Qa’ida and its affiliates as the most important
enemy (President of the USA 2010). The central strategic objectives pre-
sented in the 2011 NMS were also quite specific; to erode Taliban influence
in Afghanistan, to strengthen the Afghan security forces capacity, to enable
Pakistan to defeat al Qaida and to prevent the terrorists from returning to
either country. Finding, capturing or killing ‘violent extremists wherever
they reside when they threaten interests and citizens of America and our
allies’, were overarching objectives for countering violent extremism (US
Joint Chiefs of Staff 2011:6). Defeating terrorist networks, deterring and
defeating adversaries, maintaining nuclear deterrence and operating effec-
tively in cyberspace, space and across all other domains were presented as
core military objectives in the strategic guidance released in January 2012
(US Department of Defense 2012).
The QDR released in March 2014 was built explicitly on the Defence
Strategic Guidance of 2012. The USDoD gave priority to three strategic
pillars of which two were threat-oriented: (i) projecting US influence and
deterring aggression; and (ii) winning decisively against any adversary if
deterrence should fail. In these regards, building new partnerships and
strengthening established key alliances and partnerships were both general
objectives. Cooperating with others to address common security challenges
was the core of building global security. Providing humanitarian assistance
and disaster relief were mentioned as additional aspects (US Department of
Defense 2014). The NMS released in June 2015 addressed the need to
counter revisionist states as well as violent extremist organisations (VEOs).
The former was (when necessary) to be deterred, denied and defeated while
the VEOs were to be disrupted, degraded and defeated. A third national
military objective was also presented:
4.2.3 Needs
In 2001, the US contribution to economic well-being was emphasised. The
USDoD mentioned the vitality and productivity of the global economy, the
security of international sea, air, space and information lines of commu-
nication, as well as access to key markets and strategic resources as key
objectives. Precluding hostile domination of critical areas was mentioned as
an additional objective. Not only the American but also the US’s allies’ and
friends’ dependency on the energy resources from the Middle East was given
special attention. The US’s ability to lead formal alliances and to establish
bilateral security relationships as well as to build regional security ar-
rangements and to develop coalitions of states were considered as a cen-
trepiece of the American security (US Department of Defense 2001). Global
economic growth was one of eight overarching ends presented in the 2002
NSS. In order to ignite a new era of such growth, free markets and free trade
92 The US and the strategy of the unipole
were considered a prerequisite. An additional need-based end focused on
regional conflicts. To defuse such conflicts, the President expressed the need
to work with others. A fourth end focused specifically on the need for co-
operation with the other main centres of global power. Hence, the aim was
to develop agendas for cooperative action:
In President Trump’s 2017 NSS, one of the key objectives was to revitalise
America’s economy. The president state that ‘[u]nfair trade practices had
weakened our economy and exported our jobs overseas’. Contrary to his
predecessors, President Trump took a slightly different approach to
America’s allies. He argued that ‘[u]nfair burden-sharing with our allies and
inadequate investment in our own defense had invited danger from those
who wish us harm’. Promoting free, fair and reciprocal economic relation-
ships, as well as promoting and protecting America’s national security in-
novation base, alongside embracing American energy dominance were
presented as key objectives (President of the USA 2017:I-II). In the 2018
NSD, a key objective described was to ensure that common domains re-
mained open and free (US Department of Defense 2018a).
4.2.4 Vulnerabilities
The QDR released in September 2001 stressed the importance of ensuring
the US’s security and freedom of action, including its sovereignty, territorial
integrity, and freedom, the safety of American citizens at home and abroad
as well as the protection of critical American infrastructure (US Department
of Defense 2001). The terrorist attacks in September 2001 created a sense of
vulnerability to the US. As one of eight core ends, President Bush one year
94 The US and the strategy of the unipole
later presented the aim of transforming America’s security institutions to
meet new challenges. This included the ability to defend the homeland and
protecting critical US infrastructure (President of the USA 2002). The
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffs, General Richard Meyers stated that
the ‘attacks of 11 September 2001 demonstrated that our liberties are vul-
nerable’ (US Joint Chiefs of Staff 2004:iv–v). In the 2005 NSD, ensuring the
security of the US’s people was presented as a core end (US Department of
Defense 2005). In the 2006 QDR, to defend the American homeland in-
depth, defeating terrorist networks and preventing hostile states and non-
state actors from acquiring or using WMD were almost presented as ends in
themselves (US Department of Defense 2006). The following month,
President Bush stated that the most solemn obligation of the US was pro-
tecting the American peoples’ security (President of the USA 2006). The
very first line in the 2008 NDS read ‘A core responsibility of the U.S.
Government is to protect the American people’ (US Department of Defense
2008:1). Defending America from attacks on its territory and protecting the
physical integrity of the country were thereby regarded as key ends.
According to the USDoD, the best way of promoting security was ‘to
prevent war when possible and to encourage peaceful change within the
international system’. Consequently, important objectives were ‘building the
capacities of a broad spectrum of partners as the basis for long-term se-
curity’ as well as strengthening ‘the resiliency of the international system’,
and preventing disruptions ‘from escalating or endangering international
security, and to find ways to bring them swiftly to a conclusion’ (US
Department of Defense 2008:9).
In February 2010, security and prosperity were presented as two out of four
chief interests (US Department of Defense 2010a). Simultaneously with the
war against terrorism taking place aboard, strengthening the security and
resilience at home were described as additional ends in the May 2010 NSS.
The sense of being vulnerable also affected the objectives regarding the use of
military force. Advancing peace, security and opportunity were specific ob-
jectives regarding the Greater Middle East. This end was connected to the war
on terrorism and, in the long run, America’s security at home (President of the
USA 2010). In February 2011, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs declared that
‘[o]ur foremost priority is the security of the American people, our territory,
and our way of life’. ‘We must continue to prevent attacks against the United
States and its allies, strengthen international and regional security, and be
prepared to deter and defeat aggression that would undermine international
stability’, the Chairman continued (US Joint Chiefs of Staff 2011:1–2).
In the 2012 strategic guidance, President Obama presented promoting
security as one of the enduring American national interests presented by
President Obama. He emphasised that the end of seeking security was not
only related to the US but also its allies and partners. In the same document,
Secretary Panetta stressed the core ends of countering WMD and protecting
the US homeland (US Department of Defense 2012). The third of the three
The US and the strategy of the unipole 95
strategic pillars presented in the March 2014 QDR also indicated a perceived
vulnerability. Hence, defending the US homeland was given priority, with
deterring and defeating attacks on the US and supporting civil authorities in
mitigating the effects of potential attacks and natural disasters as core ob-
jectives. In addition, the second pillar (projecting US influence and deterring
aggression) also had an approach of vulnerability since the very purpose of
the influence was argued to be to build security globally.
Besides these strategic pillars, the same document also elaborated the core
interests of the US. Two of these four core interests focused on peace and
security. First, the security of the US and its citizens, allies and partners were
given priority. Second, the global leadership of the US was described as a
precondition for an international order that favoured strong interstate co-
operation to meet global challenges (US Department of Defense 2014). In
the 2015 NSS, escalating cybersecurity challenges were mentioned as sources
of anxiety regarding global security. Therefore, key objectives were
strengthening the security and resilience of America’s critical infrastructure
as well as securing Federal networks. The document also elaborated the
potential vulnerabilities in cyberspace and space. A central objective was
developing ‘technologies and tactics to deter and defeat efforts to attack our
space systems; enable indications, warning, and attributions of such attacks;
and enhance the resiliency of critical U.S. space capabilities’ (President of
the USA 2015:13). President Trump promised that his administration
‘would put the safety, interests, and well-being of our citizens first’. He
pledged that he and his administration would rebuild the US’s military and
‘protect our sovereignty’ (President of the USA 2017).
4.3 Means
In Table 4.1, some notable differences in the annual defence expenditure
between the three presidential administrations can be identified. During
President Bush’s eight years in power, the defence expenditures increased
each year and the annual defence expenditure almost doubled between 2001
develop capabilities that would present any adversary with complex and
multidimensional challenges and complicate its offensive planning
efforts. These include the pursuit of investments that capitalize on
enduring U.S. advantages in key strategic and operational areas, such as
persistent surveillance and long-range strike, stealth, operational man-
euver and sustainment of air, sea and ground forces at strategic
distances, air dominance and undersea warfare (US Department of
Defense 2006:30–31).
The USDoD’s emphasis on prevention also affected the guidance for de-
veloping the forces and capabilities needed for deterrence and other peace
shaping activities. Jointness was the keyword. Joint ground forces were to be
modular in their structure at all levels, largely self-sustaining, and capable of
operating both in traditional formations as well as disaggregating into
smaller autonomous units. Infantry capacity, light armour units, re-
connaissance capacity, joint fire liaison teams and UAVs were all to be in-
creased. The army was to be organised around brigade combat teams
(BCTs), with 42 BCTs in the regular army and 28 in the National Guard. In
addition, 78 support brigades were to be organised in the regular army, 78 in
the National Guard and 58 in the army reserve. By 2011, the strength of
the Army was to be 482,400 active and 533,000 reserve troops, while the
strength of the Marine Corps was to be 175,000 active and 39,000 reserve
troops. The Department was not explicit in the numbers regarding
the Special Forces but announced that in fiscal terms, the resources had
increased by over 80 per cent compared to 2001.
To achieve the future joint force characteristics regarding air capabilities,
the Department presented a list of decided actions. Developing a new land-
based, penetrating long-range strike capability, as well as reducing the B-52
fleet to 56 aircraft and use the savings for modernisations of B-52s, B-1s and
B-2s in order to support global strike operations, were two of the prioritised
programs. The Air Force was to be organised around 86 combat wings and
the personnel strength reduced by approximately 40,000 full-time equivalent
airmen. The bulk of the navy was to consist of 11 carrier strike groups.
However, also power projection capabilities in littoral waters, as well as the
riverine capability for patrol, interdiction and troop movement on inland
waterways, were on the priority list (US Department of Defense 2006).
In 2010, the bulk of the Army was to consist of four corps and 18 division
headquarters including 40 infantry, eight Stryker and 25 heavy brigade
combat teams, 21 combat aviation brigades, 15 Patriot battalions and seven
terminal high altitude area defense (THAAD) batteries. The Marine Corps
was to organise three marine expeditionary forces including three active and
one reserve divisions, six fixed-wings, seven rotary-wings, nine combat
98 The US and the strategy of the unipole
logistics regiments and seven expeditionary unit command elements. The
Navy was to sail, among other, 11 aircraft carriers with ten carrier air wings,
84 large surface combatants, 14 small surface combatants, 14 mine coun-
termeasure ships, 29 amphibious warfare ships, 53 attack submarines and
four guided-missile submarines. The main units of the Air Force included
ten theatre strike wings (with about 72 aircraft per wing), five long-range
strike bomber wings (with altogether 96 primary mission aircraft), and six
air superiority wings (with about 72 aircraft per wing). Finally, approxi-
mately 660 special operations teams (including the Army’s Alpha-teams,
and the Navy’s SEAL-platoons) and three Ranger battalions were to form
the core of the Special Forces (US Department of Defense 2010a).2 In
February 2011, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael
Mullen, stressed that the US armed forces had to prepare for an increasingly
dynamic and uncertain future in which a full spectrum of military cap-
abilities and attributes will be required to prevent and win our Nation’s wars
(US Joint Chiefs of Staff 2011). Less than a year later, in January 2012, the
Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta, declared:
Two years later, in March 2014, the USDoD admitted that it had had to
make tough decisions due to fiscal austerity. Reductions in the force
structure were considered a necessity to protect and expand critical cap-
abilities, undertake modernisation and to increase readiness. At the same
time, priority was also given to investments across all domains, to maintain
the technological edge over potential adversaries. The Department directed
each of the services with some key guidance. The bulk of the Air Force was
to consist of 48 fighter squadrons, altogether with 971 aircraft, and 9 heavy
bomber squadrons, altogether with 96 aircraft. The Army was to reduce its
active personnel strength from 570,000 to 440,000 soldiers, the National
Guard from 358,000 to 335,000 soldiers, and the Army Reserve from
205,000 to 195,000 soldiers. The strength of the Marine Corps was planned
to be 182,000 active marines but could, due to budget cuts, end up being
175,000. The Corps was to organise two marine expeditionary forces. The
bulk of the Navy was to consist of 11 aircraft carriers including ten carrier
air wings, 92 large surface combatants (71 destroyers and 21 cruisers with
additional 11 cruisers in temporary lay-up for modernisation), 43 small
surface combatants including mine countermeasure ships, 33 amphibious
warfare ships, 51 attack submarines and four guided-missile submarines (US
Department of Defense 2014). When President Trump issued his first NSS in
The US and the strategy of the unipole 99
December 2017, he stressed the importance of quantity and the size of
America’s armed forces:
To deter conflict and, if deterrence fails, to win in war, the Nation must
be able to field forces capable of operating in sufficient scale and for
ample duration to defeat enemies, consolidate military gains, and
achieve sustainable outcomes that protect the American people and
our vital interests. The United States must reverse recent decisions to
reduce the size of the Joint Force and grow the force while modernizing
and ensuring readiness (President of the USA 2017:29)
In Table 4.2, the traditional means of the US armed forces are summarised.
Table 4.2 The main traditional units and equipment of the US armed forces
2000–2020
ARMY
Army HQ 3 6
Corps HQ 4 3 3
Tank Division 5 4
Tank Brigade 2 24 5
Mechanized Division 6 2
Mechanized Brigade 5 7 4
Infantry Division 5 2
Infantry Brigade 7 30 24
Airborne Division 2 2
Airborne brigade 10 2
Special Forces Groups/Regiments 8 8 8
MBT 7,900 5,850 5,689
APC/AIFV 21,910 26,089 13,478
Attack Helicopter 1,502 1,035 973
NAVY
Tactical Submarine 55 57 53
Carrier 12 11 11
Cruiser 27 22 24
Destroyer 52 56 67
Amphibious Landing Ship 41 31 32
Marine Infantry Division 4 4 4
Marine Infantry Brigade
Special Forces Teams/Regiments 11 8 9
Naval Aviation Bomber
Naval Aviation Fighter/Attack 1,248 1,158 1,148
AIR FORCE (Tactical Aviation)
Fighter/Attack 2,878 2,525 1,112
Fighter 271
Bombers 208 154 93
Table 4.3 The main airborne enablers of the US armed forces 2000–2020
deter nuclear attack on the United States, as well as on our allies and
partners. The United States will continue to reduce the role of nuclear
weapons in deterring non-nuclear attack. However, nuclear forces
continue to play a limited but critical role in the Nation’s strategy to
address threats posed by states that possess nuclear weapons and states
that are not in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obliga-
tions (US Department of Defense 2014:14).
SLBM
Trident / aboard Ohio 432/18 336/14 280/14
ICBM
Peacekeeper 50 0 0
Minuteman III 500 500 400
STRATEGIC BOMBER
B-52 Stratofortress 92 71 46
B1 91
B2 20
and eventually replace, these bombers with the next-generation bomber, that
is the B-21 Raider, had also been initiated. Furthermore, the long-range
stand-off (LRSO) cruise missile program was launched to replace the arsenal
of air-launched cruise missile (US Department of Defense 2018b). In
Table 4.4, the nuclear means of the US armed forces are summarised.
Space and cyberspace were not only considered as enablers for the war-
fighting in the air, land and maritime domains but also as war-fighting
domains in their own right. Regarding the space domain, enhancing space
situational awareness, fostering information sharing among allies and
partners, improving space architecture resiliency and means for power
projection operations in space were prioritised. The focus on cyberspace was
quite defensive, with priority given to ensuring access to the cyberspace
domain despite cyber intrusion or cyber-attacks (US Joint Chiefs of
Staff 2011).
106 The US and the strategy of the unipole
Concurrent with the USDoD’s March 2014 announcement of cuts across
all services regarding traditional means, the Department presented its am-
bition to invest in new and expanded cyber capabilities and forces in order to
enhance America’s ability to conduct cyberspace operations. The US cyber
forces were to consist of, among other, 13 national mission teams (NMTs),
27 combat mission teams (CMTs), 18 national cyber protection teams
(CPTs), 24 service CPTs and 26 combatant command information network
CPTs. The Department presented similar ambitions regarding space op-
erations. This included making critical space-based systems more resilient by
expanding access to commercial and allied space systems. Increasing the use
and integration of unmanned aerial systems was another priority (US
Department of Defense 2014).
In June 2015, the Joint Chiefs of Staff accused North Korea of conducting
cyber-attacks that caused major damage to American corporations.
Consequently, cybersecurity, including the protection of cyber systems and
physical infrastructure, was at the top of the agenda. The US Cyber Mission
Force and the establishment of the joint information environment (JIE)
were given priority. The JIE was intended to enhance both the connectivity
and the cybersecurity among the US forces (US Joint Chiefs of Staff 2015).
In December 2017, President Trump argued that the US ‘must maintain
our leadership and freedom of action in space’. He further explained that ‘[c]
ommunications and financial networks, military and intelligence systems,
weather monitoring, navigation, and more have components in the space
domain’. The re-establishment of the National Space Council was seen as
crucial in this regard. Cyberspace was also given priority by the President.
Improving America’s ability to attribute cyberattacks as well as ‘cyber tools
across the spectrum of conflict to protect U.S. Government assets and U.S.
critical infrastructure and to protect the integrity of data and information’
were prioritised areas (President of the USA 2017:32). In January 2018, the
USDoD stressed its ambition to prioritise investments in ‘resilience, re-
constitution, and operations to assure our space capabilities. We will also
invest in cyber defense, resilience, and the continued integration of cyber
capabilities into the full spectrum of military operations’. In addition, the
Department announced its intent to invest in the military application of
‘autonomy, artificial intelligence, and machine learning, including rapid
application of commercial breakthroughs, to gain competitive military ad-
vantages’ (US Department of Defense 2018a:6–7).
4.4 Ways
4.4.1 Situation
In 2001, the USDoD focused on peacetime forward deterrence in critical
areas of the world. The Department argued that by maintaining regionally
tailored forces stationed and deployed in Europe, Northeast Asia, the East
The US and the strategy of the unipole 107
Asian littoral, the Middle East and Southwest Asia, the US could assure its
allies and friends, counter coercion, deter aggression against and provide
access for follow-on forces. If deterrence would fail, the approach was to
decisively defeat any adversary. The Department argued that the US mili-
tary must maintain the capability to impose its will on any adversaries, in-
cluding states or non-state entities. The Department declared that ‘[s]uch a
decisive defeat could include changing the regime of an adversary state or
occupation of foreign territory until US strategic objectives are met’ (US
Department of Defense 2001:13). In case of major conflicts overlapping, the
ambition was explicitly ‘preserving for the President the option to call for a
decisive victory in one of those conflicts’ (US Department of Defense
2001:17). In addition to the focus on potential major conflicts, the US
military was tasked with simultaneously conducting a limited number of
smaller-scale contingency operations.
In 2004, supporting the objectives of the NMS, four joint operating
concepts (JOCs) were presented: Homeland Security, Stability Operations,
Strategic Deterrence and Major Combat Operations. The Joint Chiefs of
Staff explained that ‘[a]lthough military objectives have enduring elements,
the ways to achieve those goals must evolve through experimentation, op-
erational experience, and the development of transformational capabilities’
(US Joint Chiefs of Staff 2004:9). Preventing conflict and surprise attacks
through ‘actions that deter aggression and coercion while retaining the
capability to act promptly in defending the nation’ were expressed as the
keys to success (US Joint Chiefs of Staff 2004:11).
Deterrence was emphasised in the March 2005 NDS. According to the
USDoD, the effective deterrence derived from not only America’s capacity
and will to defeat any adversary, but also from its capacity to dominate
every level of escalation. The Department declared that ‘[w]e will deter by
maintaining capable and rapidly deployable military forces and, when ne-
cessary, demonstrating the will to resolve conflicts decisively on favourable
terms’ (US Department of Defense 2005:8).
In February 2006, the USDoD stressed the importance of shifting the
focus from responsive actions toward ‘early, preventive measures and in-
creasing the speed of action to stop problems from becoming conflicts or
crises’ (US Department of Defense 2006:2–3). On the one hand, the
Department concluded that US military forces would maintain their pre-
dominance in traditional warfare also in the future. On the other hand, the
Department acknowledged the necessity to address non-traditional and
asymmetric challenges. Hence, irregular warfare, that is, conflicts in which
enemy combatants are not regular military forces, and catastrophic ter-
rorism (terrorists employing WMD), were given the highest priority in order
to avoid disruptive threats and crisis. The Department admitted that this
approach most likely would lead to long-duration unconventional warfare,
including counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, as well as military support
for stabilisation and reconstruction efforts. Drawing on lessons from recent
108 The US and the strategy of the unipole
operations, the USDoD ‘emphasized the importance of early measures to
prevent problems from becoming crises and crises from becoming conflicts’
(US Department of Defense 2006:17). At the same time, the Department
identified the potential needs of simultaneously undertaking multiple and
overlapping wars. As a conclusion, the USDoD presented ideas shifting
from ‘one size fits all’ deterrence toward tailored capabilities to deter ad-
vanced military powers, regional WMD states, and non-state terrorists.
Notably, deterrence still had a prominent position. However, the
Department clarified that should deterring aggression or coercion fail, the
US would ‘deny a hostile power its strategic and operational objectives’ (US
Department of Defense 2006:30).
The NSS issued in March 2006 emphasised several situations. Prevention
and denial were the keywords for confronting terrorists. For example, ter-
rorist attacks were to be prevented. Rogue states and terrorist allies were to
be denied access to WMD, as well as prevented from providing sanctuary to
terrorist groups. Ultimately, terrorists were to be denied gaining control ‘of
any nation that they would use as a base and launching pad for terror’
(President of the USA 2006:12). The Clear–Hold–Build concept was to be
implemented in Iraq:
Six core mission areas were presented in January 2009, each underpinned by a
JOC: Homeland Defense & Civil Support; Deterrence Operations; Major
Combat Operations; Irregular Warfare; Military Support to Stabilization
Security, Transition, & Reconstruction Operations; and Military Contribution
to Cooperative Security. The US Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates declared
that ‘[t]his is truly a wartime QDR’ when introducing the review in February
2010. To prevent conflicts, a new air-sea battle concept was launched,4 that
would (if needed) project power, deter aggression, and aid allies and partners.
Naturally, winning the ongoing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were on top of
the agenda. Preventing and deterring conflicts and succeeding in counter-
insurgency, stability and counterterrorism operations were also given high
priority. The Department also gave priority to preparing to defeat adversaries
and to succeed in a wide range of contingencies, in case deterrence failed, as
well as defending the US and supporting civil authorities at home. Notably,
the different services were partly to focus on different situations. For example,
the US ground forces were to remain capable of full-spectrum operations, with
a focus on counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorist operations while
US naval forces were directed to forward presence and power projection op-
erations, and US air forces to deter and ultimately defeat adversaries (US
Department of Defense 2010a).
Two months later, the USDoD announced that the Department was
preparing a declaration in which the US pledged not to ‘use or threaten to
use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to
the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations’
(US Department of Defense 2010b:viii). The Department made clear that
the US would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme cir-
cumstances to defend its own as well as its allies and partners’ vital interests
(US Department of Defense 2010b). The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
stressed in the 2011 NMS that ‘[p]reventing wars is as important as winning
them, and far less costly’ (US Joint Chiefs of Staff 2011:7). The primary
missions for the US armed forces were to provide support to civil autho-
rities, counter WMD and terrorism, deter and defeat aggression, provide a
stabilising presence in key areas and conduct stability and counter-
insurgency as well as humanitarian, disaster relief and other operations in-
cluding power projection. In January 2012, the USDoD stressed that ‘[i]n
order to credibly deter potential adversaries and to prevent them from
achieving their objectives’, the US ‘must maintain its ability to project power
in areas in which our access and freedom to operate are challenged’ (US
Department of Defense 2012:4). Two years later, in March 2014, the
USDoD declared that US armed forces:
110 The US and the strategy of the unipole
will be capable of simultaneously defending the homeland; conducting
sustained, distributed counterterrorist operations; and in multiple
regions, deterring aggression and assuring allies through forward
presence and engagement. If deterrence fails at any given time, U.S.
forces will be capable of defeating a regional adversary in a large-scale
multi-phased campaign, and denying the objectives of – or imposing
unacceptable costs on – a second aggressor in another region (US
Department of Defense 2014:vi).
The USDoD warned that US armed forces during the past decade had been
focusing on a single type of conflict – conflict management – and now
needed to restore its readiness for the full spectrum of potential conflict. For
this reason, elaborations on the operational ends and ways were used when
providing the strategic priorities:
Nevertheless, if deterrence fails, the United States will strive to end any
conflict at the lowest level of damage possible and on the best achievable
terms for the United States, allies, and partners. U.S. nuclear policy for
decades has consistently included this objective of limiting damage if
deterrence fails (US Department of Defense 2018b:VIII).
The US and the strategy of the unipole 111
4.4.2 Employment
Long-range strike aircraft and special operations forces were to provide an
immediately employable supplement to forward forces in order to achieve a
deterring effect during peacetime. Eliminating enemy offensive capability
across the depth of its territory, restoring favourable military conditions in
the region of conflict, and creating acceptable political conditions for the
cessation of hostilities were the guidelines when employing military force.
In the 2004 NMS, the prevention of conflict and the determent of aggression
were argued to rely on an integrated overseas presence in strategically im-
portant areas, conveying ‘a credible message that the United States remains
committed to preventing conflict’. The Joint Chiefs of Staff argued that
these forces also demonstrated ‘that the United States will react forcefully
should an adversary threaten the United States, its interests, allies and
partners’. Consequently, the very purpose of deploying forces forward was
explicitly stated to be ‘working with other nations to promote security and
to deter aggression’ as well as increasing ‘the capabilities of partners to
protect common security interests’ (US Joint Chiefs of Staff 2004:11). The
Joint Chiefs of Staff presented a 1-4-2-1 concept of employment: ‘to defend
the homeland, deter forward in and from four regions, and conduct two,
overlapping “swift defeat” campaigns. Even when committed to a limited
number of lesser contingencies, the force must be able to ‘win decisively’ in
one of the two campaigns’ (US Joint Chiefs of Staff 2004:21). In March
2005, the USDoD argued for active and layered employment of armed
forces: ‘We will focus our military planning, posture, operations, and cap-
abilities on the active, forward, and layered defense of our nation, our in-
terests, and our partners’ (US Department of Defense 2005:iv). The
Department also argued that allowing opponents to strike first was un-
acceptable and not an option. Instead, the US had to defeat ‘the most
dangerous challenges early and at a safe distance, before they are allowed to
mature’ (US Department of Defense 2005:9).
Five years later, in February 2010, the USDoD announced that about
400,000 US military personnel were forward-stationed and deployed around
the world, including in the ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq (US
Department of Defense 2010a). In March 2014, the USDoD declared that it
112 The US and the strategy of the unipole
had identified new paradigms for the US military presence, including: ‘po-
tentially positioning additional forward deployed naval forces in critical
areas, and deploying new combinations of ships, aviation assets, regionally
aligned or rotational ground forces, and crisis response forces’ (US
Department of Defense 2014:vi). Less than a year later, President Obama
clarified that the US’s military was postured globally in order to protect
American interests, to preserve regional and to ‘build the capacity of our
partners to join with us in meeting security challenges. U.S. forces will’ the
President continued, ‘be ready to project power globally to defeat and deny
aggression in multiple theaters’ (President of the USA 2015:8–9). In June
2015, the Joint Chiefs of Staff summarised the ways that America’s armed
forces were employed in order to implement the US strategy:
4.4.3 Behaviour
The USDoD declared in September 2001 that transformed manoeuvre and
expeditionary forces, alongside transformed rapidly deployable manoeuvre
capabilities, were necessary to manoeuvre at varying depths within enemy
areas (US Department of Defense 2001). The JOC for Homeland Security,
introduced in the 2004 NMS, included tasks to protect America from direct
attack while securing its air, sea, land and space approaches. The JOC for
Stability Operations and Strategic Deterrence included guidelines for com-
batant commanders on how to employ forces before, during and after
conflict. The JOCs for Stability Operations and Major Combat Operations
were said to be complementary. The Joint Chiefs of Staff stressed that they:
However, manoeuvre was not the focus of the February 2006 QDR. Instead,
the USDoD stressed a broad range of operations, ranging from long-duration
operations including unconventional warfare, through counterterrorism,
counterinsurgency and stabilisation and reconstruction operations, to con-
ventional major or strike operations. The Department described three ob-
jective areas: Homeland Defence, the War on Terror (including irregular and
asymmetric warfare) and Conventional Campaigns. The quest for capabilities
for waging multiple campaigns, potentially with overlapping timeframes, and
for which there may be limited or no warning of an attack, indicated the
Department’s emphasis on striving for control. The USDoD argued that the
military had to be prepared ‘to remove a hostile regime, destroy its military
capacity and set conditions for the transition to, or for the restoration of, civil
society’ (US Department of Defense 2006:38).
In December 2017, President Trump stressed the necessity of retaining a
full-spectrum force. While arguing for the expansion of America’s armed
forces and increasing their readiness, Trump warned that despite these im-
provements, US dominance and control in air, maritime, land, space and
cyberspace domains was not guaranteed. Therefore, he ordered the USDoD
to develop new operational concepts, ‘including against those operating
below the level of conventional military conflict. We must sustain our
competence in irregular warfare, which requires planning for a long-term,
rather than ad hoc, fight against terrorist networks and other irregular
threats’ (President of the USA 2017:29). Dynamic force employment and
military posture were described as key contributors when introducing un-
predictability to adversary decision-makers. With the US’s allies and part-
ners ‘we will challenge competitors by manoeuvring them into unfavourable
positions, frustrating their efforts, precluding their options while expanding
our own, and forcing them to confront conflict under adverse conditions’,
the USDoD declared (US Department of Defense 2018a:5).
In Table 4.5, US deployments of armed units abroad are summarised. The
number of deployed troops is relatively stable in several countries. However,
in the Middle East, some dramatic changes can be observed. In Europe, the
114 The US and the strategy of the unipole
Table 4.5 The main US deployments of armed units abroad 2000–2020
Bilateral
Arrangements
Australia 300 138 1,500
Bahrain 900 1,447 5,000
Belgium 790 1,276 1,050
Bermuda 800
Bulgaria 150
Cameroon 300
Canada 130 150
Colombia 84 50
Cuba 1,080 903 1,000
Djibouti 1,165 4700
El Salvador 21
Germany 61,580 53,960 38,750
Greece 420 371 1000
Greenland ? 160
(Denmark)
Haiti 230
Honduras 410 421 450
Hungary 640 200
Iceland 1,640
Iraq 120,000 6,000
Israel 46
Italy 10,500 9,474 12,750
Japan 39,750 33,392 55,600
Jordan 2,300
Kuwait 5,190 ? 13,500
Netherlands 300 528 400
Niger 800
Nigeria 50
Norway 60 76 1,400
Philippines 111 200
Oman 690
Poland 2,857
Portugal 1,040 727 250
Qatar 432 10,000
Romania 1,150
Saudi Arabia ? 277 2,000
Singapore 150 122 200
Somalia 500
South Korea 36,746 25,374 28,500
Spain 2,130 1,274 3,750
Syria 1,500
Thailand 120 300
Turkey 2,040 1,600 1,700
Ukraine 220
United Arab 104 5,500
Emirates (UAE)
(Continued)
The US and the strategy of the unipole 115
Table 4.5 (Continued)
most notable change concern Germany where the US presence has been
reduced from more than 61,000 in the year 2000 to slightly less than 39,000
in the year 2020. Increased US military presence in some other European
states do not match the decreased number of troops in Germany. In
Northeast Asia, on the other hand, a substantially increased US military
presence in Japan can be identified.
• How have the defence strategies of the US developed during the twenty-
first century?
• Do US strategic choices correspond to the expectations drawn from the
balance of power theory (BPT) and power transition theory (PTT)? It is
now time to address these questions.
Let us start with the American alignment strategy. During the Bush adminis-
tration (2001–2008), the global economy and globalisation were in focus. The
globalised economy was expected to foster increased political stability as well as
enhanced cooperation among governments, intergovernmental organizations
116 The US and the strategy of the unipole
and NGOs. Emerging powers such as China, India and Brazil were perceived
to gain influence on the global scene at the expense of ageing powers such as
Russia, Japan and some of the EU-members. This restructuring of interna-
tional relations was however not expected to change the American position as
the most powerful actor, especially not in military terms. Consequently, the US
was still believed to be able to deal with potential challenges from competitors
such as China, Russia, North Korea and Iran, as well as with the threat of
international terrorism. In counterbalancing China’s growing influence, other
states, such as Japan and Taiwan, were perceived to be dependent on the US,
rather than vice versa. Since the EU countries were expected to deal with the
challenges of ageing populations and growing immigration, mostly from
Muslim countries, with the potential of leading to periods of protracted eco-
nomic stasis, the Bush administration did not seem to have expected much
support from the European allies in dealing with global matters of shared in-
terests. Not least, the decision to invade Iraq in 2003, despite protests from key
NATO allies and without approval from the UNSC, indicated a unilateral
approach.
The classification of the Bush administration’s alignment strategy is
complicated by the fact that the prime security concern of this adminis-
tration is a non-state actor, international terrorism. The alignment stra-
tegies introduced in section 3.1 concerned relations between great powers,
not relations between states and non-state actors. Nevertheless, in fo-
cusing on how official documents from this administration related US’s
position and efforts to other states and their actions we consider it rea-
sonable to label the alignment strategy of the Bush administration as
primacy. One explicit goal presented by the USDoD was to dissuade ad-
versities from undertaking military programs or operations that could
threaten the interest of the US and its allies. Consequently, both major
and emergent powers should be dissuaded from developing capabilities
that could threaten regional stability. One key aspect of this concerned
preventing proliferation of WMD to hostile states and non-state actors.
The US needs to have the ability to deter aggression and defeat aggression
if deterrence failed.
American analyses of the strategic environment seem to display an in-
creasing awareness of challenges to both US´s unipolar position and the
liberal international order. The analysis of rising and emergent powers and
ageing powers indicates a power transition that may correspond to both
HST and PTT. However, there is no single new hegemon or dominate state
insight that could replace the US. Instead, the diffusion of power to regional
powers and non-state actors as well as many thematic trends are challenging
the US leading position and the liberal international order.
Regarding means and ways, the Department argued that the US military
must maintain the capability to impose the will of the US on any adver-
saries, including both states with advanced military capabilities and non-
state actors. To achieve decisive defeats, the administration was prepared to
The US and the strategy of the unipole 117
change the regime of an adversary state, occupy foreign territory and engage
in various preventive measures. Moreover, the US should maintain its
predominance in traditional warfare and prepare itself to undertake multiple
and overlapping wars. Concerning the general expectations of BPT and
PTT, the Bush administration primarily relied on its own overwhelming
military power and a positive power asymmetry in relation to all other
states. The focus on the imbalance of power as a key to stability is not
compatible with traditional BPT and the focus on unilateral capacities does
not match PTT. This would make the Bush administration more akin to the
hegemonic stability theory (HST). However, we also observe a gradual shift
from a uni- towards a multilateral approach in the Bush strategy that may
be interpreted as a move towards PTT.
During the Obama administration (2009–2016), the US seemed to have
accepted that the developments towards a multipolar world order was ir-
reversible. The main challengers to the US’s position were perceived to be
the BRICs: Brazil, Russia, India and China. Nonetheless, the lack of con-
sensus among these four, and between other emerging powers was, together
with the multifaceted nature of US power taken as evidence that the US
would keep its status as the first among equals in the emergent new world
order. The relative power of two main US’s allies, the EU and Japan, was
believed to be likely to decline even further. In the analyses from USNIC,
non-state actors and global trends relating to different societal factors fur-
ther undermined the US’s leading position and the liberal international
order. The Obama administration did not only focus on countering violent
extremism and stopping the spread of WMD but also on resolving and
preventing conflicts. Clearly, it realised that the burdens for fulfilling these
ambitions could not, due to the limits of US power, fall on America’s
shoulders alone. Consequently, strengthening established alliances as well as
international institutions, while also building cooperation with other key
actors were all presented as central objectives. We consider this in line with
the strategy of cooperative security. Additional support for this interpreta-
tion is the administration’s emphasis on universal values and common se-
curity challenges when it comes to ends. When it comes to means and ways,
the Obama administration used institutional means and resources such as
the new START agreement to address security challenges related to WMD.
In addressing the security needs of both states and individuals, the admin-
istration advocated the use of military capabilities to render humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief. The Obama administration’s emphasis on
global leadership and multilateral cooperation is fully compatible with the
perspective of PTT.
The Trump administration (2017–2020) instead focused on the diverging
interests among not only the major but also aspiring powers. The efficiency
of international organisations has therefore been considered to be at risk.
Nationalism, military modernisation, and foreign engagements were iden-
tified as common elements of Chinese and Russian policy. In this context,
118 The US and the strategy of the unipole
President Trump declared his ambition to promote a balance of power
strategy, favouring the US and its allies. Simultaneously, the President
stressed that he viewed the burden-sharing between the US and its allies as
unfair. We nevertheless argue that the Trump administration, despite the
President’s nationalistic rhetoric, has applied a selective engagement rather
than an isolationistic strategy. This categorisation finds support in the US
continued global deployment of forces based on both bi- and multilateral
agreements. However, the decreased number of US army units in Europe is
not fully compatible with the recommendations of selective engagements
since Europe is one of the key regions in the world in preventing wars be-
tween great powers. That the massive withdrawal of troops from Iraq was
followed by the resignation of the minister of defence also indicates that
there are different views within the Trump administration regarding US
deployment of troops to allied states. In Table 4.6, the American alignment
strategies are illustrated.
Table 4.6 The shifts in the US’s alignment strategy during the twenty-first century
Power imbalances as a Balance of power strategies
source of stability as a source of stability
Regarding the military strategy, the ends, as well as the balance between
them, have been quite similar throughout the period explored. This ob-
servation corresponds well with the USDoD’a declaration of enduring
national interests. Hence, the core values are promoting peace, sustaining
freedom, and encouraging prosperity. In addition, President Bush stated
justice, democracy and human dignity as ideals. During his time in office, the
promotion of these values made up one of the two core pillars of the Bush
strategy. In line with the alignment strategy primacy, the administration’s
ambition was to ensure that all major and emerging powers were integrated
into the international system. The Obama administration took another path
in this regard. Maintaining the functionality of the international system was
to be achieved through alliances, partnerships, and multinational institutions.
This was even presented as a goal in itself. Compared to his predecessor,
President Obama put greater emphasis on governance and on strengthening
international norms and universal rights. President Trump, on the other hand,
focused on American values and America’s way of life. Rather than pro-
moting universal values, he presented a vision of a world consisting of so-
vereign and independent nations, each with its own culture. Arguably, ends
based on values were the most central in the Bush strategy.
The US and the strategy of the unipole 119
The Bush administration declared the deterrence of adversaries from
undertaking military activities that could threaten the interests of the US as
an explicit goal. Rogue states and terrorists were described as the primary
enemies, but major and emerging powers were also to be deterred from
developing capabilities that could threaten American interests. Honouring
America’s security commitments by helping allies and partners to increase
their ability to defend themselves and to contribute to the collective efforts
to meet common threats was also declared a key objective of the Bush ad-
ministration. President Obama followed his predecessor in this regard.
Consequently, terrorism and violent extremism were stated to be the most
important threats to manage. In addition, the Obama administration men-
tioned the importance of addressing potential threats from revisionist states.
The Trump administration took this elaboration a step further, and ex-
plicitly mentioned America’s strategic competition with the revisionist
countries of China and Russia. Arguably, defending US homeland against
various threats was most predominant as an end in the Trump adminis-
trations strategy.
When it comes to ends related to needs, the Bush administration focused
on the global economy. Therefore, the security of international lines of
communication, as well as access to key markets and strategic resources
were presented as ends. Free markets and free trade were the core of these
elaborations, and cooperation with the other main centres of global power
was considered a necessity. Notably, the administration mentioned China,
India and Russia as key allies. Contrary to its predecessor, the Obama ad-
ministration stressed the necessity of strengthening established alliances to
promote an open and free international economic system. The worries ex-
pressed referred to the dependency on Russian energy by America’s
European allies and partners rather than on the needs of the US itself. The
Trump administration did not share this perspective. Instead of being
concerned about the economies of the US’s allies, the revitalisation of
America’s economy was emphasised. Arguably, the needs have not been
prioritised by any US administration during the twenty-first century.
The fourth and last aspect of the ends, vulnerabilities, also did not receive
much attention in the strategic elaborations by any presidential adminis-
tration. All three administrations focused on the safety of American citizens
at home and abroad, as well as on protecting critical US infrastructure. In its
strategic documents, the Obama administration also included vulnerabilities
related to the spread of WMD and to cyberspace. However, the documents
stated that the foremost priority was the security of the American people,
US territory and the American way of life. To conclude, we argue that
protecting and promoting values, and especially peace, freedom and pros-
perity, have been the most dominant ends of American strategy.
Regarding traditional means, the Bush administration gave priority to the
Special Operations Forces, the capacity of both the Army and the Marine
Corps to conduct irregular warfare missions, capabilities for deterrence and
120 The US and the strategy of the unipole
anti-WMD measures. Altogether, these efforts aimed at ensuring America’s
advantages vis-à-vis adversaries in key strategic and operational areas. The
Obama administration admitted that it, due to fiscal austerity, had to un-
dertake reductions in the force structure. The Army was to reduce its active
personnel strength from 570,000 to 440,000 soldiers. The Air Force was to
phase-out several combat aircraft, slow down the purchase of the Joint
Strike Fighter and cut flying hours. The Navy was to retire one of the 11
aircraft carriers while the Marine Corps was to reduce the Marine expedi-
tionary forces from three to two. President Trump made it clear that he
intended to reverse his predecessor’s decisions to reduce the size of
America’s military. The armed forces were to both grow and be modernised.
Despite this declaration, we argue that the traditional means had the most
predominant role in the Bush strategy.
The Bush administration stressed the necessity of the US’s armed forces
ability to conduct expeditionary operations globally. Therefore, the Bush
administration gave priority to strategic mobility, prepositioning, basing
infrastructure, intelligence and rapidly deployable joint task force head-
quarters. The Obama administration continued this approach, putting even
greater emphasis on the enabling systems. This included the focus on a
broad range of functions, including battlespace awareness, command and
control, logistics, unmanned aircraft systems, ISR as well as EW-
capabilities. Despite the cuts regarding traditional means, the Obama ad-
ministration announced its decision to purchase next-generation tanker/
cargo aircraft to replace the current fleet. President Trump also continued
along this path. A resilient forward posture and agile global mobility forces
were, together with a focus on training, logistics, and maintenance, central
parts of his administration’s actions to improve the readiness of the
American military. Arguably, enablers have had a central role under all
administrations during the twenty-first century.
President Bush’s November 2001 announcement to establish a nuclear triad
was never implemented. Instead, the Peacekeeper ICBMs were retired, four
ballistic missile submarines were taken out of service and the number of
Minuteman reduced to 450. The Obama administration continued decreasing
the size of America’s nuclear forces. The nuclear triad was reduced to ap-
proximately 50 per cent compared to the START I levels. Furthermore, the
MIRV capacity was completely withdrawn, leaving all American ICBMs with
just a single nuclear warhead. However, not only were the number of nuclear
weapons reduced, as was their role in the overarching strategy. Nonetheless,
shortly after his inauguration, President Trump directed the USDoD to con-
duct a new NPR. The Trump administration decided to modernise each of the
legs in the nuclear triad, while also making the next-generation F-35 combat
aircraft dual-capable and deciding to launch the LRSO cruise missile program.
Arguably, nuclear weapons were most dominant in the Trump strategy.
The Bush administration prioritised modern means in space and cyber-
space. Enabling the US to conduct information operations, computer
The US and the strategy of the unipole 121
network operations, as well as psychological operations, the means ultimately
ensured the US’s armed forces information superiority. Moreover, the ac-
celerated acquisition of UAVs doubled this specific capacity. The Obama
administration continued these efforts. For example, the US Air Force was to
organise five space operations centres, and a new cyber command was es-
tablished as a sub-unified command under USSTRATCOM. Space and cy-
berspace were not only considered as enablers for the warfighting in the air,
land, and maritime domains but also as war-fighting domains in their own
right. Moreover, at the same time as the Obama administration announced
cuts regarding the traditional means, the USDoD expanded America’s cyber
capabilities and organised an American cyber force. President Trump ex-
panded this approach even further. His administration re-established the
National Space Council and announced its intent to invest even more in areas
such as artificial intelligence. Arguably, modern means have had a central role
in all administrations during the twenty-first century.
Finally, regarding ways, the Bush administration stressed the countering
of coercion and the determent of aggression, indicating a focus on the war-
preventing situation. Simultaneously, if deterrence failed, the administration
would not shy away from a war-fighting situation. Notably, the adminis-
tration made clear that its ambition was to have the capacity necessary to
dominate every level of escalation. As the focus shifted towards irregular
warfare, the conflict avoidance situation gained increased attention.
Preventing and denying were therefore the keywords when addressing the
challenges caused by terrorists. The Obama administration also presented a
combination of preventing conflicts and deterring aggression. However,
prevailing in the ongoing irregular wars in Afghanistan and Iraq was on top
of the agenda. Moreover, the services were partly to focus on different si-
tuations. While the ground forces were to remain capable of full-spectrum
operations, with a focus on counterinsurgency and counterterrorism op-
erations in a conflict management situation, the naval and air forces were
directed to power projection in a war prevention situation. Rather than
terrorism, the Trump administration declared inter-state strategic competi-
tion as the primary concern. Hence, the focus for all services was on war
prevention. To conclude, we argue that the overarching priority over time
has been on the war prevention situation. Occasionally, other situations have
been in focus, in particular for the ground forces.
Regarding the employment of military force, the Bush administration’s
core directions were to eliminate the enemy’s offensive capability across the
depth of their territory and restoring favourable military conditions in the
region of conflict. Hence, the forward deployment of the US military was
considered a precondition for success. The Obama administration also ap-
plied this approach. Projecting power and the capacity to defeat decisively
any adversary were thereby also emphasised under Obama.
The Bush administration’s guidance held central the ability to manoeuvre
at varying depths within enemy areas. At the same time, the emphasis on
122 The US and the strategy of the unipole
achieving a full-spectrum dominance indicated the ambition to control all
events across the range of military operations. The behaviour conducted by
the American forces corresponded with the core of manoeuvre warfare as it
includes force movements to gain a positional and temporal advantage as well
as to seize rapidly the initiative. However, as counterinsurgency received more
and more attention, the administration seemed to have given priority to
control over manoeuvre. Hence, sustainability and the ability to wage mul-
tiple campaigns were emphasised. The Trump administration continued this
approach. Consequently, priority was given to ensuring American dominance
and control in all domains of warfare. Since neither employment nor beha-
viour has been addressed fully throughout the two decades explored, the focus
regarding ways is on the situation. To summarise, regarding ways, we argue
that the war prevention situation has dominated.
The similarities between the three US administrations military strategies
may come as a surprise, considering the differences between the three pre-
sident’s general international orientation and the differences related to
alignment strategies. One explanation for this continuity may be the central
role of the USDoD and the various services and branches of the armed
forces in preparing plans for the long-term development of US armed forces.
Another explanation for this continuity is the time lag between strategies for
the use of force and strategies for force generation. An elected president may
decide upon rapid changes in questions related to the use of military re-
sources. However, the development of advanced military systems and cap-
abilities is a much more time-consuming effort based on technical expertise
and not easily transformed during one president’s time in office. The
common elements in the military strategies of the three administrations are
summarised in Table 4.7.
John Ikenberry noted already in 2004 that the Bush administration was
influenced by ideas built on American global rule, the unilateral exercise of
American military power, and on the ‘gradual disentanglement from the
constraints of multilateralism and an aggressive push to bring freedom and
democracy to countries where evil lurks’ (Ikenberry 2004:7). We find that his
observations are in line with our argument on primacy as the appropriate
label of at least the initial years of the Bush presidency. Ikenberry provided
additional support for this argument when he quotes Defense Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld who suggested that the mission determines the coalition,
this was evident when the administration preferred a coalition of the willing
rather than one based on established alliances.
The US and the strategy of the unipole 123
Robert Jervis’s observation that ‘unipolarity does not seem deeply af-
fected by nuclear weapons’ supports our findings on the means, that is, that
enablers and modern means have tended to have the most prominent role
(Jervis 2009:202). Moreover, just as we did, Jervis observed the focus on
values regarding ends, and on war prevention regarding ways. Stephen Walt
noted in 2009 that despite unipolarity, the US’s primacy fell short of global
hegemony. However, according to Walt, the US’s position as the sole su-
perpower gave it command of the commons, ‘that is, the ability to operate
with near impunity in the air, oceans, and space’. Moreover, its unique
position provided the US with the ability to defeat any other country or
coalition ‘in a direct test of battlefield strength’ (Walt 2009:92–93). Even if
Walt presented his article after the Bush presidency, his findings support our
conclusions on the alignment strategy based on primacy.
Contrary to Walt, Christoffer Layne argued that already the foreshocks
of the great recession in the fall of 2007 indicated the end of US primacy
(Layne 2012). We agree with Layne’s position in this regard. However, we
slightly disagree when he claimed that preserving America’s hegemonic role
was the overarching strategic objective of the Obama administration.
Instead, we find his elaboration on unipolar exit to be in line with our
findings. We also think that his conclusion is convincing, that is, that the
sources of America’s decline can partly be explained by the rise of emerging
powers, especially China, and partly by the looming fiscal crisis in the US.
However, Joseph Nye did not agree fully with such a statement. Nye argued
that ‘military power is largely unipolar, and the United States is likely to
retain primacy for quite some time’ (Nye 2012:215).
Robert Ross focused on the rise of China when exploring the American
strategy. His suggestions on deterring China militarily and concurrently
using power projection to reassure the US’s key allies that they can rely on
America’s capacity in providing security against China are in line with our
finding on war prevention as the core aspect of ways. Arguably, his ex-
amples of how the US has ‘strengthened its forward presence in East Asia
through cooperation with its regional security partners’ in order to ‘deter
Chinese use of force to challenge the regional order’ are in line with our
conclusions regarding the US’s alignment strategy based on multilateralism
and a status quo approach (Ross 2013:26–27). Stephen Biddle and Ivan
Oelrich also focused on the rise of China. They referred to the post-Cold
War period as a ‘remarkable era of military primacy for U.S. arms against
potential state rivals’. They observed that this era may be ending, if not
globally, at least in the Western Pacific (Biddle and Oelrich 2016:7). Stephen
Brooks and William Wohlforth provided additional focus on China vis-à-vis
the American strategy. As other researchers, they referred to the financial
crisis of 2008 in their analysis. Their conclusions are similar to those pre-
sented by Biddle and Oelrich. Although we do not fully agree with their
arguments on US primacy, we support their findings that the US’s focuses
on modern means and advanced weaponry have led to supremacy in certain
124 The US and the strategy of the unipole
areas such as the space domain. We also find their conclusion noteworthy,
that ‘true counterhegemonic balancing […] will long remain effectively out
of reach for China, which alone among states has the scale and raw eco-
nomic heft to make counterbalancing even a notional option’. We agree that
the absence of Chinese global balancing capacity enables freedom of action
for the US (Brooks and Wohlforth 2016:45).5
Benjamin Friedman and Justin Logan argued that debate ‘over grand
strategy is nearly absent in US politics’. Still, they claimed that there is bi-
partisan support for primacy, defined as ‘a grand strategy that sees global US
military dominance as the basis for US security’. Furthermore, they argued
that the ‘elite consensus in favor of primacy saps political demand for critical
analysis of it or consideration of alternative grand strategies’ (Friedman and
Logan 2016:14). Even if they may be right regarding the lack of debate, we do
not share their conclusion when it comes to the bipartisan support for primacy.
By comparing the strategy of the Clinton and the Trump administrations,
Patrick Porter claimed that the US grand strategy of primacy has persisted
since the end of the Cold War. Notably, he observed that President Trump has
‘rejected the bipartisan cause of U.S. leadership’ (Porter 2018:38). We do,
however, agree with Porter that President Trump does not favour isolationism.
By shedding light on the differences between Hillary Clinton, Bernie Sanders
and Donald Trump during the 2016 presidential campaigns, John
Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt provided support to our position regarding
the lack of consensus regarding the American strategy (Mearsheimer and Walt
2016:74). Despite the use of ‘preserve’ they identified separate strategies ap-
plied by the Clinton, the G. W. Bush and the Obama administrations, re-
spectively. Since we have identified differences between the two latter,
Mearsheimer and Walt are indirectly supporting our findings in this regard.
Furthermore, when arguing that President Trump is anything but iso-
lationistic, the view is shared by Barry Posen. He concluded that when it comes
to hard power, Trump’s strategy is more ambitious compared to Obama’s
strategy. Consequently, Posen concluded that President Trump was breaking
‘with his predecessors’ in this regard. By exemplifying the military activism of
the Trump administration with the new stockpiles of American equipment in
Europe (adequate to equip an armoured division) and more frequent military
manoeuvres in Northeast Asia, ‘including sending long-range strategic bom-
bers on sorties over the Korean Peninsula’, Posen provided support for our
conclusions regarding the ways (Posen 2018:22). We also find support for our
conclusions in Posen’s previous work in which he illuminates the strategic
considerations of different American administrations (Posen 2014).
Notes
1 The Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, clarified that the QDR and ‘the
accompanying report were largely completed before the 9/11 terror attacks on the
United States’ (US Department of Defense 2001:v).
The US and the strategy of the unipole 125
2 SEAL stands for sea, air and land.
3 TACAMO stands for TAke Charge And Move Out.
4 ‘The Air Force and Navy together are developing a new joint air-sea battle concept
for defeating adversaries across the range of military operations, including ad-
versaries equipped with sophisticated anti-access and area denial capabilities. The
concept will address how air and naval forces will integrate capabilities across all
operational domains—air, sea, land, space, and cyberspace—to counter growing
challenges to U.S. freedom of action’ (US Department of Defense 2010a:32).
5 For additional findings regarding the Sino-American military relations and the US
strategy in Asia, see, for example, Philip Saunders and Julia Bowie (2016) and
Nina Silove (2016).
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5 The strategies of the contesters
Introduction
In this chapter, the strategies of the two revisionist contesters, China and
Russia respectively, are explored. Although these two great powers have
applied different alignment strategies during the past two decades, both
responded when the US strategy shifted from a unilateral towards a mul-
tilateral approach. Moreover, both kept their alignment strategy when the
US strategy shifted towards a balance-of-power approach. Regarding the
elements of military strategy, differences regarding both ends and ways
are observed while our findings indicate a similar approach when it comes to
the focus of means.
DOI: 10.4324/9781003157113-5
128 The strategies of the contesters
economic cooperation organisations had increased. The government also
noted that the terrorist attacks against the US on 9/11 had stepped up in-
ternational coordination and cooperation (Chinese State Council 2002).
Two years later, the Chinese government stated that the trends towards
multipolarity and economic globalisation had deepened, causing changes in
the balance of power among the major international actors. According to
the government, the UN was playing an irreplaceable role in international
affairs. At the same time, the government accused the US of both hege-
monism and unilateralism, mentioning the Iraqi War as an example. The
government warned that this behaviour could lead to increased struggle
among the great powers for strategic points, resources and dominance, while
also carrying the risk of causing far-reaching negative effects on interna-
tional and regional security (Chinese State Council 2004).
In 2010, the Chinese government argued that the international strategic
competition was intensifying and concluded that the international balance
of power was changing. The main causes for this were believed to be the
economic strength, growing international status and influence of developing
countries in particular emerging powers. Hence, the prospects for world
multipolarity were becoming clearer, and the prevailing trend was directed
towards a reform of the international system (Chinese State Council 2010).
In 2015, the government observed the development of an information so-
ciety. The government did not only note an enhanced international compe-
tition in the economic, scientific, technological and military fields, but also
increased signs of hegemonism, and neo-interventionism. As the world’s
economic and strategic centre continued to shift to the Asia-Pacific region, the
government expected the US to enhance its military presence and its military
alliances in this region. With concern, the Chinese government observed
Japan overhauling its military and security policies. Taiwan was another
source of worries, and the government accused the Taiwanese authorities of
threatening peaceful cross-straits relations. Unnamed neighbouring states
were accused of not only taking provocative actions but also of illegally oc-
cupying reefs and islands which, according to the government, belonged to the
People’s Republic. Some neighbours were accused of meddling in South
China Sea affairs and/or for constantly conducting air and sea reconnaissance
against China. The government admitted domestic challenges from East
Turkistan as well as from the Tibet independence struggles. Unnamed anti-
China forces were said to attempt to instigate colour revolutions in China
that, if not prevented, could challenge China’s national security and social
stability (Chinese State Council 2015). In 2019, the Chinese government
concluded that the ‘international security system and order are undermined
by growing hegemonism, power politics, unilateralism and constant regional
conflicts and wars’. The government predicted that ‘[i]nternational strategic
competition is on the rise’ (Chinese State Council 2019:3).
In 2002, the government observed the occasional appearance of disputes
in certain regions caused by ethnic or religious tensions as well as
The strategies of the contesters 129
disagreements about territory and resources. The government argued that
this could lead to armed conflicts and local wars. According to the gov-
ernment, the Asia-Pacific region had continued to enjoy peace and stability.
The region was perceived to be the world’s most dynamic region econom-
ically, and the region with the greatest development potential. The gov-
ernment concluded that the strengthened dialogue and cooperation between
several regional organisations were one of the main factors behind the
maintained regional stability, alongside the fact that common development
had become the mainstream policy of the Asian countries. The Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(SCO), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Conference on Interaction
and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), the Council on Security
Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region (CSCAP) and the Northeast Asia
Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD) were all, together with ASEAN, con-
gratulated for their achievements. The establishment of the SCO in 2001
indicated increased Sino-Russian military relations and deepened coopera-
tion. The government argued that following the signing of the Declaration
on the Conduct of Parties, the situation in the South China Sea area had
stabilised. Nevertheless, factors that could cause instability were perceived
to exist in the Asia-Pacific region. In the short term, the government men-
tioned the danger posed by terrorist, separatist and extremist forces. The
tensions in South Asia had not been fundamentally changed and the re-
conciliation on the Korean Peninsula was, according to the government,
moving haltingly. The basic pattern and trend of development in the cross-
Taiwan Straits relationship remained unchanged. In the domestic perspec-
tive, the government welcomed the UNSC’s decision to include the East
Turkistan Islamic Movement on its list of terrorist organisations (Chinese
State Council 2002).
The Asian-Pacific region was given priority in the elaborations on the
regional perspective also in 2004. On the one hand, the tensions between
India and Pakistan were observed to be eased as the two countries were
continuing their peaceful dialogues. On the other hand, the US was accused
of reinforcing its military presence in the region by reinforcing military al-
liances and accelerating the deployment of missile defence systems. The
increased American arms sales to Taiwan, both quantitatively and qualita-
tively, were especially perceived to enhance the unstable situation across the
Taiwan Straits. The developments of the missile defence system and the
increased military activities abroad were used to exemplify Japan’s adjusted
military and security policies (Chinese State Council 2004).
In 2010, the Chinese government observed that some unnamed major
powers were developing specific strategies for the polar regions (Chinese
State Council 2010). Ethnic, religious, border and territorial dispute as well
local and small-scale wars, conflicts and crises were considered causing
general insecurity in several regions also in 2015. The government argued
that terrorism, separatism and extremism had an additional negative impact
130 The strategies of the contesters
on the stability along China’s periphery. The Korean Peninsula and
Northeast Asia were claimed to be shrouded in instability and uncertainty
(Chinese State Council 2015).
The thematic elaborations, presented by the Chinese government in 2002,
included the deepened economic interdependence among nations, the glo-
balisation of the economy and the rapid scientific and technological ad-
vancements. The economic development of the world was perceived to be
unbalanced, and the North–South gap was considered to be widening fur-
ther. The government argued that terrorism, transnational crime, environ-
mental degradation, drug trafficking and other non-traditional security
threats were becoming pronounced globally and regionally. The government
warned that the balance of military power could change dramatically due to
new technologies. The development of technology was moreover argued to
have stretched the battlefield into multidimensional spaces, including both
the traditional domains of land, sea, and air but also the outer space and
electron domains. The government concluded that medium- and long-
distance precision strikes had become an important pattern of modern
military operations. Consequently, the character of war was becoming in-
creasingly information-oriented making the gap between the developed and
developing countries wider than ever before. The government feared that the
outer space was faced with the danger of increased weaponisation and even
a potential arms race (Chinese State Council 2002).
In 2004, the government concluded that confrontation between systems
had become the principal feature of modern warfare. Consequently, asym-
metrical, non-contiguous and non-linear operations were perceived to be
becoming important patterns of military operations. The government ar-
gued that as the world’s major states were stepping up the transformation of
their armed forces by introducing new high-tech weaponry and military
equipment, the generation gap in military technology between information-
based modern forces and traditional mechanised forces were widening ra-
pidly. The role played by military power in safeguarding national interests
was, the government claimed, assuming greater prominence. Other thematic
considerations involved threat posed foremost by terrorism, separatism and
extremism but also by transnational crime, piracy and drug trafficking
(Chinese State Council 2004).
In 2008, the government noted that struggles for strategic resources, lo-
cations and dominance had intensified. Energy and food security were be-
lieved to be becoming more important. Other thematic elaborations
concerned terrorism, environmental disasters, climate change, serious epi-
demics, transnational crime and piracy. Military technology was given
plenty of space in the considerations. The government concluded that as-
pects such as strategic nuclear forces, military astronautics, missile defence
systems, as well as global and battlefield reconnaissance and surveillance
had become top priorities among the major powers when strengthening their
armed forces (Chinese State Council 2008).
The strategies of the contesters 131
The international military competition was still perceived to be fierce in
2010. Major powers were accused of not only accelerating military reforms
and developing new and more sophisticated military technologies but also of
working out strategies for outer space and cyberspace (Chinese State
Council 2010). In 2015, the government’s thematic aspects included in-
security related to energy and other strategic resources, including strategic
sea lines of communication (SLOC) were all thematic aspects elaborated
upon. The revolution in military affairs (RMA) was considered to be par-
ticularly worrisome. Long-range, precise, smart and stealthy as well as un-
manned weapons and equipment were all providing new aspects of the
military dimension, the government argued. Outer space and cyberspace
were given special attention and the government feared increased strategic
competition in these domains among the great powers and other actors
(Chinese State Council 2015; 2019).
5.1.2 Ends
In 2002, the Chinese government presented an international environment of
lasting peace as an overarching value-based end. The end was however not
completely altruistic as it also connected to the objective of creating a fa-
vourable climate in China’s periphery. The articulated ends were also not
only to safeguard world peace but to oppose aggression and expansion. The
government promised that China would never seek hegemony, nor join any
military bloc or crave for any sphere of influence. Quite the contrary, China
was portrayed as opposing the policies of war, aggression and expansion.
Furthermore, the government declared that China took a position against
arms races and for the efforts of the international community to solve in-
ternational disputes peacefully. Notably, the government endorsed activities
conducted to maintain the global strategic balance (Chinese State Council
2002). The Chinese authorities continued to present the Chinese national
interests in an altruistic manner in 2004. Outward-looking ends, such as
pursuing international peace, mutual trust and benefit, and securing a fa-
vourable international strategic environment were articulated. To increase
China’s overall national strength, inward-looking ends such as safeguarding
the interests of national development and promoting domestic economic and
social development were also identified (Chinese State Council 2004).
The aim of maintaining world peace and stability was repeated in 2010.
China’s new security concept included not only aspects of mutual trust and
benefit, but also equality. It also advocated the settlement of international
disputes and regional flashpoint issues through peaceful means. The gov-
ernment opposed the threat of and the actual use of force, and acts of ag-
gression and/or expansion. It also declared its opposition to hegemony and
power politics in any form (Chinese State Council 2010). The key objectives
of China’s security policy in 2015 were to pursue development and to
maintain an independent foreign policy of peace. The Chinese strategy was
132 The strategies of the contesters
said to be defensive, opposing hegemonism and power politics in all forms.
The government again promised that China would never seek hegemony or
expansion. Instead, the Chinese armed forces were to remain a staunch force
in maintaining world peace (Chinese State Council 2015).
The threat-related ends presented in 2002 focused on safeguarding state
sovereignty, the territorial integrity and the security of the People’s Republic.
The government declared China’s territorial land, inland waters, territorial
seas and territorial airspace as inviolable. Consequently, fundamental objec-
tives were to consolidate the national defence as well as preventing and re-
sisting aggression (Chinese State Council 2002). Arguably, the Chinese
government feared being left behind in the increased pace of military in-
novation. As a result, an explicitly declared end was to build a strong military
by using science and technology. The objective of the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) was hence to improve its combat capabilities by taking ad-
vantage of scientific and technological developments (Chinese State Council
2004). Upholding national security was mentioned as an overarching end also
in 2008. This end was used as a framework when presenting the key objectives
of the armed forces. Achieving a coordinated development of China’s na-
tional defence, enhancing the Chinese armed forces’ performance, im-
plementing the active defence as well as pursuing a self-defence nuclear were
mentioned in this context (Chinese State Council 2008).
In 2010, core objectives were to safeguard national sovereignty, security
and interests of national development. Notably, China’s armed forces were
tasked with not only guarding against and resisting aggression but also with
defending the security of China’s lands, inland waters, territorial waters and
airspace. Key objectives were also to safeguard China’s maritime rights and
interests, as well as maintaining its security interests in space, electro-
magnetic space and cyberspace (Chinese State Council 2010). In 2015,
safeguarding China’s sovereignty and security was still the overarching end.
Achieving this aim required unswerving adherence to the principle of the
Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) absolute leadership. This meant that
upholding combat effectiveness and following the CCP’s commands were
the two core objectives of the Chinese armed forces (Chinese State Council
2015). Opposing and containing Taiwanese ambitions for independence,
cracking down on separatist movements such as the ones calling for in-
dependence for Tibet and East Turkistan were specific objectives presented
by the government in 2019 (Chinese State Council 2019).
Notably, ends related to China’s needs were not always present in the
policy documents. In 2008, the government concluded that the Chinese
economy had become an important part of the global economy, and noted
that China had become an important member of the international system.
Since China was expected to increasingly connect with the international
community in the future, the government argued that China could not
develop in isolation from the rest of the world, nor could the world
enjoy prosperity and stability without China. Therefore, the government
The strategies of the contesters 133
announced the overarching end of building a harmonious world of enduring
peace and common prosperity together with other countries (Chinese State
Council 2008).
In 2015, China’s destiny was considered to be vitally interrelated with that
of the world. The government concluded that a prosperous and stable world
would provide China with opportunities. On the other hand, the govern-
ment argued that China’s peaceful development also offered an opportunity
for the whole world. Consequently, safeguarding China’s territorial in-
tegrity, national sovereignty and maritime rights, as well as its development
interests and national unity were key objectives. Especially the maritime
dimension was in focus in the policy documents. Hence, protecting the se-
curity of strategic SLOCs and China’s overseas interests were considered
core objectives. In the short term, ensuring the ability to participate in in-
ternational maritime cooperation was fundamental to the government. In
the long term, the capacity to build China into a maritime power was
considered a necessity. In addition to the maritime domain, developing good
military relations with African, European, Latin American and Southern
Pacific counterparts was a key task given to the armed forces. Therefore
priority was given to the security cooperation in the SCO, and the partici-
pation in multilateral dialogues and cooperation mechanisms such as the
ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM+), Shangri-La Dialogue
(SLD), Jakarta International Defence Dialogue (JIDD) and Western Pacific
Naval Symposium (WPNS) (Chinese State Council 2015).
It is noteworthy that the ends related to vulnerabilities presented in 2002
had both an internal and an external dimension. On the one hand, the end of
safeguarding China’s security was related to the safeguarding of China’s
unity. Therefore, maintaining and promoting public order and social har-
mony as well as preventing armed subversion, including terrorism, separ-
atism and extremism, and upholding social stability were all mentioned as
key objectives. Since the People’s Republic considered Taiwan an inalien-
able part of China, promoting the principles of ‘peaceful reunification’ and
‘one country, two systems’, preventing further separatism and realising the
‘reunification of the motherland’ were parts of this logic. On the other hand,
the armed forces’ key task was to conduct defensive military operations
(Chinese State Council 2002).
In 2004, compared to the previous elaboration, the government changed
tone regarding its relations with Taiwan. It was declared a responsibility
of the Chinese armed forces to stop all attempts of the Taiwanese regime
from splitting the country. The government stated that should the
Taiwanese authorities go too far in their efforts regarding indepen-
dence from mainland China, the Chinese armed forces and the Chinese
people would resolutely and thoroughly crush such an attempt at any cost
(Chinese State Council 2004). Upholding national unity and ensuring the
interests of national development were mentioned as core objectives also in
2008 (Chinese State Council 2008).
134 The strategies of the contesters
In 2015, the Chinese armed forces were tasked with dealing with a wide
range of emergencies and military threats. Several objectives related to
perceived vulnerability were articulated: (i) to safeguard the sovereignty and
security of China’s territorial land, air and sea; (ii) to safeguard the uni-
fication of the People’s Republic; (iii) to safeguard China’s security and
interests in new domains; (iv) to maintain strategic deterrence and the ca-
pacity carrying out nuclear counterattack; and (v) to strengthen efforts
against infiltration, separatism and terrorism in order to maintain China’s
political security and social stability (Chinese State Council 2015).
5.1.3 Means
Table 5.1 indicates that China’s defence expenditures in local currency have
increased each year over the time period 2001–2019. The accumulated
growth in defence expenditures manifests itself by the fact that China’s
annual defence expenditure in local currency in 2019 was almost eight times
higher than in 2001. Measured in constant USD (2018), China’s annual
defence expenditure in 2001 was 51,980 million USD. In 2019, China’s de-
fence expenditures had increased to 266,449 million USD, this is more than
five times the spending in 2001 (SIPRI 2020b).
Regarding traditional means, the PLA was made up of both active and
reserve components with a strength of almost 2,500,000 personnel. The main
components of the PLA consisted of the army, the navy, the air force and
the second artillery force. The Central Military Commission (CMC) as-
sumed the unified command of China’s armed forces. The army of the PLA
was divided into seven military area commands. The air force organised an
air command in each of the seven military areas of the army. The artillery
force was composed of the ground-to-ground strategic nuclear missile force
and the conventional operational-tactical missile force (Chinese State
Council 2002). In 2004, the PLA was to build on qualitative efficiency in-
stead of a mere quantitative scale when transforming the military from a
manpower-intensive to a technology-intensive force. Consequently, the
The strategies of the contesters 135
government announced its decision to reduce the personnel strength by
200,000 troops by the end of 2005. The bulk of these reductions was to take
place within the army. The navy was to speed up the process of updating its
weaponry and equipment, with priority given to the development of new
combat ships and various special-purpose aircraft. Regarding the air force,
the emphasis was placed on the development of new fighters, air defence and
anti-missile weapons, and means of information operations. The capabilities
for airstrikes, air defence, information countermeasures, early warning, re-
connaissance, and strategic mobility were to be improved. By upgrading the
current missiles, stepping up the research on future missile technology, and
supporting equipment for command, communications and reconnaissance,
the second artillery force was to enhance its strength and efficiency even
further (Chinese State Council 2004).
In 2008, the government observed that decreasing the number of per-
sonnel had enabled an acceleration in the development of weaponry and
equipment. The bulk of the army included 18 combined corps and some
independent combined operational divisions and brigades. Gradually, the
army was to make its units small, modular and multi-functional through
downsizing and structural reform. Key developments included light me-
chanised and information countermeasure forces, as well as special opera-
tions forces. Priority was given to developing operational and tactical
missiles, ground-to-air missiles and to capabilities for air-ground integrated
operations, long-distance manoeuvres, and rapid assaults. The navy was to
organise three fleets. The new naval equipment was aimed at integrated sea-
air capabilities for offshore defensive operations and included new types of
submarines, destroyers, frigates and aircraft. The new air force equipment
also aimed at trans-domain operations including air-land capabilities for
both offensive and defensive operations. New aircraft, as well as new
ground-to-air missiles, were at the top of the procurement list (Chinese State
Council 2008). In 2010, the government stressed the necessity to create an
army consisting of heavy, light, amphibious and airborne assault forces. The
artillery branch component was to continue developing new types of
weapons, equipment, and ammunition, forming operational as well as tac-
tical in-depth strike system, able of carrying out precision operations with
integrated reconnaissance, control, strike, and assessment capabilities. The
air defence branch had already stepped up the development of new types of
radar as well as medium- and high-altitude ground-to-air missiles.
According to the government, the army’s aviation branch had upgraded
armed helicopters, transport and service helicopters, and significantly im-
proved its capabilities in airstrike, force projection, and support. The en-
gineering and chemical defence branches had also developed increased
capacities in various aspects. The government claimed that the navy had
improved its capacity to conduct operations in distant waters and in
countering non-traditional security threats. Furthermore, the air force had
achieved enhanced abilities to carry out airstrikes, air and missile defence,
136 The strategies of the contesters
and strategic projection also in complex electromagnetic environments
(Chinese State Council 2010).
In 2015, the combat forces of each of the services were to be further in-
tegrated to increase the ability to achieve information dominance and
conduct precision strikes and joint operations. The strategic requirement of
mobile operations was to be met with a reorientation of the ground forces
from theatre defence to trans-theatre mobility. The number of small, multi-
functional and modular units was to increase. To enhance the capacity for
offshore waters defence and open sea protection, the navy was directed to
establish a combined, multi-functional and efficient marine combat force
structure. In addition, the navy was to enhance its capabilities for strategic
deterrence and counterattack, maritime manoeuvres and joint operations at
Table 5.2 The main traditional units and equipment of the Chinese armed forces
2000–2020
ARMY
Army HQ 0 0 13
Corps HQ 22 19 0
Tank Division 11 8 1
Tank Brigade 12 8 27
Mechanized Division 7 8 1
Mechanized Brigade 0 7 23
Infantry Division 54 15 21
Infantry Brigade 20 21 28
Airborne Division 3 3 0
Airborne brigade 0 0 2
Special Forces Brigade ? ? 15
MBT 7,060 6,550 5,850
APC/AIFV 4,800 4,400 9,750
Attack Helicopter ? 126 270
NAVY
Tactical Submarine 64 62 55
Carrier 0 0 1
Cruiser 0 0 1
Destroyer 20 28 28
Amphibious Landing Ship 59 84 122
Marine Infantry Division 0 2 0
Marine Infantry Brigade 2 3 12
Special Forces Brigade ? ? 1
Naval Aviation Bomber 25 50 35
Naval Aviation Fighter/ 280 222 283
Attack
AIR FORCE (Tactical Aviation)
Fighter/Attack 1,800 283 934
Fighter 915 1,100 759
Bombers 120 82 176
Table 5.3 The main airborne enablers of the Chinese armed forces 2000–2020
SLBM
CSS-N-3 / aboard Xia 12 / 1 12 / 1 0
CSS-NX-4 / aboard Jin 0 12 / 1 48/4
ICBM
CSS-4 20 20 20
CSS-3 0 10 10
CSS-9 0 36 0
CSS-10 0 0 50
CSS-20 0 0 18
STRATEGIC BOMBER
Xian H-6 ? 20? ?
5.1.4 Ways
Regarding the different situations for using military force, the government
explicitly declared that China had implemented a military strategy of self-
defence and that the country, therefore, would only attack potential adver-
saries after being attacked. The government announced the strategy was based
on winning local wars under modern, especially high-tech, conditions and
stressed the importance of deterring war. In addition, the government claimed
to adopt an active attitude towards the UN’s reforms on peacekeeping op-
erations and articulated hopes that these reforms would make these operations
more efficient. The government also presented statistics regarding Chinese
contributions to international peacekeeping efforts. According to the govern-
ment, until 2002 China had contributed with about 650 military observers,
liaison officers, advisors and staff officers as well as approximately 800 en-
gineering troops. During 2002 alone, 53 Chinese military observers were de-
ployed in six different peace support operations. The government announced
its readiness to provide the UN peacekeeping operations with engineering,
medical, transportation and other logistical support teams at appropriate times
(Chinese State Council 2002). The government did not release much in-
formation about the Chinese way of waging modern wars. However, in 2004,
the government indicated increased ambitions when contributing to UN-led
peacekeeping operations. According to the government, engineering units had
been deployed to Cambodia, engineering and medical units to the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC), and transportation, engineering and medical
units to Liberia. In addition, China had continued to assist in international
mine clearance efforts, especially in Eritrea (Chinese State Council 2004).
In 2008, the government announced that it had formulated a new military
strategic guideline of active defence, both as a response to new trends in
140 The strategies of the contesters
global military developments and the requirements of China’s national se-
curity. This new guideline made clear that the ambition was to win local
wars. The government also stressed the importance of preventing and de-
fusing crises as well as deterring wars. Other contexts for the use of force
considered by the government included counter-terrorism operations, sta-
bility operations, rescue operations and international peacekeeping.
Notably, the government considered all these developments as consistent
with the strategic concept of people’s war. The number of deployments of
units to UN-led operations indicated that the Chinese government was
prepared to put action behind its words of increased ambitions concerning
contributing to international peacekeeping efforts. As of the end of
November 2008, China had 1,949 military personnel serving in nine UN
missions. Engineering, transportation and medical troops were deployed to
Liberia as well as to the Sudan, engineering and medical troops to the DRC
and Lebanon, and engineering troops were deployed to Darfur (Chinese
State Council 2008).
In 2010, besides UN-led peacekeeping operations, maritime escort, in-
ternational counter-terrorism cooperation and disaster relief operations
were mentioned as important contexts for the Chinese use of military force.
The government proudly announced that as of December 2010, China had
dispatched 17,390 military personnel to 19 UN peacekeeping missions as
well as deployed 18 ships, 16 helicopters, and 490 Special Operation soldiers
to naval escort missions. According to the government, the achievements of
the Chinese armed forces participating in UN-led operations included
building and repairing over 8,700 kilometres of roads and 270 bridges,
clearing over 8,900 mines and various explosive devices, transporting over
600,000 tons of cargo across a total distance of 9.3 million kilometres and
treating about 79,000 patients. Concurrently, the Chinese Navy had pro-
tected 3,139 ships, rescued 29 ships from pirate attacks and recovered nine
ships released from captivity (Chinese State Council 2010).
In 2015, in response to the new requirement emerging from China’s
growing strategic interests, the government declared that the armed forces
would participate actively in both regional and international security co-
operation in order to secure China’s interests overseas. Consequently, the
balancing between different operational demands concerned warfighting,
war preparation, war prevention, protection of national rights, stability
maintenance, deterrence and employment of military forces in peacetime.
Priority was therefore given to planning proactively for military struggle in
all directions and domains. The government stated that the concept for joint
operations built on a concentration of superior forces and on making in-
tegrated use of all operational means and methods. Moreover, upholding
the CCC’s absolute leadership over the military was not an option but a
precondition.
Simultaneously, the government opened up for expanding its military
cooperation with other major powers, as well as with neighbouring and/or
The strategies of the contesters 141
developing countries. It is evident that the government promoted the es-
tablishment of a regional framework for military cooperation. In addition,
the government expected this cooperation to focus on stability maintenance,
counter-terrorism operations, emergency rescue, disaster relief, emergency
support and air support operations. Regardless of whether these different
kind of operations were to be conducted within a regional framework or not,
the preparations for military operations other than war (MOOTW) was
given particular attention. The government also declared that China’s armed
forces were to enhance their cooperation with the Russian military within
the framework of the comprehensive strategic partnership between the two
countries. The Chinese military was also directed to continue its participa-
tion in UN-led peacekeeping missions and the international escort missions
in the Gulf of Aden. The government explicitly declared its ambition to both
gradually intensify China’s participation in international peacekeeping ac-
tivities, as well as to shoulder even more international responsibilities and
obligations within the military domain (Chinese State Council 2015). Four
years later, the government shed light on the establishment of the forward
support base in Djibouti and the successfully conducted evacuation opera-
tion in Yemen when ‘621 Chinese citizens and 279 foreign citizens from 15
countries were evacuated (Chinese State Council 2019:15). In Table 5.5, the
main deployments of armed units abroad are summarised.
Table 5.5 The main Chinese deployments of armed units abroad 2000–2020
INTERNATIONAL PSOs
DR Congo (MONUC/MONUSCO) 0 218 232
Lebanon (UNIFIL) 0 344 419
Liberia (UNMIL) 0 566 0
Mali (MINUSMA) 0 0 421
Sudan (UNAMID) 0 325 0
Sudan/South Sudan (UNMIS/ 0 444 1,057
UNMISS)
MARITIME OPERATIONS
Djibouti 0 0 240 marines
Indian Ocean 0 2 Frigates 1 Destroyer, 1 Frigate
So what does this imply when it comes to the Chinese defence strategy?
Regarding responses to the three strategies pursued by the different US
administrations, the Chinese government responded to the Bush adminis-
tration’s strategy of primacy by increasing its efforts to modernise its armed
forces to protect itself against what it described as hegemonism and neo-
interventionism. The Chinese government does not seem to have changed its
strategy during the Obama administration. Instead, efforts of internal bal-
ancing were complemented with increased efforts of collective defence bal-
ancing with Russia and deepened security cooperation with other states in
the region. One reason for this may be that the Obama administration’s
strategy of cooperative security was pursued with less consistency in East
Asia since the US perceived China as a growing power and potential future
challenger to the US. The US’s strategy towards East Asia may therefore
have been already during the Obama administration perceived as a strategy
of selective engagements and the Trump administration’s increasingly con-
frontational policies towards China did nothing to change this. China’s
military strategies with its focus on vulnerabilities to both internal and
The strategies of the contesters 147
external threats, traditional means and war prevention are consistent with
the government’s efforts of internal balancing.
We appreciate Avery Goldstein’s comparison between Bismarck’s
Germany and twenty-first-century China and the description of both as rising
powers. However, we do not fully agree with the conclusion that con-
temporary China is ‘without the availability of allies that could effectively tip
the balance of power’. Arguably, while the distinction between a partnership
and a formal alliance goes in line with our conclusions, the claims that
‘Beijing’s strategy does not feature a revisionist international agenda’ and that
China does not ‘challenge status quo’ do not. In its reports on defence policy,
the Chinese government identified China as one of the emergent powers that
will contribute to the development of a new multipolar world order and it
expressed concern regarding growing economic and military imbalances and
hegemonic tendencies. Therefore, the Chinese government’s analysis of the
present global order and its own place within this order better matches that of
a leading dissatisfied power within the context of a unipolar order similar to
that described by HST and PTT (Goldstein 2005:206 and 216). Consequently,
we also disagree with Michael Swaine and Ashley Tellis when arguing that the
Chinese government strive to avoid any great power competition and that the
Chinese revisionism was minimal before 2015 (Swaine and Tellis 2000). We
rather support Øystein Tunsjø when concluding that full-fledged ‘balancing
and global contestation is likely to be the next [Chinese] phase in resisting the
unbalanced unipolar structure and the rules governing the international
system’ (Tunsjø 2017:289).
Notably, Yi Edward Yang and his colleagues have concluded that the
current Xi Jinping leadership tend to view cooperative strategies as less
important, indicating that China’s present strategy of social mobility may
change to a strategy of social competition. As Andrew Erickson remind us,
China is still governed by a communist party with no ideological attachment
to the liberal international order and China’s emergence as a sea power may
lead to a retreat of the liberal international maritime order. Moreover,
China’s closer cooperation with Russia may be interpreted as a step towards
a ‘rising illiberal continental order’ (Erickson 2019:89–90). Therefore, we
find that Yang and his colleagues’ conclusion that ‘China is likely to take a
status quo approach to the international system unless it is confronted by
some dramatic pressure or provocation’ may be too optimistic (Yang et al
2017:599. See also Weissmann 2015). Obviously, we agree with Thomas
Rotnem when arguing that China and Russia have realised ‘their shared
interests in challenging the United States’ position as the major power in the
unipolar world order’ (Rotnem 2014:193). Joel Wuthnow has captured this
flexibility in the variation in China’s strategy across its periphery. His
findings on the different strategies for maritime Asia compared to con-
tinental Asia are interesting. Notably, he concludes that while the former
strategy aims at contesting US influence, the latter strategy ‘views US pre-
sence as, at most, a secondary problem […] In sum, China faces a different
148 The strategies of the contesters
balance of threats in maritime and continental Asia and has adopted stra-
tegies at the sub-regional level that reflect those differences’ (Wuthnow
2018:239). While we support his first conclusion, we do not fully agree with
the second and will return to the sub-regional level below.
We agree with Russell Ong when concluding that the decline in Russian
power and, hence, the threat against China along its northern borders, has
to be considered as a major military gain for China. Arguably, his ob-
servations that ‘China does not see the need to keep any permanent align-
ment’ and that some form of Sino-Russian coordination might emerge in the
twenty-first century go in line with our findings in this regard (Ong
2007:126). We also agree with Andrew Nathan and Andrew Scobell when
arguing that China is not a satisfied power and that the increased Chinese
military power is challenging the balance of power in Asia. However, we do
not support their conclusion that China militarily ‘remains almost ex-
clusively concerned with missions within and around its own borders’.
Neither do we agree that there are no signs that China intends to ‘compete
with Western military influence’ (Nathan and Scobell 2012:345–347). In this
regard, we rather support Larry Wortzel when we observed the Chinese
navy’s increased blue water capacity. We find his argument that the Chinese
at-sea refuelling capability and the continued deployment of support ships
have enabled the Chinese to reach further abroad ‘to other continents’
compelling. Wortzel’s conclusions on China’s nuclear submarines, changed
‘deterrence posture’, increase power projection capability as well as on im-
proved air and sealift capacity are in line with our findings. We agree that
the CCP is dependent on the ground forces to maintain social stability and
that the army will continue to have a domestic focus (Wortzel 2013:166–167.
See also Lee 2011; Saunders and Scobell 2015; Tunsjø 2017).
Already in 2007, Taylor Fravel predicted that frontier defence would re-
main the core mission for China’s ground forces, involving almost half of
the troops. We agree with his observation, at least when it comes to the
Chinese army, that China’s force structure can be considered consistent with
a defensive doctrine for securing its borders. However, the force deploy-
ments, which includes light infantry units stationed on the border that are
capable of offensive operations based in the interior, can rather swiftly be
changed (Fravel 2007). As notified by Richard Bitzinger, China has orga-
nised a rapid reaction force including airborne and amphibious divisions as
well as special operations forces ‘equipped and trained to carry out rapid
attacks’ (Bitzinger 2011:15). Even if this force is relatively modest compared
to the total capacity of the PLA, it projects an impressive offensive capacity.
Consequently, we do not fully agree with Liu Feng when arguing that China
has neither the willingness nor the capacity to shake the existing regional
order. We rather support his remarks on China’s ‘active engagement with
the world beyond’ (Feng 2016:179). In this regard, we find Liselotte
Odgaard’s remarks on the Chinese ‘strategy of peaceful coexistence and
active defense’ (Odgaard 2017:132). As Odgaard, Robert Ross has analysed
The strategies of the contesters 149
the strategic settings in East Asia. We find his arguments on regional bi-
polarity between China and the US compelling. However, his research fo-
cuses on the alignment strategies of the secondary powers rather than on the
two great powers (Ross 2006. See also Tow and Rigby 2011; Storey 2012;
Zhang 2012).
Arguably, James Fanell’s arguments regarding China’s military forces,
‘particularly its navy, air force, missile forces, and rapidly expanding marine
corps, as the arbiters of a new global order – one that stands opposed to
U.S. national interests and values and those of our friends and allies’ pro-
vide further support for our conclusions regarding China as a potential
challenger to the present liberal international order (Fanell 2019:17–18).
However, we note that Dennis Blasko argued that the long-range precision
strike capability of the second artillery, the navy and the air force were
prioritised over the long-distance deployability of conventional airborne,
marine and amphibious forces. We agree with his observation that having
no formal alliance obligation, the Chinese armed forces lack ‘real world
operational experience’ and only a small part of the PLA ‘has taken part in
overseas missions’. Moreover, these overseas deployments have all been
‘concentrated on non-traditional security tasks and mostly focused on small
units’ (Blasko 2006:227–228). Arguably, Ka Po Ng’s conclusion regarding
the Chinese focus on conventional deterrence support our argument on war
prevention (Ng 2005). Tilman Pradt, on the other hand, argues that China is
gaining more experience with the annual military exercises within the SCO-
frames. He concludes that the Chinese military modernisation programme
has its focus on power projection capabilities. We find that his conclusions
regarding China militarily bolstering partners rather than forming formal
alliances are in line with our observations and appreciate his elaboration on
China’s military diplomacy (Pradt 2016. See also Allen et al. 2017). We agree
with Taylor Fravel when he argues that in the short to medium term, it is
likely that Taiwan, the Sino-Indian border and the disputes in the South
China Sea will continue occupying the focus of Chinese strategic attention.
We also agree with Fravel when he stresses that the new military missions of
the Chinese armed forces ‘should be closely followed’ (Fravel 2019:276).
5.2.2 Ends
The Russian government identified several value-based ends. Examples in-
cluded on the individual level, the safeguarding of constitutional rights and
freedoms, as well as of personal security. Other examples included improved
quality of life and living standards, as well as physical, spiritual, and in-
tellectual development. At the societal level, key objectives were the con-
solidation of democracy, the attainment and maintenance of social accord,
the enhancement of the population’s creative activeness, and the spiritual
renaissance of Russia were identified as the key objectives. At the state level,
protecting the constitutional system, implementing and maintaining law and
order and developing international cooperation based on partnership were
the key objectives (President of the Russian Federation 1997).
In 2000, the Russian government articulated national ends and interests
referring to different spheres. The government declared that the national
interests in the spiritual sphere lie in preserving and strengthening the moral
values, traditions of patriotism and humanism, as well as the cultural and
scientific heritage of the Russian society (President of the Russian
Federation 2000a). Gaining influence in the general processes and positions
in the international system was perceived as important for achieving
Russia’s national interests. However, this end was also given an altruistic
dimension, with Russia described as using its influence and position to form
The strategies of the contesters 155
a stable, just and democratic world order built on the recognition of the
norms of international law, including the principles of the UN Charter, and
equitable relations among states. The international position was also said to
support domestic reforms enhancing the standards of living, successfully
implementing the transformation to democracy, strengthening the con-
stitutional system as well as ensuring individual rights and freedoms
(President of the Russian Federation 2000c). Another value-based end was
to globally promote an objective Russian as a democratic state committed to
a socially-oriented market economy with an independent foreign policy was
another value-based end presented in the FSCs (President of the Russian
Federation 2008). Domestically, values were perhaps even more important.
The government’s inward-looking objectives included social harmony, based
on shared values and humanism, peaceful coexistence and cultural unity of
Russia’s multinational population, as well as respect for family traditions
and patriotism (President of the Russian Federation 2009).
The core objectives presented in the 2014 FPC were to promote interna-
tional peace, universal security and stability. The purpose of these objectives
was declared to be the establishment of a just and democratic system in
international relations, based on collective decision-making and the primacy
of international law, with the UN as the principal organisation regulating
international relations. Strengthening the rule of law and democratic in-
stitutions, and ensuring human rights and freedoms were also key objectives
(President of the Russian Federation 2013). These value-related topics were
of course interpreted from a Russian perspective, this was further under-
scored through another end dictating that the Russian approach to human
rights issues should be promoted in international forums (President of the
Russian Federation 2013).
In wartime, the government’s key objectives were: (i) ensuring military aid
to Russia’s allies and mobilising their potential for achieving joint objec-
tives; (ii) preventing neutral states enlisting to the war on the side of the
aggressor; and (iii) forcing the aggressor to end the war at an early stage in
order to restore international security and peace (President of the Russian
Federation 2000b). A core end in the 2000 FPC was preserving and
strengthening Russia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. In this regard,
additional objectives were to form a circle of good neighbourhoods along
Russia’s borders, to eliminate existing (and prevent the emergence of) po-
tential tensions and conflicts in regions adjacent to Russia (President of the
Russian Federation 2000c).
Similarly, in the 2013 FSC core objectives were ensuring the security of
the country as well as protecting and strengthening its sovereignty and
territorial integrity. On the one hand, the Russian government emphasised
the importance of good neighbourhood relations and declared its interest in
the normalisation of Russian-Georgian relations. On the other hand, the
government gave priority to assisting the Republic of Abkhazia and the
Republic of South Ossetia in their developments towards modern
156 The strategies of the contesters
democratic states. Strengthening their international positions, ensuring their
security and supporting their social and economic recovery were declared as
Russian objectives (President of the Russian Federation 2013). Notably, an
objective of the armed forces was to neutralise potential threats in not only
the context of dangers and threat directed towards Russia’s military in-
strument but also in the case of threats towards Russia’s political, diplo-
matic and other non-military instruments of power (President of the Russian
Federation 2014).
The needs identified by the Russian government had both external and
internal dimensions. Regarding the external dimensions, a fundamental end
was to consolidate Russia’s positions as a great power, this meant being in
the centres of influence in the developing multipolar world. Internal di-
mensions included several aspects, such as neutralising the conditions sup-
porting and/or promoting the emergence of social and inter-ethnic conflicts,
as well as national and regional separatism within the Russian Federation.
Establishing political, economic, and social stability within the Federation
was also an end articulated for the domestic arena. Consequently, pro-
moting Russia’s unity and ensuring Russia’s development towards a mul-
tinational democratic federative state were two central objectives (President
of the Russian Federation 1997).
Three years later, Russia’s national interests in the international sphere
were to uphold the country’s sovereignty as well as strengthening its position
as a great power and as one of the centres of the multipolar world order
(President of the Russian Federation 2000a). In the 2000 FPC, it was argued
that Russia sought to achieve a firm and prestigious position in the world
community, consistent with Russia’s self-image as a great power and as one
of the most influential poles in the international system. The position was
however not necessarily an end in itself. Instead, the government considered
that a prestigious position was a precondition for the growth of Russia’s
political, economic, intellectual and spiritual potential. Ensuring conformity
of multilateral and bilateral cooperation with the other members of the CIS
regarding national security and strengthening the union between Belarus
and Russia were prioritised objectives (President of the Russian Federation
2000c). Eight years later, in 2008, the new FPC stressed that achieving a
strong position of authority in the world community included meeting the
interests of Russia as one of the influential centres in international politics
and creating favourable external conditions for Russia’s modernisation
process(President of the Russian Federation 2008). Clearly, transforming
Russia into a world power within a multipolar world was an overarching
end of the government (President of the Russian Federation 2009).
Likewise, in 2013, a cornerstone in the government’s elaborations was to
secure Russia’s high standing in the international community as one of the
influential and competitive poles of the modern multipolar world order. In
addition, crucial ends were to create favourable external conditions for a
steady growth of the Russian economy and strengthen Russia’s positions in
The strategies of the contesters 157
the global trade and economic system (President of the Russian Federation
2013). Expanding the range of partners and developing cooperation with
other states based on common interests were two objectives of the military
policy (President of the Russian Federation 2014). Consolidating Russia’s
status as a leading world power was a central objective also in the 2015 NSS
(President of the Russian Federation 2015).
The Russian government perceived several vulnerabilities. For example,
Russia was expected to lag far behind developed countries in terms of science
and technology. In addition, Russia increasingly depended on imports of
food, consumer goods, equipment, and technologies. Furthermore, both the
external and internal state debts were growing. Russia’s economic, scientific,
and demographic potential was declining, as were the markets and raw ma-
terial infrastructure of Russian industry. Consequently, key Russian objec-
tives were to stabilise the economy and create preconditions for production
growth because of the structural restructuring of industry (President of the
Russian Federation 1997). Three years later, vital components of Russia’s
national interests were still to protect the state, the individual and the society
from terrorism, natural and man-made emergencies and their consequences,
and from dangers and consequences arising from armed hostilities, and ulti-
mately from war (President of the Russian Federation 2000a).
5.2.3 Means
Similar to China, Russia’s defence expenditures in local currency have in-
creased, as indicated in Table 5.8. Likewise, Russia’s defence expenditures
show an exceptionally steady increase each year, with the exception of 2017
and 2018. The accumulated growth in defence expenditures manifests itself
in the fact Russia’s annual defence expenditure in local currency in 2019 was
more than 12 times higher than it was in 2001. Measured in constant USD
(2018) Russia’s annual defence expenditure in 2001 was 25,162 million
USD. In 2019, Russia’s defence expenditures had increased to 64,144 million
USD, that is two and a half times more than in 2001 (SIPRI 2020b). The
ARMY
Army HQ 6 7 12
Corps HQ 3 0 1
Tank Division 5 0 6
Tank Brigade 0 4 15
Mechanized Division 21 0 3
Mechanized Brigade 9 34 26
Airborne Division 4 4 4
Airborne brigade 3 2 4
Special Forces Brigade 7 9 9
MBT 21,820 23,000 13,000
APC/AIFV 25,975 25,080 25,760
Attack Helicopter 900 635 393
NAVY
Tactical Submarine 43 52 39
Carrier 1 1 1
Cruiser 7 5 4
Destroyer 17 14 13
Amphibious Landing Ship 25 23 20
Marine Infantry Division 1 1 0
Marine Infantry Brigade 2 3 8
Special Forces Brigade 3 3 4
Naval Aviation Bomber 45 56 ?
Naval Aviation Fighter/Attack 114 131 157
AIR FORCE (Tactical Aviation)
Fighter/Attack 575 807 708
Fighter 880 725 180
Recce 135 119 58
Table 5.10 The main airborne enablers of the Russian armed forces 2000–2020
In 1997, the most important task for Russia’s armed forces was to ensure
nuclear deterrence. Consequently, having nuclear forces with the potential of
inflicting the required damage on any aggressor state or coalition of states
was regarded as a necessity, not as an option (President of the Russian
Federation 1997). Three years later the Russian government declared its
preparedness for a further reduction of Russia’s nuclear potential based on
bilateral agreements with the US. The government also announced its
willingness to preserve the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile
Systems of 1972. Simultaneously, the government made clear that if the US
implemented its plans to create a national missile defence system, it would
inevitably compel Russia to adopt adequate measures for maintaining its
similar systems at a proper level (President of the Russian Federation
2000c). Eight years later, the government announced that it was prepared to
negotiate with all nuclear powers, and not only with the US, on a reduction
of strategic offensive weapons including intercontinental ballistic missiles,
submarine-launched ballistic missiles as well as heavy bombers and the
warheads they carry. However, a minimum level, sufficient to maintain
strategic stability, was to be kept. In addition, the government made clear
that it opposed any attempts to develop and deploy new types of weapons,
such as low-yield nuclear warheads, non-nuclear intercontinental ballistic
The strategies of the contesters 161
missiles, and strategic anti-missile systems (President of the Russian
Federation 2008). The 2010 military doctrine gave high priority to the
functioning of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces and missile early warning
systems, but also its nuclear munitions storage facilities, nuclear energy
facilities, as well as atomic and chemical industry facilities (President of the
Russian Federation 2010). In Table 5.11, the Russian strategic nuclear
forces are summarised.
SLBM
SS-N-8/aboard Delta I 64/4 0 0
SS-N-18/aboard Delta III 208/13 80/5 16/1
SS-N-20/aboard Typhoon 120/6 60/3 20/1
SS-N-23/aboard Delta IV 112/7 96/6 96/6
SS-N-32/aboard Dolgorukiy 0 0 48/3
ICBM
SS-18 Satan 180 68 46
SS-19 Stiletto 160 72 30
SS-24 Scalpel 46 0 0
RS-24 Yars 0 0 150
SS-25 Sickle 370 180 36
SS-27 Topol 20 65 78
STRATEGIC BOMBER
Tu-22 Blinder 158 0 0
Tu-95 Bear 68 63 60
Tu-160 Blackjack 15 16 16
Tu-22M Backfire 0 0 62
5.2.4 Ways
Regarding the situations, the Russian government considered the whole
spectrum ranging from nuclear war through large-scale conventional wars,
regional wars, local wars, to peace-keeping and preventive deployment
(President of the Russian Federation 1997). Three years later, more em-
phasis was put on effective coordination and cooperation with the other CIS
member states (President of the Russian Federation 2000a). The following
military doctrine presented a dramatic change in the Russian strategy. For
the first time, it was explicitly stated that Russia reserved the right to use
nuclear weapons when responding to any attack involving WMD. In ad-
dition, the doctrine reaffirmed Russia’s assurance to other CIS members,
including the extension of Russia’s nuclear umbrella to its allies.
Furthermore, the government authorised the use of nuclear weapons in
response to large-scale conventional aggression when the national security
of the Russian Federation was at stake.
The government identified six main ways of utilising the Russian armed
forces: (i) strategic operations, operations, and combat operations in large-
scale as well as in regional wars; (ii) operations and combat operations in local
wars as well as in international armed conflicts; (iii) joint special operations in
internal armed conflicts; (iv) counterterrorist operations; and (vi) peace-
keeping operations (President of the Russian Federation 2000b). Notably, in
the FSC issued later the same year, the government referred to peace making
rather than to peacekeeping (President of the Russian Federation 2000c).
The strategies of the contesters 163
The aim of the Russian military policy presented a decade later was to
prevent an arms race, deter and prevent military conflicts and improve
Russia’s military organisation. A certain degree of permanent readiness was
therefore considered necessary. Participation in international peacekeeping
activities within the framework of the UN and other international or regional
organisations, as well as in the global struggle against international terrorism
were also given priority. The government made clear that it regarded an
armed attack on a CSTO member state as an aggression against all CSTO
member states, including Russia. The government reserved the right to utilise
nuclear weapons not only in response to the utilisation of nuclear and other
types of WMD against Russia and/or its allies but also in response to ag-
gression against Russia involving the use of conventional weapons (President
of the Russian Federation 2010). The government declared that Russian
participation in international operations included the full spectrum from the
prevention of threats through the elimination of threats and the suppression
of acts of aggression to post-conflict recovery (President of the Russian
Federation 2014). According to the government, the forms and methods of
deploying the Russian armed forces had been improved. Nevertheless, due to
the altering nature of modern wars and armed conflicts, the government de-
clared its ambition to continue improving the combat capability of Russian
forces for future formations and new methods of armed combat (President of
the Russian Federation 2015). In Table 5.12, the key deployment of Russian
armed units abroad are summarised.
When it comes to military employment, the Russian government gave high
priority to military presence in certain strategically important regions. This
included the peacetime stationing of limited troop contingents through bi-
lateral agreements. Furthermore, the government argued that building on
the principles of partnership, these deployments would demonstrate the
Russian Federation’s readiness to fulfil its alliance commitments, promote
the formation of a stable military-strategic balance of forces in the regions,
and provide Russia with the potential to react to a crisis at the initial stages
of its emergence. In the long-term perspective, the government considered it
desirable to increase Russia’s participation during the initial phase in
peacekeeping operations to prevent or eliminate crisis (President of the
Russian Federation 1997). In 2000, the foreign deployment included limited
troop contingents and naval forces (President of the Russian Federation
2000a). Foreign bases had a role when protecting Russian citizens from
armed attacks outside the Russian Federation and/or when combating in-
ternational terrorism. Similarly, naval bases on foreign soil could be a
precondition when combating piracy, ensuring the safety of shipping and
securing the economic activities of Russia on the high seas. In international
military cooperation, priority was given to Belarus, the CSTO, CIS and SCO
members (President of the Russian Federation 2010).
In the NSS of 2000, the Russian government gave some attention to be-
haviour. The use of force was mentioned as a last resort to be put into action
164 The strategies of the contesters
Table 5.12 The main Russian deployments of armed units abroad 2000–2020
BILATERAL
ARRANGEMENTS
Armenia 3,100 3,214 3,300
Cuba 800 ? ?
Georgia 5,000 3,400 7,000
Kyrgyzstan 0 500 500
Moldova 2,600 1,500 1,500
Syria 150 150 5,000
Tajikistan 8,200 5,500 5,000
Ukraine 1,500 13,000 28,000
Vietnam 700 ? ?
INTERNATIONAL PSOs
Bosnia (SFOR) 1,300 0 0
Central Africa Rep, 0 117 0
(MINURCAT)
Sudan (UNMIS) 0 122 0
Yugoslavia (KFOR) 3,600 0 0
MARITIME OPERATIONS
Indian Ocean 0 1 Destroyer 0
Mediterranean Sea 0 0 2 tactical submarines,
2 frigates
only when all other measures had been exhausted or proven ineffective. The
use of military force within Russia itself was, according to the constitutional
frames, only allowed if the life of Russian citizens, Russia’s territorial in-
tegrity and/or the Russian constitutional system were threatened (President
of the Russian Federation 2000a). The military doctrine following the NSS
was portrayed as defensive. At the same time, the doctrine elaborated on
what was perceived to be the general features of modern war. Modern
warfare was said to impact on all spheres of human activity and included
extensive use of indirect and non-traditional forms and means. In this sce-
nario, long-range effective and electronic engagement were predicted to be
used to disrupt, not only the system of the enemy state but its military
command and control. At the same time, highly manoeuvrable operations
by military forces were anticipated to be launched in disparate areas. This
was expected to include extensive use of airmobile and airborne troops, as
well as special forces and irregular armed formations alongside regular units.
Attacks would hence be directed against troops, rear-service and economic
facilities, as well as against means of communication throughout the whole
territory of the enemy. Air campaigns would be targeting power plants,
especially nuclear, chemical and other dangerous production facilities,
infrastructure, means of communication and other vital installations
(President of the Russian Federation 2000b).
The strategies of the contesters 165
5.2.5 Conclusions: Russian strategy
When it comes to alignment strategy, the Russian government noted already
in the late 1990s trends towards a multipolar world. The government posi-
tioned Russia against US’s efforts of creating a unipolar order. The initial
observations of an increased commonality between Russia’s national in-
terests and other major powers’ interests, which could have resulted in a
strategy of social mobility, were replaced with an increasing mistrust to-
wards the US. NATO’s expansion to Eastern Europe was perceived as
challenging. Simultaneously, Russia considered itself being without effective
alliances supporting its national security interests. Despite this shortcoming,
the government never gave up its ambition regarding Russia’s global role
and great power position. The US-led NATO intervention in the Kosovo-
conflict without a UNSC mandate was interpreted as a trend towards
American unilateralism and willingness to use military force to promote US
national interests. Ultimately, when the US invaded Iraq without the sup-
port of either a UNSC resolution or NATO, this trend was perceived as a de
facto strategy of primacy. Moreover, the economic strength of the US in
combination with the EU’s emerging military dimension motivated Russian
efforts to find additional partnerships to the CIS and the CSTO respectively.
In this regard, both China and India were considered potential strategic
partners. However, the establishment of the SCO in 2001, indicated that
developing the Sino-Russian relations was given priority. This did not
prevent the Russian government to seek other partnerships. In 2005, Russia
established regular trilateral meetings between the foreign ministers of
the RIC-troika (Russia, India and China). Another Russian initiative, the
BRIC, was established in in 2009. Arguably, the military significance of
the RIC-troika and the BRIC/BRICS is highly questionable. Consequently,
the Russian government has given priority to the CSTO, CIS and SCO.
We conclude that Russia initially, following the end of the Cold War,
presumably adopted a strategy of strategic autonomy, supported by a policy
of developing bilateral cooperation with both Western great powers, middle
powers and various regional powers. However, the growing mistrust against
the US and its adoption of a primacy strategy, led to the Russian adoption
of a unilateral balancing strategy, directed towards not only the US but
against NATO and the EU as well. This strategy manifested itself through
both ambitious efforts of internal balancing by modernising Russia’s armed
forces and external actions such as the war against Georgia. The latter can
also be seen as a response to Georgia’s efforts to establish closer ties with the
EU and NATO. We argue that since the external actions were taken within
the borders of the former USSR, that is the Russian declared ‘close abroad’,
it is appropriate to label the strategy as defensive unilateral balancing.
Simultaneously, the Russian government acknowledged the lack of
trustworthiness of a unilateral balancing strategy. The disadvantage for
Russia regarding its power relation with the US, not to say the aggregated
166 The strategies of the contesters
strength of the West, simply was too obvious. A strategic partnership with at
least one other major power had to be established and the choice fell on
China. This could potentially be interpreted as a shift towards a collective
hard-balancing strategy. However, we are not convinced that this truly is the
case from the Russian point of view. There is a Russian mistrust directed
towards China, not least when it comes to the Chinese ambitions regarding
Siberia. Moreover, Russia’s collective balancing is not restricted to solely
China as the Russian back-up plan includes India. Consequently, we argue
that the collective efforts of Russia should be interpreted as a complement to
its unilateral ambitions, rather than as the main strategy.
The Obama administration’s cooperative security strategy initially in-
cluded efforts of a reset policy towards Russia. However, NATO’s en-
gagement in Libya, which arguably went beyond the mandate given by the
UNSC, indicated that the US no longer acted alone. Rather the coopera-
tiveness seemed to include a reunified West. Arguably, Russia’s active
military support to the Assad government in the Syrian civil war can be seen
as a shift in the Russian strategy towards an offensive unilateral balancing
aiming to undermine US power position in the Middle East. This policy was
followed by Russia’s war against Ukraine and the annexation of the
Crimean Peninsula. This action is more offensive compared to the short war
with Georgia in 2008. The shift to a selective engagements strategy during
Trump’s presidency did not result in a shift in the Russian strategy.
Arguably, Russia’s efforts to consolidate or improve its great power status
increasingly correspond to the strategy of social competition. However, the
Russian strategy also displays some of the characteristics of the status
competition strategy ‘social creativity’, exemplified by non-military aspects
of warfare including an increased preparedness to use nuclear weapons and
the emphasis on specific Russian values. The strategy to develop bilateral
relations with regional powers that can promote the development of a
‘polycentric’ world order may also be interpreted as a way of undermining
the influence of established liberal multilateral institutions. Russia’s assumed
interference in various elections and other efforts aiming at undermining the
legitimacy of other states political systems can be interpreted as an addi-
tional element in a strategy of social creativity that aims to balance a dis-
advantage in traditional hard and soft power resources. Clearly, unilateral
hard-balancing, either defensive or offensive, is not perceived as enough in
itself. Consequently, we argue that the use of both collective hard-balancing
and unilateral soft-balancing as a complement to the main strategy, that is
unilateral hard-balancing, indicates that the Russian government uses sev-
eral approaches to balance the power of not only the US but of the West.
The Russian strategy contains elements of both BPT and HST/PTT. Its
regional security arrangements and commitments to assist other states ex-
posed to armed attacks obviously contain elements of balance of power. The
strong opposition against further NATO enlargements is an additional sign
of the balance of power approach. Contrarily, the Russian government’s
The strategies of the contesters 167
analysis of a stagnating West and the steps towards a new polycentric world
order related to developments within the global economy and the increased
importance of regional governance. This fits well with both HST and PTT as
it indicates a preference for global power shift away from a liberal inter-
national order dominated by one superpower. In Table 5.13, the alignment
strategies of Russia are summarised.
Table 5.13 The alignment strategies of Russia
Regarding the Russian military strategy, the ends based on values were
expressed at several different levels, including the individual, the societal, the
state and the international levels. At the core at each of the levels was the
spiritual and intellectual sphere. Consequently, fostering and strengthening
the cultural heritage and the spiritual renaissance of Russia, as well as the
traditions of Russian patriotism, were fundamental at each level. Hence,
gaining influence in the international system had not only an external but
also an internal dimension since Russia was said to use its international
positions to form a just world order as well as strengthening the domestic
constitutional system. Promoting this image of Russia both globally and
domestically was a declared key objective. In the former case, the policy
documents often touch upon peaceful coexistence among states and the
primacy of international law and the UN system. In the latter case, Russia’s
multinational population and the peaceful coexistence, as well as social
harmony among different ethnic groups within Russia, were in focus.
Regarding the ends related to threats, a core objective was to defend
Russia’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Other central
threat-related ends included preventing military aggression against Russia
and its allies, protecting Russian facilities and installations as well as safe-
guarding Russian citizens outside Russian territory. Consequently, addi-
tional objectives involved forming a circle of good neighbourhood and not
only preventing but also eliminating the emergence of potential conflicts in
adjacent to Russia. Notably, the Russian government expressed several
wartime-related ends such as preventing neutral states enlisting the war on
the side of the aggressor; ensuring military aid to Russia’s allies, and forcing
the aggressor to end the war at an early stage. Neutralizing potential threats
was hence a key objective of the armed forces.
Similarly, regarding the needs, the Russian government identified both an
external and an internal dimension. A fundamental end regarding the
former dimension was to consolidate Russia’s positions as a great power and
168 The strategies of the contesters
as one of the poles in a multipolar world order. Hence, a crucial objective
involved creating favourable external conditions for strengthening the
Russian economy including its position in the global trade and economic
system. Notably, influence was gradually replaced with authority as the de-
sired position within the international system and hence at the core of the
elaborations. The ends of the latter dimension included preventing the
emergence of social and inter-ethnic conflicts as well as national and re-
gional separatism within the Russian Federation. Consequently, promoting
Russia’s unity and ensuring not only political but also economic and social
stability within the Federation were key objectives.
The fourth and last aspect of the ends, vulnerabilities, was mostly elabo-
rated in the early years of our period of exploration. While some vulner-
abilities were indirectly mentioned such as the lagging behind other great
powers in terms of science and technology, dependency on imports, the state
debt and terrorism, these were not extensively emphasised. To conclude, we
argue that over time the ends related to threats has had the most pre-
dominant position in the Russian government’s elaborations. This end has
been complemented with ends related to needs, that is, objectives related to
ensuring Russia a strong position within the international system.
Regarding traditional means, the government gave priority to resources
perceived necessary to deter and prevent conventional large-scale and re-
gional wars, as well as to implement alliance commitments. Initially, around
2000, the government declared that Russia did not seek to maintain parity
with the leading states of the world. On the one hand, the considerations
focused on the defence expenditures, on the other hand on the ambition to
have permanent combat readiness. Consequently, reasonable sufficiency and
effectiveness were the keywords for the undertaken transformation. Later,
around 2010, the government explicitly declared its ambition to maintain
parity with the US in certain key areas regarding strategic offensive arms
such as conventional strategic bombers. Simultaneously, increased emphasis
was put on jointness and collaboration among the different services, bran-
ches and combat arms of the armed forces. Brigades, rather than divisions,
became the main combat unit of the army.
Regarding the enablers, the Russian government initially gave priority to
strategic deployability. Efforts were made to improve systems for mobili-
zation, command and control, logistics, and transport. Other prioritised
areas were maintenance and repair as well as stockpiling. In the early years,
nuclear weapons had a key role. The Russian strategy around 2000 seemed to
be focused on nuclear deterrence. However, the Russian government de-
clared its willingness to reach bilateral agreements with the US and for a
further reduction of Russia’s nuclear force. Strategic sufficiency was the key
concept. Around 2010, this approach had changed in favour of missile early
warning systems as well as for facilities necessary for WMD systems. At the
same time, the means of each of the parts of the nuclear triad decreased in
numbers.
The strategies of the contesters 169
Finally, regarding the modern means, the government gradually put more
attention to space-based assets and information warfare as well as to specific
weaponry such as drones and autonomous arms. Notably, not only a spe-
cific space-command but also a cyber-command were established during the
later years of our investigation. Despite these developments, we conclude
that the traditional means remain the focus of the Russian strategy.
Arguably, the emphasis put on mobilization of reserves, echeloned planning
and defence industry supports our claims.
Finally, regarding ways and the situation, the Russian government ela-
borated over the whole spectrum ranging from nuclear war to preventive
deployment. Notably, the government referred to peace-making rather than
to peacekeeping. Already during the initial years, the government reserved
the right to use nuclear weapons when responding not only to any attack
involving WMD but to large-scale conventional aggression as well.
Furthermore, it pledged Russia’s commitment to defend other CIS-members
and the extension of Russia’s nuclear umbrella to these and other allies. This
assurance came to include other CSTO member states. However, around
2010, the focus shifted from the deterministic war-fighting approach towards
deterring and preventing military conflicts.
When it comes to the employment of military force, peace-time stationing
of armed contingents on the soil of friendly host nations was given priority.
Foreign bases, including naval bases, were hence regarded as attractive. The
government also announced its ambition to increase Russia’s participation
in the early phases of peace support operations to prevent or eliminate
crises. Priority regarding international military cooperation was given to
allies within the framework of CSTO, CIS and SCO respectively.
Finally, regarding behaviour, the government argued that Russia’s mili-
tary doctrine was defensive. The government gave modern warfare plenty of
attention. One part of this warfare was operations aiming at disrupting the
functioning of the enemy state including its military command and control.
Another part was highly manoeuvrable operations including the extensive
use of airmobile and airborne troops were and a third, the use of special
forces and irregular armed formations alongside regular units. Arguably, the
Russian policy documents focused on controlling and paralysing the op-
ponent. In addition, we find behaviour being at the core of the considerations
regarding the ways. The wars in Georgia and Ukraine, Russia’s military
operations supporting the Assad government in Syria also displayed a
preparedness to use military force to achieve political objectives. Table 5.14
summarises our findings on the Russian military strategy.
Note
1 CIS was formed in December 1991 following the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
Its original charter was signed by Belarus, Russia and Ukraine. A few years later
12 of the 15 former Soviet Republics participated in the CIS. Since then, several
members have withdrawn or limited their participation in CIS, among them are
Georgia and Ukraine. The three Baltic States did not apply for membership in
CIS; rather these three states came to orient their security policy towards the EU
and NATO. Eventually, they became members of both organisations in 2004.
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6 The strategies of the conservators
Introduction
In this chapter, the strategies of the two status quo-oriented conservators,
France and the United Kingdom (UK) respectively, are explored. By in-
vestigating key primary sources, released over two decades, we observe some
important differences regarding the alignment strategies, and hence, espe-
cially when it comes to the degree of strategic autonomy. Although we can
present differences also regarding the ends, we conclude that both other
elements of the military strategy, that is the means and the ways, show some
crucial similarities.
DOI: 10.4324/9781003157113-6
178 The strategies of the conservators
6.1.1 Strategic environment
Notably, the French analysis of ‘changing trends in the world strategic si-
tuation, global geopolitical balances or step changes and the type and in-
tensity of risks and threats’ was explicitly conducted to ‘determine how all
these changes affect France’s position in the international system’ (French
Ministry of Defence 2012:2).
The actor-based approach was dominant in the French policy documents.
In 2008, the distribution of global power was perceived to shift gradually
towards Asia. The nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in 1998, and North
Korea in 2006, as well as Iran and North Korea’s capacity of launching
missiles at distinctly greater ranges, were considered worrisome. However,
these were not the only countries given specific attention regarding military
developments, the government noted that:
The United States are (sic) cutting back on military spending and partly
refocusing their military efforts on the Asia-Pacific region.
Consequently, our US allies are likely to become more selective with
The strategies of the conservators 179
regard to their foreign commitments. It also puts more pressure on the
Europeans to shoulder responsibility for the security issues that concern
them most directly (President of the French Republic 2013:9).
In 2016, the French MoD presented a specific policy for the Asian-Pacific
region. The Minister of Defence, Jean-Yves Le Drian, observed that ‘[t]he
evolution of the strategic balances has strongly accelerated in Asia as well as
in the Indo-Pacific’. Le Drian concluded that ‘[i]n a nutshell, the geopolitical
entity comprising Asia and the Indo-Pacific, which is a seat of economic
dynamism, demographic growth and technological innovation, represents a
source of overall prosperity, exposed to vulnerabilities’ (French Ministry of
Defence 2016b:1).
Africa, Asia, the Middle East as well as the Mediterranean and its
southern regions were given specific attention also in the 2017 white paper.
The government feared that the weaknesses of the Balkan could be exploited
by radical movements and criminal groups, and/or used by other states for
destabilisation purposes. Europe’s eastern and northern flanks were believed
to be the targets of Russian ambitions to rebuild its sphere of influence. The
violation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, the aggressive posture in the
Baltic area, the increased military activities in the North Atlantic region as
well as the various frozen conflicts in the Caucasus and Transnistria were
considered as ‘a major concern, which France shares with its main allies and
which requires the deployment of significant capabilities’ (President of the
French Republic 2017:23).
Regarding the thematic approach, in 2008, the government elaborated on
the potentially new health and ecological risks, such as damage to the bio-
sphere and pandemics, and the potential consequences for international
security. Economic interdependence was believed to create ties of solidarity,
thus contributing to global stability. Simultaneously, the government
warned that access to worldwide communication, such as the internet, could
lead to a rapid spread of political, economic and financial crises. The gov-
ernment also feared rising nationalism and increased religious fanaticism.
The growing demand for natural resources and strategic raw materials was
also perceived as a challenge. Threats from terrorist networks, the con-
sequences of the ballistic proliferation and potential attacks on information
The strategies of the conservators 181
and communication systems were perceived worrisome. The risk of cyber-
attacks was also mentioned in this context (President of the French Republic
2008). In 2011, the Secretary-General for Defence and National Security,
Mr Francis Delon suggested that ‘[c]yberspace, like a virtual battleground,
has become a place for confrontation’ (French Network and Information
Security Agency 2011:3).
One year later, the main themes in the FMoD’s elaborations included
urbanisation, migration, population growth, increased transnational flows
and interdependencies, enhanced roles for non-state players (international
firms, transnational organised crime and terrorist groups etcetera), the
proliferation of WMD and technological changes. Other these were climate
change, the competition for access to natural resources (such as fresh water,
arable land and raw material including energy and mineral resources), as
well as increasing inequality in wealth distribution. The Ministry also fo-
cused on future warfare:
Soon after being elected as PoFR, Hollande clarified his priorities: ‘We must
[…] preserve the credibility of our nuclear deterrence and explicitly affirm
our right to take the initiative in actions that defend our interests and those
of the international community’ (President of the French Republic
2013:7–8).
Regarding the value-based ends, the government declared that one of its:
aim[s] is to defend the values of the ‘republican compact’ that binds all
French people to the State, namely the principles of democracy, and in
particular individual and collective freedoms, respect for human dignity,
solidarity and justice (President of the French Republic 2008:58).
Respect for the rule of law was explicitly mentioned as a fundamental in-
terest of France. Consequently, ensuring the legitimacy of French military
actions, both nationally and internationally, was presented as a key objec-
tive. Contributing to peace in the world and the stability of the Middle East
and the Persian Gulf were other value-based ends presented in 2013
(President of the French Republic 2013). ‘[O]nly a strong France, in control
of its own destiny, can provide answers to today’s major crises, promote its
values and assert its interests’, President Macron declared in 2017 without
specifying which French values. Indirectly, he touched upon peace promo-
tion and prosperity in his elaborations (President of the French Republic
2017:6).
Ends related to threats were often articulated in a pro-active manner. ‘It is
the ambition of France’, the government declared in 2008, ‘to be in a po-
sition where it does not have to submit to the effects of uncertainty; its
ambition, rather, is to have the capacity to anticipate, respond to and in-
fluence international developments’. Preventing or deterring the risk of war
The strategies of the conservators 183
was hence presented as a core objective. Notably, this end was declared to be
valid ‘wherever the security of France, the defence of Europe and world
peace may come under threat’ (President of the French Republic 2008:14).
The government explained that ‘[t]he aim of prevention is to avoid the
emergence or aggravation of threats to our national security’ (President of
the French Republic 2008:143). In 2013, the government highlighted that a
core end was to preserve France’s independence and sovereignty against all
forms of threats was declared (President of the French Republic 2013).
Worried by the threatening developments in the Asian-Pacific region, the
French government stressed that a national interest of France was to
maintain sovereignty over its territories in the Indian and the Pacific Oceans
and its population in these territories. Defending its interests was considered
a necessity, not an option (French Ministry of Defence 2016b). In 2017,
President Macron defined France’s vital interests as ‘our independence and,
more broadly, our freedom of decision’ (President of the French Republic
2017:6).
When it comes to ends focusing on needs, the French government an-
nounced that one of its:
Supporting the efforts of the African Union (AU) and other regional or-
ganisations was another end presented in this context. The prevention of
major conflicts in Asia was also presented as a central objective not only for
France but for all international actors. However, this end was focusing more
on the consequences for France and Europe of an Asian conflict than the
conflict itself. Arguments supporting this position were the impacts of an
Asian war on strategic maritime routes, energy supplies or strategic raw
materials, the potential economic and financial fallout and France’s and
Europe’s links with the US, especially in relation to guaranteeing the se-
curity of several Asian countries (President of the French Republic 2008).
184 The strategies of the conservators
Five years later, in 2013, the French government gave priority to the
cooperation within the EU, NATO and the UN. Especially the EU was
given considerable attention. The government declared that even closer in-
tegration within the Union regarding security and defence was ‘a key ob-
jective’. The 1963 Élysée Treaty with Germany, the 2010 two Lancaster
House treaties with the UK, as well as the cooperation among six main arms
manufacturing European states, including France, Germany, Italy, Spain,
Sweden and the UK, were also mentioned as fundamental to France. At the
same time, the government stated that France’s strategic autonomy was
underpinned by national ownership of its essential defence and security
capabilities (President of the French Republic 2013:17). Nevertheless,
guaranteeing the security of Europe and the North Atlantic space, as well as
stabilising Europe’s near environment with France’s partners and allies,
were two articulated ends that clearly noted the need for cooperation in
order to achieve France’s aims. In 2017, President Macron declared that
further consolidation of the EU’s defence and strategic autonomy was a
French objective:
Europe is the natural framework for our security and the protection of
our borders, given challenges that can only be faced collectively. The
time is therefore right to revive European defence by drawing our
strategic cultures closer, by cultivating pragmatic partnerships with
European states which, like us, have the political will and military
capabilities to meet their operational responsibilities, by committing the
necessary resources at the European level and by strengthening our
defence industries, to ensure they remain at the cutting edge of
technology and competitiveness on a global scale (President of the
French Republic 2017:6–7).
6.1.3 Means
The French defence expenditures saw a modest increase between 2001 and
2009. During President Obama’s first time in office, France’s expenditures
initially decreased. However, from 2012 and onwards, France’s expenditures
increased each year. In constant USD (2018), France spent 46,787 million
USD on defence in 2001. In 2019, the defence expenditures were 52,229
million USD (SIPRI 2020b). In Table 6.1, the defence expenditures of
France are summarised.
In 2008, the government concluded that the level of the military means ‘no
longer depends on massive commitment to a collective air-land defensive
operation in Europe, within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance’
(President of the French Republic 2008:119–120). Five years later, in 2013,
the government presented a multi-domain approach:
186 The strategies of the conservators
Table 6.1 Annual defence expenditure, France 2001–2019 (million euro)
In 2017, President Macron concluded that the armed forces ‘require an agile,
deployable and resilient defence system’. France’s armed forces must, the
President stressed, be able ‘to deploy far beyond our borders, wherever they
are needed’ (President of the French Republic 2017:6).
Regarding the traditional means, ‘the capacity for rapid adaptation and
response’ was emphasised in the 2008 elaborations. The government declared
that these capabilities must ‘be given very high priority in the nation’s defence
and security effort’ (President of the French Republic 2008:59). On the one
hand, the government shed light on France’s contributions to the EU’s battle
groups as well as NATO’s rapid reaction forces in this regard. On the other
hand, it announced its ambition to develop national capabilities:
The ground forces were to consist of 88,000 soldiers, organised in, among
other, eight brigades – equipped with some 250 Leclerc MBTs, some 650
APCs and 80 combat helicopters – and three specialised brigades. The navy
was to organise some 44,000 personnel sailing, amongst other, four SSBNs,
six nuclear attack submarines, an aircraft carrier including an air group and
18 frigates. The bulk of the air force was to include 300 combat aircraft
(President of the French Republic 2008). Of these forces, 30,000 soldiers
The strategies of the conservators 187
were to be deployable within six months for a period of one year, without
replacement. In addition, the armed forces were to organise an independent
reaction and/or reinforcement unit consisting of 5,000 troops on permanent
operational alert. Regarding the air force, ten aircraft on permanent op-
erational alert were considered a minimum. In addition, air assets were to
have the capability of projecting force of 1,500 soldiers over a distance of up
to 8,000 kilometres in a few days, including air traffic control, as well as
other airbase resources. The government decided that two naval groups were
to be ‘available for intervention missions or to provide forward presence’
(President of the French Republic 2008:204).
In 2012, the FMoD argued that ‘[t]he long-term operational credibility of
the French armed forces will be based on the preservation of a critical mass
guaranteeing a level of autonomy that is compatible with national interests
and status’ (French Ministry of Defence 2012:22). Consequently, the defence
architecture was to be organised around both a robust national military base
and new partnership mechanisms. Since military interventions were per-
ceived to increasingly take place within multinational frameworks, inter-
operability was considered a precondition (French Ministry of Defence
2012). One year later, President Hollande declared his will:
Table 6.2 The main traditional units and equipment of the French armed forces
2000–2020
ARMY
Task Force HQ 4 4 0
Corp HQ 0 0 1
Division HQ 0 0 2
Tank Brigade 3 3 2
Mechanized Brigade 4 4 2
Mechanized Regiment 0 0 1
Infantry Brigade 1 1 1
Infantry Regiment 0 0 4
Airborne Brigade 1 1 1
Airborne Regiment 0 0 1
Foreign Legion Regiments 7 5 4
Special Forces Regiments 2 2 2
MBT 834 637 222
APC/AIFV 4,613 4,601 2,970
Attack Helicopter 339 298 66
NAVY
Tactical Submarine 7 6 5
Carrier 2 1 1
Cruiser 1 1 0
Destroyer 4 11 11
Amphibious Landing Ship 9 8 3
Marine Infantry Brigade 0 0 1
Marine Infantry Regiment 24 33 ?
Naval Aviation Fighter/ 0 13 42
Attack
AIR FORCE (Tactical Aviation)
Fighter/Attack 205 139 166
Fighter 114 74 41
The policy documents were gradually giving enablers more priority. In the
2008 white paper, intelligence was said ‘to enable the highest authorities of
the State, together with our diplomacy, armed forces and our internal and
civil security services, to anticipate developments, and to reach assessments,
The strategies of the conservators 189
decide and act in full independence’ (President of the French Republic
2008:125). The government also gave priority to strategic mobility.
Replacing the strategic air transport fleet and increasing its capacity was
partly intended to be achieved through the acquisition of new-generation
aircraft such as MRTTs and A-400 Ms. Regarding naval mobility, the ac-
quisition of force projection and command vessels as well as large amphi-
bious ships were considered necessary to maintain, and potentially also
strengthen, the armed forces’ transport and landing capability. ‘Investment
in procurement must’, the government argued, seek to overcome the
weakness ‘which currently hampers the effectiveness and autonomy of
French forces’ (President of the French Republic 2008:201). Moreover, the
government stressed the necessity of developing the command and control
capabilities needed in order to enable France to fulfil a role as a framework
nation in large-scale operations. In 2015, the government presented figures
on key enablers. Regarding aircraft, the fleet was described as consisting of
five strategic airlift aircraft (A310, A340), seven tactical transport aircraft
with strategic range (A400 Atlas), 41 tactical transport aircraft (C130
Hercules, C160 Transall), 27 light tactical transport aircraft (CN235) and 14
tanker aircraft (C135FR, KC135). The navy sailed six support ships (French
Ministry of Defence 2015). In Table 6.3, the airborne enablers of the French
armed forces are summarised.
Table 6.3 The main airborne enablers of the French armed forces 2000–2020
KC-135 (tanker) 3 3 3
C-135FR (tanker) 11 11 11
Transall C-160 (tanker) 0 15 0
DC-8F (heavy transport) 3 0 0
A310-300 (heavy transport) 2 3 0
Airbus A400 (heavy transport) 0 0 15
Transall C-160 (medium transport) 77 42 12
C-130 (medium transport) 14 14 16
SLBM
M4/aboard Redoutable 32/2 0 0
M45/aboard Le Triomphant 32/2 48/3 0
M51/aboard Le Triomphant 0 0 64/4
STRATEGIC BOMBER
Super Etendard 36 24 0
Mirage 2000N 60 60 0
Rafale B 0 0 20
6.1.4 Ways
The policy elaborations on ways often corresponded to the situation ap-
proach. In 2008, the government declared that ‘[w]hatever the case, the
possibility of a threat to national security demands foresight, prevention,
and a swift response’. The prospect of high-intensity major conflict was not
perceived as probable, but plausible. The government warned that a wor-
sening of international relations could:
Table 6.5 The main French deployments of armed units abroad 2000–2020
BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS
Burkina Faso (Operation Barkhane) 0 0 250
CAR (Operation Boali) 0 240 0
Chad (Operation Epervier/Barkhane) 990 1,200 1,500
Djibouti 3,200 1,690 1,450
Estonia (NATO Forward Presence) 0 0 330
Gabon 680 775 350
Germany 2,700 2,800 2,000
Iraq (Operation Inherent Resolve) 0 0 400
Côte d’Ivoire (Operation Licorne) 500 900 950
Jordan (Operation Inherent Resolve) 0 0 ?
Mali (Operation Barkhane) 0 0 1,750
Niger (Operation Barkhane) 0 0 500
Senegal 1,170 575 350
Syria (Operation Inherent Resolve) 0 0 ?
UAE (Operation Inherent Resolve) 0 0 650
INTERNATIONAL PSOs
Afghanistan (ISAF / Resolute Support) 0 3,095 0
Bosnia (SFOR) 3,200 0 0
CAR (EUTM RCA) 0 0 160
Chad (MINURCAT) 0 308 0
Lebanon (UNIFIL) 251 1,585 670
Mali (EUTM Mali) 0 0 13
Mali (MINUSMA) 0 0 25
Saudi Arabia (Southern Watch) 170 0 0
Yugoslavia/Serbia (KFOR) 5,080 1,294 0
MARITIME OPERATIONS
Indian Ocean (Atalanta) 0 4 Frigates 1 Destroyer,
3 Frigates
1 Submarine
Mediterranean (EU NAVFOR MED) 0 0
Interference in the internal affairs in the Ukraine, and the states of the
Caucasus and Central Asia, is probable and Russia will strongly oppose
NATO expansion. Russia will seek to dominate the Arctic, considering
the region as central to her future prosperity and security. She will
continue to view China and Japan suspiciously and, despite her
membership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, will seek to
deter foreign infiltration and influence, most notably from China in
eastern Siberia (Doctrine, Concepts & Development Centre 2010:49).
Regarding China, the Centre concluded that the country’s desire for pri-
macy in the Chinese near-abroad:
Five years later, the government announced that looking ‘beyond the re-
gions adjacent to Europe, we now need to take a greater account in our
planning of a high likelihood of commitments further afield’. The poverty-
stricken and unstable Sub-Saharan Africa was considered such a region,
while the instability in parts of South Asia was perceived to have the po-
tential of requiring significant engagement in the future (British Ministry of
Defence 2003). In 2007, the DCDC predicted that the global economic
growth was most likely going to be uneven, with the Asia-Pacific region as
the relative winner and Sub-Saharan Africa lagging behind other regions
(Doctrine, Concepts & Development Centre 2007).
In 2008, the cabinet presented four regional security priorities: (i) South
Asia; (ii) parts of Africa; (iii) the Middle East; and (iv) Eastern Europe
(British Cabinet Office 2008). The DCDC predicted that ‘[c]ompetition for
resources will increase the geostrategic importance of certain regions such
as; the Asian Meridian, the wider Middle East and the Polar Regions’
(Doctrine, Concepts & Development Centre 2010:16). Besides, the
The strategies of the conservators 205
government observed that frozen inter-state conflicts could be latent in
many parts of the world, especially in Asia and Africa (British Ministry of
Defence 2011). The Middle East and North Africa were the focus of the
elaborations in 2012.
The coup d’état in 2012 in Mali was used as an example when the govern-
ment warned that regional developments could possess a long-term strategic
threat to the EU as well as to the UK homeland (British Cabinet
Office 2012).
Already in 1998, several thematic risks related to organised crime, en-
vironmental degradation and information technology were identified
(British Ministry of Defence 1998). In 2003, the government worried about
terrorism and the widespread proliferation of WMD and related technolo-
gies. Weak and failing states was another source of concerns (British
Ministry of Defence 2003). In 2007, the DCDC predicted that sustained
population growth, despite the impact of several communicable diseases,
together with rapid modernisation, aggressive economic competition and
increased consumption, would result in intensive exploitation and pressure
on all kinds of resources. The Centre warned that conflicts and crises could
‘trigger the displacement of large numbers of people, mainly into proximate
regions, which may find themselves at risk of instability or exogenous shock
(Doctrine, Concepts & Development Centre 2007:8–10). In 2009, Prime
Minister Gordon Brown argued that hostile states, terrorists and criminals
‘can all potentially use cyberspace to undermine our interests’ (British
Cabinet Office 2009:3–4). The government concluded that space was also
considered to play an increasingly key role in modern society, as space-
related technologies were critical for many services. Piracy was also given
specific attention (British Cabinet Office 2009). In 2010, the government
reflected on the changing character of war and warfare:
6.2.2 Ends
In 1998, the Minister of Defence George Robertson claimed that ‘[t]he
British are, by instinct, an internationalist people’. The minister continued:
‘We believe that as well as defending our rights, we should discharge our
responsibilities in the world. We do not want to stand idly by and watch
humanitarian disasters or the aggression of dictators go unchecked. We
want to give a lead, we want to be a force for good’ (British Ministry of
Defence 1998:7). In 2005, three overarching ends were defined as defending
the UK and its interests, strengthening international peace and stability, and
being a force for good in the world (British Ministry of Defence 2005). Prime
Minister David Cameron stated that the UK’s national security strategy
‘must begin with the role we want Britain to play in the modern world […] In
order to protect our interests at home, we must project our influence abroad’
(British Cabinet Office 2010a:4). The government announced that its vision
was a secure and prosperous UK, with global reach and influence (British
Cabinet Office 2015). In 2018, Prime Minister Theresa May stressed the
necessity to ‘leverage our influence as a nation’ (British Government 2018:2).
Value-based ends were often announced in a universal context. In 1998, the
British government declared its ambition to be ‘an advocate of human rights
and democracy the world over’ (British Ministry of Defence 1998:10). In
2008, the cabinet explicitly presented its approach to national security. The
approach was ‘clearly grounded in a set of core values. They include human
rights, the rule of law, legitimate and accountable government, justice,
freedom, tolerance, and opportunity for all’ (British Cabinet Office 2008:6).
The British NSS was, according to Prime Minister Brown ‘grounded in core
British values of fair play, human rights, openness, individual liberty, ac-
countable Government and the rule of law (British Cabinet Office 2009,
Bailey 2013:4). Prime Minister Cameron expressed similar preferences:
Our national interest requires us to stand up for the values our country
believes in – the rule of law, democracy, free speech, tolerance and
human rights. Those are the attributes for which Britain is admired in
The strategies of the conservators 207
the world and we must continue to advance them, because Britain will
be safer if our values are upheld and respected in the world (British
Cabinet Office 2010a:4).
6.2.3 Means
As the data in Table 6.8 shows, the UK’s annual defence expenditure in-
creased each year between 2001 and 2011. From 2012 to 2015 defence ex-
penditure decreased and from 2016 onwards there have been small annual
increases. Between 2001 and 2019 the annual defence expenditures measured
in constant USD (2018) increased from 46,541 USD million in 2001 to
49,916 USD million in 2019 (SIPRI 2020b).
In the late 1990s, the government concluded that the traditional means of
the armed forces had to transform. Defence Minister Robertson declared that
at the heart of the SDR, presented in 1998, was ‘the new Joint Rapid Reaction
Forces, which will be the spearhead of Britain’s modernised, rapidly de-
ployable and better supported front line’. He announced that the government
planned ‘to buy two new larger aircraft carriers to project power more flexibly
210 The strategies of the conservators
Table 6.8 Annual defence expenditure, the UK 2001–2019 (million pound)
around the world’. At the same time, less emphasis was to be placed on open-
ocean anti-submarine warfare and the number of MBTs and combat aircraft
was to be reduced (British Ministry of Defence 1998:5). In 2002, the gov-
ernment admitted that the planning assumptions presented in the 1998 SDR
had to be reconsidered. Now, the armed forces were to be able to simulta-
neously contribute to several smaller-scale operations in widely geographically
separated locations. Another ambition was to enhance the capabilities of the
special forces (British Ministry of Defence 2002).
In 2003, the government concluded that there was no need for the UK to
generate large-scale capabilities across a broad spectrum ‘given that in the
most demanding operations we will be operating alongside the US and other
allies, where capabilities such as air defence and naval escorts are less likely
to be at a premium’ (British Ministry of Defence 2003:7). New amphibious
ships were to project land power ashore and type 45 destroyers to enhance
the force projection capacity. In addition, a new set of medium weight land
forces were to be developed, offering a high level of deployability, including
by air. On the one hand, the air force was to increase its ability to deliver
offensive effect by introducing the Storm Shadow, providing long-range
stand-off precision strike capability, and through the Paveway IV ensuring
high degrees of accuracy. On the other hand, the number of combat aircraft
was to be reduced (British Ministry of Defence 2003). Clearly, the Defence
Committee of the Parliament was not pleased:
In 2005, the government announced that the armed forces were in the middle
of a substantial transformation. The purpose of the transformation was to
The strategies of the conservators 211
acquire an ‘expeditionary forces, able to project power across the globe in
support of British interests and delivering effect […] at a time and place of
our choosing’ (British Ministry of Defence 2005:6–7). ‘The cabinet declared
that we will continue to favour capability over quantity’ (British Cabinet
Office 2008:45). Clearly, the Conservative administration that took office in
May 2010, was not impressed by the achievements of its predecessor:
Twenty years after the Berlin Wall came down, the equipment we have
available is still too rooted in a Cold War mind-set […] Main battle
tanks aplenty, but not enough protected vehicles to move our forces on
the insurgency battlefield. Two massive aircraft carriers on order but
unable to operate with the aircraft of our closest allies (British Cabinet
Office 2010a:5).
Expeditionary warfare was providing the conceptual frames for the British
strategy. For example, the maritime forces were to organise a task group out
of the total resources consisting of seven SSN, two carriers, 19 destroyers/
frigates and three commando brigades. The land forces were to organise a
division from two armoured brigades, two Striker brigades, six infantry bri-
gades and an air assault brigade. The air force was to organise an air group
out of two JSF squadrons and seven Typhoon squadrons (British Cabinet
Office 2015). In 2018, the major elements of the British armed forces by 2025
were said to consist of ‘a maritime task group centred on a Queen Elizabeth
Table 6.9 The main traditional units and equipment of the British armed forces
2000–2020
ARMY
Corp HQ (ARRC) 1 1 1
Armoured Division 1 1 1
Mechanized Division 1 1 0
Infantry Division 0 0 1
Air Assault Brigade 1 1 1
Infantry Brigade HQ 14 8 0
Armoured Regiment 3 0 1
Special Forces Regiment 1 2 2
MBT 616 386 227
APC/AIFV 2,426 3,293 1,197
Attack Helicopter 269 165 50
NAVY
Tactical Submarine 12 8 6
Carrier 3 2 1
Destroyer 11 6 6
Amphibious Landing Ship 6 7 2
Marine Infantry Brigade 1 1 1
Special Forces Regiment ? ? 1
Naval Aviation Fighter/ 29 13 0
Attack
AIR FORCE (Tactical Aviation)
Fighter/Attack 238 198 162
Fighter 93 40 0
Table 6.10 The main airborne enablers of the British armed forces 2000–2020
At the same time, the government announced its intentions to reduce the
number of warheads to fewer than 160. Furthermore, the decision to build a
new class of SSBN potentially included only three submarines (British
Ministry of Defence 2006). In 2010, the cabinet decided to reduce the number
of operational launch tubes on the British SSBNs from 12 to eight and the
number of warheads from 48 to 40 (British Cabinet Office 2010b). In 2015,
Prime Minister Cameron announced that ‘[w]e will maintain our ultimate
insurance policy as a nation – our Continuous At Sea Nuclear Deterrent –
and replace our four ballistic missile submarines’ (British Cabinet Office
2015:6). In Table 6.11, the British nuclear means are summarised.
SLBM
Trident/aboard Vanguard 58/4 48/4 48/4
6.2.4 Ways
In 1998, the government presented a list of eight situations as a basis for
continued military planning: (i) peacetime security including support against
terrorism; (ii) security of the Overseas Territories including the garrisons in
the Falklands, Cyprus, Gibraltar and the Caribbean; (iii) defence diplomacy;
(iv) support to wider British interests; (v) peace support and humanitarian
operations; (vi) regional conflict outside the NATO area; (vii) regional
conflict inside the NATO area; and (viii) strategic attack on NATO (British
Ministry of Defence 1998). Following the 9/11-attacks, this approach was
slightly changed. Fighting terrorism was given more attention and was no
longer viewed as a subfield within peacetime security operations. In 2002,
the government instead mentioned conflict prevention, including defence
diplomacy activities and peace support operations, including stabilisation
efforts. In addition, the government maintained that:
by training other states’ armed forces, we can transfer our military skills
so that they can eventually do the job themselves. Where prevention has
failed and we have engaged in coercive or destructive activities, we
should be prepared to assist in post-conflict recovery, to help create the
conditions for stability, thereby reducing the likelihood of the state
supporting or harbouring terrorists in the future (British Ministry of
Defence 2002:10).
216 The strategies of the conservators
The government concluded that the British forces needed ‘to be prepared to
conduct the full range of operations from warfighting through to peace
support operations’ (British Ministry of Defence 2003:6). In 2010, the ca-
binet set up a national security council and appointed a national security
adviser, giving priority to counter-terrorism, cyber, international military
crises and disasters (British Cabinet Office 2010a). In 2011, the BMoD,
together with two other ministries, jointly published the Building Stability
Overseas Strategy. In the strategy, two of the three mutually-supporting
pillars especially concerned the armed forces: early warning, and rapid crisis
prevention and response. Training national as well as regional military
forces to manage potential conflicts themselves was a central part of the
strategy. Consequently, military teams supported the training of the
Regional Africa Standby Forces in South Africa and Kenya, while military
trainers were sent to countries such as Ethiopia and Ukraine (British
Ministry of Defence 2011). The training of the Afghan National Security
Forces was another example (British Cabinet Office 2011). In Table 6.12, the
main deployments of British armed forces abroad are summarised.
Already in 1998, the government had a clear vision for the new employ-
ment of military force. At sea, the government argued that the emphasis was
on ‘continuing to move away from large scale maritime warfare and open-
ocean operations in the North Atlantic’. Instead, the government declared
that future littoral operations and force projection ‘will be our primary
focus’. Consequently, the ‘balance of anti-mine warfare previously centred
on defence of UK waters [would] also move more towards force projection
operations’. Regarding the land battle, the government declared that ‘we
will continue to need a full range of war fighting capabilities. Scale is likely
to be less important but we need to be capable of offensive, mobile opera-
tions’. Key requirements entailed firepower, including air-delivered, with
greater emphasis on precision and range. Air superiority and air defence
were considered essential for a wide range of deployed operations:
For the next decade at least, the direct air defence of the UK will be a
lower priority. Long-range air-attack will continue to be important both
as an integral part of warfighting and as a coercive instrument to
support political objectives […]. There will be an increasing premium on
“stand-off” precision missiles which can be launched at targets from
long range (British Ministry of Defence 1998:30–31).
Following the 9/11 attacks, the government observed that ‘we may need to
deploy forces further afield than Europe […] more often than we had en-
visaged’. The government concluded that it was not required that the UK
participated ‘in all operations, but we need to take our share of the tasks and
responsibilities which may present themselves’. The government argued that
the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the US highlighted the importance
of the transatlantic relationship. ‘From the outset, we demonstrated by our
The strategies of the conservators 217
Table 6.12 The main British deployments of armed units abroad 2000–2020
BILATERAL
ARRANGEMENTS
Bahrain 0 ? 160
Belgium 196 0 0
Belize 180 30 12
Brunei 1,050 550 1,000
Canada 343 557 370
Cyprus 3,200 2,791 2,260
Estonia (Enhanced Forward 0 0 800
Presence)
Germany 20,610 22,350 185
Kenya 0 52 350
Kuwait 0 41 50
Nepal 90 280 60
Netherlands 137 120 0
Nigeria 0 0 80
Oman 33 80 90
Poland (Enhanced Forward 0 0 140
Presence)
Sierra Leone 0 63 0
UAE 0 0 200
Ukraine (Operation Orbital) 0 0 53
INTERNATIONAL PSOs
Afghanistan (ISAF/Resolute 9,000 9,000 1,100
Support)
Bahrain (Southern Watch) 50 0 0
Bosnia (SFOR) 2,700 0 0
Cyprus (UNFICYP) 312 257 257
Iraq (Southern Watch) 300 0 0
Iraq (NATO Training Mission) 0 90 0
Iraq (Operation Shader) 0 0 400
Italy (Deliberate Force) 350 0 0
Mali (Operation Barkhane) 0 0 90
Saudi Arabia (Southern 569 0 0
Watch)
Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) 15 0 0
South Sudan(UNMISS) 0 0 299
Turkey (Southern Watch) 185 0 0
Yugoslavia / Serbia (KFOR) 3,500 8 0
MARITIME OPERATIONS
Indian Ocean 2 Destroyers 4 Frigates 1 Destroyer, 1
Frigate
Indian Ocean (Ocean Shield) 0 1 Frigate
Northern Atlantic (Patrol 0 1 Destroyer
Task N)
Southern Atlantic (Patrol 0 1 Destroyer
Task S)
Collective action, preferable through the UN, EU and NATO, was con-
sidered to be the most effective way of not only managing but also reducing
the threats that the UK was facing. Moreover, collective action was con-
sidered the only avenue for eliminating any of the threats. However, the
cabinet added that ‘[w]e also recognise that sometimes the best approach will
be more flexible alliances, coalitions or bilateral relationships tailored to
particular issues’ (British Cabinet Office 2008:8). In 2009, Prime Minister
Brown declared that the British ‘approach to national security is inter-
nationalist, not isolationist; active, not passive; and agile and flexible’
(British Cabinet Office 2009:3). A year later, the cabinet concluded that in
order project power abroad, the UK could not solely rely on the US. Rather,
the UK needed to use its network of relationships:
In addition, British Defence Staffs had been established in Nigeria, for the
West African region, in the UAE for the Gulf region and in Singapore for
the Asian-Pacific region (British Ministry of Defence 2017).
Regarding behaviour, the government did not shy away from using
the ultimate weapon in the British arsenals. The government explicitly
warned that:
220 The strategies of the conservators
UK’s nuclear weapons have a continuing use as a means of deterring
major strategic military threats, and they have a continuing role in
guaranteeing the ultimate security of the UK. But we also want it to be
clear, particularly to the leaders of states of concern and terrorist
organisations, that all our forces play a part in deterrence, and that we
have a broad range of responses available (British Ministry of Defence
2002:12).
Clearly, the Parliament did not wholeheartedly support the Cabinet’s claim
that manoeuvre thinking was at the heart of the UK’s approach to warfare
and the use of military force. Rather, the Parliament expressed doubts that if
the number of platforms in certain key areas were significantly reduced, the
British armed forces would be vulnerable to any significant combat attrition
in future. Obviously, it was the numbers of means rather than the way they
were used that worried the Parliament (British Parliament 2004).
Regarding the military strategy, the ends based on values were often in
focus. The British government declared that the point of departure in its
strategic considerations was the role Britain was to play in modern inter-
national relations. The government also announced its ambition of being a
force for good in the world and claimed that the UK’s international au-
thority by far exceeded the country’s size. The British core values included,
according to the government, human rights, the rule of law, good govern-
ance, justice, freedom and tolerance. Consequently, promoting and sup-
porting the spread of democracy as well as strengthening the rules-based
international system were fundamental objectives.
Following the 9/11-attacks, the threats-related ends came into focus. To
coerce, disrupt and destroy potential opponents were declared key ends in
the fight against terrorism. However, the threat was not perceived coming
solely from terrorism, but also from the regimes providing safe-havens for
the terrorists. Consequently, preventing and deterring these regimes from
harbouring terrorists were additional objectives in this regard. Another key
objective was to counter the efforts of the terrorists to acquire WMD. In
2008, the government, on the one hand, concluded that no state or alliance
would have both the intent and the capability to pose a major threat to the
UK in the near future. On the other hand, the government admitted that it
could not rule out a possible re-emergence of such a threat in the future.
Consequently, safeguarding the UK against the re-emergence of such a
threat, as well as defending the UK and its Overseas Territories were de-
clared as core objectives. In addition, ensuring a secure and resilient UK was
presented as an overarching end. Protecting the British people, economy,
infrastructure and way of life was hence important. Moreover, by con-
tributing to the shaping of a stable world, the likelihood of risks affecting
the UK or British interests overseas would decrease.
Regarding the needs, the government expressed ends related to the UK’s
international role. Being a leading, as well as reliable, powerful and pro-
minent, member of the international community was hence an explicit ne-
cessity not least for the British self-image. At the same time, the government
admitted the needs of international cooperation. The effectiveness of
NATO, as well as the maintenance of the transatlantic relationship, was
hence declared a core British objective. However, the government made
clear that the UK’s interests were not confined to Europe. The British de-
pendency on international trade and the free flow of natural resources as
The strategies of the conservators 223
well as on foreign investment into the UK made promoting international
stability, freedom and economic development an obvious end of the UK.
Naturally, projecting power globally in order to protect British interests
overseas, as well as to maintain international security. was declared a core
objective. The fourth and last aspect of the ends, vulnerabilities, was seldom
elaborated. However, when discussed, addressing vulnerabilities was de-
scribed as the most important responsibility of the government. Ensuring
the safety and security of British citizens, as well as the prosperity of the
UK, was mentioned as a core end regarding individuals and society as a
whole. The government also considered the integrity and interests of the
state as being vulnerable, especially regarding cyber-attacks. To conclude,
we argue that a balance between values and needs have been the most
dominant ends in the elaborations of the British government. Potentially,
this can be explained by the British self-image as an outward-facing global
protector of liberal core values including human rights, the rule of law,
democracy and freedom. As noted by the cabinet in 2008, those ‘values
define who we are and what we do’.
Regarding the traditional means, the British government concluded al-
ready in the late 1990s, that a transformation was a necessity, not an option.
Jointness and rapid deployability were hence given priority. Consequently,
each of the services had to give up something. Anti-submarine warfare
capability, as well as the number of MBTs and combat aircraft, were to be
reduced. This trend was reinforced after the 9/11 attacks and the enhanced
focus on capacities for expeditionary operations. Simultaneously con-
tributing to several small-scale operations in widely geographically sepa-
rated locations rather than to a single major operation was the prioritised
approach. In addition, the development of the special forces was given extra
attention. New aircraft carriers and amphibious ships were to increase the
UK’s ability to project air and land power from the sea while new destroyers
were to enhance the force projection capacity on the oceans. The British
government explicitly favoured capability over quantity.
Because of the increased focus on expeditionary warfare, as well as on
power projection, enablers were given higher priority. This included not only
new transport aircraft and ships but also deployable headquarters, as well as
communications and logistical support including air-to-air refuelling aircraft
and tanker and support ships. Regarding the nuclear weapons, the British
government already in the late 1990s gave up the ambitions of having air-
borne capacity. Consequently, the Trident submarines became the only part
of the British nuclear force. In addition, the number of nuclear warheads, as
well as the number of operational launch tubes on the strategic submarines,
were reduced. Finally, regarding the modern means, considerable attention
was given to space assets and cyberspace as well as to systems for surveillance,
electronic warfare and satellite communication throughout the explored
decades. Unmanned combat air vehicle and other UAV capacities have hence
been at the core of the policy documents. To conclude, we argue that both
224 The strategies of the conservators
expeditionary warfare and power projection have become essential in the
British strategy. Consequently, the government has increasingly emphasised
enablers rather than traditional means. We argue that this indicates a shift in
the British military strategy. Although the Blair administration already in the
late 1990s presented plans to establish a power projection capacity, we argue
that it was not until during Cameron’s leadership that action was put behind
the ambitions and the necessary transformation in this direction took place.
We argue that this indicates a shift in the British military strategy.
Regarding ways, the British government initially presented a list of eight
situations as a basis for military planning. Notably, all but one were at the
lower end of the escalation spectrum. In the aftermath of the 9/11-attacks,
the government focused on conflict prevention, including defence diplomacy
activities, and on peace support operations, including stabilisation. At the
same time, the government stressed the need to have British armed forces
prepared to conduct the full range of operations including warfighting.
From 2010 onwards, the government has given priority to military opera-
tions to counter not only terrorism but cyber threats and international
military crises as well. Hence, early warning came, together with rapid crisis
prevention and response, to be in focus.
Already in 1998, the British government presented a new vision on the
employment of military force. For the naval forces, the new approach in-
cluded a transformation towards littoral operations and force projection.
Air superiority and air defence were considered fundamental for a wide
range of modern military operations. Notably, the direct air defence of the
UK was given lower priority. Instead, long-range air-attack was given a
more important role both as an integral part of warfighting and as a coercive
instrument. From 2003, the government also emphasised delivering effect
from the sea onto the land. Regarding the ground forces, the quantity was
considered less important. Instead, priority was given to the ability to carry
out offensive, mobile operations alongside the US. Maintaining the cap-
ability to act well beyond Europe included having a strategic presence
outside the continent. Consequently, the government strived to increase
bilateral cooperation with a wide range of new countries, as a complement
to the already long-standing partnerships with the US and Australia.
Intensifying the strategic relationship with France was also prioritised.
Deterrence and forward engagement in order to prevent escalation and re-
duce, or eliminate, threats directed toward the UK and/or British interests
were, in other words, crucial to the British strategy. West Africa, the Persian
Gulf and the Asian-Pacific region were hence given priority.
Finally, regarding behaviour, it seems reasonable to claim that the British
government did not present a consistent approach during the period ex-
plored. Arguably, the considerations referred to the balance between man-
oeuvre warfare and attrition rather than to control but a clear standpoint in
this regard was never presented. To conclude, we argue that the con-
siderations of the British government regarding ways have focused on the
The strategies of the conservators 225
situation of conflict prevention. The policy elaborations on employment
have rather been supportive in this regard than being independently con-
ducted. In Table 6.14, the British military strategy is summarised.
Notes
1 François Mitterrand of the Socialist Party (French: Parti socialiste) was PoFR 21
May 1985 – 17 May 1995.
2 Jacques Chirac of the Gaullist-conservative Rally for the Republic (French:
Rassemblement pour la République), from 2002 of the centre-right Union for a
The strategies of the conservators 229
Popular Movement (French: Union pour un mouvement populaire) was PoFR 17
May 1995 – 16 May 2005.
3 Nicolas Sarkozy of the Union for a Popular Movement was PoFR 16 May 2005 –
15 May 2012.
4 François Hollande of the Socialist Party was PoFR 15 May 2012 – 14 May 2017.
5 Emmanuel Macron of the liberal-centrist La République En Marche has been
PoFR since 14 May 2017.
6 France requested assistance from the other EU-members based on Article 42 (7) of
the Treaty on the European Union (TEU). This represented the first activation of
the mutual assistance clause following the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty in
2009. Since Article 5 of NATO’s Washington Treaty was invoked in the aftermath
of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the French government had a precedent to build a
request on if directing the request to France’s NATO-allies instead. The French
government choose not to make use of this precedent, rather it invoked another
treaty for the very first time. See European Parliament (2016) and NATO (2019).
7 The UK is the only monarchy explored in this project. Contrary to the head of
state, that is the president, in each of the other four great powers, the Queen is not
involved in the strategy formulation process. Consequently, the British parliament
also has another role in this regard compared with the parliaments of the other
four great powers. Following this difference, we have decided to include some
relevant documents issued by the British parliament in our exploration.
8 During the twenty-first century, the UK has had two Prime Ministers from the
Labour Party (Tony Blair 2 May 1997–27 June 2007, and Gordon Brown 27 June
2007–11 May 2010), and three Prime Minister from the Conservative Party (David
Cameron 11 May 2010–13 July 2016, Theresa May 13 July 2016–24 July 2019 and,
since 24 July 2019, Boris Johnson).
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7 Managing power asymmetry and
structural change
Introduction
In this final chapter, we summarise the main findings of the previous
chapters and answer our fourth main question: how do the strategic choices
among the five system-determining states interact and how does this affect
stability and change in the international system? The chapter has three main
sections. In the first section, we aggregate the findings from Chapters 4–6 by
focusing on external efforts during the first two decades of the twenty-first
century – the three different unipolar strategies pursued by the US and the
alignment strategies of the two ‘contesters’, China and Russia, and the two
‘conservators’, France and the UK. The second section focuses on the in-
ternal efforts of the five states and their military strategies and summarises
the argument from previous chapters by analysing differences and simila-
rities in strategic adjustment related to national military capacities. The third
section is dedicated to the second part of the main question: how the choice
of strategy of the US and the strategic responses of other system-
determining states affect the future stability of the international system and
the US-led liberal international order.
DOI: 10.4324/9781003157113-7
234 Managing power asymmetry and change
Table 7.1 The alignment strategies of the system-determining states
practise multilateral strategies including exercising its powers with the help
of common institutions and the consent from other leading satisfied status
quo oriented states. This is the strategy of cooperative security, which pre-
scribe a behaviour that is consistent with the liberal institutionalist IR-
theory and Power Transition Theory (PTT). The third strategy, selective
engagement, represents a focused alternative for a unipolar power based on
strategies relating to Balance of Power Theory (BPT). In this strategy, the
unipolar power does not try to advance and preserve its relative position by
dominating all other states or carry the burden of establishing and enforcing
a worldwide system for collective security and economic cooperation.
Instead, it concentrates its efforts on the goal of preserving peace among
great powers and support the balance of power in regions that may trigger a
war between great powers.
In responding to the three strategies, other states may either oppose or
cooperate with the unipolar power. A third possible strategic alternative,
open to both unipolar powers and second-ranked system determining states,
is isolationism and efforts to achieve strategic autonomy. In their responses
to the unipolar strategies, the four other system-determining states created
two clusters. First, the contesters, China and Russia, who practised balan-
cing strategies aiming to reduce the power of the US and increase their own
or collective capacities to resist pressures from the dominating state. Second,
the conservators, France and the UK, who, with some exceptions, supported
US external strategies and did not try to develop unilateral or collective
capacities to balance against the US. In this section, we present an analysis
of the responses to each US strategy based on our findings in the previous
empirical chapters.
How did the other four system-determining states respond to this strategy
of primacy?
How did the other four system-determining states respond to these two
different unipolar strategies?
China did not reverse its balancing strategy during the Obama administra-
tion. Instead, previous efforts of internal balancing by modernising its
armed forces were complemented with increased efforts of collective defence
balancing with Russia and deepened security cooperation with other states
in the region. Additionally, China began to develop new capacities for ex-
ternal power projection. A possible explanation for this is that the Obama
administration’s strategy of cooperative security was pursued with less
consistency in East Asia. The US perceived China as a growing power and
potential future challenger and the US’s pivot towards Asia began already
during the Obama administration. The Chinese government’s view of the
US as a potential hegemonic global power did not change during the Obama
administration. The Trump administration’s confrontational policies to-
wards China cemented this view as well as China’s balancing strategies.
However, the Chinese government also consistently expressed its support for
the UN system. The government’s increased ambitions regarding both re-
gional and international security cooperation as well as UN operations can
238 Managing power asymmetry and change
be interpreted as an attempt to improve its status through a strategy of
social mobility.
The Obama administrations strategy of cooperative security initially in-
cluded efforts of a reset policy towards Russia. This did not result in a long-
term improvement of Russia’s relations with Western countries. Russia’s
military involvement in Syria, its war against Ukraine and its arms deals
with Turkey are instead signs of a shift in the Russian strategy towards an
offensive unilateral balancing aiming to undermine US power position in the
Middle East and proactively prevent former Soviet Union republics from
establishing closer ties to both NATO and the EU. Russia’s war against
Ukraine and the annexation of the Crimea peninsula resulted in a re-
activation of NATO’s collective defence in Europe already during the
Obama administration. In relation to Europe and Russia, the strategy of
selective engagements can therefore be considered to have been introduced
before Trump entered office. Russia’s efforts to consolidate or improve its
great power status increasingly correspond to the status strategy social
competition. However, Russia’s preparedness to use nuclear weapons, its
emphasis on specific Russian values, hybrid warfare techniques and its
strategy to develop bilateral relations with regional powers may also be
interpreted as a strategy of social creativity aiming to compensate for a
disadvantage in traditional hard and soft power resources. In terms of BPT
and HST/PTT, the Russian strategy contains elements of both. Obvious
elements of balance of power are found in Russian regional security ar-
rangements and commitments to assist other states exposed to armed at-
tacks and the opposition to further NATO enlargements. On the other hand,
the government’s analysis of a stagnating West and developments toward a
new polycentric world order fits well with both HST and PTT and indicates
a preference for global power shift away from a liberal international order
dominated by one superpower.
France supported the Obama administrations strategy of collective se-
curity. The French government gave substantial contributions to the
NATO-led and UN-sanctioned military intervention in Libya in 2011. It was
also during the Obama administration that France returned to NATO’s
integrated military command structures. The government’s response to the
Trump administrations strategy of selective engagement followed the same
pattern. NATO’s renewed ambitions regarding collective defence is fully
consistent with the rights to collective self-defence in article 51 of the UN
charter. France’s strategic responses to US strategies indicate that it is an
autonomous status quo power that will support the dominating state as long
as it acts as a defender of common multilateral principles and norms.
However, if the dominating state pursues unilateral strategies and neglecting
common institutions, French support will be withdrawn. France’s ambition
to establish strategic alternatives that complement US-led institutions such
as NATO is characteristic of France’s leash-slipping strategy. However, the
French government’s efforts to strengthen the EU capabilities related to
Managing power asymmetry and change 239
collective defence do not aim to replace NATO or challenge US status as the
leading global power. Similarly, France’s defence cooperation outside
Europe, as well as its efforts to develop unilateral capabilities for external
military power projection, does not seem to be aimed at limiting the US’s
influence. Instead, these complementary defence cooperation aim to pro-
mote France’s ability for independent action and strategic autonomy.
Therefore, in contrast to the strategies of China and Russia, the French
alignment strategy does not correspond to expectations regarding counter-
balancing behaviour in BPT. However, France support for values and
multilateral institutions associated with the present international liberal
order fits well with PTT descriptions of a satisfied major status quo power, a
leading conservator of the present international order.
The Obama administrations strategy of cooperative security challenged
the UK to live up to the US expectation of the UK taking more responsi-
bility within the framework of international multilateral cooperation. The
British government concluded that in order to project power abroad the UK
needed a network of alliances, principally with the US and NATO and also
with EU members and Commonwealth states such as Australia, Canada and
New Zealand. Additionally, the government increased bilateral cooperation
with a wide range of other countries. Following the 2012 UK–France
Summit, security and defence cooperation with France became a priority.
Germany and Japan were also included in Britain’s strategic bilateral re-
lationships. Simultaneously, the British government decided to withdraw the
British army from its German bases. The British governments continued to
nurture UK’s ‘special relationship’ with the US also after the Trump-
administration introduction of the strategy of selective engagement.
However, the UK has complemented the US partnership with three other
strategic partnerships or alliances: key members of the Commonwealth
realms, NATO and France. Additionally, the UK has initiated cooperation
with other European states through JEF that gives it a complementary
platform to NATO for continued defence cooperation with EU member
states after Brexit. Consequently, we argue that the UK practised a strategy
of multiple courting during both the Obama and the Trump presidency.
Similar to France’s hedging strategy, the British strategy of multiple
courting, as well as its efforts to improve its capacity for external power
projection, was not intended to limit the US’s influence. The British strategy,
therefore, does not correspond to expectations regarding counter-balancing
behaviour in BPT. Instead, the British government’s consistent support for
these multilateral institutions at the centre of the US-led liberal international
order and its unconditional support for Western liberal values associated
with this order correspond well to the PTT description of a leading and
satisfied status quo power – a conservator. Similar to the French govern-
ment, the British government emphasise the importance of its overseas in-
terest. However, when it comes to autonomous unilateral external power
240 Managing power asymmetry and change
projection, the British strategy is less ambitious than the French and more
dependent on continued cooperation with the US and other states.
7.2.1 Ends
The ends based on values indicate a difference between the Western and the
two revisionist great powers. While all five stressed the value of international
peace, the Western powers also emphasised values such as democracy, good
governance, the rule of law and human dignity. Notably, these values were
referred to as universal. Sustaining freedom and encouraging prosperity
were other value-based ends mentioned by the Western powers and espe-
cially the USA. Both China and Russia expressed ambitions of creating
mutual trust and peaceful coexistence among states. On the one hand, all
five great power strived for stability in international relations. On the other
hand, they also articulated ends indicating changes. For example, indicating
that the current system and norms were not strong enough, the Western
powers mentioned intentions of strengthening the rules-based international
system as well as international norms. Moreover, all but the US articulated
ends aiming at creating favourable conditions for themselves, enhancing
their international position, as well as gaining influence and status in the
international system. Arguably, these changes had to take place at the ex-
pense of others. Interestingly, both China and Russia expressed ends re-
ferring to the domestic situation.
All five great powers often articulated ends related to threats in a pro-
active manner. Dissuading adversaries from undertaking military activities,
as well as deterring them from developing capabilities that could threaten the
interest of the great power clearly, indicates pro-action. In China’s case,
the pro-activeness also included potential threats against the communist
regime and in Russia’s potential conflicts adjacent to Russia. Other
242 Managing power asymmetry and change
similarities were the objectives defending the homeland, including its se-
curity and resilience, as well as safeguarding citizens even outside the
homeland territory. Notably, all great powers but the USA also mentioned
safeguarding the state’s sovereignty and its territorial integrity in this con-
text. In the British and French cases, overseas territories were included in
this part of the elaborations. Another threat-based end was the Chinese
government’s desire to prevent being left behind in military innovations,
especially compared to the US. Only the Russian government expressed
wartime-related threat-based ends including forcing the aggressor to end the
war at an early stage.
The five great powers also expressed some similarities regarding ends
referring to needs. Notably, these similar ends were related to the global
economy. On the one hand, the ends were about creating favourable ex-
ternal conditions to strengthen the domestic economy. On the other hand,
the ends concerned securing the access to key markets and strategic re-
sources as well as to lines of communication. While the Western powers
articulated ends related to their dependency on international cooperation
and to strengthening established alliances, both China and Russia expressed
ends connected to the national unity.
Finally, regarding vulnerabilities, we observe that the Western powers
tend to focus on the safety of their citizens as well as on their critical in-
frastructure including the functionality of the society. Instead, China and
Russia focused on public order, political stability and social harmony. While
China’s worries regarding lagging behind other great powers in terms of
science and technology were based on threat perceptions, similar Russian
worries were based on its vulnerability.
In Table 7.2, we conclude which aspects of ends have been the most
predominant in each of the great power’s policy elaborations. In the
American case, we argue that protecting and promoting values is the most
dominant end. Values are also dominant in the British strategy but while the
US emphasised peace, freedom and prosperity, the UK has stressed human
rights, the rule of law and democracy. In addition, the British also em-
phasised needs. Both China and France focused on vulnerabilities. In the
former case, the elaborations did not always use the state but rather the CCP
as a point of departure. Finally, regarding Russia, we conclude that the ends
related to threats hold the most predominant position in the policy ela-
borations. In addition, Russia has focused on ends related to needs, in-
cluding Russia’s international position.
Ends Values Vulnerability Threats & Needs Vulnerability Values & Needs
Managing power asymmetry and change 243
7.2.2 Means
Regarding the traditional means, the US armed forces have, over time, given
priority to jointness, quality and readiness over quantity while it seems rea-
sonable to argue that China and Russia have prioritised the other way around.
During the first two decades of the twenty-first century, this picture has come
to change. In the US, both the army and the marine corps have given more
attention to irregular warfare missions. In both revisionist states, the focus has
shifted from quantity to quality. In addition, both have put increased emphasis
on jointness. In China, a shift in relative priority from the ground to naval
forces has taken place. In Russia, permanent combat readiness has been de-
clared as a goal for the transformation of the military. While the American
armed forces have had the capacity for expeditionary warfare for some time,
this has become a focus in the UK as well in France. Both these states are
transforming their military towards an autonomous, swift-reaction armed
force, deployable far beyond their borders. Consequently, the number of
MBTs and combat aircraft has in both cases been reduced when capability
over quantity becomes the new motto.
When it comes to enablers, strategic logistics and mobility were given
priority in all five great powers. All three Western powers also emphasised
expeditionary warfare as well as power projection. Consequently, tanker/
cargo aircraft, command and control as well as and deployable task force
headquarters were prioritised. The prepositioning and basing of infra-
structure were also emphasised in this regard. In the American case, EW-
capabilities and intelligence were additional priorities. China also stressed
information warfare and counter-measures but focused on the national
defence industry rather than on the means themselves. In the Russian case,
maintenance, repair and stockpiling were prioritised areas.
The nuclear means initially seemed to have decreased in importance in all
cases but the French. In both the US and Russia, the means of each of the
parts of the nuclear triad decreased in numbers. Furthermore, the MIRV
capacity was withdrawn, leaving the ICBMs with just a single nuclear
warhead. Notably, France abolished its land-based IRBMs while the UK
gave up the ambitions of having airborne capacity already in the late 1990s.
However, at the end of the period explored, the Trump administration
decided to modernise the nuclear triad, make the F-35 combat aircraft dual-
capable and launch the LRSO cruise missile program. In China, counter-
measures such as early warning and protection were given priority. Russia
also came to favour early warning systems as well as facilities for its WMD
systems. The French government continued to stress that nuclear deterrence
remained the foundations of France’s strategy. Hence, modernisation of
SSBNs and airborne cruise missiles were given priority. The British did not
only decrease the number of nuclear warheads but the number of opera-
tional launch tubes on the strategic submarines as well.
244 Managing power asymmetry and change
Finally, regarding the modern means, space and cyberspace, as well as
information and electronic warfare, have become of increased importance in
all five great powers. All five states have organised special commands and
units for these domains. Specific weaponry such as drones and autonomous
arms have also received increased attention but on a different level. Clearly,
the US is in the lead regarding computer network operations and UAVs.
The US has also expressed an ambition to ensure its armed forces’ in-
formation superiority. Both space and cyberspace are hence considered as
war-fighting domains in their own right.
In Table 7.3, we conclude which aspects of means have been the most
predominant in each of the great power’s policy elaborations. In the US
case, we argue that enablers have had a central role throughout the twenty-
first century. In addition, to ensure American military supremacy, prior-
itising modern means is not an option but a necessity. We find that enablers
have come into focus also in the British strategy. Despite the developments
of the Russian and Chinese military, we conclude that the traditional means
remain the focus of the Russian and Chinese strategies. Arguably, the tra-
ditional means, and especially the ground forces, serve the domestic needs of
the CCP best. We conclude that nuclear forces still are fundamental in the
French strategy. However, as in the British case, the focus on expeditionary
warfare and power projection has also made enablers essential. We conclude
that the increased focus on enablers in the French and British cases indicates
a shift in both these states’ strategies.
7.2.3 Ways
Regarding situation, the American strategy focused on war-prevention. If
deterrence failed, the US would not shy away from a war-fighting situation.
The ambition was to dominate every level of escalation. As the focus shifted
towards irregular warfare, the ground forces came to emphasise crisis pre-
vention and conflict management with a focus on counterinsurgency and
counterterrorism operations. Over time, the US naval and air forces have
focused on power projection in a war prevention situation. We argue that
the Chinese strategy has focused on self-defence and deterrence. As China’s
overseas interests were given increased attention, participating in interna-
tional security cooperation became more important. However, the main
focus was kept on the war prevention situation. The Russian government
initially had a rather deterministic war-fighting approach. However, when
Managing power asymmetry and change 245
the American strategy shifted from primacy towards cooperative security,
the Russian focus shifted towards deterrence and increasingly active use of
military force. Both the French and the British governments focused on
rapid crisis prevention and response including preventive deployments and
defence diplomacy.
We argue that the American strategy is offensive regarding the employ-
ment of military force. Projecting power and the capacity to decisively defeat
any adversary was at the very core of the strategy. Simultaneously, by al-
ready in the initial phase eliminating the adversaries’ offensive capabilities,
their counter-offensive options were to be denied. Consequently, forward
deployment of the US military was considered necessary. The Chinese
government emphasised integrated joint operations with both offensive and
defensive ambition. We observe a shift from a static ground focused regional
defence towards a dynamic approach including offensive air as well as naval
operations. We argue that the overarching Russian strategic approach is
defensive, at least in the initial phase of armed conflict. By using foreign
bases on the soil of friendly host nations to stationing armed units, the
preconditions for a defence-in-depth is established. Notably, this does not
prevent Russia from adopting offensive approaches at the lower theatre and/
or operational levels. Moreover, Russia does not hesitate from using mili-
tary force to achieve political ends. Military presence and/or prepositioning
of military assets abroad were also fundamental to the French approach.
However, we interpret this as a key part of the pro-active and offensive
character of the French strategy. Similar conclusions can be drawn re-
garding the British strategy. Force projection, forward engagement, long-
range air-attacks and offensive, mobile land operations were all central parts
of the British approach.
Finally, regarding operational behaviour, we argue that all three Western
power emphasised manoeuvre warfare. While the British government did
not elaborate much regarding the conceptual meaning of this kind of war-
fare, both their American and French counterparts did. Although France
declared that the French armed forces strived to gain and maintain super-
iority in all domains, we argue that the elaborations focused on annihilating
the adversary. Hence, we consider it reasonable to argue that the French
government favoured manoeuvre warfare. As the US declared an ambition
to achieve full spectrum dominance, we argue that the American behaviour
aimed at achieving control in all domains of warfare. As the British, the
Chinese government did not present any conceptual considerations about
the meaning of modern warfare. On the one hand, the Chinese government
emphasised integrated joint operations. On the other hand, the government
elaborated on combining standing and reserve units. One potential ex-
planation for the lack of conceptual considerations can be that the shift
from quantity to quality has not been followed by the necessary transfor-
mation of the conceptual framework. Consequently, the previous focus on
numbers could indicate a preference for exhausting the enemy, that is
246 Managing power asymmetry and change
attrition. Finally, regarding Russia, we argue that the focus has been on
controlling and paralysing the opponent. Moreover, Russia seems to have
elaborated extensively on the conceptual aspects of warfare. Hence, com-
bining regular units, including airmobile as well as airborne troops, con-
ducting highly manoeuvrable operations with the use of special forces and
irregular armed formations, as well as information warfare, might be the
Russian approach to modern warfare.
In Table 7.4, we conclude which aspects of ways have been the most
predominant in each of the great power’s policy elaborations. In the
American and Chinese cases, we argue that the situation has been in focus
and hence war prevention. Both France and the UK have also focused on
situation, but specifically on the conflict prevention level of escalation.
Regarding Russia, we argue that behaviour has been at the core of the policy
elaborations. The wars in Georgia and Ukraine, as well as Russia’s military
operations in Syria, also displayed innovative ways of using military force.
Note
1 For a radically different interpretation of the origins of the US-led liberal inter-
national order, see Mearsheimer (2019).
Bibliography
Ikenberry, John (2004). ‘The End of the Neo-conservative Moment’ Survival,
Volume 46, Issue 1.
Ikenberry, John (2011). Liberal Leviathan – The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation
of the American World Order. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Mearsheimer, John (2019). ‘Bound to Fail – The Rise and Fall of the Liberal
International Order’ International Security, Volume 43, Issue 4.
Mearsheimer, John and Stephen Walt (2016). ‘The Case for Offshore Balancing’
Foreign Affairs, Volume 95, Issue 4.
Posen, Barry (2014). Restraint. A New Foundation for US Grand Strategy. Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press.
Index
9/11 attacks 9, 87, 93–4, 128, 200, 207, ART model 60; see also actor approach;
215–16, 220–5, 234–6, 248 regional approach; thematic approach
actor approach 58–60; China 127–8; Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
France 178–9; Russia 150–1; UK 129, 142
202–4; US 79–81 Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Adler, Emanuel 58–9 59, 83, 129; Defence Ministers’
Afghanistan 21, 46, 88, 90, 109, 111, 115, Meeting Plus 133; Regional
121, 194, 200, 216, 225, 235, 251 Forum 129
African Union 183, 198 Atlantic Alliance 185
AIDS 81 attack helicopters 65, 99, 137, 159, 188,
aircraft carriers 65, 96, 98, 198, 209–10 213, 228
Al Qaeda 88, 90, 205 attack submarines 96, 98, 186, 188, 190,
Alexander, Gerard 52 198; see also SSNs
alignment strategies 27, 40; China 51–3, Australia 82, 92, 114, 185, 196, 211,
127–31, 171–3, 234–5, 237–40; definition 218–19, 221, 224, 236, 239
of 3, 39; diversity of 240–1; France 53, autonomous systems 66–7, 169
171–81, 195–7, 226–8, 234–6, 238–9; autonomy 2, 4, 16, 32, 40, 106, 187, 189,
Russia 52–5, 59, 149–54, 165–7, 171–3, 198, 201; see also strategic autonomy
234–5, 238–40; of secondary great Azerbaijan 170
powers 51–7; and security environment
57–60; of the system-determining states Bahrain 114
234–41; UK 202–6, 220–1, 226–8, 234, Bailey, Jonathan 225
236, 239–40; of the unipolar power balance of power 3, 45, 47, 49, 51, 88–9,
41–51; US 41–51, 69, 115–17, 167, 197, 118, 128, 147–8, 153, 166, 195–6, 234,
222, 234–41; see also individual strategies 237, 250; see also distribution of
Allison, Graham 61 power; power asymmetries
anarchy 11, 13, 19 Balance of Power Theory 4, 8, 12, 15–17,
Ångström, Jan 60 50, 115, 117, 166, 172, 220, 234, 238–9
Antarctic 84 balance of threat 12, 33, 148, 226
anti-ballistic missiles 66 balancing 5, 22, 47, 50, 124, 140, 147,
appeasement strategies 55 172, 226, 234–5, 237, 240, 250;
Arab Spring 205 collective 52, 143–4, 146, 166, 172,
Arctic 84, 203 234–5, 237; counter-balancing
Argentina 84 strategies 11–12, 16–17, 22, 47, 124,
Armenia 164 171–2, 226, 239, 250; external 25, 33,
arms races 17, 82, 130–1, 139, 151, 153 51–2; hard 3, 51–2, 56, 166; internal
arms trade 195, 238 22, 25, 32, 51–2, 143, 146–7, 165, 235,
Art, Robert 47–8 237; off-shore 25, 44, 50, 250; regional
254 Index
17, 51, 55–6; soft 3, 51–3, 56; Bush, George W. 69, 87–9, 92–6, 115–24,
unilateral 52, 165–7, 234–5, 238 134, 146, 157, 177, 186, 210, 221,
ballistic missile submarines see SSBN 227–8, 234, 236, 250
bandwagoning 16, 20–2, 33, 51, 55, Buzan, Barry 8, 26–7, 58–9, 67
227–8, 234, 236, 246; defensive 55–6;
offensive 55–7 Cambodia 139
Bangladesh 22 Cameron, David 206–7, 211–12
Barnett, Michael 58–9 Cameroon 114
behaviour (ways) 69, 245–6; China 142, Canada 31, 114, 203, 218–19, 221, 239
146; France 195, 199–200; Russia Carter, Ashton 45
163–4, 169; UK 219–20, 224; US Central African Republic 164, 193–4
112–15, 122 Chad 194
Belarus 156, 163 chain ganging 55–6
Belgium 114 Chalmers, Malcolm 225–6
Bermuda 114 Chapman, Bert 225
Betts, Richard 60 China 1–4, 9–10, 17–20, 22, 25, 27–32,
Bew, John 226 40, 42–4, 46–7, 79–83, 91–2, 116–17,
Biddle, Stephen 65–6, 68, 123 119, 123–4, 151, 165–6, 171, 178–9,
bilateral cooperation 54, 156, 165, 172, 196–7, 203, 209, 220, 226, 235, 237,
196, 201, 218, 221, 224, 236, 239 248–52; alignment strategies 51–3,
bin Laden, Osama 88 127–31, 171–3, 234–5, 237–40;
Binnendijk, Hans 68 economic growth 14, 42, 79–80, 84,
biotechnology 85 86; ends (of military strategy) 131–4,
bio-threats 86, 91, 181 144–6, 241–2, 246; foreign policy 131,
bipolar system 2–3, 7–8, 13–15, 25, 32, 144; means (of military strategy)
41, 58, 149 134–9, 145–7, 243–4, 246–7; military/
birth rates 81, 84 defence expenditure 134, 235, 249;
Bitzinger, Richard 148 strategic environment 127–31; ways
Black, James 226 (of military strategy) 139–42,
Blair, Tony 202, 209, 214, 224–5 145–7, 244–6
Blasko, Dennis 149 Chinese Communist Party 132, 140,
border enforcement 84, 91 145, 147–8
Bosnia 115, 164, 194 Chirac, Jacques 177, 199
Boston, Scott 171 classical realism 57, 62
Boulègue, Mathieu 171 Clear–Hold–Build concept 108
Boyd, John 66 climate change 58, 85, 130, 153–4, 181
Brazil 22, 32, 54, 79–80, 84, 116–17, 138, Clinton, Bill 124
165, 172, 178, 203–4, 218, 220 Clinton, Hillary 124
Bretton Woods system 18, 20 Coates, David 225
Brexit 84, 221, 226–7, 239 Cold War 3–4, 7, 9, 23, 57–8, 227, 248,
British Cabinet Office 202 250, 252
British Ministry of Defence 202, 215–16 collective balancing 52, 143–4, 146, 166,
British Parliament 202 172, 234–5, 237
Brooks, Stephen 9, 27–30, 47, 65, 123–4 Collective Security Treaty Organization
Brown, Gordon 205–6, 218 163, 165, 169, 235
Brzezinski, Zbigniew 42 Colombia 114
buck-passing 20–2, 54, 56–7 Combined Joint Expeditionary
Building Stability Overseas Strategy 216 Force 219
Bulgaria 114 command and control 66–7, 100–2, 104,
Bull, Hedley 23, 62 120, 138, 145, 161, 164, 168–9, 187,
burden-sharing 46, 49, 93, 118, 226, 237 189, 198, 243
Burkina Faso 194 Commonwealth of Independent States
Bush, George H. W. 42 150, 152, 156, 162–3, 165
Index 255
communism 147, 202, 241, 252; Democratic Republic of the Congo
see also Chinese Communist Party 139–41
Conference on Interaction and Denmark 114, 219
Confidence-Building Measures in deployed troops: UK 216–17; US
Asia 129 113–15
confidence- and security-building deterrence 7, 107, 119, 121, 140, 148,
measures 45 199, 212, 214
Connolly, Richard 171 dignity 87–8, 118, 182, 197, 241
constructivism 7, 61 disaster relief 90, 109–10, 117, 140–1, 237
Conventional Forces in Europe 45 dissatisfied powers 18–23;
Cooper, Julien 171 see also revisionist powers
cooperative security 41, 43–50, 55, 100, distancing 53, 56
109, 117, 144, 146, 166–7, 197, 200, distribution of power 10–11, 16, 25–33,
221–2, 227–8, 233–4, 236–40, 40, 42, 249; see also balance of power;
245, 251–2 power asymmetries
Correlates of War 15, 32 divide and rule tactics 17
corruption 82, 84 Djibouti 114, 193–4
Côte d’Ivoire 193–4 Doctrine, Concepts and Development
Council of Europe 63 Centre 202–6, 208–9, 219
Council on Security Cooperation in the Dorman, Andrew 225–6
Asia-Pacific Region 129 drones 66, 169, 199
counter-balancing strategies 11–12, 16–17, drug trafficking 82, 130, 153
22, 47, 124, 171–2, 226, 239, 250
counterinsurgency 107, 109–10, 113, early warnings 135–6, 138–9, 142, 145,
121–2, 205, 244 161–2, 168, 216, 224, 243
counterterrorism 107, 109–10, 113, 121, East Turkistan 128, 132
140–1, 162, 202, 216, 244 East Turkistan Islamic Movement 129
Crane, Keith 171 economic growth 9, 82–5, 92; Chinese
criminal cartels see organised crime 14, 42, 79–80, 84, 86
critical theory 7 economic sanctions 143, 172
Croatia 115 Edmunds, Timothy 225
Cuba 114, 164 Edström, Håkan 57, 68–9
Cyber Security Operations Centre 215 Egypt 115
cyberspace 65, 85–7, 91, 95, 104–7, El Salvador 114
119–21, 130–2, 139, 144–5, 162, 169, electromagnetic space 65, 132, 136, 144,
181, 184–6, 190, 199, 203, 205–7, 209, 161, 191
215–16, 223–4, 244 Elgström, Ole 53
Élysée Treaty 184
Darfur 140, 193 employment (ways) 68–9, 245; China
de Gaulle, Charles 227 142, 146; France 193–5, 199; Russia
De Haas, Marcel 170 163, 169; UK 216, 218–19, 224; US
decolonisation 59 111–12, 122
defence expenditure see expenditure enablers (means) 67, 69, 243–4, 248;
defence strategy: definition of 3, 39; China 136, 145; France 188–9,
see also alignment strategies; military 198–200, 244, 246; Russia 168; UK
strategy 212–14, 223–5, 244, 246; US 100–2,
Defense Planning Guidance 42 120, 122–3, 244, 246
defensive bandwagoning 55–6 end of history 10
defensive realism 8, 12, 20–1, 24, 33, 240 ends (of military strategy) 62–4, 69,
Delon, Francis 181 241–2; China 131–4, 144–7, 241–2,
democracy 10, 43, 48, 118, 155, 202, 206, 246; France 182–5, 197–8, 200, 242,
223, 242 246; Russia 154–7, 167–9, 241–2, 246;
256 Index
UK 206–9, 221–3, 225, 242, 246; US 215, 219, 221, 224, 247–9, 251; alignment
87–95, 118–19, 122, 241–2, 246–7; strategies 53, 171–81, 195–7, 226–8,
see also needs; threats; values; 234–6, 238–9; ends (of military strategy)
vulnerabilities 182–5, 197–8, 200, 242, 246; means (of
energy provision 83–5, 93, 119, 130, military strategy) 185–91, 198–200,
153, 203 243–4, 246; military/defence expenditure
English School 23 31, 185–6, 228; strategic environment
environmental concerns 63, 83–6, 130, 178–81; ways (of military strategy)
153, 180; climate change 58, 85, 130, 191–5, 199–200, 245–6
153–4, 181 Fravel, Taylor 148–9
epidemics 130, 153–4, 205 Frazier, Derrick 59
Erickson, Andrew 147 free markets 48, 91–2, 119
Eritrea 139 free trade 10, 21, 82, 91–2, 119, 250
Estonia 194, 219 Freedman, Lawrence 68–9
Ethiopia 216 freeriding 16, 46, 54, 250–1
ethnic cleansing 44 French Ministry of Defence 177–82,
ethnic conflicts 24, 48, 128–9, 153 187, 198
European Bank for Reconstruction and French Network and Information
Development 150 Security Agency 177, 190
European Community 227 fresh water 153–4, 181
European Rapid Reaction Force 21–2 Friedman, Benjamin 124
European Security and Defence
Policy 202 Gabon 193–4
European Union 19, 26, 28–9, 47, 54, 59, Gates, Robert 100, 109
79–80, 116–17, 151, 165, 172, 178–9, gender 83, 85
183–6, 193–9, 201–2, 204–5, 208, Georgia 10, 22, 46, 59, 155, 164–5,
218–21, 226–8, 236, 238–40; Brexit 84, 169–70, 203, 227, 235, 246
221, 226–7, 239 Germany 16–17, 19–20, 22, 25, 30–2, 44,
expenditure 29, 64; China 134, 235, 249; 53, 114–15, 147, 184, 194, 196, 201,
France 31, 185–6, 228; Russia 31, 218–19, 221, 227, 239
157–8, 249; UK 31, 209–10, 228; US Giles, Kier 170
31, 95, 236 Gilpin, Robert 18
external balancing 25, 33, 51–2 Glaser, Charles 68
extremism 81–3, 85, 89–90, 92, 117, 119, Global Cyber Security Capacity
129–30, 133, 145, 153, 180, 209, 236; Centre 215
see also terrorism global economic crisis 170
global population 84
Fanell, James 149 Global War on Terror 9, 94, 113, 234–5
Farrell, Theo 225 globalisation 10, 79, 81, 85, 115, 128,
feminism 7 130, 203, 220
Feng, Liu 148 Goldstein, Avery 147
Finland 53 Golts, Alexander 170
First World War 4, 13 Gorenburg, Dmitry 171
food security 130 grand strategy 60–1
force employment see employment (ways) Gray, Colin 57, 61, 64–9
foreign policy: American 22, 79; Chinese Greenland 114
131, 144; Russian 149, 151, 155, 170; gross domestic product 28–9, 31, 44,
see also Foreign Policy Concept 178, 249
Foreign Policy Concept 162 ground launched cruise missiles 138
Foreign Policy Concept (Russia) ground-based interceptors 102
149–50, 155–6 ground-based strategic deterrent 103
France 1–5, 9, 17–18, 21, 23, 28–32, 40, Group of Eight 22, 31, 172–3
Index 257
Group of Seven 23, 31, 58 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 45
Group of Twenty 23, 28 internal balancing 22, 25, 32, 51–2, 143,
146–7, 165, 235, 237
Haiti 114 International Bank for Reconstruction
hard balancing 3, 51–2, 56, 166 and Development 150
hard power 62–3, 124 international cooperation 154, 170, 183,
headquarters 65, 67 195, 197, 199, 208, 222, 242
health systems 83–4 International Institute of Strategic
hedging 3, 54, 201, 227, 236, 239 Studies 71, 162, 191, 215
Hegemonic Stability Theory 15–16, 18, international law 57, 150, 155, 167, 193
41, 49–50, 116–17, 143, 147, 166–7, International Monetary Fund 22,
172, 234, 238, 240, 250 150, 178
hegemonism 2, 8, 11–12, 14–20, 22, International Political Economy 7
32–3, 40–4, 49, 51, 54, 79–80, 116–17, International Relations 7, 18, 23, 41, 57
123–4, 128, 131–2, 143–4, 146–7, 172, international system: change and
220–1, 237, 240, 250 stability in 9–18, 248–52; definition of
Helnarska, Karolina 201 10; distribution of power in 10–11, 16,
hiding 53 25–33, 40, 42, 249; see also balance of
hierarchy 10–13, 19, 24, 26–7, 41, 57, power; power asymmetries; stability of
59–61, 64, 251 18–33; see also bipolar systems;
high-speed anti-radiation missiles 65 multipolar systems; unipolar system
Holbraad, Carsten 59–60 internet 180
Hollande, François 177, 181–2, 187 interventionism 15, 48, 235
Honduras 114 IR theory 7, 234
Honig, Jan Willem 60 Iran 20, 48, 51, 79, 81, 83, 116, 151, 204,
Hooker, Richard 69 235, 251
human dignity 87–8, 118, 182, 197, 241 Iraq 1, 9, 20–2, 43, 46, 48, 53, 79, 88,
human rights 10, 21, 43, 48, 63, 88, 155, 108–9, 111, 114, 116, 118, 121, 128,
206–7, 222–3 165, 194–5, 200, 221, 225, 228, 251
human trafficking 153 Islamic State 81, 83, 152
humanism 154–5 isolationism 3, 42, 48, 53–4, 118, 124,
humanitarian assistance 45, 48, 68, 81–2, 195, 201
90, 109–10, 117, 153, 206, 215, 237 ISR 100–1, 120; see also intelligence;
Hungary 114 reconnaissance; surveillance
Huntington, Samuel 14, 62 Israel 30, 83, 114
hybrid threats 195, 199 Italy 31, 114, 184, 196
Iceland 114 Jackson, Robert 7
idealism 7, 57 Jakarta International Defence
Ikenberry, John 41, 46–7, 122, 249–52 Dialogue 133
India 19, 28–30, 42, 54, 79–83, 92, Japan 17, 19, 22, 25–6, 30–2, 47, 53,
116–17, 119, 129, 149, 151, 165–6, 172, 79–80, 82, 86, 92, 114–17, 128, 143,
178–9, 185, 203–4, 209, 218, 220, 236 151, 185, 196, 203, 218, 220–1,
Indonesia 22, 79 236, 239
INF Treaty 66 Jervis, Robert 41, 57, 123
information countermeasures 135–6, Johansson, Linda 66–7
142, 243 Joint Expeditionary Force 219, 221, 239
information technology 85, 105 joint information environment 106
Inglehart, Ronald 63 Joint Terrorism Analysis
intelligence 67, 100–1; see also ISR Centre 202
intercontinental ballistic missiles 66–7, Jones, Charles 58, 63
102–4, 120, 160–1, 189–90, 198, 243 Jones, David Martin 226
intermediate range ballistic missiles 138 Jordan 114, 194
258 Index
Kaufmann, Chaim 68 Mattis, Jim 103
Kazakhstan 151 May, Theresa 204, 206
Kennedy, Paul 16 McDermott, Roger 170
Kenya 216 means (of military strategy) 64–7, 69,
Keohane, Daniel 201 243–4; China 134–9, 145–7, 243–4,
Keohane, Robert 18 246–7; France 185–91, 198–200,
Kirghizia 151 243–4, 246; Russia 157–62, 168–9,
Kissinger, Henry 42 243–4, 246–7; UK 209–15, 223–5,
Konyshev, Valery 171 243–4, 246; US 95–117, 119–23,
Kosovo 165 243–4, 246–7; see also enablers;
Krauthammer, Charles 1, 9, 43 modern means; nuclear means;
Krieger, Joel 225 traditional means
Kristensen, Hans 170–1 Mearsheimer, John 11–12, 14, 21, 41–2,
Kugler, Richard 68 44, 54, 69, 124, 250
Kuwait 114 medium range ballistic missiles 138
Kyrgyzstan 164 Medvedev, Dimitry 150
Mexico 79, 84
Lancaster House treaties 184 Meyers, Richard 94
large medium-speed roll-on/roll-off migration 58, 85–6, 116, 153, 181
military transport ships 65 military expenditure see expenditure
Larson, Deborah Welch 23, 25–6 military operations other than war 141
Latvia 219 military satellites 65, 214, 249
Layne, Christopher 44, 54, 123 military strategy 27, 60–70; definition of
Le Drian, Jean-Yves 180 3–4, 39, 61–2; diversity of 246–8; ends
League of Nations 7 see ends (of military strategy); means
leash-slipping 51, 54, 56, 196–7, 200–1, see means (of military strategy);
227, 234 operationalising 69–70; of the system-
Lebanon 140–2, 194 determining states 241–8; ways
Lee, Ji Yun 54 see ways (of military strategy)
Lemke, Douglas 20–3 Mitterrand, François 177
Leonard, Robert 69 mobile landing platform 101
liberal theory 18 modern means 67, 69, 244; China 138–9,
Liberia 139–41 145; France 190–1, 199; Russia 161–2,
Libya 1, 9, 20, 43, 46, 166, 200, 228, 238 169; UK 214–15, 223–4; United States
Liddell Hart, Basil 61, 69 104–6, 120–3; US 244; US
Lieber, Keir 52 Department of Defense 246
Lind, William 69 modernisation 22, 81, 92, 97–100, 103,
Lisbon Treaty 193, 197 117, 120, 136, 138, 143, 145–6, 149,
Lithuania 219 153–4, 156, 158–9, 165, 170–2, 178–9,
Little, Richard 58, 63 189–90, 198, 205, 209, 211, 235, 237,
Logan, Justin 124 243, 247, 249
long-range airlift aircraft 65–6 Moldova 164
Luttwak, Edward 69 Monteiro, Nuno 17–18, 21, 30
Lykke, Arthur 61 Morgenthau, Hans 11, 19, 62
Mullen, Michael 98
Macron, Emmanuel 177, 179, 181–6, 190 multilateral institutions 5, 9, 21, 40, 43,
main battle tanks 99, 137, 159, 186, 188, 45, 49, 166, 172, 196–220, 227, 237,
210, 213, 223, 228, 243, 248 239; see also individual institutions
Mali 141, 194, 205 multiple courting 54, 56, 221–2,
Malmlöf, Tomas 171 227, 239
market capitalism 21 multipolar system 2, 8–9, 13–15, 25, 54,
Massicot, Dara 171 80, 86, 127–8, 143, 151, 156, 165, 168,
materials science 85 171, 203, 220, 235
Index 259
nanotechnology 85 nuclear means 67, 69, 243–4; China 136,
Nathan, Andrew 148 138, 145, 247; France 189–90,
National Defense Strategy (US) 78, 199–200, 244, 246; Russia 160–1; UK
88–9, 92–4, 100 214, 223; United States 101–4,
National Intelligence Council (US) 120, 123
69, 79–86 Nuclear Posture Review 78, 101
national interest 5, 20, 43–6, 62, 64, 81, Nuclear Posture Review (US) 69
87–8, 93–4, 112, 118, 130–1, 149–51, nuclear weapons 14, 17, 29–31, 44–5,
154, 156–8, 165, 182–3, 187, 193, 196, 47–8, 51, 59, 65–6, 83, 86, 109–10, 130,
199–200, 204, 206, 226, 237 132, 134, 142, 145–6, 153, 162–3, 166,
National Military Strategy (US) 69, 89, 168–71, 178–9, 181–2, 197, 202, 220,
107, 111, 113 238, 243; second-strike capability 14,
National Security Capability Review 202 30–1, 44; see also individual weapons
National Security Concept (Russia) 149 Nye, Joseph 9, 62, 123
National Security Strategy (Russia) 150,
157, 163–4, 170 Obama, Barack 69, 88, 90, 92–6, 102–3,
National Security Strategy (US) 69, 112, 117–21, 123–4, 134, 146, 157, 166,
87–93, 95, 98–9, 101, 108 185–6, 200, 210, 221, 227–8,
National Space Council (US) 106, 121 234, 236–8
nationalism 49, 81, 83, 117, 180, 237 Odgaard, Liselotte 148
natural disasters 89, 95 Oelrich, Ivan 123
natural resources 63, 84, 180–1, 203, 222 offensive bandwagoning 55–7
needs (ends) 64, 69, 242; China 132–3; offensive realism 8, 11–12, 19–22, 24, 41,
France 183–4, 197–8; Russia 156–7, 234, 240
167–9, 242, 246; UK 208–9, 222–3, off-shore balancing 25, 44, 50, 250
225, 242, 246; US 91–3, 119 oil 48, 81, 85, 152, 204, 208
neo-interventionism 128, 143, 146 Oman 114
neo-isolationism 41, 43–4, 47–50, 53, Ong, Russell 148
55, 57 organised crime 82, 91, 130, 153, 181
neoliberalism 7 Organization for Security and
neorealism 7 Co-operation in Europe 45
Netherlands 114, 219 Organization of the Petroleum
neutrality 51, 53 Exporting Countries 81
New START 103, 237 Organski, Abramo Fimo Kenneth 18
New Zealand 218–19, 221, 239 Ostermann, Falk 201
Ng, Ka Po 149 Østerud, Øyvind 59
Niger 114, 194 outer space 105–6, 121, 130–2, 138–9,
Nigeria 114, 219 144–5, 161–2, 169, 186, 190, 199, 244
Nolte, Detlef 59
non-governmental organisations 79, 116 Pakistan 30, 81, 90, 129, 178–9
Norris, Robert 170–1 pandemics 58, 85, 91, 153, 180
North Atlantic Treaty Organization 4, Panetta, Leon 94, 98
20–2, 42, 44–6, 48, 54, 58, 92, 116, Pannier, Alice 201
150–1, 165–6, 171–2, 178, 184, 186, Pape, Robert 52–3
193–4, 196–201, 203–4, 208, 215, patriotism 154–5, 167
218–22, 226–8, 235, 238–40, 250–1 peacekeeping 82, 139–41, 146, 158,
North Korea 1, 9–10, 14, 30, 43–4, 48, 162–3, 169, 193
51, 59, 79, 106, 116, 235 peace-making 162, 169, 193
Northeast Asia Cooperation pensions 84
Dialogue 129 People’s Liberation Army 132, 134–8,
Norway 114 144–5, 148–9
nuclear deterrence 7, 148, 192, 199, Philippines 114
212, 214 piracy 130, 163, 205
260 Index
Poland 114 Republic of South Ossetia 155–6
political realism see classical realism revisionist powers 2–4, 8, 11, 25, 40, 42,
polycentric world order 151–2, 47, 50, 53–7, 70, 90–1, 118–19, 127,
166–7, 238 143, 147, 172, 227, 243, 247–52;
population ageing 81, 84–5, 116 see also China; Russia
population growth 84, 181, 205 revolution in military affairs 131
populism 10 Rieker, Pernille 201
Porter, Patrick 124, 225 Robertson, George 206, 209
Portugal 114 rogue states 108, 119
Posen, Barry 41–4, 46–9, 60–1, 65–6, Romania 114
69, 124 Ross, Andrew 41–4, 46–9
post-structuralism 7 Ross, Robert 123, 148
poverty 153, 204 Rotnem, Thomas 147
power, definition of 11 rule of law 108, 155, 182, 197, 206,
power asymmetries 1–2, 4, 15, 49, 117, 222–3, 241–2
143, 251; see also balance of power; Rumsfeld, Donald 122
distribution of power Russet, Bruce 63
Power Transition Theory 4, 8, 15–16, Russia 1–4, 9–10, 14, 17–19, 22, 25–6,
18–23, 40, 47, 49–50, 115–17, 143, 147, 28, 30–2, 40, 42–4, 46–8, 79–81, 84,
166–7, 172, 196, 220, 227, 234, 91–3, 116–17, 119, 129, 141, 143,
237–40, 251 146–8, 178–9, 197, 202–4, 220, 226–7,
precision strike capability 86, 96, 111, 235, 237, 248–52; alignment strategies
130, 136, 138, 145, 149, 210 52–5, 59, 149–54, 165–7, 171–3, 234–5,
primacy 41–3, 45–50, 55, 57, 116, 118, 238–40; ends (of military strategy)
122–4, 144, 146, 155, 165, 167, 171, 154–7, 167–9, 241–2, 246; foreign
197, 200, 203, 221–2, 227–8, 233–6, policy 149, 151, 155, 170;
240, 245, 250 see also Foreign Policy Concept;
property rights 82 means (of military strategy) 157–62,
public opinion 48 168–9, 243–4, 246–7; military/defence
Putin, Vladimir 149–50, 170, 172, 252 expenditure 31, 157–8, 249; strategic
Putnam, Tonya 170 environment 150–4; ways (of military
strategy) 162–4, 169, 244–6
Qatar 114
Quadrennial Defense Review 69, 87–90, Sanders, Bernie 124
93–5, 109, 113 Sarkozy, Nicolas 177, 182, 199–201
Quadrennial Roles and Mission Review satisfied powers 18–21, 23, 31, 148;
100, 105 see also status quo powers
Saudi Arabia 114, 194
Ramm, Aleksei 171 Savill, Matthew 225
realism see classical realism; structural Schmitt, Olivier 201
realism Schweller, Randall 24–5
reconnaissance 65, 67, 97, 100, 105, 128, Scobell, Andrew 148
130, 135–6, 215; see also ISR sea lines of communication 131, 133, 144
regional approach 58–60; China 128–30; Second World War 4, 20, 57
France 179–80; Russia 151–2; UK second-strike capability 14, 30–1, 44
204–5; US 81–4 selective engagement 41–5, 47–50, 55,
regional balancing 17, 51, 55–6 118, 144, 146, 166–7, 197, 200, 221–2,
regional security complexes 59 228, 233–4, 236–40, 250
religion 11, 20, 24, 62–3, 81–2, 116, Senegal 193–4
153, 180 separatism 129–30, 132–4, 145, 153,
Renz, Bettina 170 156, 168
Republic of Abkhazia 155–6 Serbia 115, 194
Index 261
Sergunin, Alexander 171 strategic bombers 66–7, 103–4, 124, 138,
Shanghai Cooperation Organization 52, 158, 161, 168, 190
129, 133, 142, 149, 163, 165, 169, 203 Strategic Defence Review 202, 209–10
Shanghai Five 151 strategic environment 195; China
Shangri-La Dialogue 133 127–31; France 178–81; Russia 150–4;
Shevchenko, Alexei 25–6 UK 202–6; US 79–87; see also actor
Siberia 166, 203 approach; regional approach;
Sierra Leone 225 thematic approach
Singapore 114 strategic mobility 101, 120, 135–6,
SIPRI 64 189, 198
situation (ways) 69, 244–6; China 146; Strategic Support Force 139
France 191–3, 199–200; Russia 162–3, structural realism 1, 3, 7–10, 17, 20, 24,
169; UK 215–16, 224–5; United States 57–8, 62, 226, 240; basic premises of
106–10, 121–2 10–14; defensive realism 8, 12, 20–1,
social creativity 26 24, 33, 240; offensive realism 8, 11–12,
Social Identity Theory 25 19–22, 24, 41, 234, 240
social mobility 25–6, 143, 147, 165, 238, submarine-launched ballistic missiles
240, 252 30–1, 66–7, 102–4, 160–1, 190
soft balancing 3, 51–3, 56 Sub-Saharan Africa 81–4, 204–5
soft power 62–3 Sudan 140–1, 164
Somalia 114 surface-to-surface ballistic nuclear
Sørensen, Georg 7 missiles 177
South Africa 79, 165, 172, 216 surveillance 67, 100, 104, 130;
South Korea 92, 114 see also ISR
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization 42 Swaine, Michael 147
sovereignty 23, 41, 43, 58, 93, 95, 132–4, Sweden 53, 184, 196
144–5, 155–6, 158, 167, 183, 185, 194, Switzerland 53
197, 242 Syria 22, 46, 114, 164, 166, 169, 172,
Soviet Union 1, 3, 9, 16, 20, 46, 66 194–5, 238
space see outer space
Spain 114, 184, 196 Taiwan 46, 82, 116, 128–9, 132–3, 143,
Special Forces 65, 67, 96–9, 137, 159, 149, 203
164, 169, 187–8, 210, 212–13, 223, 246 Tajikistan 151, 164
spectrum-of-conflict model 67–8 Taliban 90
SSBNs 30–1, 103, 186, 189–90, 198, Tammen, Ronald 19, 22–3
214, 243 Tangredi, Sam 67–8
SSNs 65, 212; see also attack submarines Taylor, Maxwell 39
standards of living 155 Tellis, Ashley 147
Starr, Harvey 63 Tenenbaum, Élie 201
status competition 23–6 Terpan, Fabien 200
status quo powers 2–5, 8, 11, 15, 17, terrorism 9, 43, 79–80, 82–4, 87, 89–91,
19–21, 23, 40, 42, 47–50, 54–7, 70, 118, 93–4, 96–7, 107–10, 116, 119, 121,
123, 143, 147, 172, 177, 196, 200, 220, 128–30, 133–4, 157, 163, 168, 180–1,
226–7, 234, 238–41, 249, 251–2; 196–7, 200, 202, 205, 207, 209, 215–16,
see also France; United Kingdom 220, 222, 247; 9/11 attacks 9, 87, 93–4,
Stewart-Ingersoll, Robert 59 128, 200, 207, 215–16, 220–5, 234–6,
stockpiling 124, 160, 168, 243 248; Global War on Terror 9, 94, 113,
Strachan, Hew 225 234–5; see also extremism
strategic arms limitation talks 66 Thailand 114
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 45, 66 thematic approach 58–60; China 130;
strategic autonomy 54, 56, 143–4, 165, France 180–1; Russia 152–4; UK
177, 184, 195–201, 227–8, 234, 236, 205–6; US 84–7
239, 246 Thomas, Timothy 171
262 Index
threats (ends) 64, 69, 241–2; China 132, 28–32, 40, 66, 129, 142–4, 146–7, 149,
144; France 182–3, 197; Russia 167–9, 151, 160, 165, 168, 171–2, 178–9, 183,
242, 246; UK 222; US 89–91 185, 196, 200–1, 203, 210, 216, 218–21,
Tibet 128, 132 224–8, 246–7, 249–52; 9/11 attacks 9,
trade wars 143 87, 93–4, 128, 200, 207, 215–16, 220–5,
traditional means 67, 69, 243–4, 248; 234–6, 248; alignment strategies
China 134–7, 145–7, 244, 246; France 41–51, 69, 115–17, 167, 197, 222,
186–8, 198; Russia 158–9, 168–9, 244, 234–41; see also cooperative security;
246; UK 209–13, 223; US 95–100 neo-isolationism; primacy; selective
Treaty on the Limitation of Anti- engagement; alignment strategies in
Ballistic Missile Systems 160 relation to 51–7; ends (of military
Trump, Donald 69, 88–9, 91, 93, 95–6, strategy) 87–95, 118–19, 122, 241–2,
98–9, 101, 103, 106, 113, 117–22, 124, 246–7; foreign policy 22, 79; means (of
134, 146, 157, 166, 186, 200, 210, 221, military strategy) 95–117, 119–23,
228, 234, 237–9, 243, 247 243–4, 246–7; military/defence
Turkey 81, 114, 204, 238 expenditure 31, 95, 236; strategic
environment 79–87; ways (of military
Ukraine 10, 22, 31, 46, 48, 59, 93, 114, strategy) 106–17, 121–2, 244–6
151, 164, 166, 169–72, 180, 203–4, 216, universalism 62–3
238, 246 unmanned aerial vehicles 65, 96–7, 121,
unconventional warfare 107, 113, 190–1, 199, 215, 223, 244, 249
121, 201 urbanisation 84, 181
unemployment 82–3 US Cyber Command 105
unilateral balancing 52, 165–7, US Department of Defense 69, 87–92,
234–5, 238 94–8, 100–13, 116, 118, 121–2
unilateralism 48, 51, 53, 128, 143, US Joint Chiefs of Staff 78, 94, 98,
165, 171 101–4, 106–7, 109, 111–13
uni-multipolar system 14 US Joint Forces Command 105
unipolar system 1–5, 8–9, 18, 20, 25, 33, US Strategic Command 102, 104–5, 121
147, 196, 201, 234, 240, 250–1; USSR see Soviet Union
stability of 14–18; see also United
States values (ends) 64, 69, 241–2; China 131–2,
United Arab Emirates 114, 194 144; France 182, 197; Russia 154–6,
United Kingdom 1–5, 9, 17–18, 21, 23, 167–8; UK 206–8, 221–3, 225, 242,
28–32, 40, 115, 184, 192, 196, 201, 246; US 87–9, 118–19, 122, 242, 246
246–50; alignment strategies 202–6, Van Evera, Stephen 47
220–1, 226–8, 234, 236, 239–40; Brexit Vendil Pallin, Carolina 170
84, 221, 226–7, 239; ends (of military Vietnam 164
strategy) 206–9, 221–3, 225, 242, 246; violent extremist organisations 90
means (of military strategy) 209–15, von Clausewitz, Carl 61
223–5, 243–4, 246; military/defence vulnerabilities (ends) 64, 69, 242; China
expenditure 31, 209–10, 228; Overseas 133–4, 145–7, 242, 246; France 184–5,
Territories 207–8, 215, 222, 226, 236, 198, 200, 242, 246; Russia 157, 168;
242; strategic environment 202–6; UK 209, 223; US 93–5, 119
ways (of military strategy) 215–25, 246
United Nations 20, 23, 45, 63, 139–41, Wæver, Ole 26–7, 59
143, 151, 155, 163, 167, 178, 183–4, Walt, Stephen 12, 44, 51–3, 55,
193–6, 198–201, 203, 218–19, 123–4, 143–4
221, 237–8 Waltz, Kenneth 7–8, 10–16, 19, 21, 39,
United Nations Security Council 14, 22, 51, 57, 62, 226
27, 31, 53, 116, 129, 151, 153, 165, 200, Washington Treaty 197, 200, 235
218–19, 228, 235–6 ways (of military strategy) 67–9, 244–6;
United States 1–5, 9–10, 12, 14–22, 26, China 139–42, 145–7, 244–6; France
Index 263
191–5, 199–200, 245–6; Russia 162–4, Wilson, Woodrow 57
169, 244–6; UK 215–25, 246; US Wohlforth, William 1, 9, 14–18, 21,
106–17, 121–2, 244–6; 24–5, 27–30, 47, 65, 123–4
see also behaviour; employment; world peace 44–5, 50, 131–2, 144,
situation 183, 206
Weapon States 1, 9, 43 World Trade Organization 58, 178, 203
weaponisation 130, 139 Wortzel, Larry 148
weapons of mass destruction 1, 9, 42–4, Wuthnow, Joel 147
47–8, 65, 79, 85–7, 89–90, 92, 94, 96–7,
102, 104, 107–10, 116–17, 119–20, 150, xenophobia 44
153, 162–3, 168–9, 181, 205, 207, 222, Xi Jinping 147
235–6, 243
weapons trafficking 153 Yang, Yi Edward 147
Westberg, Jacob 57 Yeltsin, Boris 149–50
Western Pacific Naval Symposium 133 Yugoslavia 21–2, 115, 164, 194