Military Strategy of Great Powers: Managing Power Asymmetry and Structural Change in The Twenty-First Century

Cass Military Studies
MILITARY STRATEGY OF
GREAT POWERS
MANAGING POWER ASYMMETRY AND STRUCTURAL
CHANGE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
Håkan Edström and Jacob Westberg

Military Strategy of Great Powers
This book explores the military strategies of the five system-determining

great powers during the twenty-first century.
The book’s point of departure is that analyses of countries’ defence
strategies should acknowledge that states come in various shapes and sizes
and that their strategic choices are affected by their perceptions of their
position in the international system and by power asymmetries between
more and less resourceful states. This creates a diversity in strategies that is
often overlooked in theoretically oriented analyses. The book examines how
five major powers – the United States, China, the United Kingdom, France
and Russia – have adjusted their strategies to improve or maintain their
relative position and to manage power asymmetries during the twenty-first
century. It also develops and applies an analytical framework for exploring
and categorising the strategies pursued by the five major powers which
combines elements of structural realism with research on power transition
theory and status competition. The concluding chapter addresses questions
related to stability and change in the present international system.
This book will be of interest to students of strategic studies, foreign policy
and International Relations.
Håkan Edström is an Associate Professor of Political Science and a Senior

Lecturer in War Studies at the Swedish Defence University.
Jacob Westberg is an Associate Professor of War Studies and a Senior

Lecturer in Security Policy and Strategy at the Swedish Defence University.
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For more information about this series, please visit: https://www.routledge.com/

Cass-Military-Studies/book-series/CMS
Military Strategy of Great
Powers
Managing Power Asymmetry and
Structural Change in the
Twenty-first Century

First published 2022
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British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Edström, Håkan, author. | Westberg, Jacob, author.
Title: Military strategy of great powers: managing power asymmetry
and structural change in the 21st century/Håkan Edström, and Jacob
Westberg.
Other titles: Managing power asymmetry and structural change in the
21st century
Description: Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2022. |
Series: Cass military studies | Includes bibliographical references and
index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2021013041 (print) | LCCN 2021013042 (ebook) |
ISBN 9780367743192 (hardback) | ISBN 9780367743208 (paperback) |
ISBN 9781003157113 (ebook)
Subjects: LCSH: Strategic rivalries (World politics) | Great
powers‐‐History‐‐21st century. | United States‐‐Military policy. |
China‐‐Military policy. | United Kingdom‐‐Military policy. |
France‐‐Military policy. | Russia (Federation)‐‐Military policy.
Classification: LCC JZ5595 .E37 2022 (print) | LCC JZ5595 (ebook) |
DDC 355.02‐‐dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021013041
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021013042
ISBN: 978-0-367-74319-2 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-0-367-74320-8 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-1-003-15711-3 (ebk)
DOI: 10.4324/9781003157113
Typeset in TimesNewRoman
by MPS Limited, Dehradun
Contents
List of illustrations vi
Acknowledgements viii
List of abbreviations ix
1 The diversity of great powers’ strategies 1
2 Exploring great power strategies 7
3 Operationalising the dependent variable 39
4 The US and the strategy of the unipole 78
5 The strategies of the contesters 127
6 The strategies of the conservators 177
7 Managing power asymmetry and structural change 233
Index 253
List of Illustrations
Figures
2.1 The structure of the international system in the present

1+1+3 system 32
Tables
2.1 Indicators of the economic capabilities of six potential

system-determining powers 2020 29
2.2 Indicator of the military capability of six potential system-
determining powers 30
3.1 Four alternative unipolar alignment strategies 50
3.2 Alternative alignment strategies towards the unipolar power 56
3.3 Operationalising military strategy 69
4.1 Annual defence expenditure, the US 2001–2019 96
4.2 The main traditional units and equipment of the US
armed forces 2000–2020 99
4.3 The main airborne enablers of the US armed forces
2000–2020 102
4.4 The main strategic nuclear forces of the US 2000–2020 104
4.5 The main US deployments of armed units abroad
2000–2020 114
4.6 The shifts in the US’s alignment strategy during the
twenty-first century 118
4.7 The military strategy of the US 122
5.1 Annual defence expenditure, China 2001–2019 134
5.2 The main traditional units and equipment of the Chinese
5.3 The main airborne enablers of the Chinese armed forces
2000–2020. 137
5.4 The main strategic nuclear forces of China 2000–2020 138
List of Illustrations vii
5.5 The main Chinese deployments of armed units abroad
2000–2020 141
5.6 The alignment strategies of China 144
5.7 The military strategy of China 146
5.8 Annual defence expenditure, Russia 2001–2019 157
5.9 The main traditional units and equipment of the Russian
5.10 The main airborne enablers of the Russian armed forces
2000–2020 160
5.11 The main strategic nuclear forces of Russia 2000–2020 161
5.12 The main Russian deployments of armed units abroad
2000–2020 164
5.13 The alignment strategies of Russia 167
5.14 The military strategy of Russia 169
6.1 Annual defence expenditure, France 2001–2019 186
6.2 The main traditional units and equipment of the French
6.3 The main airborne enablers of the French armed forces
2000–2020 189
6.4 The main strategic nuclear forces of France 2000–2020 190
6.5 The main French deployments of armed units abroad
2000–2020 194
6.6 The alignment strategies of France 197
6.7 The military strategy of France 200
6.8 Annual defence expenditure, the UK 2001–2019 210
6.9 The main traditional units and equipment of the British
6.10 The main airborne enablers of the British armed forces
2000–2020 213
6.11 The main strategic nuclear forces of the UK 2000–2020 214
6.12 The main British deployments of armed units abroad
2000–2020 217
6.13 The alignment strategies of the UK 222
6.14 The military strategy of the UK 225
7.1 The alignment strategies of the system-determining states 234
7.2 The ends-element of the system-determining states’ strategies 242
7.3 The means-element of the system-determining states’
strategies 244
7.4 The ways-element of the system-determining states’
strategies 246
7.5 The military strategies of the system-determining states’ 246
Acknowledgements
We are indebted to our senior editor, Andrew Humphrys, and to our editorial
assistant, Bethany Lund-Yates, for once again wholeheartedly providing their
support for our project. We would also like to express our gratitude to our
colleague, Dr Malin Karlsson, for carefully reading initial drafts of the
manuscript and providing suggestions for improvements. Thank you!
Abbreviations
ABM Anti-Ballistic Missiles

ADMM+ ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus
AI Artificial Intelligence
AIDS Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARF ASEAN Regional Forum
ART Actor, Region, Theme
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU African Union
AWACS Airborne Warning and Control Systems
BCO British Cabinet Office
BCT Brigade Combat Team
BMoD British Ministry of Defence
BP British Parliament
BPT Balance of Power Theory
BRIC Brazil, Russia, India and China
BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CAR Central African Republic
CBRNE Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and
high yield Explosives
CCP Chinese Communist Party
CFE Conventional Forces in Europe
CICA Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building
Measures in Asia
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States
CMC Central Military Commission
CMT Combat Mission Team
CNO Computer Network Operation
CPT Cyber Protection Team
CSCAP Council on Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific
Region
CSL Cooperative Security Locations
CSOC Cyber Security Operations Centre
x Abbreviations
CSTO Collective Security Treaty Organization
CSMB Confidence-and Security-Building Measures
DCDC Doctrine, Concepts and Development Centre
DoD Department of Defense
DPG Defense Planning Guidance
DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo
EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development
ECM Electronic Counter-Measure
ESDP European Security and Defence Policy
EU European Union
EUFOR Althea European Union Force Althea
EU NAVFOR MED European Union Naval Force in the Mediterranean
EUTM Mali European Union Training Mission to Mali
EUTM RCA European Union Training Mission to Central
African Republic
EW Electronic Warfare
FCAS Future Combat Air System
FMoD French Ministry of Defence
FNISA French Network and Information Security Agency
(in French: Agence nationale de la sécurité des
systèmes d’information, ANSSI)
FPM French Prime Minister
FOS Forward Operating Sites
FPC Foreign Policy Concept
G6 Group of Six
G7 Group of Seven
G8 Group of Eight
G20 Group of Twenty
GBSD Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GLCM Ground Launched Cruise Missiles
HARM High-speed Anti-Radiation Missiles
HST Hegemonic Stability Theory
HUMINT Human Intelligence
IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development
ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
ICT Information Communications Technologies
IMF International Monetary Fund
INF Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
IPE International Political Economy
IR International Relations
IRBM Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles
ISAF International Security Assistance Force
Abbreviations xi
ISIL Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant
ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance
JIDD Jakarta International Defence Dialogue
JIE Joint Information Environment
KFOR Kosovo Force
LCS Littoral Combat Ship
LHD Landing Helicopter Dock
LMSR Large Medium-Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off Military
Transport Ships
LRSO Long-Range Stand-Off
MASINT Measurement and Signature Intelligence
MBT Main Battle Tanks
MINURCAT Mission des Nations Unies en République Centre
Africaine et au Tchad (French)
MINUSMA Mission multidimensionnelle Intégrée des Nations
Unies pour la Stabilisation au Mali (French)
MIRV Multiple Independently targetable Reentry Vehicle
MLP Mobile Landing Platform
MOB Main Operating Bases
MONUC Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en
République démocratique du Congo (French)
MONUSCO Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la
Stabilisation en République démocratique du
Congo (French)
MOOTW Military Operations Other Than War
MRBM Medium Range Ballistic Missiles
NAOC National Airborne Operations Center
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDS National Defense Strategy
NSS National Security Strategy
NEACD Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue
NGO Non-governmental Organisations
NMS National Military Strategy
NMT National Mission Team
NPR Nuclear Posture Review
NSC National Security Concept
NSS National Security Strategy
OPEC Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe
PoFR President of the French Republic
POTUS President of the United States
PTT Power Transition Theory
QDR Quadrennial Defense Review
QRMR Quadrennial Roles and Mission Review
xii Abbreviations
PLA People’s Liberation Army
RMA Revolution in Military Affairs
RSC Regional Security Complexes
SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SAM Surface-to-Air Missiles
SEAL Sea, Air, Land
SEATO Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SDR Strategic Defence Review
SFOR Stabilisation Force
SIGINT Signals Intelligence
SIT Social Identity Theory
SLBM Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles
SLD Shangri-La Dialogue
SLOC Sea Lines of Communication
SSN Nuclear-Powered Attack Submarines
START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
STOVL Short Take-Off Vertical Landing
TACAMO Take Charge and Move Out
THAAD Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
UAE United Arab Emirates
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
UK United Kingdom (of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland)
UNAMID United Nations Assistance Mission in Darfur
UNIFIL United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNFICYP United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNMIL United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMIS United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNMISS United Nations Mission in the Republic of South
Sudan
UNSC United Nations Security Council
UNSOS United Nations Assistance Office in Somalia
UNOMSIL United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone
US United States (of America)
USCYBERCOM US Cyber Command
USDoD US Department of Defense
USJCS US Joint Chiefs of Staff
USJFCOM US Joint Forces Command
USNIC US National Intelligence Council
USSR Soviet Union
USSTRATCOM US Strategic Command
VEO Violent Extremist Organisation
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
WPNS Western Pacific Naval Symposium
Abbreviations xiii
WTO World Trade Organization
WWI First World War
WWII Second World War
1 The diversity of great powers’
strategies
Contrary to mainstream research informed by structural realism, this book

is based on the claim that analyses of defence strategies should acknowledge
that states come in different shapes and sizes and that their perceived in-
terests and choices of strategic means and ways are affected by power
asymmetries between more and less resourceful states. In earlier studies, we
have explored the strategic adjustments during the past two decades by both
small states and middle powers (see Edström et al. 2019; Edström and
Westberg 2020a; 2020b). In this book, we turn our attention to how a more
resourceful category of states, the ‘system determining states’ – the super-
powers and great powers – have adjusted their strategies to manage the
power asymmetries in the international system of the twenty-first century.1
For reasons presented in Chapter 2, we argue that the present international
system consists of one superpower – the United States (US), one emergent
potential superpower – China and three great powers – the United Kingdom
(UK), France and Russia. All five states are included in this study.
The collapse of the Soviet Union (USSR) left the US as the world’s sole
superpower. According to one contemporary observer, Charles Krauthammer,
the emerging post-Cold War order was a ‘unipolar moment’. However, ac-
cording to Krauthammer, this did not mean that the US was now free to ‘come
home’ and focus on other issues than power competition and wars. Instead, it
continuously had to provide international leadership in the struggle against new
emerging strategic threats related to the proliferation of weapons of mass de-
struction (WMD) and the rise of several so-called ‘Weapon States’, exemplified
by Iraq, Libya and North Korea (Krauthammer 1990). Prominent researchers
using the theoretical prism of structural realism argued that this unipolar
moment would be brief and replaced by a bi- or multipolar order with com-
peting great powers (Mearsheimer 1990; Layne 1993; Waltz 1993). At the end
of the first decade of the post-Cold War era, William Wohlforth (1999) instead
argued that the unipolar order could be both durable and peaceful if the US
continued to pursue its policy of preponderance and international engagements.
The debate on the stability of the present unipolar system and the US’s ‘best
strategy’ has continued during the first decades of the twenty-first century
without resulting in any consensus among scholars.2
DOI: 10.4324/9781003157113-1
2 The diversity of great powers’ strategies
The lack of consensus in the debate on the unipolar moment is not sur-
prising – the study of international politics and strategy has always been
characterised by diverging views within and between competing theoretical
perspectives. However, a consequence of the continued focus on the stability
of the unipolar system and the US’s strategies is that questions related to
other major powers’ responses to unipolarity have received less attention.
Moreover, even when strategies of ‘secondary great powers’ have been ad-
dressed, the arguments are generally based on the behaviour of states in
previous bi- or multipolar systems or theoretical assumptions, rather than
the actual strategies and behaviour of great powers in the present unipolar
system. Furthermore, analyses of great powers usually treat these states as a
single category of states, neglecting differences in relative power, status and
position in the present system.
In contrast, we do not expect that changes in the distribution of power
among the most resourceful states in the international system will provide
the major powers with identical structural incentives and opportunities.
Instead, differences related to the distribution of power and relative posi-
tional rank will provide the major powers with different strategic opportu-
nities and priorities. We see three main reasons for this. First, a system with
only one superpower makes it necessary to separate the strategies of the
unipolar power from the strategies of the other system-determining states.
The unique position of an established unipolar power means that it can only
improve its relative position by trying to achieve hegemony, a move that, if
successful, would threaten all other states’ autonomy and change the non-
hierarchical nature of the international system. In maintaining its position as
the sole superpower, the unipolar power, therefore, has incentives and
options that are unique for its position as the sole superpower, which
separates it from the other system-determining states. Moreover, the ana-
lysis of the strategies of the ‘second-ranked’ great powers, must take the
strategies of the first ranked states into account.
Second, if we are correct in describing the present international system as
a 1+1+3 system, China holds a second unique position as an emerging
potential superpower, which also gives it structural incentives that are dif-
ferent from all other powers when it comes to improving or maintaining its
relative position. Third, we will also argue that there are important differ-
ences between the three great powers, France, Russia and the UK, relating
to their position in the system and their general views regarding the present
liberal international order. Using a distinction between status quo (or sa-
tisfied) and revisionist (or dissatisfied) powers, we argue that states are also
affected by how they appreciate their present position in the system and how
they relate to the status quo.
How a specific state perceives its relative position is likely to be influenced
by this state’s position in the previous system. For Russia, even a recognised
position as a great power within the present unipolar system represents a
loss in rank as compared to its superpower position in the bipolar system of
The diversity of great powers’ strategies 3
the Cold War era. This makes Russia a potential revisionist power, likely to
practice unilateral or collective counter-balancing strategies towards the sole
remaining superpower. For China, its present position is higher regarded in
comparison to previous positions during the nineteenth and twentieth cen-
turies, and its economic development has benefitted from the liberal eco-
nomic order created by the US. However, China may still have greater
ambitions, and its attitude towards the present system may change. France
and the UK, on the other hand, had lost their status as first ranked states
during the first part of the twentieth century and belonged to the winning
side in the Cold War. Arguably, these two states can be assumed generally
supportive of the liberal post-Cold War order that emerged after the im-
plosion of the USSR, acting as status quo powers in relation to the system
and bandwagoning with the US. However, if the sole superpower were to
pursue unilateral strategies that are perceived to threaten their vital interests,
France and the UK might instead turn to balance strategies, and then
practice various forms of hard and soft balancing in cooperation with other
states.
Studying the strategies of ‘the big five’, we focus on two interconnected
levels of strategy, which may, at an aggregated level, be referred to as ‘de-
fence strategy’. Defence strategy is defined as an interconnected set of ideas
on how politically defined strategic ends should be achieved through a
combination of alignment strategies and suitable strategic ways of devel-
oping and employing military means. Alignment strategies refer to different
ways of interacting on a political level with other states and organisations to
promote the state’s interests relating to security, influence or status. This
aspect of strategy is a part of states’ external efforts to promote their per-
ceived interest. Examples of alignment strategies are the balance of power,
bandwagoning, isolation and hedging. Military strategy concerns the crea-
tion, direction and use of military force. This aspect of strategy focuses on
states’ internal efforts to promote their interest by developing and using
their military resources. Diplomatic and economic strategies, which do not
concern questions related to military power, are not included in this defi-
nition of defence strategy.
Systematic comparative empirical studies on major powers’ strategic ad-
justments in the international system in the post-Cold War era are very
rare.3 With this study, we aim to contribute to research in two main ways.
First, we intervene in the debate on the stability of the present unipolar
system by offering an analytical framework and an empirical approach for
exploring and categorising the actual strategies for security, influence and
status pursued by the major powers in the international system of the
twenty-first century. In doing so, we are also able to present a more detailed
analysis of how the strategies of the five system-determining states interact
and affect the stability of the system, as well as the possibility of systematic
change. Second, explaining why states pursue different strategies, we com-
plement the parsimonious analytical framework of structural realism and
Balance of Power Theory (BPT) with insights from research on status
competition and Power Transition Theory (PTT). Thereby, we offer a new
comprehensive theoretical approach for analysing how asymmetric power
relations, status and different priorities regarding basic aims such as se-
curity, influence strategic choices of major powers. More specifically, four
main questions will be addressed:
i. How have the defence strategies of the US developed during the twenty-
first century and do US strategic choices correspond to expectations
drawn from BPT and PTT?
ii. How have China and Russia adjusted their defence strategies in
response to the strategies of the US and changes in the distribution of
power in the international system during the twenty-first century? To
what extent do the strategic choices of these two potentially revisionist
‘secondary major powers’ correspond to the expectations drawn from
BPT and PTT?
iii. How have the UK and France adjusted their defence strategies in
response to the strategies of the US and changes in the distribution of
power in the international system during the twenty-first century? To
what extent do the strategic choices of these two potentially status quo
oriented ‘secondary major powers’ correspond to the expectations
iv. How do the strategic choices among the five system-determining states
interact and affect stability and change in the international system?
In the next two chapters, we present a framework for analysing the align-
ment and military strategies of great powers in unipolar systems. In the
following three empirical chapters, we systematically map and analyse the
strategies these states have pursued during the twenty-first century using the
method of structured focused comparison based on our definition of mili-
tary strategy. The first empirical chapter focuses on the alignment and
military strategies of the sole superpower. Here, we will present an overview
of the strategies pursued by the three different US administrations during
the twenty-first century. The second chapter focuses on China and Russia,
two potentially revisionist great powers, which are more likely than the
other two great powers to perceive the present unipolar order as a threat to
their great power ambitions and autonomy. The third chapter focuses on the
strategies of France and the UK, two leading Western powers that fought
together with the US in the First (WWI) and Second World War (WWII).
During the Cold War, the two states differed in their support to US lea-
dership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Moreover, they
have mostly displayed different ambitions regarding Europe, with France
generally promoting a stronger and more independent Europe, and the UK
protecting the transatlantic link and using its ‘special relationship’ with the
US to promote its influence in global affairs. However, despite these
The diversity of great powers’ strategies 5
differences between the two Western great powers, both states have gen-
erally supported the post-Cold War order established in the 1990s.
Nevertheless, this does not mean that they will always support the US.
Actions that threaten to undermine multilateral institutions perceived as
important for promoting their national interest may provoke balancing
strategies from these status quo-oriented states. In the concluding chapter,
the results from our empirical chapters are summarised and form a basis for
an analysis of how the different strategies of the sole superpower and the
secondary great powers collectively affect the stability of the present uni-
polar system.
Notes
1 The term ‘system determining states’ was introduced by Robert Keohane in an
article from 1969. Keohane used this term to create a separate category for the first
ranked states whose number determined the polarity of a specific international
system, that is, if the system is uni-, bi- or multipolar (Keohane 1969). Following
Barry Buzan (2004), we will extend the term system determining states to include
both superpowers (which are still seen as determining the general polarity of the
international system) and great powers. The inclusion of different categories of
major powers makes it possible to analyse changes in the distribution of power in
the international system that do not include a change in polarity, for instance,
China’s rise to the status of a potential superpower. For a similar conception of
the present international system, see Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth
(2016a; 2016b).
2 For some of the more recent contributions, see Layne (2012), Nye (2012; 2015),
Wohlforth (2012), Brooks and Wohlforth (2016a; 2016b) and Mearsheimer (2018).
For a survey of the debate, see Monteiro (2014:7–13).
3 Admittedly, there are some theoretically informed studies on how competing
major powers may adjust their strategies for security or influence to manage ne-
gative power asymmetries (see Buzan 2004; Walt 2005; 2009). However, these
studies have not systematically explored and compared the actual strategies pur-
sued by the leading states. Additionally, there are a few examples of comparative
empirical research on strategic responses from both major powers and middle
powers, but this research is not primarily directed towards alignment and military
strategies (see Gilley and O’Neil 2014; Balzacq et al. 2019).
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2 Exploring great power strategies
Introduction
The study of International Relations (IR) has always been sensitive to the
overall developments in international politics. IR was introduced as a se
parate academic subject at the end of World War I with the establishment of
the Woodrow Wilson Chair of International Politics and the Department of
International Politics at the University of Aberystwyth in 1919.1 The new
academic discipline was founded to advance knowledge that could con
tribute to avoiding new wars. The solutions that the new discipline came up
with were influenced by ideas that we today would label liberal IR theory or
idealism. The early development of IR research mirrored the successes and
failures of the League of Nations and the political developments in Europe.
As noted by Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen, liberal idealism was not ‘a
good intellectual guide to international relations in the 1930s’ (Jackson and
Sørensen 2007:36).
In the early Cold War era, realism established itself as the dominant
theoretical perspective, focusing on questions related to the competition
between the two superpowers, nuclear deterrence and the stability of the
bipolar order (Waltz 1979; Morgenthau 2006; Waltz 1979; Schelling 2008).
Following the economic crisis in the 1970s, questions relating to
International Political Economy (IPE), interdependence and international
regimes received increased attention, producing a debate between the ‘in
tellectual siblings’ neorealism and neoliberalism (Keohane 1984; Gilpin
1987; Keohane and Nye 2001; Keohane 1984; Gilpin 1987; Lamy 2005).
During the final decade of the Cold War, criticism against structural rea
lism2, and especially its leading theorist Kenneth Waltz, began to grow
(Keohane 1986). After the unexpected and unforeseen ending of the Cold
War, this critique exploded.
In the 1990s, several competing approaches such as constructivism, cri
tical theory, post-structuralism and feminism challenged structural realism
on both epistemological and ontological grounds by questioning its state-
centrism and ‘positivist’ focus on the distribution of material capacities.3
Reflecting on how IR theory and events in international politics have
DOI: 10.4324/9781003157113-2
interacted in previous eras, we expect that realism will find a more fertile
breeding ground in the present post-Cold War era as compared to the 1990s.
However, it is not equally clear whether it is Waltz’s particular version of
realist theory that needs to be resurrected. Waltz developed his theory to
analyse the stability of bipolar and multipolar systems, and to explain how
the international system generally affects states’ interest and strategies. He
did not address questions related to the unipolar system and ‘real world
strategies’ of specific states (Monteiro 2014:28–30). Moreover, some of his
basic assumptions related to states being ‘like units’, even prevented such
analysis. However, in our opinion, some of the insights of structural realism
are worth rescuing. In this chapter, we will present an analytical framework
that integrates elements of structural realism with theories on status com
petition and hegemonic stability, which are better suited when analysing
strategic choices made by individual states and when explaining why states
pursue different strategies.
In the first section, we discuss some of the basic premises of structural
realism including Waltz’s conceptualisation of the international system and
the debate between defensive and offensive realism. This is followed by a
second subsection focusing on the debate on the stability of unipolar sys
tems. Here we conclude that the disagreement among realist scholars in
dicates that BPT will not be able to provide one answer to the question of
the durability or peacefulness of unipolar systems. Moreover, all partici
pants in the debate on unipolarity seem to admit that the durability and
peacefulness of the system are dependent on the strategic choices of the
leading states. Still, the parsimonious analytical framework originally de
veloped by Waltz provides us with little or no guidance as to why states seem
to pursue different strategies, and the assumption of states being like units
does not help us.
In the second section, we discuss a theoretical perspective that is better
suited for the task of explaining why states pursue different strategies, PTT.
This theory is particularly useful for analysing the dynamics of unipolar
systems since its basic conception of the international system includes one
dominating state interacting with two different categories of states: satisfied
and dissatisfied states. The dominating state and the satisfied states are the
guardians of the status quo, and the dissatisfied states are the potentially
revisionist challengers. PTT presents several hypotheses relating to the
leading powers’ behaviour that contradict some of BPT’s basic assumptions.
In the following subsection, we introduce research on status competition.
This research body act as a complement to PTT in analysing how states’
different position in the present system affect their basic strategic choices.
Finally, we conclude this section by presenting our conceptualisation of the
present international system. Accounting for the change of the distribution
of power in the international system during the first decades of the twenty-
first century, we argue that it is necessary to introduce a distinction between
superpowers and great powers in the definition of the structure of the
Exploring great power strategies 9
international system. Inspired by arguments from Barry Buzan (2004) as
well as from Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth (2016a), we argue that
the present international system should be analysed as a 1+1+3 system, with
the US as the sole superpower, China as the sole emerging potential su
perpower and France, the UK and Russia as the three great powers.
Collectively, these states represent the highest category of the state system,
the ‘system-determining states’.4 Other categories of states that we explored
in previous studies include ‘middle powers’ and ‘small states’ (Edström and
Westberg 2020a; 2020b).
2.1 Change and stability in the post-Cold War international

system
The collapse of the USSR left the US as the world’s sole superpower.
According to Charles Krauthammer, the emerging post-Cold War order was
a ‘unipolar moment’ for the US. The US still had to provide international
leadership in the struggle against new emerging strategic threats such as the
proliferation of WMD and so-called ‘Weapon States’, exemplified by Iraq,
Libya, and North Korea (Krauthammer 1990). Joseph Nye, a prominent
liberal scholar of IR, reached a similar conclusion regarding the need for
continued active global US engagement and leadership (Nye 1990). Other
scholars, using the prism of structural realism, challenged these conclusions
and argued that the unipolar moment was nothing more than a ‘geopolitical
interlude’. Counter-balancing strategies by potential great powers and un
even differential economic growth rates would ensure that multi-polarity
was restored in the first decade of the twenty-first century (Layne 1993;
Waltz 1993). In the 1990s, the general developments in global politics
seemed to support the arguments in favour of an active US policy, consisting
of continued support to multilateral institutions and alliances originating
from the Cold War era, and successive US administrations continued to
pursue an active liberal internationalist strategy of multilateralism pro
moting Western values (Rose 2019).
However, in the initial decades of the twenty-first century, several dif
ferent actors and events challenged US pre-eminence. The 9/11 terrorist
attacks in 2001 were followed by several long-lasting, costly and un
successful military campaigns and operations related to the ‘Global War on
Terror’. Additionally, efforts to combat international terrorism accom
panied a new unilateral strategic approach to US global leadership. This
approach has been characterised as ‘a geostrategic wrecking ball’, threa
tening to weaken the US’s security partnerships and to destroy the inter
national institutional architecture created by the US during the Cold War
era (Ikenberry 2004:7). Moreover, the US’s leading position has increasingly
been challenged. China’s increased economic and military strengths have,
according to some scholars, established China as ‘an emergent potential su
perpower’ (Brooks and Wohlforth 2016a; 2016b), and, arguably, as a potential
future challenger to the US position as the sole superpower (Layne 2012).
Meanwhile, Russia has regained some of its previous military strength and
has openly challenged the post-Cold War security order in Europe by
waging war against Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014 onwards). In North-
East Asia, the risk of an open war between the US and North Korea,
potentially also between the US and China, has increased (Allison 2015; 2017;
Welsh 2017).
Additionally, populist reactions to globalisation, and frustration con
cerning the outcomes of previous military interventions, may make future
US governments more reluctant to use their military, economic and soft
power resources to support the international institutions that the liberal
world order is dependent on (Nye 2017). Furthermore, liberal values related
to universal human rights, democracy and free trade – ideas which were
thought to have won a definite victory against its previous challengers in the
early post-Cold War era producing an ‘end of history’ – are once again
openly contested (Fukuyama 1992; Patrick 2017; Posen 2018; Rose 2019;
Zakaria 2019).
2.1.1 Basic premises of structural realism

Analysing the magnitude of these changes and relating them to the question
of the stability of the unipolar system, we must first provide a more clear
definition of the international system. A system is, according to Kenneth
Waltz, composed of a structure and interacting units (Waltz 1979:79). This
means that analyses of the differences between the international system of
the early post-Cold War era and the present international system can focus
on two related but different aspects of the system: changes in the structure of
the system and changes related to patterns of interaction between the main
actors of the system.
In Waltz’s classical definition in Theory of International Politics, the
structure of a system is defined along three dimensions: (i) the basic ordering
principles of a system; (ii) the functional differentiation between units; and
(iii) the distribution of power. In the discussion on the first and most fun
damental dimension, Waltz contrasted the international system with do
mestic political systems. Domestic systems are centralised and hierarchical,
the ‘parts’, or the main actors in the system, ‘stand in relations of super- and
subordination’. In international political systems, the parts are formally
equal and none is ‘entitled to command’. International systems are therefore
decentralised and anarchical. The lack of central authority forces the main
actors of the system – the states – to develop self-help strategies to protect
and promote their interests. Waltz argued that each state must have the own
survival as its most fundamental end since it is a ‘prerequisite to achieving
any goal that states may have, other than […] promoting their own dis
appearance as political entities’. Beyond the survival motive, states’ ambi
tions could be ‘endlessly varied’, ranging from establishing a world empire
or just being left alone (Waltz 1979:88 and 91–92). Because great powers
very seldom face threat to their survival, we will extend this goal to include
general defensive goals related to security.
In a self-help system, the means for self-preservation and security fall into
two categories: internal efforts (moves to increase the state’s economic
capabilities and military strength) and external efforts (moves to strengthen
alliances and/or weaken the opposing ones). Because ‘power is a means and
not an end’, Waltz did not ‘expect the strong to combine with the strong in
order to increase the extent of their power over others’. Instead, states were
expected to practice counter-balancing strategies to block further expansion
by rising powers and prevent that the strongest expansionist state forged
world hegemony. The same logic was assumed to apply to ‘secondary states’
which, ‘if they were free to choose’, would ‘flock to the weaker side’, to
protect themselves against the long-term greater threat from the stronger
expansive power (Waltz 1979:118 and 126–127).
This way, the basic ordering principle, anarchy, creates incentives for
states to act in a certain manner (prioritising survival and if necessary,
practising counter-balancing), but the system does not force any states to ‘do
the right thing’. However, states that make the wrong priorities risk ex
tinction if they suffer an attack by a more resourceful state. The counter-
balancing strategies also reproduce the non-hierarchical system and prevent
it from turning into a hegemonic imperial system dominated by one state.
Offensive realist scholars challenge the argument that priority should be
given to self-preservation and maintaining the relative position in the system.
They argue that states instead should pursue strategies that improve their
relative position and increase their ability to enforce their will on other states
(Morgenthau 2006Mearsheimer 2001; 2018; Morgenthau 2006). Governments
and people, Morgenthau argued, may have many different aims relating to
fundamental values like freedom, security and prosperity. They may define
their goals in terms of specific ideological or religious ideas and may choose
various means and ways to realise such aims. However, ‘whenever they strive
to realize their goal by means of international politics, they do so by striving
for power’. Power, defined as ‘man’s control over the minds and actions of
other men […] a psychological relation between those who exercise it and
those over whom it is exercised’, is therefore always the immediate aim and
increasing the power of the own state in relation to other actors is the key to
achieve all other political aims (Morgenthau 2006:29–30).
In his seminal work, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, John
Mearsheimer took Morgenthau’s argument one step further, arguing that
great powers do not only strive to be the strongest of all powers, but their
‘ultimate aim is to be the hegemon – that is the only great power in the
system’. Therefore, great powers are ‘rarely content with the current dis
tribution of power’ and ‘almost always have revisionist intentions’, unless
the cost and risks of shifting the balance of power are too great.
Accordingly, there are ‘no status quo powers in the international system
save for the occasional hegemon that wants to maintain its dominating
position’. However, great powers do not only seek to gain power for
themselves but they will also try to ‘thwart rivals bent on gaining power on
their expense’, and if a change in the distribution of power in the system
would favour another state, great powers may also defend the present bal
ance of power (Mearsheimer 2001:2–3).
Offensive realism leaves us with a less conclusive argument regarding great
power strategies. The dominating power, and potential hegemon, obviously
have two alternatives: to go for hegemony or to consolidate its position as
primus inter pares. In later works, Mearsheimer has himself recommended that
the US should pursue a strategy of ‘restrain’ by using its unique geographic
position to act as an off-shore balancer, letting other powers take greater re
sponsibility for their own security and balance each other off (Mearsheimer
2018Mearsheimer and Walt 2016; Mearsheimer 2018). However, if a unipolar
power tries to establish hegemony, an offensive realist would expect the other
great powers to form a counter-balancing coalition similar to the strategies
recommended by defensive realists (Mearsheimer 2001:271). Stephen Walt has
suggested another modification of classical balance of power theories. He ar
gued that the choice to either oppose (balance) or ally (bandwagon) with rising
powers is not only based on statesmen’s assessments of changes in the dis
tribution of power among competing states but also on threat perceptions,
meaning that states will ‘ally with or against the most threatening power’ (Walt
1985:8–9). Walt argued that the perceived level of threat is affected by both
changes in the relative distribution of power and factors related to geographic
proximity, offensive capabilities and perceived intentions. The traditional
balance of power theory should therefore be modified into a ‘balance of threat
theory’ (Walt, 1987:5 and 21–26).
We do not consider it necessary to choose between defensive and offensive
realism. Instead, we view state priorities on this issue as an open empirical
question, assuming that states may weigh these interests differently.
However, we believe that Walt was correct in focusing on perceived threats.
Moreover, we suggest that states – in addition to protecting their survival or
security and maximising their influence and ability to enforce their will upon
others – may have strong interests in gaining recognition of having a certain
relative positional status rank. The three basic interests – security, influence
and status – are not mutually exclusive. Power maximisation may be a way
of protecting the security and survival of the state, and increased influence
over other actors may increase the status rank of a particular state. States
situated in a regional context where they do not perceive any existential
threats may also take survival for granted. This, however, does not mean
that these ‘secure states’ do not care about their survival. What matters in
our empirical analysis is what kind of basic aims the political leadership
prioritises in questions related to the use of their armed forces.
The second dimension in Waltz’s definition concerns functional differ
entiation among interacting parts in the system. In hierarchical systems, the
parts perform different functions. Domestic political systems may have both
different layers of government (central, regional, local), and separation of
competencies horizontally along functional lines (various executive, legis
lative and judiciary branches of government). Domestic political systems are
more or less centralised and have different degrees of separation of powers,
determining the rules of the game for each political system. According to
Waltz, states, as the main units of international systems, are ‘not formally
differentiated by the function they perform’. Moreover, the non-hierarchical
structure of the international system implies a ‘sameness’, and ‘so long as
anarchy endures, states remain like units’. This sameness refers to the fact
that each state is ‘like all other states in being an autonomous political unit’.
Admitting that states vary widely in size, power and form, Waltz specified
this claim: ‘states are alike in the tasks that they face, though not in their
ability to perform them’. Since the lack of differentiation between states
would endure as long as the system remains non-hierarchical, the second
dimension of system characteristics cannot be used to distinguish between
different anarchical systems (Waltz 1979:93 and 95–96). In our view, the
assumption of states being ‘like units’ comes with a high price. Faithfulness
to this assumption prevents scholars from analysing the diversity of real-
world strategic choices made by states. In an article from 1993, Waltz ac
knowledged that states ‘will from their different historical experiences,
geographical locations, and economic interest, interpret events differently
and often prefer different policies’ (Waltz 1993:74).
The third dimension in Waltz’s conceptualisation of the structure of the
international system concerns the distribution of capabilities among the
main competing units. Waltz argued that while analyses of national gov
ernments focus on distinctions, such as parliamentary and presidential
systems, students of international politics, ‘make distinctions between
international-political systems only according to the number of their great
powers’. This dimension makes it possible to differentiate between uni-, bi-,
and different multipolar systems. Identifying the polarity, the researcher
should focus on the relative capacities of the units, not their relations. For
instance, an international system in which three or more powers have split
into two alliances would still be a multipolar system, structurally distinct
from a bipolar system with two dominating powers (Waltz 1979:97–98).
In his analysis of the stability of bi- and multipolar systems, Waltz
claimed that multipolar systems were less stable since the management of
alliances were more complicated, creating situations in which generally de
fensive great powers were forced to enter wars because of their dependence
on more adventurous alliance members. Waltz illustrated this problem with
the failed policies of alliances that proceeded the outbreak of WWI. In bi
polar systems, strategic interdependence declines since the two dominating
powers depend mainly on their own resources and balance each other off
with nationally controlled ‘internal’ means rather than ‘external’ means
(alliances). Moreover, states are less likely to misjudge the relative strength
of individual states than they are to misjudge the strength and credibility of
a coalition of states (Waltz 1979:166–169).
2.1.2 The stability of unipolar systems

Waltz did not extend his analysis of system stability to include a unipolar
system. In Theory of International Politics, he argued that two competing
powers were ‘the smallest number possible in a self-help system’. In an ar
ticle from 2000, he saw an ‘all-but-inevitable movement from unipolarity to
multipolarity’ taking place in Asia, predicting that China, supported by its
strong economic growth rate, would emerge as a great power and develop
second-strike nuclear capacities reaching a level of parity with the US. The
hostility of China, North Korea and Russia, as well as doubts about the
extent to which it can continue to rely on US support, would make Japan
follow China on the route to become a great power. Moreover, the US’s
policy to contain China and its aspiration to ‘keep the world unipolar is
doomed’, since this task would exceed even the US’s power resources.
Additionally, the very effort to maintain a ‘hegemonic position is the surest
way to undermine it […] Multipolarity is developing before our eyes’ (Waltz
1979:136; Waltz 2000:32–37).
Even before Waltz published his prediction, Samuel Huntington had argued
that the unipolar moment already had passed and that the present system
should be conceptualised as a ‘uni-multipolar system’, with one superpower
and several major powers. The US’s relative power position was not as
dominant as we would expect from a unipolar power. To be able to intervene
military in various conflicts, the US was increasingly dependent on active
support from other regional and major powers, and it had to avoid provoking
a veto in the United Nations’ Security Council (UNSC). According to
Huntington, the support for US leadership was shrinking, with the US finding
itself increasingly alone (Huntington 1999). Two decades later, Mearsheimer
argued that the US created liberal international order was ending, and that the
rise of China and the revival of Russian power ‘brought the unipolar era to a
close’. He further predicted that the ‘emerging multipolar world will consist of
a realist based international order’ (Mearsheimer 2019:8).
In an influential article from 1999, William Wohlforth presented a com
prehensive argument questioning ‘the emerging conventional wisdom’ of
unipolar systems being unstable and conflict-prone. Wohlforth’s argument
had three propositions suggesting that the present system is (i) ‘un
ambiguously unipolar’; (ii) ‘prone to peace’; and (iii) ‘durable’. He defined
‘unipolarity’ as ‘a structure in which one state’s capabilities are too great to
be counterbalanced. […] At the same time, capabilities are not so con
centrated as to produce a global empire’. Consequently, unipolar systems
should not be confused with either bi- or multipolar systems that contain
one especially strong state, or imperial systems containing only one major
power (Wohlforth 1999:7–9).
Wohlforth supported the first proposition by comparing the US’s relative
power position to the position of leading states in previous systems. Using
an established power capability index (Correlates of War) and various
quantitative data related to the relative size of the leading power’s economy,
its percentage of military expenditure among major powers and ‘informa
tion age’ capacities, Wohlforth concluded that the extraordinary con
centration of capabilities in the US in the 1990s is unparalleled in modern
history. Unlike previous system leaders, the US has ‘commanding leads in
all the elements of material power’, including all forms of military power. In
previous systems, the leading powers often had ‘asymmetrical power port
folios’ generating ambiguity about the relative power distribution among
major powers (for instance, in comparing land and sea powers). These kind
of asymmetries are absent from the distribution of power in the present
system and efforts by any state to correct this imbalance will take decades.
Moreover, US’s geographic position and friendly neighbourhood further
increase its advantage. All other major powers are located on the Eurasian
continent and have to compete against other major powers in their region
(Wohlforth 1999:10–22 and 28).
The second proposition, the peacefulness of the present system, does not
imply an absence of conflicts. It concerns an absence of two specific pro
blems that have ‘bedevilled’ political leaders in previous systems: hegemonic
rivalry and balance of power politics among major powers. Wohlforth’s
argument on this proposition relates to Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST)
and PTT and their claims that an especially powerful state (a ‘hegemon’ or a
‘dominant state’) foster international orders that are stable until differential
growth rates in power capacities produce a ‘dissatisfied state’ with enough
capabilities to challenge the leading state. Consequently, the larger the
concentration of power in the leading state, the more peaceful the interna
tional order associated with it will be. The key to this argument is that
hegemonic rivalry only occurs in situations when the leading state thinks of
itself as capable of defending the status quo, and dissatisfied states believe
that they are capable of challenging the leading power. The US’s un
precedented strong position, relative to all other major powers, makes such
a challenge highly unlikely.
Additionally, the peacefulness of the unipolar system also finds support in
BPT. Waltz himself suggested that bipolar systems are less war-prone than
multipolar systems because they reduce uncertainties in calculating power
resources. According to this logic, Wohlforth argued that unipolar systems
should be even less war-prone. The superior power capacities of the unipolar
power will leave the ‘second-tier states’ with only two options: to band
wagon with the unipolar power, or isolate itself and avoid ‘actions that
could incur its focused enmity’. Therefore, second-tier states face structural
incentives ‘similar to those of lesser states in a region dominated by one
power, such as North America’. Moreover, the unbalanced unipolar power
can be more interventionist than leader states in bi- or multipolar systems
and maintain a system of alliances creating and exploiting security de
pendencies among second-tier states. Wohlforth, therefore, concluded that
Both HST/PTT and BPT support the claim that a unipolar system generates
‘comparatively few incentives for security or prestige competition among the
great powers’ (Wohlforth 1999:23–26).
Wohlforth’s definition of unipolarity supported the third proposition re
garding the durability of a unipolar system. Since unipolarity is defined as a
structure in which one state’s capabilities are too great to be counterbalanced,
counter-balancing strategies are impossible until the distribution of power
changes. Such a change can occur in three different ways. First, the unipolar
power position may erode due to high ambitions and too many global en
gagements, ‘imperial overstretch’ in the vocabulary of Paul Kennedy
(Kennedy 1989:515), or it may have too limited ambitions when it comes to
developing capabilities and policies necessary to protect the present interna
tional order. Regarding these two scenarios, Wohlforth worried the most
about the latter, that Washington would ‘shrink from accepting the financial,
military, and especially the domestic burdens of sole pole status’ (Wohlforth
1999:39–40). Secondly and thirdly, competing major powers may increase
their national capacities and balance collectively against the unipole.
In analysing the second and third possibility, Wohlforth introduced an
important distinction between a unipolarity in the making and an already
established unipolarity. In the first case, we may, as Waltz did, expect other
major powers to pursue counter-balancing strategies to protect their long-
term political autonomy and survival. However, the sudden implosion of the
Soviet Union resulted in a unique unipolar system with the US as an already
established unipolar power, creating a ‘structural fait accompli’ and a si
tuation in which ‘the theory’s central tendency cannot operate’ (Wohlforth
1999:30). In a later article, Wohlforth developed this argument further, ar
guing that the scope conditions of Waltz’s counter-hegemonic balancing
strategies are no longer obtained. The counter-balancing argument concerns
reactions to ‘a rising power that might attain preponderance, not responses
to a state whose preponderance is already firmly established’. An already
established unipolarity creates a completely different set of incentives for the
less resourceful states and a unipolar system that is both peaceful and
durable. The size and comprehensiveness of the capability cap, together with
the US’s geographical advantages, would block any speedy return to equi
librium through internal efforts by any other state even in a long-term
perspective (Wohlforth 2012:221).
Moreover, for alliances to aggregate power efficiently, they have to be
‘reliably binding and permit the merging of armed forces, defence industries,
infrastructures, and strategic decision making’. Instead of accepting such
limits to their autonomy and dependence on others, states are more likely to
freeride or bandwagon in search of favours from the unipolar power. In the
near term, Wohlforth could only see three possible challengers to the US’s
unipolar position: a true unification of Europe combining Germany’s
economic potential with the military resources of France and the UK, a
recreated Russian empire or an East Asian pole dominated by either China
or Japan. Wohlforth argued that in all three cases, regional balancing dy
namics are likely to kick in, preventing an aspiring superpower from es
tablishing a regional hegemony. Moreover, even as a declining offshore
unipolar power, the US will have unusual wide opportunities to play divide
and rule tactics, as any ‘second-tier state seeking to counter-balance has to
contend with the existing pro-US bandwagon’, and potentially confront
both the unipolar state and its great power ally (Wohlforth 1999:29–34).
In a major effort to update Waltz’s theory of international politics with a
systematic analysis of the dynamics of unipolar systems, Nuno Monteiro
suggested a third possibility: that the present unipolar system is durable, but
not peaceful. Moreover, the durability of the system is highly dependent on
the strategies of the unipolar power towards other major powers. If the
unipole accommodates the continuing economic growth of rising powers
possessing nuclear weapons as a defensive deterrent, the rising powers will
have fewer incentives to strengthen their military capacities beyond the point
they need for their survival. Eventually, the rising powers may become a
‘satisfied status quo military power’. Regarding peacefulness, Monteiro ar
gued that unipolarity makes room for significant conflict beyond open conflict
among great powers. The unbalanced power of the unipole generates
‘abundant opportunities’ for wars between the unipole and minor powers
lacking both capabilities and allies to deter the unipole from attacking.
Unipolarity also creates opportunities for conflicts among minor powers that
may have been avoided if they had been disciplined by a great power ally
protecting the regional balance of power. Moreover, the maintenance of the
status quo requires that the unipole practices a strategy of ‘defensive dom
inance’, including selective but regular military involvement in conflicts to
lower the incentives for regional arms races (Monteiro 2014:4–6).
The disagreement among structural realists indicates in our view that BPT
will not be able to provide one answer to the question of the durability or
peacefulness of unipolar systems. However, all participants in the debate on
the unipolar moment seem to admit that the durability and peacefulness of
the system are partly dependent on the strategic choices of the leading
powers. Monteiro even argued that the grand strategy of the unipolar power
is the ‘most important variable’, conditioning both the durability and
peacefulness of the system (Monteiro 2014:63). Still, the parsimonious
analytical framework originally developed by Waltz provide us with little or
no guidance as to why states pursue different strategies, and his assumption
that states are like units does not help us. However, Monteiro’s distinction
between satisfied powers supporting the system and rising powers challen
ging the system is an important step forward in this regard. In contrast to
most structural realists, Monteiro explicitly addressed the question of dif
ferences arguing that the ‘different behaviour of states is determined by the
different positions they occupy in the international context, which in turn
are determined by their relative power and the strategic relations they have
with the unipole’ (Monteiro 2014:36). In the next section, we discuss two
theoretical perspectives that are better suited for the task of explaining why
states pursue different strategies: power transition theory and research on
status competition.
2.2 System stability and great power interaction processes

In this section, we first introduce PTT. This theory is particularly useful for
analysing the dynamics of unipolar systems since its basic conception of the
international system includes one dominating state interacting with the two
different categories of states: satisfied and dissatisfied states. In the following
subsection, we also introduce research on status competition. This set of
research act as a complement to PTT in analysing how states different po
sition in the present system will affect their basic strategic choices. Finally,
we conclude this section by presenting our conceptualisation of the dis
tribution of power in the present international system.
2.2.1 Basic premises of power transition theory

The IR debate on hegemonic stability has its roots in competing views on the
consequences of the US’s relative economic decline in the 1970s. According
to proponents of the HST, international orders such as the Bretton Woods
system require active efforts and continuous support by the leading state, the
‘hegemon’, who fulfils a critical function in creating a specific regime and
enforcing the norms and rules of the cooperation.5 In this debate, realist
scholars, such as Robert Gilpin (1987), and liberal theorists, such as Robert
Keohane, reached different conclusions, with Keohane arguing that the
regime could survive without the active support from the leading state since
other states also benefited from the cooperation and therefore would con
tinue to support it (Keohane 1984). The logic of hegemonic stability is not
restricted to economic cooperation. In War and Change in World Politics,
Gilpin extended the analysis of hegemonic stability to security orders. In
both cases, states accept the leadership of a ‘benign hegemon’ because they
believe that they benefit from the collective good provided by the hegemon
(Gilpin 1981).
PTT complements the HST debate by adding the distinction between
satisfied and dissatisfied states. This distinction, present in both Wolhforth’s
and Monteiro’s argument, is of particular interest for this study since our
selection of cases includes two potentially satisfied great powers (France and
the UK) and two potentially dissatisfied great powers (China and Russia).
PTT was originally developed by Abramo Fimo Kenneth Organski in his
study World Politics (1968). The theory’s focus on the dynamics of inter
national systems dominated by one state has earned it renewed attention in
analyses of the post-Cold War era (Tammen et al. 2000; Lemke 2004). In
contrast to the previously discussed assumption of states being like units,
PTT describes a layered hierarchical state system. At the top of the system
sits the ‘dominant state’, which controls the largest proportions of relevant
power resources within the system. However, the dominant state is not a
hegemon in the strong sense of the word, and the system is still anarchical in
the terminology of Waltz. It is composed of formally sovereign units, and
the dominating state cannot single-handedly control the actions of other
major powers. Instead, its position rests on its power preponderance over
potential rivals and its ability to manage the international system in ways
that benefit its allies and satisfy their interests (Tammen et al. 2000:6).
Directly beneath the dominant state, we find the category of great powers.
This category is inhabited by two kinds of powers: (i) satisfied powers,
whose function in the system is to contribute to the allocation of resources
and to assist the dominant state in maintaining the system; and (ii) dis
satisfied powers, which are not fully integrated into the norms and rules of a
particular system. Potential challengers to the dominant power come from
the latter category. According to PTT, a potential challenger must have 80
per cent or more of the dominant power’s resources. Like Morgenthau and
many other realist scholars, Tammen and his colleagues define power as ‘the
ability to impose on or persuade an opponent to comply with demands’.
Measuring power, PTT uses a combination of three indicators: population
size, economic productivity and the effectiveness of the political system in
extracting resources to advance national goals (Tammen et al. 2000:7–8).
Presently, according to Tammen and his colleagues, China represents the
sole potential challenger to the US. This is contingent on if China remains
dissatisfied with its place and role in the present system. The three other
great powers in the present system are Germany, or the European Union
(EU), Japan and Russia (‘assuming recovery’). ‘In the distant future’, India
may also rise to great power status and even become a challenger to the then
dominating state. Beneath the great powers, we find the more numerous
category of middle powers, who are characterised by the fact that they in
dividually have ‘resources that cannot be dismissed’, but still ‘insufficient
powers to challenge the dominant power’. Finally, at the bottom of the
pyramid resides the most numerous category of states, the small powers,
with few resources even compared to middle powers. A similar hierarchy is
also assumed to exist in subordinated regional systems, with their own set of
dominant, great and lesser powers (Tammen et al. 2000:7–8).
According to PTT, the prime motivating factor for decisions on war and
peace is countries’ relative satisfaction with the rules of the global or re
gional hierarchy and a ‘desire of a nation to improve its political position in
the hierarchy’. Consequently, dissatisfied states are potential challengers to
the status quo. So far, PTT relates closely to the premises of offensive
realism. However, PTT also claims that conflicts ‘do not occur frequently at
the great power level’. The reason for this is that most of these states are
relatively satisfied; they support the existing rules of the present system, and
‘seek cooperative solutions’ to enhance national interests related to both the
economy and security. The assumption that some great powers will accept
the leadership of a dominating power thereby becoming status quo powers
bandwagoning with the dominating power, is incompatible with the as
sumptions of both defensive and offensive realism. However, all states are
not equally satisfied. PTT expects that there are a few dissatisfied states at
the top of the system and an increasing number of dissatisfied states in the
lower categories. These states believe that the present international system
does not confer benefits equal to their expectations or long-term interests.
Instead, they see the system as unfair, biased and dominated by hostile
forces. The specific rationale for their grievances may differ; it can be his
torical (Germany prior WWII), cultural (China), ideological (USSR), re
ligious (Iran) or even personal (Libya and Iraq) (Tammen et al. 2000:9).
Another difference between structural realism and PTT concerns the
analysis of the stability of alliances. In traditional realist theory, alliances
reflect the interests of their leading power(s) and are held together by the
fear of common enemies. Contrary to this, PTT argues that the stability of
alliances reflects the ‘similarity of interests and the degree of agreement
about the status quo among allies’. While states with similar preferences will
form stable alliances, alliances that include states with incompatible pre
ferences on the existing order are likely to be broken when the common
threat has disappeared. NATO is an example of the former, and the alliances
between the Western powers and the USSR during WWII an example of the
latter (Tammen et al. 2000:13).
Contrasting PTT and offensive realism, Douglas Lemke presented an
analysis of the interaction processes between the US and the great powers of
the post-Cold war era. Following the basic premises of offensive realism, we
should expect the unipolar power to continue its struggle for more power
until it has established itself as a hegemon by eliminating rivals, or otherwise
subjugating them. Great powers are expected, if possible, to pass the buck of
deterring aggression to other great powers. However, the more powerful the
dominant state is relative to its foes, the more likely it is that the other states
respond by forming coalitions to balance the threat from the dominating
state. Bandwagoning is, in the perspective of offensive realism, the least
likely alignment strategy of great powers since it would contradict the as
sumption of states being driven by ambitions to maximise power (Lemke
2004:53–55).
PTT predicts the opposite strategic behaviour. The US has in this per
spective been the dominant power ever since the end of WWII when it
founded the international institutional structure relating to the UN system,
as well as the financial institutions of the Bretton Woods system and the
infrastructure that support a global free trade market (capital markets, stock
exchanges and communication networks). These institutions provide ‘re
sources (capital, credit and relief from trade disputes) disproportionately to
states that organize their domestic economies following American concepts
of market capitalism, free trade, and respect for liberal democratic norms of
conduct and human rights’ (Lemke 2004:56). Lemke argued that as the
dominant power, the US is the main status quo power and the first defender
of this system. Some other states will also benefit from this system, but
others will not. The more similar a state’s domestic institutions are to those
of the dominant power, the more likely the state is to benefit from the status
quo, benefits that will also increase the likelihood of this particular state
being a ‘satisfied state’. And conversely, the more different a state’s domestic
institutions are from the dominant state, the more likely it is that the state
will not benefit from the system and therefore becomes a dissatisfied state
wanting to challenge the status quo (Lemke 2004:56).
According to the main hypothesis of PTT, the probability of war between
the dominant state and other major powers rises dramatically when a dis
satisfied power achieves parity with the dominant power. However, a parity
between a rising satisfied power and the dominant power is not likely to lead
to war if the new dominant power maintains the status quo instituted by the
former dominant state (Lemke 2004:57). The US replacing the UK as the
dominant power during the twentieth century may be interpreted as an
example of a peaceful succession between two like-minded satisfied domi
nant states. Another claim that can be drawn from the basic assumptions of
PTT is that the preponderance of power at the hands of the dominant state
promotes the stability of the system. Again, the predictions of PTT stand in
sharp contrast to the predictions of Waltz’s theory of the international
system. However, the predictions are fully compatible with the arguments on
unipolarity put forth by Wohlforth and Monteiro. Moreover, in contrast to
Waltz’s defensive realism and offensive realists such as Mearsheimer, PTT
also suggests that satisfied states will neither balance nor buck-pass in efforts
to constrain rising satisfied states (Lemke 2004:57).
According to Lemke, the great power strategies of the post-Cold War era
generally confirmed the expectations of PTT and disconfirmed the ex
pectations of offensive realism. Regarding the dominating state, Lemke
argued that the active policies of the US corresponded well with the ex
pectations of a dominant state, exercising influence with consent through
multilateral institutions and, mostly, active support from other satisfied
major powers (Lemke 2004:63–64). Regarding the strategic responses from
other major powers, the UK has consistently supported the US and fought
alongside the Americans in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and twice in Iraq.
Thus, practising a strategy of bandwagoning through building on its special
relationship with the dominant power. Moreover, the UK has not under
taken any major military build-ups to balance the US by internal efforts and
it has remained in NATO. France participated in the US-led coalitions in
Iraq (1991), sent naval units to support the US’s war efforts in Afghanistan
and has increased its ties to NATO in the post-Cold War era. However,
France has also been a leader in efforts to develop independent European
military capacities in the form of the so-called European Rapid Reaction
Force, and it has been increasingly critical of US foreign policy, especially
with respect to the war against Iraq 2003. Lemke, therefore, argued that it
cannot be said that France ‘wholeheartedly bandwagons’ with the US.
However, neither does it balance nor buck-pass US preponderance (Lemke
2004:59–61).6 Since both Germany and Japan are still cooperating closely
with the US in questions related to territorial defence, Lemke found support
for classifying both countries’ alignment strategies as bandwagoning to
wards the US (Lemke 2004:61–62).7
Turning to the first of the two potentially dissatisfied states, Lemke noted
that China has not sent military contributions to any post-Cold War US
operation, it abstained in the UNSC vote authorising the first War in Iraq
1991, it bitterly opposed NATO actions against Yugoslavia in 1999 and
threatened to veto the use of force against Iraq in 2003. Moreover, the
Chinese military has been ‘undergoing restructuring and augmentation,
featuring acquisition of new generations of fighter aircraft and warships’,
and its government ‘regularly express dissatisfaction with American hege
mony’. According to Lemke, in addition to its internal balancing efforts,
China explored the possibility of constructing a counter-balancing coalition
with Russia. Lemke admitted that the balancing behaviour of China is
consistent with the dictates of offensive realism. However, it also fits well
with PTT’s expectations regarding dissatisfied states. Russia, on the other
hand, did not match the characteristics of a dissatisfied state in the analysis
of Lemke. Impressed with the then intensive US economic support to
Russia, Russia’s cooperation with the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and its membership in the Group of Eight (G8), Lemke classified Russia as
bandwagoning with the US (Lemke 2004:61–62).
Since Lemke presented his arguments, Russia has been expelled from the
G8, invaded two neighbouring countries (Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in
2014), provided military support to the Assad government in Syria in its war
against US allies and is accused of interfering in two American presidential
elections (2016 and 2020). Additionally, the Russian government has in
vested heavily in modernising and increasing its military capacities and is
openly challenging liberal values, decreasing political freedom within Russia
and supporting non-liberal parties abroad. We argue that Russia, from 2008
onwards, fits well with the expectations of both offensive realism and dis
satisfied states in PTT.
As already mentioned, we view PTT’s distinctions between the dominant
state and other states as well as satisfied and dissatisfied states, as potentially
useful in analysing differences in strategic behaviour. However, we do not
agree with the choice of indicators for measuring power or the selection of
great powers. Tammen and his colleagues admitted that the population’s
size does not tell us much as an isolated variable. If it did, countries like
Bangladesh, Indonesia and Brazil would also be considered great powers
(Tammen et al. 2000:9). We also find it difficult to operationalise PTT’s third
indicator, ‘the effectiveness of the political system’, and considering
economic strength, we think that productivity should be complemented with
the size of each state’s economy. Regarding the selection of great powers, we
also note that PTT theorists find it hard to agree even among themselves;
Tammen and his colleagues excluded the UK and France from the great
power category, while Lemke included them. Moreover, PTT’s discussion
on satisfied and dissatisfied powers is biased towards international political-
economic considerations. Since our dependent variable is defence and
military strategies, we will complement PTT’s analysis of attitudes towards
the status quo with motives related to status competition and positional
conflicts related to the use of military force.
2.2.2 Status competition

Status is a relational variable based on mutually recognised differences in
status among members of a particular system or organisation. Recognition
by other states as having a special status may increase a particular state’s
political capital and give it access to exclusive decision-making forums. In
the present state system, recognition includes ideas of each state having
equal formal rights to sovereignty, procedures of diplomatic representation
and collective recognition by peers acknowledged as membership and re
presentation in the United Nations (UN) or organisations such as the Group
of Seven (G7) and Group of Twenty (G20). Interest in states’ competition
for status and recognition is not novel. During the Cold War, some re
searchers belonging to the ‘English school’ emphasised this aspect of power
competition in their analyses and definitions of great powers and less re
sourceful states (Bull 1977:200–202; Holbraad 1984:75–76; Wight
1986:41–43 and 96–98). In a classical study from 1977, The Anarchical
Society, Hedley Bull, a leading representative of the English School, argued
that great powers are in the front rank in military strength. Additionally,
great powers are recognised by both their own leaders and people as well as
other states to have ‘certain special rights and duties’. Foremost, they assert
the right to ‘play a part in determining issues that affect the peace and se
curity of the international system as a whole’ (Bull 1977:202).
The insights of the English School regarding status competition were lost
in the theoretical debates within the IR discipline in the 1980s and the early
1990s.8 However, during the last years of the 1990s and the first two decades
of the twenty-first century, the interest for status has resurged, resulting in a
celebrated edited volume with the title Status in World Politics. In the in
troduction to the book, Deborah Welch Larson and her colleagues defined
status as ‘collective beliefs about a given state’s ranking on valued attri
butes’. Status, they argued, manifests itself in two distinct ways: as mem
bership in a defined club of actors and as a relative standing within a
particular club. Membership in ‘international society’ – recognised sover
eignty – is a status sought by many sub-state groups and once this status is
conferred via recognition by others, the new states may continue to improve
their relative position further by advancing to middle power status.
Ultimately, states may seek entrance to the highest status group – the great
power club – and continue to compete for the ‘less formal rankings’ within
this group (Larson et al., 2014:7–8).9
Whether it concerns membership in a specific club or informal positioning
within the ‘social hierarchy’, status involves both shared collective beliefs
and judgements related to the relative ranking of club members and sub
jective perceptions related to estimations of different countries’ power ca
pacities. Relative ranking implies a view of status as a ‘positional good’, a
scarce resource that cannot be enjoyed by everyone. However, while status is
always relational, it is not necessary zero-sum. Sub-state groups can, and
have been allowed to, enter the society of states without diminishing the
status of other states, and single middle powers can rise to great power
status without diminishing the status of other members of the great power
club (Larson et al. 2014:8–9).
The question of status as a ‘positional good’, based on both collective
beliefs and subjective estimations has been analysed further by other re
searchers. In an article on growth and positional conflicts, Randall Schweller
argued that positional competition – in contrast to some other efforts related
to security – is a zero-sum game. In these matters, ‘a gain (loss) for one
player becomes a corresponding loss (gain) for the opponent(s)’. Schweller
also identified ‘an especially virulent’ subset of positional competitions;
‘positional conflicts’. In these conflicts, at least one of the parties seeks the
‘total destruction or subjugation’ of the other, and bargaining and com
promises are impossible. Examples of this are contemporary civil wars as
well as ethnic and religious conflicts (Schweller 1999:29).
The subjective character of estimations of power capacities creates a risk
of states experiencing ‘status inconsistency’ – that a state receives mixed
signals from other states regarding its relative position, or that a state per
ceives itself to be worthy of a higher rank than other states are prepared to
recognise. In an article on polarity and status competition, Wohlforth ar
gued that status inconsistency is more likely to trigger open status compe
tition when the power capabilities of states are evenly matched. Uneven
‘capability portfolios – when states excel in different material dimension –
make status inconsistency more likely’. Putting these two propositions to
gether, he concluded that unipolar systems characterised by one state
‘possessing unambiguous preponderance’ in all relevant dimension of power
capabilities are the systems that are the least prone to power competition
(Wohlforth 2011:45–47).
In our view, the renewed attention to status competition constitutes an
important complement to the previous structural realist focus on the dis
tribution of material power capabilities. As previously mentioned, we also
consider that recognition of status rank constitutes a third possible basic
goal as it complements defensive realism’s emphasis on survival/security and
offensive realism’s assumptions regarding power maximisation and
increased influence. We agree with the argument that more states can enter a
certain category without diminishing the status of the states already be
longing to this category. Allowing new members to enter a particular group
might even strengthen the group collectively. A rising number of states being
allowed to enter a group of, for example, middle powers, may improve the
influence and standing of the whole group if they can coordinate their ac
tions toward other categories of states.
However, when we turn to the category of system-determining states, this
line of reasoning becomes complicated. Increasing the number of first
ranked great powers changes the structure of the system, turning a unipolar
system into a bipolar system or a bipolar system into a multipolar system.
This change would diminish the relative position of the unipolar or bipolar
powers respectively, and improve the relative position of the rising power.
Moreover, as members of the top category of states, system-determining
states have less need for coordinating their actions when they interact with
states from lower categories. Furthermore, we agree with Schweller’s ar
gument that status competition involves a struggle for positional goods in
volving relative gains and losses. Wohlforth may be correct in claiming that
status inconsistencies are less likely to occur in unipolar systems, with one
state having a huge advantage in terms of access to all relevant power ca
pacities. However, this distribution of power does not prevent the secondary
powers from competing among themselves to improve their relative status
position against each other. Moreover, if the unipolar power practices iso
lationist strategies or strategies of offshore balancing, potential revisionist
states are left under-deterred and status competition is likely to increase
among the secondary great powers.
With a traditional focus on the distribution of material power capacities,
states can only improve their position in two ways: by increasing their na
tional capacities (internal balancing vis-à-vis other states) or by coordinating
their efforts with other states through military alliances or otherwise (ex
ternal balancing). If we extend the analysis to status competition, several
additional strategic possibilities emerge. With a departure in Social Identity
Theory (SIT), Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko identified
three different strategies for states (or other groups or individuals) to im
prove their social status. If the boundaries to higher status groups are seen
as ‘permeable’, a lower status group opt for a strategy of conforming to the
norms of the elite group to gain acceptance, and practice a strategy of ‘social
mobility’. Germany and Japan’s integration into the Western community
after WWII provide us with examples of this first strategy. According to
Larson and Shevchenko, both China and Russia tried to practice this
strategy in the early post-Cold War era. However, if the boundaries to
higher-ranking states are perceived to be ‘impermeable’ to new members,
states may instead opt for strategies of social competition and develop
strategies that challenge the values of the present system and the established
great powers. Similarly, Larson and Shevchenko exemplified Japan’s
imperialism in the 1930s and Russia’s re-orientation in the late 1990s and
early 2000s as historical illustrations of this. A third strategy is ‘social
creativity’. For states pursuing this strategy, the present status hierarchy is
perceived as stable and difficult to challenge. Instead of trying to excel in
capacities that other states have an advantage in, states practising this
strategy try to excel in other dimensions by promoting new norms that can
change how status is perceived. The status competition between the US and
the EU was offered as one example of this (Larson and Shevchenko 2010).
The insights from research on status competition will be used in two ways
in this study. First, we view the improvement of status as a third possible
basic goal, common to both the defence strategy and the military strategy, of
a specific country. This means that military capacities may be developed and
used to promote three interrelated but not identical purposes: (i) survival/
security; (ii) power maximisation/influence; and (iii) maintaining/increasing
status rank. Second, the strategies of social mobility, social competition and
social creativity will be used to analyse the strategies that different states use
to consolidate or improve their status rank.
2.2.3 The distribution of power in the present international system

Our analysis of the distribution of power in the present international system
departs from a distinction between superpowers and great powers in
troduced by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver. Superpowers must, according to
their definition, ‘possess first-class military-political capabilities (as mea
sured by the standards of the day), and the economies to support such
capabilities’. Moreover, superpowers have to exercise ‘global military and
political reach’. Furthermore, they must both identify themselves as a su
perpower and ‘be accepted by others in rhetoric and behaviour, as having
this rank’. Finally, a superpower needs to be an active player in processes of
security agenda setting in all, or nearly all, of the regions in the system.
According to Buzan and Wæver, the US is the only superpower in the post-
Cold War era. Great power status, they argued, ‘rest mainly on a single key’:
that other ‘major powers’ include them in their system-level calculations as if
they have ‘the clear economic, military, and political potential to bid for the
superpower status in the short or medium term’. The ‘actual possession of
material and legal attributes’, they argued, is less crucial for great powers
than for superpowers. However, great powers ‘will usually have appropriate
levels of capability […] they will generally think of themselves as more than
regional powers and possibly as prospective superpowers, and they will
usually be capable of operating in more than one region’ (Buzan and Wæver
2003:34–35).
The distinction between superpowers and great powers is in our view
fruitful since it offers an opportunity for distinguishing changes in the in
ternational system that are of less significance than a change in the funda
mental polarity (if a system is uni-, bi- or multipolar). We agree with Buzan
and Wæver regarding the importance of the mutual recognition of status.
However, whether or not other ‘major powers’ include a particular potential
great power in their system-level calculations cannot be answered until it is
decided which states are included in this category. Consequently, we do not
consider recognition of superpower potential among major powers to be a
useful criterion for identifying great powers. Moreover, since our category
of system-determining states includes both superpowers and great powers,
we see no need to exclude states that are not perceived as potential super
powers from the category of great powers. Furthermore, since the dependent
variable of this study is alignment and military strategies, we consider it
necessary that both superpowers and great powers meet certain criteria re
garding the possession of both material and legal attributes. Without ma
terial capabilities, these states will not be able to pursue and sustain military
strategies corresponding to great powers. Without formal legal attributes,
such as formally recognised rights and membership in relevant decision-
making institutions, these powers will not be able to use their status in
various institutional settings. In this study, the veto-right and permanent
membership in the UNSC are obvious examples of this.
Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth developed Buzan and Wæver’s
distinction between superpowers and great powers further. In an article and
a book from 2016, they argued that the rise of China has turned the inter
national system of the 1990s with one superpower and an unspecified
number of great powers (a ‘1+X structure’), into a system with a ‘1+1+X’
structure.10 According to this conceptualisation of the international system,
the US is still the sole superpower, but China’s increasing economic strength
has made it advance into an ‘emerging potential superpower’. The letter X is
used to signify that a change in the number of great powers does not alter
the basic properties of the system (Brooks and Wohlforth 2016a).11 In their
analysis of the distribution of power, Brooks and Wohlforth focused on
three interacting ‘core elements of material power’: military capacity, eco
nomic capacity and technological capacity (Brooks and Wohlforth
2016a:16). Data on the differences in aggregate capabilities between major
powers were used to create several hierarchically ordered subcategories
(superpowers, potential superpowers and great powers), and to make esti
mations regarding the time needed for a specific state to advance to a higher
category.
The standard approach to measuring the distribution of military power
focuses on annual defence expenditures. According to Brooks and
Wohlforth, this standard approach has significant limitations. One such
limitation concerns the temporal aspect of analysing the build-up of new
military capacities. Brooks and Wohlforth argued that the length of the time
gap that separates the choice to attain some capability and the creation of
that capability is potentially very long, and depends on the level of tech
nological development of the specific country as well as its ability to convert
economic and technological power elements to new military capabilities.
The increased complexity in producing and using advanced weaponry has
increased this interdependency between the different core elements of power.
Furthermore, investments in defence spending accumulate over decades,
making a change from one year to another less significant (Brooks and
Wohlforth 2016a:17–19).
According to Brooks and Wohlforth, assessments of the military power of
superpowers and potential superpowers should include an analysis of the
key military capacities needed to exercise ‘command of the global commons’
(the open sea, space and air above 15,000 feet).12 Exercising command of the
commons in the twenty-first century, states require a broad range of very
expensive and complex systems that have to be integrated and supported by
an infrastructure that includes long-range transport capacity and military
installations in foreign countries. After summarising the total resources for
global power projection among six major powers (China, France, India,
Russia, the UK and the US), Brooks and Wohlforth estimated that the US-
controlled more than 50 per cent of all indicators of command of the
commons, leaving China and the other majorpowers very far behind
(Brooks and Wohlforth 2016a:20–21).
Regarding economic capacities, Brooks and Wohlforth admitted that
China’s share of the global gross domestic product (GDP) had grown dra
matically from 4.5 per cent in 2000 to 11.3 in 2014 and that China had made
a remarkable sprint to reach middle-income status. However, they con
tinued, China would face a more difficult challenge of moving to high-
income status. Most countries fail this step, and among those states that
succeed, slower growth rates are usually experienced as their economy ad
vances (Brooks and Wohlforth 2016a:26–28; for a similar argument, see Nye
2012; 2015). Moreover, to reach the level of ‘potential superpower’, China
must also develop technological capacities to challenge the US in the mili
tary realm. Increased technological capacities would give China sufficient
‘latent material capacity’ to bid for superpower status. However, before
China can reach the level of superpower rank, it must convert this latent
capacity to military resources. This is needed for commanding the global
commons, a final step that in itself is likely to take decades.
We use Brooks and Wohlforth’s conceptualisation of the current interna
tional system’s structure when defining the level of system-determining states
and when separating great powers from middle powers. However, Brooks and
Wohlforth did not present any specific criteria for great powers; neither did they
specify what states occupy this level in the present international system.
However, in their analysis of global power projection they identified six ‘major
powers’, the five states we categorise as the system-determining states and India.
If our focus had been on economic power and strategies for influence in the
global economy, it could have been reasonable to view the EU as a great power.
After all, the EU is a member of the G20 and the Commission of the EU has the
mandate to represent all Union members in international trade negotiations.
However, when it comes to issues related to defence policy, the member states
have so far been reluctant to cede formal decision-making authority to common
supranational institutions or establishing common military capacities.13
Our selection of system-determining states is based on aggregate cap
abilities related to three dimensions: (i) economic capacity (measured as
annual GDP and GDP per capita); (ii) military capabilities (accumulated
military expenditure and access to nuclear weapons); and (iii) recognition of
status (permanent membership in UNSC and membership in G7). To meet
the criteria for system-determining states, a state must score high on at least
two out of three indicators.
In ranking the economic capabilities among the six major powers identified
by Brooks and Wohlforth, we combine GDP and GDP per capita to get an
approximation of both the raw size of each country’s economy and its level of
development (see Table 2.1). A combined evaluation of annual GDP and GDP
per capita gives the US a clear advantage over all other states. China’s huge
advantage in size to the other major powers makes it reasonable to see China
as being in a class of its own, second to the US, but clearly ahead of France
and the UK. The size of India’s economy is equal to Britain’s and France’s, but
its GDP per capita is far below even Russia’s. Russia, on the other hand, has
the smallest economy. India’s huge population gives it enormous growth po
tential. However, in this study, we are concerned with the distribution of power
in the present international system, not the number of great powers in future
systems. Looking at the size and the level of development of India’s economy
at the present, it is clearly behind France and the UK.
Table 2.1 Indicators of the economic capabilities of six potential system-determining

powers 2020
Country GDP (billion USD) GDP per capita (USD)
The US 21,433 65,254

China 14,401 10,287
India 2,869 2,098
The UK 2,831 42,379
France 2,716 39,257
Russia 1,702 11,601
Source: International Monetary Fund.
Concerning military capacities, we are also interested in both quantity and

quality. Regarding the first, we have aggregated data on the annual average
military expenditure of over ten years to compensate for short time fluc
tuations and to get a more comprehensive picture (see Table 2.2). Again, the
US is clearly in a class of its own, followed by China in second place. When
it comes to military expenditure, the other four major powers are roughly
equal. However, following Brooks and Wohlforth’s argument concerning
‘key military capacities’ to exercise ‘command of the global commons’
(Brooks and Wohlforth 2016a:20–21), we also consider a qualitative
dimension of military capacities. Since even some potential great powers
have very limited ability for global power projection in the post-Cold War
era, we will not use Brooks and Wohlforth’s indicators of superpower
capabilities. Instead, we see access to nuclear weapons and second-strike
capability as two key military capacities of great powers. As for indicators of
second-strike capabilities, we use access to nuclear-powered ballistic missile
submarines (SSBN) and the number of deployed warheads (as a protection
against surprise attacks).
Table 2.2 Indicator of the military capability of six potential system-determining powers
Country Accumulated military expenditures 2010–2019 (billion USD)
The US 6,877
China 1,956
Russia 712
India 551
The UK 540
France 505
Sources: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
Access to nuclear weapons is important both as a defensive deterrent and

as a source of recognition of status. We will therefore use access to nuclear
weapons as a necessary criterion in identifying great powers, and for se
parating this class of states from middle powers. In the early debate on
unipolarity, one participant expected that Germany and Japan soon would
make moves to acquire ‘a full spectrum of great power capabilities, in
cluding nuclear weapons’ (Layne 1993:33–37). Another researcher argued
that a multipolar Europe would be more stable if Germany was allowed to
acquire a nuclear deterrent (Mearsheimer 1990:55). So far, these two states
have not made any efforts to procure nuclear weapons and they are there
fore not included in the category of system-determining states. However,
and in contrast to Monteiro (2014:46), we do not view access to nuclear
weapons as a sufficient criterion for great power rank or a single key to
major power status, since that would force us to include Israel, North Korea
and Pakistan in the category of major powers. Adding nuclear weapons and
second-strike capability to the equation changes the picture based on just
military expenditure. On this parameter, Russia is almost equal to the US,
placing these two states in a class of their own. However, considering the
US’s huge advantage in defence expenditure and capacities for global power
projection, Russia is still clearly behind the US when we combine conven
tional and nuclear military capacities. France and the UK are the only
states, besides Russia and the US, to fulfil both criteria for second-strike
capability. Russia’s huge advantage when it comes to nuclear capacities
makes us rank France and the UK as third-ranked military powers. China’s
efforts to introduce submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) seem to
be in a development phase although it has made progress with its new JL-2
missile system. According to Chinese authorities, all weapons exhibited in a
parade were in active service (Global Security, 2020). China, therefore,
seems to have at least a rudimentary second-strike capability and its capa
cities are assumed to increase rapidly, creating a growing concern among US
observers (Richard 2021). Moreover, China has a clear advantage over
France, Russia and the UK when it comes to military expenditure. India has
the lowest military expenditure of the six major powers, it fulfils only one of
the criteria for second-strike capabilities and its SSBN program is still in an
early phase. We, therefore, rank India below the other major powers.14
In measuring recognition, we use permanent membership of the UNSC
and membership in the G7 as two indicators of established institutionalised
great power status in matters relating to international security and the global
economy respectively. The G7 group consist of Canada, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, the UK and the US. The G7 was originally founded in 1975 as
the Group of Six (G6). In 1976, when Canada joined the group, the present
constellation of members was established. The cooperation was intended to
give the major Western industrial powers a venue to address economic
concerns, making it a potential club for those ‘satisfied states’ that are
benefiting most economically from the present international system.
Between 1998 and 2014, this intergovernmental forum was called G8 and
included Russia. Russia was suspended in 2014 due to its war against
Ukraine. In 2017, Russia announced that it did not intend to re-join the
group (Laub 2014; Batchelor 2017).
Recognition by other states as having a special status give states access to
exclusive decision-making forums. In matters regarding international se
curity, the status of being one of the five permanent members of the UNSC
with veto-right gives the five major powers – China, France, Russia, the UK
and the US – a special standing. Our focus on military strategy makes us
weigh the UNSC and G8 memberships as the most important indicators of
great power recognition.15 Again, India falls behind the rest of the six major
powers.
When we aggregate the results for our three indicators of power capa
cities, we find that only five of the six states can make strong claims for being
in a class of their own: China, France, Russia, the UK and the US. These
states are the only states that are ranked high on at least two of our di
mensions of aggregate power. Russia scores comparably low on our in
dicators for economic capacity, having both a relatively small economy and
a low level of development measured as GDP per capita. However, Russia’s
complete catalogue of nuclear capacities and its permanent seat in the
UNSC provide strong support for a great power status on the two other
indicators.
India’s low GDP per capita economy and low recognition rate create a
distance between India and the five states included in our selection of
system-determining states. We will therefore not include India in the
category of system-determining states, even though it could be argued that
its great growth potential may earn them the status of an ‘emergent potential
great power’ (Edström and Westberg 2020b). A similar classification of
leading powers appears in a recent study on a comparative grand strategy
where our five system-determining states are collectively referred to as the
‘major powers’ in the present system. India, on the other hand, is together
with Brazil categorised as a ‘pivotal state’, although with considerable re
gional influence (Balzacq et al. 2019:13). Similarly, The Correlates of War
index, commonly used to select cases in empirical analyses of interstate
conflicts, includes all our system-determining states plus Germany and
Japan in their classification of ‘major powers’ in 2016, but not India (Volgy
et al. 2011:5). In Figure 2.1, the structure of the international system is il
lustrated.
The uneven distribution of power between the superpower, the emerging
potential superpower and the three great powers give these five system-
determining states different strategic options. The unique position of an
established unipolar power means that it can only improve its relative po
sition by trying to achieve hegemony, a move that if successful, would
threaten all other states’ autonomy and change the anarchical ordering
principle of the international system. The position of the emerging potential
superpower also gives it structural incentives that are different from all other
powers. The emergent superpower can achieve the rank of a superpower by
increasing its power capacities (internal balancing). If this effort is suc
cessful, the international system will return to bipolarity. ‘Third-ranked’
Superpower
(The US)
Emergent
Potential superpower
potential superpower
(none)
(China)
Great power 1 Great power 2 Great power 3

(The UK) (France) (Russia)
Figure 2.1 The structure of the international system in the present 1+1+3 system.
great powers have several options responding to this stratified structure. To
protect themselves against hegemony (as defensive realism teaches), they
may choose to balance against the unipolar power by means of collective
external balancing. However, some great powers may also (in line with the
balance of threat theory) find that their ‘relative position’ is best protected if
they bandwagon with the less threatening unipolar power. Figure 2.1
Notes
1 Regarding the establishment of the Woodrow Wilson Chair, see the homepage of
the Department of International Politics at Aberystwyth (Aberystwyth
University 2019).
2 It is common to refer to this theoretical tradition as ‘neorealist’ to distinguish this
tradition from an older ‘classical’ or ‘political’ realism (for an overview of the
development of the realist tradition in the twentieth century, see Hollis and Smith
1990; Jackson and Sørensen 2007). We prefer the label ‘structural realism’ be
cause it more clearly expresses the defining feature of this tradition: the focus on
the influence and stability of the structure of the international system. ‘Structural
realism’ is also the label used by the founder of the ‘neorealist’ tradition, Waltz
(2000), and contemporary leading theorists working in this tradition; see
Monteiro (2014) and Mearsheimer (2016).
3 For an early and often cited example on constructivist critique focusing on an
alternative explanation of the peaceful ending of bipolarity and the Cold War, see
Alexander Wendt (1992). Other major early constructivist works focusing on
norms and identity in international relations include Onuf (2013); Finnemore
(1996); Katzenstein (1996) and Wendt’s (1999). One of the most celebrated works
in Critical IR-theory is Andrew Linklater (1998). For an introduction to feminist
IR-theory in the early Post-Cold War era, see Tickner (2001). Two early examples
of major works in post-structural IR theory presenting the most radical episte
mological challenges to realism include Walker (1993) and Campbell (1992).
4 The concept ‘system-determining states’ was introduced by Robert Keohane in
the context of a fourfold typology that focused on the systematic role states’
leaders; see their countries play. The system-determining states were the great
powers whose numbers defined the polarity of the system (Keohane 1969).
5 For a prominent work in this tradition, see Gilpin (1987).
6 In the terminology we introduce in the section on alignment strategies of sec
ondary great powers, the strategies of ‘leash-slipping’ and ‘soft balancing’ offer
alternative ways to classify the French strategy.
7 In our extended conceptual toolbox, we would probably classify the Japanese
strategy as an example of ‘regional balancing’ instead (through the effort to
promote the military presence of a friendly great power to balance one or more
threatening great powers). In any case, we agree that neither Germany nor Japan
can be said to be balancing against the US with military means.
8 For a summary of these IR debates see, for example, Keohane (1986),Hollis and
Smith (1990) and Jackson and Sørensen (2007).
9 For further discussion on status as a basic interest of states and status compe
tition as an alternative or complementary source for competition and conflicts in
international relations, see Schweller (1999), Larson and Shevchenko (2010),
Volgy et al. (2011), Wohlforth (2011), Thompson (2014) and Renshon (2017).
10 This more inclusive definition of the structure of the international system is in
spired by Barry Buzan’s conceptualisation of the system structure having a ‘1+X
structure’: one superpower (the US) and the four great powers the EU, China,
Japan and Russia (Buzan 2004:69).
11 The argument in the article is further developed in Brooks and Wohlforth
(2016b). For their other works on this issue, see Wohlforth (1999);Brooks and
Wohlforth (2008; 2011).
12 Brooks and Wohlforth base their argument on this aspect of military power on
Barry Posen’s (2003) influential study. Brooks and Wohlforth’s indicators for
command of the commons included nuclear-powered submarines, aircraft car
riers, cruisers and destroyers, principal amphibious ships, heavy unmanned aerial
vehicles, fourth- and fifth-generation tactical aircraft, attack helicopters, military
satellites and various transport aircraft.
13 Admittedly, in efforts to create a common capability to conduct military op
erations and civilian missions, the EU has introduced three permanent political
and bureaucratic bodies: the EU Political and Security Committee (EUPSC), the
EU Military Committee (EUMC) and the EU Military Staff (EUMS). However,
none of these institutions is supranational. Furthermore, in contrast to NATO,
the EU has not established a permanent Operations Headquarters (OHQ) and –
despite the ambitions regarding collective defence and security in Article 42 in the
Treaty of Lisbon – the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) does not
include territorial defence planning (Edström and Gyllensporre 2014:48–51).
14 According to media reports in January 2018, one out of two Indian SSBNs had
been out of service for ten months after suffering flood damage. The second
SSBN was launched in November 2017. However, construction work has re
portedly already begun on a third and fourth SSBN with expected launch dates in
2020 and 2022 (SIPRI 2018:271).
15 One possible objection to this is that the composition of UNSC reflects the dis
tribution of power in the early decades of the Cold War, rather than the status of
the great powers in the current system. However, the mandate of the UNSC and
the special rights of the permanent five have remained intact and in matters re
lated to international security, the UNSC is still the most prestigious decision-
making institution.
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3 Operationalising the dependent
variable
A national security strategy, like any strategy, must be a combination of ends

(what we are seeking to achieve), ways (the ways by which we seek to achieve
those ends) and means (the resources we can devote to achieving the ends). A
strategy must reflect the context in which it is developed […] It must balance
the ends, ways and means (The British Cabinet, October 2010 – emphasis in
original).
Introduction
In Theory of International Politics, Waltz argued that states must have their
survival as the most fundamental end. The means for self-preservation falls
into two categories: (i) internal efforts, that is, actions to increase the state’s
military strength and resilience; and (ii) external efforts, that is, actions to
strengthen the own military alliance and/or weaken the opposing ditto
(Waltz 1979:168). Our definition of defence strategy combines these two
categories. Defence strategy is defined as interconnected ideas on how po-
litically defined strategic ends should be achieved through a combination of
alignment strategies and suitable strategic ways of developing and em-
ploying military means. Alignment strategies refer to different ways of in-
teracting on a political level with other states and organisations to promote
the state’s security, influence or status. This aspect of strategy is a part of
states’ external efforts to promote their perceived interest. Examples of
alignment strategies are balance of power, bandwagoning, isolation and
hedging. Military strategy concerns the creation, direction and use of mili-
tary force and focuses on states’ internal efforts to promote their interest by
developing and using the own state’s military resources (Edström et al.
2019:4–5). More specifically, we will approach the concept of military
strategy through the lens of Maxwell Taylor’s definition that frames strategy
as a matching set of ends, ways and means (Lykke 1989). Diplomatic and
economic strategies, which do not concern military power, are not included
in our definition of defence strategy. The defence strategies analysed in this
book are therefore less inclusive than most definitions of grand strategy, but
more inclusive than most definitions of military strategy.
DOI: 10.4324/9781003157113-3
40 Operationalising the dependent variable
In this chapter, we introduce our analytical framework for analysing the
defence strategies of the ‘big five’, that is the five system-determining states.
The first section contains two subsections introducing the different align-
ment strategies of the unipolar power and the secondary great powers. The
second section presents our definition and operationalisation of military
strategy. The last section introduces the research design and the structure of
the book.
3.1 Alignment strategies of great powers

The uneven distribution of power gives the five system-determining states
different strategic options. In Chapter 2, we argued that the distribution of
power in the present unipolar international system is most accurately
conceptualised as a 1+1+3 system with the US still being the sole super-
power, China being the top contender, classified as ‘an emergent potential
superpower’, followed by the three great powers France, Russia and the
UK. In line with Power Transition Theory (PTT) and other recent research
on unipolarity (see, for example, Tammen et al. 2000; Walt 2005; 2009;
Ikenberry et al. 2011), we argued that in the unipolar system the strategies
of the dominant power should be analysed separately from the strategies
pursued by the other system-determining states, the secondary great
powers. The unique position of the unipolar power means that it can only
improve its relative position by trying to achieve hegemony, a strategy that
would threaten all other states’ autonomy, and change the anarchical or-
dering principle of the international system. Alternatively, the unipolar
power may have less ambitious but still revisionist aims related to changing
the character of the present unipolar system, for instance by withdrawing
its support to existing multilateral liberal international organisations, as
well as retrench and limit its global military engagements. However, the
unipolar power may also pursue more status quo-oriented strategies, and
continue to use its powers to provide public goods by supporting the ex-
isting institutional order.
The secondary great powers will have to adjust their strategies in response
to the strategies pursued by the unipolar power. In doing this, they will have
to decide whether they will work with or against the unipolar power, or if
they should try to isolate themselves from the unipolar power. Additionally,
the strategies of both the unipolar power and the secondary great powers are
assumed to reflect their perceptions of their states’ status and role in the
present system. These perceptions form the basis for further distinction
between satisfied status quo-oriented states and dissatisfied revisionist states.
In the next subsection, we turn our attention to the alignment strategies of
the unipolar power.
Operationalising the dependent variable 41
3.1.1 Alignment strategies of the unipolar power
In analysing the strategic alternatives for the unipolar power, it is important
to be aware of the difference between non-hierarchical unipolar systems and
hierarchical systems, such as an empire. Robert Jervis argues that unipolarity
is different from empires because a unipolar state system implies the existence
of many formally equal nation-states that do not recognise any legitimate
supra-national authority above the state. Empires do not recognise the formal
sovereignty of other units within their realm. Instead, empire implies that the
central power is receiving tribute (Jervis 2009:190–191). Additionally, uni-
polarity should be distinguished from hegemony. A unipolar system is char-
acterised by a distinctive distribution of material resources: a concentration of
various power capacities in one leading state. This distribution of material
resources may benefit the unipolar power’s abilities to enforce its will on
others, but the distribution of power should not lead to assumptions about
how the unipolar power chooses to use its advantage in material resources
and how other states respond to this. As argued by John Ikenberry and his
colleagues, unipolarity should therefore be distinguished from both ‘hege-
mony and empire, terms that refer to political relationships and degrees of
influence rather than to distributions of material capability’ (Ikenberry et al.
2011:3–4). In this subsection, we will analyse some of the different strategic
options that have been advanced by leading IR scholars in the post-Cold War
debate on US unipolar strategies.
In an article from 1997, Barry Posen and Andrew Ross identified and
compared four competing visions for US ‘grand strategy’: neo-isolationism,
selective engagement, cooperative security and primacy. The most ambitious
strategy is primacy. This strategy is based on the perspective of offensive
realism and Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST) and it is therefore well
suited for analysing one of the options open to a unipolar power.1 The
major objective of this strategy is to ensure peace and stability through the
preponderance of US power. One of its basic premises is that the pre-Cold
War practice of aggregating powers through coalitions and alliances is in-
sufficient, and in contrast to bipolar systems, stability in a unipolar system
cannot rely on an equilibrium of power between two competing major
powers. Instead, peace is the result of an ‘imbalance of power’ in which the
US’s capabilities can and should be used to ‘cow all potential challengers
and to comfort all coalition partners’. For the unipolar power being primus
inter pares is not enough, one must be primus solus. The greatest threat to
international order is the rise of a peer competitor and the prime objective
for primacy is therefore not merely to preserve peace among major powers,
but to preserve ‘U.S. supremacy by politically, economically, and militarily
outdistancing any global challenger’ (Posen and Ross 1996/97:32).
This strategy is also consistent with the recommendations of offensive rea-
lism. In, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, John Mearsheimer even took
this argument one step further, arguing that great powers do not only strive to
be the strongest of all powers, but their ‘ultimate aim is to be the hegemon –
that is the only great power in the system’. Therefore, great powers are ‘rarely
content with the current distribution of power’ and ‘almost always have re-
visionist intentions’. Accordingly, there are ‘no status quo powers in the in-
ternational system save for the occasional hegemon that wants to maintain its
dominating position’ (Mearsheimer 2001:2–3). The leaked passages from a
draft for the H.W. Bush administration’s Defense Planning Guidance (DPG)
provide, according to Posen and Ross, the ‘most fully developed blueprint’ for
preventing the rise of any peer competitor. According to the draft, the US’s
first objective is to ‘prevent the re-emergence of a new rival’. To achieve this,
the US had ‘to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose
resources would … be sufficient to generate global power’. Moreover, the US’s
strategy should ‘refocus on precluding the emergence of any potential future
global competitor’ (Posen and Ross 1996/97:33).
According to Posen and Ross, scholars supporting this strategy also
display a ‘healthy skepticism’ towards international organisations, an atti-
tude that proponents of primacy share with advocates of isolationism and
selective engagements. The reason for this scepticism is that these organi-
sations lack means to maintain and restore peace. Yet, for the dominant
state, multilateral organisations may be useful as a diplomatic cover that
‘renders the rule of an extraordinary power more palatable to ordinary
powers’ (Posen and Ross 1996/97:34 and 39–40). On strategies directed to
specific regions and states, the strategy of primacy outlined in the draft DPG
included support to economic and political reforms in Russia as well as
strong commitments to NATO. The latter included continued US presence
and the integration of states in East and Central Europe in Western security
institutions. A similar strategy of reassurance and military presence was to
be pursued in East Asia, the Middle East and South-West Asia, where the
US should maintain a position of a ‘preeminent extra-regional power’. In
South Asia, India’s hegemonic ambitions were to be discouraged.
Scholars supporting a strategy of primacy have emphasised elements of
containment in their arguments on military alliances and partnerships. For
instance, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Henry Kissinger were already in the mid-
1990s concerned about the seductive effect of a ‘security vacuum’ in Eastern
Europe, which Russia could be tempted to fill (Posen and Ross 1996/
97:34–37). Therefore, Brzezinski argued in support of a more active US
policy around Russia’s near neighbourhood, including ‘political assurances
for Ukraine’s independence and territorial integrity’ and ‘a more visible
American show of interest’ in the independence of other states in Central
Asia and the Caucasus (Brzezinski 1994). Other observers in the 1990s were
more concerned with China’s economic growth and increasing military ca-
pacities, and recommended that US presence in the region should be
maintained or even strengthened with a new version of the Southeast Asia
Treaty Organization (SEATO) (Posen and Ross 1996/97:39). Regarding
other major threats to international security, the proliferation of WMD was
a great concern for advocates of primacy, since it may undermine US
freedom of action by increasing the cost and risks of US intervention (Posen
and Ross 1996/97:35 and 40). One previously mentioned example of this line
of reasoning is Krauthammer’s article on the ‘unipolar moment’, which
argued that the US had to continue to provide international leadership in
the struggle against new emerging strategic threats related to the prolifera-
tion of WMD and the rise of ‘Weapon States’, exemplified by Iraq, Libya,
and North Korea (Krauthammer 1990).
When commenting on the strategy of primacy, Posen and Ross presented
a number of objections. One of them was the concern that the US’s in-
sistence on hegemonic leadership can engender resistance, which will un-
dermine the long-term effectiveness of multilateral institutions that the US
wish to exploit. Moreover, primacy carries the logical implication of pre-
ventive warfare. There are reasons to doubt the support for such wars within
the US’s domestic politics and among other major powers. The pursuit of
primacy also runs a constant risk of ‘imperial overstretch’ since more power
will always seem better. Other strategies, like selective engagements or co-
operative security, are better suited for limiting engagements or sharing the
burden with like-minded states. Posen and Ross, therefore, concluded that
primacy is probably both unstable and self-defeating (Posen and Ross 1996/
97:43. For a similar conclusion, see Layne 1993; 2012; Mearsheimer 2018).
Reflecting on the US’s experiences in the first two decades of the twenty-first
century, it seems like many of the objections presented by Posen and Ross
are worthy of consideration.
Neo-isolationism represents the opposite strategy to primacy when it
comes to the level of US international commitments and engagements.
Regarding the general orientation and major objectives, neo-isolationism is
the least ambitious strategy of the four alternatives presented by Posen and
Ross. Neo-isolationism embraces a view of the US’s national interest that
renders the international ambitions of the other strategies both unnecessary
and counterproductive. As a result, the national defence should focus on
defensive purposes, protecting the security, liberty and property of the
American people – the ‘only vital U.S. interest’. The strategy is based on the
assumption that no other state has the power to threaten the sovereignty and
safety of the US. This assumption is supported by reference to the US’s
protected position between two oceans and the lack of competitors in the
Western hemisphere. Moreover, the US’s advantage in terms of nuclear
weapons makes it ‘nearly inconceivable for any other power to win a tra-
ditional war’ against the US. Additionally, even if China and Russia begin
to build up their military capacities, other wealthy Western-oriented states
are assumed to be capable of containing them. For neo-isolationism, self-
defence will seldom justify international interventions. The international
promotion of values such as democracy and human rights may instead in-
spire ‘ill-advised crusades’, creating resentment against the US and in-
creasing the risk of it becoming a target of international terrorists. Since
neo-isolationism wants the US to stay out of international political conflicts
and wars, it sees no particular need for political instruments. Regarding
alignment strategies, even traditional alliances that commit the US to come
to other states’ support, such as NATO, ought to be dismantled (Posen and
Ross 1996/97:9–14).
Neo-isolationism would free the US from several costly obligations and
complicated issues, such as the NATO’s ‘ill-conceived expansion’, the wars
on the Balkans, Russia’s economic reform, the North Korean threat and the
Arab-Israeli conflict. All these issues would instead be left to the most
threatened states to sort out on their own. As a result, neo-isolationism
demands a relatively small force structure, unlikely to cost more than two
per cent of the GDP. The force structure would focus on the need to retain a
secure nuclear second-strike capability. Additionally, it would include
modest air and missile defences to deal with ‘low grade threats’, and the US
intelligence community would have the task of watching developments of
weapons of mass destruction globally to forestall threats against the US
(Posen and Ross 1996/97:14–15).
Ross and Posen did not find this strategy compelling either. The dis-
appearance of the US from the world stage is likely to precipitate regional
competition in different parts of the world and give aspiring regional he-
gemons more opportunities. The proliferation of nuclear weapons would
intensify and the savings on defence spending would have to be balanced
against great losses in international influence. Moreover, assumptions re-
garding other Western states’ will and capability to deter China and Russia
may turn out wrong, and the US may not be able to return in time to
prevent an ‘aspiring hegemon from getting a jump ahead, as Nazi Germany
did in WW2’ (Posen and Ross 1996/97: 15–16). Nevertheless, during the last
decade leading realist scholars such as Christopher Layne (2012), John
Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt (2016) have presented arguments similar to
those of neo-isolationism, arguing in support of strategies of ‘restrain’ and
‘off-shore balancing’. Posen, who in his article together with Ross seemed to
advocate the strategy called selective engagements, has in a later work
presented views closer to the neo-isolationist view (Posen 2014).
Advocates of the third strategy, cooperative security, have an expanded
liberal conception of the national interest. It argues that the US has a huge
interest in world peace and that the US’s best strategy is to promote world
peace collectively and multilaterally through international institutions. This
major objective rests on the basic premise that the other strategies do not
share that ‘peace is effectively indivisible’ and that the security of states is
characterised by ‘strategic interdependence’. Wars in one region or country
will spread to other places and ‘unsavoury military practices’ – such as the
use of WMD and ethnic cleansing – used in one conflict, will spread to new
conflicts. Likewise, refugees fleeing national and ethnic violence in one state
will energise xenophobia in the countries where refugees seek shelter.
Moreover, the global media carries information and brings images of these
horrors directly to the living rooms of citizens of economically advanced
states not directly involved in the conflict. According to the advocates of
cooperative security, these factors connect the security of the US and its
traditional allies with the security situation in less fortunate places in the
world (Posen and Ross 1996/97:23–26).
Advocates of cooperative security do not believe that world peace can rely
on spontaneous balance of power strategies since these will only be used
when states consider that their own more narrowly defined vital national
interests are at stake. Therefore, international institutions such as the UN
and regional institutions, in particular a transformed NATO, are critical in
‘coordinating the deterrence and defeat of aggressors’ (Posen and Ross 1996/
97:24–26). Proponents of this strategy admit that the new multilateral se-
curity system is still a work-in-progress. However, Ashton Carter and his
colleagues argue that existing overlapping and mutually reinforcing ar-
rangements can provide a foundation for cooperation and that ‘military
establishments around the world already are entangled in a web of inter-
nationally sanctioned restraints on how they equip themselves and operate
in peacetime’. In Europe, important implementing provisions have already
been introduced through the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START),
Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), and Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Forces (INF) treaties and efforts to thicken this web. This work is further
supported by multilateral organisations such as the Organization for
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) that coordinate confidence-
and security-building measures (CSBM), reducing the risk of conflicts
arising from misperceptions (Carter et al. 1992:8–9).
Proliferation is a key international security issue for advocates of co-
operative security, and they support very strong measures to prevent and
reverse the spread of nuclear weapons. In contrast to primacy and selective
engagement, proponents of cooperative security do not define certain re-
gions as being of greater importance to US interests. Similarly, they argue
that the cooperative security strategy should apply equally to all states re-
gardless of their relations with the US. Regional conflicts are also of ‘critical
interest’ to advocates of cooperative security. In these conflicts, traditional
concerns regarding wars between states have been complemented by con-
cerns related to conflicts within states. As a result, advocates of cooperative
security also support military intervention for humanitarian purposes
(Posen and Ross 1996/97:28).
Similar to primacy, proponents of cooperative security believes that an
imbalance in the balance of power produces stability. However, in this
perspective, power is exercised in various institutional settings relaying on
cooperation and consent among like-minded states. The force posture
needed to support a cooperative security strategy is partly dependent on
what other states bring to the table, and how the major powers react to a
liberal order that is ultimately defined by the US. An established and well-
functioning system for cooperative security may offer the US, as the
dominant power, opportunities for both burden-sharing with like-minded
states and the spreading of norms and values through overlapping institu-
tional settings. This may eventually result in great savings in human lives
and material resources. However, until the system has established itself, the
US will have to maintain elements of its armed forces which go beyond those
required for its territorial defence and make these elements available to
multinational international operations. According to the estimation of
Posen and Ross, the US would initially have to ‘provide disproportionate
military power to launch a global cooperative security regime’, and the
military resources needed for this are only slightly less ambitious than those
needed for primacy (Posen and Ross 1996/97:29–30).
In their comments on the cooperative security, Posen and Ross presented
four main objections. First, the strategy is dependent on individual states’
ability to ‘rise above narrow conceptions of national interest’, respond to
appeals for a ‘collective good’ and engage in ‘armed altruism’. Posen and
Ross argued that there would be both defectors and free riders in the co-
operative security system. States concerned about their relative standing will
‘still ask if any given opportunity for current cooperation to achieve a
common good, or oppose a common bad, changes their power position
relative to all other potential challengers’, and NATO allies will not fight
China over Taiwan. Second, the task of building credibility to a system of
cooperative security will be both difficult and very costly. The US did not
succeed in deterring the USSR from exercising various military interven-
tions, and the US will likely have to involve itself in multiple wars over
several years if it wants to demonstrate its determination to respond to all
aggressors. This would strain public support for this demanding strategy.
Third, advocates of cooperative security assume that democracies will find it
easier to work together in building and supporting cooperative regimes.
Relying on cooperation with democracies may turn out to be problematic
since the governments of these states need the support of their citizens who
are ‘casualty-sensitive’, especially if the operations involve distant wars.
Fourth, cooperative security relies on arms control. It is, Posen and Ross
argued, ‘not clear that arms control can bear that burden’, and non-
proliferation efforts have a mixed historical record of accomplishment
(Posen and Ross 1996/97:24 and 30–31).
In the light of the developments in the twenty-first century and the dis-
couraging experiences from multilateral interventions in the wars in
Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria as well as Russia’s wars against Georgia
and Ukraine, Posen and Ross’ objections are worthy of consideration.
Moreover, while this strategy probably would find many supporters among
less resourceful Western-oriented middle powers and small states, it is more
difficult today to find leading American policy-oriented IR scholars con-
sistently arguing along the lines of cooperative security. However, John
Ikenberry has presented a comprehensive argument in support of a con-
tinued but reformed US-led liberal international order that shares many of
the premises of cooperative security and PTT (Ikenberry 2011). Some of the
arguments from Brooks and Wohlforth (2018) in support of a continued
active global engagement for maintaining the liberal international order also
provide further support for this strategy. Moreover, in this study, we analyse
US strategies both before and after these wars and on the eve of the twenty-
first century, cooperative security was – according to Posen and Ross – still
on the table. Additionally, there are interesting similarities between PTT and
cooperative security.
Cooperative security and PTT both put great emphasis on institutions
and multilateral cooperation as means for the dominating state to exercise
global influence, and they both expect that a majority of the major powers
will be satisfied with status quo powers. Both also assume that the US will
lead a liberal world order that will primarily benefit states that have inter-
nalised the values of the leading state and have domestic economic and
political systems similar to the dominating power – the US. Moreover, both
cooperative security and PTT share the view of primacy, that stability is
supported by an imbalance of power, rather than a balance of power.
However, for cooperative security and PTT, the preponderance of power
does not rest solely with the power of the dominant state. Instead, the
majority of hard and soft power rests in a common multilateral system or a
multilateral system led by a dominant state supported by other satisfied
status quo-oriented states. In contrast, primacy contains potential revisionist
aims relating to the unipolar power’s efforts to further increase its power to
dominate other states.
In selective engagement, the fourth strategy presented by Posen and Ross,
the primary objective is to preserve peace among great powers. The rationale
for this is that great power wars bring the greatest military capabilities into
play and they, therefore, have the greatest potential negative effects on the
US’s interests. The great powers identified by Posen and Ross were Russia,
‘the wealthier states’ of the EU, China and Japan. Several of these states are
nuclear powers and war between them was considered to ‘have the greatest
chance of producing large-scale resort to weapons of mass destruction, a
global experiment the United States ought to try to prevent’. These states
were also involved in the world wars that previously had involved the US,
despite its ambitions to stay out. Advocates of selective engagement, such as
Robert Art (1991; 1998/99) and Stephen Van Evera (1990), hold that any
great power war in Eurasia is a danger to the US (Posen and Ross 1996/
97:17). Similar to neo-isolationists, advocates of selective engagement accept
the basic assumption of traditional balance of power theory; that states will
pursue counter-balancing strategies towards rising powers and that nuclear
weapons favour the defenders of status quo. However, they also recognise
that states for various reasons may fail to act and that nuclear deterrence
may fail. Therefore, advocates reason that: ‘Balancing happens, but it
happens earlier and more easily with a leader. Nuclear weapons deter, but
why not place the weight of U.S. strategic nuclear forces behind the status
quo powers, just to simplify the calculations of the ambitions?’. Contrary to
advocates of primacy and cooperative security, the strategy of selective
engagement starts from the premise that US’s resources are scarce and that
the US public opinion will not support too ambitious aims. Consequently,
advocates of selective engagement do not view the aims of the other two
strategies as attainable.
Robert Art has characterised selective engagement as ‘the middle course
between an isolationist, unilateralist course, on the one hand, and a world
policeman, highly interventionist role, on the other’. According to Art, this
strategy seeks ‘both realist and liberal goals’ as it aims both to keep the US
‘secure and prosperous’ and ‘to nudge the world towards values the nation
holds dear – democracy, free markets, human rights and international open-
ness’ (Art 1998/99:80). Posen and Ross maintain that while advocates for this
strategy are concerned with nuclear proliferation, they are primarily worried
about countries that show insensibility to costs and risks of nuclear pro-
liferation. Therefore, the proliferation of WMD matters when it comes to
states such as North Korea, Iraq and Iran. Regional conflicts matter to the
extent that they can trigger great power conflict. The Persian Gulf is for this
reason the third region of core US security interest. The US has its own access
to oil, but other great powers’ dependence on oil from the Persian Gulf may
draw them into a regional conflict in the Middle East on opposing sides.
Similarly, ethnic conflicts matter to the extent that they may ignite a great
power war involving WMD. Posen and Ross could only identify one such
possibility: the ‘dormant rivalry’ between Russia and Ukraine (who at the time
had not given up its arsenal of nuclear weapons). Advocates of selective en-
gagement support the US’s efforts to exert extended deterrence as part of the
US’s preventive balance of power strategy, and therefore they view traditional
military alliances as appropriate ways to promote US interests. They especially
favour the preservation of NATO. However, and in contrast to cooperative
security, they do not advocate an expansion of NATO. Regarding humani-
tarian intervention, proponents of selective engagement argue that interven-
tion decisions should be taken on a case-by-case basis and carefully weigh
costs and benefits. As the ‘casualties mount’ in an intervention, the bloodshed
will make the US action ‘morally ambiguous to the American public’.
Consequently, the political will and possibilities to act in more ‘important
regions could erode’ (Posen and Ross 1996/97:20–21).
According to Posen and Ross, selective engagements requires a force statue
that is less ambitious than those required for primacy and cooperative se-
curity, but more ambitious than the force posture needed for a neo-
isolationist strategy. Specific capabilities needed for this strategy include a
strong nuclear deterrent, and since this strategy identifies three regions of
prime concern (both ends of the Eurasian continent and the Middle East), the
US would need to retain a ‘two regional war capacity’. This includes sufficient
air and ground forces to fight one ‘major regional contingency’ and si-
multaneously give air support to a regional ally in a second contingency.
Posen and Ross did not identify any major objections to selective engage-
ments. Instead, they noted that this strategy ‘lacks a certain romance’ and that
its ‘cool and quiet exercise of US’s power’ may find it harder to gain political
support compared to strategies that may mobilise values related to nation-
alism (primacy and neo-isolationism) or liberalism (cooperative security). This
strategy could also affect American prestige and reputation negatively, and
reduce its ability to persuade others to contribute to issues that are important
to the US’s interests (Posen and Ross 1996/97:22–23).
The four strategies presented by Posen and Ross provide us with four
different answers to two fundamental question that any unipolar power
must address:
1. How does the balance of power between competing major powers affect
the stability of the unipolar system and the unipolar power’s dominant
position?
2. Are unilateral or multilateral strategies the most beneficial and effective
for achieving the unipolar power’s interests?
Cooperative security and PTT answer the first question in a similar manner as
primacy and HST. In unipolar systems and systems in which one state holds a
dominant position in terms of various power capabilities, stability is guar-
anteed by a positive power asymmetry and an imbalance of power in favour of
the leading or dominant state and other status quo powers. However, co-
operative security and PTT give different answers to the second question
compared to primacy and HST. From the perspective of cooperative security,
the positive power asymmetry needed to deter any aggressor from attacking
weaker neighbouring states or to deter a government from using unmotivated
armed force against parts of its own population is related to an established
and well-functioning multilateral system. Initially, the unipolar power will
have to take on great responsibilities in offering unmatched military and
political capabilities, as well as using its soft power and status to establish the
credibility of the new system of cooperative security. However, eventually, the
system will offer a common institutional framework for both burden-sharing
among status quo countries and the spread of norms related to the use of
force. In contrast to cooperative security, PTT has a greater emphasis on
positive power asymmetries between the dominant state and potential com-
petitors. Nevertheless, in analysing the overall balance between satisfied and
dissatisfied states, multilateral institutions and the collective power of the
status quo states are more important to both cooperative security and PTT
compared to primacy and HST. To primacy and HST, multilateral institu-
tions lack independent capacities to intervene in conflicts and their prime
function is to offer a convenient cover for the unipolar state’s interest and to
support the unipolar power’s efforts to appear as a ‘benevolent hegemon’. The
determining factor for the latter two theories is the unilateral power capacities
of the unipolar power.
Selective engagement and neo-isolationism, on the other hand, both rely
on the traditional balance of power theory as sources of stability in an-
swering the first question. For selective engagement, the US’s military and
political power should be used actively and proactively, and provide ex-
tended regional deterrence to prevent great power wars in regions where
conflicts may trigger confrontations between great powers. In doing so, the
strategy mainly relies on a traditional balance of power by supporting
weaker states against stronger potential aggressors. Neo-isolationists also
base their strategy on the balance of power. In this perspective, however, the
great powers of the Eurasian continent are supposed to do the initial bal-
ancing among themselves. The US’s military strength and fortunate geo-
graphical position allow it to enter conflicts in a later stage if the Eurasian
states fail to balance each other off. By taking on responsibilities for world
peace, cooperative security and the avoidance of great power wars, the US
instead, according to the proponents of off-shore balancing, let potential
competitors free ride and flourish on the public goods provided by the US’s
economy and military strength. By subsidising international security and
supporting open flows of goods and knowledge, the US also contributes to
the rise of future challengers to its present primacy. Similar to the per-
spectives of cooperative security/PTT and primacy, proponents of selective
engagement and neo-isolationism, therefore, present different answers to the
second question.
An additional difference between the four perspectives concerns status
quo-oriented and potential revisionist strategies. Cooperative security/PTT
and selective (or deep) engagement are all status quo strategies, aiming to
improve and preserve the present US-led liberal international order. Primacy
challenges the multilateral basis for the present order. Depending on the
ideological preferences of the US administrations, primacy may also chal-
lenge the liberal values that the present liberal international order is founded
on. Neo-isolationism, on the other hand, threatens the present order by
withdrawing US power, thereby creating more room for regional power
competition and revisionist great powers. It also weakens the international
institutional framework that the US established for both international se-
curity (UN) and the international economy. In Table 3.1, the four strategies’
answers to the two questions are summarised.
Table 3.1 Four alternative unipolar alignment strategies
Power imbalances as a Balance of power strategies

source of stability as a source of stability
Multilateral & status quo- Cooperative security Selective engagement

oriented strategies PTT
Unilateral potentially Primacy Neo-isolationism/off-shore
revisionist strategies HST balancing
In analysing the empirical material, we use these four perspectives to
categorise the general tendencies of the external efforts of the three US
presidential administrations during the two first decades of the twenty-first
century. This work is guided by the following question:
• To which extent do the US presidential administrations’ analyses of the

international environment express underlying assumptions regarding
power imbalances/power balance and multilateralism/unilateralism that
corresponds to the four strategies, and to which extent do their general
objectives and ways correspond to the four grand strategies discussed in
this subsection?
3.1.2 Alignment strategies of secondary great powers

This section will introduce a menu of alternative strategies available to sec-
ondary great powers in response to strategies pursued by the sole superpower.
Stephen Walt (2005) has most systematically addressed the alignment and
alliance strategies of states in a unipolar system. The argument presented in
this book was updated in an article from 2009. Here, Walt identifies six basic
strategies ranging from extreme opposition to the unipole (‘hard balancing’) to
‘formal alignment’ with it (‘regional balancing’). Between these two extremes,
Walt identified four additional strategies: soft balancing, leash-slipping, neu-
trality and bandwagoning (Walt 2009:100–101). These six strategies will form
the basis for our analyses of secondary powers’ alignment strategies. However,
we have found it necessary to modify some of these strategies and add some
additional strategies.
Balance of power strategies are essentially defensive strategies, aiming at
avoiding losses and protecting a state’s relative position (Schweller 1994:74).
This aim is achieved by creating counter-weights to expansive powers and
increasing the cost for further expansion. Both first-ranked powers and
secondary states are, according to Waltz, expected to ‘flock to the weaker
side’ to avoid the main threat: that one state establishes itself as a hegemon
(Waltz 1979:126–127). ‘Hard balancing’ focuses, according to Walt, on the
‘overall balance of power and seeks to assemble a countervailing coalition
that will be strong enough to keep the dominant power in check’. Faced with
an unbalanced power, states may pursue a strategy of ‘internal balancing’,
mobilising their resources to ‘enable them to resist stronger states more ef-
fectively’, or they may balance externally ‘combining their resources with
others’. In the present unipolar system, this would mean ‘the creation of an
anti-U.S. coalition’. States may, of course, also pursue both strategies si-
multaneously (Walt 2005:120–126).
It is not difficult to find examples of efforts of internal balancing. Walt’s
examples of this include China’s military build-up and Iran and North
Korea’s efforts to gain nuclear weapons (Walt 2009: 101).2 Walt had greater
difficulties in finding examples of external balancing, but he argued that the
continuing security cooperation between Russia and China within the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), can be ‘seen as a form of bal-
ancing […] even if they lack the capabilities necessary to create a true
counterpoise to the current unipole’ (Walt 2009:102). Walt explained the
absence of hard balancing with reference to the fact that the US so far has
not been perceived as a major threat by most other powers (Walt 2005:124).
Keir Lieber and Gerard Alexander have suggested a more detailed definition
of external balancing. According to them, there is an agreement among
experts that ‘external balancing against the United States would be marked
by the formation of alliances (including lesser defence agreements), discus-
sions concerning the formation of such alliances or, at the least, discussions
about shared interest in defense cooperation against the United States’
(Lieber and Alexander 2005:123).
In this study, we will use the distinction between internal and external
balancing to differentiate between two ways of pursuing a strategy of hard
balancing: unilateral and collective balancing. Unilateral balancing consists
of internal efforts that develop and mobilise national military capacities
which improve the own state’s capability to resist pressures from the uni-
polar power and increase the costs of a direct attack. Unilateral balancing
can also be used offensively on the territory of other states, preventing the
unipolar power to establish spheres of influence outside its territory.
Collective balancing consists of coordinated actions between states relating
to the use of force to thwart the offensive strategies of the unipolar power.
Collective balancing may be used for both offensive and defensive purposes.
Offensive collective balancing occurs in conflicts outside the territory of both
the balancing state and the unipolar power. Offensive collective balancing
aims to increase the influence of the own state and decrease the influence of
the unipolar power in a particular state or region. Defensive collective
balancing consists of efforts related to collective defence against the unipolar
power. Defensive collective balancing aims to increase the security of the
state by increasing the cost of an attack. By focusing on actions related to
the use of force rather than formal offensive or defensive military alliances,
our definition of hard balancing is less demanding than the definition pre-
sented by Lieber and Alexander. Our reason for choosing a more inclusive
definition is that formal alliances directed against the unipolar power have
not yet occurred among the great powers of the present system.
The absence of hard external collective balancing has resulted in an in-
creased interest in a balancing strategy termed ‘soft balancing’.3 Walt de-
fined soft balancing as the ‘conscious coordination of diplomatic action in
order to obtain outcomes contrary to U.S. preferences […] soft balancers
combine their diplomatic assets in order to defend their interests’ (Walt
2009:104). Accordingly, soft balancing can be seen as an alternative strategy
to collective balancing where the emphasis is placed on diplomatic means
rather than military means. Robert Pape has similarly defined soft balancing
as ‘actions that do not directly challenge U.S. military preponderance but
that use non-military tools to delay, frustrate, and undermine aggressive
unilateral U.S. military policies’. Instead of military means, soft balancing
strategies use international institutions, economic statecraft and diplomatic
arrangements. According to Pape, soft balancing is likely to be more intense
if the US pursues an aggressive unilateralist national security policy (Pape
2005:10). An obvious example of this used by both Walt and Pape is the
opposition in the UNSC to the US war against Iraq in 2003. On this oc-
casion, France, Germany and Russia managed to formulate and maintain a
unified position that denied the US the legitimacy it had sought when it tried
to obtain an authorisation for the war in the UNSC (Walt 2009:105). This
example also shows that soft balancing strategies are not restricted to dis-
satisfied revisionist powers. In this study, we will use Walt’s definition of soft
balancing.
A third possible strategy discussed by Walt is ‘neutrality’. As noted by
Walt himself, ‘true neutrality is likely to be rarer’ in unipolar systems than in
other systems (Walt 2009:115). We agree with this. With the exception of
permanently neutral states such as Switzerland, neutrality is mainly a
strategy that is applied by states who want to remain outside a specific
conflict by declaring themselves neutral towards both sides in the conflict. In
a unipolar world, it is very difficult to identify such a third position and
many of Europe’s formerly neutral states, such as Finland and Sweden, do
not call themselves neutral anymore. Moreover, it is very difficult to think of
a conflict involving the US that would motivate a declaration of neutrality
from any of the five powers included in this study.
However, states and even great powers may still want to isolate or dis-
tance themselves from the unipolar power. The alignment strategy isolation
may therefore be a relevant alternative to neutrality. This strategy has been
explored primarily in research on small states. Isolationistic strategies may
differ in intensity. For instance, active efforts to promote a small state’s
interests in relation to great powers are termed distancing by Ole Elgström.
Hiding is the opposite of this strategy and consists of a passive approach
including the avoidance of involvement in great power conflicts (Elgström
2000). Before WWI and during the interwar era, the US practised a strategy
of splendid isolation vis-a-vis the competing European great powers. This
strategy also resonates with some aspects of neo-isolationism. US’s geopo-
litical position, being the only great power on its continent and separated
from other great powers by two oceans, greatly supported this strategy
(Mearsheimer 2001).
Is it possible to imagine that the secondary great powers of the Eurasian
continent today can pursue a similar policy? Even though China and Japan
practised isolationist strategies in previous centuries, it is unlikely that any
Eurasian great power in the twenty-first century will have isolationism as its
main strategy. However, isolationist strategies may be used as com-
plementary to other strategies as some of these powers may on different
occasions want to distance themselves from the strategies of unipolar power
and institutions reflecting its values and interests. However, hiding does not
appear to be a relevant alternative to secondary great powers. In our pre-
vious study on alignment strategies of middle powers, we identified an iso-
lationist alignment strategy that we called strategic autonomy. This strategy
was pursued by two comparatively ambitious, self-confident and large
middle powers with a dominant position within their own regional security
complex: Brazil and India. This strategy aims to remain a dominant regional
power and to limit the influence of external great powers or superpowers in
their own region. These ambitions seem reasonable to expect from sec-
ondary great powers as well (Edström and Westberg 2020a; 2020b).
Additionally, isolationist strategies may also be pursued with free-riding
purposes. Even within an alliance, states have incitements to pass the buck to
some or several of their allies, hence free-riding on the security provided by
other members of the alliance. According to Mearsheimer, buck-passing
does not take place in bipolar systems since there is no third party that can
catch the buck. However, in multipolar systems, buck-passing is always
possible (Mearsheimer 2001:270). In unipolar systems, status quo powers
may want to pass the buck concerning the preservations of common goods
to the unipolar power. Revisionist powers may also find it in their interest to
let the unipolar power deal with threats related to the actions of other great
powers.
A third main alignment strategy is hedging. This strategy includes efforts
of multiple courting, that is, a combination of alignment strategies involving
cooperation with several different states or institutional settings, or efforts
of pursuing different simultaneous strategies toward a particular state. For
instance, the EU’s policy in relation to Russia has previously sought to
balance a possible aggressive resurgence and integrate the country into
Europe (Art 2004). Ji Yun Lee (2016) described hedging as a way to avoid
the risk of ‘betting on the wrong horse’. In the context of secondary powers
strategies towards the unipolar power, multiple courting is defined as efforts
to utilize resources related to several different intuitional settings to become
less dependent on institutions dominated by the unipolar power. An ex-
ample of this is EU member states using the EU as an alternative platform
to NATO or bilateral cooperation with the US (Posen 2004).
Inspired by Layne, Walt has identified a hedging strategy that is closely
related to multiple courting: leash-slipping. In applying this strategy, states
form an alliance or establish common institutions to ‘reduce their dependency
on the unipole by pooling their own capabilities’ (Walt 2009:107). According
to Layne, leash-slipping represents efforts to ‘acquiring the capability to act
independent of the United States in the realm of security’. By pursuing this
strategy, states ‘can slip free of the hegemon’s leash-like grip’ and get an
‘insurance against a hegemon that might someday exercise its power in a
predatory and menacing fashion’ (Layne 2006:29–39). In addition to multiple
courting, leash-slipping includes active efforts of creating or strengthening
institutional settings that do not include the unipolar power.
In analysing bandwagoning strategies towards the unipolar power, Walt
focused on defensive bandwagoning which entails appeasement strategies
towards the unipolar power. Appeasement strategies are, according to Walt,
usually confined to weak and isolated states. However, he also notes that
Wohlforth suggested that bandwagon strategies are likely to become more
common in a unipolar system because it is harder to balance against the
unipolar power and the unipole is in a better position to punish opponents
and reward clients (Wohlforth 1999; Walt 2009:108). The possibility of re-
wards concerns an alternative offensive bandwagon strategy that is not
discussed by Walt: bandwagoning for profit. This strategy involves the
alignment with the dominant side in a conflict ‘in order to share the spoils of
victory’ (Schweller 1994:74). For the purpose of this study, offensive band-
wagoning is defined as a strategy primarily motivated by perceived oppor-
tunities for gains and is pursued by giving substantial support to collective
efforts defined and led by the unipolar power. Defensive bandwagoning, on
the other hand, is defined as a strategy that includes unilateral concessions to
a threatening state or alliance in order to promote the security of the state.
The alignment strategy regional balancing presents an additional motive
for establishing closer ties with the unipolar power: the desire for protection
against a local regional threat. European states’ efforts to gain external
deterrence from the US against Russia are examples of this strategy.
According to Walt, regional balancing should be categorised as a specific
form of balance of power since the motive for the strategy is to counter a
threat from a neighbouring great power (Walt 2009:111). However, if we
focus on secondary great powers strategies towards the unipolar power, re-
gional balance is more closely related to bandwagoning for profit. By leaving
a substantial contribution to regional arrangements for collective defence led
by the unipolar power, the state pursuing a regional balance strategy hope to
gain continued active support for these collective efforts from the unipolar
power. Within an alliance, states can chain gang. This strategy includes
stronger commitments to agreements on collective defence and military
contributions to allied contingency planning or war efforts (Christensen and
Snyder 1990). In Table 3.2, the alignment strategies of secondary great
powers are summarised.
We expect that each secondary great power’s choice of alignment strategy
will be affected by their general orientation towards both the present system
and the unipolar power. The differences in general orientation concern the
distinction between satisfied/status quo-oriented powers and dissatisfied/re-
visionist powers previously discussed. Moreover, the secondary great powers
choice of alignment strategy will depend on the unipolar power’s choice of
strategy. Cooperative security, primacy, selective engagement and neo-
isolationism are likely to generate different responses from secondary great
powers and these responses are in turn likely to reflect differences in the
general orientation of each category of states. If for instance, the unipolar
power pursues unilateral strategies such as primacy and neo-isolationism,
56
Table 3.2 Alternative alignment strategies towards the unipolar power
Revisionist strategies/opposing the Unipole Status quo strategies/supporting the Unipole
Balance of power Isolation Hedging Bandwagoning

Operationalising the dependent variable
Hard-balancing Distancing Leash-slipping Offensive (for profit)

• Collective Strategic autonomy Multiple courting Defensive (appeasement)Regional balancing
• Unilateral Buck-passing
Soft-balancing Chain-ganging
status quo-oriented states may be forced to pursue strategies supporting the
previous multilateral order and there will be fewer opportunities for buck-
passing and offensive bandwagoning. Revisionist powers, on the other hand,
are expected to have other and different incentives in responding to the
different strategies pursued by the unipolar power and they may direct their
strategies against both the institutions and values of the present interna-
tional system and against the unipolar power itself.
3.1.3 Exploring the alignment strategy – security environment

Influenced by Colin Gray’s (2014) elaboration on assumptions as a potential
element of strategy, as well as Robert Jervis (1976) and his research on
perceptions and misperceptions in international politics, we analyse policy-
makers’ considerations of the international security environment when ex-
ploring the alignment strategy. Jacob Westberg (2015) argued that the en-
vironment constitutes the strategy’s external part and that the internal parts
(the ends, means and ways) are to influence, balance or adapt according to
certain decisions and priorities. Håkan Edström (2003) presented a similar
approach when elaborating on the abstract and concrete dimensions of
military doctrine. According to Edström, the former dimension (threat
perceptions and security priorities) provides the rationality for the latter
dimension (the military strategy) (see also Edström et al. 2019).
The lenses through which the security environment has been observed
have changed over time. After the end of WWI, the idealistic approach,
guided by the American President Woodrow Wilson’s principles, gained
support. Hence, the idealist belief in international law as the premier in-
strument to secure worldwide peace was influential when analysing IR (see,
for example, Part I in Williams et al. 1999). The outbreak of WWII un-
dermined the credibility of the idealistic, or utopian, school. Instead, realism
was given renewed attention as the focus shifted to a state-centric approach.
Consequently, the core assumption of classical realism, that is (i) that states
are the most important actors in world politics; (ii) that states are unitary
rational actors; and (iii) that states seek power and calculate their interests in
terms of power, came to prevail throughout the Cold War era (see, for ex-
ample, Carr 1946; Morgenthau 1993).
During the second half of the twentieth century, the increased institu-
tional and economic interdependence among states inspired modifications of
classical realism. To mention an example, structural realism emphasised the
structure of the world system rather than the hostile nature of states. Waltz
(1979) defined the structure as being about how the units of the system stand
in relation to each other and how the units are arranged within the system.
He built his theory on three major assumptions. First, the units are states
and although the states may be different in several aspects, they fulfil similar
functions within the system. Second, the organising principle of the system is
based either on anarchy or hierarchy. Since all units are equal in their
sovereignty, the arrangements of the units within the system are based on
the former principle. Third, since there neither exists a functional differ-
entiation among the units nor a heterogeneously organised system, the
fundamental aspect of the security environment is the distribution of cap-
abilities within the system. In other words, the state-centric actor-approach
of realism remained.
Barry Buzan, Charles Jones and Richard Little (1993) developed struc-
tural realism, albeit Buzan had already during the 1980s (1983; 1988; see also
1994) presented a thematic rather than state-centric approach to the analyses
of the security environment. He related each of five different themes to se-
curity:
Military security concerns the […] offensive and defensive capabilities of

states, and states’ perceptions of each other’s intentions. Political
security concerns the organizational stability of states, systems of
government and the ideologies that give them legitimacy. Economic
security concerns access to resources, finance and markets necessary to
sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power. Societal security
concerns the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution,
of traditional patterns of language, culture and religious and national
identity and custom. Environmental security concerns the maintenance
of the local and planetary biosphere as the essential support system on
which all other human enterprises depend (Buzan, 1991:19–20).
Furthermore, according to Buzan, each of these themes or sectors should be

taken into account when a centre of power, or a pole, in the international
system is to be identified. During the Cold War, he argued, the military was
the most important sector for the two superpowers in the then bipolar
system. We claim, as elaborated earlier, that the five sectors have a more
balanced impact when defining the poles of the system in the contemporary
multipolar world order. Put simply, focusing solely on military capabilities
when analysing the security environment is no longer sufficient. In addition
to the attributes states, intergovernmental as well as non-governmental or-
ganisations may be analysed in terms of sectors. NATO can, for example, be
perceived as a military organisation while the G7 and the World Trade
Organization (WTO) are examples of economic organisations. However, the
idea of the thematic approach is not to describe actors in terms of sectors;
rather, this approach is about analysing the security environment through
the lenses of themes. In some cases, actors may not even be involved, at least
not directly and/or initially. Pandemics, migration, hunger, climate change
and other phenomena may, for example, affect the security settings without
being initiated by an actor.
In the late 1990s, Emanuel Adler, Michael Barnett and their colleagues
presented the regional approach as a complement to the actor-focused and
thematic approaches to analysing the security environment. In the edited
volume Security Communities (1998), they argued that regions not only
could exist at the international level but also fulfil an important role between
the unit and the system levels. Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver (2003) reached a
similar conclusion. In their monograph Regions and Power, they partly in-
corporated both the actor and the thematic approaches in their analytical
model. Decolonisation, which gradually took place after the end of WWII,
reduced the hierarchical aspects of the organising principle of the system,
that is, between the sovereigns and their subjects. However, the regional
integration currently taking place all over the world is partly reintroducing
hierarchy. Yet, even if the EU often serves as an example of a successful
creation of a supranational organisation, the integration processes do not
follow a universal pattern. In some regions, the integration may include all
or most of the sectors discussed in the thematic approach above. In other
regions, the integration may instead focus primarily on one of the sectors
(Edström 2007).
Another aspect that differentiates regions is whether there exists one or
several regional great powers. According to Øyvind Østerud (1992), regional
great powers are defined as being (i) part of a delineated geographical re-
gion; (ii) able to stand up to any coalition of other states in its region; (iii)
highly influential in regional affairs; and (iv) potentially a great power on the
global scale. Detlef Nolte (2010) presented a list with an even larger number
of defining criteria for regional powers. According to Robert Stewart-
Ingersoll and Derrick Frazier (2012), regional powers may be defined as
states that possess sufficient capabilities to project power throughout, and
who disproportionately influence the security dynamics within, their own
region. We consider all these definitions too restrictive since they tend to
exclude the possibility that regional powers may use their regional position,
as well as the regional integration and potentially a regional organisation, as
force multipliers at the global level.
Consequently, the dynamics of the region, rather than the potential re-
gional powers themselves, are the focus in our analysis. More precisely, we
aggregate the regional perspective to the continental level. We are fully
aware that, for example, Buzan and Wæver (2003) could have served as a
theoretical point of departure together with their definition of the regional
security complexes (RSC). However, compared to their analysis, we argue
that some important changes have occurred. Firstly, taking Russia’s wars
against both Georgia and Ukraine into account, the security situation in the
former USSR has arguably worsened. Therefore, it does not seem appro-
priate to label the complex as a security regime. Secondly, we do not agree
that East Asia forms a homogenous RSC. In the North East, the nuclear
and ballistic tests conducted by North Korea have escalated the situation
into an even stronger conflict formation whereas the increased regional
cooperation within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
has reached the status of a security regime. Thirdly, 16 regions is to oper-
ationalise this approach too far. Carsten Holbraad’s (1984) suggestion to
focus on six major regions; Africa, Asia, Europe, North and Central
America, Oceania and Indonesia and South America, seems more practical
in this regard.
When summarising the elaborations in this section, the ART (Actor,
Region, Theme) model emerges. Consequently, the perceptions of the great
powers on the security environment are analysed by using an actor as well as
a regional and a thematic approach. Based on the findings of this analysis we
intend to draw conclusions on the great powers’ alignment strategies.
3.2 Military strategies of great powers

Military strategy is a phenomenon that involves a delicate division of labour
and complex interaction between the political level (the politico-strategic
level) and the senior military level (the military-strategic level).
Consequently, the research in this book falls within the realm of Strategic
Studies. According to Richard Betts, this field of research focuses on the
interaction between political ends and military means under contextual
constraints (Betts 1997). In practice, as well as in Strategic Studies, several
conceptual or analytical levels coexist; politico-strategic, military-strategic,
operational and, occasionally, the tactical level. These levels not only have a
hierarchical relationship, but they also harbour their own distinct logics.
Betts argued (2000) that the logic at each level governs the immediate in-
ferior level concurrently as it severing its superior level. According to him,
Strategic Studies addresses the classical Clausewitzian problem: ‘how to
make force a rational instrument of policy rather than mindless murder –
how to integrate politics and war’ (Betts 1997:8).
Military strategy is often understood and elaborated upon in similar ra-
tionalistic manners. Jan Willem Honig and Jan Ångström (2012) argued that
it would be a conceptual contradiction to talk about strategy without dis-
tinguishing between the elements of ends and means. However, they also
argued that an additional component of strategy is the need for the careful
management of scarce resources since access to unlimited resources would
render discussions on which military resources to use pointless (Honig and
Ångström 2012:669). Similarly, Betts defined strategy as ‘the link between
military means and political ends, the scheme for how to make one produce
the other’ (Betts 2000:5). Barry Posen presents an important distinction
between grand strategy and military doctrine:
Grand strategy is a political-military, means-ends chain, a state’s theory

about how it can best ‘cause’ security for itself. […] A grand strategy
must identify likely threats to the state’s security and it must device
political, economic, military, and other remedies for those threats. […]
[M]ilitary doctrine [is] the subcomponent of grand strategy that deals
explicitly with military means (Posen 1984:13).
Colin Gray offered a corresponding definition, claiming that strategy con-
cerns ‘the direction and use made of means by chosen ways in order to
achieve desired ends’ (Gray 2010:18). Like Posen, he also made a distinction
between grand strategy and military strategy. The former concerns ‘the di-
rection and use made of any or all of the assets of a security community,
including its military instrument, for the purposes of policy as decided by
politics’. The latter concerns ‘the direction and use made of force and the
threat of force, for the purposes of policy as decided by politics’ (Gray
2015:47).
According to Basil Liddell Hart (1975), having clear and distinct objec-
tives for the political and military levels is a necessity, not an option. He also
stressed the importance of having the objectives of the different levels
carefully nested so that the military efforts support the political intent.
Arthur Lykke argued (1989) that plausible military objectives include, but
are not limited to, deterring military aggression, protecting lines of com-
munication, defending the homeland, territorial expansion or regaining lost
territories and defeating an opponent. The ways to employ military force
include various ideas and concepts based on combinations of offensive and
defensive measures merged into a feasible course of action. Offensive con-
cepts often involve air superiority, deterrence, and separation of parties by
force. Defensive options comprise elements of forward defence, defence in
depth, and retrograde operations. Other important factors, regardless of the
offensive-defensive mixture, include the possible level of cooperation with
other military forces and the relative weight of the principles of war (see
McIvor 2012).
Naturally, we are fully aware that the rationalistic school is not exhaustive
in explaining and understanding military strategy. Other paradigms would
most likely contend that hierarchies and objective reasoning fall short of
providing a sufficient account of strategy. Graham Allison’s influential work
on explaining strategy during the Cuban missile crisis is one such example.
Reasonably, organisational affiliation and bureaucratic agendas may very
well provide additional explanatory power (Allison and Zelikow 1999).
Another alternative, constructivism, posit that military strategies are socially
constructed. Hence, social contexts, interaction processes and beliefs relating
to norms shape not only the strategy but also identities that influence the
way different actors perceive their aims and interests (Finnemore 1996; 2003;
Katzenstein 1996; Honig and Ångström 2012).
Despite these alternative perspectives, we have decided to apply a ratio-
nalistic view for the purpose of this book, hence framing military strategy as
a matching set of ends, ways and means (Lykke 1989). Obviously, we are
obliged to admit that Carl von Clausewitz and his ends-means paradigm
has been the most influential in this regard (Herberg-Rothe 2014).
Consequently, military strategy includes objectives, resources and ideas of
how to use military force. Our definition of military strategy encompasses
considerations to frame and justify the military mission, which ensures that
it is addressing the political intent by formulating military objectives (ends),
allocating resources including capabilities and forces (means) as well as
considerations on their application including courses of action, doctrines
and concepts (ways).
3.2.1 Ends and objectives

As touched upon earlier, we do not shy away from admitting that we are
influenced by realism. Naturally, Hans Morgenthau and the political or
classical realism is an obvious starting point for the theoretical elaborations
in this section. In the second of his six principles, Morgenthau defined in-
terests in terms of power: ‘The main signpost that helps political realism to
find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of
interest defined in terms of power’ (Morgenthau 1993:5). According to
Hedley Bull, the national interests of a state have to be understood in re-
lation to the objectives that the state seeks to achieve. He mentioned se-
curity, prosperity and common values as core interests (Bull 1977).
We are also influenced by the structural realism developed by Barry Buzan
and his colleagues. In The Logic of Anarchy, they presented a theory of the
global system based on three levels of analysis: structural, interaction and unit
(Buzan et al. 1993). The structural level includes the organisational principles
and the differentiation of units, familiar from Waltz, but also the systematic
patterns in the distribution of units’ attributes. Buzan and his colleagues la-
belled the two first parts of this level deep structure, that is, the anarchy of the
world order without a supranational government and with states as the prin-
cipal actors fulfilling similar tasks. The third part of the structural level con-
cerns traditional attributes: military capability, economic capability, political
cohesion and ideology (Buzan et al. 1993:34–47). Joseph Nye distinguished
(2002) between the military and economic attributes (which he termed hard
power) and the political and ideological attributes (which he defined as soft
power). According to Nye, soft power is the ability of a political actor, such as
a state, to influence the interests or behaviours of other political actors by
ideological or cultural means. Nye argued that while hard power often is direct,
soft power (by using culture, values, norms, and ideas) indirectly influences the
cognitive and the conceptual frameworks of other actors.
The discussion on the effects of soft power is related to questions of
whether there exists one single universal human civilisation, or whether the
differences between different ethnic and/or religious groups indicate several
parallel civilisations and hence different logics for the use of soft power.
According to Samuel Huntington, there is no universal level:
The concept of a universal civilization is a distinctive product of

Western civilization […] Universalism is the ideology of the West for
confrontations with non-Western cultures […] The non-West sees as
Western what the West sees as universal (Huntington 1977:66).
There are, however, examples of universality such as the UN’s universal
declaration of human rights.4 Ronald Inglehart’s World Values Surveys is
another example. Focusing on individuals, Inglehart divided values into
religious, legal, social, and political aspects (Inglehart 1997; 2000). However,
according to the Council of Europe, the targets or victims of both hard and
soft power can also be religious, social (including economic), and political
organisations or groups of individuals as well as legal authorities.5
The second level of analysis elaborated in The Logic of Anarchy, inter-
action, concerns the interaction capacity within the global system. More
precisely, this level is about the absolute quality of technological and societal
capabilities across the system of interaction. Interaction is, according to
Buzan and his colleagues, divided into different sectors: economic, military,
political, and societal interactions (Buzan et al. 1993:34–47). In one of his
previous work, Buzan had already described two perspectives when devel-
oping a national security policy: one inward-looking focused on the vul-
nerabilities of the state, the other outward-looking focused on threats
against the state (Buzan 1991:112–116). Compared to the work conducted
with Jones and Little, Buzan in his individual contribution included the
environment, or ecology, as a fifth sector (see also Bull 1977). As the quo-
tation of Buzan in the previous section indicates, the outward-looking policy
relates not only to threats directed towards the state but also to the state’s
needs. To distinguish the directions of interaction we can use the dichoto-
mies desired/undesired and present/absent. Naturally, threats directed to-
wards the state are undesirable and the absence of a threat, therefore,
implies security. Consequently, the capacity to meet critical national needs,
such as access to resources and political influence, are desirable conditions
and their presence implies safety.
The third analytical level presented by Buzan and his colleagues, the unit
level, relates to the behaviour of the units explained in terms of their attri-
butes. Consequently, the individual units (the states) are examined through
their domestic processes and components. The former aspect is analysed
both concerning bureaucratic procedures and in terms of patterns in the
action−reaction behaviour in the unit’s response to the ditto of other units
(Buzan et al. 1993:47–65). Even if Barry Buzan, like Bruce Russet and
Harvey Starr (1995), described a state consisting of three different attributes,
he used five attributes – population, territory, infrastructure, institutions
and ideas – in his elaborations. Buzan argued that the first attribute, the
physical base, is composed of both the population and the territory of the
state. The latter included qualitative aspects such as natural resources and
created values, that is, infrastructure. Buzan’s second attribute consisted of
the institutions governing the physical base and his third attribute the ideas
that give the institutions legitimacy to govern (Buzan 1991:64–66
and 90–91).
To summarise the elaborations so far, objectives and ends are considered
to have four alternative points of departure. At the system level, the ends are
about values. The interaction level includes both threats directed towards the
state from the global community, but also the state’s needs for access to
critical resources from the global community. Finally, at the unit level, the
objectives are about the vulnerability of the state in relation to each of its
attributes. We argue that priorities between these four aspects are made
differently between different states. Colin Gray described national interests
as a filter through which the state subjectively interprets the correlations of
global events, that is, the environment elaborated upon in the previous
section. Hence, according to Gray, the function or purpose of the national
interests is to indicate the significance of the events to the strategic decision-
makers, thereby helping them to tailor a response. Gray suggested a hier-
archy of interests with four distinct levels. Unfortunately, his elaborations
are rather abstract and do not provide any clear empirical examples on how
interests can be developed into ends and objectives (Gray 1998:116, 191 and
200–206). Other sources, however, provide insights in this regard (see, for
example, Tangredi 2002). Therefore, we find it reasonable to conclude that
national interests are closely related to the ability of the government, or
more precisely, to the cabinet’s freedom of action. Hence, not all interests
have equal importance or are given similar priority; there is a hierarchy of at
least two levels. The ends and objectives related to these interests are often
expressed in terms of desired effects such as to boost, ensure, establish,
maintain, maximise, promote, protect, prevent, reduce and suppress. The
effects are related to one or several of the aspects below:
• The values and norms relating to the national culture, mind-set and
rationality.
• The threats and risks emanating from potential enemies, or nature,
preventing them from being realised by deterrence or proactive actions.
• The national dependency and capacity to meet the critical needs of the
nation, material as well as immaterial.
• the vulnerability and resilience of the state regardless of possible
antagonists, including nature herself.
3.2.2 Military means

A traditional approach when measuring military power is to focus on annual
defence expenditures such as SIPRI’s yearly statistical reports. Focusing
only on annual defence expenditures, however, has some significant lim-
itations. One shortcoming concerns the temporal aspect of analysing the
build-up of new military capacities. For example, a state may decide to
increase its defence spending significantly from one year to another. At the
same time, the state’s ability to create new military capacities may still be
very limited in the short-term perspective, regardless of the political ambi-
tions. The time between the decision, the acquiring of certain military cap-
abilities and having them operational and fully integrated into the armed
forces, tends to be lengthy. The timeframes depend on the technology level
of the specific state and its ability to convert economic and technological
capacities to additional military capabilities (Brooks and Wohlforth 2016).
Instead, Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth argued that assessments
of the military power of superpowers should include an analysis of the key
military capacities needed to exercise command of the global commons, that
is, the open sea, space and air above 15,000 feet. The military means ne-
cessary for exercising such command included: nuclear-powered submarines,
aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, principal amphibious ships, heavy
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), fourth- and fifth-generation tactical air-
craft, attack helicopters and military satellites. However, these expensive
and complex resources were not considered sufficient. The systems not only
had to be fully integrated but also supported by an infrastructure that in-
cludes long-range transport capacity and military installations in foreign
countries (Brooks and Wohlforth 2016a).
Brooks and Wohlforth used Barry Posen’s (2003) influential work as their
point of departure. Posen differentiated between resources needed for
commanding each of the global commons. According to Posen, command of
the sea demands not only nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN) as well
as aircraft carriers and amphibious assets, but also destroyers to protect the
latter surface combatants. According to Posen, a combination of attack, air-
defence, reconnaissance, intelligence and electronic warfare capabilities is
necessary to achieve command in the air and the suppression of enemy air
defences. These capabilities not only include aircraft but also relevant
weaponry such as surface-to-air missiles (SAM), precision-guided muni-
tions, and high-speed anti-radiation missiles (HARM). Posen found the
infrastructural aspect to include bases on foreign soil, prepositioning of
combat as well as support equipment, large medium-speed roll-on/roll-off
military transport ships (LMSR), long-range airlift aircraft, aerial tankers
and large multifunction military headquarters, in some cases ‘based in the
theatres in which they would fight’ (Posen 2003:18).
Obviously, these distinctions of military capabilities risk being too
nuanced to serve the purpose of this project. Colin Gray (1999) elaborated
on the expanding complexity of war and warfare and provided helpful
support in this regard. He differentiated between the traditional domains of
land, sea and air, and the non-traditional domains of WMD, space and the
electromagnetic spectrum including cyberspace. Gray also clustered the
different physical geographical dimensions as ‘terrestrial’(land power and
sea power), and ‘altitude and electrons’(air power) space power and cyber
power. In addition, he gave special attention to nuclear weapons as well as
to Special Forces.
Stephen Biddle presented a different approach. He argued that military
capability must be disaggregated ‘into separate dimensions of ability to
control territory, ability to inflict causalities, and ability to control duration,
and specify casual effects with respect to these dimensions directly rather
than conflating them’ (Biddle 2001:194). Biddle also stressed the necessity to
distinguish offensive from defensive capabilities. Since he did not provide
any clear definitions or examples of for example what constitutes territorial
control capability, his argumentations seem to be too vague to serve our
needs. However, Biddle also differentiated between close combat and deep-
strike capabilities. The former category is exemplified with heavy-armoured
units and the latter with strategic mobile light infantry units.
Using Posen’s elaboration as a starting point for deeper analysis, two as-
pects are of special interest. First, his notion of amphibious capability can be
connected to Biddle’s notion of deep strike. According to our interpretation,
both of them touch upon expeditionary capacity. This includes not only
amphibious forces and high mobile light infantry units but also specially
organised airborne or assault forces. Second, Posen’s argument on the im-
portance of military transport ships and long-range airlift aircraft should not
only be seen in the context of transporting these expeditionary forces, but of
transport capacity as such. In other words, transport should be recognised as a
key strategic enabler regardless of what other resources are being transported.
Posen also touched upon other strategic enablers such as command and
control, logistics and intelligence. These three functions are fundamental for
the analyses concerning contemporary military theory and operational art
(see, for example, Angstrom and Widen 2015). However, we focus on each of
them as strategic enablers rather than as operational functions.
Following Biddle’s suggestion about disaggregation, the nuclear dimen-
sion mentioned by Gray should also be discussed further. For this discus-
sion, the result of international negotiations is a good point of departure.
The agreement between the US and the USSR on anti-ballistic missiles
(ABM), signed in Moscow 1972, limited each of the two countries’ capacity
(including interceptors, launchers and radars) to counter strategic ballistic
missiles. The strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) also included a limita-
tion of the number of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), inter-
continental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and SLBM-capable submarines. The
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) between the US and the USSR
in 1991, included agreements on reducing the numbers of, amongst other,
strategic bombers equipped for nuclear armaments as well as nuclear war-
heads. An additional agreement between the US and the USSR including
the INF treaty signed in 1987.6 We argue that the distinctions made in these
agreements can serve the purpose of further operationalising the nuclear
military means.
The revolution in military affairs has arguably also lead to an increased
focus on not only unmanned and remotely controlled systems such as drones
but also on various degrees of automatic systems. A colleague of ours, Linda
Johansson, separated between (i) remotely controlled; (ii) semi-automatic;
and (iii) fully automatic machines or weaponry. She defined the second
category by referring to John Boyd’s OODA-loop, that is, observe, orient,
decide and act, as the deliberate decision by the human to step out of the
loop and to let the machine decide whether to act or not. Johansson defined
the last category as ‘fully capable of making decisions without any human
involvement’ (Johansson 2017:198). For the purpose of this project, we
cluster Johansson’s three categories as autonomous systems and include this
as an increasingly important part of modern means.
To summarise, we intend to disaggregate military means into four cate-
gories. The first category, traditional means, focuses not only on the regular
forces of the traditional services including the army, the navy and the air
force but also on expeditionary forces and Special Forces. The second ca-
tegory includes strategic enablers; command and control units and systems
including theatre headquarters and strategic commands; intelligence, in-
cluding reconnaissance and surveillance units and systems; as well as logistic
units and systems. The third category involves nuclear forces, including not
only the traditional triad of ICBMs, SLBMs and strategic bombers but also
ABM-capabilities and INF-resources. Finally, the fourth category focuses
on modern means including space power and electronic warfare capabilities
as well as autonomously operating systems for different domains.
3.2.3 Using military force – ways

When addressing the last element of strategy, ways, our initial elaboration
departs from the escalation spectrum. Sam Tangredi (2002) presented a
spectrum-of-conflict model with two axes: the level of violence (x-axe) and
the probability of occurrence (y-axe). Within this model, he identified three
levels of escalation: peacetime; conflict; and war. Barry Buzan (1987) also
provided a theoretical framework in this regard (see also Edström 2003).
Inspired by their elaborations, we identify four significant situations for the
use of military force: conflict avoidance; crises management; war prevention;
and war-fighting.
Even if Tangredi did not separate prevention/avoidance from the actual
response/management, he identified three steps regarding crisis response
(surveillance, the show of force and the use of force), and four different war-
fighting contexts (limited war, global conventional war, theatre nuclear war,
strategic nuclear war). Colin Gray (1999) clustered the different levels of
violence with the different character of war and identified four outcomes:
general war; limited war; irregular conflict; and terrorism. Gray also dis-
tinguished preparations for war from war proper. Although military op-
erations are a fundamental aspect of the latter category, Gray did not
provide any ideas on how to operationalise the term. For the purposes of
this project, the benefit of Tangredi’s model is his connection of objectives
(ends) with different military missions, such as:
• Forward presence;
• Power projection;
• Rapid response and reinforcement;
• Freedom of the sea including protection of sea lines of communication
(maritime supremacy);
• Large-scale expeditionary warfare as well as amphibious and airborne
assault;
• Interdiction, close air support, suppression of enemy air defence as well
as long and intermediate-range air-strikes (multi-mission air opera-
tions) and;
• Non-combatant evacuation, foreign military training, humanitarian
assistance and other peace support activities.
These missions are connected not only to the level of conflict and the ends
but also to the means. Richard Kugler and Hans Binnendijk (2002) stressed
that the priorities given to different aspects of these kinds of missions in-
dicate whether a defensive or an offensive approach to the use of force is
preferred. Gray acknowledged this perpetual dialectic, however, claimed
that offence and defence ‘are matters of such subjective judgement at the
level of policy, and are so closely interwoven and interdependent in tactics,
operations and military strategy, that they have limited merit as the base a
theory’ (Gray 1999:179). Lawrence Freedman also questioned the theore-
tical value of distinguishing the offensive and defensive approaches. He
elaborated upon the elements ends-means-ways and stressed the differences
between high-intensity and low-intensity operations. Referring mainly to the
means, Freedman argued that ‘being truly defensive or offensive tends to be
misleading’ (1998:44). The balance of offensive and defensive capabilities
has been explored quite extensively (see Snyder 1984; van Evra 1999).7
Biddle criticised this literature for focusing almost exclusively on the
consequences of the balance. Instead, he introduced force employment as a
key factor, that is, ‘the way the two sides use the materiel at their disposal
rather than just the nature of the materiel itself’ (Biddle 2001:742). Another
aspect of Biddle’s critique is related to the unit of analysis. While others,
such as Charles Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann (1998), have evaluated the
outcomes of wars, Biddle argued that the military operation constitutes a
more suitable choice. He highlighted that the key variation of force em-
ployment concern:
the defender’s choice between deep, reserve-oriented dispositions and

shallow, forward-oriented dispositions; and the attacker´s choice be-
tween rapid closure at the cost of high exposure to defensive fire, and a
more deliberate tempo in exchange for reduced exposure (Biddle
2001:749–750).
Håkan Edström (2003) presented a similar approach with four distinct ways
of employing military force in a war-fighting context. The offensive em-
ployment is targeted towards the adversary’s key strategic assets while the
semi-offensive employment is aiming at the adversary’s military resources.
Clearly, both approaches to force employments are inspired by the ela-
borations of Basil Liddel-Hart (1975). Edström’s semi-defensive alternative
has similarities with Barry Posen’s (1984) theories on denying an adversary
while the defensive is explicitly based on, amongst other, Edward Luttwak’s
(1976) defence-in-depth.8 While both Biddle and Edström focused on the
war-fighting level, John Mearsheimer (1983) applied the offensive-defensive
dichotomy on the war-preventing level. Deterrence by retaliation or by
punishment serves as offensive alternatives while deterrence by denial serves
as defensive ditto. Since we think that Biddle, Edström and Mearsheimer
have provided valuable theoretical examples, we build on their elaborations
rather than on Gray’s and Freedman’s warnings.
Gray (1998) identified two other perpetual dialectics: fire and movement,
and attrition and manoeuvre warfare. We find the latter dialect fruitful for
the purpose of this project. It has also been expanded upon by, amongst
others, William Lind (1985), Robert Leonard (1991), and Richard Hooker
Jr. (1993).9 Gray, however, introduced a third strategic behaviour in the
latter dialect; control. He argued that while attrition is about exhausting the
enemy, and that manoeuvre warfare is about annihilating, control is in-
tended to paralyse the opponent.
To summarise, when distinguishing between different ways of using the
military force, we will focus on three separate aspects; first, on the different
levels of the escalation spectrum or situation; second, on the different force
employment alternatives; and third, on the operational behaviour.
3.2.4 Summary – operationalising military strategy

When operationalising the three elements of the military strategy, regarding
ends, we focus on values, threats, needs and vulnerabilities. The military
means will be studied by analysing traditional, nuclear and modern re-
sources as well as enablers. Finally, when it comes to the ways, we explore
the situation, employment and behaviour surrounding the intended use of
the military means. In Table 3.3, our operationalisation of military strategy
is summarised.
We do not expect this to be an either–or equation, rather, we focus on
which of the outcomes of each of the elements the great powers tend to
prioritise. After all, one of the aspects separating great powers from other
Table 3.3 Operationalising military strategy
Ends Means Ways
• Values • Traditional • Situation

• Threats • Enablers • Employment
• Needs • Nuclear • Behaviour
• Vulnerability • Modern
states is that the resources at their disposal do not make it a necessity to
choose, rather an option given the armed forces a specific profile.
3.3 Research design

In this book, we address four straightforward questions:
i. How have the defence strategies of the US developed during the twenty-
first century and do US strategic choices correspond to expectations
ii. How have China and Russia adjusted their defence strategies in
response to the US strategies of the US and the changes in the
distribution of power in the international system in the twenty-first
century? To what extent do the strategic choices of these two potentially
revisionist ‘secondary major powers’ correspond to the expectations
iii. How have the UK and France adjusted their defence strategies in
response to the strategies of the US and the changes in the distribution
of power in the international system in the twenty-first century? To what
extent do the strategic choices of these two potentially status quo
oriented ‘secondary major powers’ correspond to the expectations
iv. How do the strategic choices among the five system-determining interact
and affect stability and change in the international system?
Our answers to questions one to three are presented in three separate em-
pirical chapters where we systematically map and analyse the strategies
pursued by the different system-determining states during the twenty-first
century using the method of structured focused comparison based on the
operationalisation of military strategy presented in section 3.2. The first
empirical chapter, Chapter 4, focuses on the alignment and military stra-
tegies of the sole superpower. Here, we will present an overview of the
strategies pursued by the three different US administrations during the
twenty-first century. Chapter 5 focuses on China and Russia, two potentially
revisionist great powers, which are more likely than the other two great
powers to perceive the present unipolar order as a threat to their own great
power ambitions and autonomy. Chapter 6 focuses on the strategies of
France and the UK, two leading Western powers that are expected to be
generally supportive towards the US-led liberal multilateral international
order that was created during the second half of the twentieth-century and
consolidated within a new unipolar system during the 1990s. The fourth
question is answered in the concluding Chapter 7.
Each country-specific section in Chapters 4 to 6 gives a detailed pre-
sentation of the sources used in our analysis. We have retrieved the empirical
material for the textual analysis solely from primary official sources. The
defence decision-making process in each state has served as a guiding tool in
selecting the material. Consequently, we have used materials such as bills,
committee recommendations, commission reports and various documents
relating to each state’s national security or defence strategy. In collecting
information concerning the five states’ military means, this material has been
complemented with data collected from the International Institute of
Strategic Studies (IISS) reports on the military balance.
Since the political decision-making processes are not identical among the
countries, there is a discrepancy between the cases in our selection of key
documents. However, we argue that these differences do not affect the result
of the comparison. Although their roles in the process may differ between
the countries, the Head of State, the Cabinet, the Ministry of Defence
(MoD), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), the Parliament, and its
committees on Defence and Foreign Affairs respectively, as well as the Chief
of Defence (ChoD), play a key role in defining each states national security
priorities. Therefore, it seems reasonable to argue that documents presented
by these key state actors and institutions are representative sources for the
official policy of the respective state. There is always a risk that officially
released strategic documents are declaratory rather than operational in their
nature (see, for example, Edström 2003). We claim, however, that at least in
democracies, these kinds of official documents serve as political guidance
and direction of the armed forces. Consequently, these documents internal
role in this regard would be paradoxical if they are only declaratory.
Furthermore, the documents also have an external role, to signal intentions
and ambitions to other states. However, we would still like to emphasise that
the defence strategies studied in this book concern the public and official
strategies presented by each state. Of course, many aspects of, especially, the
military strategy do not appear in public documents.
In the presentation of our empirical findings, we use the method of
structured focused comparison (SFC). According to George and Bennett,
the research method SFC relies on two major components. First, its
‘structure’ is borrowed from statistical or survey methods and implies a
reliance on ‘asking a set of standardized, general questions to each case’.
These questions should reflect the research objective and theoretical focus
(2005:69–70). Our purpose of using SFC is to obtain systematic, consistent
data on variables that are possible to compare across cases.10 The pre-
sentation of each state’s defence strategy is divided into five subsections. The
first subsection consists of an analysis of the strategic environment. This
subsection is further divided into the three dimensions presented in section
3.1.3 (actors, regions and themes). The second subsection focus on military-
strategic ends which are divided into the categories presented in section 3.2.1
(values, threats, needs and vulnerabilities). The third subsection focuses on
military means, distinguishing between four different kind of means (tradi-
tional, enablers, nuclear and modern) introduced in section 3.2.2. The fourth
subsection concerns military-strategic ways and is, in accordance with the
operationalisation in section 3.2.3, divided into three separate parts: situa-
tion, employment and behaviour. Finally, each case study contains a sum-
mary in which our findings on specific states’ alignment strategies and the
military strategies are summarised and related to previous research.
The fourth question is addressed in the final chapter. In answering this
question, we will focus on how different unipolar strategies interact with the
different strategies pursued by secondary great powers. Our arguments on
this issue are based on the findings in the previous chapters. However, we
will also address questions related to possible future developments and
status competition among the five system-determining states. More specifi-
cally, we analyse how different choices of strategies may affect the durability
and peacefulness of the unipolar system of the twenty-first century.
Notes
1 For an extended argument on hegemonic stability, see Gilpin (1981)
2 Contrary to this view, Robert Pape has argued that internal balancing ‘is not a
viable option’ against a unipolar power because no increase in one state’s military
forces or economic strength is adequate to the task (Pape 2005:15). Pape’s ar-
gument may be valid if we were discussing the possibility for one state to
transform the present unipolar system into a bipolar system. As mentioned, we
agree with Brooks and Wohlforth (2016a; 2016b) that China is the only state that
at present has the potential to do this, and it still has a long way to go before it
reaches parity with the US. However, this does not exclude the possibility that
states may choose to pursue strategies that aim to improve the own state’s cap-
ability to resist pressures from the unipolar power and to increase the costs of a
direct attack.
3 See, for example, Brooks and Wohlforth (2005), Pape (2005) and Lieber and
Alexander (2005).
4 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was proclaimed by the General
Assembly of the UN on 10 December 1948.
5 The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, better known as the European Convention on Human Rights, was
adopted in Rome on 4 November 1950.
6 Each of these original documents is found at the website of the US Department
of State (see ‘Treaties and Agreements’ at https://www.state.gov/t/avc/trty/
index.htm).
7 Snyder, for example, argues that a rational strategist’s choice of an offensive or a
defensive strategy depends on the aims of the foreign policy, technological and
geographical constraints, and the military balance rather than on force em-
ployments.
8 Posen distinguishes between offensive operations aiming to disarm the adversary,
that is to destroy his armed forces and defensive operations with the purpose to
deny the adversary the objectives that he seeks.
9 Jan Ångström and Jerker Widén (2015) identify analogies between the dichotomy
manoeuvre-attrition and the division between indirect and direct approach pre-
sented by Liddell-Hart after WWI. Although we do agree with their conclusion,
we rather relate the direct/indirect dichotomy to the two offensive alternatives
when employing force than to behaviour. While Liddell-Harts definition is re-
lative, that is direct approach attacking the enemy’s strength and the indirect
approach attacking his weakness, we follow Edström’s example with a more
absolute definition, that is semi-offensive approach attacking the enemy’s mili-
tary forces and the offensive approach attacking his other key strategic assets.
10 Gary King and his colleagues argue similarly that SFC is mainly characterised by
its highly systematic data collection; the same information should be collected
about the same variables in all cases with the guidance of relevant theory. The
goal is a systematic description in order to make the drawing of causal inference
possible (1994:45–46).
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4 The US and the strategy of the
unipole
Introduction
In this chapter, the US strategy is explored. By studying key primary
sources, issued over two decades, we conclude that three presidential ad-
ministrations applied different alignment strategies. Despite this difference,
we argue that the focus on each of the elements of the military strategy has
remained rather constant. This indicates that while the internal efforts tend
to be stable despite changes in the White House, the external efforts are
more dependent on the policy of the administrations.
The empirical material has been retrieved from the processes of the US-
bureaucracy preparing a new administration entering into office and the
cabinet’s formulation of strategy once assuming command. The National
Intelligence Council (USNIC) takes the initial step by presenting a long-term
analysis of potential global trends and developments during the upcoming
decades. This is normally followed by the US Department of Defense
(USDoD) presenting a Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the
President of the United States (POTUS) deciding a new National Security
Strategy (NSS), which is the supreme American strategy. Occasionally
during the four-year term of the administration, the USDoD delivers a
National Defense Strategy (NDS) and/or a Defense Strategic Guidance, and
the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (USJCS) and a National Military Strategy
(NMS). These are the second and third-ranked strategies. Occasionally, a
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) can also be released during the President’s
time in office. Hence, when President George W. Bush was sworn in as the
American President in January 2001, the USNIC had already released its
global trend analysis in December 2000. In September 2001, the USDoD
released a QDR and one year later, President Bush presented a new NSS.
This procedure was followed during President Bush’s second (2005–2008) as
well as during President Barrack Obama’s first (2009–2012) and second
(2013–2016) terms. However, when President Donald Trump issued a new
NSS in December 2017, he did so without having a new QDR to build his
directives on.
DOI: 10.4324/9781003157113-4
The US and the strategy of the unipole 79
4.1 Strategic environment
4.1.1 Actors
In 2000, the USNIC identified four actor-related key drivers that were ex-
pected to shape the world in 2015. The first concerned the global economy.
The globalised economy was expected to be a net contributor to increased
political stability. However, the USNIC warned that a sustained financial
crisis or a prolonged disruption of energy supplies could undo this optimistic
projection. The second driver concerned governance. Notably, the ability of
states to deal with non-state actors and the opportunities for cooperation
between governments and private organisations were considered increas-
ingly important. The growing reach of international criminal and terrorist
networks was perceived as especially worrying. The third driver focused on
future conflicts. The USNIC suggested that asymmetric threats, including
non-state adversaries, constituted a reality. At the same time, Russia and
China were expected to (and potentially North Korea, Iran and Iraq) have
the capability to strike the US with strategic WMD. It was also expected
that both states (and non-state actors) had a growing potential for the un-
conventional delivery of WMD. The fourth and last actor-driven trend
concerned the US itself. The USNIC concluded that ‘[i]n the absence of a
clear and overriding national security threat, the United States will have
difficulty drawing on its economic prowess to advance its foreign policy
agenda’ (National Intelligence Council 2000:12). Some states, adversaries as
well as allies, were, however, expected to test American hegemony. The
growing power of China and the declining ditto of Russia were central in
these elaborations but Brazil, India, Japan, Mexico and the EU were also
considered to be of special importance (National Intelligence Council 2000).
In 2004, the USNIC identified 14 major trends. Five of these trends were
actor-based: rising powers and the changing geopolitical landscape, other
emerging powers, increased pressures on international institutions, the po-
tential for catastrophic terrorism and new challenges to governance. States,
and especially the US, were still considered to have a pivotal role; but other
actors including non-governmental organisations (NGOs) were also re-
cognised as being of great importance. Regarding the rising and emerging
powers, economic power was in focus. Both China and India were predicted
to achieve higher economic growth than Europe and Japan by 2020.
Furthermore, the economies of other developing countries, such as Brazil
and Indonesia, were also believed to be in a position to surpass all but the
largest European economies by that year. In addition to these two countries,
Russia and South Africa were also expected to achieve important economic
growth. In contrast to these rising and emerging powers, there were the so-
called ‘ageing powers’ – Japan and the members of the EU. Growing energy
demands, not least by China and India, were expected to have substantial
impacts on geopolitical relations. Regarding the challenges to governance,
80 The US and the strategy of the unipole
Russia and most of the Central Asian regimes were believed to be slipping
back toward authoritarianism. The USNIC warned that Islamic terrorists’
aspirations of a new Caliphate might not be just a dream in 2020. Finally,
regarding international institutions, the USNIC cautioned that ‘post-World
War II creations as the UN and international financial institutions risk
sliding into obsolescence unless they take into consideration the growing
power of the developing world’ (National Intelligence Council 2004:104).
In 2008, the USNIC predicted that in 2025 the international system would
be multipolar, although not homogeneous. Even if the strategic rivalries
were likely to revolve around trade, rivalry regarding investments, techno-
logical innovation and acquisition, arms races, territorial expansion and
military rivalries were not ruled out. Brazil, Russia, India and China (the
BRICs) were expected to present the greatest growth in economic power.
Both China and India were expected to continue their naval build-ups, de-
veloping blue-water naval capabilities. Iran’s potential acquisition of nuclear
weapons was presented as a source of concern. North Korea was also
mentioned in this context (National Intelligence Council 2008).
In 2012, the USNIC was critical to its previous reports, admitting that
while detailing a gradual ascendance of non-state actors it had not clarified
the role of states versus non-state actors. Consequently, the USNIC an-
nounced its intention to delve more into the dynamics of governance and to
explore the complex relationships among a diverse set of actors. The USNIC
predicted that there would not be a hegemonic power in 2030. Instead,
power would shift to networks and coalitions in a multipolar world. The
Council also admitted that while it had foreseen the direction of the US’s
major competitors – with China increasing and Russia decreasing in terms
of relative power - China’s power had increased faster than expected. The
USNIC predicted that China, India, and Brazil would be the key actors in
addition to the US, while the relative power of the EU, Japan, and Russia
was considered likely to continue to decline. Regarding the risks of conflict,
the USNIC identified three different ‘baskets’ that were considered to have
the potential of conspiring to increase the risk of an outbreak of interstate
conflict. While the first basket elaborated on the changing calculations of
particularly China, India, and Russia, the second focused on the increasing
contention over resources, and the third on the increased accessibility of
instruments of war. Finally, regarding the role of the US, the Council
concluded that even if the era of unrivalled American ascendancy in inter-
national politics was winding down, the multifaceted nature of US power
suggested that the US most likely would be the first among equals alongside
the other great powers in 2030 (National Intelligence Council 2012).
In 2017, the USNIC warned that the risk of conflict between major and
aspiring powers was expected to increase due to diverging interests.
Combined with an expanding terrorist threat, continued instability in weak
states, and the increasing complexity of other emerging global challenges,
the USNIC predicted that countries would cope on an ad hoc basis by
collaborating with regional organisations and non-state actors to target
narrowly defined issues. The USNI predicted that since ‘more actors will
employ a wider range of military and non-military tools’, the line between
war and peace will be blurred, and the old norms of escalation and deter-
rence would be undermined (National Intelligence Council 2017:20).
Notably, not only non-state but also sub-state actors were mentioned in this
context, the latter exemplified with the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant
(ISIL). The Chinese regime’s struggle to maintain legitimacy and political
order was described as a critical driver. Russia’s aspiration to restore its
great power status through nationalism, military modernisation and foreign
engagements was another key driver. The USNIC predicted that recent
Sino-Russian cooperation was likely to return to competition, not least re-
garding influence in Central Asia. The relations between India and Pakistan
also got USNIC’s attention. Pakistan’s attempt to address India’s economic
and conventional military capabilities through asymmetric means was
considered especially problematic.
4.1.2 Regions
In 2000, the USNIC concluded that different drivers would have varying
impacts in different regions. Due to the adverse effects of globalisation and
insufficient attention to reform, the prospects of potentially destabilising
social changes were expected to remain negative for the societies and the
regimes in the Middle East. The spike in oil revenues was predicted to lead
to rising demands for oil from the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC). Still, it was considered unlikely that these revenues
primarily would be directed at core social needs. The projections for Sub-
Saharan Africa were even direr than concluded in previous reports because
of the spread of AIDS, humanitarian crises, political instability, and military
conflict. The USNIC warned that regions feeling left behind the positive
economic developments could face deepening economic stagnation, political
instability and cultural alienation. Consequently, they could foster political,
ethnic, ideological, and religious extremism. Central Asia was described as a
regional hot spot, with occasionally competing for national interests be-
tween not only Russia, China, and India but also of Iran and Turkey. East
Asia was said to be characterised by uneven economic dynamics, within and
between states, as well as by political and national assertiveness, with po-
tentials for strategic tensions. The widening strategic and economic gaps
between India and Pakistan were expected to define the strategic setting of
South Asia. By 2015, many Latin American states were predicted to enjoy
greater prosperity due to factors such as expanding hemispheric and global
economic links, lowered birth rates and progress in democracy building.
However, according to the USNIC, the reversal of democracy in some
countries could lead to insurgencies. Although an ageing population and
low birth rates would become major challenges to European prosperity and
cohesion, most of Europe was expected to be wealthy and peaceful. Notably,
Oceania was not given much attention. Instead, Australia was included in
the analysis of South East Asia (National Intelligence Council 2000).
In 2004, the USNIC calculated that the rising power of China and India
would greatly affect the regional level. In East Asia, some states were ex-
pected to adapt to the new setting by forging closer economic and political
ties with Beijing, while Japan, Taiwan and various Southeast Asian nations,
were said to prefer closer ties with the US and/or India to counterbalance
China’s growing influence. Furthermore, the USNIC argued that the
growing energy requirements would likely prompt China to increase its
global activism in regions such as the Middle East, Africa, Latin America,
and Eurasia. The rise of India was perceived to present strategic compli-
cations not only for Asia as a whole, but especially for Southern and Central
Asia, and potentially also for the Middle East. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the
major risk was considered to be worsening humanitarian emergencies, often
stemming from conflicts. West Africa was projected to become a more im-
portant energy supplier, while vulnerable to intensified Islamic radicalism.
Regarding Europe, attributes and problems related to ‘aging states’ were
again emphasised (National Intelligence Council 2004).
In 2008, the USNIC gave most regional attention to Sub-Saharan Africa,
Latin America and the Middle East. The former was considered the single
most vulnerable region to economic disruption, population stresses, civil
conflict and political instability. The UNSIC warned that there was a risk
that local populations were unlikely to experience significant economic gain
and that instead, the increases in commodity prices might lead to even
greater corruption. Despite the positive developments predicted, several
Latin American countries risked lagging behind or even becoming poorer
and less governable. Drug trafficking organisations, transnational criminal
cartels and local gangs were expected to contribute to making parts of Latin
America among the world’s most violent areas. The USNIC further warned
that small countries in Central America and the Caribbean risked becoming
failed states, and concluded that Latin America ‘will continue to play a
marginal role in the international system, except for its participation in in-
ternational trade and some peacekeeping efforts’ (National Intelligence
Council 2008:15). The USNIC feared that the lack of economic growth
combined with a high degree of youth unemployment in the Middle East
would continue facilitating terrorist organisations’ recruitment of young
people. In addition, the USNIC shed light on the risks of an arms race in the
region involving both nuclear weapons and external actors. Elaborating on
regionalism, the USNIC illuminated the trend towards free trade and
financial clusters that could become quasi-blocs: North America, Europe
and East Asia. The USNIC argued that these blocks, and potentially
other regional clusters, could compete in setting trans-regional standards
not only for products but also for property rights (National Intelligence
Council 2008).
In 2012, the USNIC identified the widened scope of regional instability as
one of the six game-changers. Hence, the focus was on whether instability in
the Middle East and South Asia would spill over and create global in-
security. In the former region, elaborations were concentrated on three main
issues; whether Iran would gain access to nuclear weapons or not, the po-
tential of moderate and democratic governments emerging throughout the
region and the resolving of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In the latter re-
gion, themes related to challenges such as low economic growth, rising food
prices, unemployment, large youth population, lack of infrastructure and
energy shortages. The USNIC warned that combined with conflicting stra-
tegic goals, widespread distrust among neighbouring states and the lack of
an institutionalised regional security framework, these challenges could lead
to the eruption of widespread conflict. Furthermore, the lack of a well-
anchored regional security framework for Asia as a whole constituted one of
the largest global threats according to the UNSIC. The USNIC concluded
that a multipolar regional order combined with rising intrastate tensions,
growing Chinese nationalism and questions about future US engagement
and involvement will most likely increase regional insecurities in Asia.
Further, the USNIC warned that an unstable Asia would cause large-scale
damage to the global economy (National Intelligence Council 2012).
The 2017 USNIC report included an appendix specifically focusing on ten
regions. The regional interactions in East and Southeast Asia were said to be
influenced by the interplay between security competition, regime stability
and economic cooperation. Middle powers and smaller states alike were
expected to seek assurance against Chinese assertiveness. As they were un-
likely to be resolved, the longstanding territorial and maritime disputes in
the region were considered to require the full attention of the ASEAN. The
USNIC argued that the security challenges would motivate continued build-
up and potential use of military instruments in the region. South Asia was
expected to face tremendous internal and external challenges, shaping the
security and political stability in the region. The deepening strategic re-
lationship between the US and India, China’s westward ambitions, the ac-
tivities of ISIL and other terrorist groups, violent extremism, sectarian
divisions, governance shortfalls, environmental concerns, weak health sys-
tems, gender inequality and demographic pressures were all considered
contributing to the extremely complex situation.
The Middle East and North Africa were expected to be characterised by
political upheaval as civil and proxy wars were predicted to continue in
several weak or failed states. The USNIC warned that contests among re-
ligious and political forces combined with low energy prices and weakened
institutions could include security competition among regional actors, but
could also involve the great powers. The USNIC feared that socioeconomic
challenges such as water shortages as well as the global energy demands
would increase the tensions even further. According to the USNIC esti-
mates, Sub-Saharan Africa was likely to suffer from insufficient economic
growth and job creation, hence further overwhelming the abilities of most
governments in the region. The USNIC predicted that lack of infrastructure
and educated workforces could halt the economic growth, and added that as
China’s economy cools down, Chinese aid would most likely decline.
Consequently, the economies in the region would remain weak. Many
Eurasian governments desired control over reforms and suffered poor eco-
nomic performance and corruption. They were therefore also considered
highly vulnerable to Russian influence.
The need to restructure European relations in light of the decision of the
UK to leave the EU was according to the USNIC likely to not only un-
dermine the region’s international clout but could also weaken transatlantic
cooperation. The USNIC expected further assertiveness from Russia and
deliberate attempts to split European solidarity. Naturally, the elaborations
on North America had a clear US-centred perspective. The USNIC pre-
dicted that the issue of immigration from the Caribbean, Central America
and Mexico, combined with continued threats from terrorism could lead to
even tighter border enforcement. Brazil was considered to play a key role in
South America. Together with Argentina, the regional great power could
foster better regional relations and increased regional trade, the USNIC
argued. The Antarctic and the Arctic were believed to have increased eco-
nomic importance, due to the diminishing sea ice. Long-term economic
stakes and opportunities, combined with environmental concerns, were ex-
pected to raise the risk of increased competition between the Arctic and non-
Arctic countries over access to sea routes and resources (National
Intelligence Council 2017).
4.1.3 Themes
In addition to the global economy and globalisation, the USNIC identified
three thematic key drivers in 2000: demography, natural resources and the
environment, and science and technology. Regarding the first driver, the
global population was expected to be 7.2 billion in 2015, compared to the 6.1
billion at the time of the publishing of the report. The USNIC predicted that
about 95 per cent of this increase would be in developing countries, and
nearly all in rapidly expanding urban areas. The consequences of demo-
graphical developments were diverse. In countries where the political sys-
tems are brittle, the combination of population growth and urbanisation
could foster instability. In states with advanced economies and emerging
markets, declining birth-rates and ageing populations could increase the
costs of health care and pensions, while simultaneously reducing the size and
capacity of the workforce. The second thematic driver – natural resources
and the environment – included discussions on the consequences of the over
three billion individuals who were expected to be living in water-stressed
regions, and the implications for conflict. The linkages between the
availability of energy resources, price, and distribution were also more
thoroughly analysed. Despite a 50 per cent increase in global energy de-
mand, energy resources would be sufficient to meet these demands, the
USNIC concluded. Finally, regarding science and technology, the USNIC
paid specific attention to the growing significance of information tech-
nology, biotechnology, materials science, and nanotechnology (National
Intelligence Council 2000).
Even if the USNIC’s report of 2004 did not present an explicit thematic
approach, nine out of the 14 significant characteristics perceived to be
shaping the global future by 2020 were thematic in their character. While
none of these themes concerned environmental issues, two addressed poli-
tical (the contradictions of globalisation and halting democratisation), four
social (a more pervasive sense of insecurity, lingering social inequalities, the
global ageing phenomenon and the spread of radical Islamic ideology), two
economic (the expanding global economy and the accelerating pace of sci-
entific change and the dispersion of dual-use technologies) and one military
(proliferation of WMD) aspects. The USNIC treated not only WMD but
also cyber warfare as central in the elaborations regarding the military
theme. The USNIC concluded:
Most US adversaries, be they states or non-state actors, will recognize

the military superiority of the United States. Rather than acquiesce to
US force, they will try to circumvent or minimize US strengths and
exploit perceived weaknesses, using asymmetric strategies, including
terrorism and illicit acquisition of WMD (National Intelligence Council
2004:118).
In the November 2008 report, the USNIC touched upon several thematic
aspects. Resource issues were expected to gain prominence on the interna-
tional agenda. The unprecedented global economic growth was, for ex-
ample, projected to continue to put pressure on several highly strategic
resources, including energy, food, and water. Regarding energy, the pro-
duction of crude oil, natural gas liquids, and tar sands was not expected to
grow at the same rate as demands. The USNIC further argued that as oil
and gas production most likely would be concentrated to unstable areas, this
could result in a fundamental energy transition away from oil, toward
natural gas, coal and other alternatives. In addition, climate change was
expected to exacerbate resource scarcity even further. The USNIC warned
that although the impact of climate change was projected to vary by region,
particularly water scarcity could lead to harmful effects, such as the loss of
agricultural production in several regions.
The USNIC elaborated on social themes related to the risk of global
pandemics, ageing populations in the developed world, the swelling of the
global middle class concurrent with the poor part of the globe’s population
becoming relatively poorer, as well as women’s increasing educational at-
tainment. ‘Shifts in ethno-religious composition resulting from migration’
could, the USNIC warned, ‘fuel political change, particularly where im-
migrants settle in low-fertility industrialized countries’ (National Intelligence
Council 2008:23). The USNIC added that resource scarcities, poor gov-
ernance, ethnic rivalries and/or environmental degradation could also gen-
erate societal disruptions. Referring to the military aspects, the US was
expected to ‘retain unique military capabilities, especially its ability to
project military power globally’. Although ‘the emergence of new nuclear-
weapon states may constrain US freedom of action’, US military superiority
regarding conventional and nuclear weapons as well as missile defence
capabilities was considered being of continued importance ‘deterring openly
aggressive behavior on the part of any new nuclear states’ (National
Intelligence Council 2008:97). the USNIC feared that in addition to ter-
rorists gaining access to advanced weaponry including WMD, some of the
more advanced states could develop capacities needed for conducting
counter-space strikes as well as information warfare including cyber and
network attacks. The continued proliferation of long-range missile systems,
anti-access capabilities, and different forms of WMD including nuclear
weapons, were other risks elaborated upon (National Intelligence
Council 2008).
In its report from December 2012, the USNIC focused on five thematic
aspects; the global economy, technology, individual empowerment, demo-
graphic patterns and growing demands for key resources. However, in its
elaborations on future conflicts, the Council touched upon some key mili-
tary aspects as well. These were precision-strike capabilities, means for cyber
warfare, bioterror weaponry and the proliferation of WMD. Regarding the
global economy, the USNIC predicted that the combined share of the
American, European, and Japanese global income was to fall from 56 per
cent in 2012 to well under half by 2030. China’s and other emerging markets’
shares of financial assets were projected to almost double during the same
period. The USNIC warned that global volatility and imbalances among
actors with different economic interests could result in the collapse of the
current economic order. On the other hand, a greater multipolarity was also
said to have the potential to increase the resiliency of the global economy
(National Intelligence Council 2012).
In 2017, the USNIC presented five overarching trends focused on people:
how people live, how people create and innovate, how people prosper, how
people think, how people govern and how people fight. Regarding pros-
perity, the USNIC saw the economic transition of two of the world’s three
leading economies as worrisome. Finally, regarding fighting future conflicts,
USNIC presented three keywords: diffuse, diverse and disruptive. Future
conflicts were expected to be more diffuse ‘because the greater accessibility
to instruments of war will enable a variety of actors, including states, non-
state and sub-state entities’ such as terrorist groups, criminal networks, in-
surgent forces, mercenaries and private corporations ‘to engage in conflict’.
They were described as diverse ‘because the means of conflict will vary
across a wider spectrum’ ranging from non-military capabilities, such as
‘economic coercion, cyberattacks, and information operations, to advanced
conventional weapons’ and WMD as well as ‘occur in multiple domains, to
include space and cyberspace’. Finally, future conflicts were characterised as
disruptive ‘because of an increasing emphasis by states and terrorist groups,
on disrupting critical infrastructure, societal cohesion and government
functions rather than on defeating enemy forces on the battlefield through
traditional military means’. The USNIC concluded that the proliferation of
cyber capabilities, precision-guided weapons, robotic systems, long-range
strike assets and unmanned-armed vehicles were shifting ‘warfare from di-
rect clashes of opposing armies to more standoff and remote operations,
especially in the initial phases of conflict’ (National Intelligence Council
2017:214–217).
4.2 Ends
4.2.1 Values
In September 2001, shortly after the terrorist attacks, the USDoD issued a
QDR.1 The department declared that the:
purpose of the U.S. Armed Forces is to protect and advance U.S.

national interests and, if deterrence fails, to decisively defeat threats to
those interests. The United States has interests, responsibilities, and
commitments that span the world. As a global power with an open
society, the United States is affected by trends, events, and influences
that originate from beyond its borders (US Department of Defense
2001:2).
The Department also presented a list of ‘enduring national interests’ that,

according to the USDoD, should be taken into account when developing
the defence posture. Besides the freedom of the US, peace and stability in
the Western Hemisphere were the only explicit values presented (US
Department of Defense 2001). In September 2002, President Bush decided
on a new NSS with altogether eight overarching ends. The first of these ends
was to champion aspirations for human dignity (President of the USA
2002). In March 2005, the USDoD stressed that the Bush administration
was committed to strengthening the community of free nations and ad-
vancing democratic reforms and freedom around the globe (US Department
of Defense 2005). Shaping the choices of countries at strategic crossroads
was a value related end presented by the Department in February 2006. ‘The
choices that major and emerging powers make will affect the future strategic
position and freedom of action’ of not only the US but also of the US’s allies
and partners (US Department of Defense 2006:27). Consequently, shaping
these choices in ways that foster cooperation and mutual security interests
was a key US objective. In March 2006, President Bush stated that freedom,
justice, liberty, democracy and human dignity were fundamental American
ideals. Hence, the promotion of these values was prioritised and constituted
one of the two core pillars of the strategy (President of the USA 2006).
Liberty and democratic values were central aims also in the NDS submitted
in June 2008. ‘The spread of liberty both manifests our ideals and protects
our interests’, the USDoD declared (US Department of Defense 2008:1).
Assisting states in need and promoting the common good were presented
as goals in themselves in the QDR released in February 2010. America’s
interests were described as being inextricably linked to the integrity and
resilience of the international system. Broad respect for universal values and
an international order that promotes cooperative action were hence ar-
ticulated as two of the chief interests (US Department of Defense 2010a). In
President Obama’s first NSS, released in May 2010, the Obama adminis-
tration stressed the end of promoting not only peace among different peo-
ples, but also democracy. Strengthening the international norms that protect
universal rights was another value-based objective mentioned by the
President. Governance, liberty, justice and human dignity were key words of
these elaborations (President of the USA 2010). President Obama declared
in January 2012 that America has ‘responsibly ended the war in Iraq, put al-
Qa’ida on the path to defeat – including delivering justice to Osama bin
Laden – and made significant progress in Afghanistan’. Rather than ad-
dressing threat-oriented ends, the President focused on value-based ends.
America seeks ‘a just and sustainable international order where the rights
and responsibilities of nations and peoples are upheld, especially the fun-
damental rights of every human being’, the President declared, while also
stressing the importance of universal rights and human dignity (US
Department of Defense 2012). Respect for universal values at home and
around the globe was one of four core national interests articulated in the
QDR of March 2014 (US Department of Defense 2014). Central ends
mentioned by President Obama in 2015 were promoting universal values
abroad, defending democracy and human rights, as well as preventing, or if
considered necessary, responding to mass atrocities. Obama declared that
‘The United States will concentrate attention and resources to help countries
consolidate their gains and move toward more democratic and re-
presentative systems of governance. Our focus is on supporting countries
that are moving in the right direction’ (President of the USA 2015:20).
When President Trump released his first NSS in December 2017, one of
his central ends was to advance America’s values. Preserving ‘our way of
life’ and ‘advancing American influence in the world’ were both parts of the
President’s vision. In pursuing this vision, that is, ‘a world of strong, so-
vereign, and independent nations, each with its own cultures and dreams,
thriving side-by-side in prosperity, freedom, and peace’, President Trump
declared his ambition to promote a balance of power strategy that favoured
not only the US but also America’s allies and partners. ‘We will never lose
sight of our values and their capacity to inspire, uplift, and renew’, the
President argued (President of the USA 2017:II).
4.2.2 Threats
No clear threats were identified in the QDR presented in September 2001.
Instead, the USDoD admitted that the US ‘cannot predict with a high de-
gree of confidence the identity of the countries or the actors that may
threaten its interests and security’ (US Department of Defense 2001:3). Two
of the eight overarching ends presented in the NSS of September 2002 fo-
cused on threat-related aspects. First, to prevent attacks against America
and its friends and to defeat global terrorism, alliances were to be
strengthened. Second, potential enemies were to be prevented from threa-
tening the US as well as its allies and friends with WMD. In the NMS
presented two years later, three military objectives supporting the NDS were
established: (i) protecting the US against external attacks and aggression; ii)
preventing conflict and surprise attack; and (iii) prevailing against adver-
saries (US Joint Chiefs of Staff 2004). In the NDS released in March 2005,
the core ends related to threats were assuring allies and friends, dissuading
potential adversaries, deterring aggression and coercion and defeating ene-
mies. Retaining global freedom of action by securing access to key regions,
lines of communications and the global commons were thus key objectives.
Helping partners to increase not only their ability to defend themselves but
also to contribute to the collective efforts of meeting common threats was
another objective. Establishing favourable security conditions, the depart-
ment intended to honour America’s security commitments, and bring about
a common appreciation of these threats (US Department of Defense 2005).
In February 2006, the USDoD presented two ends associated with the threat
dimension. First, terrorist networks were to be defeated. Second, hostile
states, as well as non-state actors, were to be prevented from acquiring and
using WMD (US Department of Defense 2006). One month later, in March
2006, President Bush announced that the second pillar of the American
strategy was to confront ‘the challenges of our time by leading a growing
community of democracies’. The President included threats such as pan-
demic diseases, the proliferation of WMD, terrorism, and natural disasters
in these challenges. The president concluded that ‘[e]ffective multinational
efforts are essential to solve these problems’ (President of the USA 2006:19).
A spectrum of challenges was in 2008 considered facing the US as well as its
allies and partners. These challenges included: hostile states armed with
WMD, violent transnational extremist networks, rising regional powers,
emerging space and cyber threats as well as natural and pandemic disasters.
In responding to these threats, maintaining, strengthening and even ex-
panding America’s wide range of allies, friends and partners were considered
a capstone of the strategy. The department declared that ‘We cannot prevail
if we act alone’ (US Department of Defense 2008:1). Consequently,
preventing enemies from threatening the US and its allies, and working with
others to defuse regional conflicts were considered important objectives. The
Department announced that ‘We must defeat violent extremism as a threat
to our way of life’ (US Department of Defense 2008:7).
The US was declared a nation at war in the QDR issued in February 2010.
Consequently, disrupting, dismantling and defeating Al Qaeda and the
Taliban were declared key objectives. The proliferation of WMD and other
weapons and technology were considered as direct physical threats to the
US, and protecting the American people was presented as an overarching
end (US Department of Defense 2010a). In the NSS released in May 2010,
President Obama identified Al-Qa’ida and its affiliates as the most important
enemy (President of the USA 2010). The central strategic objectives pre-
sented in the 2011 NMS were also quite specific; to erode Taliban influence
in Afghanistan, to strengthen the Afghan security forces capacity, to enable
Pakistan to defeat al Qaida and to prevent the terrorists from returning to
either country. Finding, capturing or killing ‘violent extremists wherever
they reside when they threaten interests and citizens of America and our
allies’, were overarching objectives for countering violent extremism (US
Joint Chiefs of Staff 2011:6). Defeating terrorist networks, deterring and
defeating adversaries, maintaining nuclear deterrence and operating effec-
tively in cyberspace, space and across all other domains were presented as
core military objectives in the strategic guidance released in January 2012
(US Department of Defense 2012).
The QDR released in March 2014 was built explicitly on the Defence
Strategic Guidance of 2012. The USDoD gave priority to three strategic
pillars of which two were threat-oriented: (i) projecting US influence and
deterring aggression; and (ii) winning decisively against any adversary if
deterrence should fail. In these regards, building new partnerships and
strengthening established key alliances and partnerships were both general
objectives. Cooperating with others to address common security challenges
was the core of building global security. Providing humanitarian assistance
and disaster relief were mentioned as additional aspects (US Department of
Defense 2014). The NMS released in June 2015 addressed the need to
counter revisionist states as well as violent extremist organisations (VEOs).
The former was (when necessary) to be deterred, denied and defeated while
the VEOs were to be disrupted, degraded and defeated. A third national
military objective was also presented:
Central to these efforts is strengthening our global network of allies and

partners. This integrated strategy requires us to conduct synchronized
operations around the globe, implement institutional reforms at home,
and sustain the capabilities, capacity, and readiness required to prevail
in conflicts that may differ significantly in scope, scale, and duration
(US Joint Chiefs of Staff 2015:1).
In December 2017, President Trump stressed the enforcement and the de-
fence of America’s borders as being one of his prioritised ends. Central
objectives identified by the President were to defend the US against WMD,
combating bio-threats and pandemics, strengthening border control and
immigration policy, pursuing threats to their source, defeating Jihadist
terrorists, dismantling transnational criminal organisations, defending
America against cyber threats and promoting American resilience (President
of the USA 2017). The USDoD concluded that the central challenge (rather
than threat) to the prosperity and security of the US was the re-emergence of
long-term strategic competition by revisionist powers such as China and
Russia. The Department worried especially about China’s increased power.
Consequently, the department declared that ‘most far-reaching objective of
this defense strategy is to set the military relationship between our two
countries on a path of transparency and non-aggression’ (US Department of
Defense 2018a:2). In this context, two other ends were to ensure that the
global balances of power remained in America’s favour and advance an
international order conducive to America’s security and prosperity.
Simultaneously, the Department admitted that it was ‘undeniable that the
homeland is no longer a sanctuary. America is a target, whether from ter-
rorists seeking to attack our citizens; malicious cyber activity against
personal, commercial, or government infrastructure; or political and
information subversion’ (US Department of Defense 2018a:3). Hence, de-
fending the US homeland was also a core objective. Other explicit objectives
included: (i) maintaining favourable regional balances of power in key areas;
(ii) preventing terrorists from directing or supporting external operations
against the US homeland as well as America’s citizens, allies, and partners
overseas; (iii) sustaining the US’s military advantages, both globally and in
key regions; and (iv) advancing US influence and interests (US Department
of Defense 2018a).
4.2.3 Needs
In 2001, the US contribution to economic well-being was emphasised. The
USDoD mentioned the vitality and productivity of the global economy, the
security of international sea, air, space and information lines of commu-
nication, as well as access to key markets and strategic resources as key
objectives. Precluding hostile domination of critical areas was mentioned as
an additional objective. Not only the American but also the US’s allies’ and
friends’ dependency on the energy resources from the Middle East was given
special attention. The US’s ability to lead formal alliances and to establish
bilateral security relationships as well as to build regional security ar-
rangements and to develop coalitions of states were considered as a cen-
trepiece of the American security (US Department of Defense 2001). Global
economic growth was one of eight overarching ends presented in the 2002
NSS. In order to ignite a new era of such growth, free markets and free trade
were considered a prerequisite. An additional need-based end focused on
regional conflicts. To defuse such conflicts, the President expressed the need
to work with others. A fourth end focused specifically on the need for co-
operation with the other main centres of global power. Hence, the aim was
to develop agendas for cooperative action:
Several potential great powers are now in the midst of internal

transition—most importantly Russia, India, and China. In all three
cases, recent developments have encouraged our hope that a truly global
consensus about basic principles is slowly taking shape (President of the
USA 2002:26).
Consequently, dissuading future military competition was expressed as an

objective, so was assuring America’s allies and friends. In addition to NATO
and the members of the alliance, Australia, Japan and South Korea were
mentioned in this regard:
The presence of American forces overseas is one of the most profound

symbols of the U.S. commitments to allies and friends. Through our
willingness to use force in our own defense and in defense of others, the
United States demonstrates its resolve to maintain a balance of power
that favors freedom (President of the USA 2002:28).
Strengthening the community of free nations was presented as a key objective

in the NDS of March 2005. One of the arguments behind this position was
the ambition of advancing economic well-being all over the world (US
Department of Defense 2005). Global economic growth was also one of the
eight overarching ends presented in the NSS of 2006. The President admitted
that America’s dependency on foreign energy sources was problematic.
Ultimately, the aim was to ensure energy independence (President of the USA
2006). The USDoD observed the growing global competition for resources
and declared that securing America’s interest abroad was one of the
Department’s two core responsibilities. In addition, the USDoD noted the
growing global flow of goods, services, people, technology and information,
and the risks that terrorists and others could cause a wide range of economic
damage. Consequently, protecting American lives and assets in this context
was declared an important objective (US Department of Defense 2008:7).
In May 2010, President Obama declared it necessary to strengthening
established alliances while modernising them to meet new challenges.
Simultaneously, the President clarified that this ‘engagement is no end in itself’.
Instead, the very purpose of maintaining old alliances and building new part-
nerships around the world was said to be to counter violent extremism, stop-
ping the spread of WMD, as well as resolving and preventing conflicts. The
burden for achieving all these ends ‘cannot fall on America’s shoulders alone’,
the President argued. Ensuring strong alliances, building cooperation with
other centres of influence and strengthening both institutions and mechanisms
for cooperation were presented as central objectives when creating the preferred
international order (President of the USA 2010). In 2012, President Obama
stressed that America seeks ‘the prosperity that flows from an open and free
international economic system’. Protecting the vitality of the US’s economy
was also presented as an end. Hence, the free flow of commerce and the as-
surance of access to and use of the global commons as well as maintaining the
US’s influence were identified as key objectives (US Department of Defense
2012). One of the four core national interests presented in the 2014 QDR
concerned American needs. It was argued that to foster a strong, innovative
and growing US economy, an open international economic system was a
prerequisite (US Department of Defense 2014). In 2015, President Obama
stressed that America’s economic strength was not only the foundation of US
national security but also a critical source of US influence abroad. While the
President expressed self-confidence regarding America’s situation, he admitted
that some key allies faced more worrisome challenges. Consequently, their
dependencies and needs affected America’s security:
The challenges faced by Ukrainian and European dependence on

Russian energy supplies put a spotlight on the need for an expanded
view of energy security that recognizes the collective needs of the United
States, our allies, and trading partners as well as the importance of
competitive energy markets (President of the USA 2015:16).
In President Trump’s 2017 NSS, one of the key objectives was to revitalise
America’s economy. The president state that ‘[u]nfair trade practices had
weakened our economy and exported our jobs overseas’. Contrary to his
predecessors, President Trump took a slightly different approach to
America’s allies. He argued that ‘[u]nfair burden-sharing with our allies and
inadequate investment in our own defense had invited danger from those
who wish us harm’. Promoting free, fair and reciprocal economic relation-
ships, as well as promoting and protecting America’s national security in-
novation base, alongside embracing American energy dominance were
presented as key objectives (President of the USA 2017:I-II). In the 2018
NSD, a key objective described was to ensure that common domains re-
mained open and free (US Department of Defense 2018a).
4.2.4 Vulnerabilities
The QDR released in September 2001 stressed the importance of ensuring
the US’s security and freedom of action, including its sovereignty, territorial
integrity, and freedom, the safety of American citizens at home and abroad
as well as the protection of critical American infrastructure (US Department
of Defense 2001). The terrorist attacks in September 2001 created a sense of
vulnerability to the US. As one of eight core ends, President Bush one year
later presented the aim of transforming America’s security institutions to
meet new challenges. This included the ability to defend the homeland and
protecting critical US infrastructure (President of the USA 2002). The
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffs, General Richard Meyers stated that
the ‘attacks of 11 September 2001 demonstrated that our liberties are vul-
nerable’ (US Joint Chiefs of Staff 2004:iv–v). In the 2005 NSD, ensuring the
security of the US’s people was presented as a core end (US Department of
Defense 2005). In the 2006 QDR, to defend the American homeland in-
depth, defeating terrorist networks and preventing hostile states and non-
state actors from acquiring or using WMD were almost presented as ends in
themselves (US Department of Defense 2006). The following month,
President Bush stated that the most solemn obligation of the US was pro-
tecting the American peoples’ security (President of the USA 2006). The
very first line in the 2008 NDS read ‘A core responsibility of the U.S.
Government is to protect the American people’ (US Department of Defense
2008:1). Defending America from attacks on its territory and protecting the
physical integrity of the country were thereby regarded as key ends.
According to the USDoD, the best way of promoting security was ‘to
prevent war when possible and to encourage peaceful change within the
international system’. Consequently, important objectives were ‘building the
capacities of a broad spectrum of partners as the basis for long-term se-
curity’ as well as strengthening ‘the resiliency of the international system’,
and preventing disruptions ‘from escalating or endangering international
security, and to find ways to bring them swiftly to a conclusion’ (US
Department of Defense 2008:9).
In February 2010, security and prosperity were presented as two out of four
chief interests (US Department of Defense 2010a). Simultaneously with the
war against terrorism taking place aboard, strengthening the security and
resilience at home were described as additional ends in the May 2010 NSS.
The sense of being vulnerable also affected the objectives regarding the use of
military force. Advancing peace, security and opportunity were specific ob-
jectives regarding the Greater Middle East. This end was connected to the war
on terrorism and, in the long run, America’s security at home (President of the
USA 2010). In February 2011, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs declared that
‘[o]ur foremost priority is the security of the American people, our territory,
and our way of life’. ‘We must continue to prevent attacks against the United
States and its allies, strengthen international and regional security, and be
prepared to deter and defeat aggression that would undermine international
stability’, the Chairman continued (US Joint Chiefs of Staff 2011:1–2).
In the 2012 strategic guidance, President Obama presented promoting
security as one of the enduring American national interests presented by
President Obama. He emphasised that the end of seeking security was not
only related to the US but also its allies and partners. In the same document,
Secretary Panetta stressed the core ends of countering WMD and protecting
the US homeland (US Department of Defense 2012). The third of the three
strategic pillars presented in the March 2014 QDR also indicated a perceived
vulnerability. Hence, defending the US homeland was given priority, with
deterring and defeating attacks on the US and supporting civil authorities in
mitigating the effects of potential attacks and natural disasters as core ob-
jectives. In addition, the second pillar (projecting US influence and deterring
aggression) also had an approach of vulnerability since the very purpose of
the influence was argued to be to build security globally.
Besides these strategic pillars, the same document also elaborated the core
interests of the US. Two of these four core interests focused on peace and
security. First, the security of the US and its citizens, allies and partners were
given priority. Second, the global leadership of the US was described as a
precondition for an international order that favoured strong interstate co-
operation to meet global challenges (US Department of Defense 2014). In
the 2015 NSS, escalating cybersecurity challenges were mentioned as sources
of anxiety regarding global security. Therefore, key objectives were
strengthening the security and resilience of America’s critical infrastructure
as well as securing Federal networks. The document also elaborated the
potential vulnerabilities in cyberspace and space. A central objective was
developing ‘technologies and tactics to deter and defeat efforts to attack our
space systems; enable indications, warning, and attributions of such attacks;
and enhance the resiliency of critical U.S. space capabilities’ (President of
the USA 2015:13). President Trump promised that his administration
‘would put the safety, interests, and well-being of our citizens first’. He
pledged that he and his administration would rebuild the US’s military and
‘protect our sovereignty’ (President of the USA 2017).
4.3 Means
In Table 4.1, some notable differences in the annual defence expenditure
between the three presidential administrations can be identified. During
President Bush’s eight years in power, the defence expenditures increased
each year and the annual defence expenditure almost doubled between 2001
Table 4.1 Annual defence expenditure, the US 2001–2019 (billion USD)

Bush I 2001 2002 2003 2004
Defence expenditure 331.806 378.463 440.532 492.999
Bush II 2005 2006 2007 2008
Obama I 2009 2010 2011 2012
Obama II 2013 2014 2015 2016
Trump I 2017 2018 2019 2020
Defence expenditure 646.753 682.491 731.751
Sources: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

and 2008. During President Obama’s first three years in office, the defence
expenditure continued to increase, reaching the highest level of the whole
period 2001–2019. However, between 2012 and 2015, the defence ex-
penditure decreased. During President Trump three first years in power, the
defence expenditure again increased. The overall trend in the development
of the US’s defence expenditure is annual increases. Defence expenditures
increased 15 out of 19 years and in total, the annual defence expenditures
more than doubled between the years 2001 and 2019.
4.3.1 Traditional means

In September 2001, the USDoD presented a list of traditional means that
form the then-current force structure. Regarding the US Army, ten regular
divisions, eight National Guard divisions, 15 independent National Guard
brigades, one armoured cavalry regiment and one light cavalry regiment
formed the main units. The US Air Force consisted of 46 active and 38
reserve fighter squadrons, four reserve air defence squadrons and 112
bombers. The bulk of the US Navy included 12 aircraft carriers, 11 air
wings, 12 amphibious ready groups, 55 attack submarines and 108 active
and eight reserve surface combatants. The US Marine Corps organised three
marine expeditionary forces including three active and one reserve division,
as well as three active and one reserve air wing. The USDoD concluded that
certain capabilities, including advanced remote sensing, long-range precision
strike, as well as transformed manoeuvre and expeditionary forces were
especially required. The Department argued that the strike capabilities were
to include not only long-range precision attacks delivered from aircraft and
missiles but also appropriately structured ground force attacks, naval fires
and other capabilities. Other key requirements identified included new
combinations of immediately employable forward stationed and deployed
forces, expeditionary and forcible entry capabilities, special operations
forces, as well as rapidly deployable, highly lethal and sustainable forces (US
Department of Defense 2001). In 2006, the USDoD presented four key
programmatic decisions for developing future means. First, to strengthen
the forces to defeat terrorist networks, the number of special forces batta-
lions was to be increased by one-third. In addition, multipurpose Army and
Marine Corps ground forces were to strengthen their capabilities and ca-
pacity to conduct irregular warfare missions. Second, full-scale civil-military
exercises to improve interagency planning for complex homeland security
contingencies were to be facilitated. Third, to strengthen deterrence and to
hedge against future strategic uncertainty, conventional and non-kinetic
deterrent options were to be developed. The procurement of UAVs was
hence to double the capacity, while the development of the next generation
long-range strike systems was to be accelerated. Fourth, in order to improve
the ability to deal with the dangers posed by states that possess WMD as
well as the possibility of terrorists gaining control of such weapons, the
Department was to expand the US’s capabilities for addressing such con-
tingencies. The Department announced that the US would:
develop capabilities that would present any adversary with complex and
multidimensional challenges and complicate its offensive planning
efforts. These include the pursuit of investments that capitalize on
enduring U.S. advantages in key strategic and operational areas, such as
persistent surveillance and long-range strike, stealth, operational man-
euver and sustainment of air, sea and ground forces at strategic
distances, air dominance and undersea warfare (US Department of
Defense 2006:30–31).
The USDoD’s emphasis on prevention also affected the guidance for de-
veloping the forces and capabilities needed for deterrence and other peace
shaping activities. Jointness was the keyword. Joint ground forces were to be
modular in their structure at all levels, largely self-sustaining, and capable of
operating both in traditional formations as well as disaggregating into
smaller autonomous units. Infantry capacity, light armour units, re-
connaissance capacity, joint fire liaison teams and UAVs were all to be in-
creased. The army was to be organised around brigade combat teams
(BCTs), with 42 BCTs in the regular army and 28 in the National Guard. In
addition, 78 support brigades were to be organised in the regular army, 78 in
the National Guard and 58 in the army reserve. By 2011, the strength of
the Army was to be 482,400 active and 533,000 reserve troops, while the
strength of the Marine Corps was to be 175,000 active and 39,000 reserve
troops. The Department was not explicit in the numbers regarding
the Special Forces but announced that in fiscal terms, the resources had
increased by over 80 per cent compared to 2001.
To achieve the future joint force characteristics regarding air capabilities,
the Department presented a list of decided actions. Developing a new land-
based, penetrating long-range strike capability, as well as reducing the B-52
fleet to 56 aircraft and use the savings for modernisations of B-52s, B-1s and
B-2s in order to support global strike operations, were two of the prioritised
programs. The Air Force was to be organised around 86 combat wings and
the personnel strength reduced by approximately 40,000 full-time equivalent
airmen. The bulk of the navy was to consist of 11 carrier strike groups.
However, also power projection capabilities in littoral waters, as well as the
riverine capability for patrol, interdiction and troop movement on inland
waterways, were on the priority list (US Department of Defense 2006).
In 2010, the bulk of the Army was to consist of four corps and 18 division
headquarters including 40 infantry, eight Stryker and 25 heavy brigade
combat teams, 21 combat aviation brigades, 15 Patriot battalions and seven
terminal high altitude area defense (THAAD) batteries. The Marine Corps
was to organise three marine expeditionary forces including three active and
one reserve divisions, six fixed-wings, seven rotary-wings, nine combat
logistics regiments and seven expeditionary unit command elements. The
Navy was to sail, among other, 11 aircraft carriers with ten carrier air wings,
84 large surface combatants, 14 small surface combatants, 14 mine coun-
termeasure ships, 29 amphibious warfare ships, 53 attack submarines and
four guided-missile submarines. The main units of the Air Force included
ten theatre strike wings (with about 72 aircraft per wing), five long-range
strike bomber wings (with altogether 96 primary mission aircraft), and six
air superiority wings (with about 72 aircraft per wing). Finally, approxi-
mately 660 special operations teams (including the Army’s Alpha-teams,
and the Navy’s SEAL-platoons) and three Ranger battalions were to form
the core of the Special Forces (US Department of Defense 2010a).2 In
February 2011, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael
Mullen, stressed that the US armed forces had to prepare for an increasingly
dynamic and uncertain future in which a full spectrum of military cap-
abilities and attributes will be required to prevent and win our Nation’s wars
(US Joint Chiefs of Staff 2011). Less than a year later, in January 2012, the
Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta, declared:
This country is at a strategic turning point after a decade of war and,

therefore, we are shaping a Joint Force for the future that will be smaller
and leaner, but will be agile, flexible, ready, and technologically
advanced. It will have cutting edge capabilities, exploiting our techno-
logical, joint, and networked advantage. It will be led by the highest
quality, battle-tested professionals (US Department of Defense 2012).
Two years later, in March 2014, the USDoD admitted that it had had to
make tough decisions due to fiscal austerity. Reductions in the force
structure were considered a necessity to protect and expand critical cap-
abilities, undertake modernisation and to increase readiness. At the same
time, priority was also given to investments across all domains, to maintain
the technological edge over potential adversaries. The Department directed
each of the services with some key guidance. The bulk of the Air Force was
to consist of 48 fighter squadrons, altogether with 971 aircraft, and 9 heavy
bomber squadrons, altogether with 96 aircraft. The Army was to reduce its
active personnel strength from 570,000 to 440,000 soldiers, the National
Guard from 358,000 to 335,000 soldiers, and the Army Reserve from
205,000 to 195,000 soldiers. The strength of the Marine Corps was planned
to be 182,000 active marines but could, due to budget cuts, end up being
175,000. The Corps was to organise two marine expeditionary forces. The
bulk of the Navy was to consist of 11 aircraft carriers including ten carrier
air wings, 92 large surface combatants (71 destroyers and 21 cruisers with
additional 11 cruisers in temporary lay-up for modernisation), 43 small
surface combatants including mine countermeasure ships, 33 amphibious
warfare ships, 51 attack submarines and four guided-missile submarines (US
Department of Defense 2014). When President Trump issued his first NSS in
December 2017, he stressed the importance of quantity and the size of
America’s armed forces:
To deter conflict and, if deterrence fails, to win in war, the Nation must
be able to field forces capable of operating in sufficient scale and for
ample duration to defeat enemies, consolidate military gains, and
achieve sustainable outcomes that protect the American people and
our vital interests. The United States must reverse recent decisions to
reduce the size of the Joint Force and grow the force while modernizing
and ensuring readiness (President of the USA 2017:29)
In Table 4.2, the traditional means of the US armed forces are summarised.
Table 4.2 The main traditional units and equipment of the US armed forces
2000–2020
2000 2010 2020
ARMY
Army HQ 3 6
Corps HQ 4 3 3
Tank Division 5 4
Tank Brigade 2 24 5
Mechanized Division 6 2
Mechanized Brigade 5 7 4
Infantry Division 5 2
Infantry Brigade 7 30 24
Airborne Division 2 2
Airborne brigade 10 2
Special Forces Groups/Regiments 8 8 8
MBT 7,900 5,850 5,689
APC/AIFV 21,910 26,089 13,478
Attack Helicopter 1,502 1,035 973
NAVY
Tactical Submarine 55 57 53
Carrier 12 11 11
Cruiser 27 22 24
Destroyer 52 56 67
Amphibious Landing Ship 41 31 32
Marine Infantry Division 4 4 4
Marine Infantry Brigade
Special Forces Teams/Regiments 11 8 9
Naval Aviation Bomber
Naval Aviation Fighter/Attack 1,248 1,158 1,148
AIR FORCE (Tactical Aviation)
Fighter/Attack 2,878 2,525 1,112
Fighter 271
Bombers 208 154 93
Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies.

4.3.2 Enablers
In 2001, the USDoD identified the necessity for the American armed forces
to have sufficient mobility to conduct expeditionary operations in distant
theatres. This included airlift, sealift, prepositioning, basing infrastructure,
alternative points of debarkation and new logistical concepts of operations.
Globally available reconnaissance, strike and command and control assets
were given special attention. The Department also identified an existing
shortfall in strategic transport aircraft, which was considered worrisome (US
Department of Defense 2001). Strengthening intelligence, as well as estab-
lishing and protecting critical bases of military operations, were central
priorities when the USDoD directed the transformation of the US armed
forces in the NDS of 2005. The new global posture built on using main
operating bases (MOBs), forward operating sites (FOSs) and an array of
more austere cooperative security locations (CSLs). In addition, the
Department promised that ‘our prepositioned equipment and stocks over-
seas will be better configured and positioned for global employment’. ‘We
will make better use of ‘reach-back’ capabilities for those functions that can
be accomplished without deploying forward’, the USDoD declared (US
In the February 2006 USDoD, rapid global mobility was considered
central to the armed forces’ effectiveness. Consequently, the USDoD an-
nounced its plans to acquire and modernise a fleet of 292 inter-theatre air-
lifters, including 180 C-17s and 112 modernised C-5s. In addition, the Air
Force was to procure 18 C-130Js and the Marine Corps eight KC-130Js.
Furthermore, to ensure global mobility and power projection, the tanker
fleet was to be recapitalised. Regarding intelligence, surveillance, re-
connaissance (ISR), the Department announced its ambition to increase
human intelligence (HUMINT) resources as well as the measurement and
signature intelligence (MASINT) and expanding the signals intelligence
(SIGINT) capabilities. Robust and coherent joint command and control
capabilities was another prioritised area. The numbers of these assets were
to be increased to provide combatant commanders with rapidly deployable,
standing joint task force headquarters (US Department of Defense 2006).
In January 2009, the Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, and his
Department issued an inaugural Quadrennial Roles and Mission Review
(QRMR). The report identified nine core competencies. While Building
Partnerships, Force Application, Protection and Corporate Management &
Support had a general approach, Battlespace Awareness, Command &
Control, Logistics, Force Support and Net-Centric had an enabling focus.
In addition, Intra-theatre Airlift; Unmanned Aircraft Systems, and ISR
were recognised as special focus areas (US Department of Defense 2009). In
2010, the USDoD stressed the necessity of fielding more (and better) en-
abling systems, ISR, electronic attack capabilities and communications
networks, as well as more resilient base infrastructure. Consequently, the
Navy was to consist of, among other, 126 land-based ISR and electronic
warfare (EW) aircraft, 30 combat logistics force ships, one mobile landing
platform (MLP), 17 command and support vessels, three dry cargo/am-
munition ships and 51 roll-on/roll-off strategic sealift vessels. The Air Force
was to organise eight ISR wings (all together with up to 380 aircraft), 30
airlift and aerial refuelling wings (with 33 aircraft per wing) and three
command and control wings (US Department of Defense 2010a).
In February 2011, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs proudly declared that
no other military could match the US logistics, strategic mobility, planning,
command and control and other enabling capabilities. The Chairman an-
nounced America’s ambition to further ‘explore joint operational concepts
leveraging mobile and more survivable bases, sea-borne mobility, and in-
novative uses of space. We will maintain this superiority’ (US Joint Chiefs of
Staff 2011:20). Establishing a robust ISR architecture as well as meth-
odologies for employing and integrating ISR assets across the services were
also prioritised. Despite the cuts to traditional means announced by the
USDoD in March 2014, the Department gave priority to ISR capabilities in
order to support global situational awareness. Enabling efficient and rapid
long-range deployments, the USDoD also gave priority to the KC-46A next-
generation tanker/cargo aircraft to replace the current KC-10 tanker fleet.
Altogether, the Air Force was to include 443 aerial refuelling aircraft, 211
strategic airlift aircraft, 300 tactical airlift aircraft, 280 ISR aircraft, and 27
command and control aircraft (US Department of Defense 2014).
Improving readiness was given high priority in President Trump’s first
NSS. The President argued that ‘[r]eadiness requires a renewed focus on
training, logistics, and maintenance’. ‘We must be able to get to a theatre in
time to shape events quickly. This will require a resilient forward posture
and agile global mobility forces’, he declared (President of the USA
2017:29). In January 2018, the USDoD announced its decision giving
priority to ‘prepositioned forward stocks and munitions, strategic mobility
assets, partner and allied support, as well as non-commercially dependent
distributed logistics and maintenance to ensure logistics sustainment while
Table 4.3 The main airborne enablers of the US armed forces 2000–2020
2000 2010 2020
KC-135 Stratotanker (tanker) 604 453 156

KC-46 Pegasus (tanker) 22
KC-10 Extender (tanker/transport) 59 59
C-5 Super Galaxy (heavy transport) 126 111 36
C-17 Globemaster (heavy transport) 174 146
C-130 Hercules (medium transport) 547 435 104

under persistent multi-domain attack’ (US Department of Defense 2018a:7).
In Table 4.3, the enabling means of the US armed forces are summarised.
4.3.3 Nuclear means

Based on President Bush’s public announcement in November 2001, the
USDoD soon released a partly classified NPR. According to the unclassified
pages, a new triad was to be established. Composing this triad were: (i) both
nuclear and non-nuclear offensive strike systems; (ii) both active and passive
defensive systems; and (iii) new capabilities in order to meet emerging threats.
These three legs were to be bound together by enhanced command and control
as well as intelligence systems. The explicit goal was to have 1,700–2,200 op-
erational warheads deployed (US Department of Defense 2002). In 2006, the
USDoD announced that the Peacekeeper ICBM had been retired and four
ballistic missile submarines removed from strategic nuclear service. The
number of Minuteman was to be reduced from 500 to 450. Furthermore, four
E-4B national airborne operations centers (NAOCs) aircraft were to be retired
while the procurement of two C-32 aircraft was to be accelerated and the fleet
of E-6B TACAMO command and control aircraft to be upgraded in order to
sustain a survivable airborne link to strategic nuclear forces.3 In addition, the
US ballistic missile defences had begun operations to defend against a range of
potential threats. The US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) was as-
signed several new missions, including global missile defence and combating
WMD (US Department of Defense 2006).
In 2010, the USDoD paid attention to defensive actions. The Department
argued that America’s combined efforts to detect, interdict and contain the
effects of these weapons had to increase. Hence, a Joint Task Force
Elimination Headquarters was to be established in order to plan, train, and
execute WMD-elimination operations. In addition, the biological threat
reduction program was to be expanded and new verification technologies
developed. The number of ground-based interceptors (GBIs) was also to be
increased from 30 to 44 (US Department of Defense 2010a). President
Obama’s vision of a world without nuclear weapons inspired the NPR is-
sued in 2010. The Review’s purpose was to describe how the US was going
to reduce the role and numbers of its nuclear weaponry. Simultaneously, the
USDoD made clear that the ‘nuclear forces will continue to play an essential
role in deterring potential adversaries and reassuring allies and partners
around the world’ (US Department of Defense 2010b:v). In numbers, this
decision left the US with a nuclear arsenal consisting of ‘1,550 accountable
strategic warheads, 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles, and a combined
limit of 800 deployed and non-deployed strategic launchers’. In addition, the
multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) capacity of all
American ICBMs was to be withdrawn, leaving each ICBM with a single
warhead (US Department of Defense 2010b:ix). In 2011, the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs made clear that the US:
seeks the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.
However, as long as nuclear weapons exist, deterring nuclear attack on
the United States, our allies, and partners will continue to be the
fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons. In support of the President’s
vision, we will reduce the role and numbers of nuclear weapons, while
maintaining a safe, secure, and effective strategic deterrent (US Joint
Chiefs of Staff 2011:7).
Following the New START agreement, US nuclear forces were to consist of

1,550 warheads deployed on 420 Minuteman III ICBMs, 240 SLBMs on
altogether 12 SSBNs, and 60 nuclear-capable heavy bombers. The USDoD
declared that the fundamental role of the US’s nuclear forces was to:
deter nuclear attack on the United States, as well as on our allies and
partners. The United States will continue to reduce the role of nuclear
weapons in deterring non-nuclear attack. However, nuclear forces
continue to play a limited but critical role in the Nation’s strategy to
address threats posed by states that possess nuclear weapons and states
that are not in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obliga-
tions (US Department of Defense 2014:14).
In 2017, President Trump expressed his worries that parts of America’s

strategic nuclear triad were too old. The President argued that since
America’s nuclear-armed adversaries were believed to have expanded their
arsenals and range of delivery systems, significant investments were needed
in order ‘to maintain a U.S. nuclear arsenal and infrastructure that is able to
meet national security threats over the coming decades’ (President of the
USA 2017:30). In 2018, the USDoD announced its ambition to modernise
America’s nuclear forces. The department declared that ‘[m]odernization of
the nuclear force includes developing options to counter competitors’
coercive strategies, predicated on the threatened use of nuclear or strategic
non-nuclear attacks’, the Department declared (US Department of Defense
2018a:6). In addition, the next-generation F-35 combat aircraft was to be
modernised to dual-capable fighter-bombers, allowing a forward deploy-
ment of nuclear weapons, should the security situation demand such a step.
The Secretary of Defense, former general Jim Mattis argued that ‘[m]ain-
taining an effective nuclear deterrent is much less expensive than fighting a
war that we were unable to deter’ (US Department of Defense 2018b:III).
Regarding SSBNs, the 14 Ohio-class submarines were planned to be re-
placed with a minimum of 12 Colombia-class ditto. All 450 ICBM launch
facilities were to be modernised as a part of the ground-based strategic
deterrent (GBSD) program. The GBSD also included the replacement of
Minuteman III, to begin in 2029.
The third leg, that is, the strategic bombers, included 46 nuclear-capable
B-52H and 20 nuclear-capable B-2A bombers. A program to supplement,
Table 4.4 The main strategic nuclear forces of the US 2000–2020
2000 2010 2020
SLBM
Trident / aboard Ohio 432/18 336/14 280/14
ICBM
Peacekeeper 50 0 0
Minuteman III 500 500 400
STRATEGIC BOMBER
B-52 Stratofortress 92 71 46
B1 91
B2 20
and eventually replace, these bombers with the next-generation bomber, that
is the B-21 Raider, had also been initiated. Furthermore, the long-range
stand-off (LRSO) cruise missile program was launched to replace the arsenal
of air-launched cruise missile (US Department of Defense 2018b). In
Table 4.4, the nuclear means of the US armed forces are summarised.
4.3.4 Modern means

In September 2001, the USDoD worried about technological advances with the
potential for creating competition in space and cyberspace. This included of-
fensive information operations and deliberate disruption of critical information
infrastructure. Acquiring the means necessary to address the growing challenge
of maintaining space control and defending against attacks on American in-
formation infrastructure were considered fundamental. The USDoD particu-
larly emphasised means for ensuring space surveillance, enhancing the
command and control structure, developing capabilities to conduct space op-
erations and providing space situational awareness (US Department of Defense
2001). The Joint Chiefs of Staff stressed the requirements needed to ‘conduct
information operations, including electronic warfare, computer network op-
erations, military deception, psychological operations and operations security
that enable information superiority’. (US Joint Chiefs of Staff 2004:19). In
2005, the USDoD identified key priorities as abilities to operate from inter-
national waters, airspace, space and cyberspace, as well as conducting network-
centric operations (US Department of Defense 2005). In 2006, the USDoD
gave priority to means designed to support the penetration of surveillance and
strike systems, and to integrated defence systems against short-, intermediate-
and intercontinental-range ballistic systems as well as against cruise missile
systems. Capabilities to shape and defend cyberspace, and joint command and
control capabilities, survivable in the face of attacks from WMD and electronic
and cyber weapons, were also on the list of priorities. USSTRATCOM was
assigned with the responsibilities associated with space operations and global
network operations, while US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) was given
the responsibility for developing an information operations capability and in-
tegrating computer network operations into regular warfighting activities.
Regarding the space domain, the USDoD trusted the space radar program to
provide persistent, all-weather day and night surveillance and reconnaissance
capabilities in otherwise denied areas (US Department of Defense 2006).
In the 2009 QRMR, one of three special focus areas was unmanned air-
craft systems. The Department presented a vision regarding how to develop
cyberspace capabilities ‘that provides global situational awareness of
cyberspace, U.S. freedom of action in cyberspace, the ability to provide
warfighting effects within and through cyberspace, and, when called upon,
provide cyberspace support to civil authorities’ (US Department of Defense
2009:14). The Department announced its decision to develop a professional
cyberspace force able to influence and execute cyberspace operations. To
increase the capacity for conducting computer network operations (CNOs),
training facilities for up to 1,000 students per year were to be established
(US Department of Defense 2009). In 2010, the USDoD declared that the
security environment ‘demands improved capabilities to counter threats in
cyberspace’. According to the Department, ‘modern armed forces simply
cannot conduct effective high-tempo operations without resilient, reliable
information and communication networks and assured access to cyberspace’
(US Department of Defense 2010a:ix). Consequently, the USDoD an-
nounced that the Air Force was to organise five fully operational air and
space operations centres with a total of 27 primary mission aircraft, as well
as ten space and cyberspace wings. Furthermore, the US Cyber Command
(USCYBERCOM) was organised as a sub-unified command under USST-
RATCOM. The new command was to:
lead, integrate and better coordinate the day-to-day defense, protection,

and operation of DoD networks. USCYBERCOM will direct the
operation and defense of DoD’s information networks, and will prepare
to, and when directed, conduct full spectrum cyberspace military
operations. An operational USCYBERCOM will also play a leading
role in helping to integrate cyber operations into operational and
contingency planning (US Department of Defense 2010a:38).
Space and cyberspace were not only considered as enablers for the war-
fighting in the air, land and maritime domains but also as war-fighting
domains in their own right. Regarding the space domain, enhancing space
situational awareness, fostering information sharing among allies and
partners, improving space architecture resiliency and means for power
projection operations in space were prioritised. The focus on cyberspace was
quite defensive, with priority given to ensuring access to the cyberspace
domain despite cyber intrusion or cyber-attacks (US Joint Chiefs of
Staff 2011).
Concurrent with the USDoD’s March 2014 announcement of cuts across
all services regarding traditional means, the Department presented its am-
bition to invest in new and expanded cyber capabilities and forces in order to
enhance America’s ability to conduct cyberspace operations. The US cyber
forces were to consist of, among other, 13 national mission teams (NMTs),
27 combat mission teams (CMTs), 18 national cyber protection teams
(CPTs), 24 service CPTs and 26 combatant command information network
CPTs. The Department presented similar ambitions regarding space op-
erations. This included making critical space-based systems more resilient by
expanding access to commercial and allied space systems. Increasing the use
and integration of unmanned aerial systems was another priority (US
Department of Defense 2014).
In June 2015, the Joint Chiefs of Staff accused North Korea of conducting
cyber-attacks that caused major damage to American corporations.
Consequently, cybersecurity, including the protection of cyber systems and
physical infrastructure, was at the top of the agenda. The US Cyber Mission
Force and the establishment of the joint information environment (JIE)
were given priority. The JIE was intended to enhance both the connectivity
and the cybersecurity among the US forces (US Joint Chiefs of Staff 2015).
In December 2017, President Trump argued that the US ‘must maintain
our leadership and freedom of action in space’. He further explained that ‘[c]
ommunications and financial networks, military and intelligence systems,
weather monitoring, navigation, and more have components in the space
domain’. The re-establishment of the National Space Council was seen as
crucial in this regard. Cyberspace was also given priority by the President.
Improving America’s ability to attribute cyberattacks as well as ‘cyber tools
across the spectrum of conflict to protect U.S. Government assets and U.S.
critical infrastructure and to protect the integrity of data and information’
were prioritised areas (President of the USA 2017:32). In January 2018, the
USDoD stressed its ambition to prioritise investments in ‘resilience, re-
constitution, and operations to assure our space capabilities. We will also
invest in cyber defense, resilience, and the continued integration of cyber
capabilities into the full spectrum of military operations’. In addition, the
Department announced its intent to invest in the military application of
‘autonomy, artificial intelligence, and machine learning, including rapid
application of commercial breakthroughs, to gain competitive military ad-
vantages’ (US Department of Defense 2018a:6–7).
4.4 Ways
4.4.1 Situation
In 2001, the USDoD focused on peacetime forward deterrence in critical
areas of the world. The Department argued that by maintaining regionally
tailored forces stationed and deployed in Europe, Northeast Asia, the East
Asian littoral, the Middle East and Southwest Asia, the US could assure its
allies and friends, counter coercion, deter aggression against and provide
access for follow-on forces. If deterrence would fail, the approach was to
decisively defeat any adversary. The Department argued that the US mili-
tary must maintain the capability to impose its will on any adversaries, in-
cluding states or non-state entities. The Department declared that ‘[s]uch a
decisive defeat could include changing the regime of an adversary state or
occupation of foreign territory until US strategic objectives are met’ (US
Department of Defense 2001:13). In case of major conflicts overlapping, the
ambition was explicitly ‘preserving for the President the option to call for a
decisive victory in one of those conflicts’ (US Department of Defense
2001:17). In addition to the focus on potential major conflicts, the US
military was tasked with simultaneously conducting a limited number of
smaller-scale contingency operations.
In 2004, supporting the objectives of the NMS, four joint operating
concepts (JOCs) were presented: Homeland Security, Stability Operations,
Strategic Deterrence and Major Combat Operations. The Joint Chiefs of
Staff explained that ‘[a]lthough military objectives have enduring elements,
the ways to achieve those goals must evolve through experimentation, op-
erational experience, and the development of transformational capabilities’
(US Joint Chiefs of Staff 2004:9). Preventing conflict and surprise attacks
through ‘actions that deter aggression and coercion while retaining the
capability to act promptly in defending the nation’ were expressed as the
keys to success (US Joint Chiefs of Staff 2004:11).
Deterrence was emphasised in the March 2005 NDS. According to the
USDoD, the effective deterrence derived from not only America’s capacity
and will to defeat any adversary, but also from its capacity to dominate
every level of escalation. The Department declared that ‘[w]e will deter by
maintaining capable and rapidly deployable military forces and, when ne-
cessary, demonstrating the will to resolve conflicts decisively on favourable
terms’ (US Department of Defense 2005:8).
In February 2006, the USDoD stressed the importance of shifting the
focus from responsive actions toward ‘early, preventive measures and in-
creasing the speed of action to stop problems from becoming conflicts or
crises’ (US Department of Defense 2006:2–3). On the one hand, the
Department concluded that US military forces would maintain their pre-
dominance in traditional warfare also in the future. On the other hand, the
Department acknowledged the necessity to address non-traditional and
asymmetric challenges. Hence, irregular warfare, that is, conflicts in which
enemy combatants are not regular military forces, and catastrophic ter-
rorism (terrorists employing WMD), were given the highest priority in order
to avoid disruptive threats and crisis. The Department admitted that this
approach most likely would lead to long-duration unconventional warfare,
including counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, as well as military support
for stabilisation and reconstruction efforts. Drawing on lessons from recent
operations, the USDoD ‘emphasized the importance of early measures to
prevent problems from becoming crises and crises from becoming conflicts’
(US Department of Defense 2006:17). At the same time, the Department
identified the potential needs of simultaneously undertaking multiple and
overlapping wars. As a conclusion, the USDoD presented ideas shifting
from ‘one size fits all’ deterrence toward tailored capabilities to deter ad-
vanced military powers, regional WMD states, and non-state terrorists.
Notably, deterrence still had a prominent position. However, the
Department clarified that should deterring aggression or coercion fail, the
US would ‘deny a hostile power its strategic and operational objectives’ (US
The NSS issued in March 2006 emphasised several situations. Prevention
and denial were the keywords for confronting terrorists. For example, ter-
rorist attacks were to be prevented. Rogue states and terrorist allies were to
be denied access to WMD, as well as prevented from providing sanctuary to
terrorist groups. Ultimately, terrorists were to be denied gaining control ‘of
any nation that they would use as a base and launching pad for terror’
(President of the USA 2006:12). The Clear–Hold–Build concept was to be
implemented in Iraq:
• Clear areas of enemy control by remaining on the offensive, killing and

capturing enemy fighters, and denying them safe haven;
• Hold areas freed from enemy control with an adequate Iraqi security
force presence that ensures these areas remain under the control of a
peaceful Iraqi Government; and
• Build Iraqi Security Forces and the capacity of local institutions to
deliver services, advance the rule of law, and nurture civil society
(President of the USA 2006:12).
Conflicts were to be avoided, and if avoidance was unsuccessful, interven-

tions were occasionally considered a necessary way of conflict management:
‘Some conflicts pose such a grave threat to our broader interests and values
that conflict intervention may be needed to restore peace and stability’
(President of the USA 2006:16). The President argued that once peace had
been restored ‘the hard work of post-conflict stabilization and reconstruc-
tion must begin’. He further upheld that ‘military involvement may be ne-
cessary to stop a bloody conflict, but peace and stability will last only if
follow-on efforts to restore order and rebuild are successful’ (President of
the USA 2006:16). In June 2008, USDoD stressed the importance of de-
terring potential adversaries:
Deterrence is key to preventing conflict and enhancing security. It

requires influencing the political and military choices of an adversary,
dissuading it from taking an action by making its leaders understand
that either the cost of the action is too great, is of no use, or
unnecessary. Deterrence also is based upon credibility: the ability to
prevent attack, respond decisively to any attack so as to discourage even
contemplating an attack upon us, and strike accurately when necessary
(US Department of Defense 2008:11).
Six core mission areas were presented in January 2009, each underpinned by a
JOC: Homeland Defense & Civil Support; Deterrence Operations; Major
Combat Operations; Irregular Warfare; Military Support to Stabilization
Security, Transition, & Reconstruction Operations; and Military Contribution
to Cooperative Security. The US Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates declared
that ‘[t]his is truly a wartime QDR’ when introducing the review in February
2010. To prevent conflicts, a new air-sea battle concept was launched,4 that
would (if needed) project power, deter aggression, and aid allies and partners.
Naturally, winning the ongoing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were on top of
the agenda. Preventing and deterring conflicts and succeeding in counter-
insurgency, stability and counterterrorism operations were also given high
priority. The Department also gave priority to preparing to defeat adversaries
and to succeed in a wide range of contingencies, in case deterrence failed, as
well as defending the US and supporting civil authorities at home. Notably,
the different services were partly to focus on different situations. For example,
the US ground forces were to remain capable of full-spectrum operations, with
a focus on counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorist operations while
US naval forces were directed to forward presence and power projection op-
erations, and US air forces to deter and ultimately defeat adversaries (US
Department of Defense 2010a).
Two months later, the USDoD announced that the Department was
preparing a declaration in which the US pledged not to ‘use or threaten to
use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to
the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations’
(US Department of Defense 2010b:viii). The Department made clear that
the US would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme cir-
cumstances to defend its own as well as its allies and partners’ vital interests
(US Department of Defense 2010b). The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
stressed in the 2011 NMS that ‘[p]reventing wars is as important as winning
them, and far less costly’ (US Joint Chiefs of Staff 2011:7). The primary
missions for the US armed forces were to provide support to civil autho-
rities, counter WMD and terrorism, deter and defeat aggression, provide a
stabilising presence in key areas and conduct stability and counter-
insurgency as well as humanitarian, disaster relief and other operations in-
cluding power projection. In January 2012, the USDoD stressed that ‘[i]n
order to credibly deter potential adversaries and to prevent them from
achieving their objectives’, the US ‘must maintain its ability to project power
in areas in which our access and freedom to operate are challenged’ (US
Department of Defense 2012:4). Two years later, in March 2014, the
USDoD declared that US armed forces:
will be capable of simultaneously defending the homeland; conducting
sustained, distributed counterterrorist operations; and in multiple
regions, deterring aggression and assuring allies through forward
presence and engagement. If deterrence fails at any given time, U.S.
forces will be capable of defeating a regional adversary in a large-scale
multi-phased campaign, and denying the objectives of – or imposing
unacceptable costs on – a second aggressor in another region (US
Department of Defense 2014:vi).
The USDoD warned that US armed forces during the past decade had been
focusing on a single type of conflict – conflict management – and now
needed to restore its readiness for the full spectrum of potential conflict. For
this reason, elaborations on the operational ends and ways were used when
providing the strategic priorities:
1. Maintain a secure and effective nuclear deterrent;

2. Provide for military defense of the homeland;
3. Defeat an adversary;
4. Provide a global, stabilizing presence;
5. Combat terrorism;
6. Counter weapons of mass destruction;
7. Deny an adversary’s objectives;
8. Respond to crisis and conduct limited contingency operations;
9. Conduct military engagement and security cooperation;
10. Conduct stability and counterinsurgency operations;
11. Provide support to civil authorities; and
12. Conduct humanitarian assistance and disaster response (US Department
of Defense 2014:60–61).
In January 2018, rather than terrorism, inter-state strategic competition was

presented as the primary concern. The USDoD admitted that deterring or
defeating long-term strategic competitors were fundamentally different chal-
lenges compared to the regional adversaries in focus in previous US strategies.
Being strategically predictable while concurrently operationally unpredictable
was argued to be the key to success (US Department of Defense 2018a). The
following month, the USDoD declared that the US would only consider the
employment of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital
interests of America, its allies and its partners.
Nevertheless, if deterrence fails, the United States will strive to end any
conflict at the lowest level of damage possible and on the best achievable
terms for the United States, allies, and partners. U.S. nuclear policy for
decades has consistently included this objective of limiting damage if
deterrence fails (US Department of Defense 2018b:VIII).
4.4.2 Employment
Long-range strike aircraft and special operations forces were to provide an
immediately employable supplement to forward forces in order to achieve a
deterring effect during peacetime. Eliminating enemy offensive capability
across the depth of its territory, restoring favourable military conditions in
the region of conflict, and creating acceptable political conditions for the
cessation of hostilities were the guidelines when employing military force.
U.S. forces will degrade an aggressor’s ability to coerce others through

conventional or asymmetric means, including CBRNE weapons. U.S.
forces will fight from a forward deterrent posture with immediately
employable forces, including long-range precision strike capabilities
from within and beyond the theater, and rapidly deployable maneuver
capabilities […] This capability will include the ability to occupy
territory or set the conditions for a regime change if so directed (US
In the 2004 NMS, the prevention of conflict and the determent of aggression
were argued to rely on an integrated overseas presence in strategically im-
portant areas, conveying ‘a credible message that the United States remains
committed to preventing conflict’. The Joint Chiefs of Staff argued that
these forces also demonstrated ‘that the United States will react forcefully
should an adversary threaten the United States, its interests, allies and
partners’. Consequently, the very purpose of deploying forces forward was
explicitly stated to be ‘working with other nations to promote security and
to deter aggression’ as well as increasing ‘the capabilities of partners to
protect common security interests’ (US Joint Chiefs of Staff 2004:11). The
Joint Chiefs of Staff presented a 1-4-2-1 concept of employment: ‘to defend
the homeland, deter forward in and from four regions, and conduct two,
overlapping “swift defeat” campaigns. Even when committed to a limited
number of lesser contingencies, the force must be able to ‘win decisively’ in
one of the two campaigns’ (US Joint Chiefs of Staff 2004:21). In March
2005, the USDoD argued for active and layered employment of armed
forces: ‘We will focus our military planning, posture, operations, and cap-
abilities on the active, forward, and layered defense of our nation, our in-
terests, and our partners’ (US Department of Defense 2005:iv). The
Department also argued that allowing opponents to strike first was un-
acceptable and not an option. Instead, the US had to defeat ‘the most
dangerous challenges early and at a safe distance, before they are allowed to
mature’ (US Department of Defense 2005:9).
Five years later, in February 2010, the USDoD announced that about
400,000 US military personnel were forward-stationed and deployed around
the world, including in the ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq (US
Department of Defense 2010a). In March 2014, the USDoD declared that it
had identified new paradigms for the US military presence, including: ‘po-
tentially positioning additional forward deployed naval forces in critical
areas, and deploying new combinations of ships, aviation assets, regionally
aligned or rotational ground forces, and crisis response forces’ (US
Department of Defense 2014:vi). Less than a year later, President Obama
clarified that the US’s military was postured globally in order to protect
American interests, to preserve regional and to ‘build the capacity of our
partners to join with us in meeting security challenges. U.S. forces will’ the
President continued, ‘be ready to project power globally to defeat and deny
aggression in multiple theaters’ (President of the USA 2015:8–9). In June
2015, the Joint Chiefs of Staff summarised the ways that America’s armed
forces were employed in order to implement the US strategy:
The U.S. military deters aggression by maintaining a credible nuclear

capability that is safe, secure, and effective; conducting forward engagement
and operations; and maintaining Active, National Guard, and Reserve
forces prepared to deploy and conduct operations of sufficient scale and
duration to accomplish their missions. Forward deployed, rotational, and
globally responsive forces regularly demonstrate the capability and will to
act. Should deterrence fail to prevent aggression, the U.S. military stands
ready to project power to deny an adversary’s objectives and decisively
defeat any actor that threatens the U.S. homeland, our national interests, or
our allies and partners (US Joint Chiefs of Staff 2015:7).
4.4.3 Behaviour
The USDoD declared in September 2001 that transformed manoeuvre and
expeditionary forces, alongside transformed rapidly deployable manoeuvre
capabilities, were necessary to manoeuvre at varying depths within enemy
areas (US Department of Defense 2001). The JOC for Homeland Security,
introduced in the 2004 NMS, included tasks to protect America from direct
attack while securing its air, sea, land and space approaches. The JOC for
Stability Operations and Strategic Deterrence included guidelines for com-
batant commanders on how to employ forces before, during and after
conflict. The JOCs for Stability Operations and Major Combat Operations
were said to be complementary. The Joint Chiefs of Staff stressed that they:
must be fully integrated and synchronized in campaign planning. These

concepts allow the Joint Force to conduct sequential, parallel or
simultaneous operations throughout the physical and information
domains of the global battlespace. The goal of these JOCs is to sustain
increased operating tempo, place continuous pressure on the adversary
and synchronize military action with the application of other instru-
ments of national power (US Joint Chiefs of Staff 2004:14).
The Joint Chiefs advocated full spectrum dominance, that is, the ability to
control any situation or defeat any adversary across the range of military
operations. This approach seems to favour control. However, in order to
achieve the NMS’ objectives, the application of military force tended to
focus on manoeuvre. Force application was declared as the primary task of
the US armed forces. The application:
requires the integrated use of maneuver and engagement to create

precisely defined effects. Force application includes force movement to
gain positional and temporal advantage to rapidly seize the initiative
and complicate an adversary’s defensive plans (US Joint Chiefs of Staff
2004:16).
However, manoeuvre was not the focus of the February 2006 QDR. Instead,
the USDoD stressed a broad range of operations, ranging from long-duration
operations including unconventional warfare, through counterterrorism,
counterinsurgency and stabilisation and reconstruction operations, to con-
ventional major or strike operations. The Department described three ob-
jective areas: Homeland Defence, the War on Terror (including irregular and
asymmetric warfare) and Conventional Campaigns. The quest for capabilities
for waging multiple campaigns, potentially with overlapping timeframes, and
for which there may be limited or no warning of an attack, indicated the
Department’s emphasis on striving for control. The USDoD argued that the
military had to be prepared ‘to remove a hostile regime, destroy its military
capacity and set conditions for the transition to, or for the restoration of, civil
society’ (US Department of Defense 2006:38).
In December 2017, President Trump stressed the necessity of retaining a
full-spectrum force. While arguing for the expansion of America’s armed
forces and increasing their readiness, Trump warned that despite these im-
provements, US dominance and control in air, maritime, land, space and
cyberspace domains was not guaranteed. Therefore, he ordered the USDoD
to develop new operational concepts, ‘including against those operating
below the level of conventional military conflict. We must sustain our
competence in irregular warfare, which requires planning for a long-term,
rather than ad hoc, fight against terrorist networks and other irregular
threats’ (President of the USA 2017:29). Dynamic force employment and
military posture were described as key contributors when introducing un-
predictability to adversary decision-makers. With the US’s allies and part-
ners ‘we will challenge competitors by manoeuvring them into unfavourable
positions, frustrating their efforts, precluding their options while expanding
our own, and forcing them to confront conflict under adverse conditions’,
the USDoD declared (US Department of Defense 2018a:5).
In Table 4.5, US deployments of armed units abroad are summarised. The
number of deployed troops is relatively stable in several countries. However,
in the Middle East, some dramatic changes can be observed. In Europe, the
Table 4.5 The main US deployments of armed units abroad 2000–2020
2000 2010 2020
Bilateral
Arrangements
Australia 300 138 1,500
Bahrain 900 1,447 5,000
Belgium 790 1,276 1,050
Bermuda 800
Bulgaria 150
Cameroon 300
Canada 130 150
Colombia 84 50
Cuba 1,080 903 1,000
Djibouti 1,165 4700
El Salvador 21
Germany 61,580 53,960 38,750
Greece 420 371 1000
Greenland ? 160
(Denmark)
Haiti 230
Honduras 410 421 450
Hungary 640 200
Iceland 1,640
Iraq 120,000 6,000
Israel 46
Italy 10,500 9,474 12,750
Japan 39,750 33,392 55,600
Jordan 2,300
Kuwait 5,190 ? 13,500
Netherlands 300 528 400
Niger 800
Nigeria 50
Norway 60 76 1,400
Philippines 111 200
Oman 690
Poland 2,857
Portugal 1,040 727 250
Qatar 432 10,000
Romania 1,150
Saudi Arabia ? 277 2,000
Singapore 150 122 200
Somalia 500
South Korea 36,746 25,374 28,500
Spain 2,130 1,274 3,750
Syria 1,500
Thailand 120 300
Turkey 2,040 1,600 1,700
Ukraine 220
United Arab 104 5,500
Emirates (UAE)
(Continued)
Table 4.5 (Continued)
2000 2010 2020
United 11,340 9,367 9,500

Kingdom (UK)
International PSOs
Afghanistan 65,929 8,475
Bosnia/ 7,950
Croatia (SFOR
Egypt (MFO) 918 688 454
Yugoslavia / 1,000 1,475 660
Serbia (KFOR)
Maritime
Operations
Arabian Sea 1 Carrier, 2 2 Submarines, 1
Cruisers, 5 Carrier, 1 Cruiser,
Destroyers 2 Destroyers
Mediterranean 4 Submarines, 1 1 Destroyer 1 Submarine, 2
Sea Carrier-group Destroyers
North Sea 1 Destroyer
Persian Gulf 16 Patrol & Costal
combatants
most notable change concern Germany where the US presence has been
reduced from more than 61,000 in the year 2000 to slightly less than 39,000
in the year 2020. Increased US military presence in some other European
states do not match the decreased number of troops in Germany. In
Northeast Asia, on the other hand, a substantially increased US military
presence in Japan can be identified.
4.5 Conclusions – the American strategy

In the initial chapters, we introduced two research questions regarding the
American strategy:
• How have the defence strategies of the US developed during the twenty-
first century?
• Do US strategic choices correspond to the expectations drawn from the
balance of power theory (BPT) and power transition theory (PTT)? It is
now time to address these questions.
Let us start with the American alignment strategy. During the Bush adminis-
tration (2001–2008), the global economy and globalisation were in focus. The
globalised economy was expected to foster increased political stability as well as
enhanced cooperation among governments, intergovernmental organizations
and NGOs. Emerging powers such as China, India and Brazil were perceived
to gain influence on the global scene at the expense of ageing powers such as
Russia, Japan and some of the EU-members. This restructuring of interna-
tional relations was however not expected to change the American position as
the most powerful actor, especially not in military terms. Consequently, the US
was still believed to be able to deal with potential challenges from competitors
such as China, Russia, North Korea and Iran, as well as with the threat of
international terrorism. In counterbalancing China’s growing influence, other
states, such as Japan and Taiwan, were perceived to be dependent on the US,
rather than vice versa. Since the EU countries were expected to deal with the
challenges of ageing populations and growing immigration, mostly from
Muslim countries, with the potential of leading to periods of protracted eco-
nomic stasis, the Bush administration did not seem to have expected much
support from the European allies in dealing with global matters of shared in-
terests. Not least, the decision to invade Iraq in 2003, despite protests from key
NATO allies and without approval from the UNSC, indicated a unilateral
approach.
The classification of the Bush administration’s alignment strategy is
complicated by the fact that the prime security concern of this adminis-
tration is a non-state actor, international terrorism. The alignment stra-
tegies introduced in section 3.1 concerned relations between great powers,
not relations between states and non-state actors. Nevertheless, in fo-
cusing on how official documents from this administration related US’s
position and efforts to other states and their actions we consider it rea-
sonable to label the alignment strategy of the Bush administration as
primacy. One explicit goal presented by the USDoD was to dissuade ad-
versities from undertaking military programs or operations that could
threaten the interest of the US and its allies. Consequently, both major
and emergent powers should be dissuaded from developing capabilities
that could threaten regional stability. One key aspect of this concerned
preventing proliferation of WMD to hostile states and non-state actors.
The US needs to have the ability to deter aggression and defeat aggression
if deterrence failed.
American analyses of the strategic environment seem to display an in-
creasing awareness of challenges to both US´s unipolar position and the
liberal international order. The analysis of rising and emergent powers and
ageing powers indicates a power transition that may correspond to both
HST and PTT. However, there is no single new hegemon or dominate state
insight that could replace the US. Instead, the diffusion of power to regional
powers and non-state actors as well as many thematic trends are challenging
the US leading position and the liberal international order.
Regarding means and ways, the Department argued that the US military
must maintain the capability to impose the will of the US on any adver-
saries, including both states with advanced military capabilities and non-
state actors. To achieve decisive defeats, the administration was prepared to
change the regime of an adversary state, occupy foreign territory and engage
in various preventive measures. Moreover, the US should maintain its
predominance in traditional warfare and prepare itself to undertake multiple
and overlapping wars. Concerning the general expectations of BPT and
PTT, the Bush administration primarily relied on its own overwhelming
military power and a positive power asymmetry in relation to all other
states. The focus on the imbalance of power as a key to stability is not
compatible with traditional BPT and the focus on unilateral capacities does
not match PTT. This would make the Bush administration more akin to the
hegemonic stability theory (HST). However, we also observe a gradual shift
from a uni- towards a multilateral approach in the Bush strategy that may
be interpreted as a move towards PTT.
During the Obama administration (2009–2016), the US seemed to have
accepted that the developments towards a multipolar world order was ir-
reversible. The main challengers to the US’s position were perceived to be
the BRICs: Brazil, Russia, India and China. Nonetheless, the lack of con-
sensus among these four, and between other emerging powers was, together
with the multifaceted nature of US power taken as evidence that the US
would keep its status as the first among equals in the emergent new world
order. The relative power of two main US’s allies, the EU and Japan, was
believed to be likely to decline even further. In the analyses from USNIC,
non-state actors and global trends relating to different societal factors fur-
ther undermined the US’s leading position and the liberal international
order. The Obama administration did not only focus on countering violent
extremism and stopping the spread of WMD but also on resolving and
preventing conflicts. Clearly, it realised that the burdens for fulfilling these
ambitions could not, due to the limits of US power, fall on America’s
shoulders alone. Consequently, strengthening established alliances as well as
international institutions, while also building cooperation with other key
actors were all presented as central objectives. We consider this in line with
the strategy of cooperative security. Additional support for this interpreta-
tion is the administration’s emphasis on universal values and common se-
curity challenges when it comes to ends. When it comes to means and ways,
the Obama administration used institutional means and resources such as
the new START agreement to address security challenges related to WMD.
In addressing the security needs of both states and individuals, the admin-
istration advocated the use of military capabilities to render humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief. The Obama administration’s emphasis on
global leadership and multilateral cooperation is fully compatible with the
perspective of PTT.
The Trump administration (2017–2020) instead focused on the diverging
interests among not only the major but also aspiring powers. The efficiency
of international organisations has therefore been considered to be at risk.
Nationalism, military modernisation, and foreign engagements were iden-
tified as common elements of Chinese and Russian policy. In this context,
President Trump declared his ambition to promote a balance of power
strategy, favouring the US and its allies. Simultaneously, the President
stressed that he viewed the burden-sharing between the US and its allies as
unfair. We nevertheless argue that the Trump administration, despite the
President’s nationalistic rhetoric, has applied a selective engagement rather
than an isolationistic strategy. This categorisation finds support in the US
continued global deployment of forces based on both bi- and multilateral
agreements. However, the decreased number of US army units in Europe is
not fully compatible with the recommendations of selective engagements
since Europe is one of the key regions in the world in preventing wars be-
tween great powers. That the massive withdrawal of troops from Iraq was
followed by the resignation of the minister of defence also indicates that
there are different views within the Trump administration regarding US
deployment of troops to allied states. In Table 4.6, the American alignment
strategies are illustrated.
Table 4.6 The shifts in the US’s alignment strategy during the twenty-first century
Power imbalances as a Balance of power strategies
source of stability as a source of stability
Multilateral & status

quo-oriented strategies
Unilateral potentially
revisionist strategies
Regarding the military strategy, the ends, as well as the balance between
them, have been quite similar throughout the period explored. This ob-
servation corresponds well with the USDoD’a declaration of enduring
national interests. Hence, the core values are promoting peace, sustaining
freedom, and encouraging prosperity. In addition, President Bush stated
justice, democracy and human dignity as ideals. During his time in office, the
promotion of these values made up one of the two core pillars of the Bush
strategy. In line with the alignment strategy primacy, the administration’s
ambition was to ensure that all major and emerging powers were integrated
into the international system. The Obama administration took another path
in this regard. Maintaining the functionality of the international system was
to be achieved through alliances, partnerships, and multinational institutions.
This was even presented as a goal in itself. Compared to his predecessor,
President Obama put greater emphasis on governance and on strengthening
international norms and universal rights. President Trump, on the other hand,
focused on American values and America’s way of life. Rather than pro-
moting universal values, he presented a vision of a world consisting of so-
vereign and independent nations, each with its own culture. Arguably, ends
based on values were the most central in the Bush strategy.
The Bush administration declared the deterrence of adversaries from
undertaking military activities that could threaten the interests of the US as
an explicit goal. Rogue states and terrorists were described as the primary
enemies, but major and emerging powers were also to be deterred from
developing capabilities that could threaten American interests. Honouring
America’s security commitments by helping allies and partners to increase
their ability to defend themselves and to contribute to the collective efforts
to meet common threats was also declared a key objective of the Bush ad-
ministration. President Obama followed his predecessor in this regard.
Consequently, terrorism and violent extremism were stated to be the most
important threats to manage. In addition, the Obama administration men-
tioned the importance of addressing potential threats from revisionist states.
The Trump administration took this elaboration a step further, and ex-
plicitly mentioned America’s strategic competition with the revisionist
countries of China and Russia. Arguably, defending US homeland against
various threats was most predominant as an end in the Trump adminis-
trations strategy.
When it comes to ends related to needs, the Bush administration focused
on the global economy. Therefore, the security of international lines of
communication, as well as access to key markets and strategic resources
were presented as ends. Free markets and free trade were the core of these
elaborations, and cooperation with the other main centres of global power
was considered a necessity. Notably, the administration mentioned China,
India and Russia as key allies. Contrary to its predecessor, the Obama ad-
ministration stressed the necessity of strengthening established alliances to
promote an open and free international economic system. The worries ex-
pressed referred to the dependency on Russian energy by America’s
European allies and partners rather than on the needs of the US itself. The
Trump administration did not share this perspective. Instead of being
concerned about the economies of the US’s allies, the revitalisation of
America’s economy was emphasised. Arguably, the needs have not been
prioritised by any US administration during the twenty-first century.
The fourth and last aspect of the ends, vulnerabilities, also did not receive
much attention in the strategic elaborations by any presidential adminis-
tration. All three administrations focused on the safety of American citizens
at home and abroad, as well as on protecting critical US infrastructure. In its
strategic documents, the Obama administration also included vulnerabilities
related to the spread of WMD and to cyberspace. However, the documents
stated that the foremost priority was the security of the American people,
US territory and the American way of life. To conclude, we argue that
protecting and promoting values, and especially peace, freedom and pros-
perity, have been the most dominant ends of American strategy.
Regarding traditional means, the Bush administration gave priority to the
Special Operations Forces, the capacity of both the Army and the Marine
Corps to conduct irregular warfare missions, capabilities for deterrence and
anti-WMD measures. Altogether, these efforts aimed at ensuring America’s
advantages vis-à-vis adversaries in key strategic and operational areas. The
Obama administration admitted that it, due to fiscal austerity, had to un-
dertake reductions in the force structure. The Army was to reduce its active
personnel strength from 570,000 to 440,000 soldiers. The Air Force was to
phase-out several combat aircraft, slow down the purchase of the Joint
Strike Fighter and cut flying hours. The Navy was to retire one of the 11
aircraft carriers while the Marine Corps was to reduce the Marine expedi-
tionary forces from three to two. President Trump made it clear that he
intended to reverse his predecessor’s decisions to reduce the size of
America’s military. The armed forces were to both grow and be modernised.
Despite this declaration, we argue that the traditional means had the most
predominant role in the Bush strategy.
The Bush administration stressed the necessity of the US’s armed forces
ability to conduct expeditionary operations globally. Therefore, the Bush
administration gave priority to strategic mobility, prepositioning, basing
infrastructure, intelligence and rapidly deployable joint task force head-
quarters. The Obama administration continued this approach, putting even
greater emphasis on the enabling systems. This included the focus on a
broad range of functions, including battlespace awareness, command and
control, logistics, unmanned aircraft systems, ISR as well as EW-
capabilities. Despite the cuts regarding traditional means, the Obama ad-
ministration announced its decision to purchase next-generation tanker/
cargo aircraft to replace the current fleet. President Trump also continued
along this path. A resilient forward posture and agile global mobility forces
were, together with a focus on training, logistics, and maintenance, central
parts of his administration’s actions to improve the readiness of the
American military. Arguably, enablers have had a central role under all
administrations during the twenty-first century.
President Bush’s November 2001 announcement to establish a nuclear triad
was never implemented. Instead, the Peacekeeper ICBMs were retired, four
ballistic missile submarines were taken out of service and the number of
Minuteman reduced to 450. The Obama administration continued decreasing
the size of America’s nuclear forces. The nuclear triad was reduced to ap-
proximately 50 per cent compared to the START I levels. Furthermore, the
MIRV capacity was completely withdrawn, leaving all American ICBMs with
just a single nuclear warhead. However, not only were the number of nuclear
weapons reduced, as was their role in the overarching strategy. Nonetheless,
shortly after his inauguration, President Trump directed the USDoD to con-
duct a new NPR. The Trump administration decided to modernise each of the
legs in the nuclear triad, while also making the next-generation F-35 combat
aircraft dual-capable and deciding to launch the LRSO cruise missile program.
Arguably, nuclear weapons were most dominant in the Trump strategy.
The Bush administration prioritised modern means in space and cyber-
space. Enabling the US to conduct information operations, computer
network operations, as well as psychological operations, the means ultimately
ensured the US’s armed forces information superiority. Moreover, the ac-
celerated acquisition of UAVs doubled this specific capacity. The Obama
administration continued these efforts. For example, the US Air Force was to
organise five space operations centres, and a new cyber command was es-
tablished as a sub-unified command under USSTRATCOM. Space and cy-
berspace were not only considered as enablers for the warfighting in the air,
land, and maritime domains but also as war-fighting domains in their own
right. Moreover, at the same time as the Obama administration announced
cuts regarding the traditional means, the USDoD expanded America’s cyber
capabilities and organised an American cyber force. President Trump ex-
panded this approach even further. His administration re-established the
National Space Council and announced its intent to invest even more in areas
such as artificial intelligence. Arguably, modern means have had a central role
in all administrations during the twenty-first century.
Finally, regarding ways, the Bush administration stressed the countering
of coercion and the determent of aggression, indicating a focus on the war-
preventing situation. Simultaneously, if deterrence failed, the administration
would not shy away from a war-fighting situation. Notably, the adminis-
tration made clear that its ambition was to have the capacity necessary to
dominate every level of escalation. As the focus shifted towards irregular
warfare, the conflict avoidance situation gained increased attention.
Preventing and denying were therefore the keywords when addressing the
challenges caused by terrorists. The Obama administration also presented a
combination of preventing conflicts and deterring aggression. However,
prevailing in the ongoing irregular wars in Afghanistan and Iraq was on top
of the agenda. Moreover, the services were partly to focus on different si-
tuations. While the ground forces were to remain capable of full-spectrum
operations, with a focus on counterinsurgency and counterterrorism op-
erations in a conflict management situation, the naval and air forces were
directed to power projection in a war prevention situation. Rather than
terrorism, the Trump administration declared inter-state strategic competi-
tion as the primary concern. Hence, the focus for all services was on war
prevention. To conclude, we argue that the overarching priority over time
has been on the war prevention situation. Occasionally, other situations have
been in focus, in particular for the ground forces.
Regarding the employment of military force, the Bush administration’s
core directions were to eliminate the enemy’s offensive capability across the
depth of their territory and restoring favourable military conditions in the
region of conflict. Hence, the forward deployment of the US military was
considered a precondition for success. The Obama administration also ap-
plied this approach. Projecting power and the capacity to defeat decisively
any adversary were thereby also emphasised under Obama.
The Bush administration’s guidance held central the ability to manoeuvre
at varying depths within enemy areas. At the same time, the emphasis on
achieving a full-spectrum dominance indicated the ambition to control all
events across the range of military operations. The behaviour conducted by
the American forces corresponded with the core of manoeuvre warfare as it
includes force movements to gain a positional and temporal advantage as well
as to seize rapidly the initiative. However, as counterinsurgency received more
and more attention, the administration seemed to have given priority to
control over manoeuvre. Hence, sustainability and the ability to wage mul-
tiple campaigns were emphasised. The Trump administration continued this
approach. Consequently, priority was given to ensuring American dominance
and control in all domains of warfare. Since neither employment nor beha-
viour has been addressed fully throughout the two decades explored, the focus
regarding ways is on the situation. To summarise, regarding ways, we argue
that the war prevention situation has dominated.
The similarities between the three US administrations military strategies
may come as a surprise, considering the differences between the three pre-
sident’s general international orientation and the differences related to
alignment strategies. One explanation for this continuity may be the central
role of the USDoD and the various services and branches of the armed
forces in preparing plans for the long-term development of US armed forces.
Another explanation for this continuity is the time lag between strategies for
the use of force and strategies for force generation. An elected president may
decide upon rapid changes in questions related to the use of military re-
sources. However, the development of advanced military systems and cap-
abilities is a much more time-consuming effort based on technical expertise
and not easily transformed during one president’s time in office. The
common elements in the military strategies of the three administrations are
summarised in Table 4.7.
Table 4.7 The military strategy of the US
Ends Means Ways
Values Enablers & Modern Situation
John Ikenberry noted already in 2004 that the Bush administration was
influenced by ideas built on American global rule, the unilateral exercise of
American military power, and on the ‘gradual disentanglement from the
constraints of multilateralism and an aggressive push to bring freedom and
democracy to countries where evil lurks’ (Ikenberry 2004:7). We find that his
observations are in line with our argument on primacy as the appropriate
label of at least the initial years of the Bush presidency. Ikenberry provided
additional support for this argument when he quotes Defense Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld who suggested that the mission determines the coalition,
this was evident when the administration preferred a coalition of the willing
rather than one based on established alliances.
Robert Jervis’s observation that ‘unipolarity does not seem deeply af-
fected by nuclear weapons’ supports our findings on the means, that is, that
enablers and modern means have tended to have the most prominent role
(Jervis 2009:202). Moreover, just as we did, Jervis observed the focus on
values regarding ends, and on war prevention regarding ways. Stephen Walt
noted in 2009 that despite unipolarity, the US’s primacy fell short of global
hegemony. However, according to Walt, the US’s position as the sole su-
perpower gave it command of the commons, ‘that is, the ability to operate
with near impunity in the air, oceans, and space’. Moreover, its unique
position provided the US with the ability to defeat any other country or
coalition ‘in a direct test of battlefield strength’ (Walt 2009:92–93). Even if
Walt presented his article after the Bush presidency, his findings support our
conclusions on the alignment strategy based on primacy.
Contrary to Walt, Christoffer Layne argued that already the foreshocks
of the great recession in the fall of 2007 indicated the end of US primacy
(Layne 2012). We agree with Layne’s position in this regard. However, we
slightly disagree when he claimed that preserving America’s hegemonic role
was the overarching strategic objective of the Obama administration.
Instead, we find his elaboration on unipolar exit to be in line with our
findings. We also think that his conclusion is convincing, that is, that the
sources of America’s decline can partly be explained by the rise of emerging
powers, especially China, and partly by the looming fiscal crisis in the US.
However, Joseph Nye did not agree fully with such a statement. Nye argued
that ‘military power is largely unipolar, and the United States is likely to
retain primacy for quite some time’ (Nye 2012:215).
Robert Ross focused on the rise of China when exploring the American
strategy. His suggestions on deterring China militarily and concurrently
using power projection to reassure the US’s key allies that they can rely on
America’s capacity in providing security against China are in line with our
finding on war prevention as the core aspect of ways. Arguably, his ex-
amples of how the US has ‘strengthened its forward presence in East Asia
through cooperation with its regional security partners’ in order to ‘deter
Chinese use of force to challenge the regional order’ are in line with our
conclusions regarding the US’s alignment strategy based on multilateralism
and a status quo approach (Ross 2013:26–27). Stephen Biddle and Ivan
Oelrich also focused on the rise of China. They referred to the post-Cold
War period as a ‘remarkable era of military primacy for U.S. arms against
potential state rivals’. They observed that this era may be ending, if not
globally, at least in the Western Pacific (Biddle and Oelrich 2016:7). Stephen
Brooks and William Wohlforth provided additional focus on China vis-à-vis
the American strategy. As other researchers, they referred to the financial
crisis of 2008 in their analysis. Their conclusions are similar to those pre-
sented by Biddle and Oelrich. Although we do not fully agree with their
arguments on US primacy, we support their findings that the US’s focuses
on modern means and advanced weaponry have led to supremacy in certain
areas such as the space domain. We also find their conclusion noteworthy,
that ‘true counterhegemonic balancing […] will long remain effectively out
of reach for China, which alone among states has the scale and raw eco-
nomic heft to make counterbalancing even a notional option’. We agree that
the absence of Chinese global balancing capacity enables freedom of action
for the US (Brooks and Wohlforth 2016:45).5
Benjamin Friedman and Justin Logan argued that debate ‘over grand
strategy is nearly absent in US politics’. Still, they claimed that there is bi-
partisan support for primacy, defined as ‘a grand strategy that sees global US
military dominance as the basis for US security’. Furthermore, they argued
that the ‘elite consensus in favor of primacy saps political demand for critical
analysis of it or consideration of alternative grand strategies’ (Friedman and
Logan 2016:14). Even if they may be right regarding the lack of debate, we do
not share their conclusion when it comes to the bipartisan support for primacy.
By comparing the strategy of the Clinton and the Trump administrations,
Patrick Porter claimed that the US grand strategy of primacy has persisted
since the end of the Cold War. Notably, he observed that President Trump has
‘rejected the bipartisan cause of U.S. leadership’ (Porter 2018:38). We do,
however, agree with Porter that President Trump does not favour isolationism.
By shedding light on the differences between Hillary Clinton, Bernie Sanders
and Donald Trump during the 2016 presidential campaigns, John
Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt provided support to our position regarding
the lack of consensus regarding the American strategy (Mearsheimer and Walt
2016:74). Despite the use of ‘preserve’ they identified separate strategies ap-
plied by the Clinton, the G. W. Bush and the Obama administrations, re-
spectively. Since we have identified differences between the two latter,
Mearsheimer and Walt are indirectly supporting our findings in this regard.
Furthermore, when arguing that President Trump is anything but iso-
lationistic, the view is shared by Barry Posen. He concluded that when it comes
to hard power, Trump’s strategy is more ambitious compared to Obama’s
strategy. Consequently, Posen concluded that President Trump was breaking
‘with his predecessors’ in this regard. By exemplifying the military activism of
the Trump administration with the new stockpiles of American equipment in
Europe (adequate to equip an armoured division) and more frequent military
manoeuvres in Northeast Asia, ‘including sending long-range strategic bom-
bers on sorties over the Korean Peninsula’, Posen provided support for our
conclusions regarding the ways (Posen 2018:22). We also find support for our
conclusions in Posen’s previous work in which he illuminates the strategic
considerations of different American administrations (Posen 2014).
Notes
1 The Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, clarified that the QDR and ‘the
accompanying report were largely completed before the 9/11 terror attacks on the
United States’ (US Department of Defense 2001:v).
2 SEAL stands for sea, air and land.
3 TACAMO stands for TAke Charge And Move Out.
4 ‘The Air Force and Navy together are developing a new joint air-sea battle concept
for defeating adversaries across the range of military operations, including ad-
versaries equipped with sophisticated anti-access and area denial capabilities. The
concept will address how air and naval forces will integrate capabilities across all
operational domains—air, sea, land, space, and cyberspace—to counter growing
challenges to U.S. freedom of action’ (US Department of Defense 2010a:32).
5 For additional findings regarding the Sino-American military relations and the US
strategy in Asia, see, for example, Philip Saunders and Julia Bowie (2016) and
Nina Silove (2016).
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Issue 1.
5 The strategies of the contesters
Introduction
In this chapter, the strategies of the two revisionist contesters, China and
Russia respectively, are explored. Although these two great powers have
applied different alignment strategies during the past two decades, both
responded when the US strategy shifted from a unilateral towards a mul-
tilateral approach. Moreover, both kept their alignment strategy when the
US strategy shifted towards a balance-of-power approach. Regarding the
elements of military strategy, differences regarding both ends and ways
are observed while our findings indicate a similar approach when it comes to
the focus of means.
5.1 The strategy of China

Between 2002 and 2010, the State Council of the People’s Republic of China
issued English versions of the Chinese national defence policy on four oc-
casions: in 2002, 2004, 2008 and 2010. In addition, the Council released
English versions of China’s national military strategy in 2015 and 2019. The
first defence policy was published in December 2002, during Jiang Zemin’s
presidency. Succeeding Jiang as the General Secretary of the Communist
Party already in November 2002, one year later, Hu Jintao replaced Jiang as
President of the People’s Republic. The three following defence policies were
presented during Hu’s leadership. Hu held the office of the General
Secretary until 2012 and was President until 2013. On both occasions, he
was succeeded by Xi Jinping. The main empirical sources of the analysis in
this section consist of the documents mentioned earlier.
5.1.1 Strategic environment

In 2002, regarding actors, the Chinese government observed that the world
order was characterised by multipolarity. The government argued that
competition among nations had become increasingly fierce. Simultaneously,
according to the government, the role played by global and regional
DOI: 10.4324/9781003157113-5
economic cooperation organisations had increased. The government also
noted that the terrorist attacks against the US on 9/11 had stepped up in-
ternational coordination and cooperation (Chinese State Council 2002).
Two years later, the Chinese government stated that the trends towards
multipolarity and economic globalisation had deepened, causing changes in
the balance of power among the major international actors. According to
the government, the UN was playing an irreplaceable role in international
affairs. At the same time, the government accused the US of both hege-
monism and unilateralism, mentioning the Iraqi War as an example. The
government warned that this behaviour could lead to increased struggle
among the great powers for strategic points, resources and dominance, while
also carrying the risk of causing far-reaching negative effects on interna-
tional and regional security (Chinese State Council 2004).
In 2010, the Chinese government argued that the international strategic
competition was intensifying and concluded that the international balance
of power was changing. The main causes for this were believed to be the
economic strength, growing international status and influence of developing
countries in particular emerging powers. Hence, the prospects for world
multipolarity were becoming clearer, and the prevailing trend was directed
towards a reform of the international system (Chinese State Council 2010).
In 2015, the government observed the development of an information so-
ciety. The government did not only note an enhanced international compe-
tition in the economic, scientific, technological and military fields, but also
increased signs of hegemonism, and neo-interventionism. As the world’s
economic and strategic centre continued to shift to the Asia-Pacific region, the
government expected the US to enhance its military presence and its military
alliances in this region. With concern, the Chinese government observed
Japan overhauling its military and security policies. Taiwan was another
source of worries, and the government accused the Taiwanese authorities of
threatening peaceful cross-straits relations. Unnamed neighbouring states
were accused of not only taking provocative actions but also of illegally oc-
cupying reefs and islands which, according to the government, belonged to the
People’s Republic. Some neighbours were accused of meddling in South
China Sea affairs and/or for constantly conducting air and sea reconnaissance
against China. The government admitted domestic challenges from East
Turkistan as well as from the Tibet independence struggles. Unnamed anti-
China forces were said to attempt to instigate colour revolutions in China
that, if not prevented, could challenge China’s national security and social
stability (Chinese State Council 2015). In 2019, the Chinese government
concluded that the ‘international security system and order are undermined
by growing hegemonism, power politics, unilateralism and constant regional
conflicts and wars’. The government predicted that ‘[i]nternational strategic
competition is on the rise’ (Chinese State Council 2019:3).
In 2002, the government observed the occasional appearance of disputes
in certain regions caused by ethnic or religious tensions as well as
The strategies of the contesters 129
disagreements about territory and resources. The government argued that
this could lead to armed conflicts and local wars. According to the gov-
ernment, the Asia-Pacific region had continued to enjoy peace and stability.
The region was perceived to be the world’s most dynamic region econom-
ically, and the region with the greatest development potential. The gov-
ernment concluded that the strengthened dialogue and cooperation between
several regional organisations were one of the main factors behind the
maintained regional stability, alongside the fact that common development
had become the mainstream policy of the Asian countries. The Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(SCO), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Conference on Interaction
and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), the Council on Security
Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region (CSCAP) and the Northeast Asia
Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD) were all, together with ASEAN, con-
gratulated for their achievements. The establishment of the SCO in 2001
indicated increased Sino-Russian military relations and deepened coopera-
tion. The government argued that following the signing of the Declaration
on the Conduct of Parties, the situation in the South China Sea area had
stabilised. Nevertheless, factors that could cause instability were perceived
to exist in the Asia-Pacific region. In the short term, the government men-
tioned the danger posed by terrorist, separatist and extremist forces. The
tensions in South Asia had not been fundamentally changed and the re-
conciliation on the Korean Peninsula was, according to the government,
moving haltingly. The basic pattern and trend of development in the cross-
Taiwan Straits relationship remained unchanged. In the domestic perspec-
tive, the government welcomed the UNSC’s decision to include the East
Turkistan Islamic Movement on its list of terrorist organisations (Chinese
State Council 2002).
The Asian-Pacific region was given priority in the elaborations on the
regional perspective also in 2004. On the one hand, the tensions between
India and Pakistan were observed to be eased as the two countries were
continuing their peaceful dialogues. On the other hand, the US was accused
of reinforcing its military presence in the region by reinforcing military al-
liances and accelerating the deployment of missile defence systems. The
increased American arms sales to Taiwan, both quantitatively and qualita-
tively, were especially perceived to enhance the unstable situation across the
Taiwan Straits. The developments of the missile defence system and the
increased military activities abroad were used to exemplify Japan’s adjusted
military and security policies (Chinese State Council 2004).
In 2010, the Chinese government observed that some unnamed major
powers were developing specific strategies for the polar regions (Chinese
State Council 2010). Ethnic, religious, border and territorial dispute as well
local and small-scale wars, conflicts and crises were considered causing
general insecurity in several regions also in 2015. The government argued
that terrorism, separatism and extremism had an additional negative impact
on the stability along China’s periphery. The Korean Peninsula and
Northeast Asia were claimed to be shrouded in instability and uncertainty
(Chinese State Council 2015).
The thematic elaborations, presented by the Chinese government in 2002,
included the deepened economic interdependence among nations, the glo-
balisation of the economy and the rapid scientific and technological ad-
vancements. The economic development of the world was perceived to be
unbalanced, and the North–South gap was considered to be widening fur-
ther. The government argued that terrorism, transnational crime, environ-
mental degradation, drug trafficking and other non-traditional security
threats were becoming pronounced globally and regionally. The government
warned that the balance of military power could change dramatically due to
new technologies. The development of technology was moreover argued to
have stretched the battlefield into multidimensional spaces, including both
the traditional domains of land, sea, and air but also the outer space and
electron domains. The government concluded that medium- and long-
distance precision strikes had become an important pattern of modern
military operations. Consequently, the character of war was becoming in-
creasingly information-oriented making the gap between the developed and
developing countries wider than ever before. The government feared that the
outer space was faced with the danger of increased weaponisation and even
a potential arms race (Chinese State Council 2002).
In 2004, the government concluded that confrontation between systems
had become the principal feature of modern warfare. Consequently, asym-
metrical, non-contiguous and non-linear operations were perceived to be
becoming important patterns of military operations. The government ar-
gued that as the world’s major states were stepping up the transformation of
their armed forces by introducing new high-tech weaponry and military
equipment, the generation gap in military technology between information-
based modern forces and traditional mechanised forces were widening ra-
pidly. The role played by military power in safeguarding national interests
was, the government claimed, assuming greater prominence. Other thematic
considerations involved threat posed foremost by terrorism, separatism and
extremism but also by transnational crime, piracy and drug trafficking
In 2008, the government noted that struggles for strategic resources, lo-
cations and dominance had intensified. Energy and food security were be-
lieved to be becoming more important. Other thematic elaborations
concerned terrorism, environmental disasters, climate change, serious epi-
demics, transnational crime and piracy. Military technology was given
plenty of space in the considerations. The government concluded that as-
pects such as strategic nuclear forces, military astronautics, missile defence
systems, as well as global and battlefield reconnaissance and surveillance
had become top priorities among the major powers when strengthening their
armed forces (Chinese State Council 2008).
The international military competition was still perceived to be fierce in
2010. Major powers were accused of not only accelerating military reforms
and developing new and more sophisticated military technologies but also of
working out strategies for outer space and cyberspace (Chinese State
Council 2010). In 2015, the government’s thematic aspects included in-
security related to energy and other strategic resources, including strategic
sea lines of communication (SLOC) were all thematic aspects elaborated
upon. The revolution in military affairs (RMA) was considered to be par-
ticularly worrisome. Long-range, precise, smart and stealthy as well as un-
manned weapons and equipment were all providing new aspects of the
military dimension, the government argued. Outer space and cyberspace
were given special attention and the government feared increased strategic
competition in these domains among the great powers and other actors
(Chinese State Council 2015; 2019).
5.1.2 Ends
In 2002, the Chinese government presented an international environment of
lasting peace as an overarching value-based end. The end was however not
completely altruistic as it also connected to the objective of creating a fa-
vourable climate in China’s periphery. The articulated ends were also not
only to safeguard world peace but to oppose aggression and expansion. The
government promised that China would never seek hegemony, nor join any
military bloc or crave for any sphere of influence. Quite the contrary, China
was portrayed as opposing the policies of war, aggression and expansion.
Furthermore, the government declared that China took a position against
arms races and for the efforts of the international community to solve in-
ternational disputes peacefully. Notably, the government endorsed activities
conducted to maintain the global strategic balance (Chinese State Council
2002). The Chinese authorities continued to present the Chinese national
interests in an altruistic manner in 2004. Outward-looking ends, such as
pursuing international peace, mutual trust and benefit, and securing a fa-
vourable international strategic environment were articulated. To increase
China’s overall national strength, inward-looking ends such as safeguarding
the interests of national development and promoting domestic economic and
social development were also identified (Chinese State Council 2004).
The aim of maintaining world peace and stability was repeated in 2010.
China’s new security concept included not only aspects of mutual trust and
benefit, but also equality. It also advocated the settlement of international
disputes and regional flashpoint issues through peaceful means. The gov-
ernment opposed the threat of and the actual use of force, and acts of ag-
gression and/or expansion. It also declared its opposition to hegemony and
power politics in any form (Chinese State Council 2010). The key objectives
of China’s security policy in 2015 were to pursue development and to
maintain an independent foreign policy of peace. The Chinese strategy was
said to be defensive, opposing hegemonism and power politics in all forms.
The government again promised that China would never seek hegemony or
expansion. Instead, the Chinese armed forces were to remain a staunch force
in maintaining world peace (Chinese State Council 2015).
The threat-related ends presented in 2002 focused on safeguarding state
sovereignty, the territorial integrity and the security of the People’s Republic.
The government declared China’s territorial land, inland waters, territorial
seas and territorial airspace as inviolable. Consequently, fundamental objec-
tives were to consolidate the national defence as well as preventing and re-
sisting aggression (Chinese State Council 2002). Arguably, the Chinese
government feared being left behind in the increased pace of military in-
novation. As a result, an explicitly declared end was to build a strong military
by using science and technology. The objective of the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) was hence to improve its combat capabilities by taking ad-
vantage of scientific and technological developments (Chinese State Council
2004). Upholding national security was mentioned as an overarching end also
in 2008. This end was used as a framework when presenting the key objectives
of the armed forces. Achieving a coordinated development of China’s na-
tional defence, enhancing the Chinese armed forces’ performance, im-
plementing the active defence as well as pursuing a self-defence nuclear were
mentioned in this context (Chinese State Council 2008).
In 2010, core objectives were to safeguard national sovereignty, security
and interests of national development. Notably, China’s armed forces were
tasked with not only guarding against and resisting aggression but also with
defending the security of China’s lands, inland waters, territorial waters and
airspace. Key objectives were also to safeguard China’s maritime rights and
interests, as well as maintaining its security interests in space, electro-
magnetic space and cyberspace (Chinese State Council 2010). In 2015,
safeguarding China’s sovereignty and security was still the overarching end.
Achieving this aim required unswerving adherence to the principle of the
Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) absolute leadership. This meant that
upholding combat effectiveness and following the CCP’s commands were
the two core objectives of the Chinese armed forces (Chinese State Council
2015). Opposing and containing Taiwanese ambitions for independence,
cracking down on separatist movements such as the ones calling for in-
dependence for Tibet and East Turkistan were specific objectives presented
by the government in 2019 (Chinese State Council 2019).
Notably, ends related to China’s needs were not always present in the
policy documents. In 2008, the government concluded that the Chinese
economy had become an important part of the global economy, and noted
that China had become an important member of the international system.
Since China was expected to increasingly connect with the international
community in the future, the government argued that China could not
develop in isolation from the rest of the world, nor could the world
enjoy prosperity and stability without China. Therefore, the government
announced the overarching end of building a harmonious world of enduring
peace and common prosperity together with other countries (Chinese State
Council 2008).
In 2015, China’s destiny was considered to be vitally interrelated with that
of the world. The government concluded that a prosperous and stable world
would provide China with opportunities. On the other hand, the govern-
ment argued that China’s peaceful development also offered an opportunity
for the whole world. Consequently, safeguarding China’s territorial in-
tegrity, national sovereignty and maritime rights, as well as its development
interests and national unity were key objectives. Especially the maritime
dimension was in focus in the policy documents. Hence, protecting the se-
curity of strategic SLOCs and China’s overseas interests were considered
core objectives. In the short term, ensuring the ability to participate in in-
ternational maritime cooperation was fundamental to the government. In
the long term, the capacity to build China into a maritime power was
considered a necessity. In addition to the maritime domain, developing good
military relations with African, European, Latin American and Southern
Pacific counterparts was a key task given to the armed forces. Therefore
priority was given to the security cooperation in the SCO, and the partici-
pation in multilateral dialogues and cooperation mechanisms such as the
ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM+), Shangri-La Dialogue
(SLD), Jakarta International Defence Dialogue (JIDD) and Western Pacific
Naval Symposium (WPNS) (Chinese State Council 2015).
It is noteworthy that the ends related to vulnerabilities presented in 2002
had both an internal and an external dimension. On the one hand, the end of
safeguarding China’s security was related to the safeguarding of China’s
unity. Therefore, maintaining and promoting public order and social har-
mony as well as preventing armed subversion, including terrorism, separ-
atism and extremism, and upholding social stability were all mentioned as
key objectives. Since the People’s Republic considered Taiwan an inalien-
able part of China, promoting the principles of ‘peaceful reunification’ and
‘one country, two systems’, preventing further separatism and realising the
‘reunification of the motherland’ were parts of this logic. On the other hand,
the armed forces’ key task was to conduct defensive military operations
In 2004, compared to the previous elaboration, the government changed
tone regarding its relations with Taiwan. It was declared a responsibility
of the Chinese armed forces to stop all attempts of the Taiwanese regime
from splitting the country. The government stated that should the
Taiwanese authorities go too far in their efforts regarding indepen-
dence from mainland China, the Chinese armed forces and the Chinese
people would resolutely and thoroughly crush such an attempt at any cost
(Chinese State Council 2004). Upholding national unity and ensuring the
interests of national development were mentioned as core objectives also in
2008 (Chinese State Council 2008).
In 2015, the Chinese armed forces were tasked with dealing with a wide
range of emergencies and military threats. Several objectives related to
perceived vulnerability were articulated: (i) to safeguard the sovereignty and
security of China’s territorial land, air and sea; (ii) to safeguard the uni-
fication of the People’s Republic; (iii) to safeguard China’s security and
interests in new domains; (iv) to maintain strategic deterrence and the ca-
pacity carrying out nuclear counterattack; and (v) to strengthen efforts
against infiltration, separatism and terrorism in order to maintain China’s
political security and social stability (Chinese State Council 2015).
5.1.3 Means
Table 5.1 indicates that China’s defence expenditures in local currency have
increased each year over the time period 2001–2019. The accumulated
growth in defence expenditures manifests itself by the fact that China’s
annual defence expenditure in local currency in 2019 was almost eight times
higher than in 2001. Measured in constant USD (2018), China’s annual
defence expenditure in 2001 was 51,980 million USD. In 2019, China’s de-
fence expenditures had increased to 266,449 million USD, this is more than
five times the spending in 2001 (SIPRI 2020b).
Table 5.1 Annual defence expenditure, China 2001–2019 (billion yuan)

Bush I 2001 2002 2003 2004
Defence expenditure 231 266 291 334
Bush II 2005 2006 2007 2008
Obama I 2009 2010 2011 2012
Obama II 2013 2014 2015 2016
Defence expenditure 1,114 1,233 1,336 1,439
Trump I 2017 2018 2019 2020
Defence expenditure 1,546 1,677 1,804
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
Regarding traditional means, the PLA was made up of both active and
reserve components with a strength of almost 2,500,000 personnel. The main
components of the PLA consisted of the army, the navy, the air force and
the second artillery force. The Central Military Commission (CMC) as-
sumed the unified command of China’s armed forces. The army of the PLA
was divided into seven military area commands. The air force organised an
air command in each of the seven military areas of the army. The artillery
force was composed of the ground-to-ground strategic nuclear missile force
and the conventional operational-tactical missile force (Chinese State
Council 2002). In 2004, the PLA was to build on qualitative efficiency in-
stead of a mere quantitative scale when transforming the military from a
manpower-intensive to a technology-intensive force. Consequently, the
government announced its decision to reduce the personnel strength by
200,000 troops by the end of 2005. The bulk of these reductions was to take
place within the army. The navy was to speed up the process of updating its
weaponry and equipment, with priority given to the development of new
combat ships and various special-purpose aircraft. Regarding the air force,
the emphasis was placed on the development of new fighters, air defence and
anti-missile weapons, and means of information operations. The capabilities
for airstrikes, air defence, information countermeasures, early warning, re-
connaissance, and strategic mobility were to be improved. By upgrading the
current missiles, stepping up the research on future missile technology, and
supporting equipment for command, communications and reconnaissance,
the second artillery force was to enhance its strength and efficiency even
further (Chinese State Council 2004).
In 2008, the government observed that decreasing the number of per-
sonnel had enabled an acceleration in the development of weaponry and
equipment. The bulk of the army included 18 combined corps and some
independent combined operational divisions and brigades. Gradually, the
army was to make its units small, modular and multi-functional through
downsizing and structural reform. Key developments included light me-
chanised and information countermeasure forces, as well as special opera-
tions forces. Priority was given to developing operational and tactical
missiles, ground-to-air missiles and to capabilities for air-ground integrated
operations, long-distance manoeuvres, and rapid assaults. The navy was to
organise three fleets. The new naval equipment was aimed at integrated sea-
air capabilities for offshore defensive operations and included new types of
submarines, destroyers, frigates and aircraft. The new air force equipment
also aimed at trans-domain operations including air-land capabilities for
both offensive and defensive operations. New aircraft, as well as new
ground-to-air missiles, were at the top of the procurement list (Chinese State
Council 2008). In 2010, the government stressed the necessity to create an
army consisting of heavy, light, amphibious and airborne assault forces. The
artillery branch component was to continue developing new types of
weapons, equipment, and ammunition, forming operational as well as tac-
tical in-depth strike system, able of carrying out precision operations with
integrated reconnaissance, control, strike, and assessment capabilities. The
air defence branch had already stepped up the development of new types of
radar as well as medium- and high-altitude ground-to-air missiles.
According to the government, the army’s aviation branch had upgraded
armed helicopters, transport and service helicopters, and significantly im-
proved its capabilities in airstrike, force projection, and support. The en-
gineering and chemical defence branches had also developed increased
capacities in various aspects. The government claimed that the navy had
improved its capacity to conduct operations in distant waters and in
countering non-traditional security threats. Furthermore, the air force had
achieved enhanced abilities to carry out airstrikes, air and missile defence,
and strategic projection also in complex electromagnetic environments
In 2015, the combat forces of each of the services were to be further in-
tegrated to increase the ability to achieve information dominance and
conduct precision strikes and joint operations. The strategic requirement of
mobile operations was to be met with a reorientation of the ground forces
from theatre defence to trans-theatre mobility. The number of small, multi-
functional and modular units was to increase. To enhance the capacity for
offshore waters defence and open sea protection, the navy was directed to
establish a combined, multi-functional and efficient marine combat force
structure. In addition, the navy was to enhance its capabilities for strategic
deterrence and counterattack, maritime manoeuvres and joint operations at
Table 5.2 The main traditional units and equipment of the Chinese armed forces
2000–2020
2000 2010 2020
ARMY
Army HQ 0 0 13
Corps HQ 22 19 0
Tank Division 11 8 1
Tank Brigade 12 8 27
Mechanized Division 7 8 1
Infantry Division 54 15 21
Airborne Division 3 3 0
Airborne brigade 0 0 2
Special Forces Brigade ? ? 15
MBT 7,060 6,550 5,850
APC/AIFV 4,800 4,400 9,750
Attack Helicopter ? 126 270
NAVY
Carrier 0 0 1
Cruiser 0 0 1
Destroyer 20 28 28
Marine Infantry Brigade 2 3 12
Special Forces Brigade ? ? 1
Naval Aviation Bomber 25 50 35
Naval Aviation Fighter/ 280 222 283
Attack
Fighter/Attack 1,800 283 934
Fighter 915 1,100 759
Bombers 120 82 176

sea, as well as comprehensive defence and support. Priority was given to
strengthening the strategic prepositioning as well as maintaining constant
combat readiness while continuously guarding China’s borders, coastal
waters and air space (Chinese State Council 2015). Four years later, the
government announced its ambition ‘to fully transform the people’s armed
forces into world-class forces by the mid-21st century’ (Chinese State
Council 2015:10). In Table 5.2, the main traditional resources of the PLA
are summarised.
In the 2002 white paper, the government did not elaborate much on en-
ablers at the military strategic and operational levels. The presentation in-
stead took a political-strategic approach. The national defence industry was
described almost as an integrated part of the PLA (Chinese State Council
2002). In addition to the improvements regarding information counter-
measures, early warning, reconnaissance and strategic mobility, the armed
forces were to enhance the logistical branch. One such activity aimed at
merging the support systems of the services into an integrated tri-service unit
(the second artillery force was not yet included in these efforts). All theatres
were hence to organise a joint theatre logistics department (Chinese State
Council 2004). In 2015, to optimise strategic logistics deployment, the
modernisation of the logistical branch of the armed forces was given
priority. The developments included new support means, augmented war
reserves, integrated logistics information systems and improvements of rules
and standards. The armed forces were to undertake a comprehensive
transformation towards the increased capacity for information warfare
(Chinese State Council 2015). In Table 5.3, the airborne enablers of the PLA
are summarised.
Table 5.3 The main airborne enablers of the Chinese armed forces 2000–2020
2000 2010 2020
Xian HY-6 (tanker) 6 6 10

IL-78 Midas (tanker) 0 0 3
IL-76 Candid (heavy transport) 14 18 20
An-12/Y-8 Cub (medium transport) 68 ? 30
ShaanxiY-9 Cub (medium transport) 0 0 12
In 2002, the government did not provide much information regarding

China’s nuclear forces. While the government advocated for the complete
prohibition and the destruction of nuclear weapons, it also stressed
the importance of China’s possession of such weapons (Chinese State
Council 2002). In 2008, on top of the agenda when making the decisions
on how to modernise the second artillery force was a new surface-to-surface
missile equipment system, comprising both nuclear and conventional missiles
with different ranges (Chinese State Council 2008). In 2015, the government
declared its intentions to modernise China’s nuclear force. The moderni-
sation included improvements in several areas, such as early warning, com-
mand and control, rapid reaction, as well as survivability and protection. To
ensure a trustworthy deterrence, possessing both nuclear and conventional
missiles was considered a precondition. Consequently, the weaponry and
equipment needed for the effectiveness of the missile systems were to be up-
dated. Capabilities for strategic deterrence and nuclear counterattack were
also to be strengthened, alongside the capabilities for medium- and long-range
precision strikes (Chinese State Council 2015). Notably, China also had a
significant number of dual-capable intermediate range ballistic missiles
(IRBMs), nuclear as well as conventional medium range ballistic missiles
(MRBMs), and dual-capable ground launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) at its
disposal (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2000; 2010; 2020). In
Table 5.4, the nuclear forces of the PLA are summarised.
Table 5.4 The main strategic nuclear forces of China 2000–2020
2000 2010 2020
SLBM
CSS-N-3 / aboard Xia 12 / 1 12 / 1 0
CSS-NX-4 / aboard Jin 0 12 / 1 48/4
ICBM
CSS-4 20 20 20
CSS-3 0 10 10
CSS-9 0 36 0
CSS-10 0 0 50
CSS-20 0 0 18
STRATEGIC BOMBER
Xian H-6 ? 20? ?
In 2002, the elaborations on modern military means focused on the space

domain. The government proudly announced that the ‘Long March’ series
of carrier rockets had successfully launched 27 satellites, while simulta-
neously admitting that all these satellites had been foreign-made (Chinese
State Council 2002). In October 2003, the successful launching of the
Shenzhou V spaceship sending China’s first astronaut, or taikonaut, into
space boosted the Chinese self-image regarding its modern military means.
The government proudly announced that China now operated various ap-
plications of satellites, including sun-synchronous orbit-, geostationary
orbit-, meteorological-, oceanographic-satellites, as well as the China-Brazil
earth resource satellite (Chinese State Council 2004). In 2008, priority was
given to the electronic information equipment enhancing systems’ integra-
tion across the services and the creation of specific joint development
(Chinese State Council 2008). While the government claimed that it opposed
the weaponisation of and arms races in outer space, it ordered the armed
forces to deal with the threats from outer and cyberspace. Hence, priority
was given to securing China’s space assets and cyberinfrastructure.
Developing a special cyber force and enhancing China’s capabilities of cy-
berspace situation awareness and cyber-defence was also on top of the se-
curity agenda. In this regard, cultivating personnel capable of meeting the
demands of information warfare was considered a precondition (Chinese
State Council 2015). Notably, in 2020, China’s armed forces operated 117
satellites for communications, early warning, navigation/positioning, in-
telligence and counter-space purposes. In addition, a new branch of the
armed forces had been formed, the Strategic Support Force (SSF). SSF was
divided into three sections. The responsibilities of the first section included
defensive and offensive operations in cyberspace while the second section
managed military space operation and the third electronic warfare activities
(International Institute for Strategic Studies 2020).
5.1.4 Ways
Regarding the different situations for using military force, the government
explicitly declared that China had implemented a military strategy of self-
defence and that the country, therefore, would only attack potential adver-
saries after being attacked. The government announced the strategy was based
on winning local wars under modern, especially high-tech, conditions and
stressed the importance of deterring war. In addition, the government claimed
to adopt an active attitude towards the UN’s reforms on peacekeeping op-
erations and articulated hopes that these reforms would make these operations
more efficient. The government also presented statistics regarding Chinese
contributions to international peacekeeping efforts. According to the govern-
ment, until 2002 China had contributed with about 650 military observers,
liaison officers, advisors and staff officers as well as approximately 800 en-
gineering troops. During 2002 alone, 53 Chinese military observers were de-
ployed in six different peace support operations. The government announced
its readiness to provide the UN peacekeeping operations with engineering,
medical, transportation and other logistical support teams at appropriate times
(Chinese State Council 2002). The government did not release much in-
formation about the Chinese way of waging modern wars. However, in 2004,
the government indicated increased ambitions when contributing to UN-led
peacekeeping operations. According to the government, engineering units had
been deployed to Cambodia, engineering and medical units to the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC), and transportation, engineering and medical
units to Liberia. In addition, China had continued to assist in international
mine clearance efforts, especially in Eritrea (Chinese State Council 2004).
In 2008, the government announced that it had formulated a new military
strategic guideline of active defence, both as a response to new trends in
global military developments and the requirements of China’s national se-
curity. This new guideline made clear that the ambition was to win local
wars. The government also stressed the importance of preventing and de-
fusing crises as well as deterring wars. Other contexts for the use of force
considered by the government included counter-terrorism operations, sta-
bility operations, rescue operations and international peacekeeping.
Notably, the government considered all these developments as consistent
with the strategic concept of people’s war. The number of deployments of
units to UN-led operations indicated that the Chinese government was
prepared to put action behind its words of increased ambitions concerning
contributing to international peacekeeping efforts. As of the end of
November 2008, China had 1,949 military personnel serving in nine UN
missions. Engineering, transportation and medical troops were deployed to
Liberia as well as to the Sudan, engineering and medical troops to the DRC
and Lebanon, and engineering troops were deployed to Darfur (Chinese
State Council 2008).
In 2010, besides UN-led peacekeeping operations, maritime escort, in-
ternational counter-terrorism cooperation and disaster relief operations
were mentioned as important contexts for the Chinese use of military force.
The government proudly announced that as of December 2010, China had
dispatched 17,390 military personnel to 19 UN peacekeeping missions as
well as deployed 18 ships, 16 helicopters, and 490 Special Operation soldiers
to naval escort missions. According to the government, the achievements of
the Chinese armed forces participating in UN-led operations included
building and repairing over 8,700 kilometres of roads and 270 bridges,
clearing over 8,900 mines and various explosive devices, transporting over
600,000 tons of cargo across a total distance of 9.3 million kilometres and
treating about 79,000 patients. Concurrently, the Chinese Navy had pro-
tected 3,139 ships, rescued 29 ships from pirate attacks and recovered nine
ships released from captivity (Chinese State Council 2010).
In 2015, in response to the new requirement emerging from China’s
growing strategic interests, the government declared that the armed forces
would participate actively in both regional and international security co-
operation in order to secure China’s interests overseas. Consequently, the
balancing between different operational demands concerned warfighting,
war preparation, war prevention, protection of national rights, stability
maintenance, deterrence and employment of military forces in peacetime.
Priority was therefore given to planning proactively for military struggle in
all directions and domains. The government stated that the concept for joint
operations built on a concentration of superior forces and on making in-
tegrated use of all operational means and methods. Moreover, upholding
the CCC’s absolute leadership over the military was not an option but a
precondition.
Simultaneously, the government opened up for expanding its military
cooperation with other major powers, as well as with neighbouring and/or
developing countries. It is evident that the government promoted the es-
tablishment of a regional framework for military cooperation. In addition,
the government expected this cooperation to focus on stability maintenance,
counter-terrorism operations, emergency rescue, disaster relief, emergency
support and air support operations. Regardless of whether these different
kind of operations were to be conducted within a regional framework or not,
the preparations for military operations other than war (MOOTW) was
given particular attention. The government also declared that China’s armed
forces were to enhance their cooperation with the Russian military within
the framework of the comprehensive strategic partnership between the two
countries. The Chinese military was also directed to continue its participa-
tion in UN-led peacekeeping missions and the international escort missions
in the Gulf of Aden. The government explicitly declared its ambition to both
gradually intensify China’s participation in international peacekeeping ac-
tivities, as well as to shoulder even more international responsibilities and
obligations within the military domain (Chinese State Council 2015). Four
years later, the government shed light on the establishment of the forward
support base in Djibouti and the successfully conducted evacuation opera-
tion in Yemen when ‘621 Chinese citizens and 279 foreign citizens from 15
countries were evacuated (Chinese State Council 2019:15). In Table 5.5, the
main deployments of armed units abroad are summarised.
Table 5.5 The main Chinese deployments of armed units abroad 2000–2020
2000 2010 2020
INTERNATIONAL PSOs
DR Congo (MONUC/MONUSCO) 0 218 232
Lebanon (UNIFIL) 0 344 419
Liberia (UNMIL) 0 566 0
Mali (MINUSMA) 0 0 421
Sudan (UNAMID) 0 325 0
Sudan/South Sudan (UNMIS/ 0 444 1,057
UNMISS)
MARITIME OPERATIONS
Djibouti 0 0 240 marines
Indian Ocean 0 2 Frigates 1 Destroyer, 1 Frigate
In 2010, Chinese engineer companies were deployed to five different UN-

missions, field hospitals and transport companies to four and two missions
respectively (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2010). In 2020, this
force composition was altered and new types of units were deployed in
addition to the engineer companies and the field hospitals. For example, one
marine infantry company with a landing ship was deployed to Djibouti, a
security company deployed to Mali and an infantry battalion to South Sudan.
Furthermore, an additional engineer company had been deployed to Lebanon
while the transport companies had been withdrawn (International Institute
for Strategic Studies 2020).
The Chinese government did not elaborate much on force employment.
However, in 2008 the considerations regarding the evolution of modern
warfare were presented. The considerations underscored the necessity for
China to prepare for both offensive and defensive operations under complex
circumstances. Integrated joint operations were the basic approach. Priority
was given to the flexible application of the use of military force, including
attacking the enemy’s weak points. According to the government, the army
was shifting from regional defence to trans-regional mobility. The govern-
ment also announced that the Chinese air force was to shift gradually from a
concept focused on territorial air defence, to a concept including both of-
fensive and defensive air operations (Chinese State Council 2008). The
government explicitly declared its decision to shift the focus of naval op-
erations from offshore waters defence to open seas protection. Simultane-
ously, air operations were to shift focus from territorial air defence to a
mixture of offensive and defensive air-space operations, including early
warning, airstrike, air and missile defence, information countermeasures,
airborne operations and strategic projection (Chinese State Council 2015).
The Chinese approach to the behaviour aspects of the way-element was
explicitly stated to be based on the principles of people’s war. The govern-
ment openly declared that due to the changes in modern warfare, China
intended to persist in relying on combining a small but capable standing
army with a powerful reserve among the people. Consequently, improving
the mobilisation mechanisms in order to establish a national defence
mobilisation system in line with the requirements of modern warfare was
given priority. The military strategy was categorised as active defence.
Strategically, this meant that China intended to pursue defensive operations,
self-defence and attack only after being attacked. The government also
stressed China’s policy of no first use of nuclear weapons and underscored
its restrained attitude towards the development of nuclear weapons. Hence,
the government argued that China’s limited nuclear counterattack ability
was entirely for deterrence against possible nuclear attacks by other states
5.1.5 Conclusions – the Chinese strategy

Regarding the Chinese alignment strategy, we observe that already in 2002
the Chinese government argued that the world order was characterised by
multipolarity. The government did not identify any peers to the US when it
came to power resources. Instead, it concluded that both the competition
among nations as well as the role played by trade organisations (such as
APEC) and security organisations (such as SCO) was going to increase even
further. Moreover, in later reports on the defence policy, the government
identified trends or progress towards a multipolar world but expressed
concerns regarding the growing imbalances in military power in the favour
of the US. Simultaneously, the growing international status, influence and
economic strength of the emerging powers, implicitly including China itself,
were seen as factors increasing the prospects of a multipolar world and a
reform of the international system. The analyses of the Chinese government
correspond fairly well to the struggle between the dominating power (joined
potentially by other satisfied status quo oriented states) and dissatisfied and
potentially revisionist states described by both HST and PTT. However, the
Chinese government analysed this struggle from the perspective of a dis-
satisfied state and consequently, power imbalances in the dominating states’
favour were not seen as a positive stabilising factor.
Despite this, the Chinese government did not present itself as a challenger
to the UN security system. Instead, it was the US dominating position that it
challenged, explicitly accusing the US of unilateralism, neo-interventionism,
and for seeking dominance. China’s increased ambitions regarding both
regional and international security cooperation and UN operations can be
interpreted as a way of improving its status through a strategy of social
mobility. The government gradually increased China’s participation in these
efforts and expressed its willingness to shoulder even more military re-
sponsibilities internationally. The Chinese government also pledged that it
would never seek hegemony or expansion and announced it opposed all
forms of power politics. However, the motives for pursuing a strategy of
social mobility are based on the premise that the borders to higher status
groups are permeable – that Chinas peaceful rise are allowed to continue.
Increased tensions between China and the US and other Western powers
involving economic sanctions and trade wars may result in a different
strategy – social competition.
At the regional level, Japan and Taiwan were seen as two additional
sources of concern for the Chinese government. Moreover, although the
government labelled China’s strategy as military self-defence, we argue that
the government feared that China would be left behind militarily. Among
other things, the increased pace of military innovation may have contributed
to this fear. Responding to perceived threats from both the US increased
involvement in East Asia and states in its own region, China can be said to
practice both internal balancing relating to the modernisation of its own
military resources, including an improved capacity to project military power
beyond its own territory, and defensive collective balancing, primarily with
Russia. Additionally, the government expanded China’s military coopera-
tion with neighbours and developing states. We argue that during the two
decades explored, China gradually has shifted its alignment strategy from
strategic autonomy, that is isolation, towards more active collective balan-
cing strategies. The strategic partnership with Russia fulfils, at least based on
the Chinese priorities, our criterion for defensive collective balancing even
though the two states still, as noted by Walt, lack capabilities to challenge
Table 5.6 The alignment strategies of China
US’s global Primacy Cooperative security Selective engagements

strategy
China’s Strategic Defensive collective Defensive collective

strategy autonomy balancing balancing
the US militarily (Walt 2009:101). In Table 5.6, the Chinese alignment

strategies are summarised.
So what can be said about the Chinese military strategy? Regarding the
value-based ends, rationality was creating favourable conditions for China
rather than altruism. Nevertheless, the Chinese government pledged not to
seek hegemony neither create a sphere of influence. On the one hand, a
worldwide lasting peace, as well as a global strategic balance and stability,
were declared as overarching objectives. Consequently, opposing the ag-
gression and expansion of other states was central. Instead of power politics,
the Chinese government advocated mutual trust. On the other hand, other
objectives included enhancing China’s strength and international position.
As the Chinese strength and self-confidence increased, so did the emphasis
on China’s independent foreign policy. At the end of the explored period,
the Chinese government did not shy away from referring to the PLA as an
instrument when maintaining world peace.
The threats related ends focused on defensive goals related to survival and
security such as safeguarding state sovereignty, territorial integrity and
the security of the People’s Republic. The Chinese government expressed the
threat of being left behind regarding military innovations. Consequently, the
PLA was to take advantage of scientific and technological developments to
enhance the capacity of the Chinese armed forces to meet the challenges
from especially the US. Notably, the ends related to defending China’s land,
inland waters, territorial waters and airspace were by the conclusion of the
period complemented with ends related to safeguarding China’s rights and
interests in other domains including in space, electromagnetic space and
cyberspace. Over time, neutralising threats against the absolute leadership of
the CCP was an overarching end.
Notably, ends related to China’s needs were not always present in the
policy documents. Only during the last half of the period, ends associated
with this aspect were explicitly expressed. This had to do with the increased
role of China regarding not only the global economy but with the interna-
tional system as a whole. The government admitted that China was de-
pendent on the rest of the world to enjoy prosperity. The maritime
dimension was hence often emphasised in the policy documents and pro-
tecting the strategic SLOCs was declared a Chinese interest. The government
also stressed the need for Chinese participation in multilateral dialogues and
cooperation mechanisms. In addition, the need to maintain national unity
was declared a key objective.
The fourth and last aspect of the ends, vulnerabilities, also had both an
internal and an external dimension. On the one hand, safeguarding China’s
unity and, hence, not only promoting public order and social harmony but
also preventing subversion, separatism and extremism were all mentioned as
key objectives. In addition, maintaining strategic deterrence and the capacity
to carry out nuclear counterattack were expressed as fundamental ends re-
garding the vulnerability of external efforts undermining China’s political
security and social stability. To conclude, we argue that this last aspect, that
is vulnerabilities, has been the most dominant factor regarding the ends of
the Chinese strategy. Ultimately, the vulnerability is not primarily referred
to the territorial sovereignty of China, rather to the CCP.
Regarding traditional means, over time the PLA has been organised with
both active and reserve components and with an impressive strength of al-
most 2,500,000 personnel. Flexibility, mobility and self-dependence have
been key aspects of the undertaken transformation of each of the services.
Within the frames of increased integration between the services, not only
jointness but also information dominance and precision strikes have gra-
dually been given more attention. Arguably, a shift in relative priority from
the ground to naval forces has taken place. The air force has more or less
maintained its position as the focus has shifted from quantity to quality.
Notably, the government has not elaborated much on enablers in its con-
siderations. Hence, rather than the means, the national defence industry has
been in focus. When specific enablers have been discussed, information
warfare and counter-measures, as well as strategic logistics and mobility,
have been given priority. The Chinese government has not always been
explicit regarding nuclear weapons either. Surface-to-surface missiles with
different ranges were initially at the top of the modernisation agenda. This
was later complemented with other areas, especially regarding early
warning, command and control, rapid reaction, and protection. On an
overarching level, strategic deterrence and nuclear counterattack were given
priority. Finally, regarding modern means, space-based resources have over
time been prioritized. Lately, the cyber domain has received increased at-
tention and the establishment of special units for cyber defence as well as for
electronic warfare indicates the enhanced Chinese ambitions. To conclude,
we argue that despite the increased priority to several aspects of the modern
means, as well as the modernization of China’s nuclear forces, the tradi-
tional means remain at the core of the Chinese military strategy. Arguably,
among all the different means, the traditional means serve best the CCP’s
domestic needs.
Finally, regarding ways, the Chinese approach to situations had a focus
on self-defence and deterrence. On the one hand, the government pledged
only to attack an adversary after being attacked. On the other hand,
winning local wars was also declared as a fundamental part of the strategy.
Gradually, participating in regional and international security cooperation
to secure China’s overseas interest was given increased attention.
Consequently, situations such as protection of national rights and other
employment of military forces in peacetime were increasingly discussed and
elaborated. Hence, the preparations for military operations other than war
were given specific attention and the Chinese government continued to in-
tensify China’s participation in international peacekeeping activities. In this
regard, the force composition of the Chinese contributions to the interna-
tional efforts was altered and new types of more combat-ready units were
deployed in addition to the combat support and combat service support
units. The Chinese government did not elaborate much on force employ-
ment. Only lately, integrated joint operations for both offensive and de-
fensive purposes have been explicitly elaborated. This new approach also
indicated a shift from rather static ground focused regional defence to more
dynamic trans-regional mobility including offensive air as well as naval
operations. Finally, regarding the behaviour aspects, the government’s ap-
proach to modern warfare was combining standing and reserve units.
Moreover, the government emphasised China’s policy of no first use of
nuclear weapons. To conclude on the ways, we argue that the war preven-
tion situation has been the dominating aspect of the Chinese strategy. In
Table 5.7, the Chinese military strategy is summarised.
Table 5.7 The military strategy of China
Ends Means Ways
Vulnerability Traditional Situation
So what does this imply when it comes to the Chinese defence strategy?
Regarding responses to the three strategies pursued by the different US
administrations, the Chinese government responded to the Bush adminis-
tration’s strategy of primacy by increasing its efforts to modernise its armed
forces to protect itself against what it described as hegemonism and neo-
interventionism. The Chinese government does not seem to have changed its
strategy during the Obama administration. Instead, efforts of internal bal-
ancing were complemented with increased efforts of collective defence bal-
ancing with Russia and deepened security cooperation with other states in
the region. One reason for this may be that the Obama administration’s
strategy of cooperative security was pursued with less consistency in East
Asia since the US perceived China as a growing power and potential future
challenger to the US. The US’s strategy towards East Asia may therefore
have been already during the Obama administration perceived as a strategy
of selective engagements and the Trump administration’s increasingly con-
frontational policies towards China did nothing to change this. China’s
military strategies with its focus on vulnerabilities to both internal and
external threats, traditional means and war prevention are consistent with
the government’s efforts of internal balancing.
We appreciate Avery Goldstein’s comparison between Bismarck’s
Germany and twenty-first-century China and the description of both as rising
powers. However, we do not fully agree with the conclusion that con-
temporary China is ‘without the availability of allies that could effectively tip
the balance of power’. Arguably, while the distinction between a partnership
and a formal alliance goes in line with our conclusions, the claims that
‘Beijing’s strategy does not feature a revisionist international agenda’ and that
China does not ‘challenge status quo’ do not. In its reports on defence policy,
the Chinese government identified China as one of the emergent powers that
will contribute to the development of a new multipolar world order and it
expressed concern regarding growing economic and military imbalances and
hegemonic tendencies. Therefore, the Chinese government’s analysis of the
present global order and its own place within this order better matches that of
a leading dissatisfied power within the context of a unipolar order similar to
that described by HST and PTT (Goldstein 2005:206 and 216). Consequently,
we also disagree with Michael Swaine and Ashley Tellis when arguing that the
Chinese government strive to avoid any great power competition and that the
Chinese revisionism was minimal before 2015 (Swaine and Tellis 2000). We
rather support Øystein Tunsjø when concluding that full-fledged ‘balancing
and global contestation is likely to be the next [Chinese] phase in resisting the
unbalanced unipolar structure and the rules governing the international
system’ (Tunsjø 2017:289).
Notably, Yi Edward Yang and his colleagues have concluded that the
current Xi Jinping leadership tend to view cooperative strategies as less
important, indicating that China’s present strategy of social mobility may
change to a strategy of social competition. As Andrew Erickson remind us,
China is still governed by a communist party with no ideological attachment
to the liberal international order and China’s emergence as a sea power may
lead to a retreat of the liberal international maritime order. Moreover,
China’s closer cooperation with Russia may be interpreted as a step towards
a ‘rising illiberal continental order’ (Erickson 2019:89–90). Therefore, we
find that Yang and his colleagues’ conclusion that ‘China is likely to take a
status quo approach to the international system unless it is confronted by
some dramatic pressure or provocation’ may be too optimistic (Yang et al
2017:599. See also Weissmann 2015). Obviously, we agree with Thomas
Rotnem when arguing that China and Russia have realised ‘their shared
interests in challenging the United States’ position as the major power in the
unipolar world order’ (Rotnem 2014:193). Joel Wuthnow has captured this
flexibility in the variation in China’s strategy across its periphery. His
findings on the different strategies for maritime Asia compared to con-
tinental Asia are interesting. Notably, he concludes that while the former
strategy aims at contesting US influence, the latter strategy ‘views US pre-
sence as, at most, a secondary problem […] In sum, China faces a different
balance of threats in maritime and continental Asia and has adopted stra-
tegies at the sub-regional level that reflect those differences’ (Wuthnow
2018:239). While we support his first conclusion, we do not fully agree with
the second and will return to the sub-regional level below.
We agree with Russell Ong when concluding that the decline in Russian
power and, hence, the threat against China along its northern borders, has
to be considered as a major military gain for China. Arguably, his ob-
servations that ‘China does not see the need to keep any permanent align-
ment’ and that some form of Sino-Russian coordination might emerge in the
twenty-first century go in line with our findings in this regard (Ong
2007:126). We also agree with Andrew Nathan and Andrew Scobell when
arguing that China is not a satisfied power and that the increased Chinese
military power is challenging the balance of power in Asia. However, we do
not support their conclusion that China militarily ‘remains almost ex-
clusively concerned with missions within and around its own borders’.
Neither do we agree that there are no signs that China intends to ‘compete
with Western military influence’ (Nathan and Scobell 2012:345–347). In this
regard, we rather support Larry Wortzel when we observed the Chinese
navy’s increased blue water capacity. We find his argument that the Chinese
at-sea refuelling capability and the continued deployment of support ships
have enabled the Chinese to reach further abroad ‘to other continents’
compelling. Wortzel’s conclusions on China’s nuclear submarines, changed
‘deterrence posture’, increase power projection capability as well as on im-
proved air and sealift capacity are in line with our findings. We agree that
the CCP is dependent on the ground forces to maintain social stability and
that the army will continue to have a domestic focus (Wortzel 2013:166–167.
See also Lee 2011; Saunders and Scobell 2015; Tunsjø 2017).
Already in 2007, Taylor Fravel predicted that frontier defence would re-
main the core mission for China’s ground forces, involving almost half of
the troops. We agree with his observation, at least when it comes to the
Chinese army, that China’s force structure can be considered consistent with
a defensive doctrine for securing its borders. However, the force deploy-
ments, which includes light infantry units stationed on the border that are
capable of offensive operations based in the interior, can rather swiftly be
changed (Fravel 2007). As notified by Richard Bitzinger, China has orga-
nised a rapid reaction force including airborne and amphibious divisions as
well as special operations forces ‘equipped and trained to carry out rapid
attacks’ (Bitzinger 2011:15). Even if this force is relatively modest compared
to the total capacity of the PLA, it projects an impressive offensive capacity.
Consequently, we do not fully agree with Liu Feng when arguing that China
has neither the willingness nor the capacity to shake the existing regional
order. We rather support his remarks on China’s ‘active engagement with
the world beyond’ (Feng 2016:179). In this regard, we find Liselotte
Odgaard’s remarks on the Chinese ‘strategy of peaceful coexistence and
active defense’ (Odgaard 2017:132). As Odgaard, Robert Ross has analysed
the strategic settings in East Asia. We find his arguments on regional bi-
polarity between China and the US compelling. However, his research fo-
cuses on the alignment strategies of the secondary powers rather than on the
two great powers (Ross 2006. See also Tow and Rigby 2011; Storey 2012;
Zhang 2012).
Arguably, James Fanell’s arguments regarding China’s military forces,
‘particularly its navy, air force, missile forces, and rapidly expanding marine
corps, as the arbiters of a new global order – one that stands opposed to
U.S. national interests and values and those of our friends and allies’ pro-
vide further support for our conclusions regarding China as a potential
challenger to the present liberal international order (Fanell 2019:17–18).
However, we note that Dennis Blasko argued that the long-range precision
strike capability of the second artillery, the navy and the air force were
prioritised over the long-distance deployability of conventional airborne,
marine and amphibious forces. We agree with his observation that having
no formal alliance obligation, the Chinese armed forces lack ‘real world
operational experience’ and only a small part of the PLA ‘has taken part in
overseas missions’. Moreover, these overseas deployments have all been
‘concentrated on non-traditional security tasks and mostly focused on small
units’ (Blasko 2006:227–228). Arguably, Ka Po Ng’s conclusion regarding
the Chinese focus on conventional deterrence support our argument on war
prevention (Ng 2005). Tilman Pradt, on the other hand, argues that China is
gaining more experience with the annual military exercises within the SCO-
frames. He concludes that the Chinese military modernisation programme
has its focus on power projection capabilities. We find that his conclusions
regarding China militarily bolstering partners rather than forming formal
alliances are in line with our observations and appreciate his elaboration on
China’s military diplomacy (Pradt 2016. See also Allen et al. 2017). We agree
with Taylor Fravel when he argues that in the short to medium term, it is
likely that Taiwan, the Sino-Indian border and the disputes in the South
China Sea will continue occupying the focus of Chinese strategic attention.
We also agree with Fravel when he stresses that the new military missions of
the Chinese armed forces ‘should be closely followed’ (Fravel 2019:276).
5.2 The strategy of Russia

The empirical material retrieved for Russia consists of English versions of
blueprints, concepts, doctrines and strategies released under the authorisa-
tion of the President of the Russian federation. In January 2000, the strategy
formulating process was initiated with the publication of the national se-
curity concept (NSC). At the time, Boris Yeltsin formally held the pre-
sidential office while Vladimir Putin served as Prime Minister and, since
December 1999, also as Yeltsin’s stand-in. In April, acting President Putin
approved a military doctrine which proceeded the NSC and in June, one
month after he was formally sworn in as President, a foreign policy concept
(FPC). In less than six months, Putin took the initiative to initiate a new
Russian security policy. Eight years later, in July 2008, the newly elected
President Dimitry Medvedev oversaw the release of a new security policy.
The FPC was followed by a national security strategy (NSS) in May 2009
and a new military doctrine in February 2010. In 2013, Vladimir Putin, who
had returned to the Presidential office approved a third issuing order was
with a new FPC. This time the FPC was followed by a military doctrine in
2014 and a new NSS in 2015. In addition to these documents, the national
security blueprint of 1997 (released under Boris Yeltsin) was analysed.
Moreover, the NSS released in 2020 is classified. Therefore, we will only
include references to this document in relation to secondary sources.

In 1997, regarding the actors’ perspective, the Russian government observed
an expansion in the commonality of Russia’s national interests with the in-
terests of several other states. This overlap provided an option for Russia for
broader integration with the global economy, including membership and
partnership with institutions such as the IMF, the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), and the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). On the other hand, the govern-
ment noted that many other states had an increased ambition to weaken
Russia’s position in the political, economic, and military spheres. The pro-
spect of NATO expansion to Eastern Europe was explicitly described as
unacceptable to Russia. Simultaneously, the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS)1 was considered to be insufficiently effective to ensure Russia’s
national security interests (President of the Russian Federation 1997).
In 2000, the government accused the US of preferring unilateral solutions
(primarily by the use of military force) to key issues in global politics, hence
circumventing the fundamental rules of international law. At the same time,
the government observed that several states were striving to increase their
influence in world politics, including by procuring WMD. Notably, most of
the perceived main threats listed by the government had an actor per-
spective:
i. The danger of a weakening of Russia’s political, economic and military

influence in the world;
ii. The strengthening of military-political blocs and alliances, above all
NATO’s eastward expansion;
iii. Foreign military bases and large troop contingents in direct proximity
to Russia’s borders;
iv. A weakening of the integration processes in the CIS;
v. Outbreak and escalation of conflicts near the border of Russia and/or
the external borders of other CIS-members; and
vi. Territorial claims against Russia (President of the Russian Federation 2000).
The military doctrine released later the same year included elaborations on
illegal armed formations within Russia itself as well as attempts to ignore
Russia’s interests in resolving international security problems and to oppose
its position as a node in the multipolar world (President of the Russian
Federation 2000b). The economic strength of the US and the West’s dom-
ination in international institutions were considered to weaken the role of
the UN. The emerging military dimension of the EU was given particular
attention. NATO’s 1999 strategic concept, with an option of out-of-area
operations without the sanction of the UNSC, was considered worrisome.
The Russian government warned that the American strategy of unilateral
actions could destabilise the international situation, provoke tensions and
initiate an arms race. Consequently, the government declared that Russia
intended to achieve a multipolar system. The Shanghai Five which includes
the cooperation between Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia and
Tajikistan, was considered important. As was the development of friendly
relations with the leading Asian states, primarily China and India but also
with Iran and Japan (President of the Russian Federation 2000c).
In 2010, NATO’s ambition to welcome additional members, carry out
missions outside the territory of its members and develop the military in-
frastructure in member states bordering to Russia was seen as the main
external military threat (President of the Russian Federation 2010). Three
years later, the government argued that the ability of the West to dominate
the world economy and politics had continued to diminish. Western coun-
tries were accused of trying to preserve their traditional positions, hence
enhancing global competition and creating growing instability in interna-
tional relations (President of the Russian Federation 2013). The government
believed that the increased global competition not only involved the great
powers but other states as well (President of the Russian Federation 2014).
The government accused the US and its allies of seeking to retain their
dominance in world affairs and in order to contain Russia actively opposing
the government’s implementation of an independent foreign policy. Despite
this opposition from the West, the government claimed that Russia had
enhanced its role in shaping a polycentric world. The EU and the US were
also accused of supporting what the Russia government described as an anti-
constitutional coup d’état in Ukraine, which not only had caused a deep
split in Ukrainian society but also led to an armed conflict (President of the
Russian Federation 2015).
When it comes to the regional perspective, the government perceived
Russia as an influential European-Asian power with national interests in
Europe, the Middle East, Central and South Asia, as well as in the Asian-
Pacific region (President of the Russian Federation 1997). In 2000, the
government noted increased ambitions regarding the shaping and
strengthening of regional power centres (President of the Russian
Federation 2000b). The government concluded that military-political rivalry
among regional powers as well as unregulated or potential regional and local
armed conflicts posed a threat to international peace and security. South-
East Asia, South Asia, the Korean Peninsula, the Middle East, the
Mediterranean region, the Black Sea region, the Caucasus and the Caspian
Sea basin were all given specific attention (President of the Russian
Federation 2000c).
The government observed the developments of regional and sub-regional
integration in especially the CIS area, the Euro-Atlantic region, the Asia-
Pacific region, Africa and Latin America. The government concluded that if
the economic growth in these regions converted into political influence, the
trend to a polycentric world order would grow even further. Notably, the
government identified some key states in these regions and declared its
ambition to develop bilateral relations with these countries as a complement
to cooperation at the regional level (President of the Russian Federation
2008). In 2009, the government concluded that the rise of new centres of
economic growth and political influence had led to a qualitatively new
geopolitical situation. The government observed an increasing tendency to
seek resolutions to existing problems and to manage crises on a regional
basis, without the participation from non-regional powers (President of the
In 2013, the Russian government’s observations indicated a tendency of
decentralisation of the global system towards regional governance. The
government speculated that this could form the basis for a polycentric world
order, reflecting the world’s diversity and variety. The government argued
that new centres of economic and political power – regional great powers –
were increasingly taking the lead for developments in their respective re-
gions. Hence, regional integration could become an effective mean to in-
crease the competitiveness of the participating states. The government noted
the importance of several regions. The Balkan region was considered to be
of great strategic importance to Russia, in particular, due to the region’s role
as a major transportation and infrastructure hub for supplying gas and oil to
other European countries (President of the Russian Federation 2013). The
regions bordering Russia were considered problematic, especially if they had
the potential of including territorial claims on Russia (President of the
Russian Federation 2014). In addition to already existing hot spots of re-
gional tensions in the Near and Middle East, Africa, South Asia and the
Korean peninsula, the government expressed worries regarding the emer-
gence of the Islamic State (President of the Russian Federation 2015).
The Russian government touched upon several thematic aspects in its ela-
borations. The themes considered to impact the trends towards the formation
of a multipolar order included the economic and political positions of an
increased number of influential states and factors such as international poli-
tical, economic, financial, informational processes as well as scientific, tech-
nical and ecological factors. In addition, military force was expected to retain
its significance in international relations. The Russian government concluded
that the international competition regarding securing natural, technological,
and informational resources and markets would intensify during the up-
coming years (President of the Russian Federation 1997). Economic, political,
science and technological, environmental and information factors were con-
sidered to play an ever-increasing role also in 2000. However, the government
found that the significance of the military and security aspects of international
relations remained substantial (President of the Russian Federation 2000a).
On the one hand, the threat of large-scale wars, as well as of nuclear conflict
was perceived to have decreased. On the other hand, according to the gov-
ernment, the threat of local wars and armed conflict, regional arms races, and
the spread of WMD and their delivery systems had increased. The govern-
ment warned that the use of military force labelled as humanitarian inter-
vention, without the sanction of the UNSC, risked undermining the generally
accepted principles and norms of international relations. The social theme was
also given considerable attention. National, ethnic, and religious extremism,
increased separatism, the activities of terrorist movements and the expansion
of organised crime, including weapons and drug trafficking, worried the
government (President of the Russian Federation 2000b). While military
power retained significance in international relations, the government gave an
even greater role to economic, political, scientific and technological, ecological
and information factors (President of the Russian Federation 2000c).
In 2008, the Russian government identified a range of modern transna-
tional challenges and threats that no longer could be addressed solely by the
traditional military and political alliances. The new settings included inter-
national terrorism, drug trafficking, organised crime, the spread of WMD
and means of their delivery, demographic problems, global poverty, energy
poverty, illegal migration, climate change and infectious diseases. In addi-
tion, the government claimed that international relation was acquiring a
civilizational dimension, including a potential competition between different
value systems based on cultural and religious diversity (President of the
Russian Federation 2008). Hence, values and models of development were
perceived as the subject of global competition.
Regarding military aspects, the developments within cyber, biological and
information domains were considered worrisome. Challenges related to se-
paratism, violent extremism, religious radicalism, the global demographic
situation, environmental problems, uncontrolled and illegal migration, drug
and human trafficking, different forms of transnational organised crime as
well as freshwater shortage were all predicted to become more acute in the
near future (President of the Russian Federation 2009). However, the show
of military force on the territories of states contiguous with Russia or its
allies was, if the exercises were carried out provocatively, considered as the
main military threat (President of the Russian Federation 2010).
In 2013, the government warned that the balance of military power be-
tween states and groups of states was changing. There were worries that
efforts to build up and/or modernise offensive potentials and to create and
deploy new types of weapons could make international treaties and
agreements on arms control obsolete. In addition, the government warned
that the increased competition for strategic resources could cause extreme
volatility of the commodity markets (President of the Russian Federation
2013). These factors would contribute to the changing nature of modern
warfare. The integration of political, economic, informational and other
non-military measures with the use of military force was expected to in-
crease. This could be coordinated with extensive use of orchestrated public
protests, as well as the use of special operations forces. Furthermore, the
participation in hostilities by irregular armed groups and by private military
companies was expected to increase. The use of indirect and asymmetric
methods, including the use of externally funded political forces and social
movements, could make future warfare even more complex, the government
concluded (President of the Russian Federation 2014).
According to the Russian government, the role of force as a factor in
international relations was not declining. Quite the contrary, the govern-
ment stressed that aspirations to build up and modernise offensive weaponry
and to deploy them was weakening the system of global security as well as
the system of treaties and agreements regarding arms control. In addition,
the government elaborated relatively comprehensively on social and ecolo-
gical issues, such as the global demographic, the shortage of fresh water, the
consequences of climate change and widespread epidemics caused by new
and previously unknown viruses (President of the Russian Federation 2015).
5.2.2 Ends
The Russian government identified several value-based ends. Examples in-
cluded on the individual level, the safeguarding of constitutional rights and
freedoms, as well as of personal security. Other examples included improved
quality of life and living standards, as well as physical, spiritual, and in-
tellectual development. At the societal level, key objectives were the con-
solidation of democracy, the attainment and maintenance of social accord,
the enhancement of the population’s creative activeness, and the spiritual
renaissance of Russia were identified as the key objectives. At the state level,
protecting the constitutional system, implementing and maintaining law and
order and developing international cooperation based on partnership were
the key objectives (President of the Russian Federation 1997).
In 2000, the Russian government articulated national ends and interests
referring to different spheres. The government declared that the national
interests in the spiritual sphere lie in preserving and strengthening the moral
values, traditions of patriotism and humanism, as well as the cultural and
scientific heritage of the Russian society (President of the Russian
Federation 2000a). Gaining influence in the general processes and positions
in the international system was perceived as important for achieving
Russia’s national interests. However, this end was also given an altruistic
dimension, with Russia described as using its influence and position to form
a stable, just and democratic world order built on the recognition of the
norms of international law, including the principles of the UN Charter, and
equitable relations among states. The international position was also said to
support domestic reforms enhancing the standards of living, successfully
implementing the transformation to democracy, strengthening the con-
stitutional system as well as ensuring individual rights and freedoms
(President of the Russian Federation 2000c). Another value-based end was
to globally promote an objective Russian as a democratic state committed to
a socially-oriented market economy with an independent foreign policy was
another value-based end presented in the FSCs (President of the Russian
Federation 2008). Domestically, values were perhaps even more important.
The government’s inward-looking objectives included social harmony, based
on shared values and humanism, peaceful coexistence and cultural unity of
Russia’s multinational population, as well as respect for family traditions
and patriotism (President of the Russian Federation 2009).
The core objectives presented in the 2014 FPC were to promote interna-
tional peace, universal security and stability. The purpose of these objectives
was declared to be the establishment of a just and democratic system in
international relations, based on collective decision-making and the primacy
of international law, with the UN as the principal organisation regulating
international relations. Strengthening the rule of law and democratic in-
stitutions, and ensuring human rights and freedoms were also key objectives
(President of the Russian Federation 2013). These value-related topics were
of course interpreted from a Russian perspective, this was further under-
scored through another end dictating that the Russian approach to human
rights issues should be promoted in international forums (President of the
In wartime, the government’s key objectives were: (i) ensuring military aid
to Russia’s allies and mobilising their potential for achieving joint objec-
tives; (ii) preventing neutral states enlisting to the war on the side of the
aggressor; and (iii) forcing the aggressor to end the war at an early stage in
order to restore international security and peace (President of the Russian
Federation 2000b). A core end in the 2000 FPC was preserving and
strengthening Russia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. In this regard,
additional objectives were to form a circle of good neighbourhoods along
Russia’s borders, to eliminate existing (and prevent the emergence of) po-
tential tensions and conflicts in regions adjacent to Russia (President of the
Russian Federation 2000c).
Similarly, in the 2013 FSC core objectives were ensuring the security of
the country as well as protecting and strengthening its sovereignty and
territorial integrity. On the one hand, the Russian government emphasised
the importance of good neighbourhood relations and declared its interest in
the normalisation of Russian-Georgian relations. On the other hand, the
government gave priority to assisting the Republic of Abkhazia and the
Republic of South Ossetia in their developments towards modern
democratic states. Strengthening their international positions, ensuring their
security and supporting their social and economic recovery were declared as
Russian objectives (President of the Russian Federation 2013). Notably, an
objective of the armed forces was to neutralise potential threats in not only
the context of dangers and threat directed towards Russia’s military in-
strument but also in the case of threats towards Russia’s political, diplo-
matic and other non-military instruments of power (President of the Russian
Federation 2014).
The needs identified by the Russian government had both external and
internal dimensions. Regarding the external dimensions, a fundamental end
was to consolidate Russia’s positions as a great power, this meant being in
the centres of influence in the developing multipolar world. Internal di-
mensions included several aspects, such as neutralising the conditions sup-
porting and/or promoting the emergence of social and inter-ethnic conflicts,
as well as national and regional separatism within the Russian Federation.
Establishing political, economic, and social stability within the Federation
was also an end articulated for the domestic arena. Consequently, pro-
moting Russia’s unity and ensuring Russia’s development towards a mul-
tinational democratic federative state were two central objectives (President
of the Russian Federation 1997).
Three years later, Russia’s national interests in the international sphere
were to uphold the country’s sovereignty as well as strengthening its position
as a great power and as one of the centres of the multipolar world order
(President of the Russian Federation 2000a). In the 2000 FPC, it was argued
that Russia sought to achieve a firm and prestigious position in the world
community, consistent with Russia’s self-image as a great power and as one
of the most influential poles in the international system. The position was
however not necessarily an end in itself. Instead, the government considered
that a prestigious position was a precondition for the growth of Russia’s
political, economic, intellectual and spiritual potential. Ensuring conformity
of multilateral and bilateral cooperation with the other members of the CIS
regarding national security and strengthening the union between Belarus
and Russia were prioritised objectives (President of the Russian Federation
2000c). Eight years later, in 2008, the new FPC stressed that achieving a
strong position of authority in the world community included meeting the
interests of Russia as one of the influential centres in international politics
and creating favourable external conditions for Russia’s modernisation
process(President of the Russian Federation 2008). Clearly, transforming
Russia into a world power within a multipolar world was an overarching
end of the government (President of the Russian Federation 2009).
Likewise, in 2013, a cornerstone in the government’s elaborations was to
secure Russia’s high standing in the international community as one of the
influential and competitive poles of the modern multipolar world order. In
addition, crucial ends were to create favourable external conditions for a
steady growth of the Russian economy and strengthen Russia’s positions in
the global trade and economic system (President of the Russian Federation
2013). Expanding the range of partners and developing cooperation with
other states based on common interests were two objectives of the military
policy (President of the Russian Federation 2014). Consolidating Russia’s
status as a leading world power was a central objective also in the 2015 NSS
(President of the Russian Federation 2015).
The Russian government perceived several vulnerabilities. For example,
Russia was expected to lag far behind developed countries in terms of science
and technology. In addition, Russia increasingly depended on imports of
food, consumer goods, equipment, and technologies. Furthermore, both the
external and internal state debts were growing. Russia’s economic, scientific,
and demographic potential was declining, as were the markets and raw ma-
terial infrastructure of Russian industry. Consequently, key Russian objec-
tives were to stabilise the economy and create preconditions for production
growth because of the structural restructuring of industry (President of the
Russian Federation 1997). Three years later, vital components of Russia’s
national interests were still to protect the state, the individual and the society
from terrorism, natural and man-made emergencies and their consequences,
and from dangers and consequences arising from armed hostilities, and ulti-
mately from war (President of the Russian Federation 2000a).
5.2.3 Means
Similar to China, Russia’s defence expenditures in local currency have in-
creased, as indicated in Table 5.8. Likewise, Russia’s defence expenditures
show an exceptionally steady increase each year, with the exception of 2017
and 2018. The accumulated growth in defence expenditures manifests itself
in the fact Russia’s annual defence expenditure in local currency in 2019 was
more than 12 times higher than it was in 2001. Measured in constant USD
(2018) Russia’s annual defence expenditure in 2001 was 25,162 million
USD. In 2019, Russia’s defence expenditures had increased to 64,144 million
USD, that is two and a half times more than in 2001 (SIPRI 2020b). The
Table 5.8 Annual defence expenditure, Russia 2001–2019 (billion rouble)

Bush I 2001 2002 2003 2004
Bush II 2005 2006 2007 2008
Defence expenditure 773 939 1,114 1,396
Obama I 2009 2010 2011 2012
Obama II 2013 2014 2015 2016
Trump I 2017 2018 2019 2020

more modest increase in the Russian defence expenditure measured in
constant USD reflect a decrease in the value of the Russian roubles.
Regarding the traditional means, the government explicitly stated that
Russia did not seek to maintain parity with the leading states of the world.
Instead, the government intended to orient the developments of the armed
forces towards the principle of realistic deterrence, that is, to make appro-
priate use of the available military might to avert aggression. Consequently,
priority was given to means necessary to deter and prevent conventional
large-scale or regional wars, as well as to implement alliance commitments.
The peacetime combat composition of the armed forces was to ensure de-
fence against air attacks, rebuffing aggression in local wars, deploying
troops to perform tasks in regional wars and to conduct both unitary and
multilateral peacekeeping activities (President of the Russian Federation
1997). The goal when transforming the armed forces was to provide the
capability to respond adequately to threats. The government stipulated the
need for cost efficiency of these developments.
As a guide for the upcoming modernisations, the government stated that
the armed forces’ peacetime organisation had to be capable of protecting
Russia against air attacks and to, with other agencies, accomplish the re-
pulsion of aggression in local wars and armed conflicts (President of the
Russian Federation 2000a). The military doctrine stressed the importance of
staffing (including both the principles of contracts and draft) and equipping
troop units in order to prepare for a state of permanent combat readiness,
performing missions of deterrence and conducting combat operations in
local wars and armed conflicts. The doctrine failed, however, to provide
information regarding which units these ambitions referred to (President of
the Russian Federation 2000b). Notably, the use of force was not mentioned
as a last resort in 2009. The government instead proclaimed that Russia, in
the sphere of international security, would maintain its adherence to the use
of different strategic instruments to defend its sovereignty and national in-
terests, including political, legal, economic, military and other tools.
Similarly, the government underscored the importance of having a pre-
dictable and open security policy. The government declared that the na-
tional defence was based on reasonable sufficiency and effectiveness,
including using international military cooperation and peacekeeping, di-
plomacy and other non-military means. Noteworthy, the government ex-
plicitly declared its ambition to undertake all necessary efforts to maintain
parity with the US in the area of strategic offensive arms, including non-
nuclear equipped strategic bombers (President of the Russian Federation
2009). The 2010 military doctrine gave priority to ensuring the necessary
degree of manning, equipment, and support for the large formations of the
permanent-readiness forces as well as improving the collaboration among
the different services, branches and combat arms of the armed forces
(President of the Russian Federation 2010). However, as shown in Table 5.9,
the modernisation of Russia’s armed forces was accompanied by decreases
Table 5.9 The main traditional units and equipment of the Russian armed forces
2000–2020
2000 2010 2020
ARMY
Army HQ 6 7 12
Corps HQ 3 0 1
Tank Division 5 0 6
Tank Brigade 0 4 15
Airborne Division 4 4 4
Airborne brigade 3 2 4
Special Forces Brigade 7 9 9
MBT 21,820 23,000 13,000
APC/AIFV 25,975 25,080 25,760
Attack Helicopter 900 635 393
NAVY
Carrier 1 1 1
Cruiser 7 5 4
Destroyer 17 14 13
Special Forces Brigade 3 3 4
Naval Aviation Bomber 45 56 ?
Naval Aviation Fighter/Attack 114 131 157
Fighter/Attack 575 807 708
Fighter 880 725 180
Recce 135 119 58
in volume concerning traditional conventional capacities for inter-state

warfare such as MBTs, attack helicopters, larger warships and fighters.
In 2000, the Russian government underscored the necessity of the armed
forces ability to deploy strategically in order to perform missions in large-
scale wars. This had to include different kinds of enablers. The government
did however not provide any examples (President of the Russian Federation
2000a), albeit the military doctrine issued later the same year included some
guidelines on how the government intended to develop the armed forces in
this regard. These guidelines included improving strategic planning, creating
an integrated system of command, control of the military organisation, as
well as creating and maintaining the necessary structures for the mobilisa-
tion of resources and the deployment of mobilised troops (President of the
Russian Federation 2000b). Ten years later, the government emphasised the
importance of increasing the level of combat and mobilisation readiness of
the armed forces in order to carry out strategic deployments. This ambition
must include several enablers such as logistics and transport. However, the
government did not specify these aspects but touched upon the necessity of
creating reserves of resources, including stockpiles of armaments and other
military equipment as well as echeloned placing and the maintenance of
these reserve resources. Notably, the ambition of improving the qualitative
level of the defence industry complex was mentioned (President of the
Russian Federation 2010). Improving the systems for the mobilisation of
resources, including stockpiles of weapons, military and special equipment,
as well as logistical tools, was mentioned again in the 2014 doctrine. In
addition, the government stressed the importance of improving the systems
for maintenance and repair of this equipment (President of the Russian
Federation 2014). In Table 5.10, the airborne enablers of the Russian armed
forces are summarised.
Table 5.10 The main airborne enablers of the Russian armed forces 2000–2020
2000 2010 2020
IL-78 Midas (tanker) 20 20 15

IL-76 Candid (heavy transport) ? 210 105
An-12 Cub medium transport) ? 50 65
An-22 Cock (heavy transport) ? 21 4
An-124 Condor heavy transport) ? 12 11
In 1997, the most important task for Russia’s armed forces was to ensure
nuclear deterrence. Consequently, having nuclear forces with the potential of
inflicting the required damage on any aggressor state or coalition of states
was regarded as a necessity, not as an option (President of the Russian
Federation 1997). Three years later the Russian government declared its
preparedness for a further reduction of Russia’s nuclear potential based on
bilateral agreements with the US. The government also announced its
willingness to preserve the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile
Systems of 1972. Simultaneously, the government made clear that if the US
implemented its plans to create a national missile defence system, it would
inevitably compel Russia to adopt adequate measures for maintaining its
similar systems at a proper level (President of the Russian Federation
2000c). Eight years later, the government announced that it was prepared to
negotiate with all nuclear powers, and not only with the US, on a reduction
of strategic offensive weapons including intercontinental ballistic missiles,
submarine-launched ballistic missiles as well as heavy bombers and the
warheads they carry. However, a minimum level, sufficient to maintain
strategic stability, was to be kept. In addition, the government made clear
that it opposed any attempts to develop and deploy new types of weapons,
such as low-yield nuclear warheads, non-nuclear intercontinental ballistic
missiles, and strategic anti-missile systems (President of the Russian
Federation 2008). The 2010 military doctrine gave high priority to the
functioning of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces and missile early warning
systems, but also its nuclear munitions storage facilities, nuclear energy
facilities, as well as atomic and chemical industry facilities (President of the
Russian Federation 2010). In Table 5.11, the Russian strategic nuclear
Table 5.11 The main strategic nuclear forces of Russia 2000–2020
2000 2010 2020
SLBM
SS-N-8/aboard Delta I 64/4 0 0
SS-N-18/aboard Delta III 208/13 80/5 16/1
SS-N-20/aboard Typhoon 120/6 60/3 20/1
SS-N-23/aboard Delta IV 112/7 96/6 96/6
SS-N-32/aboard Dolgorukiy 0 0 48/3
ICBM
SS-18 Satan 180 68 46
SS-19 Stiletto 160 72 30
SS-24 Scalpel 46 0 0
RS-24 Yars 0 0 150
SS-25 Sickle 370 180 36
SS-27 Topol 20 65 78
STRATEGIC BOMBER
Tu-22 Blinder 158 0 0
Tu-95 Bear 68 63 60
Tu-160 Blackjack 15 16 16
Tu-22M Backfire 0 0 62
Regarding modern means, in 1997, priority was given to a reliable defence

against space attacks (President of the Russian Federation 1997). A decade
later, in 2008, the government declared its ambition to prevent the deploy-
ment of weapons in outer space (President of the Russian Federation 2008).
The functioning of Russia’s systems for monitoring outer space was given
high priority. The President observed that contemporary military conflicts
were characterised by weapons and military equipment operating in airspace
and outer space, by an increased role of information warfare, and by global
network-based automatised command and control systems. The government
also noted some specific weaponry including precision, electromagnetic,
laser and infrasound weaponry, systems, drones and autonomous maritime
craft as well as guided robotised models of arms. The government gave
priority to the creation of a system for air-space defence and the develop-
ment of an information warfare force (President of the Russian Federation
2010). Without giving any detailed instructions, the government stressed the
importance of maintaining and developing the means necessary to counter
any attempt to achieve military superiority by deploying strategic missile
defence systems or placing arms in space, including conventional precision
weapon systems. Simultaneously, the government underscored the need for
Russia to have the capacity for security operations in outer space and for
monitoring objects and events in the near-Earth space. The means necessary
for aerospace defence of critical objects and for repelling air and space at-
tack were given priority (President of the Russian Federation 2014).
According to the International Institute of Strategic Studies’ annual re-
ports on the military balance, the modern means had no specific organisa-
tion in 2000. A decade later, a space force with the strength of some 40,000
personnel had been organised by withdrawing formations and units from
both the strategic missile forces and the air defence forces. The task of the
space force was to detect missile attacks on Russia and its allies and to
manage spacecraft launch and control (International Institute for Strategic
Studies 2010). In 2020, the space command operated 106 satellites for
communications, early warning, navigation/positioning and intelligence
purposes. In addition, a new information-warfare branch of the armed
forces had been formed. This new branch was expected to have assumed the
overarching command of Russian cyber warfare activities (International
Institute for Strategic Studies 2020).
5.2.4 Ways
Regarding the situations, the Russian government considered the whole
spectrum ranging from nuclear war through large-scale conventional wars,
regional wars, local wars, to peace-keeping and preventive deployment
(President of the Russian Federation 1997). Three years later, more em-
phasis was put on effective coordination and cooperation with the other CIS
member states (President of the Russian Federation 2000a). The following
military doctrine presented a dramatic change in the Russian strategy. For
the first time, it was explicitly stated that Russia reserved the right to use
nuclear weapons when responding to any attack involving WMD. In ad-
dition, the doctrine reaffirmed Russia’s assurance to other CIS members,
including the extension of Russia’s nuclear umbrella to its allies.
Furthermore, the government authorised the use of nuclear weapons in
response to large-scale conventional aggression when the national security
of the Russian Federation was at stake.
The government identified six main ways of utilising the Russian armed
forces: (i) strategic operations, operations, and combat operations in large-
scale as well as in regional wars; (ii) operations and combat operations in local
wars as well as in international armed conflicts; (iii) joint special operations in
internal armed conflicts; (iv) counterterrorist operations; and (vi) peace-
keeping operations (President of the Russian Federation 2000b). Notably, in
the FSC issued later the same year, the government referred to peace making
rather than to peacekeeping (President of the Russian Federation 2000c).
The aim of the Russian military policy presented a decade later was to
prevent an arms race, deter and prevent military conflicts and improve
Russia’s military organisation. A certain degree of permanent readiness was
therefore considered necessary. Participation in international peacekeeping
activities within the framework of the UN and other international or regional
organisations, as well as in the global struggle against international terrorism
were also given priority. The government made clear that it regarded an
armed attack on a CSTO member state as an aggression against all CSTO
member states, including Russia. The government reserved the right to utilise
nuclear weapons not only in response to the utilisation of nuclear and other
types of WMD against Russia and/or its allies but also in response to ag-
gression against Russia involving the use of conventional weapons (President
of the Russian Federation 2010). The government declared that Russian
participation in international operations included the full spectrum from the
prevention of threats through the elimination of threats and the suppression
of acts of aggression to post-conflict recovery (President of the Russian
Federation 2014). According to the government, the forms and methods of
deploying the Russian armed forces had been improved. Nevertheless, due to
the altering nature of modern wars and armed conflicts, the government de-
clared its ambition to continue improving the combat capability of Russian
forces for future formations and new methods of armed combat (President of
the Russian Federation 2015). In Table 5.12, the key deployment of Russian
armed units abroad are summarised.
When it comes to military employment, the Russian government gave high
priority to military presence in certain strategically important regions. This
included the peacetime stationing of limited troop contingents through bi-
lateral agreements. Furthermore, the government argued that building on
the principles of partnership, these deployments would demonstrate the
Russian Federation’s readiness to fulfil its alliance commitments, promote
the formation of a stable military-strategic balance of forces in the regions,
and provide Russia with the potential to react to a crisis at the initial stages
of its emergence. In the long-term perspective, the government considered it
desirable to increase Russia’s participation during the initial phase in
peacekeeping operations to prevent or eliminate crisis (President of the
Russian Federation 1997). In 2000, the foreign deployment included limited
troop contingents and naval forces (President of the Russian Federation
2000a). Foreign bases had a role when protecting Russian citizens from
armed attacks outside the Russian Federation and/or when combating in-
ternational terrorism. Similarly, naval bases on foreign soil could be a
precondition when combating piracy, ensuring the safety of shipping and
securing the economic activities of Russia on the high seas. In international
military cooperation, priority was given to Belarus, the CSTO, CIS and SCO
members (President of the Russian Federation 2010).
In the NSS of 2000, the Russian government gave some attention to be-
haviour. The use of force was mentioned as a last resort to be put into action
Table 5.12 The main Russian deployments of armed units abroad 2000–2020
2000 2010 2020
BILATERAL
ARRANGEMENTS
Armenia 3,100 3,214 3,300
Cuba 800 ? ?
Georgia 5,000 3,400 7,000
Kyrgyzstan 0 500 500
Moldova 2,600 1,500 1,500
Syria 150 150 5,000
Tajikistan 8,200 5,500 5,000
Ukraine 1,500 13,000 28,000
Vietnam 700 ? ?
INTERNATIONAL PSOs
Bosnia (SFOR) 1,300 0 0
Central Africa Rep, 0 117 0
(MINURCAT)
Sudan (UNMIS) 0 122 0
Yugoslavia (KFOR) 3,600 0 0
MARITIME OPERATIONS
Indian Ocean 0 1 Destroyer 0
Mediterranean Sea 0 0 2 tactical submarines,
2 frigates
only when all other measures had been exhausted or proven ineffective. The
use of military force within Russia itself was, according to the constitutional
frames, only allowed if the life of Russian citizens, Russia’s territorial in-
tegrity and/or the Russian constitutional system were threatened (President
of the Russian Federation 2000a). The military doctrine following the NSS
was portrayed as defensive. At the same time, the doctrine elaborated on
what was perceived to be the general features of modern war. Modern
warfare was said to impact on all spheres of human activity and included
extensive use of indirect and non-traditional forms and means. In this sce-
nario, long-range effective and electronic engagement were predicted to be
used to disrupt, not only the system of the enemy state but its military
command and control. At the same time, highly manoeuvrable operations
by military forces were anticipated to be launched in disparate areas. This
was expected to include extensive use of airmobile and airborne troops, as
well as special forces and irregular armed formations alongside regular units.
Attacks would hence be directed against troops, rear-service and economic
facilities, as well as against means of communication throughout the whole
territory of the enemy. Air campaigns would be targeting power plants,
especially nuclear, chemical and other dangerous production facilities,
infrastructure, means of communication and other vital installations
(President of the Russian Federation 2000b).
5.2.5 Conclusions: Russian strategy
When it comes to alignment strategy, the Russian government noted already
in the late 1990s trends towards a multipolar world. The government posi-
tioned Russia against US’s efforts of creating a unipolar order. The initial
observations of an increased commonality between Russia’s national in-
terests and other major powers’ interests, which could have resulted in a
strategy of social mobility, were replaced with an increasing mistrust to-
wards the US. NATO’s expansion to Eastern Europe was perceived as
challenging. Simultaneously, Russia considered itself being without effective
alliances supporting its national security interests. Despite this shortcoming,
the government never gave up its ambition regarding Russia’s global role
and great power position. The US-led NATO intervention in the Kosovo-
conflict without a UNSC mandate was interpreted as a trend towards
American unilateralism and willingness to use military force to promote US
national interests. Ultimately, when the US invaded Iraq without the sup-
port of either a UNSC resolution or NATO, this trend was perceived as a de
facto strategy of primacy. Moreover, the economic strength of the US in
combination with the EU’s emerging military dimension motivated Russian
efforts to find additional partnerships to the CIS and the CSTO respectively.
In this regard, both China and India were considered potential strategic
partners. However, the establishment of the SCO in 2001, indicated that
developing the Sino-Russian relations was given priority. This did not
prevent the Russian government to seek other partnerships. In 2005, Russia
established regular trilateral meetings between the foreign ministers of
the RIC-troika (Russia, India and China). Another Russian initiative, the
BRIC, was established in in 2009. Arguably, the military significance of
the RIC-troika and the BRIC/BRICS is highly questionable. Consequently,
the Russian government has given priority to the CSTO, CIS and SCO.
We conclude that Russia initially, following the end of the Cold War,
presumably adopted a strategy of strategic autonomy, supported by a policy
of developing bilateral cooperation with both Western great powers, middle
powers and various regional powers. However, the growing mistrust against
the US and its adoption of a primacy strategy, led to the Russian adoption
of a unilateral balancing strategy, directed towards not only the US but
against NATO and the EU as well. This strategy manifested itself through
both ambitious efforts of internal balancing by modernising Russia’s armed
forces and external actions such as the war against Georgia. The latter can
also be seen as a response to Georgia’s efforts to establish closer ties with the
EU and NATO. We argue that since the external actions were taken within
the borders of the former USSR, that is the Russian declared ‘close abroad’,
it is appropriate to label the strategy as defensive unilateral balancing.
Simultaneously, the Russian government acknowledged the lack of
trustworthiness of a unilateral balancing strategy. The disadvantage for
Russia regarding its power relation with the US, not to say the aggregated
strength of the West, simply was too obvious. A strategic partnership with at
least one other major power had to be established and the choice fell on
China. This could potentially be interpreted as a shift towards a collective
hard-balancing strategy. However, we are not convinced that this truly is the
case from the Russian point of view. There is a Russian mistrust directed
towards China, not least when it comes to the Chinese ambitions regarding
Siberia. Moreover, Russia’s collective balancing is not restricted to solely
China as the Russian back-up plan includes India. Consequently, we argue
that the collective efforts of Russia should be interpreted as a complement to
its unilateral ambitions, rather than as the main strategy.
The Obama administration’s cooperative security strategy initially in-
cluded efforts of a reset policy towards Russia. However, NATO’s en-
gagement in Libya, which arguably went beyond the mandate given by the
UNSC, indicated that the US no longer acted alone. Rather the coopera-
tiveness seemed to include a reunified West. Arguably, Russia’s active
military support to the Assad government in the Syrian civil war can be seen
as a shift in the Russian strategy towards an offensive unilateral balancing
aiming to undermine US power position in the Middle East. This policy was
followed by Russia’s war against Ukraine and the annexation of the
Crimean Peninsula. This action is more offensive compared to the short war
with Georgia in 2008. The shift to a selective engagements strategy during
Trump’s presidency did not result in a shift in the Russian strategy.
Arguably, Russia’s efforts to consolidate or improve its great power status
increasingly correspond to the strategy of social competition. However, the
Russian strategy also displays some of the characteristics of the status
competition strategy ‘social creativity’, exemplified by non-military aspects
of warfare including an increased preparedness to use nuclear weapons and
the emphasis on specific Russian values. The strategy to develop bilateral
relations with regional powers that can promote the development of a
‘polycentric’ world order may also be interpreted as a way of undermining
the influence of established liberal multilateral institutions. Russia’s assumed
interference in various elections and other efforts aiming at undermining the
legitimacy of other states political systems can be interpreted as an addi-
tional element in a strategy of social creativity that aims to balance a dis-
advantage in traditional hard and soft power resources. Clearly, unilateral
hard-balancing, either defensive or offensive, is not perceived as enough in
itself. Consequently, we argue that the use of both collective hard-balancing
and unilateral soft-balancing as a complement to the main strategy, that is
unilateral hard-balancing, indicates that the Russian government uses sev-
eral approaches to balance the power of not only the US but of the West.
The Russian strategy contains elements of both BPT and HST/PTT. Its
regional security arrangements and commitments to assist other states ex-
posed to armed attacks obviously contain elements of balance of power. The
strong opposition against further NATO enlargements is an additional sign
of the balance of power approach. Contrarily, the Russian government’s
analysis of a stagnating West and the steps towards a new polycentric world
order related to developments within the global economy and the increased
importance of regional governance. This fits well with both HST and PTT as
it indicates a preference for global power shift away from a liberal inter-
national order dominated by one superpower. In Table 5.13, the alignment
strategies of Russia are summarised.
Table 5.13 The alignment strategies of Russia
US’s global Primacy Cooperative security Selective

strategy engagements
Russia’s Defensive Offensive unilateral Offensive unilateral

strategy unilateral balancing balancing
balancing
Regarding the Russian military strategy, the ends based on values were
expressed at several different levels, including the individual, the societal, the
state and the international levels. At the core at each of the levels was the
spiritual and intellectual sphere. Consequently, fostering and strengthening
the cultural heritage and the spiritual renaissance of Russia, as well as the
traditions of Russian patriotism, were fundamental at each level. Hence,
gaining influence in the international system had not only an external but
also an internal dimension since Russia was said to use its international
positions to form a just world order as well as strengthening the domestic
constitutional system. Promoting this image of Russia both globally and
domestically was a declared key objective. In the former case, the policy
documents often touch upon peaceful coexistence among states and the
primacy of international law and the UN system. In the latter case, Russia’s
multinational population and the peaceful coexistence, as well as social
harmony among different ethnic groups within Russia, were in focus.
Regarding the ends related to threats, a core objective was to defend
Russia’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Other central
threat-related ends included preventing military aggression against Russia
and its allies, protecting Russian facilities and installations as well as safe-
guarding Russian citizens outside Russian territory. Consequently, addi-
tional objectives involved forming a circle of good neighbourhood and not
only preventing but also eliminating the emergence of potential conflicts in
adjacent to Russia. Notably, the Russian government expressed several
wartime-related ends such as preventing neutral states enlisting the war on
the side of the aggressor; ensuring military aid to Russia’s allies, and forcing
the aggressor to end the war at an early stage. Neutralizing potential threats
was hence a key objective of the armed forces.
Similarly, regarding the needs, the Russian government identified both an
external and an internal dimension. A fundamental end regarding the
former dimension was to consolidate Russia’s positions as a great power and
as one of the poles in a multipolar world order. Hence, a crucial objective
involved creating favourable external conditions for strengthening the
Russian economy including its position in the global trade and economic
system. Notably, influence was gradually replaced with authority as the de-
sired position within the international system and hence at the core of the
elaborations. The ends of the latter dimension included preventing the
emergence of social and inter-ethnic conflicts as well as national and re-
gional separatism within the Russian Federation. Consequently, promoting
Russia’s unity and ensuring not only political but also economic and social
stability within the Federation were key objectives.
The fourth and last aspect of the ends, vulnerabilities, was mostly elabo-
rated in the early years of our period of exploration. While some vulner-
abilities were indirectly mentioned such as the lagging behind other great
powers in terms of science and technology, dependency on imports, the state
debt and terrorism, these were not extensively emphasised. To conclude, we
argue that over time the ends related to threats has had the most pre-
dominant position in the Russian government’s elaborations. This end has
been complemented with ends related to needs, that is, objectives related to
ensuring Russia a strong position within the international system.
Regarding traditional means, the government gave priority to resources
perceived necessary to deter and prevent conventional large-scale and re-
gional wars, as well as to implement alliance commitments. Initially, around
2000, the government declared that Russia did not seek to maintain parity
with the leading states of the world. On the one hand, the considerations
focused on the defence expenditures, on the other hand on the ambition to
have permanent combat readiness. Consequently, reasonable sufficiency and
effectiveness were the keywords for the undertaken transformation. Later,
around 2010, the government explicitly declared its ambition to maintain
parity with the US in certain key areas regarding strategic offensive arms
such as conventional strategic bombers. Simultaneously, increased emphasis
was put on jointness and collaboration among the different services, bran-
ches and combat arms of the armed forces. Brigades, rather than divisions,
became the main combat unit of the army.
Regarding the enablers, the Russian government initially gave priority to
strategic deployability. Efforts were made to improve systems for mobili-
zation, command and control, logistics, and transport. Other prioritised
areas were maintenance and repair as well as stockpiling. In the early years,
nuclear weapons had a key role. The Russian strategy around 2000 seemed to
be focused on nuclear deterrence. However, the Russian government de-
clared its willingness to reach bilateral agreements with the US and for a
further reduction of Russia’s nuclear force. Strategic sufficiency was the key
concept. Around 2010, this approach had changed in favour of missile early
warning systems as well as for facilities necessary for WMD systems. At the
same time, the means of each of the parts of the nuclear triad decreased in
numbers.
Finally, regarding the modern means, the government gradually put more
attention to space-based assets and information warfare as well as to specific
weaponry such as drones and autonomous arms. Notably, not only a spe-
cific space-command but also a cyber-command were established during the
later years of our investigation. Despite these developments, we conclude
that the traditional means remain the focus of the Russian strategy.
Arguably, the emphasis put on mobilization of reserves, echeloned planning
and defence industry supports our claims.
Finally, regarding ways and the situation, the Russian government ela-
borated over the whole spectrum ranging from nuclear war to preventive
deployment. Notably, the government referred to peace-making rather than
to peacekeeping. Already during the initial years, the government reserved
the right to use nuclear weapons when responding not only to any attack
involving WMD but to large-scale conventional aggression as well.
Furthermore, it pledged Russia’s commitment to defend other CIS-members
and the extension of Russia’s nuclear umbrella to these and other allies. This
assurance came to include other CSTO member states. However, around
2010, the focus shifted from the deterministic war-fighting approach towards
deterring and preventing military conflicts.
When it comes to the employment of military force, peace-time stationing
of armed contingents on the soil of friendly host nations was given priority.
Foreign bases, including naval bases, were hence regarded as attractive. The
government also announced its ambition to increase Russia’s participation
in the early phases of peace support operations to prevent or eliminate
crises. Priority regarding international military cooperation was given to
allies within the framework of CSTO, CIS and SCO respectively.
Finally, regarding behaviour, the government argued that Russia’s mili-
tary doctrine was defensive. The government gave modern warfare plenty of
attention. One part of this warfare was operations aiming at disrupting the
functioning of the enemy state including its military command and control.
Another part was highly manoeuvrable operations including the extensive
use of airmobile and airborne troops were and a third, the use of special
forces and irregular armed formations alongside regular units. Arguably, the
Russian policy documents focused on controlling and paralysing the op-
ponent. In addition, we find behaviour being at the core of the considerations
regarding the ways. The wars in Georgia and Ukraine, Russia’s military
operations supporting the Assad government in Syria also displayed a
preparedness to use military force to achieve political objectives. Table 5.14
summarises our findings on the Russian military strategy.
Table 5.14 The military strategy of Russia
Ends Means Ways
Threats & Needs Traditional Behaviour

We find Alexander Golts and Tonya Putnam’s conclusions regarding the
Russian president’s continuous deflection from reform pressures interesting.
However, their claim that Russia’s military elite is striving to restore the
Russian military to its former size and strength is not consistent with the
IISS’s 2010-2020 (see Table 5.6). Rather it seems like Russia’s efforts to
increase its strength and modernise its armed forces include a reduction in
the number of most military units related to traditional inter-state warfare
(Golts and Putnam 2004). We agree with Kier Giles when arguing that the
2009 Russian NSS broke a trend as it took a step away from the narrative of
victimhood and instead reflected a more self-confident Russian leadership
signalling its ambition to influence global politics (Giles 2009).
In addition to the NSS, Roger McDermott points at the changes within the
Russian armed forces taken place in the aftermath of the Russia-Georgia war of
2008. Notably, already in 2009, he predicted that once the new reforms were
implemented in 2012, ‘we are likely to see a reappearance of the more belligerent
rhetoric from Moscow’. As the Russian forces become more credible in con-
ventional terms, ‘this will have policy implications for the West in terms of
Russian foreign policy in what Moscow regards as its “sphere of privileged in-
terests” within the former Soviet Union’ (McDermott 2009:501). In 2011, Marcel
De Haas concluded that ‘Russian military action could possibly be expected
against Azerbaijan or Ukraine, if the latter returns to a pro-Western stance’ and
we appreciate his detailed chronology of the reforms within the Russian armed
force since the Russia-Georgia war of 2008 (De Haas 2011:35). We agree with
Julien Cooper when concluding that in addition to the experience from the 2008
Russia-Georgia war, the Russian experiences of the global economic crisis in
2008 most likely explains the new Russian strategic approach in 2009 (Cooper
2012; see also Oxenstierna 2013; Oxenstierna and Westerlund 2013).
We concur with Carolina Vendil Pallin when highlighting the tendency to
underestimate the considerable time it takes to implement military trans-
formation. We also agree with her when observing that President Putin has
been credited for military reforms, which in reality is the results of decisions
taken before he got to power. In this regard, Vendil Pallin finds political will
rather than the ability of the military organisation as paramount (Vendil
Pallin 2009; see also McDermott 2011; Klein 2012; Renz 2018).
We agree with Bettina Renz when illuminating Kremlin’s ambitions
gaining recognition as a great power. However, we do not fully agree with
her conclusions that the Russian military transformation foremost have
taken a domestic perspective. We rather find support in her conclusion that
Russia’s international ambitions ‘cannot be achieved in isolation, but only in
cooperation with other powerful actors’ (Renz 2018:200). Arguably, this
goes in line with our conclusions regarding the Russian alignment strategy
as well as the ends (Regarding the Russian dependency on international
cooperation, see also, for example, Aleksandrov 2017; Blank 2017). We also
agree with Hans Kristensen and Robert Norris when arguing that ‘nuclear
forces are indispensable for Russia’s security and status as a great power’
(Kristensen and Norris 2018:185).
Regarding the means, we agree with Julien Cooper when concluding that
‘Russia is back on the world stage as a major military actor’ and (Cooper
2016:52. See also Cooper 2017; 2018). We also support Dmitry Gorenburg
who, when referring to the impact of the Russian military capabilities, ar-
gued that ‘Russia is already strong enough to defend itself in a conventional
war against any adversary and to defeat any neighboring state other than
China’ (Gorenburg 2017:6). Consequently, we do not share the views of
Alexander Sergunin and Valery Konyshev when interpreting the moder-
nisation of the Russian armed forces as a part of maintaining a deterrent
potential rather than being associated with developing offensive capabilities
(Sergunin and Konyshev 2017). However, we do appreciate the illuminating
observations of Tomas Malmlö f that ‘Russia’s State Armament Programme
up to 2027 demonstrates a more measured course on procurement and it is
more conservative in terms of ambition than its immediate predecessor’
(Malmlö f 2018). Notably, Richard Connolly and Mathieu Boulègue also
conclude that ‘the defence burden is likely to decline going into the early
2020s’ (Connolly and Boulègue 2018:37. See also Connolly 2019). Ultimately,
we think Keith Crane and his colleagues are accurate when arguing that
‘Russian capabilities to invade or threaten its immediate neighbors, especially
those countries not part of NATO, have increased and are not going away’
(Crane et al 2019:71).
We find that the conclusions of Timothy Thomas are in line with our own
regarding the development of indirect, asymmetric, and non-military mea-
sures, combined with new methods and forms of warfare. Like Thomas, we
argue that Russia’s war against Ukraine indicates ‘the further refinement of
Russian military strategy’ (Thomas 2015:460. See also Fabian 2019). We
also agree with Scott Boston and Dara Massicot regarding Russia’s way of
warfare and when observing that ‘Russian forces have demonstrated an
increasing array of conventional capabilities that would challenge adver-
saries at the tactical and operational levels of war’ (Boston and Massicot
2017:12). We find the observations presented by Aleksei Ramm, that over
63,000 Russian military personnel have gained combat experience in Syria
noteworthy (Ramm 2019).
5.3 Conclusions: the strategies of the contesters

Both China and Russia responded to US primacy with counter-balancing
strategies against perceived US unilateralism and they appear as dissatisfied/
aspiring states supporting a new multipolar world order with themselves as
one of the poles. Both states can therefore be said to have practised anti-
primacy strategies. Moreover, they have continued their counter-balancing
strategies during all three US presidential administrations using both
internal and collective balancing strategies by modernising their armed
forces and engaging in various forms of defence and security cooperation
between themselves and with other states. Another similarity between the
two contesters is that they identify internal threats to their stability.
However, there are also significant differences between the two contesters.
In contrast to China, Russia has practised greater competitive strategies
against the US by using both defensive collective balancing with China and
offensive balancing with Syria. Moreover, Russia has so far shown greater
preparedness to use military force to impose its will on less resourceful
states. Therefore, Russia appears to more openly practising status strategies
of social competition and social creativity. Another difference between the
two contesters concerns the difference between emergent and dissatisfied
powers and status quo oriented satisfied states. Even though both states
actively promotes cooperation between emergent powers through bilateral
cooperation and alternative multilateral institutions such as BRICS, China
emerges as a leader among emergent powers in questions relating to the
global economy. Contrarily, Russia’s claims of great power status are de-
pendent on its military resources and the use of various instruments related
to information warfare.
In opposing the US’s dominant position in the international system, both
states’ practice strategies that correspond to both BPT and HST/PTT.
Regarding the BPT, China’s and Russia’s unilateral and collective balancing
against the US correspond to the expectations of defensive realism – that
first and second-ranked states will pursue counter-balancing strategies to
prevent one leading power from establishing itself as a global hegemon.
However, counter-balancing strategies against the dominant state are also
the expected behaviour from revisionist dissatisfied states in HST and PTT.
The opposition and balancing directed against the US specifically corre-
spond better with HST as it has a stronger focus on the unilateral capacities
of the leading power. PTT put greater emphasis on the supporting role of
other status quo-oriented powers, multilateral institutions and the spread of
values associated with the dominant state. Arguably, China seems to be
more focused on balancing US power specifically, while Russia is actively
balancing against both US and liberal multilateral organisations such as the
EU and NATO. One example of this is Russia’s strong reaction to Ukraine’s
efforts to create closer ties with the EU and the resulting disengagement with
the G8. The economic sanctions that the EU have directed against Russia as
a consequence of its annexation of the Crimean peninsula, have contributed
to upholding the opposition between Russia and the EU. Russia’s growing
estrangement with Western liberal institutions also includes the G8 (pre-
viously G6 and G7), a political forum with roots in the Cold War era whose
member states represent the seven largest Western economies. Russia was
allowed to enter this club in 1997, transforming G7 to G8. Because of its war
against Ukraine, Russia’s membership of the G8 was suspended in 2014.
However, Putin had already in 2012 abstained from attending a G8 meeting
personally and in 2017 Russia announced that it did not intend to re-join the
group (Batchelor 2017).
Note
1 CIS was formed in December 1991 following the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
Its original charter was signed by Belarus, Russia and Ukraine. A few years later
12 of the 15 former Soviet Republics participated in the CIS. Since then, several
members have withdrawn or limited their participation in CIS, among them are
Georgia and Ukraine. The three Baltic States did not apply for membership in
CIS; rather these three states came to orient their security policy towards the EU
and NATO. Eventually, they became members of both organisations in 2004.
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6 The strategies of the conservators
Introduction
In this chapter, the strategies of the two status quo-oriented conservators,
France and the United Kingdom (UK) respectively, are explored. By in-
vestigating key primary sources, released over two decades, we observe some
important differences regarding the alignment strategies, and hence, espe-
cially when it comes to the degree of strategic autonomy. Although we can
present differences also regarding the ends, we conclude that both other
elements of the military strategy, that is the means and the ways, show some
crucial similarities.
6.1 The strategy of France

Following the end of the Cold War, France conducted a major overhaul of
its strategy in 1994 under François Mitterrand’s presidency.1 Two years
later, the President of the French Republic (PoFR), Jacques Chirac trans-
formed the army into an all-volunteer service and dismantled the surface-to-
surface ballistic nuclear missiles.2 In 2008, President Nicolas Sarkozy pre-
sented a White Paper on Defence and National Security, reflecting on the
post-Cold War era.3 Only five years later, in 2013, the new President,
François Hollande, issued a new white paper on defence was issued.4 Soon
after Emmanuel Macron was sworn in as PoFR in 2017, a defence and
national security strategic review was published.5 All five PoFR since the
end of the Cold War have issued white papers on defence, and the three last
white papers constitute the main empirical material analysed in this section.
In addition, policies and defence key figures released by the French Ministry
of Defence (FMoD), as well as strategies for specific defence sectors, pre-
sented by the French Prime Minister (FPM) and the French Network and
Information Security Agency (FNISA), have been studied. Notably, since
no French white paper on defence was issued between 1994 and 2008, we do
not have primary sources presented during the initial years of the Bush
administration. Therefore, we will only include references to these years in
relation to secondary sources.
DOI: 10.4324/9781003157113-6
Notably, the French analysis of ‘changing trends in the world strategic si-
tuation, global geopolitical balances or step changes and the type and in-
tensity of risks and threats’ was explicitly conducted to ‘determine how all
these changes affect France’s position in the international system’ (French
Ministry of Defence 2012:2).
The actor-based approach was dominant in the French policy documents.
In 2008, the distribution of global power was perceived to shift gradually
towards Asia. The nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in 1998, and North
Korea in 2006, as well as Iran and North Korea’s capacity of launching
missiles at distinctly greater ranges, were considered worrisome. However,
these were not the only countries given specific attention regarding military
developments, the government noted that:
China is continuing to modernise its equipment, with substantial

purchases from Russia (combat aircraft and submarines) and has
expanded its nuclear and ballistic capabilities. India’s spending has
grown at the same fast pace as its GDP growth. This has resulted in a
substantial increase in the military resources of both countries, and
especially China (President of the French Republic 2008:29).
Simultaneously, many international institutions such as the UN, the WTO

and the IMF were perceived to be in crisis due to lack of legitimacy and
efficacy (President of the French Republic 2008). In 2012, the FMoD ex-
pected the end of Western domination in global affairs. New major powers
with regional or global influence were expected to amplify the shift in the
global strategic centre of gravity. Brazil, Russia, India and China were all
mentioned in this regard. The FMoD warned that the EU ‘will remain a
first-rate power only if its members manage to define common goals and
unite their efforts, while continuing to consolidate political, economic, and
military integration’ (French Ministry of Defence 2012:10). The Ministry
argued that with China and India as the economic locomotives, the world’s
major economic growth would take place in Asia. The FMoD calculated
that these changes could lead to the emergence of an oligo-polar system
‘structured around regional centres or based on pragmatic alliances that
shift according to the interests at stake’ (French Ministry of Defence
2012:12). In 2013, the government concluded that the financial crisis had
marked a break with the security environment described in the previous
French white paper, forcing many states to amend their previous security
and defence arrangements:
The United States are (sic) cutting back on military spending and partly
refocusing their military efforts on the Asia-Pacific region.
Consequently, our US allies are likely to become more selective with
The strategies of the conservators 179
regard to their foreign commitments. It also puts more pressure on the
Europeans to shoulder responsibility for the security issues that concern
them most directly (President of the French Republic 2013:9).
Nevertheless, the government concluded that ‘France no longer faces any

direct, explicit conventional military threat against its territory’ (President of
the French Republic 2013:13). The government argued that the international
system was becoming multipolar. The involvement of two poles, China and
Russia, in different territorial disputes worried the government. The Indo-
Pakistani dispute over Kashmir was another conflict involving major
powers, hence causing concern. The government observed that Russia’s
military budget was growing rapidly and highlighted that Russia ‘is mod-
ernising its nuclear arsenal and working to provide its conventional forces
with enhanced intervention capabilities’ (President of the French Republic
2013:35). In 2017, President Macron claimed that ‘France and Europe are
now directly at risk’. He explained further that ‘the threat of a major conflict
is once again a possibility. Assertive powers and authoritarian regimes are
emerging or re-emerging, while multilateralism appears to be giving way to
the rule of force’ (President of the French Republic 2017:5). Besides, the
government maintained that ‘Russia seeks to undermine the transatlantic
relationship and to divide the European Union’. The government perceived
China as ‘striving to become the dominant power in Asia in the near future
and, in the long term, to match or overtake the power of the United States.
To that end, the development of its military capabilities is a priority’. In
addition, a growing number of regional powers were observed investing in
advanced weapon systems (President of the French Republic 2017:41–42).
When it comes to the regional approach, the considerations did not only
focus on Europe but instead took a worldwide approach. In 2008, the
government concluded that globalisation had led to flagrant economic and
social inequality, with entire regions in Africa, Asia and even Latin America
unable to reap the benefits of global economic growth. The government
stressed the risks that this development could pose for international stabi-
lity. Several sources of conflict were considered to constitute a constant
threat to peace and stability in the Near and Middle East. In South Asia, the
situation in Pakistan was perceived to become increasingly fragile. In East
Asia, the Korean and Taiwanese questions were considered to be of special
concern due to the risks of great power involvement. Regarding Africa, the
government admitted that North Africa was of special importance to France
due to historic and linguistic reasons. The situations in the Horn, the Great
Lakes and the Sahel regions were given special attention. The French gov-
ernment concluded that ‘[t]he presence of China and Russia in the Gulf
States and Africa is growing hand in hand with sizeable arms sales’
(President of the French Republic 2008:42).
In 2012, the FMoD expected China to replace the US as the ‘strategic
policeman’ in East Asia by 2040 (French Ministry of Defence 2012:10). The
FMoD observed the increased regional integration taking place worldwide,
focusing on Africa, Asia and Latin America. In 2013, the political and social
revolutions in the Arab world were considered to be of particular sig-
nificance as they were ‘on Europe’s doorstep’ (President of the French
Republic 2013:10). Clearly, the regional dimension was considered im-
portant:
France is present in every ocean and in most continents, thanks to the

overseas territories which – in addition to their economic and strategic
importance – provide a special relationship with countries far away
from Europe, making us a recognised partner – and often the only
European one – for numerous regional organisations (President of the
French Republic 2013:13).
In 2016, the French MoD presented a specific policy for the Asian-Pacific
region. The Minister of Defence, Jean-Yves Le Drian, observed that ‘[t]he
evolution of the strategic balances has strongly accelerated in Asia as well as
in the Indo-Pacific’. Le Drian concluded that ‘[i]n a nutshell, the geopolitical
entity comprising Asia and the Indo-Pacific, which is a seat of economic
dynamism, demographic growth and technological innovation, represents a
source of overall prosperity, exposed to vulnerabilities’ (French Ministry of
Defence 2016b:1).
Africa, Asia, the Middle East as well as the Mediterranean and its
southern regions were given specific attention also in the 2017 white paper.
The government feared that the weaknesses of the Balkan could be exploited
by radical movements and criminal groups, and/or used by other states for
destabilisation purposes. Europe’s eastern and northern flanks were believed
to be the targets of Russian ambitions to rebuild its sphere of influence. The
violation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, the aggressive posture in the
Baltic area, the increased military activities in the North Atlantic region as
well as the various frozen conflicts in the Caucasus and Transnistria were
considered as ‘a major concern, which France shares with its main allies and
which requires the deployment of significant capabilities’ (President of the
French Republic 2017:23).
Regarding the thematic approach, in 2008, the government elaborated on
the potentially new health and ecological risks, such as damage to the bio-
sphere and pandemics, and the potential consequences for international
security. Economic interdependence was believed to create ties of solidarity,
thus contributing to global stability. Simultaneously, the government
warned that access to worldwide communication, such as the internet, could
lead to a rapid spread of political, economic and financial crises. The gov-
ernment also feared rising nationalism and increased religious fanaticism.
The growing demand for natural resources and strategic raw materials was
also perceived as a challenge. Threats from terrorist networks, the con-
sequences of the ballistic proliferation and potential attacks on information
and communication systems were perceived worrisome. The risk of cyber-
attacks was also mentioned in this context (President of the French Republic
2008). In 2011, the Secretary-General for Defence and National Security,
Mr Francis Delon suggested that ‘[c]yberspace, like a virtual battleground,
has become a place for confrontation’ (French Network and Information
Security Agency 2011:3).
One year later, the main themes in the FMoD’s elaborations included
urbanisation, migration, population growth, increased transnational flows
and interdependencies, enhanced roles for non-state players (international
firms, transnational organised crime and terrorist groups etcetera), the
proliferation of WMD and technological changes. Other these were climate
change, the competition for access to natural resources (such as fresh water,
arable land and raw material including energy and mineral resources), as
well as increasing inequality in wealth distribution. The Ministry also fo-
cused on future warfare:
The line between international and intra-national conflicts, between

regular and irregular wars, and between low- and high-intensity
conflicts, will be increasingly blurred. The interrelationship between
state and non-state players, with increasingly diverse modes of action,
will be more and more complex (French Ministry of Defence 2012:20).
In 2013, President François Hollande observed that the ‘threats already

identified in 2008 – terrorism, cyber-attacks, nuclear proliferation, pan-
demics, etc. – have become even more pressing’ (President of the French
Republic 2013:7). Other themes which were considered to have the potential
of having serious repercussions for the security of France were climate
change, organised crime, the spread of conventional weapons, the pro-
liferation of WMD, as well as technological and natural risks (President of
the French Republic 2013). Notably, space was also given specific attention:
The possibility of aggression in space is more likely as progress is made

in anti-satellite weaponry, especially low-orbit satellites. Furthermore,
the risk of collision to which they are exposed grows as the number of
objects – especially debris - increases in the orbits where they are
stationed (President of the French Republic 2013:44).
In 2017, President Macron observed the spread of Islamic terrorism to new

regions and that aggressive behaviour in cyberspace were becoming more
frequent. He warned that this could have dire consequences. Some aspects of
the military theme, such as the spread of conventional weaponry and the
proliferation of not only nuclear but of biological and chemical weapons
were given specific attention (President of the French Republic 2017).
6.1.2 Ends
In March 2008, President Sarkozy made clear that his two goals ‘are to
ensure that France remains a major military and diplomatic power, ready to
take on the challenges congruent with our international obligations and that
the State has the capacity to guarantee the independence of France and the
protection of all French citizens (President of the French Republic 2008:9).
The FMoD identified unique French objectives and simultaneously stressed
the necessity for increased European cooperation:
[O]ur status as a nuclear power, our international responsibilities, our

defence pacts and French influence overseas will set our national
interests apart from those of our main partners. Unless we significantly
revise the level of our ambitions, this ‘strategic identity’ will require us
to have a substantial margin for independent action, capable of covering
specific fields of interest (French Ministry of Defence 2012:22).
Soon after being elected as PoFR, Hollande clarified his priorities: ‘We must
[…] preserve the credibility of our nuclear deterrence and explicitly affirm
our right to take the initiative in actions that defend our interests and those
of the international community’ (President of the French Republic
2013:7–8).
Regarding the value-based ends, the government declared that one of its:
aim[s] is to defend the values of the ‘republican compact’ that binds all
French people to the State, namely the principles of democracy, and in
particular individual and collective freedoms, respect for human dignity,
solidarity and justice (President of the French Republic 2008:58).
Respect for the rule of law was explicitly mentioned as a fundamental in-
terest of France. Consequently, ensuring the legitimacy of French military
actions, both nationally and internationally, was presented as a key objec-
tive. Contributing to peace in the world and the stability of the Middle East
and the Persian Gulf were other value-based ends presented in 2013
(President of the French Republic 2013). ‘[O]nly a strong France, in control
of its own destiny, can provide answers to today’s major crises, promote its
values and assert its interests’, President Macron declared in 2017 without
specifying which French values. Indirectly, he touched upon peace promo-
tion and prosperity in his elaborations (President of the French Republic
2017:6).
Ends related to threats were often articulated in a pro-active manner. ‘It is
the ambition of France’, the government declared in 2008, ‘to be in a po-
sition where it does not have to submit to the effects of uncertainty; its
ambition, rather, is to have the capacity to anticipate, respond to and in-
fluence international developments’. Preventing or deterring the risk of war
was hence presented as a core objective. Notably, this end was declared to be
valid ‘wherever the security of France, the defence of Europe and world
peace may come under threat’ (President of the French Republic 2008:14).
The government explained that ‘[t]he aim of prevention is to avoid the
emergence or aggravation of threats to our national security’ (President of
the French Republic 2008:143). In 2013, the government highlighted that a
core end was to preserve France’s independence and sovereignty against all
forms of threats was declared (President of the French Republic 2013).
Worried by the threatening developments in the Asian-Pacific region, the
French government stressed that a national interest of France was to
maintain sovereignty over its territories in the Indian and the Pacific Oceans
and its population in these territories. Defending its interests was considered
a necessity, not an option (French Ministry of Defence 2016b). In 2017,
President Macron defined France’s vital interests as ‘our independence and,
more broadly, our freedom of decision’ (President of the French Republic
2017:6).
When it comes to ends focusing on needs, the French government an-
nounced that one of its:
aim[s] is to enable France to contribute to European and international

security: this corresponds both to its own security needs, which also
extend beyond its frontiers, and to the responsibilities shouldered by
France within the framework of the United Nations and the alliances
and treaties which it has signed (President of the French Republic
2008:58).
France’s dependency on international cooperation was explicitly made clear.

Consequently, an additional end was declared to be:
promoting the European Union as a global security actor on the one

hand, and the construction of a legitimate and effective system of global
governance on the other, are the necessary fulcrums for the defence of
the major security interests of France (President of the French Republic
2008:39).
Supporting the efforts of the African Union (AU) and other regional or-
ganisations was another end presented in this context. The prevention of
major conflicts in Asia was also presented as a central objective not only for
France but for all international actors. However, this end was focusing more
on the consequences for France and Europe of an Asian conflict than the
conflict itself. Arguments supporting this position were the impacts of an
Asian war on strategic maritime routes, energy supplies or strategic raw
materials, the potential economic and financial fallout and France’s and
Europe’s links with the US, especially in relation to guaranteeing the se-
curity of several Asian countries (President of the French Republic 2008).
Five years later, in 2013, the French government gave priority to the
cooperation within the EU, NATO and the UN. Especially the EU was
given considerable attention. The government declared that even closer in-
tegration within the Union regarding security and defence was ‘a key ob-
jective’. The 1963 Élysée Treaty with Germany, the 2010 two Lancaster
House treaties with the UK, as well as the cooperation among six main arms
manufacturing European states, including France, Germany, Italy, Spain,
Sweden and the UK, were also mentioned as fundamental to France. At the
same time, the government stated that France’s strategic autonomy was
underpinned by national ownership of its essential defence and security
capabilities (President of the French Republic 2013:17). Nevertheless,
guaranteeing the security of Europe and the North Atlantic space, as well as
stabilising Europe’s near environment with France’s partners and allies,
were two articulated ends that clearly noted the need for cooperation in
order to achieve France’s aims. In 2017, President Macron declared that
further consolidation of the EU’s defence and strategic autonomy was a
French objective:
Europe is the natural framework for our security and the protection of
our borders, given challenges that can only be faced collectively. The
time is therefore right to revive European defence by drawing our
strategic cultures closer, by cultivating pragmatic partnerships with
European states which, like us, have the political will and military
capabilities to meet their operational responsibilities, by committing the
necessary resources at the European level and by strengthening our
defence industries, to ensure they remain at the cutting edge of
technology and competitiveness on a global scale (President of the
French Republic 2017:6–7).
Vulnerabilities were often the point of departure in the strategic considera-

tions. ‘In this volatile environment’, the government stated in 2008, ‘the
French territory and population are vulnerable in new ways that must now be
treated as key factors in adapting our defence and security’ (President of the
French Republic 2008:14). Consequently, key objectives were to guarantee the
security of French citizens, both on French soil and beyond. In the 2008 white
paper, The government’s ‘duty’ and ‘responsibility’ was ‘to defend the po-
pulation and French territory’ (President of the French Republic 2008:58).
Protecting the national territory and French nationals abroad and guaran-
teeing the continuity of the Nation’s essential functions remained as core ends
also in the 2013 white paper (President of the French Republic 2013).
The French government was also concerned about vulnerabilities re-
garding cyberattacks. Consequently, safeguarding the security of not only
France’s citizens and companies, but of the nation as a whole in cyberspace
was presented as an important end. Four strategic objectives in the cyber
domain were articulated: (i) France becoming a world power in cyber
defence; (ii) protecting information related to France’s sovereignty; (iii)
strengthening the cybersecurity of critical national infrastructures; and (iv)
ensuring security in cyberspace (French Network and Information Security
Agency 2011). In 2015, a national digital security strategy was launched.
Ensuring France’s freedom of expression and action as well as the security of
its critical infrastructures in case of a major cyberattack was presented as the
first objective of the strategy. This objective included preventing attackers
from stealing confidential military data as well as providing the armed forces
with the required level of security when making decisions and taking action.
None of the other four objectives presented in the strategy had a clear
connection to the military domain (French Prime Minister 2015).
The French government declared that as Asia was the EU’s ‘largest
trading partner, any crisis or conflict in the Asia-Pacific [was] likely to ad-
versely affect the interests of Europe as well as France’ (French Ministry of
Defence 2016b:4). The government shed light on trading numbers and the
fact that more than 17 per cent of France’s imports came from Asia, while
13 per cent of its exports went to Asia. In addition, the government illu-
minated that 62 per cent of France’s exclusive economic zone was located in
the Pacific Ocean and another 24 per cent in the Indian Ocean.
Consequently, contributing to the stability of the Asian-Pacific region was
explicitly declared as an end. Simultaneously, the government clarified that
in order to fulfil this objective, it was a precondition (and almost an end in
itself) to maintain strong relations with France’s partners, primarily
Australia, India, Japan and the US (French Ministry of Defence 2016b).
According to President Macron, the primary mission of France’s armed
forces ‘will remain the protection of France and its people, on our mainland
as well as our overseas departments and territories’ (President of the French
Republic 2017:6). The government asserted that ‘[t]he integrity of our ter-
ritory and the protection of our population are central to our vital interests’
6.1.3 Means
The French defence expenditures saw a modest increase between 2001 and
2009. During President Obama’s first time in office, France’s expenditures
initially decreased. However, from 2012 and onwards, France’s expenditures
increased each year. In constant USD (2018), France spent 46,787 million
USD on defence in 2001. In 2019, the defence expenditures were 52,229
million USD (SIPRI 2020b). In Table 6.1, the defence expenditures of
France are summarised.
In 2008, the government concluded that the level of the military means ‘no
longer depends on massive commitment to a collective air-land defensive
operation in Europe, within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance’
(President of the French Republic 2008:119–120). Five years later, in 2013,
the government presented a multi-domain approach:
Table 6.1 Annual defence expenditure, France 2001–2019 (million euro)
Bush I 2001 2002 2003 2004

Bush II 2005 2006 2007 2008
Obama I 2009 2010 2011 2012
Obama II 2013 2014 2015 2016
Trump I 2017 2018 2019 2020
In order to acquire and retain operational superiority over our

adversaries, conduct of these coercive engagements will be coordinated
in all five environments (earth, air, sea, outer space and cyberspace).
Technological superiority […] will be essential (President of the French
Republic 2013:81).
In 2017, President Macron concluded that the armed forces ‘require an agile,
deployable and resilient defence system’. France’s armed forces must, the
President stressed, be able ‘to deploy far beyond our borders, wherever they
are needed’ (President of the French Republic 2017:6).
Regarding the traditional means, ‘the capacity for rapid adaptation and
response’ was emphasised in the 2008 elaborations. The government declared
that these capabilities must ‘be given very high priority in the nation’s defence
and security effort’ (President of the French Republic 2008:59). On the one
hand, the government shed light on France’s contributions to the EU’s battle
groups as well as NATO’s rapid reaction forces in this regard. On the other
hand, it announced its ambition to develop national capabilities:
for long-distance, in-depth force projection against an adversary. The

strategic range of its military capabilities in all their components, sea, air
and land-based, will be sufficient to cover all strategic zones of major
interest. The quality and coherence of the French military capabilities
will be maintained and improved in order to retain the advantage over
all plausible adversaries (President of the French Republic 2008:191).
The ground forces were to consist of 88,000 soldiers, organised in, among
other, eight brigades – equipped with some 250 Leclerc MBTs, some 650
APCs and 80 combat helicopters – and three specialised brigades. The navy
was to organise some 44,000 personnel sailing, amongst other, four SSBNs,
six nuclear attack submarines, an aircraft carrier including an air group and
18 frigates. The bulk of the air force was to include 300 combat aircraft
(President of the French Republic 2008). Of these forces, 30,000 soldiers
were to be deployable within six months for a period of one year, without
replacement. In addition, the armed forces were to organise an independent
reaction and/or reinforcement unit consisting of 5,000 troops on permanent
operational alert. Regarding the air force, ten aircraft on permanent op-
erational alert were considered a minimum. In addition, air assets were to
have the capability of projecting force of 1,500 soldiers over a distance of up
to 8,000 kilometres in a few days, including air traffic control, as well as
other airbase resources. The government decided that two naval groups were
to be ‘available for intervention missions or to provide forward presence’
In 2012, the FMoD argued that ‘[t]he long-term operational credibility of
the French armed forces will be based on the preservation of a critical mass
guaranteeing a level of autonomy that is compatible with national interests
and status’ (French Ministry of Defence 2012:22). Consequently, the defence
architecture was to be organised around both a robust national military base
and new partnership mechanisms. Since military interventions were per-
ceived to increasingly take place within multinational frameworks, inter-
operability was considered a precondition (French Ministry of Defence
2012). One year later, President Hollande declared his will:
to retain autonomous, swift-reaction deployment military means relying

on well-trained, well-equipped and well-informed forces. They must be
able to have a decisive impact in regions where the greatest threats to
our interests and those of our partners and allies are located (President
of the French Republic 2013:8).
The government argued that to guarantee a capability for autonomous re-

action in the event of a crisis, France had to organise:
a national emergency force of 5,000 troops on standby, enabling it to

constitute an immediate reaction joint force (FIRI) of 2,300 troops, that
can be mobilised to intervene over a radius of 3,000 km from the
national territory or a foreign base, in seven days. [FIRI] will be
composed of special forces, a combined land group of 1,500 men
equipped with armoured vehicles and helicopters, a naval group
consisting of one force projection and command vessel (BPC), 10
fighter jets, tactical transport planes, maritime patrol aircraft and air-
to-air refuelling aircraft, along with the associated command and
control means (President of the French Republic 2013:87).
The government declared that in case of a major coercive operation, France

needed to allocate a significant number of resources, including: (i) special
forces; (ii) ground forces up to two combined brigades representing around
15,000 land troops; (iii) air forces up to 45 fighter jets; (iv) naval forces
including the aircraft carrier, two combined force projection and command
vessels, escort vessels comprised primarily of frigates, a nuclear attack
submarine and naval patrol aircraft (President of the French Republic
2013). In 2016, the bulk of the army consisted of 200 Leclerc MBTs while the
air force operated 212 combat aircraft (81 Rafale and 131 Mirage-2000). The
navy sailed four SSBNs, six nuclear-powered attack submarines, one carrier
with 42 Rafale combat aircraft, three landing helicopter docks (LHDs), 23
frigates, 19 offshore patrol vessels and 17 landing docks/crafts (French
Ministry of Defence 2016a). Notably, the figures and categorisations in
Table 6.2 are based on secondary sources.
Table 6.2 The main traditional units and equipment of the French armed forces
2000–2020
2000 2010 2020
ARMY
Task Force HQ 4 4 0
Corp HQ 0 0 1
Division HQ 0 0 2
Tank Brigade 3 3 2
Mechanized Regiment 0 0 1
Infantry Regiment 0 0 4
Airborne Brigade 1 1 1
Airborne Regiment 0 0 1
Foreign Legion Regiments 7 5 4
Special Forces Regiments 2 2 2
MBT 834 637 222
APC/AIFV 4,613 4,601 2,970
NAVY
Carrier 2 1 1
Cruiser 1 1 0
Destroyer 4 11 11
Marine Infantry Regiment 24 33 ?
Attack
Fighter 114 74 41
The policy documents were gradually giving enablers more priority. In the
2008 white paper, intelligence was said ‘to enable the highest authorities of
the State, together with our diplomacy, armed forces and our internal and
civil security services, to anticipate developments, and to reach assessments,
decide and act in full independence’ (President of the French Republic
2008:125). The government also gave priority to strategic mobility.
Replacing the strategic air transport fleet and increasing its capacity was
partly intended to be achieved through the acquisition of new-generation
aircraft such as MRTTs and A-400 Ms. Regarding naval mobility, the ac-
quisition of force projection and command vessels as well as large amphi-
bious ships were considered necessary to maintain, and potentially also
strengthen, the armed forces’ transport and landing capability. ‘Investment
in procurement must’, the government argued, seek to overcome the
weakness ‘which currently hampers the effectiveness and autonomy of
French forces’ (President of the French Republic 2008:201). Moreover, the
government stressed the necessity of developing the command and control
capabilities needed in order to enable France to fulfil a role as a framework
nation in large-scale operations. In 2015, the government presented figures
on key enablers. Regarding aircraft, the fleet was described as consisting of
five strategic airlift aircraft (A310, A340), seven tactical transport aircraft
with strategic range (A400 Atlas), 41 tactical transport aircraft (C130
Hercules, C160 Transall), 27 light tactical transport aircraft (CN235) and 14
tanker aircraft (C135FR, KC135). The navy sailed six support ships (French
Ministry of Defence 2015). In Table 6.3, the airborne enablers of the French
armed forces are summarised.
Table 6.3 The main airborne enablers of the French armed forces 2000–2020
2000 2010 2020
KC-135 (tanker) 3 3 3
C-135FR (tanker) 11 11 11
Transall C-160 (tanker) 0 15 0
DC-8F (heavy transport) 3 0 0
A310-300 (heavy transport) 2 3 0
Airbus A400 (heavy transport) 0 0 15
Transall C-160 (medium transport) 77 42 12
C-130 (medium transport) 14 14 16
The nuclear means were fundamental in the policy documents, reflecting

the French self-image as a great power. The government suggested that ‘[n]
uclear deterrence remains one of the foundations of France’s strategy. It is
the ultimate guarantee of national security and independence. It is one of the
conditions of France’s strategic autonomy’ (President of the French
Republic 2008:64). The government shed light on its intended modernisation
of the nuclear forces:
In 2010, the M-51 intercontinental ballistic missile will be brought into

service on the French new-generation SSBNs, providing the seaborne
component with a much extended range and increased flexibility. The
new missile will be technically evaluative and from 2015 will be fitted
with the new ONW warhead. From 2009 onwards, the airborne
component will be equipped with the ASMP-A cruise missile deployed
on Mirage 2000-NK3 and Rafale aircraft stationed in France (two
squadrons), or carrier-based (President of the French Republic
2008:162).
In 2017, President Macron announced that he had ‘decided to maintain our

nuclear deterrence strategy and renew its two components’ (President of the
French Republic 2017:6). In Table 6.4, these two components are summarised.
Table 6.4 The main strategic nuclear forces of France 2000–2020
2000 2010 2020
SLBM
M4/aboard Redoutable 32/2 0 0
M45/aboard Le Triomphant 32/2 48/3 0
M51/aboard Le Triomphant 0 0 64/4
STRATEGIC BOMBER
Super Etendard 36 24 0
Mirage 2000N 60 60 0
Rafale B 0 0 20
Regarding modern means, in 2008, the government observed the need to

develop a fighting capacity in the cyber-space. The need for space-based
assets was also noted. The government declared that France ‘will ensure the
continuity and modernisation of its observation and communications sa-
tellites which have now become indispensable to intelligence gathering on
the one hand, and to the conduct of military interventions on the other’
(President of the French Republic 2008:135). Other modern means such as
drones and medium altitude and long endurance UAV system were, together
with the space-based assets, often connected to intelligence. The planning
also included land-based means, such as advanced transmissions detach-
ments and ‘seaborne assets in the form of an “acoustic intelligence” ship and
nuclear attack submarines’ (President of the French Republic 2008:129).
In 2009, given the emergence of cyberspace in the field of national se-
curity, the government decided to set up the FNISA (French: Agence na-
tionale de la sécurité des systèmes d’information, ANSSI). One year later, the
PoFR decided to make FNISA responsible for the defence of the govern-
ment’s information systems, in addition to its security role (French Network
and Information Security Agency 2011). Notably, in 2013 the government
explicitly admitted its intention to establish offensive cyber capacities
(President of the French Republic 2013). In 2016, the army had 72 UAVs to
its disposal while the air force had four Harfang and three Reaper UAVs. In
addition, the air force operated two C160G electromagnetic intelligence-
gathering aircraft (French Ministry of Defence 2016a). In 2010, according to
the IISS, France had an operational space control brigade. The brigade
controlled the two French Helios satellites. In 2016, a military cyber corps
with a personnel strength of about 2,600 was organised. The number of
satellites had by 2020 increased to seven, including not only the two Helios
surveillance satellites but also two Pleiades surveillance satellites, two
Syracuse and one Athena-Fidus communication satellites (International
Institute for Strategic Studies 2010; 2020).
6.1.4 Ways
The policy elaborations on ways often corresponded to the situation ap-
proach. In 2008, the government declared that ‘[w]hatever the case, the
possibility of a threat to national security demands foresight, prevention,
and a swift response’. The prospect of high-intensity major conflict was not
perceived as probable, but plausible. The government warned that a wor-
sening of international relations could:
lead to the re-emergence of a global threat, especially a military one, to

Europe and France. France’s strategic choices must therefore preserve
the country’s capacity for build-up and to adapt its military and civil
forces, its industrial capacity and its means of training, in the light of
such developments (President of the French Republic 2008:59–60).
Preventing, or at least limiting, the occurrence of threats or wars that could

target France directly or via a chain reaction was described as one of the
main situations the armed forces had to manage. Deterring any state from
thinking that it could attack the vital interests of France without incurring
unacceptable risks for itself was presented as another key situation. The
third situation, protecting, aimed at ensuring the security of France’s citizens
as well as the French society and its economic life, primarily on French soil.
Finally, intervention, aimed at providing ‘our national security, in close co-
ordination with our European partners and our allies, with the necessary
depth, adaptability and mobility inherent to any defence strategy in the
twenty-first century world’ (President of the French Republic 2008:61).
The government presented three different operational contexts for the use
of military force. The operations on national territory were argued to demand
close cooperation between the armed forces, other authorities and agencies.
Contrary to these operations, the government argued that military opera-
tions abroad (including stabilisation operations and large-scale operations)
could be conducted strictly with military means. The government calculated
that stabilisation operations would:
generally entail the sending of relatively small contingents of between
1,000 and 5,000 troops, not including naval and air forces. The armed
forces will be expected to deploy and maintain contingents of this kind
in many theatres, in geographically distant regions, often remote and
with harsh physical, human and economic features. These operations
may be of long duration and evolve considerably over time, requiring
the forces on the ground to adapt permanently President of the French
Republic 2008:122).
The government argued that large-scale military operations, could not be

ruled out as an operation ‘generally comprises a high intensity or “decisive”
phase, followed by a stabilisation phase that may stretch over a number of
years’ (President of the French Republic 2008:122). The third context was
defined as combined civil and military operations outside national territory.
The government also mentioned the bilateral defence co-operations in these
contexts.
Another implicit context, the nuclear deterrence, was declared to be
strictly defensive. At the same time, the government declared that French
nuclear retaliation would target the aggressor’s ‘centres of political, eco-
nomic and military power’. The operational credibility of France’s nuclear
deterrent was argued to rely on permanent submarine patrols and airborne
capabilities. Notably, the nuclear deterrence was coordinated with another
neighbouring nuclear power: ‘Together with the other European nuclear
power, the United Kingdom, France notes that there is no situation in which
the vital interests of one may be threatened without the interests of the other
being threatened also’ (President of the French Republic 2008:65). Five
years later, in 2013, the government declared:
The use of nuclear weapons would only be conceivable in extreme

circumstances of legitimate self-defence. In this respect, nuclear deter-
rence is the ultimate guarantee of the security, protection and indepen-
dence of the Nation. It ensures, permanently, our independence of
decision-making and our freedom of action within the framework of our
international responsibilities, including in the event of any threat of
blackmail that might be directed against us in the event of a crisis.
The French government explained that the purpose of external interventions

responded to three objectives: (i) ensuring the protection of French nationals
abroad; (ii) defending France’s strategic interests and those of its partners
and allies; and (iii) exercising France’s international responsibilities
(President of the French Republic 2013). In addition, in 2017 the govern-
ment argued that to maintain France’s nuclear deterrent capacity, the armed
forces simultaneously had to address four major challenges: (i) the protec-
tion of the national territory, airspace and maritime areas; (ii) the ability to
respond to a crisis in France’s neighbourhood including intervening alone;
(iii) the preservation of France’s dominance over non-state adversaries in-
cluding those possessing significant resources and advanced military cap-
abilities; and (iv) the shouldering of France’s responsibilities, along with
allies and partners, in a military confrontation with state actors operating
leading-edge capabilities (President of the French Republic 2017).
Regarding the employment of the armed forces, the government an-
nounced that military interventions in most cases were to take place within a
multilateral framework. This framework included the UN, the EU, NATO
‘or another appropriate grouping legitimised by international law’. The only
eventualities in which a purely French intervention was considered plausible
involved situations requiring: (i) the protection of French citizens abroad;
(ii) the application of bilateral defence agreements; and (iii) a response to
actions against French national interests. To act in a compact and con-
centrated manner, the government wanted to avoid dispersing France’s
armed forces. Consequently, the intervention capabilities were deployed due
to geographical priorities. The government explained that ‘[t]he main sphere
follows the contours of the principal risks, from the Atlantic to the Gulf of
Oman and the Indian Ocean, from where extensions of our presence towards
Asia are possible’ (President of the French Republic 2008:67). Military
presence in the Mediterranean, West Africa and the Caribbean was given
priority, together with prepositioning assets related to the French partner-
ships with several African countries. In 2008, French forces were deployed at
seven bases: four staging bases in Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Gabon and,
Senegal, one long-standing deployment in Chad and three operations in
progress in the Central African Republic (CAR), Côte d’Ivoire and on the
Chadian border of Darfur. These deployments were, however, considered in
need of reconfiguration. The government explained that France’s ‘arrange-
ments should ultimately comprise a presence on the continent of Africa’s
Atlantic seaboard, one or two outposts in the Arabian-Persian Gulf, and
one in the Indian Ocean’ (President of the French Republic 2008:68). In
addition, it was considered necessary to establish theatre resources in French
Guyana for the West Indies, in Réunion for the Indian Ocean and in New
Caledonia for the Pacific Ocean, to enhance the capability of rapid inter-
ventions in all three zones.
The government presented extensive ambitions to develop the EU’s
military capability to reflect the Union’s role as the world’s premier eco-
nomic and trading power. The government argued that ‘[t]he common aim
should be to have the capacity to conduct two or three peace-keeping or
peace-making operations simultaneously, for a significant duration’
(President of the French Republic 2008:83). It also stressed that the Lisbon
Treaty stipulated that in the event of armed aggression against the territory
of a member state, the other members are expected to provide aid and as-
sistance with all the means in their power. However, the government made
clear that it considered NATO as the foundation for European collective
defence efforts (President of the French Republic 2008). In Table 6.5, the
major French deployments of armed units abroad are summarised.
In June 2014, the government announced that France had almost 19,000
troops deployed abroad. These troops were divided into four categories. In
total, more than 7,000 troops were deployed as sovereignty forces to the
Antilles, French Guyana, French Polynesia, Mayotte, New Caledonia and
Reunion. Slightly less than 4,000 troops were deployed as presence force to
Djibouti, Gabon, Senegal and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Nearly
6,000 troops were, in total, deployed to national French operations in the
CAR, Gulf of Guinea, Sahel and Côte d’Ivoire. Another 2,000 troops were
deployed to EU-, NATO- and UN-led operations and other multilateral
constellations (French Ministry of Defence 2014). In November 2017,
Table 6.5 The main French deployments of armed units abroad 2000–2020
2000 2010 2020
BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS
Burkina Faso (Operation Barkhane) 0 0 250
CAR (Operation Boali) 0 240 0
Chad (Operation Epervier/Barkhane) 990 1,200 1,500
Djibouti 3,200 1,690 1,450
Estonia (NATO Forward Presence) 0 0 330
Gabon 680 775 350
Germany 2,700 2,800 2,000
Iraq (Operation Inherent Resolve) 0 0 400
Côte d’Ivoire (Operation Licorne) 500 900 950
Jordan (Operation Inherent Resolve) 0 0 ?
Mali (Operation Barkhane) 0 0 1,750
Niger (Operation Barkhane) 0 0 500
Senegal 1,170 575 350
Syria (Operation Inherent Resolve) 0 0 ?
UAE (Operation Inherent Resolve) 0 0 650
INTERNATIONAL PSOs
Afghanistan (ISAF / Resolute Support) 0 3,095 0
CAR (EUTM RCA) 0 0 160
Chad (MINURCAT) 0 308 0
Lebanon (UNIFIL) 251 1,585 670
Mali (EUTM Mali) 0 0 13
Mali (MINUSMA) 0 0 25
Saudi Arabia (Southern Watch) 170 0 0
Yugoslavia/Serbia (KFOR) 5,080 1,294 0
MARITIME OPERATIONS
Indian Ocean (Atalanta) 0 4 Frigates 1 Destroyer,
3 Frigates
1 Submarine
Mediterranean (EU NAVFOR MED) 0 0

France had about 17,000 troops deployed abroad. Approximately 1,200 of
these troops were engaged in the operations in Iraq and Syria (President of
the French Republic 2017).
When it comes to behaviour, the government argued for a comprehensive
approach ‘harnessing all of the means at the government’s disposal and the
activation of European and international co-operation’ (President of the
French Republic 2008:16). International co-operation in the management or
prevention of crises was described as a key to success. In this regard, the
UN-led operations were favourably mentioned. In 2013, the government
argued that France’s numerous strategic and defence partnership agree-
ments with several countries confirmed its influential status in the world
(President of the French Republic 2013).
At the same time, the government was aware that the armed forces ‘will
have to adapt to the emergence of “hybrid threats”. Whether on a one-off or
more permanent basis, some non-State players might combine asymmetrical
means of action with State-level resources or high-tech capabilities, acquired
or stolen’ (President of the French Republic 2013:81–82). The government
stressed the importance of both joint exercises and arms trade in establishing
and maintaining good relations with partners in the Asian-Pacific region
(French Ministry of Defence 2016b). In 2017, the government described its
vision for the behaviour of the armed forces. The government declared that
the French military must:
be able to gain and maintain combat superiority in all domains, perform

in-depth strikes, deploy assets to hardened theatres with high in-theatre
mobility and protection against conventional threats, provide fire
support to troops in contact, conduct amphibian or airborne operations
and missions in complex or extreme environments (including urban or
mountainous terrain, deserts and jungles…), and perform combat
search and rescue. In these fields, partnerships will be sought whenever
we lack the necessary capabilities, provided political agreement can be
found (President of the French Republic 2017:76).
6.1.5 Conclusions: French strategy

Regarding the French alignment strategy, we observe that the government
elaborated on strategic autonomy. However, we do not conclude that France
has adopted an isolationistic strategy, quite the opposite. The protection of
French citizens abroad and the security of French oversea territories are
central objectives for its defence strategy and these goals are achieved by
building both unilateral capacities for global projection of military force and
bi- and multilateral defence cooperation with other EU countries and states
situated in other regions of importance for France. Notably, the government
stressed the importance of balance of power between the major global
actors. On the one hand, as the government noted the relative decline in US
global power, it expected that China would replace the US as the ‘strategic
policeman’ in East Asia by 2040. On the other hand, the government con-
cluded that the US remained the world’s dominant military power. The EU
(rather than France) was expected to be a first-rate power but only if its
members managed to define common goals, unite their efforts and con-
solidate a further military integration. The government appears as a de-
fender of liberal values and the traditional multilateral institutions that are
challenged by emergent powers and eroding legitimacy due to a lack of ef-
ficiency. Its emphasis on institutions and values as well as the growth of
different emergent powers as a part of a global power transition process
correspond well with PTT. In relation to this theory, France appears as a
major status quo oriented great power supporting an eroding liberal mul-
tilateral order that may still help France to promote its national interest and
status as a world power.
The government announced its ambitions that France remains a major
military and diplomatic power. These ambitions included building an ef-
fective European defence policy and guaranteeing independent French ac-
tions. Simultaneously, the government considered NATO rather than the
EU as the foundation of European collective defence efforts. However, it did
not only give priority to the cooperation within the EU and NATO, but also
to the UN. In addition, the government announced its intentions to establish
even deeper bilateral relations with key European allies such as Germany
and the UK. Moreover, the government stressed the importance of the
cooperation on arms manufacturing with not only Germany and the UK,
but with Italy, Spain and Sweden. Furthermore, to protect trade routes and
the security of its citizens and companies in oversea territories, France
identified an interest in contributing to the stability of the Asian-Pacific
region. To promote this goal, France established bilateral cooperation with
middle powers such as Australia and Japan. Moreover, the government
emphasised the importance of its strategic partnerships in Africa and the
Middle East. Even more importantly, France made great efforts to uphold
unilateral capabilities for global power projection. Consequently, we argue
that the French alignment strategy best can be labelled leash-slipping, that is
a hedging strategy. In unipolar systems, leash-slipping is characterised by
efforts to establish various forms of institutionalised cooperation between
like-minded states to reduce the own states’ dependency of the unipole.
Pooling capabilities with other states in order to act independently of the
unipolar power is central to this strategy. Depending on the behaviour of the
unipole, the quest for independence can ultimately result in a strategy based
on strategic autonomy. Arguably, in the French case, this step always tends
to be an option.
France’s ambition to establish strategic alternatives that complement
NATO and that does not include the US signifies the leash-slipping strategy.
Notably, following the terrorist attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015, the
government decided to request aid and assistance from its allies based on the
EU’s Lisbon Treaty rather than on NATO’s Washington Treaty. Arguably,
when it mattered, the government did not put deeds behind the statement
that it considered NATO rather than the EU as the foundation of European
collective defence, at least not against threats related to non-state actors.6
However, France efforts to strengthen the EU capabilities related to col-
lective defence do not aim to replace NATO with some other in-
stitutionalised arrangements. For instance, the aim with the decision to
return to the NATO’s integrated military command structures was twofold:
to increase France’s presence and influence in the Alliance, and to facilitate
renewed momentum for Europe’s collective defence. Similarly, France’s
defence cooperation outside Europe and the efforts to develop unilateral
capabilities for external military power projection do not seem to be aimed
at limiting the US’s influence. Instead, they are developed to promote
France’s ability for independent action and potentially strategic autonomy.
Therefore, the French alignment strategy, in contrast to the strategies of
China and Russia, does not correspond to expectations regarding counter-
balancing behaviour in BPT. In Table 6.6, the alignment strategies of France
are summarised.
Table 6.6 The alignment strategies of France

France’s Leash-slipping Leash-slipping Leash-slipping

strategy (Strategic (Strategic (Strategic
autonomy) autonomy) autonomy)
Regarding the military strategy, the overarching ends articulated by the

French government focused on ensuring that France remained a major
military and diplomatic power at the global level. Hence, the government
referred to France’s strategic identity, including its status as a nuclear
power, international responsibilities and global influence. Regarding the
value-based ends, the government declared its ambitions to defend French
values including democracy, freedom, solidarity as well as respect for human
dignity and the rule of law. Contributing to peace and stability worldwide
was another value-related objective expressed by the French government.
Ends related to threats were often proactively articulated. Consequently,
core objectives included preventing and deterring the risk of war as well as
avoiding the emergence of threats to France’s national security. Preserving
France’s independence, sovereignty and freedom of decision against all forms
of threats was also declared as a central objective of the French strategy.
Regarding needs, the French government explicitly admitted France’s
dependency on international cooperation. Being able to contribute to the
efforts of the EU, UN and NATO, as well as other alliances and treaties,
was hence viewed as an essential objective. Other central aims were to
promote the EU as a global security actor and support the AU and other
regional organisations. At the same time, the government stated that
France’s strategic autonomy was a crucial part of the strategy.
The fourth and last aspect of the ends, vulnerabilities, were often the point
of departure in the strategic elaborations of the French government. These
vulnerabilities were referring to both the territory and the population of
France. Consequently, defending its citizens (on French soil and beyond)
and territory was declared as the first aim of the government. Protecting the
functionality of French society and critical national infrastructures were also
presented as fundamental objectives. To conclude, we argue that vulner-
ability over time has been the most dominant aspect influencing the for-
mulation of the French strategic ends.
When it comes to the traditional means, the French government moved
from an approach built on a collective air-land defensive operation in
Europe within the framework of NATO, towards an approach focusing on
deployability far beyond France’s borders. Developing capacity for rapid
adaptation and response was hence the focus of the reorientation. Initially,
the ambition was to give the ground forces a personnel strength of 35,000
soldiers. Of this force, about 30,000 was to be deployable within six months
for a period of one year, without replacement, and with full autonomy in the
main joint operational functions. In addition, an independent reaction unit
consisting of 5,000 troops on permanent operational alert was to be orga-
nised. Regarding the air force, 70 combat aircraft capable of sustained high-
intensity operations were considered a minimum. Ten of these aircraft were
to be on permanent operational alert. Moreover, two naval groups were to
be available for intervention missions and/or to provide forward presence.
Six nuclear attack submarines and an aircraft carrier including an air group
formed the bulk of the traditional naval forces. The French MoD made clear
that the new force structure had to be balanced between quality- and
quantity. Clearly, an autonomous, swift-reaction and deployable armed
force was at the core of the French strategy.
The white papers were increasingly giving attention to Enablers. The 2008
white paper considered different strategic functions with priority given to
intelligence and strategic mobility. Consequently, both strategic air trans-
port, including tankers and naval mobility were given increased capacity. In
addition, command and control capabilities were also emphasised. All these
efforts explicitly aimed at enabling France to fulfil a role as a framework
nation in large-scale operations. Regarding nuclear weapons, the government
declared that nuclear deterrence remained foundational to France’s strategy.
This was considered crucial for France’s ambitions regarding strategic au-
tonomy. Consequently, modernisation of SSBNs and the airborne cruise
missiles was given priority. Notably, the third leg of the French nuclear
triad, that is the land-based IRBMs, was abolished already in 1999. When it
comes to modern means, the French government has given extensive atten-
tion to not only space-based and cyber-related assets but also to drones and
to UAV systems. We argue that the ambition to maintain a capacity for
strategic autonomy has influenced France policies surrounding the means.
Although both the traditional and the modern means have been central in
the considerations, we claim that ultimately, the nuclear forces have been
fundamental in this regard. Gradually, expeditionary warfare has become
the conceptual framework for conventional means. Consequently, enablers
also have become essential for the autonomous option as well as for power
projection. Although President Chirac already in 1996 decided to establish
power projection capacity, we argue that it was not until Sarkozy’s pre-
sidency that transformation and implementation took place. We argue that
this indicates a shift in the French military strategy.
Finally, regarding ways, we find that the French government often took
prevention as a point of departure. The preferred way of action was a swift
response to any threat to prevent the situation from escalating. Preventive
deployments were also mentioned in this context. The usefulness of these
deployments was not only related to prevention but also to, demonstrate
France’s determination and contribution to international stability.
Projecting France’s determination was also crucial to deterring any adver-
sary from attacking the interests of France. This included nuclear deter-
rence. In addition, the government emphasised military interventions
abroad (including stabilisation and large-scale military operation) as well as
protecting France’s citizens and the French society.
Regarding the employment of the French armed forces, the government
announced that military interventions most likely were to take place within a
multilateral framework. These frameworks included not only the EU, UN
and NATO but also other appropriate constellations. French interventions
without support from allies were considered plausible when protecting
French citizens abroad, fulfilling bilateral defence agreements or responding
to actions against French national interests. Military presence and/or pre-
positioning of military assets abroad was perceived as a precondition for
success. Geographically, the Mediterranean, West Africa and the Caribbean
were initially given priority. Later on, the priority shifted in favour of the
African continent, the Atlantic seaboard, the Arabian-Persian Gulf and the
Indian Ocean. More specifically, French Guyana, Réunion and New
Caledonia came to serve as strategic bases.
Finally, regarding behaviour, the French government initially argued for a
comprehensive approach including all the instruments at the government’s
disposal. The white papers during this phase focused on international co-
operation and the management or prevention of crises abroad. Later on, an
adoption towards managing hybrid threats and asymmetrical methods was
considered necessary. Despite these new challenges, the government de-
clared that the French armed forces had to gain and maintain combat su-
periority in all domains. We argue that the government focused on
annihilating rather than paralysing the adversary. Consequently, we claim
that the French government favoured manoeuvre warfare. To conclude, we
find that the French strategy, regarding the ways, focused on a conflict
prevention situation. Although the government emphasised employment, we
argue that focus was on prevention. Moreover, we argue that the deploy-
ments aimed at supporting conflict prevention ambitions. In Table 6.7, the
military strategy of France is summarised.
Table 6.7 The military strategy of France
Ends Means Ways
Vulnerability Nuclear & Enablers Situation
Regarding the French government’s responses to the three strategies

pursued by the different US administrations, our results indicate that the
government has adjusted its strategies in response to each US’s strategy.
France did not hesitate to support the UN-sanctioned allied war efforts in
Afghanistan after the 9/11 attacks, in fact, France initiated the processes to
evoke Article V of the Washington Treaty after the attack. However, when
the Bush administration introduced its strategy of primacy, France upheld
its strategic autonomy. Clear evidence of this, is the French decision not
participate in the US-led coalition of willing in the war against Iraq in 2003.
This time the UNSC did not sanction the war effort.
Contrastingly, the Obama administration’s collective security strategy
found support from the French government. France gave substantial con-
tributions to the NATO-led and UN-sanctioned military intervention in
Libya in 2011 and it was during the Obama administration that France
returned to NATO’s integrated military command structures. The govern-
ment’s response to the Trump administrations strategy of selective engage-
ment follows the same pattern. NATO’s renewed ambitions regarding the
collective defence is firmly anchored in an established multilateral context
and it is fully consistent with the rights to collective self-defence in Article 51
of the UN Charter. France’s strategic responses to US strategies indicates
that it is an autonomous status quo power that will support the dominating
state as long as it acts as a defender of common multilateral principles and
norms. However, if the dominating state pursues unilateral strategies and
neglecting common institutions, French support will be withdrawn.
We agree with Fabien Terpan when arguing that a common defence
within the EU has become a priority for France. We also support his claim
that the French defence policy is mainly driven by national interest con-
siderations and the ambition of not depending on others when it comes to
deterrence and protection of vital interests. His argument regarding
President Sarkozy’s willingness to create closer ties with the US is compel-
ling and can be interpreted as contradicting our conclusion on leash-slipping
(Terpan 2008). However, as previously argued, the strategy of leash-slipping
does not exclude the possibility of continued cooperation with the unipolar
power and participation in institutional settings that are dominated by the
leading state. Leash-slipping is about developing complementary forums for
defence cooperation that decreases the dependency of the unipolar power.
Élie Tenenbaum’s findings regarding France’s approach to irregular war-
fare, and the adoption of US- and NATO-sponsored concepts and doc-
trines, may also be seen as contesting our conclusions regarding leash-
slipping (Tenenbaum 2017). However, we do not view French efforts to
improve its armed forces’ interoperability with other NATO member states
as contradicting our argument regarding leash-slipping. Leash-slipping is
not an isolationistic strategy.
Our interpretation of the French hedging strategy also finds support in
previous research. Karolina Helnarska has observed that Sarkozy’s decision
to reintegrate France with NATO was complemented with the defence co-
operation between France and the UK. (Helnarska 2013. See also Pannier
2017; Jurczyszyn and Terlikowski 2018). Notably, this also concurs with
Falk Ostermann’s observation regarding the Franco-British rapprochement
in security and defence cooperation (Ostermann 2015). Pernille Rieker’s
argument on France’s ambition to hold important positions in the EU, UN
and NATO, gives further support to our interpretation of the French
alignment strategy. Arguably, her conclusions also support our claims re-
garding the French military strategy (Rieker 2017).
In addition, we agree with Daniel Keohane when arguing that France has
the ambition of remaining a European power with a global reach. His ob-
servations on France’s efforts to strengthen military ties with several part-
ners outside Europe, such as in the Gulf and the wider Indo-Pacific, are
consistent with our conclusions regarding the bilateral aspects of the French
hedging approach. His conclusions regarding the bilateral cooperation be-
tween France and Germany provide additional support (Keohane 2017).
We also find Falk Ostermann’s elaborations on the balance between au-
tonomy and influence compelling. Arguably, his conclusion that ‘Sarkozy
brought a symbol of Gaullism to an end’ in order to gain more French
influence within the NATO context supports our argument regarding a
French alignment strategy focused on hedging (Ostermann 2019:160. See
also Talmor and Selden 2017). We find Olivier Schmitt’s observations re-
garding the gap between the French policy rhetoric emphasizing strategic
autonomy and the actual security practices as gradually embedded within
the transatlantic security structures, interesting (Schmitt 2017). However, as
demonstrated in this chapter, the French government has directed sig-
nificant resources to uphold and develop unilateral capacities to act outside
the NATO context as well. Together with Alice Pannier, Schmitt provides
additional support for our conclusions regarding the French status-seeking
in its international relations (Pannier and Schmitt 2021).
6.2 The strategy of the UK
Many of the British government’s initial national security reforms during
the twenty-first century focused on international terrorism. For example, in
2002, the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) included a new chapter that set
out the contribution of the British armed forces to counter-terrorism. In
2003, the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre was established, bringing together
expertise from the police, intelligence agencies and several other depart-
ments. Three years later, the first cross-government counterterrorism
strategy and a cross-government counter-proliferation framework were
launched. Although a defence white paper was issued in December 2003, it
was not until 2008 that the British Cabinet Office (BCO) presented the first
official national security strategy. This was followed by an annual update in
2009 and a new strategy in 2010. The new strategy was complemented by
annual updates and by defence and security reviews. In addition, the BCO
and the British Ministry of Defence (BMoD) have presented specific stra-
tegies for cybersecurity, defence industry and overseas engagement.
Furthermore, the Doctrine, Concepts and Development Centre (DCDC)
regularly performs analysis on the global strategic trends. The British
Parliament (BP) has also released official reviews on issues such as national
security capabilities.7 In addition to the National Security Capability
Review of 2018, these documents constitute the main sources analysed in
this section.8

In 1998, the British government concluded that ‘[t]he collapse of
Communism and the emergence of democratic states throughout Eastern
Europe and in Russia means that there is today no direct military threat to
the United Kingdom or Western Europe. Nor do we foresee the re-
emergence of such a threat’ (British Ministry of Defence 1998:8). The gov-
ernment paid plenty of attention to actors and insisted that despite the fall of
the Soviet bloc, there were still dangerous regimes in the world. The gov-
ernment warned that ‘[s]ome are well armed with conventional weapons and
their armouries assume greater significance as democratic countries reduce
their armaments’ (British Ministry of Defence 1998:9). Five years later, the
government presented a quite optimistic view. The EU’s European Security
and Defence Policy (ESDP) had been established and even launched its first
operations. In addition, the first steps towards a strategic relationship be-
tween the EU and Russia had been taken: ‘There is currently no major
conventional threat to Europe’ the government concluded (British Ministry
of Defence 2003:5).
In 2006, Prime Minister Tony Blair observed that ‘[d]espite our best ef-
forts, the number of states with nuclear weapons continues to grow, and
may grow further’ (British Ministry of Defence 2006:5). One year later, the
DCDC predicted that international relations were in the transition from a
unipolar to a multipolar system, and the US was expected to adjust its focus
towards Asia. China and India were expected to use their growing global
economic status to increase their political influence. Russia and Brazil were
also mentioned as potential poles in a multipolar order. States like Russia,
Canada and Brazil were considered to be in a position of benefiting from the
expected increased competition regarding natural resources, including en-
ergy and food. The Centre expected that due to Japan’s need to be able to
respond to regional security challenges, Japan was considered likely to de-
monstrate a growing willingness to shoulder broader international security
burdens alongside the US. The Centre also claimed that major interstate
wars were unlikely in the future. The centre concluded that ‘Russia is un-
likely to threaten its Western neighbours with direct military force, although
its wealth in energy resources will give it substantial strategic leverage’
(Doctrine, Concepts & Development Centre 2007:53).
Two years later, the government argued that the war between Russia and
Georgia had shown how intra-state conflicts suddenly could erupt (British
Cabinet Office 2009). In 2010, the DCDC predicted that when ‘intervention
becomes unavoidable, actors will seek to distance themselves by use of proxy
forces, cyberattack, as well as covert and clandestine methods’ (Doctrine,
Concepts & Development Centre 2010:15). Institutions such as the UN and
the WTO were considered to remain ‘influential, especially in addressing the
problems of a highly globalised and interdependent world’ (Doctrine,
Concepts & Development Centre 2010:39). Russia was expected to recapture
the country’s status as a global power:
Interference in the internal affairs in the Ukraine, and the states of the
Caucasus and Central Asia, is probable and Russia will strongly oppose
NATO expansion. Russia will seek to dominate the Arctic, considering
the region as central to her future prosperity and security. She will
continue to view China and Japan suspiciously and, despite her
membership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, will seek to
deter foreign infiltration and influence, most notably from China in
eastern Siberia (Doctrine, Concepts & Development Centre 2010:49).
Regarding China, the Centre concluded that the country’s desire for pri-
macy in the Chinese near-abroad:
may result in periodic military posturing and confrontation with tradi-

tional regional rivals such as India, Japan, Korea and the US. Regional
arms races, both nuclear and conventional, are possible, although efforts
to prevent proliferation will continue. Potential flashpoints include
Taiwan and her relationship with China, and multi-party disputes over
potentially resource rich territorial claims in the South China Sea
(Doctrine, Concepts & Development Centre 2010:52).
It was considered unlikely that India would be drawn into unilateral or
multilateral interventions outside the Indian Ocean region. Furthermore,
Brazil, Iran and Turkey were given specific attention as emerging powers
(Doctrine, Concepts & Development Centre 2010). Four years later, the
DCDC assumed that India’s defence budget could make the country a
second-tier power by 2045. (Doctrine, Concepts & Development Centre
2014a). The Centre predicted that rising powers ‘such as Brazil and India,
will take a strategic interest beyond their own regions in pursuit of resources’
(Doctrine, Concepts & Development Centre 2014b:2). The government
perceived the Russian war against Ukraine, as well as Russian military ac-
tivities close to the UK’s airspace and territorial waters, as threatening. The
government acknowledged that ‘Russia’s behaviour will continue to be hard
to predict, and, though highly unlikely, we cannot rule out the possibility
that it may feel tempted to act aggressively against NATO Allies’ (British
Cabinet Office 2015:18). In 2018, Prime Minister Theresa May especially
warned of ‘the resurgence of state-based threats’ and ‘the increasing com-
petition between states’ (British Government 2018:2).
In 1998, the government clarified its priorities regarding the regional
perspective:
We have particularly important national interests and close friendships in

the Gulf. Oil supplies from the Gulf are crucial to the world economy.
Confrontation in the Middle East carries the risk of escalation and since
the region borders on NATO, in some circumstances crises could involve
the Alliance directly. The same is true, to a lesser extent, in North Africa.
Although our direct interests in the region are limited, its proximity to the
southern boundary of the European Union and NATO gives us a
continuing stake in its stability (British Ministry of Defence 1998:16–17).
Five years later, the government announced that looking ‘beyond the re-
gions adjacent to Europe, we now need to take a greater account in our
planning of a high likelihood of commitments further afield’. The poverty-
stricken and unstable Sub-Saharan Africa was considered such a region,
while the instability in parts of South Asia was perceived to have the po-
tential of requiring significant engagement in the future (British Ministry of
Defence 2003). In 2007, the DCDC predicted that the global economic
growth was most likely going to be uneven, with the Asia-Pacific region as
the relative winner and Sub-Saharan Africa lagging behind other regions
(Doctrine, Concepts & Development Centre 2007).
In 2008, the cabinet presented four regional security priorities: (i) South
Asia; (ii) parts of Africa; (iii) the Middle East; and (iv) Eastern Europe
(British Cabinet Office 2008). The DCDC predicted that ‘[c]ompetition for
resources will increase the geostrategic importance of certain regions such
as; the Asian Meridian, the wider Middle East and the Polar Regions’
(Doctrine, Concepts & Development Centre 2010:16). Besides, the
government observed that frozen inter-state conflicts could be latent in
many parts of the world, especially in Asia and Africa (British Ministry of
Defence 2011). The Middle East and North Africa were the focus of the
elaborations in 2012.
Developments in the Arab Spring include civil conflict in Syria with

potential implications for wider peace and stability in the region. Al
Qaida and associated terrorists have exploited areas of Yemen, Somalia
and other regions lacking effective governance, extending now into sub-
Saharan Africa (British Cabinet Office 2012:1).
The coup d’état in 2012 in Mali was used as an example when the govern-
ment warned that regional developments could possess a long-term strategic
threat to the EU as well as to the UK homeland (British Cabinet
Office 2012).
Already in 1998, several thematic risks related to organised crime, en-
vironmental degradation and information technology were identified
(British Ministry of Defence 1998). In 2003, the government worried about
terrorism and the widespread proliferation of WMD and related technolo-
gies. Weak and failing states was another source of concerns (British
Ministry of Defence 2003). In 2007, the DCDC predicted that sustained
population growth, despite the impact of several communicable diseases,
together with rapid modernisation, aggressive economic competition and
increased consumption, would result in intensive exploitation and pressure
on all kinds of resources. The Centre warned that conflicts and crises could
‘trigger the displacement of large numbers of people, mainly into proximate
regions, which may find themselves at risk of instability or exogenous shock
(Doctrine, Concepts & Development Centre 2007:8–10). In 2009, Prime
Minister Gordon Brown argued that hostile states, terrorists and criminals
‘can all potentially use cyberspace to undermine our interests’ (British
Cabinet Office 2009:3–4). The government concluded that space was also
considered to play an increasingly key role in modern society, as space-
related technologies were critical for many services. Piracy was also given
specific attention (British Cabinet Office 2009). In 2010, the government
reflected on the changing character of war and warfare:
Many future wars will be ‘among the people’, resembling in some

respects the counter-insurgency that we are currently fighting with allies
in Afghanistan. But there will also be wars between states. Critically,
both types of conflict will share some common characteristics that affect
our own military requirements (British Cabinet Office 2010a:17).
In 2011, internal conflict, terrorism and criminal violence were considered to

be the most important factors causing instability (British Ministry of
Defence 2011:8). In addition, the government suggested that ‘cyberattacks
continue to cost the UK economy billions of pounds per annum and pose a
significant national security threat’ (British Cabinet Office 2013:2). In 2014,
the DCDC issued a new report on strategic trends. The thematic perspective
was well elaborated and included 13 overarching themes, among them de-
fence spending and capabilities (Doctrine, Concepts & Development Centre
2014a). Four years later, the report focused on five overarching themes,
including conflict and security. One of the key conclusions of the analysis
was that states ‘will need to prepare for state-on-state warfare, including
through collective defence alliances, whole-of-government approaches and
strengthening homeland resilience’ (Doctrine, Concepts & Development
Centre 2018:18).
6.2.2 Ends
In 1998, the Minister of Defence George Robertson claimed that ‘[t]he
British are, by instinct, an internationalist people’. The minister continued:
‘We believe that as well as defending our rights, we should discharge our
responsibilities in the world. We do not want to stand idly by and watch
humanitarian disasters or the aggression of dictators go unchecked. We
want to give a lead, we want to be a force for good’ (British Ministry of
Defence 1998:7). In 2005, three overarching ends were defined as defending
the UK and its interests, strengthening international peace and stability, and
being a force for good in the world (British Ministry of Defence 2005). Prime
Minister David Cameron stated that the UK’s national security strategy
‘must begin with the role we want Britain to play in the modern world […] In
order to protect our interests at home, we must project our influence abroad’
(British Cabinet Office 2010a:4). The government announced that its vision
was a secure and prosperous UK, with global reach and influence (British
Cabinet Office 2015). In 2018, Prime Minister Theresa May stressed the
necessity to ‘leverage our influence as a nation’ (British Government 2018:2).
Value-based ends were often announced in a universal context. In 1998, the
British government declared its ambition to be ‘an advocate of human rights
and democracy the world over’ (British Ministry of Defence 1998:10). In
2008, the cabinet explicitly presented its approach to national security. The
approach was ‘clearly grounded in a set of core values. They include human
rights, the rule of law, legitimate and accountable government, justice,
freedom, tolerance, and opportunity for all’ (British Cabinet Office 2008:6).
The British NSS was, according to Prime Minister Brown ‘grounded in core
British values of fair play, human rights, openness, individual liberty, ac-
countable Government and the rule of law (British Cabinet Office 2009,
Bailey 2013:4). Prime Minister Cameron expressed similar preferences:
Our national interest requires us to stand up for the values our country
believes in – the rule of law, democracy, free speech, tolerance and
human rights. Those are the attributes for which Britain is admired in
the world and we must continue to advance them, because Britain will
be safer if our values are upheld and respected in the world (British
Cabinet Office 2010a:4).
Consequently, strengthening the rules-based international system was a core

British objective (British Ministry of Defence 2011). Encouraging reform to
enable further participation of growing powers as well as promoting good
governance and human rights were also mentioned as objectives (British
Cabinet Office 2015).
The threats-related ends came into focus after the 9/11 attacks.
Consequently, to coerce, disrupt and destroy potential opponents were ex-
plicitly mentioned as key ends when fighting terrorism (British Ministry of
Defence 2002). To prevent, deter, coerce, disrupt and destroy international
terrorists as well as the regimes that harbour the terrorists, and to counter
the efforts of the terrorists to acquire WMD were key objectives articulated
also in 2003 (British Ministry of Defence 2003). In 2008, the cabinet pre-
sented an integrated approach toward fighting terrorism based on four main
objectives, all beginning with the letter ‘P’: (i) to pursue, that is, stopping
terrorist attacks; (ii) to protect, by strengthening Britain’s protection against
attacks; (iii) to prepare, by mitigating the impact of attacks; and (iv) to
prevent, by stopping people becoming terrorists or supporting violent ex-
tremism. In addition, the cabinet presented four main objectives regarding
the proliferation of WMD, all beginning with the letter ‘D’: (i) to dissuade
states from acquiring, developing, and contributing to the spread of WMD;
(ii) to detect attempts by states, and terrorists, to develop or acquire WMD-
capability; (iii) to deny access to WMD and the necessary materials,
equipment, technology, and expertise to develop them; and (iv) to defend the
UK, its citizens and armed forces, as well as its strategic interests from the
threats posed by proliferation.
The cabinet argued that ‘[w]hile for the foreseeable future no state or
alliance will have both the intent and the capability to pose a major and
direct threat to the United Kingdom’ it could not ‘rule out a possible re-
emergence of such a threat in future decades’. Consequently, safeguarding
the UK against the re-emergence of such a threat, and to defend the territory
of the UK, ‘its sea and air approaches, its information and communications
systems, and its other vital interests, including our Overseas Territories’,
were declared as core objectives (British Cabinet Office 2008:44). The ca-
binet admitted that Britain’s ability to meet current and future threats ‘de-
pends crucially on tackling the budget deficit’. Consequently, bringing the
defence budget back to balance was an end in itself (British Cabinet Office
2010a:4). Therefore, ensuring a secure and resilient UK was one of two
overarching ends in 2010. To fulfil this end, the government argued that it
was fundamental to protect the British people, economy, infrastructure,
territory and way of life from real and present threats, such as terrorism and
cyberattacks, and to promote resilience in the face of natural or man-made
emergencies and crime. The other overarching end was to contribute to a
stable world. This included acting to reduce the likelihood of risks affecting
the UK or British interests overseas, as well as tackling potential risks at
their source (British Cabinet Office 2010a).
On the one hand, the government expressed ends related to needs re-
garding international cooperation, especially in international originations.
On the other hand, these needs were articulated with emphasis on the role of
the UK within the organisations. Being a ‘leading European member’ and ‘a
reliable and powerful ally’ of NATO, ‘a major European state’ and a
‘leading member’ of the EU, a ‘prominent member’ of the OSCE, as well as
a ‘leader in Europe and the international community’, were important ob-
jectives (British Ministry of Defence 1998). At the same time, the govern-
ment made clear that the UK’s vital interests were not confined to Europe.
The government explained that ‘[w]e invest more of our income abroad than
any other major economy’. Simultaneously, ‘[f]oreign investment into the
UK also provides nearly 20% of manufacturing jobs. We depend on foreign
countries for supplies of raw materials, above all oil’. Besides, the govern-
ment added that
Over 10 million British citizens live and work overseas. We have 13

Overseas Territories spread around the world. We are members of many
important international organisations and have developed close ties of
friendship with countries in every continent […] Our national security
and prosperity thus depend on promoting international stability,
freedom and economic development (British Ministry of Defence
1998:11).
In 2003, the maintenance of the transatlantic relationship was declared to be

fundamental to the British security and defence policy. Another central end
was the promotion of international stability, freedom and economic devel-
opment. Consequently, the government explained that having the capacity
‘to deliver effective military force in peace support and intervention op-
erations, alongside our EU and NATO allies, is a vital component of our
security policy’ (British Ministry of Defence 2003:4). In 2014, the DCDC
suggested that ‘[c]ontinued access to established and emerging markets
across the globe will remain key to the UK’s economic prosperity’. In ad-
dition to protecting the UK mainland, the UK’s Overseas Territories and
British citizens abroad, the Centre suggested two other overarching and
interrelated objectives: (i) to actively shape the international environment by
promoting British interests overseas, by enhancing the UK’s reputation and
by contributing to international security and stability; and (ii) to respond to
crises by projecting power in order to protect British interests overseas and
by maintaining international security and stability (Doctrine, Concepts &
Development Centre 2014b:5–6). The following year, the government did
not only declare the promotion of the UK’s prosperity as an end, but also
declared ‘expanding our economic relationship with growing powers such as
India and China, helping to build global prosperity, investing in innovation
and skills and supporting UK defence and security exports’, as core objec-
tives (British Cabinet Office 2015:10).
Ends related to vulnerabilities were seldom elaborated. However, when
these ends were discussed their importance were emphasised and related to
the British nation’s fundamental security concerns. In 2006, Prime Minister
Blair declared that ‘[t]he primary responsibility of any government is to
ensure the safety and security of its citizens’ (British Ministry of Defence
2006:5). In 2008, the cabinet concluded that ‘[n]o state threatens the United
Kingdom directly’, yet providing ‘security for the nation and for its citizens
remains the most important responsibility of government’. Consequently, a
core end was ‘to safeguard the nation, its citizens, our prosperity and our
way of life’. The integrity and interests of the state were considered vul-
nerable due to global developments (British Cabinet Office 2008:3–5). In
2014, the DCDC expressed concerns regarding the vulnerability to remote
attacks, particularly from cyberspace, and by larger immigrant diasporas
that maintain close ties with their country of origin. The Centre did however
not suggest any clear end regarding the perceived exposure but implicitly
touched upon the importance of protecting critical infrastructure (Doctrine,
Concepts & Development Centre 2014b). Clearly, terrorism, radicalisation
and extremism at home created a sense of vulnerability. In 2015, the fun-
damental end was again declared as protecting the people, as well as ‘our
territory, economic security, infrastructure and way of life’ (British Cabinet
Office 2015:11). Notably, the cybersecurity strategy released in 2016 did not
only focus on threats but also on vulnerabilities. The lack of cybersecurity
on Britain’s own devices, the vulnerabilities in the government’s software
and networks and insufficient training and skills among its personnel were
all elaborated as the government stated that enhancing Britain’s cyber de-
fence was a prioritised end (British Cabinet Office 2016).
6.2.3 Means
As the data in Table 6.8 shows, the UK’s annual defence expenditure in-
creased each year between 2001 and 2011. From 2012 to 2015 defence ex-
penditure decreased and from 2016 onwards there have been small annual
increases. Between 2001 and 2019 the annual defence expenditures measured
in constant USD (2018) increased from 46,541 USD million in 2001 to
49,916 USD million in 2019 (SIPRI 2020b).
In the late 1990s, the government concluded that the traditional means of
the armed forces had to transform. Defence Minister Robertson declared that
at the heart of the SDR, presented in 1998, was ‘the new Joint Rapid Reaction
Forces, which will be the spearhead of Britain’s modernised, rapidly de-
ployable and better supported front line’. He announced that the government
planned ‘to buy two new larger aircraft carriers to project power more flexibly
Table 6.8 Annual defence expenditure, the UK 2001–2019 (million pound)
Bush I 2001 2002 2003 2004

Bush II 2005 2006 2007 2008
Obama I 2009 2010 2011 2012
Obama II 2013 2014 2015 2016
Trump I 2017 2018 2019 2020
around the world’. At the same time, less emphasis was to be placed on open-
ocean anti-submarine warfare and the number of MBTs and combat aircraft
was to be reduced (British Ministry of Defence 1998:5). In 2002, the gov-
ernment admitted that the planning assumptions presented in the 1998 SDR
had to be reconsidered. Now, the armed forces were to be able to simulta-
neously contribute to several smaller-scale operations in widely geographically
separated locations. Another ambition was to enhance the capabilities of the
special forces (British Ministry of Defence 2002).
In 2003, the government concluded that there was no need for the UK to
generate large-scale capabilities across a broad spectrum ‘given that in the
most demanding operations we will be operating alongside the US and other
allies, where capabilities such as air defence and naval escorts are less likely
to be at a premium’ (British Ministry of Defence 2003:7). New amphibious
ships were to project land power ashore and type 45 destroyers to enhance
the force projection capacity. In addition, a new set of medium weight land
forces were to be developed, offering a high level of deployability, including
by air. On the one hand, the air force was to increase its ability to deliver
offensive effect by introducing the Storm Shadow, providing long-range
stand-off precision strike capability, and through the Paveway IV ensuring
high degrees of accuracy. On the other hand, the number of combat aircraft
was to be reduced (British Ministry of Defence 2003). Clearly, the Defence
Committee of the Parliament was not pleased:
We are disappointed that an important policy document has been

presented with little or no information on the relevant procurement
decisions, funding questions or likely changes in force structures […] A
policy of reducing or restructuring existing forces in advance of acquiring
new capabilities is potentially dangerous (British Parliament 2004:3).
In 2005, the government announced that the armed forces were in the middle
of a substantial transformation. The purpose of the transformation was to
acquire an ‘expeditionary forces, able to project power across the globe in
support of British interests and delivering effect […] at a time and place of
our choosing’ (British Ministry of Defence 2005:6–7). ‘The cabinet declared
that we will continue to favour capability over quantity’ (British Cabinet
Office 2008:45). Clearly, the Conservative administration that took office in
May 2010, was not impressed by the achievements of its predecessor:
Twenty years after the Berlin Wall came down, the equipment we have
available is still too rooted in a Cold War mind-set […] Main battle
tanks aplenty, but not enough protected vehicles to move our forces on
the insurgency battlefield. Two massive aircraft carriers on order but
unable to operate with the aircraft of our closest allies (British Cabinet
Office 2010a:5).
The declared ambition was to be able to deploy a self-sustaining, properly

equipped brigade-sized force anywhere around the world and to sustain it
indefinitely. Relevant battlefield mobility would be ensured through the ac-
quirement of new armoured vehicles and 12 additional heavy-lift Chinook
helicopters. The cabinet also decided to retire the Harrier combat aircraft.
Other decisions included retaining the Royal Marine brigade and effective
amphibious capability. In addition, the air force was, by the 2020s, to be
based around the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) and a modernised Typhoon fleet
(British Cabinet Office 2010b). In 2011, the government announced its am-
bition to increase the defence budget. ‘This decision’ the cabinet argued,
‘makes several significant programmes possible, including spending on the
JSF, procurement of the Rivet Joint intelligence and surveillance aircraft and
the development of the Global Combat Ship (British Cabinet Office 2011:3).
At the same time, the government announced that the carrier HMS Ark
Royal had been taken out of service, the number of frigates reduced by four
and a Bay-class amphibious ship sold to Australia. On the other hand, the
third Type 45 destroyer had entered service and the second Astute-class
submarine had been launched. The army was to consist of 112,000 troops
by2020, with about 70 per cent regular forces and 30 per cent reserves. The
air force had already withdrawn the Harrier combat aircraft from service
and had initiated the drawdown of the Tornado (British Cabinet Office
2011). In 2012, the government decided to adopt the short take-off vertical
landing (STOVL) variant of the JSF for aircraft carrier use. The first aircraft
was expected to be delivered in 2016 ‘with flying from HMS Queen Elizabeth
to begin in 2018’, the government announced as it informed that HMS
Illustrious was to be decommissioned in 2014 (British Cabinet Office
2012:32). In 2015, Prime Minister Cameron presented ambitious plans:
We will establish two additional Typhoon squadrons and an additional

squadron of F35 Lightning combat aircraft to operate from our new
aircraft carriers. We will buy nine new Maritime Patrol Aircraft, based
in Scotland, to protect our nuclear deterrent, hunt down hostile
submarines and enhance our maritime search and rescue. We will create
two new Strike Brigades, forces of up to 5,000 personnel fully equipped
to deploy rapidly and sustain themselves in the field. By 2025, we will
have a highly capable expeditionary force of around 50,000, up from the
30,000 we committed to in 2010. We will double our investment in our
Special Forces’ equipment. […] In the longer term we will also increase
the size of the Royal Navy’s frigate fleet (British Cabinet Office 2015:6).
Expeditionary warfare was providing the conceptual frames for the British
strategy. For example, the maritime forces were to organise a task group out
of the total resources consisting of seven SSN, two carriers, 19 destroyers/
frigates and three commando brigades. The land forces were to organise a
division from two armoured brigades, two Striker brigades, six infantry bri-
gades and an air assault brigade. The air force was to organise an air group
out of two JSF squadrons and seven Typhoon squadrons (British Cabinet
Office 2015). In 2018, the major elements of the British armed forces by 2025
were said to consist of ‘a maritime task group centred on a Queen Elizabeth
Table 6.9 The main traditional units and equipment of the British armed forces
2000–2020
2000 2010 2020
ARMY
Corp HQ (ARRC) 1 1 1
Armoured Division 1 1 1
Infantry Division 0 0 1
Air Assault Brigade 1 1 1
Infantry Brigade HQ 14 8 0
Armoured Regiment 3 0 1
Special Forces Regiment 1 2 2
MBT 616 386 227
APC/AIFV 2,426 3,293 1,197
NAVY
Carrier 3 2 1
Destroyer 11 6 6
Special Forces Regiment ? ? 1
Attack
Fighter 93 40 0

Class aircraft carrier […]; a land division with three brigades including a new
Strike force; an air group of combat, transport and surveillance aircraft; and a
Special Forces task group’ (British Government 2018:14). Notably, the figures
and categorisations in Table 6.9 are based on secondary sources.
The government was aware of the importance of enablers as it already in
1998, announced that ‘[n]ew transport aircraft and ships will move our people
and equipment rapidly to trouble spots’ (British Ministry of Defence 1998:5).
The government suggested that being able to simultaneously contribute to
several smaller-scale operations, potentially widely geographically separated,
demanded having sufficient critical enabling assets such as deployable head-
quarters, communications and deployed logistical support. Network-centric
capabilities were therefore considered a precondition (British Ministry of
Defence 2002). In 2003, the government suggested that ‘[t]he increased fre-
quency and duration of operations has emphasised the need to plan carefully
and utilise our logistic enablers to best effect’. Having sufficient sea and air
transport capacity was also elaborated upon. The core of the airborne cap-
ability was still the C-130 fleet, but both A400M and C-17 were considered as
options for carrying the largest items. The fleet of six Roll-on/Roll-off vessels
was, together with the four new landing ship docks perceived to meet the
seaborne needs (British Ministry of Defence 2003). In 2010, the government
gave priority to the procurement of enhanced communications equipment and
a new strategic lift aircraft (British Cabinet Office 2010b). One year later, the
government announced that the bulk of air-to-air refuelling aircraft would be
built around the VC-10 until the introduction of the Voyager. Regarding
transport aircraft, following the introduction of the first A400 in 2014, the C-
130 Hercules was to be withdrawn by 2022 (British Cabinet Office 2011). In
2012, the government decided to purchase an additional C-17 (British Cabinet
Office 2012). The government presented a list of different enabling resources
considered necessary. The list included two landing platform docks, three
landing ship docks, six tanker ships, three support ships, 14 Voyager air-
refuelling aircraft and eight C17 Globemaster heavy transport aircraft (British
Cabinet Office 2015). In Table 6.10, the airborne enablers of the British armed
Table 6.10 The main airborne enablers of the British armed forces 2000–2020
2000 2010 2020
Tristar K-1 (tanker) 6 9 0

Vickers VC-10 (tanker) 21 16 0
A330 Voyager (tanker) 0 0 14
C17 Globemaster (heavy transport) 0 6 8
A400 Atlas (heavy transport) 0 0 20
C-130 (medium transport) 51 43 14

In 1998, the government declared that the UK was to retain its nuclear
deterrent but with fewer warheads than in the past, hence, less than 200
operationally available compared to previously 300 deployed in 58 missile
bodies. With the withdrawal of the last RAF WE177 bombs in 1998, the
government admitted that Trident had become the UK’s only nuclear
weapon. ‘This is why we need a force of four Trident submarines’, the
government argued. The government announced that the last of these
Vanguard-class submarines, Vengeance, was ‘to be launched later this year’.
The government made clear that the UK ‘will have only one submarine on
patrol at a time, carrying a reduced load of 48 warheads’ (British Ministry of
Defence 1998:24–26). Prime Minister Blair explained:
We believe that an independent British nuclear deterrent is an essential

part of our insurance against the uncertainties and risks of the future.
We have therefore decided to maintain our deterrent system beyond the
life of the Vanguards with a new generation of ballistic missile-carrying
submarines. We will also extend the life of the Trident D5 missile
(British Ministry of Defence 2006:5).
At the same time, the government announced its intentions to reduce the
number of warheads to fewer than 160. Furthermore, the decision to build a
new class of SSBN potentially included only three submarines (British
Ministry of Defence 2006). In 2010, the cabinet decided to reduce the number
of operational launch tubes on the British SSBNs from 12 to eight and the
number of warheads from 48 to 40 (British Cabinet Office 2010b). In 2015,
Prime Minister Cameron announced that ‘[w]e will maintain our ultimate
insurance policy as a nation – our Continuous At Sea Nuclear Deterrent –
and replace our four ballistic missile submarines’ (British Cabinet Office
2015:6). In Table 6.11, the British nuclear means are summarised.
Table 6.11 The main strategic nuclear forces of the UK 2000–2020
2000 2010 2020
SLBM
Trident/aboard Vanguard 58/4 48/4 48/4
Modern capabilities were given considerable attention already in 2002 as

the government announced that it was ‘already investing in a range of
sensors, including airborne stand-off, […] battlefield unmanned air vehicles;
and battlefield electronic warfare capabilities’ (British Ministry of Defence
2002:15). In 2005, the government shed lights on the developments in space.
The next generation of military satellite communication was delivered by
Skynet 5 which was to completely replace Skynet 4. In addition, ‘automated
decision aids to ensure an appropriate and timely response, particularly
against short-range high speed threats’, were to be introduced (British
Ministry of Defence 2005:123). In 2010, the government gave priority to
increasing the use of UAVs in both combat and reconnaissance roles (British
Cabinet Office 2010b). In 2013, the Global Cyber Security Capacity Centre
was established. The government decided to develop ‘a full-spectrum mili-
tary cyber capability, including a strike capability’ (British Cabinet Office
2013:18). Three years later, the government announced its ambition to en-
hance ‘cyber threat awareness, detection, and reaction functions, through
the development of a Cyber Security Operations Centre (CSOC) that uses
state-of-the-art defensive cyber capabilities to protect the MoD’s cyberspace
and deal with threats’ (British Cabinet Office 2016:38). The government
stated its intentions to ensure that the UK had ‘appropriate offensive cyber
capabilities that can be deployed at a time and place of our choosing, for
both deterrence and operational purposes’ (British Cabinet Office 2016:51).
Together with its French counterparts, the government also initiated the
developments on an unmanned combat air vehicle demonstrator and laun-
ched a future combat air system technology initiative (FCAS) as part of its
planning for a future combat air capability (British Parliament 2017).
According to IISS, British armed forces operated eight communication sa-
tellites in 2020 (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2020).
6.2.4 Ways
In 1998, the government presented a list of eight situations as a basis for
continued military planning: (i) peacetime security including support against
terrorism; (ii) security of the Overseas Territories including the garrisons in
the Falklands, Cyprus, Gibraltar and the Caribbean; (iii) defence diplomacy;
(iv) support to wider British interests; (v) peace support and humanitarian
operations; (vi) regional conflict outside the NATO area; (vii) regional
conflict inside the NATO area; and (viii) strategic attack on NATO (British
Ministry of Defence 1998). Following the 9/11-attacks, this approach was
slightly changed. Fighting terrorism was given more attention and was no
longer viewed as a subfield within peacetime security operations. In 2002,
the government instead mentioned conflict prevention, including defence
diplomacy activities and peace support operations, including stabilisation
efforts. In addition, the government maintained that:
by training other states’ armed forces, we can transfer our military skills
so that they can eventually do the job themselves. Where prevention has
failed and we have engaged in coercive or destructive activities, we
should be prepared to assist in post-conflict recovery, to help create the
conditions for stability, thereby reducing the likelihood of the state
supporting or harbouring terrorists in the future (British Ministry of
Defence 2002:10).
The government concluded that the British forces needed ‘to be prepared to
conduct the full range of operations from warfighting through to peace
support operations’ (British Ministry of Defence 2003:6). In 2010, the ca-
binet set up a national security council and appointed a national security
adviser, giving priority to counter-terrorism, cyber, international military
crises and disasters (British Cabinet Office 2010a). In 2011, the BMoD,
together with two other ministries, jointly published the Building Stability
Overseas Strategy. In the strategy, two of the three mutually-supporting
pillars especially concerned the armed forces: early warning, and rapid crisis
prevention and response. Training national as well as regional military
forces to manage potential conflicts themselves was a central part of the
strategy. Consequently, military teams supported the training of the
Regional Africa Standby Forces in South Africa and Kenya, while military
trainers were sent to countries such as Ethiopia and Ukraine (British
Ministry of Defence 2011). The training of the Afghan National Security
Forces was another example (British Cabinet Office 2011). In Table 6.12, the
main deployments of British armed forces abroad are summarised.
Already in 1998, the government had a clear vision for the new employ-
ment of military force. At sea, the government argued that the emphasis was
on ‘continuing to move away from large scale maritime warfare and open-
ocean operations in the North Atlantic’. Instead, the government declared
that future littoral operations and force projection ‘will be our primary
focus’. Consequently, the ‘balance of anti-mine warfare previously centred
on defence of UK waters [would] also move more towards force projection
operations’. Regarding the land battle, the government declared that ‘we
will continue to need a full range of war fighting capabilities. Scale is likely
to be less important but we need to be capable of offensive, mobile opera-
tions’. Key requirements entailed firepower, including air-delivered, with
greater emphasis on precision and range. Air superiority and air defence
were considered essential for a wide range of deployed operations:
For the next decade at least, the direct air defence of the UK will be a
lower priority. Long-range air-attack will continue to be important both
as an integral part of warfighting and as a coercive instrument to
support political objectives […]. There will be an increasing premium on
“stand-off” precision missiles which can be launched at targets from
long range (British Ministry of Defence 1998:30–31).
Following the 9/11 attacks, the government observed that ‘we may need to
deploy forces further afield than Europe […] more often than we had en-
visaged’. The government concluded that it was not required that the UK
participated ‘in all operations, but we need to take our share of the tasks and
responsibilities which may present themselves’. The government argued that
the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the US highlighted the importance
of the transatlantic relationship. ‘From the outset, we demonstrated by our
Table 6.12 The main British deployments of armed units abroad 2000–2020
2000 2010 2020
BILATERAL
ARRANGEMENTS
Bahrain 0 ? 160
Belgium 196 0 0
Belize 180 30 12
Brunei 1,050 550 1,000
Canada 343 557 370
Cyprus 3,200 2,791 2,260
Estonia (Enhanced Forward 0 0 800
Presence)
Germany 20,610 22,350 185
Kenya 0 52 350
Kuwait 0 41 50
Nepal 90 280 60
Netherlands 137 120 0
Nigeria 0 0 80
Oman 33 80 90
Poland (Enhanced Forward 0 0 140
Presence)
Sierra Leone 0 63 0
UAE 0 0 200
Ukraine (Operation Orbital) 0 0 53
INTERNATIONAL PSOs
Afghanistan (ISAF/Resolute 9,000 9,000 1,100
Support)
Bahrain (Southern Watch) 50 0 0
Cyprus (UNFICYP) 312 257 257
Iraq (Southern Watch) 300 0 0
Iraq (NATO Training Mission) 0 90 0
Iraq (Operation Shader) 0 0 400
Italy (Deliberate Force) 350 0 0
Mali (Operation Barkhane) 0 0 90
Saudi Arabia (Southern 569 0 0
Watch)
Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) 15 0 0
South Sudan(UNMISS) 0 0 299
Turkey (Southern Watch) 185 0 0
Yugoslavia / Serbia (KFOR) 3,500 8 0
MARITIME OPERATIONS
Indian Ocean 2 Destroyers 4 Frigates 1 Destroyer, 1
Frigate
Indian Ocean (Ocean Shield) 0 1 Frigate
Northern Atlantic (Patrol 0 1 Destroyer
Task N)
Southern Atlantic (Patrol 0 1 Destroyer
Task S)

actions our wish to work closely with our most important ally, the US. Our
ability to operate alongside the US’, the government declared, ‘will be key to
future success’ (British Ministry of Defence 2002:5). In 2003, the govern-
ment emphasised the maritime domain and delivering effect from the sea
onto the land. This included ‘a land attack capability, supporting forces
ashore and on securing access to the theatre of operations and protecting the
crucial sea lines of communications from the home base’ (British Ministry of
Defence 2003:12). In 2008, the cabinet made clear that wherever possible:
we will tackle security challenges early. We are committed to improving

our ability to scan the horizon for future security risks, and to
developing our capabilities for preventive action. The most effective
way to tackle all the major security challenges involves early engage-
ment (British Cabinet Office 2008:7).
Collective action, preferable through the UN, EU and NATO, was con-
sidered to be the most effective way of not only managing but also reducing
the threats that the UK was facing. Moreover, collective action was con-
sidered the only avenue for eliminating any of the threats. However, the
cabinet added that ‘[w]e also recognise that sometimes the best approach will
be more flexible alliances, coalitions or bilateral relationships tailored to
particular issues’ (British Cabinet Office 2008:8). In 2009, Prime Minister
Brown declared that the British ‘approach to national security is inter-
nationalist, not isolationist; active, not passive; and agile and flexible’
(British Cabinet Office 2009:3). A year later, the cabinet concluded that in
order project power abroad, the UK could not solely rely on the US. Rather,
the UK needed to use its network of relationships:
principally with the United States of America, but also as a member of

the European Union and NATO, and a permanent member of the UN
Security Council. We must also maintain the capability to act well
beyond our shores and work with our allies to have a strategic presence
wherever we need it’ (British Cabinet Office 2010a:4).
Working in and through alliances and partnerships wherever possible to

generate stronger responses became the motto of the British government.
Consequently, the government strived to increase bilateral cooperation with
a wide range of new countries, as a complement to the already long-standing
partnerships with the US, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. The shared
interests were considered to be the most intense with the UK’s NATO- and
EU-partners including allies such as Germany. The government expressed
its ambitions to develop deepened bilateral security partnerships with India,
Japan and others. In addition, building up political and security dialogue
with fast-growing economies like Brazil was also on the agenda (British
Cabinet Office 2010b). In 2013, the government announced that intensifying
the security and defence relationship with France continued to be a priority.
Following the 2012 UK-France Summit, the government declared that the
‘regular high-level meetings have advanced a number of initiatives, including
development of the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force’ (British Cabinet
Office 2013:26). The government also announced that the army was to be
restructured as well as rebased and concentrated in the UK. The ambition
was to have all army personnel returned from Germany by 2020 (British
Cabinet Office 2013). In 2014, the DCDC argued that in addition to de-
terrence and forward engagement, the UK needed the capability to respond
to events and project power overseas in order to protect UK interests. The
necessary deployments were to be undertaken either alone or with allies. The
centre explained that ‘[t]hese operations could be described as ‘forward
defence’ – because they aim to prevent escalation and reduce, or eliminate,
the threat to the UK or our interests’ (Doctrine, Concepts & Development
Centre 2014b:39).
In 2017, the government announced that as ‘we leave the European Union
we will be more prominent on the world stage than ever: an outward-facing,
global partner at the heart of international efforts to secure peace and
prosperity for all our people’ (British Ministry of Defence 2017:3). NATO
was declared to be at the centre of the global approach, and the government
claimed that the UK was playing a key leadership role in the Alliance.
Britain’s strategic bilateral relationships, its permanent membership of the
UNSC, the intelligence collaboration between the UK, the US, Australia,
Canada and New Zealand, the Five Power Defence Arrangements in the
Asia-Pacific region, as well as the UK’s relationships with regional organi-
sations such as the AU, were also considered vital for the British defence
policy. Participation in training and exercises within the NATO framework,
as well as contribution to the UN-led military missions in Africa, were used
to exemplify Britain’s international commitments. Other examples were also
mentioned in this regard:
[T]he UK is leading the work to develop the Joint Expeditionary Force

(JEF) with Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands and
Norway which can operate as part of NATO or independently. The UK
is working with France to further develop our bilateral UK/France
Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF). The UK is also part of
the NATO Response Force, standing NATO naval forces and other
formations (British Ministry of Defence D 2017:7).
In addition, British Defence Staffs had been established in Nigeria, for the
West African region, in the UAE for the Gulf region and in Singapore for
the Asian-Pacific region (British Ministry of Defence 2017).
Regarding behaviour, the government did not shy away from using
the ultimate weapon in the British arsenals. The government explicitly
warned that:
UK’s nuclear weapons have a continuing use as a means of deterring
major strategic military threats, and they have a continuing role in
guaranteeing the ultimate security of the UK. But we also want it to be
clear, particularly to the leaders of states of concern and terrorist
organisations, that all our forces play a part in deterrence, and that we
have a broad range of responses available (British Ministry of Defence
2002:12).
Clearly, the Parliament did not wholeheartedly support the Cabinet’s claim
that manoeuvre thinking was at the heart of the UK’s approach to warfare
and the use of military force. Rather, the Parliament expressed doubts that if
the number of platforms in certain key areas were significantly reduced, the
British armed forces would be vulnerable to any significant combat attrition
in future. Obviously, it was the numbers of means rather than the way they
were used that worried the Parliament (British Parliament 2004).
6.2.5 Conclusions: British strategy

Trends related to the development of a multi-polar world order were in
focus in the British alignment strategy and the government’s analyses of
Britain’s role and status. On the one hand, the US was perceived as the
world’s dominating economic and military power. On the other hand, within
a few decades especially China was expected to challenge America’s status as
the global hegemon. India, Russia, Japan and the EU were considered as
potential additional poles in a future multipolar order. Occasionally, Brazil
and some other countries were mentioned as emerging powers in the policy
documents. The British government was worried about Russian military
activities around the territory of NATO-members and especially close to the
airspace and territorial waters of the UK. Notably, the government trusted
global institutions such as the UN in addressing international and globalised
problems. Projecting the UK’s influence abroad through these organisations
was described as essential. Moreover, the UK was to be a leading and
prominent member. The British government’s consistent support for these
multilateral institutions at the centre of the US-led liberal international
order and its unconditional support for Western liberal values associated
with this order correspond well to PTT description of a leading and satisfied
status quo power. We find that the British strategy is not consistent with the
expected counter-balancing behaviour in the BPT.
Being a reliable and powerful ally of NATO has over time been at the core
of the British strategy. Hence, not only the military effectiveness of NATO
but also the political ditto was fundamental for the government.
Consequently, being able not only to deliver effective military force in peace
support and intervention operations alongside Britain’s NATO allies but
especially to operate in tandem with the US armed forces was considered
crucial. Following the 9/11-attacks, the importance of the transatlantic re-
lationship was highlighted and the US was mentioned as Britain’s most
important ally. The ability to operate alongside the US was hence declared
as a necessity rather than an option. We find it appropriate to define the
British alignment strategy during the Bush administration’s strategy of
primacy as offensive bandwagoning. This culminated with the UK’s un-
conditional support to the US during the war against Iraq in 2003.
Arguably, the British close ties to the US distanced the UK from other key
NATO-member such as France and Germany which were against the he-
gemonic behaviour of the US. Moreover, the British position which ne-
glected the role of the UNSC limited the option to work through the UN-
channels. Consequently, multiple courting was rather difficult to achieve.
UK’s lower ambitions regarding unilateral capabilities is consistent with its
drastic decrease in the size of its armed forces and its emphasis on training
other state’s armed forces to manage conflicts themselves.
Ultimately, when the Obama-administration shifted to cooperative se-
curity, the British dependency of the US and the drastic need for devel-
oping the British armed forces more or less forced the UK to shift its
strategy towards multiple courting. Arguably, the UK had difficulties to
live up to the expectation of the USA to take more responsibility within the
frames of the new American strategy of multilateral cooperation. Clearly,
the British government concluded that to project power abroad, the UK
needed a network of alliances, principally with the US but also with
members of the EU and NATO. The long-standing partnerships with
Australia, Canada and New Zealand were also mentioned in this regard.
Notably, the government strived to increase bilateral cooperation with a
wide range of new countries, as a complement to the already established
cooperation. Following the 2012 UK-France Summit, intensifying the se-
curity and defence relationship with France became a priority. On the one
hand, Germany and Japan were also mentioned as important to Britain’s
strategic bilateral relationships. On the other hand, the British government
decided to withdraw the British army from its German bases. The British
governments have continued to nurture UK’s ‘special relationship’ with
the US also after the Trump-administration introduction of the selective
engagement strategy. However, we argue that the UK has complemented
the US-partnership with three other strategic partnerships or alliances:
(i) with the other key members of the Commonwealth realms, including
Australia, Canada and New Zealand; (ii) with and within NATO; and
(iii) with France. Additionally, the UK has initiated cooperation with
other European states such as the JEF that gives it a complementary
platform to NATO for continued defence cooperation with member states
of the EU after Brexit. Consequently, we argue that multiple courting was
occurring also during the Trump presidency. In Table 6.13, the alignment
strategies of the UK are summarised.
Table 6.13 The alignment strategies of the UK
US’s global Primacy Cooperative Selective

strategy security engagements
UK’s strategy Offensive Multiple courting Multiple courting

bandwagoning
Regarding the military strategy, the ends based on values were often in
focus. The British government declared that the point of departure in its
strategic considerations was the role Britain was to play in modern inter-
national relations. The government also announced its ambition of being a
force for good in the world and claimed that the UK’s international au-
thority by far exceeded the country’s size. The British core values included,
according to the government, human rights, the rule of law, good govern-
ance, justice, freedom and tolerance. Consequently, promoting and sup-
porting the spread of democracy as well as strengthening the rules-based
international system were fundamental objectives.
Following the 9/11-attacks, the threats-related ends came into focus. To
coerce, disrupt and destroy potential opponents were declared key ends in
the fight against terrorism. However, the threat was not perceived coming
solely from terrorism, but also from the regimes providing safe-havens for
the terrorists. Consequently, preventing and deterring these regimes from
harbouring terrorists were additional objectives in this regard. Another key
objective was to counter the efforts of the terrorists to acquire WMD. In
2008, the government, on the one hand, concluded that no state or alliance
would have both the intent and the capability to pose a major threat to the
UK in the near future. On the other hand, the government admitted that it
could not rule out a possible re-emergence of such a threat in the future.
Consequently, safeguarding the UK against the re-emergence of such a
threat, as well as defending the UK and its Overseas Territories were de-
clared as core objectives. In addition, ensuring a secure and resilient UK was
presented as an overarching end. Protecting the British people, economy,
infrastructure and way of life was hence important. Moreover, by con-
tributing to the shaping of a stable world, the likelihood of risks affecting
the UK or British interests overseas would decrease.
Regarding the needs, the government expressed ends related to the UK’s
international role. Being a leading, as well as reliable, powerful and pro-
minent, member of the international community was hence an explicit ne-
cessity not least for the British self-image. At the same time, the government
admitted the needs of international cooperation. The effectiveness of
NATO, as well as the maintenance of the transatlantic relationship, was
hence declared a core British objective. However, the government made
clear that the UK’s interests were not confined to Europe. The British de-
pendency on international trade and the free flow of natural resources as
well as on foreign investment into the UK made promoting international
stability, freedom and economic development an obvious end of the UK.
Naturally, projecting power globally in order to protect British interests
overseas, as well as to maintain international security. was declared a core
objective. The fourth and last aspect of the ends, vulnerabilities, was seldom
elaborated. However, when discussed, addressing vulnerabilities was de-
scribed as the most important responsibility of the government. Ensuring
the safety and security of British citizens, as well as the prosperity of the
UK, was mentioned as a core end regarding individuals and society as a
whole. The government also considered the integrity and interests of the
state as being vulnerable, especially regarding cyber-attacks. To conclude,
we argue that a balance between values and needs have been the most
dominant ends in the elaborations of the British government. Potentially,
this can be explained by the British self-image as an outward-facing global
protector of liberal core values including human rights, the rule of law,
democracy and freedom. As noted by the cabinet in 2008, those ‘values
define who we are and what we do’.
Regarding the traditional means, the British government concluded al-
ready in the late 1990s, that a transformation was a necessity, not an option.
Jointness and rapid deployability were hence given priority. Consequently,
each of the services had to give up something. Anti-submarine warfare
capability, as well as the number of MBTs and combat aircraft, were to be
reduced. This trend was reinforced after the 9/11 attacks and the enhanced
focus on capacities for expeditionary operations. Simultaneously con-
tributing to several small-scale operations in widely geographically sepa-
rated locations rather than to a single major operation was the prioritised
approach. In addition, the development of the special forces was given extra
attention. New aircraft carriers and amphibious ships were to increase the
UK’s ability to project air and land power from the sea while new destroyers
were to enhance the force projection capacity on the oceans. The British
government explicitly favoured capability over quantity.
Because of the increased focus on expeditionary warfare, as well as on
power projection, enablers were given higher priority. This included not only
new transport aircraft and ships but also deployable headquarters, as well as
communications and logistical support including air-to-air refuelling aircraft
and tanker and support ships. Regarding the nuclear weapons, the British
government already in the late 1990s gave up the ambitions of having air-
borne capacity. Consequently, the Trident submarines became the only part
of the British nuclear force. In addition, the number of nuclear warheads, as
well as the number of operational launch tubes on the strategic submarines,
were reduced. Finally, regarding the modern means, considerable attention
was given to space assets and cyberspace as well as to systems for surveillance,
electronic warfare and satellite communication throughout the explored
decades. Unmanned combat air vehicle and other UAV capacities have hence
been at the core of the policy documents. To conclude, we argue that both
expeditionary warfare and power projection have become essential in the
British strategy. Consequently, the government has increasingly emphasised
enablers rather than traditional means. We argue that this indicates a shift in
the British military strategy. Although the Blair administration already in the
late 1990s presented plans to establish a power projection capacity, we argue
that it was not until during Cameron’s leadership that action was put behind
the ambitions and the necessary transformation in this direction took place.
We argue that this indicates a shift in the British military strategy.
Regarding ways, the British government initially presented a list of eight
situations as a basis for military planning. Notably, all but one were at the
lower end of the escalation spectrum. In the aftermath of the 9/11-attacks,
the government focused on conflict prevention, including defence diplomacy
activities, and on peace support operations, including stabilisation. At the
same time, the government stressed the need to have British armed forces
prepared to conduct the full range of operations including warfighting.
From 2010 onwards, the government has given priority to military opera-
tions to counter not only terrorism but cyber threats and international
military crises as well. Hence, early warning came, together with rapid crisis
prevention and response, to be in focus.
Already in 1998, the British government presented a new vision on the
employment of military force. For the naval forces, the new approach in-
cluded a transformation towards littoral operations and force projection.
Air superiority and air defence were considered fundamental for a wide
range of modern military operations. Notably, the direct air defence of the
UK was given lower priority. Instead, long-range air-attack was given a
more important role both as an integral part of warfighting and as a coercive
instrument. From 2003, the government also emphasised delivering effect
from the sea onto the land. Regarding the ground forces, the quantity was
considered less important. Instead, priority was given to the ability to carry
out offensive, mobile operations alongside the US. Maintaining the cap-
ability to act well beyond Europe included having a strategic presence
outside the continent. Consequently, the government strived to increase
bilateral cooperation with a wide range of new countries, as a complement
to the already long-standing partnerships with the US and Australia.
Intensifying the strategic relationship with France was also prioritised.
Deterrence and forward engagement in order to prevent escalation and re-
duce, or eliminate, threats directed toward the UK and/or British interests
were, in other words, crucial to the British strategy. West Africa, the Persian
Gulf and the Asian-Pacific region were hence given priority.
Finally, regarding behaviour, it seems reasonable to claim that the British
government did not present a consistent approach during the period ex-
plored. Arguably, the considerations referred to the balance between man-
oeuvre warfare and attrition rather than to control but a clear standpoint in
this regard was never presented. To conclude, we argue that the con-
siderations of the British government regarding ways have focused on the
situation of conflict prevention. The policy elaborations on employment
have rather been supportive in this regard than being independently con-
ducted. In Table 6.14, the British military strategy is summarised.
Table 6.14 The military strategy of the UK
Ends Means Ways
Values & Needs Enablers Situation
Relatively much scholarly attention has been given to British strategy

during Prime Minister Blair’s time in office. For example, Andrew Dorman
(2009) provides interesting insights regarding the British preferences on
expeditionary warfare during the intervention in Sierra Leone while Coates
and Krieger (2004) focus on the war in Iraq. Yet another example is the
edited volume presented by Jonathan Bailey (2013) and his colleagues. In the
final chapter of this volume, Hew Strachan conclude that the British goal
‘was to deliver an expeditionary capability’. Moreover, Strachan concluded
that a direct consequence of the 9/11 attacks was that the British strategy
became subordinated to the American ditto. He claims that during Blair’s
leadership Britain suffered from not developing an independent strategy
(Strachan 2013b:328–332).
Theo Farrell (2017) also observes the underdeveloped British strategy and
the desire to take part in global affairs partnered with the US. We do not
fully agree with Strachan and Farrell as conclusions about the British
strategy should be based on more than findings from a single campaign.
Outside the context of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the British defence
strategy included both bilateral and multilateral defence cooperation with
other states than the US. Farrell also observed that the drivers of British
military transformation mainly are American. This has involved ‘the tra-
ditional mission-set of the British military: namely, expeditionary warfare
[…] in the constant concern of the British military to be able to fight with the
Americans’ (Farrell 2008:804–805. See also Dunn et al. 2011; Strachan
2013a). Arguably, this goes in line with our findings.
However, as Timothy Edmunds (2010), Malcolm Chalmers (2015) and Bert
Chapman (2016), Farrell concluded the British government was aware of the
fact that it could not match the level of US investment in military transfor-
mation, hence forced the British military to develop their own profile.
Edmunds also noted that within this ‘environment in which resources are
constrained and choices must inevitably be made between what strategic ca-
pacities can be funded and sustained’ the British government had made ‘a
concerted and serious attempt’ to create a new ‘framework for strategic
decision-making in this context’ (Edmunds 2014:538–539). We make con-
clusions similar to Patrick Porter (2010) who argues for a more independent
British strategy with rebalanced ends and means (See also Layton 2015).
Consequently, we do not fully agree with Matthew Savill (2011) when
arguing that the British strategy-making has been characterised as muddling
through. Instead, we agree with Malcolm Chalmers (2016) when observing a
shift in the British defence policy between 2010 and 2015 which increasingly
emphasised the UK’s international relationships and ability to operate with
allies and partners. We agree with James Black and his colleagues when
arguing that it is yet too early to make any clear conclusions regarding the
impact of Brexit in this regard (Black et al. 2017).
We concur with Andrew Dorman (2017) that the UK cannot avoid taking
the expectations from NATO (not abandoning its European allies), from the
US (having an enhanced global military presence) as well from the EU
(supporting the military operations of the Union and occasionally also
sharing the burdens) into account when defining its strategy. Finally, we find
John Bew and David Martin Jones’s argument that ‘the UK is still best
served by the preservation of international stability and the avoidance of
great power conflict’ as well as their description of the UK as ‘the ultimate
status quo power’ in line with the overarching theme of this chapter (Bew
and Jones 2017:8–9).
6.3 Conclusions: the strategies of the conservators

Regarding alignment strategies, France and the UK both present themselves
as satisfied leading status quo powers in relation to the US-led multilateral
liberal global order established in the 1990s. Neither of them pursued bal-
ancing strategies directed against the US. Their strategies, therefore, do not
correspond to be counter-balancing behaviour expected by traditional de-
fensive structural realists such as Waltz. Moreover, in the official docu-
ments, it is difficult to find signs of active military counter-balancing
strategies towards China’s growing power. Counter-balancing strategies
towards China seem to be left to the US and its East Asian allies. However,
when it comes to Europe both states actively support efforts for collective
defence and counter-balancing strategies directed towards Russia. In addi-
tion, while concerned about the US’s demands for increased burden-sharing
and its pivot to Asia, both welcomed a continued US presence in the region
and the extended deterrence that comes with it. Walt’s argument related to
the balance of threats – that states balance against perceived threats rather
than growing power alone – may contribute to explanations of the strategic
behaviour of France and the UK.
However, neither of them are prepared to confine their defence strategies to
counter-balancing strategies towards Russia in a NATO context. Both France
and the UK have national interests related to the protection of global trade
routes and the security of its citizens and companies in overseas territories. To
protect these interests, both have developed defence cooperation with non-
NATO-members. Even when it comes to efforts related to Europe’s collective
defence, both are active in developing complementary forums for bi- and
multilateral defence cooperation in which they can play a leading role.
Therefore, the strategy of extended deterrence with the US and collective
defence against Russia within a NATO-context are, for both states, only two
elements in a more comprehensive hedging strategy. However, before the re-
newed Russian revisionist approach became visible through the war against
Georgia in 2008, and as long as the Bush-administration pursued primacy, we
argue that the UK applied an alignment strategy based on bandwagoning with
the US. Arguably, once the Obama-administration shifted to cooperative se-
curity, the British government considered it necessary to shift its strategy
towards multiple courting. The British and French governments’ concerns
regarding the ongoing global power transition process towards a multipolar
order are consistent with the expectations of PTT. Additional factors con-
sistent with the basic assumptions of PTT regarding the strategies of leading
status quo-oriented powers are both states’ emphasis on the importance of
liberal multilateral institutions related to the collective management of
common global economic concerns and their strong identification with the
values that these institutions are expected to promote.
However, in addition to these similarities, the French and British official
policy statements also provide information concerning differences related to
their alignment and status strategies. As mentioned, the French defence
strategy has greater ambitions when it comes to protecting its strategic au-
tonomy in order to decrease a one-sided dependency on the US. This is why
we categorise the French hedging strategy as leash-slipping and the British as
multiple-courting. France has a long tradition of promoting European in-
tegration as a way of establishing a political platform for promoting French
and European interests independently of the US. This tradition began al-
ready during the first decades of the Cold War when the European in-
tegration process focused on economic recovery and reconciliation between
France and Germany. When the UK decided to apply for membership in the
European Community (EC) in the 1960s one important motive was that an
EC-membership would allow Britain to promote Europe’s contacts with the
US as well as the British Commonwealth, and prevent a fragmentation
within the Western community. The British government’s efforts to join the
EC were twice blocked by the French president Charles de Gaulle. The
French president argued that the UK was too closely tied up to its global
English speaking community to fit into this continental European club and
that a British entrance would threaten the cohesion of the EC. Notably, it
was also during de Gaulle’s presidency that France decided to withdraw
from NATO’s integrated military command (George 1998; Dinan 1999). A
possible consequence of Brexit is that France may find it easier to promote
goals related to common European defence efforts through the institutions
of the EU. The UK, on the other hand, will have fewer possibilities to in-
fluence the EU’s long-term strategic development.
However, the British and French choices of alignment strategies are also
dependent on which strategy the US pursues. Our analysis found differences
in the French and British response to the Bush administration’s strategy of
primacy differently. In contrast to the UK’s bandwagoning, France did not
join the US’s coalition of willing in the war against Iraq in 2003. However, in
responding to the Obama administrations strategy of cooperative security,
short of foreign occupation, both France and the UK supported the US-led
efforts to implement the UNSC Resolution 1973 to establish a no-fly zone in
Libya and protect civilians ‘by all means necessary’. In addition, France re-
sponded to cooperative security by returning to NATO’s integrated military
command structures explicitly emphasising that there was no competition
between the EU and NATO. Regarding the Trump administrations strategy
of selective engagements, both France and the UK responded by actively
supporting NATO’s renewed efforts for collective defence in Europe.
Regarding the two conservators military strategies, both have moderately
increased their defence expenditure during the last two decades. France and
the UK have both transformed their armed forces in order to maintain and
improve their capabilities for expeditionary warfare and military power
projection outside their own region. Both have also developed military ca-
pacities related to new arms technology and information warfare. At the same
time, they reduced their capacities related to large scale traditional intra-state
warfare, making them more dependent on defence cooperation with other
states in matters related to collective defence against a major opponent.
However, in contrast to the UK, France still has greater ambitions for uni-
lateral use of force. Additionally, the French government presents greater
ambitions to lead multilateral international military operations. In this regard,
France’s military strategy more clearly expresses ambitions related to strategic
autonomy. The British government instead mostly presents ambitions to train
the armed forces of other states to take care of their security challenges on
their own and to give contributions to international operations led by other
states, preferably the US. A possible explanation for UK’s more limited
ambitions is that the drastic reduction in all of its military services makes it
difficult to be one main contributor to and a leader of large multilateral
operations. Another potential explanation for the UK’s more limited ambi-
tions is its continued reliance on the special relationship with the US. We
argue that the decreased focus on traditional means such as MBTs, APCs and
attack helicopters in favour of enablers indicates a shift in the UK’s strategies.
The transformation of the traditional means from a focus on collective de-
fence in Europe towards not only expeditionary warfare but also on power
projection globally is an additional indication that this is the case.
Notes
1 François Mitterrand of the Socialist Party (French: Parti socialiste) was PoFR 21
May 1985 – 17 May 1995.
2 Jacques Chirac of the Gaullist-conservative Rally for the Republic (French:
Rassemblement pour la République), from 2002 of the centre-right Union for a
Popular Movement (French: Union pour un mouvement populaire) was PoFR 17
May 1995 – 16 May 2005.
3 Nicolas Sarkozy of the Union for a Popular Movement was PoFR 16 May 2005 –
15 May 2012.
4 François Hollande of the Socialist Party was PoFR 15 May 2012 – 14 May 2017.
5 Emmanuel Macron of the liberal-centrist La République En Marche has been
PoFR since 14 May 2017.
6 France requested assistance from the other EU-members based on Article 42 (7) of
the Treaty on the European Union (TEU). This represented the first activation of
the mutual assistance clause following the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty in
2009. Since Article 5 of NATO’s Washington Treaty was invoked in the aftermath
of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the French government had a precedent to build a
request on if directing the request to France’s NATO-allies instead. The French
government choose not to make use of this precedent, rather it invoked another
treaty for the very first time. See European Parliament (2016) and NATO (2019).
7 The UK is the only monarchy explored in this project. Contrary to the head of
state, that is the president, in each of the other four great powers, the Queen is not
involved in the strategy formulation process. Consequently, the British parliament
also has another role in this regard compared with the parliaments of the other
four great powers. Following this difference, we have decided to include some
relevant documents issued by the British parliament in our exploration.
8 During the twenty-first century, the UK has had two Prime Ministers from the
Labour Party (Tony Blair 2 May 1997–27 June 2007, and Gordon Brown 27 June
2007–11 May 2010), and three Prime Minister from the Conservative Party (David
Cameron 11 May 2010–13 July 2016, Theresa May 13 July 2016–24 July 2019 and,
since 24 July 2019, Boris Johnson).
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7 Managing power asymmetry and
structural change
Introduction
In this final chapter, we summarise the main findings of the previous
chapters and answer our fourth main question: how do the strategic choices
among the five system-determining states interact and how does this affect
stability and change in the international system? The chapter has three main
sections. In the first section, we aggregate the findings from Chapters 4–6 by
focusing on external efforts during the first two decades of the twenty-first
century – the three different unipolar strategies pursued by the US and the
alignment strategies of the two ‘contesters’, China and Russia, and the two
‘conservators’, France and the UK. The second section focuses on the in-
ternal efforts of the five states and their military strategies and summarises
the argument from previous chapters by analysing differences and simila-
rities in strategic adjustment related to national military capacities. The third
section is dedicated to the second part of the main question: how the choice
of strategy of the US and the strategic responses of other system-
determining states affect the future stability of the international system and
the US-led liberal international order.
7.1 The alignment strategies of the system-determining states

In Table 7.1, the main strategies of the Bush administration (primacy), the
Obama administration (cooperative security) and the Trump administration
(selective engagement) are presented together with the other four system-
determining states’ alignment strategies. As our classification of the strate-
gies makes clear, there are great differences among the five states. However,
it is also possible to identify three clusters. Being the unipolar power, the US
have strategic options that set it apart from the other system-determining
states. It may go for a strategy of primacy achieving stability through the
preponderance of US power, enforcing its will on other states and pre-
venting the rise of any peer competitor. This strategy is consistent with the
expected behaviour of offensive realism and Hegemonic Stability Theory
(HST). On the other hand, as a unipolar power, the US may choose to
DOI: 10.4324/9781003157113-7
234 Managing power asymmetry and change
Table 7.1 The alignment strategies of the system-determining states

China’s Strategic autonomy Defensive collective Defensive collective

strategy balancing balancing
Russia’s Defensive unilateral Offensive unilateral Offensive unilateral
strategy balancing balancing balancing
France’s Strategic autonomy Leash-slipping Leash-slipping
strategy (Leash-slipping) (Strategic (Strategic
autonomy) autonomy)
UK’s Offensive Multiple courting Multiple courting
strategy bandwagoning
practise multilateral strategies including exercising its powers with the help
of common institutions and the consent from other leading satisfied status
quo oriented states. This is the strategy of cooperative security, which pre-
scribe a behaviour that is consistent with the liberal institutionalist IR-
theory and Power Transition Theory (PTT). The third strategy, selective
engagement, represents a focused alternative for a unipolar power based on
strategies relating to Balance of Power Theory (BPT). In this strategy, the
unipolar power does not try to advance and preserve its relative position by
dominating all other states or carry the burden of establishing and enforcing
a worldwide system for collective security and economic cooperation.
Instead, it concentrates its efforts on the goal of preserving peace among
great powers and support the balance of power in regions that may trigger a
war between great powers.
In responding to the three strategies, other states may either oppose or
cooperate with the unipolar power. A third possible strategic alternative,
open to both unipolar powers and second-ranked system determining states,
is isolationism and efforts to achieve strategic autonomy. In their responses
to the unipolar strategies, the four other system-determining states created
two clusters. First, the contesters, China and Russia, who practised balan-
cing strategies aiming to reduce the power of the US and increase their own
or collective capacities to resist pressures from the dominating state. Second,
the conservators, France and the UK, who, with some exceptions, supported
US external strategies and did not try to develop unilateral or collective
capacities to balance against the US. In this section, we present an analysis
of the responses to each US strategy based on our findings in the previous
empirical chapters.
7.1.1 Responses to primacy

Following the 9/11 attacks, the Bush administration declared a ‘Global War
on Terror’ (GWOT) and demanded that all states declared themselves as
Managing power asymmetry and change 235
either with or against the US. Despite protests from key NATO allies and
without approval from the UNSC, the administration’s decision to invade
Iraq in 2003 indicated a new unilateral approach to the global leadership
that has been described as a threat to US’s security partnerships and the
liberal international order previously created by the US (Ikenberry 2004:7).
In addition, the US emphasised its capacity to prevent the spread of WMD
and deal with potential challengers such as China, Russia, North Korea and
Iran. Consequently, both major and emergent powers should be deterred
from developing capabilities that could threaten regional stability.
Managing the challenges from other states, the Bush administration mainly
relied on its own overwhelming military power to deter and defeat aggres-
sion and impose its will on any adversaries, including both states with ad-
vanced military capabilities and non-state actors.
How did the other four system-determining states respond to this strategy
of primacy?
In response to primacy, as the only potential challenger to the US when it

comes to nationally controlled power resources and the only potential
emergent superpower in the present international system, China did not
comply and adjust its policies to US preferences. Instead, it expressed in-
creasing concern of US interventionism and unilateral tendencies and en-
gaged in efforts of internal balancing. China’s internal efforts, which are
further analysed in the next section, were financed by yearly increases in
defence expenditures and the military capacities it developed were directed
towards both resisting the US military pressures and increasing its own
capacity for the external projection of force.
The other contester, Russia, responded even stronger to US primacy as
well as to NATO’s ambition to welcome additional member states and its
military interventions outside the member states’ territories. In response,
and to restore its great power position, Russia engaged in unilateral bal-
ancing efforts through the modernisation of its armed forces and defensive
collective balancing with former republics of Soviet Union within the con-
text of CSTO. At the end of this period, we also find some efforts of uni-
lateral offensive balancing (the War in Georgia 2008). Moreover, both
China and Russia welcomed trends towards a multipolar international order
that were to replace the US-led liberal international order.
In contrast to China and Russia, neither of the two conservators’ re-
sponded to primacy by balancing against the US. Instead, France and the
UK practised hedging strategies. However, there are distinct differences in
their alignment strategies towards the unipole. France supported the UN-
sanctioned allied war efforts in Afghanistan and it was France that evoked
Article V of the Washington Treaty after the 9/11 attack. However, when the
Bush administration introduced its strategy of primacy, France did not
participate in the US-led coalition of willing in the war against Iraq in 2003.
This time the UNSC had not sanctioned the war effort. As a part of its
hedging strategy, France pursued a strategy of strategic autonomy by di-
recting internal efforts towards keeping and developing unilateral military
capacities for global power projection. France directed its external efforts
towards bi- and multilateral defence cooperation with other EU countries
and states situated in regions of importance for France. Building an effective
European defence policy was part of these ambitions. Furthermore, to
protect trade routes and the security of its citizens and companies in over-
seas territories, France identified an interest in contributing to the stability
of the Asian-Pacific region. Promoting this goal, France established bilateral
cooperation with middle powers such as Australia, India and Japan.
Additionally, the French government emphasised the importance of its
strategic partnerships in Africa and the Middle East. France’s efforts to
preserve unilateral capabilities for power projection and establish various
forms of institutionalised cooperation between states to reduce its de-
pendency on the US make us categorise France’s response to primacy as the
hedging strategy leash-slipping. Additionally, we also see signs of ambitions
related to strategic autonomy. However, because of its global interests and
support for a multilateral liberal international order, France did not pursue
strategic autonomy in an isolationistic manner. In addition, France external
and internal efforts do not seem to be aimed at limiting the US’s influence.
We have not noticed similar tendencies towards strategic autonomy in the
UK’s responses to US primacy. Instead, the British hedging strategy dis-
played elements of offensive bandwagoning with the US. Following the 9/11
attacks, the importance of the transatlantic relationship was highlighted and
the US was mentioned as Britain’s most important ally. The ability to op-
erate alongside the US was declared as the ‘key to future success’. In con-
trast to France and some other NATO countries, the UK joined the US
coalition of willing in the war against Iraq in 2003 and British soldiers
continued to fight alongside US soldiers in Afghanistan. During the Bush
administration, changes in the UK’s defence expenditure seem to reflect
these ambitions as the expenditure gradually increased each year.
7.1.2 Responses to cooperative security and selective engagements

The four system-determining states’ responses to US strategy were not af-
fected by the US’s change of strategy from cooperative security to selective
engagements. Therefore, we present our analysis of the responses to co-
operative security and selective engagements in the same section. During the
Obama administration (2009–2016), the US overall global strategy was co-
operative security. In order to meet the challenges of new emergent powers,
counter violent extremism, stop the spread of WMD and resolve and pre-
vent conflicts, the Obama administration found it necessary to strengthen
established alliances and international institutions and build cooperation
with other key actors. Additional support for characterising the Obama
strategy as cooperative security is the administration’s emphasis on universal
values and common security challenges. When it comes to means and ways,
the Obama administration used institutional means and resources such as
multilateral diplomacy and the new START agreement to address security
challenges related to WMD. In addressing the security needs of both states
and individuals, the administration advocated the use of military capabilities
to render humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. The Obama adminis-
tration’s emphasis on global leadership and multilateral cooperation is fully
compatible with the perspective of PTT.
In contrast to this, the Trump administration (2017–2020) focused on the
diverging interests among both major and aspiring powers. The adminis-
tration expressed open criticism of several multilateral institutions including
advocating more bilateral approaches and emphasising the US’s national
interest. Nationalism, military modernisation and foreign engagements were
also identified by the administration as common elements of Chinese and
Russian policy. In this context, President Trump declared his ambition to
promote a balance of power strategy, favouring the US and its allies. At the
same time, the President stressed that he viewed the burden-sharing between
the US and its allies as unfair. We nevertheless argue that the Trump ad-
ministration, despite the President’s nationalistic rhetoric, has applied a
selective engagement rather than an isolationistic strategy. This categorisa-
tion, supported by the US, continued global deployment of forces based on
both bi- and multilateral agreements. However, the decreased number of US
army units in Europe and the massive withdrawal of troops from Iraq de-
parts from the recommendations of selective engagements.
How did the other four system-determining states respond to these two
different unipolar strategies?
China did not reverse its balancing strategy during the Obama administra-
tion. Instead, previous efforts of internal balancing by modernising its
armed forces were complemented with increased efforts of collective defence
balancing with Russia and deepened security cooperation with other states
in the region. Additionally, China began to develop new capacities for ex-
ternal power projection. A possible explanation for this is that the Obama
administration’s strategy of cooperative security was pursued with less
consistency in East Asia. The US perceived China as a growing power and
potential future challenger and the US’s pivot towards Asia began already
during the Obama administration. The Chinese government’s view of the
US as a potential hegemonic global power did not change during the Obama
administration. The Trump administration’s confrontational policies to-
wards China cemented this view as well as China’s balancing strategies.
However, the Chinese government also consistently expressed its support for
the UN system. The government’s increased ambitions regarding both re-
gional and international security cooperation as well as UN operations can
be interpreted as an attempt to improve its status through a strategy of
social mobility.
The Obama administrations strategy of cooperative security initially in-
cluded efforts of a reset policy towards Russia. This did not result in a long-
term improvement of Russia’s relations with Western countries. Russia’s
military involvement in Syria, its war against Ukraine and its arms deals
with Turkey are instead signs of a shift in the Russian strategy towards an
offensive unilateral balancing aiming to undermine US power position in the
Middle East and proactively prevent former Soviet Union republics from
establishing closer ties to both NATO and the EU. Russia’s war against
Ukraine and the annexation of the Crimea peninsula resulted in a re-
activation of NATO’s collective defence in Europe already during the
Obama administration. In relation to Europe and Russia, the strategy of
selective engagements can therefore be considered to have been introduced
before Trump entered office. Russia’s efforts to consolidate or improve its
great power status increasingly correspond to the status strategy social
competition. However, Russia’s preparedness to use nuclear weapons, its
emphasis on specific Russian values, hybrid warfare techniques and its
strategy to develop bilateral relations with regional powers may also be
interpreted as a strategy of social creativity aiming to compensate for a
disadvantage in traditional hard and soft power resources. In terms of BPT
and HST/PTT, the Russian strategy contains elements of both. Obvious
elements of balance of power are found in Russian regional security ar-
rangements and commitments to assist other states exposed to armed at-
tacks and the opposition to further NATO enlargements. On the other hand,
the government’s analysis of a stagnating West and developments toward a
new polycentric world order fits well with both HST and PTT and indicates
a preference for global power shift away from a liberal international order
dominated by one superpower.
France supported the Obama administrations strategy of collective se-
curity. The French government gave substantial contributions to the
NATO-led and UN-sanctioned military intervention in Libya in 2011. It was
also during the Obama administration that France returned to NATO’s
integrated military command structures. The government’s response to the
Trump administrations strategy of selective engagement followed the same
pattern. NATO’s renewed ambitions regarding collective defence is fully
consistent with the rights to collective self-defence in article 51 of the UN
charter. France’s strategic responses to US strategies indicate that it is an
autonomous status quo power that will support the dominating state as long
as it acts as a defender of common multilateral principles and norms.
However, if the dominating state pursues unilateral strategies and neglecting
common institutions, French support will be withdrawn. France’s ambition
to establish strategic alternatives that complement US-led institutions such
as NATO is characteristic of France’s leash-slipping strategy. However, the
French government’s efforts to strengthen the EU capabilities related to
collective defence do not aim to replace NATO or challenge US status as the
leading global power. Similarly, France’s defence cooperation outside
Europe, as well as its efforts to develop unilateral capabilities for external
military power projection, does not seem to be aimed at limiting the US’s
influence. Instead, these complementary defence cooperation aim to pro-
mote France’s ability for independent action and strategic autonomy.
Therefore, in contrast to the strategies of China and Russia, the French
alignment strategy does not correspond to expectations regarding counter-
balancing behaviour in BPT. However, France support for values and
multilateral institutions associated with the present international liberal
order fits well with PTT descriptions of a satisfied major status quo power, a
leading conservator of the present international order.
The Obama administrations strategy of cooperative security challenged
the UK to live up to the US expectation of the UK taking more responsi-
bility within the framework of international multilateral cooperation. The
British government concluded that in order to project power abroad the UK
needed a network of alliances, principally with the US and NATO and also
with EU members and Commonwealth states such as Australia, Canada and
New Zealand. Additionally, the government increased bilateral cooperation
with a wide range of other countries. Following the 2012 UK–France
Summit, security and defence cooperation with France became a priority.
Germany and Japan were also included in Britain’s strategic bilateral re-
lationships. Simultaneously, the British government decided to withdraw the
British army from its German bases. The British governments continued to
nurture UK’s ‘special relationship’ with the US also after the Trump-
administration introduction of the strategy of selective engagement.
However, the UK has complemented the US partnership with three other
strategic partnerships or alliances: key members of the Commonwealth
realms, NATO and France. Additionally, the UK has initiated cooperation
with other European states through JEF that gives it a complementary
platform to NATO for continued defence cooperation with EU member
states after Brexit. Consequently, we argue that the UK practised a strategy
of multiple courting during both the Obama and the Trump presidency.
Similar to France’s hedging strategy, the British strategy of multiple
courting, as well as its efforts to improve its capacity for external power
projection, was not intended to limit the US’s influence. The British strategy,
therefore, does not correspond to expectations regarding counter-balancing
behaviour in BPT. Instead, the British government’s consistent support for
these multilateral institutions at the centre of the US-led liberal international
order and its unconditional support for Western liberal values associated
with this order correspond well to the PTT description of a leading and
satisfied status quo power – a conservator. Similar to the French govern-
ment, the British government emphasise the importance of its overseas in-
terest. However, when it comes to autonomous unilateral external power
projection, the British strategy is less ambitious than the French and more
dependent on continued cooperation with the US and other states.
7.1.3 Conclusions: the diversity of alignment strategies

In the debate between defensive and offensive structural realists and the
debate on the unipolar moment, as described in Chapter 2, the participants
generally recommended one general strategy. Defensive realists expected
that both first and secondary powers would balance against an expansive
power to protect their own long-term political independence and survival
and reduce the risk that one state establishes itself as a hegemon. Offensive
realists instead argued that states are primarily driven by ambitions to in-
crease their own influence and relative power. In the debate on the stability
of unipolarity, some participants argued that the US’s efforts to prolong its
dominant position were futile and that other states would devote their ef-
forts to catch up and coordinate with each other to restore a bi- or multi-
polar order. Others argued that the US’s position as the sole superpower
would allow it to preserve its dominant position either by pursuing a
strategy of primacy or by cooperating with like-minded countries and sup-
port the present multilateral liberal international order.
Regarding US’s unipolar strategies, a first general observation based on
this study is that the three different strategies pursued during the first two
decades of the twenty-first century have not been consistently applied in
different regional contexts and against different competitors and partners.
Moreover, US strategies were perceived very differently among the other
four system-determining states. This may not be surprising, but it is still
potentially consequential for the discussion on how different strategies
promote the US’s interests and the stability of a US-led international liberal
order.
A second general observation concerns the diversity of strategic responses
to US strategies by the second-ranked system-determining powers. In ana-
lysing this diversity, the distinction between, on one hand, revisionist and
dissatisfied states and, on the other hand, status quo-oriented and satisfied
states associated with HST and PTT has proved useful. In their strategic
analyses and responses to the US’s strategies, both China and Russia met
the expectations of how revisionist and dissatisfied states evaluate the pre-
sent international order and how they respond (various balancing strategies
against the dominant state) which confirms the expectations of both system
theories and BPT. However, there are also differences between the two
contesters. China appears more focused on balancing US power specifically,
while Russia is actively balancing against both US and liberal multilateral
organisations such as the EU and NATO. One possible explanation for this
is differences relating to power resources. China’s huge economic growth
potential may create greater incitements for a status strategy of social mo-
bility resulting in a continued peaceful rise. However, as Russia’s power rests
more firmly on its military power resources, during the last decade, Russia
has largely relied on status strategies openly challenging both Western
powers and the liberal international order. Contrastingly, the two con-
servators (France and the UK) have responded in ways that correspond to
major satisfied status quo-oriented powers thereby contradicting the ex-
pectations of BPT. However, there are differences in their strategic responses
suggesting that they will not respond uniformly to future US strategies.
Together, these two observations may suggest that the search for one ‘best
US grand strategy’ should be replaced with a more diversified strategy based
on analyses of which strategy is most suitable in each regional context to-
wards specific allies and opponents. We will return to this issue in the final
section of this chapter after an analysis of how the differences in alignment
strategy correspond to differences in military strategies.
7.2 The military strategies of the system-determining states

Notably, each of the five great powers has formulated rather individual
military strategies regarding ends, means as well as ways.
7.2.1 Ends
The ends based on values indicate a difference between the Western and the
two revisionist great powers. While all five stressed the value of international
peace, the Western powers also emphasised values such as democracy, good
governance, the rule of law and human dignity. Notably, these values were
referred to as universal. Sustaining freedom and encouraging prosperity
were other value-based ends mentioned by the Western powers and espe-
cially the USA. Both China and Russia expressed ambitions of creating
mutual trust and peaceful coexistence among states. On the one hand, all
five great power strived for stability in international relations. On the other
hand, they also articulated ends indicating changes. For example, indicating
that the current system and norms were not strong enough, the Western
powers mentioned intentions of strengthening the rules-based international
system as well as international norms. Moreover, all but the US articulated
ends aiming at creating favourable conditions for themselves, enhancing
their international position, as well as gaining influence and status in the
international system. Arguably, these changes had to take place at the ex-
pense of others. Interestingly, both China and Russia expressed ends re-
ferring to the domestic situation.
All five great powers often articulated ends related to threats in a pro-
active manner. Dissuading adversaries from undertaking military activities,
as well as deterring them from developing capabilities that could threaten the
interest of the great power clearly, indicates pro-action. In China’s case,
the pro-activeness also included potential threats against the communist
regime and in Russia’s potential conflicts adjacent to Russia. Other
similarities were the objectives defending the homeland, including its se-
curity and resilience, as well as safeguarding citizens even outside the
homeland territory. Notably, all great powers but the USA also mentioned
safeguarding the state’s sovereignty and its territorial integrity in this con-
text. In the British and French cases, overseas territories were included in
this part of the elaborations. Another threat-based end was the Chinese
government’s desire to prevent being left behind in military innovations,
especially compared to the US. Only the Russian government expressed
wartime-related threat-based ends including forcing the aggressor to end the
war at an early stage.
The five great powers also expressed some similarities regarding ends
referring to needs. Notably, these similar ends were related to the global
economy. On the one hand, the ends were about creating favourable ex-
ternal conditions to strengthen the domestic economy. On the other hand,
the ends concerned securing the access to key markets and strategic re-
sources as well as to lines of communication. While the Western powers
articulated ends related to their dependency on international cooperation
and to strengthening established alliances, both China and Russia expressed
ends connected to the national unity.
Finally, regarding vulnerabilities, we observe that the Western powers
tend to focus on the safety of their citizens as well as on their critical in-
frastructure including the functionality of the society. Instead, China and
Russia focused on public order, political stability and social harmony. While
China’s worries regarding lagging behind other great powers in terms of
science and technology were based on threat perceptions, similar Russian
worries were based on its vulnerability.
In Table 7.2, we conclude which aspects of ends have been the most
predominant in each of the great power’s policy elaborations. In the
American case, we argue that protecting and promoting values is the most
dominant end. Values are also dominant in the British strategy but while the
US emphasised peace, freedom and prosperity, the UK has stressed human
rights, the rule of law and democracy. In addition, the British also em-
phasised needs. Both China and France focused on vulnerabilities. In the
former case, the elaborations did not always use the state but rather the CCP
as a point of departure. Finally, regarding Russia, we conclude that the ends
related to threats hold the most predominant position in the policy ela-
borations. In addition, Russia has focused on ends related to needs, in-
cluding Russia’s international position.
Table 7.2 The ends-element of the system-determining states’ strategies
The US China Russia France The UK
Ends Values Vulnerability Threats & Needs Vulnerability Values & Needs
7.2.2 Means
Regarding the traditional means, the US armed forces have, over time, given
priority to jointness, quality and readiness over quantity while it seems rea-
sonable to argue that China and Russia have prioritised the other way around.
During the first two decades of the twenty-first century, this picture has come
to change. In the US, both the army and the marine corps have given more
attention to irregular warfare missions. In both revisionist states, the focus has
shifted from quantity to quality. In addition, both have put increased emphasis
on jointness. In China, a shift in relative priority from the ground to naval
forces has taken place. In Russia, permanent combat readiness has been de-
clared as a goal for the transformation of the military. While the American
armed forces have had the capacity for expeditionary warfare for some time,
this has become a focus in the UK as well in France. Both these states are
transforming their military towards an autonomous, swift-reaction armed
force, deployable far beyond their borders. Consequently, the number of
MBTs and combat aircraft has in both cases been reduced when capability
over quantity becomes the new motto.
When it comes to enablers, strategic logistics and mobility were given
priority in all five great powers. All three Western powers also emphasised
expeditionary warfare as well as power projection. Consequently, tanker/
cargo aircraft, command and control as well as and deployable task force
headquarters were prioritised. The prepositioning and basing of infra-
structure were also emphasised in this regard. In the American case, EW-
capabilities and intelligence were additional priorities. China also stressed
information warfare and counter-measures but focused on the national
defence industry rather than on the means themselves. In the Russian case,
maintenance, repair and stockpiling were prioritised areas.
The nuclear means initially seemed to have decreased in importance in all
cases but the French. In both the US and Russia, the means of each of the
parts of the nuclear triad decreased in numbers. Furthermore, the MIRV
capacity was withdrawn, leaving the ICBMs with just a single nuclear
warhead. Notably, France abolished its land-based IRBMs while the UK
gave up the ambitions of having airborne capacity already in the late 1990s.
However, at the end of the period explored, the Trump administration
decided to modernise the nuclear triad, make the F-35 combat aircraft dual-
capable and launch the LRSO cruise missile program. In China, counter-
measures such as early warning and protection were given priority. Russia
also came to favour early warning systems as well as facilities for its WMD
systems. The French government continued to stress that nuclear deterrence
remained the foundations of France’s strategy. Hence, modernisation of
SSBNs and airborne cruise missiles were given priority. The British did not
only decrease the number of nuclear warheads but the number of opera-
tional launch tubes on the strategic submarines as well.
Finally, regarding the modern means, space and cyberspace, as well as
information and electronic warfare, have become of increased importance in
all five great powers. All five states have organised special commands and
units for these domains. Specific weaponry such as drones and autonomous
arms have also received increased attention but on a different level. Clearly,
the US is in the lead regarding computer network operations and UAVs.
The US has also expressed an ambition to ensure its armed forces’ in-
formation superiority. Both space and cyberspace are hence considered as
war-fighting domains in their own right.
In Table 7.3, we conclude which aspects of means have been the most
predominant in each of the great power’s policy elaborations. In the US
case, we argue that enablers have had a central role throughout the twenty-
first century. In addition, to ensure American military supremacy, prior-
itising modern means is not an option but a necessity. We find that enablers
have come into focus also in the British strategy. Despite the developments
of the Russian and Chinese military, we conclude that the traditional means
remain the focus of the Russian and Chinese strategies. Arguably, the tra-
ditional means, and especially the ground forces, serve the domestic needs of
the CCP best. We conclude that nuclear forces still are fundamental in the
French strategy. However, as in the British case, the focus on expeditionary
warfare and power projection has also made enablers essential. We conclude
that the increased focus on enablers in the French and British cases indicates
a shift in both these states’ strategies.
Table 7.3 The means-element of the system-determining states’ strategies
Means Enablers & Traditional Traditional Nuclear & Enablers

Modern Enablers
7.2.3 Ways
Regarding situation, the American strategy focused on war-prevention. If
deterrence failed, the US would not shy away from a war-fighting situation.
The ambition was to dominate every level of escalation. As the focus shifted
towards irregular warfare, the ground forces came to emphasise crisis pre-
vention and conflict management with a focus on counterinsurgency and
counterterrorism operations. Over time, the US naval and air forces have
focused on power projection in a war prevention situation. We argue that
the Chinese strategy has focused on self-defence and deterrence. As China’s
overseas interests were given increased attention, participating in interna-
tional security cooperation became more important. However, the main
focus was kept on the war prevention situation. The Russian government
initially had a rather deterministic war-fighting approach. However, when
the American strategy shifted from primacy towards cooperative security,
the Russian focus shifted towards deterrence and increasingly active use of
military force. Both the French and the British governments focused on
rapid crisis prevention and response including preventive deployments and
defence diplomacy.
We argue that the American strategy is offensive regarding the employ-
ment of military force. Projecting power and the capacity to decisively defeat
any adversary was at the very core of the strategy. Simultaneously, by al-
ready in the initial phase eliminating the adversaries’ offensive capabilities,
their counter-offensive options were to be denied. Consequently, forward
deployment of the US military was considered necessary. The Chinese
government emphasised integrated joint operations with both offensive and
defensive ambition. We observe a shift from a static ground focused regional
defence towards a dynamic approach including offensive air as well as naval
operations. We argue that the overarching Russian strategic approach is
defensive, at least in the initial phase of armed conflict. By using foreign
bases on the soil of friendly host nations to stationing armed units, the
preconditions for a defence-in-depth is established. Notably, this does not
prevent Russia from adopting offensive approaches at the lower theatre and/
or operational levels. Moreover, Russia does not hesitate from using mili-
tary force to achieve political ends. Military presence and/or prepositioning
of military assets abroad were also fundamental to the French approach.
However, we interpret this as a key part of the pro-active and offensive
character of the French strategy. Similar conclusions can be drawn re-
garding the British strategy. Force projection, forward engagement, long-
range air-attacks and offensive, mobile land operations were all central parts
of the British approach.
Finally, regarding operational behaviour, we argue that all three Western
power emphasised manoeuvre warfare. While the British government did
not elaborate much regarding the conceptual meaning of this kind of war-
fare, both their American and French counterparts did. Although France
declared that the French armed forces strived to gain and maintain super-
iority in all domains, we argue that the elaborations focused on annihilating
the adversary. Hence, we consider it reasonable to argue that the French
government favoured manoeuvre warfare. As the US declared an ambition
to achieve full spectrum dominance, we argue that the American behaviour
aimed at achieving control in all domains of warfare. As the British, the
Chinese government did not present any conceptual considerations about
the meaning of modern warfare. On the one hand, the Chinese government
emphasised integrated joint operations. On the other hand, the government
elaborated on combining standing and reserve units. One potential ex-
planation for the lack of conceptual considerations can be that the shift
from quantity to quality has not been followed by the necessary transfor-
mation of the conceptual framework. Consequently, the previous focus on
numbers could indicate a preference for exhausting the enemy, that is
attrition. Finally, regarding Russia, we argue that the focus has been on
controlling and paralysing the opponent. Moreover, Russia seems to have
elaborated extensively on the conceptual aspects of warfare. Hence, com-
bining regular units, including airmobile as well as airborne troops, con-
ducting highly manoeuvrable operations with the use of special forces and
irregular armed formations, as well as information warfare, might be the
Russian approach to modern warfare.
In Table 7.4, we conclude which aspects of ways have been the most
predominant in each of the great power’s policy elaborations. In the
American and Chinese cases, we argue that the situation has been in focus
and hence war prevention. Both France and the UK have also focused on
situation, but specifically on the conflict prevention level of escalation.
Regarding Russia, we argue that behaviour has been at the core of the policy
elaborations. The wars in Georgia and Ukraine, as well as Russia’s military
operations in Syria, also displayed innovative ways of using military force.
Table 7.4 The ways-element of the system-determining states’ strategies
Ways Situation Situation Behaviour Situation Situation
7.2.4 Conclusions: the diversity of military strategies

Table 7.5 summarises our findings. We observe most similarities between
American and British strategies. These strategies share a focus on values,
enablers and situations. While the American strategy also put emphasis on
modern means, the British focus on ends also includes needs. Arguably, it
takes more time to implement a change in military strategy compared to a
change in the alignment strategy. Consequently, these similarities can po-
tentially be explained by the initial British bandwagoning alignment
strategy. In their ambition to achieve operational interoperability with the
US (their main ally), the British government may have strived for conceptual
interoperability at the strategic level as well. We find it interesting that both
powers that indicated preferences for strategic autonomy as an alignment
Table 7.5 The military strategies of the system-determining states
Ends Means Ways
The US Values Enablers & Modern Situation

China Vulnerability Traditional Situation
Russia Threats & Needs Traditional Behaviour
France Vulnerability Nuclear & Enablers Situation
The UK Values & Needs Enablers Situation
strategy, namely China and France, also show similarities when it comes to
the military strategies. Both focus on vulnerabilities regarding the ends as
well as on situation regarding the ways. Notably, the only similarity ob-
served when comparing the Chinese and the Russian military strategies (the
two revisionist states) is the focus on the traditional means.
Interestingly, each of the military strategies has been rather constant over
time. In addition to the two shifts regarding the French and British strate-
gies, we have only identified a few minor adjustments that have taken place.
Regarding the US strategy, initially, there was a shift in the ends from the
Bush administration’s focus on addressing the threats from terrorism and
violent extremism via a balanced approach presented by the Obama ad-
ministration to the Trump administrations focus on addressing potential
threats from revisionist states. Second, the Obama administration under-
took some significant reductions of the traditional means, including de-
creasing the personnel strength from 570,000 to 440,000 troops, phasing out
several combat aircraft, retiring an aircraft carrier and reducing the Marine
expeditionary forces from three to two. When President Trump took office,
he made clear that the armed forces were to both grow and be modernised.
Third, the Trump administration decided to modernise the nuclear means,
including aspects of each of the legs in the nuclear triad. However, neither of
these shifts decreased the main focus on the value-based ends, enablers and
modern means.
Regarding the Chinese strategy, we have identified some shifts in focus as
well. First, in 2004, the traditional means were to be transformed from a
quantitative and manpower-intensive design towards a qualitative and
technology-intensive force structure. Second, in 2008, the government’s new
military strategic guidelines indicated a shift regarding the ways towards a
more active defence. This was further developed in 2015 when the govern-
ment emphasised joint operations and participation in international military
operations. Third, in 2015 the government announced its intentions of
modernising China’s nuclear means. Notably, neither of these adjustments
decreased the main focus on the traditional means or the situation-based
ways. Moreover, the government declared that the developments were
consistent with the overarching strategic concept of people’s war.
Arguably, when it comes to the Russian strategy, the military doctrine of
2010 indicated a shift towards an increased emphasis on permanent-
readiness forces and strategic deployment as well as on jointness between the
services. Moreover, not only the means but also the ways shifted as the focus
changed from a war-fighting towards a war-preventing situation. Notably,
the government reserved the right to utilise nuclear weapons in response to
any armed aggression against Russia. However, we do argue that neither of
these adjustments decreased the main focus on the traditional means or the
behaviour-based ways.
Finally, regarding France and the UK, we identify a transformation from
force structure built on multilateral collective defence operation in Europe
towards an approach focusing on expeditionary warfare, power projection
and deployability far beyond their borders. Arguably, this indicates a shift in
priority from traditional means to enablers. Even if the enablers were given
increased focus in both cases already following the 9/11 attacks, we argue
that this has taken new proportions. This can be explained not only by an
increased focus on expeditionary warfare but on global power projection as
well. Notably, this shift has been accomplished by a reduced focus on col-
lective defence in Europe. Consequently, the transformation of the tradi-
tional means from heavy formations with plenty of MBTs and APCs
towards rapidly deployable units is another aspect of this shift.
To summarise, we observe a significant difference regarding the military
strategies between the three Western powers and the two revisionist states.
While the strategies of the former three focus on means for expeditionary
warfare and global power projection, the strategies of the latter two focus on
traditional means. Arguably, the revisionist states need to manage their
domestic situations can explain their emphasis on traditional means and
especially on ground forces. However, potentially, a revival of the horizontal
escalation of the Cold War is in the beginning. If so, we could expect an
increased focus on means for expeditionary warfare and global power
projection in both revisionist states as well. Whether the Chinese built-up of
their naval and air forces and/or the Russian involvement in the Syrian civil
war indicate a shift towards expeditionary warfare in the revisionist states
remain to be seen. Moreover, we could also expect an increased quest for
overseas presence in strategically important areas, prepositioning of military
assets abroad and forward deployment of military forces. We would expect
an increased completion among the great powers in this regard. While
China’s economic power most likely will continue to increase, hence en-
abling the acquirement of means for global expeditionary, we find it unlikely
that Russia will afford such an approach. On the other hand, so far Russia’s
military technological know-how has been superior to the Chinese.
Consequently, the contesters seem to benefit from cooperating if the military
supremacy of the US is to be truly challenged.
7.3 Stability and change in the international system

The analysis of change and stability in the present international system in-
volves two different dimensions: the distribution of power between the
system-determining states and institutional practises related to the US-led
liberal international order. Regarding the former dimension, all five system-
determining states identified trends towards multipolarity in their analysis of
the strategic environment. However, these claims were not supported with
evidence indicating that two or more states were close to reach parity with the
US’s combined military, economic and political power. In addition, a po-
tential challenger to the US would have to develop military capacities for
global power projection and ‘command of the global commons’. This includes
nuclear-power submarines, aircraft carries, principal amphibious ships, heavy
UAVs, new generations of tactical aircraft, military satellites and strategic
transport capabilities. To exercise command of the global commons, states
also need a broad range of integrated and complex systems supported by
infrastructure including military installations in foreign countries.
Our analysis of China and Russia’s military strategies illuminate huge
increases in both states’ military expenditures and both have made great
efforts in modernising their armed forces. However, when it comes to ca-
pacities related to global power projection, both states are still far behind the
US. Our analysis of the military strategies of France and the UK indicate
that both states have made great efforts in improving their capacities for
expeditionary warfare and global power projection. However, these efforts
did not aim to balance the US’s global power. Moreover, the British and
French efforts to keep and improve their capacities for power projection
were not supported by significant increases in national defence expenditures,
rather in drastic cuts in the size of the two countries armed forces and ca-
pacities needed for traditional inter-state warfare in their own region.
The experiences of the British and French defence transformation pro-
cesses indicates that China and Russia will have difficulties in developing
capacities for global power projection without massive increases in defence
expenditures or a reduction of their traditional military capacities. Russia’s
relatively small economy will probably prevent it from building military
capacities for global power projection that can match the US’s present
capabilities. Russia’s accumulated military defence expenditures during the
second decade of the twenty-first century was 712 billion USD compared to
the US’s 6,877 billion USD spending. China’s GDP in 2019 was almost
equal to the US’s, but its accumulated military expenditure from 2010 to
2019 only adds up to 1,956 billion USD. This indicates that a reduction in
traditional military capacities will not free enough resources for any of these
states to reach parity with the US when it comes to global power projection.
Moreover, China and Russia’s concerns with domestic stability and regional
threats to their security also make it unlikely that they will abandon their
focus on traditional military means. For these reasons, we argue that the
distribution of power in the international system is best described by the
1+1+3 formula presented in Chapter 2 and that the US for long will remain
the sole superpower if it continues to devote resources to keep its command
of the global commons. However, the US dominant position when it comes
to global military power projection has not prevented China and Russia
from strengthening their position in their own regions and from providing
support to other regional powers outside their own regions.
An international order, according to John Ikenberry, manifests patterns
of interaction guided by settled rules and arrangements between states.
Historically, international orders have often ended with a great power war
between revisionist states trying to overturn the present order and status quo
states trying to protect it. Ikenberry traces the origins of the present US-led
liberal international order back to the UK’s free-trade regime during the late
nineteenth century. According to Ikenberry, the end of the Cold War turned
the US-led cooperation between western states into a ‘sprawling global
system’ (Ikenberry 2011:11–22).1 The second dimension of our analysis, that
is the stability of the present international system, concerns the future of this
order. The fact that the present liberal international order is a US-led order
in a unipolar international system makes the order extremely dependent on
the strategic choices made by the sole superpower.
According to Ikenberry, international orders can be established and
maintained in three different ways: through balance, command and consent.
An international order based on balance is maintained through an equili-
brium of power where the order emerges from a power stalemate. This
mechanism has traditionally been a part of European power politics and
contributed to keeping the Cold War cold. However, for this to be a relevant
option for producing global stability, the distribution of power must change
to a bi- or multipolar system. Still, proponents of a strategy of ‘restrain’ and
‘off-shore balancing’ base their argument on this mechanism, or logic,
suggesting that the US should withdraw from Europe, forcing European
members of NATO to take on greater responsibility for their own security
and balance the potentially revisionist Russia on their own. Similarly, the
regional balance of power logic is assumed to eventually force other states to
take greater responsibilities in East Asia and the Middle East. Hence, the US
would be able to prevent free-riding among allies and consolidate its own
national power base. If the US implement this strategy without a transi-
tional period, the liberal international order will face enormous challenges.
However, the proponents of this strategy often adhere to some of the ideas
of selective engagements that will offer the former allies some time to adjust
to a change in US strategy (Posen 2014; Mearsheimer and Walt 2016). If the
US implement this strategy, the global unipolar distribution of power would
not be essential for the stability and security in these regions. Instead, re-
gional balances of power would be the prime source of stability. A US-led
liberal international order would then again be one of several competing
international economic orders, a development that Mearsheimer has de-
scribed as a return to a realist international order (Mearsheimer 2019).
In an international order based on command, one dominating state or-
ganises and enforces order. According to Ikenberry, both the British- and
American-led liberal orders had displayed some elements of command
through a mix of imperial and liberal characteristics. The exercise of com-
mand by the dominating state is the general source of stability in HST. In
this perspective, the stability of the system is dependent on the hegemon’s
ability to enforce its will on other states and the stability of the system is
enhanced by increases in the hegemon’s relative power capacities. The
strategy of primacy pursued by the Bush administration is consistent with
this logic. Clearly, this strategy was not successful in promoting stability.
China and Russia responded with counter-balancing strategies and many
NATO member states, including France, did not join the coalition of willing
in the war against Iraq. Additionally, the costly and unsuccessful wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq and other wars related to GWOT undermined the
US’s international position, its defence economy and the domestic support
for a policy of active engagements. This alternative does not seem to be on
the table in the near future.
An international order based on consent is, according to Ikenberry,
founded on common institutions and rules that allocate rights, promote
collective efforts and limit the unilateral use of power. Disparities of power
between states still matter but the rules and institutions reflect reciprocal and
negotiated agreements. A consent-strategy is compatible with both PTT and
the strategy of cooperative security. The stability of a system dominated by
this logic is dependent on the balance between satisfied and dissatisfied
powers and the distribution of power between the dominating state and its
potential challengers. The US-led liberal international order is, Ikenberry
argues, in critical respects built on consent. In a unipolar system, the ac-
ceptance of command and hierarchy may be more difficult to achieve and
the opportunities for free-riding increases with the absence of immediate
external threats. By focusing on aspects of the international system related
to the balance of power between status quo states and revisionist states, the
stability of the present liberal international order may be best served by a US
strategy aiming at keeping friends of a liberal order close and contributing,
and the enemies of the liberal order divided. PTT’s wider perspective in-
cluding community of values and efforts channelised by common institu-
tions may provide a useful guide in identifying potential allies, partners and
opponents.
This recommendation is consistent with Inkenberry’s argument in favour
of a new more ‘milieu-oriented’ US strategy focusing on re-creating basic
governance institutions and investing in alliances, partnerships and multi-
lateral organisations, rather than positional competition with challenging
powers. This strategy strives to create a coalition of status quo powers with
shared responsibility to govern the system and contribute to its main-
tenance. In this renegotiated and more inclusive liberal international order,
the US would still be the ‘first among equals’ but it would rule by consent
and common rules rather than command. In question related to alignment
policies, the US should recommit to and rebuild its security alliances, in-
cluding both NATO and its bilateral partnerships in East Asia. The findings
in this study and our earlier studies on middle states and small states indicate
that such multilateral strategy is likely to find support from many status
quo-oriented states. However, as we emphasised in our previous analyses of
China and Russia, it is not equally clear that participation in a US-led liberal
international order will be able to accommodate the ambitions of these two
contesters. As noted by Inkenberry, China is the ‘swing state’ in world
politics. It may resist integration into a US-led liberal international order
and connect to other similarly estranged states such as Russia and Iran,
trying to oppose a new Western-centred liberal international order.
Ikenberry argued that China’s interest in developing its economy and in-
crease its trade is likely to prevent it from such a move. Additionally, China
can benefit from and be influenced by the rules and norms of common
liberal institutions, and eventually, China may become a major status quo
power (Ikenberry 2011:333–360).
Our findings do not exclude the possibility of such development.
However, China’s alignment and military strategies, its ideological com-
mitments to communism and its suspicions regarding US global power
projection indicate that a Chinese strategy of social mobility and peaceful
rise within a reformed liberal international order cannot be taken for
granted. Instead, its responses to various initiatives must be carefully
monitored. Regarding Russia, our findings even more clearly indicate that
Russia during Putin’s leadership has moved in an opposite direction,
practicing strategies of social competition and social creativity challenging
not only US’s position as a unipolar power but also institutions and fun-
damental values of the liberal international order. To handle open chal-
lenges to the international order, the strategy of cooperative security needs
to be complemented with strategies actively containing revisionist powers.
During the first decade of the Cold War era, the US practiced diversified
strategy supporting both European and Transatlantic integration as well as
containing the spread of communism across the globe. Eventually, the US
realised that China and Russia could also be played against each other, an
insight that is potentially important to remember as well.
Note
1 For a radically different interpretation of the origins of the US-led liberal inter-
national order, see Mearsheimer (2019).
Bibliography
Ikenberry, John (2004). ‘The End of the Neo-conservative Moment’ Survival,
Volume 46, Issue 1.
Ikenberry, John (2011). Liberal Leviathan – The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation
of the American World Order. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Mearsheimer, John (2019). ‘Bound to Fail – The Rise and Fall of the Liberal
International Order’ International Security, Volume 43, Issue 4.
Posen, Barry (2014). Restraint. A New Foundation for US Grand Strategy. Ithaca,
Index
9/11 attacks 9, 87, 93–4, 128, 200, 207, ART model 60; see also actor approach;
215–16, 220–5, 234–6, 248 regional approach; thematic approach
actor approach 58–60; China 127–8; Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
France 178–9; Russia 150–1; UK 129, 142
202–4; US 79–81 Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Adler, Emanuel 58–9 59, 83, 129; Defence Ministers’
Afghanistan 21, 46, 88, 90, 109, 111, 115, Meeting Plus 133; Regional
121, 194, 200, 216, 225, 235, 251 Forum 129
African Union 183, 198 Atlantic Alliance 185
AIDS 81 attack helicopters 65, 99, 137, 159, 188,
aircraft carriers 65, 96, 98, 198, 209–10 213, 228
Al Qaeda 88, 90, 205 attack submarines 96, 98, 186, 188, 190,
Alexander, Gerard 52 198; see also SSNs
alignment strategies 27, 40; China 51–3, Australia 82, 92, 114, 185, 196, 211,
127–31, 171–3, 234–5, 237–40; definition 218–19, 221, 224, 236, 239
of 3, 39; diversity of 240–1; France 53, autonomous systems 66–7, 169
171–81, 195–7, 226–8, 234–6, 238–9; autonomy 2, 4, 16, 32, 40, 106, 187, 189,
Russia 52–5, 59, 149–54, 165–7, 171–3, 198, 201; see also strategic autonomy
234–5, 238–40; of secondary great Azerbaijan 170
powers 51–7; and security environment
57–60; of the system-determining states Bahrain 114
234–41; UK 202–6, 220–1, 226–8, 234, Bailey, Jonathan 225
236, 239–40; of the unipolar power balance of power 3, 45, 47, 49, 51, 88–9,
41–51; US 41–51, 69, 115–17, 167, 197, 118, 128, 147–8, 153, 166, 195–6, 234,
222, 234–41; see also individual strategies 237, 250; see also distribution of
Allison, Graham 61 power; power asymmetries
anarchy 11, 13, 19 Balance of Power Theory 4, 8, 12, 15–17,
Ångström, Jan 60 50, 115, 117, 166, 172, 220, 234, 238–9
Antarctic 84 balance of threat 12, 33, 148, 226
anti-ballistic missiles 66 balancing 5, 22, 47, 50, 124, 140, 147,
appeasement strategies 55 172, 226, 234–5, 237, 240, 250;
Arab Spring 205 collective 52, 143–4, 146, 166, 172,
Arctic 84, 203 234–5, 237; counter-balancing
Argentina 84 strategies 11–12, 16–17, 22, 47, 124,
Armenia 164 171–2, 226, 239, 250; external 25, 33,
arms races 17, 82, 130–1, 139, 151, 153 51–2; hard 3, 51–2, 56, 166; internal
arms trade 195, 238 22, 25, 32, 51–2, 143, 146–7, 165, 235,
Art, Robert 47–8 237; off-shore 25, 44, 50, 250; regional
254 Index
17, 51, 55–6; soft 3, 51–3, 56; Bush, George W. 69, 87–9, 92–6, 115–24,
unilateral 52, 165–7, 234–5, 238 134, 146, 157, 177, 186, 210, 221,
ballistic missile submarines see SSBN 227–8, 234, 236, 250
bandwagoning 16, 20–2, 33, 51, 55, Buzan, Barry 8, 26–7, 58–9, 67
227–8, 234, 236, 246; defensive 55–6;
offensive 55–7 Cambodia 139
Bangladesh 22 Cameron, David 206–7, 211–12
Barnett, Michael 58–9 Cameroon 114
behaviour (ways) 69, 245–6; China 142, Canada 31, 114, 203, 218–19, 221, 239
146; France 195, 199–200; Russia Carter, Ashton 45
163–4, 169; UK 219–20, 224; US Central African Republic 164, 193–4
112–15, 122 Chad 194
Belarus 156, 163 chain ganging 55–6
Belgium 114 Chalmers, Malcolm 225–6
Bermuda 114 Chapman, Bert 225
Betts, Richard 60 China 1–4, 9–10, 17–20, 22, 25, 27–32,
Bew, John 226 40, 42–4, 46–7, 79–83, 91–2, 116–17,
Biddle, Stephen 65–6, 68, 123 119, 123–4, 151, 165–6, 171, 178–9,
bilateral cooperation 54, 156, 165, 172, 196–7, 203, 209, 220, 226, 235, 237,
196, 201, 218, 221, 224, 236, 239 248–52; alignment strategies 51–3,
bin Laden, Osama 88 127–31, 171–3, 234–5, 237–40;
Binnendijk, Hans 68 economic growth 14, 42, 79–80, 84,
biotechnology 85 86; ends (of military strategy) 131–4,
bio-threats 86, 91, 181 144–6, 241–2, 246; foreign policy 131,
bipolar system 2–3, 7–8, 13–15, 25, 32, 144; means (of military strategy)
41, 58, 149 134–9, 145–7, 243–4, 246–7; military/
birth rates 81, 84 defence expenditure 134, 235, 249;
Bitzinger, Richard 148 strategic environment 127–31; ways
Black, James 226 (of military strategy) 139–42,
Blair, Tony 202, 209, 214, 224–5 145–7, 244–6
Blasko, Dennis 149 Chinese Communist Party 132, 140,
border enforcement 84, 91 145, 147–8
Bosnia 115, 164, 194 Chirac, Jacques 177, 199
Boston, Scott 171 classical realism 57, 62
Boulègue, Mathieu 171 Clear–Hold–Build concept 108
Boyd, John 66 climate change 58, 85, 130, 153–4, 181
Brazil 22, 32, 54, 79–80, 84, 116–17, 138, Clinton, Bill 124
165, 172, 178, 203–4, 218, 220 Clinton, Hillary 124
Bretton Woods system 18, 20 Coates, David 225
Brexit 84, 221, 226–7, 239 Cold War 3–4, 7, 9, 23, 57–8, 227, 248,
British Cabinet Office 202 250, 252
British Ministry of Defence 202, 215–16 collective balancing 52, 143–4, 146, 166,
British Parliament 202 172, 234–5, 237
Brooks, Stephen 9, 27–30, 47, 65, 123–4 Collective Security Treaty Organization
Brown, Gordon 205–6, 218 163, 165, 169, 235
Brzezinski, Zbigniew 42 Colombia 114
buck-passing 20–2, 54, 56–7 Combined Joint Expeditionary
Building Stability Overseas Strategy 216 Force 219
Bulgaria 114 command and control 66–7, 100–2, 104,
Bull, Hedley 23, 62 120, 138, 145, 161, 164, 168–9, 187,
burden-sharing 46, 49, 93, 118, 226, 237 189, 198, 243
Burkina Faso 194 Commonwealth of Independent States
Bush, George H. W. 42 150, 152, 156, 162–3, 165
Index 255
communism 147, 202, 241, 252; Democratic Republic of the Congo
see also Chinese Communist Party 139–41
Conference on Interaction and Denmark 114, 219
Confidence-Building Measures in deployed troops: UK 216–17; US
Asia 129 113–15
confidence- and security-building deterrence 7, 107, 119, 121, 140, 148,
measures 45 199, 212, 214
Connolly, Richard 171 dignity 87–8, 118, 182, 197, 241
constructivism 7, 61 disaster relief 90, 109–10, 117, 140–1, 237
Conventional Forces in Europe 45 dissatisfied powers 18–23;
Cooper, Julien 171 see also revisionist powers
cooperative security 41, 43–50, 55, 100, distancing 53, 56
109, 117, 144, 146, 166–7, 197, 200, distribution of power 10–11, 16, 25–33,
221–2, 227–8, 233–4, 236–40, 40, 42, 249; see also balance of power;
245, 251–2 power asymmetries
Correlates of War 15, 32 divide and rule tactics 17
corruption 82, 84 Djibouti 114, 193–4
Côte d’Ivoire 193–4 Doctrine, Concepts and Development
Council of Europe 63 Centre 202–6, 208–9, 219
Council on Security Cooperation in the Dorman, Andrew 225–6
Asia-Pacific Region 129 drones 66, 169, 199
counter-balancing strategies 11–12, 16–17, drug trafficking 82, 130, 153
22, 47, 124, 171–2, 226, 239, 250
counterinsurgency 107, 109–10, 113, early warnings 135–6, 138–9, 142, 145,
121–2, 205, 244 161–2, 168, 216, 224, 243
counterterrorism 107, 109–10, 113, 121, East Turkistan 128, 132
140–1, 162, 202, 216, 244 East Turkistan Islamic Movement 129
Crane, Keith 171 economic growth 9, 82–5, 92; Chinese
criminal cartels see organised crime 14, 42, 79–80, 84, 86
critical theory 7 economic sanctions 143, 172
Croatia 115 Edmunds, Timothy 225
Cuba 114, 164 Edström, Håkan 57, 68–9
Cyber Security Operations Centre 215 Egypt 115
cyberspace 65, 85–7, 91, 95, 104–7, El Salvador 114
119–21, 130–2, 139, 144–5, 162, 169, electromagnetic space 65, 132, 136, 144,
181, 184–6, 190, 199, 203, 205–7, 209, 161, 191
215–16, 223–4, 244 Elgström, Ole 53
Élysée Treaty 184
Darfur 140, 193 employment (ways) 68–9, 245; China
de Gaulle, Charles 227 142, 146; France 193–5, 199; Russia
De Haas, Marcel 170 163, 169; UK 216, 218–19, 224; US
decolonisation 59 111–12, 122
defence expenditure see expenditure enablers (means) 67, 69, 243–4, 248;
defence strategy: definition of 3, 39; China 136, 145; France 188–9,
see also alignment strategies; military 198–200, 244, 246; Russia 168; UK
strategy 212–14, 223–5, 244, 246; US 100–2,
Defense Planning Guidance 42 120, 122–3, 244, 246
defensive bandwagoning 55–6 end of history 10
defensive realism 8, 12, 20–1, 24, 33, 240 ends (of military strategy) 62–4, 69,
Delon, Francis 181 241–2; China 131–4, 144–7, 241–2,
democracy 10, 43, 48, 118, 155, 202, 206, 246; France 182–5, 197–8, 200, 242,
223, 242 246; Russia 154–7, 167–9, 241–2, 246;
256 Index
UK 206–9, 221–3, 225, 242, 246; US 215, 219, 221, 224, 247–9, 251; alignment
87–95, 118–19, 122, 241–2, 246–7; strategies 53, 171–81, 195–7, 226–8,
see also needs; threats; values; 234–6, 238–9; ends (of military strategy)
vulnerabilities 182–5, 197–8, 200, 242, 246; means (of
energy provision 83–5, 93, 119, 130, military strategy) 185–91, 198–200,
153, 203 243–4, 246; military/defence expenditure
English School 23 31, 185–6, 228; strategic environment
environmental concerns 63, 83–6, 130, 178–81; ways (of military strategy)
153, 180; climate change 58, 85, 130, 191–5, 199–200, 245–6
153–4, 181 Fravel, Taylor 148–9
epidemics 130, 153–4, 205 Frazier, Derrick 59
Erickson, Andrew 147 free markets 48, 91–2, 119
Eritrea 139 free trade 10, 21, 82, 91–2, 119, 250
Estonia 194, 219 Freedman, Lawrence 68–9
Ethiopia 216 freeriding 16, 46, 54, 250–1
ethnic cleansing 44 French Ministry of Defence 177–82,
ethnic conflicts 24, 48, 128–9, 153 187, 198
European Bank for Reconstruction and French Network and Information
Development 150 Security Agency 177, 190
European Community 227 fresh water 153–4, 181
European Rapid Reaction Force 21–2 Friedman, Benjamin 124
European Security and Defence
Policy 202 Gabon 193–4
European Union 19, 26, 28–9, 47, 54, 59, Gates, Robert 100, 109
79–80, 116–17, 151, 165, 172, 178–9, gender 83, 85
183–6, 193–9, 201–2, 204–5, 208, Georgia 10, 22, 46, 59, 155, 164–5,
218–21, 226–8, 236, 238–40; Brexit 84, 169–70, 203, 227, 235, 246
221, 226–7, 239 Germany 16–17, 19–20, 22, 25, 30–2, 44,
expenditure 29, 64; China 134, 235, 249; 53, 114–15, 147, 184, 194, 196, 201,
France 31, 185–6, 228; Russia 31, 218–19, 221, 227, 239
157–8, 249; UK 31, 209–10, 228; US Giles, Kier 170
31, 95, 236 Gilpin, Robert 18
external balancing 25, 33, 51–2 Glaser, Charles 68
extremism 81–3, 85, 89–90, 92, 117, 119, Global Cyber Security Capacity
129–30, 133, 145, 153, 180, 209, 236; Centre 215
see also terrorism global economic crisis 170
global population 84
Fanell, James 149 Global War on Terror 9, 94, 113, 234–5
Farrell, Theo 225 globalisation 10, 79, 81, 85, 115, 128,
feminism 7 130, 203, 220
Feng, Liu 148 Goldstein, Avery 147
Finland 53 Golts, Alexander 170
First World War 4, 13 Gorenburg, Dmitry 171
food security 130 grand strategy 60–1
force employment see employment (ways) Gray, Colin 57, 61, 64–9
foreign policy: American 22, 79; Chinese Greenland 114
131, 144; Russian 149, 151, 155, 170; gross domestic product 28–9, 31, 44,
see also Foreign Policy Concept 178, 249
Foreign Policy Concept 162 ground launched cruise missiles 138
Foreign Policy Concept (Russia) ground-based interceptors 102
149–50, 155–6 ground-based strategic deterrent 103
France 1–5, 9, 17–18, 21, 23, 28–32, 40, Group of Eight 22, 31, 172–3
Index 257
Group of Seven 23, 31, 58 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 45
Group of Twenty 23, 28 internal balancing 22, 25, 32, 51–2, 143,
146–7, 165, 235, 237
Haiti 114 International Bank for Reconstruction
hard balancing 3, 51–2, 56, 166 and Development 150
hard power 62–3, 124 international cooperation 154, 170, 183,
headquarters 65, 67 195, 197, 199, 208, 222, 242
health systems 83–4 International Institute of Strategic
hedging 3, 54, 201, 227, 236, 239 Studies 71, 162, 191, 215
Hegemonic Stability Theory 15–16, 18, international law 57, 150, 155, 167, 193
41, 49–50, 116–17, 143, 147, 166–7, International Monetary Fund 22,
172, 234, 238, 240, 250 150, 178
hegemonism 2, 8, 11–12, 14–20, 22, International Political Economy 7
32–3, 40–4, 49, 51, 54, 79–80, 116–17, International Relations 7, 18, 23, 41, 57
123–4, 128, 131–2, 143–4, 146–7, 172, international system: change and
220–1, 237, 240, 250 stability in 9–18, 248–52; definition of
Helnarska, Karolina 201 10; distribution of power in 10–11, 16,
hiding 53 25–33, 40, 42, 249; see also balance of
hierarchy 10–13, 19, 24, 26–7, 41, 57, power; power asymmetries; stability of
59–61, 64, 251 18–33; see also bipolar systems;
high-speed anti-radiation missiles 65 multipolar systems; unipolar system
Holbraad, Carsten 59–60 internet 180
Hollande, François 177, 181–2, 187 interventionism 15, 48, 235
Honduras 114 IR theory 7, 234
Honig, Jan Willem 60 Iran 20, 48, 51, 79, 81, 83, 116, 151, 204,
Hooker, Richard 69 235, 251
human dignity 87–8, 118, 182, 197, 241 Iraq 1, 9, 20–2, 43, 46, 48, 53, 79, 88,
human rights 10, 21, 43, 48, 63, 88, 155, 108–9, 111, 114, 116, 118, 121, 128,
206–7, 222–3 165, 194–5, 200, 221, 225, 228, 251
human trafficking 153 Islamic State 81, 83, 152
humanism 154–5 isolationism 3, 42, 48, 53–4, 118, 124,
humanitarian assistance 45, 48, 68, 81–2, 195, 201
90, 109–10, 117, 153, 206, 215, 237 ISR 100–1, 120; see also intelligence;
Hungary 114 reconnaissance; surveillance
Huntington, Samuel 14, 62 Israel 30, 83, 114
hybrid threats 195, 199 Italy 31, 114, 184, 196
Iceland 114 Jackson, Robert 7
idealism 7, 57 Jakarta International Defence
Ikenberry, John 41, 46–7, 122, 249–52 Dialogue 133
India 19, 28–30, 42, 54, 79–83, 92, Japan 17, 19, 22, 25–6, 30–2, 47, 53,
116–17, 119, 129, 149, 151, 165–6, 172, 79–80, 82, 86, 92, 114–17, 128, 143,
178–9, 185, 203–4, 209, 218, 220, 236 151, 185, 196, 203, 218, 220–1,
Indonesia 22, 79 236, 239
INF Treaty 66 Jervis, Robert 41, 57, 123
information countermeasures 135–6, Johansson, Linda 66–7
142, 243 Joint Expeditionary Force 219, 221, 239
information technology 85, 105 joint information environment 106
Inglehart, Ronald 63 Joint Terrorism Analysis
intelligence 67, 100–1; see also ISR Centre 202
intercontinental ballistic missiles 66–7, Jones, Charles 58, 63
102–4, 120, 160–1, 189–90, 198, 243 Jones, David Martin 226
intermediate range ballistic missiles 138 Jordan 114, 194
258 Index
Kaufmann, Chaim 68 Mattis, Jim 103
Kazakhstan 151 May, Theresa 204, 206
Kennedy, Paul 16 McDermott, Roger 170
Kenya 216 means (of military strategy) 64–7, 69,
Keohane, Daniel 201 243–4; China 134–9, 145–7, 243–4,
Keohane, Robert 18 246–7; France 185–91, 198–200,
Kirghizia 151 243–4, 246; Russia 157–62, 168–9,
Kissinger, Henry 42 243–4, 246–7; UK 209–15, 223–5,
Konyshev, Valery 171 243–4, 246; US 95–117, 119–23,
Kosovo 165 243–4, 246–7; see also enablers;
Krauthammer, Charles 1, 9, 43 modern means; nuclear means;
Krieger, Joel 225 traditional means
Kristensen, Hans 170–1 Mearsheimer, John 11–12, 14, 21, 41–2,
Kugler, Richard 68 44, 54, 69, 124, 250
Kuwait 114 medium range ballistic missiles 138
Kyrgyzstan 164 Medvedev, Dimitry 150
Mexico 79, 84
Lancaster House treaties 184 Meyers, Richard 94
large medium-speed roll-on/roll-off migration 58, 85–6, 116, 153, 181
military transport ships 65 military expenditure see expenditure
Larson, Deborah Welch 23, 25–6 military operations other than war 141
Latvia 219 military satellites 65, 214, 249
Layne, Christopher 44, 54, 123 military strategy 27, 60–70; definition of
Le Drian, Jean-Yves 180 3–4, 39, 61–2; diversity of 246–8; ends
League of Nations 7 see ends (of military strategy); means
leash-slipping 51, 54, 56, 196–7, 200–1, see means (of military strategy);
227, 234 operationalising 69–70; of the system-
Lebanon 140–2, 194 determining states 241–8; ways
Lee, Ji Yun 54 see ways (of military strategy)
Lemke, Douglas 20–3 Mitterrand, François 177
Leonard, Robert 69 mobile landing platform 101
liberal theory 18 modern means 67, 69, 244; China 138–9,
Liberia 139–41 145; France 190–1, 199; Russia 161–2,
Libya 1, 9, 20, 43, 46, 166, 200, 228, 238 169; UK 214–15, 223–4; United States
Liddell Hart, Basil 61, 69 104–6, 120–3; US 244; US
Lieber, Keir 52 Department of Defense 246
Lind, William 69 modernisation 22, 81, 92, 97–100, 103,
Lisbon Treaty 193, 197 117, 120, 136, 138, 143, 145–6, 149,
Lithuania 219 153–4, 156, 158–9, 165, 170–2, 178–9,
Little, Richard 58, 63 189–90, 198, 205, 209, 211, 235, 237,
Logan, Justin 124 243, 247, 249
long-range airlift aircraft 65–6 Moldova 164
Luttwak, Edward 69 Monteiro, Nuno 17–18, 21, 30
Lykke, Arthur 61 Morgenthau, Hans 11, 19, 62
Mullen, Michael 98
Macron, Emmanuel 177, 179, 181–6, 190 multilateral institutions 5, 9, 21, 40, 43,
main battle tanks 99, 137, 159, 186, 188, 45, 49, 166, 172, 196–220, 227, 237,
210, 213, 223, 228, 243, 248 239; see also individual institutions
Mali 141, 194, 205 multiple courting 54, 56, 221–2,
Malmlöf, Tomas 171 227, 239
market capitalism 21 multipolar system 2, 8–9, 13–15, 25, 54,
Massicot, Dara 171 80, 86, 127–8, 143, 151, 156, 165, 168,
materials science 85 171, 203, 220, 235
Index 259
nanotechnology 85 nuclear means 67, 69, 243–4; China 136,
Nathan, Andrew 148 138, 145, 247; France 189–90,
National Defense Strategy (US) 78, 199–200, 244, 246; Russia 160–1; UK
88–9, 92–4, 100 214, 223; United States 101–4,
National Intelligence Council (US) 120, 123
69, 79–86 Nuclear Posture Review 78, 101
national interest 5, 20, 43–6, 62, 64, 81, Nuclear Posture Review (US) 69
87–8, 93–4, 112, 118, 130–1, 149–51, nuclear weapons 14, 17, 29–31, 44–5,
154, 156–8, 165, 182–3, 187, 193, 196, 47–8, 51, 59, 65–6, 83, 86, 109–10, 130,
199–200, 204, 206, 226, 237 132, 134, 142, 145–6, 153, 162–3, 166,
National Military Strategy (US) 69, 89, 168–71, 178–9, 181–2, 197, 202, 220,
107, 111, 113 238, 243; second-strike capability 14,
National Security Capability Review 202 30–1, 44; see also individual weapons
National Security Concept (Russia) 149 Nye, Joseph 9, 62, 123
National Security Strategy (Russia) 150,
157, 163–4, 170 Obama, Barack 69, 88, 90, 92–6, 102–3,
National Security Strategy (US) 69, 112, 117–21, 123–4, 134, 146, 157, 166,
87–93, 95, 98–9, 101, 108 185–6, 200, 210, 221, 227–8,
National Space Council (US) 106, 121 234, 236–8
nationalism 49, 81, 83, 117, 180, 237 Odgaard, Liselotte 148
natural disasters 89, 95 Oelrich, Ivan 123
natural resources 63, 84, 180–1, 203, 222 offensive bandwagoning 55–7
needs (ends) 64, 69, 242; China 132–3; offensive realism 8, 11–12, 19–22, 24, 41,
France 183–4, 197–8; Russia 156–7, 234, 240
167–9, 242, 246; UK 208–9, 222–3, off-shore balancing 25, 44, 50, 250
225, 242, 246; US 91–3, 119 oil 48, 81, 85, 152, 204, 208
neo-interventionism 128, 143, 146 Oman 114
neo-isolationism 41, 43–4, 47–50, 53, Ong, Russell 148
55, 57 organised crime 82, 91, 130, 153, 181
neoliberalism 7 Organization for Security and
neorealism 7 Co-operation in Europe 45
Netherlands 114, 219 Organization of the Petroleum
neutrality 51, 53 Exporting Countries 81
New START 103, 237 Organski, Abramo Fimo Kenneth 18
New Zealand 218–19, 221, 239 Ostermann, Falk 201
Ng, Ka Po 149 Østerud, Øyvind 59
Niger 114, 194 outer space 105–6, 121, 130–2, 138–9,
Nigeria 114, 219 144–5, 161–2, 169, 186, 190, 199, 244
Nolte, Detlef 59
non-governmental organisations 79, 116 Pakistan 30, 81, 90, 129, 178–9
Norris, Robert 170–1 pandemics 58, 85, 91, 153, 180
North Atlantic Treaty Organization 4, Panetta, Leon 94, 98
20–2, 42, 44–6, 48, 54, 58, 92, 116, Pannier, Alice 201
150–1, 165–6, 171–2, 178, 184, 186, Pape, Robert 52–3
193–4, 196–201, 203–4, 208, 215, patriotism 154–5, 167
218–22, 226–8, 235, 238–40, 250–1 peacekeeping 82, 139–41, 146, 158,
North Korea 1, 9–10, 14, 30, 43–4, 48, 162–3, 169, 193
51, 59, 79, 106, 116, 235 peace-making 162, 169, 193
Northeast Asia Cooperation pensions 84
Dialogue 129 People’s Liberation Army 132, 134–8,
Norway 114 144–5, 148–9
nuclear deterrence 7, 148, 192, 199, Philippines 114
212, 214 piracy 130, 163, 205
260 Index
Poland 114 Republic of South Ossetia 155–6
political realism see classical realism revisionist powers 2–4, 8, 11, 25, 40, 42,
polycentric world order 151–2, 47, 50, 53–7, 70, 90–1, 118–19, 127,
166–7, 238 143, 147, 172, 227, 243, 247–52;
population ageing 81, 84–5, 116 see also China; Russia
population growth 84, 181, 205 revolution in military affairs 131
populism 10 Rieker, Pernille 201
Porter, Patrick 124, 225 Robertson, George 206, 209
Portugal 114 rogue states 108, 119
Posen, Barry 41–4, 46–9, 60–1, 65–6, Romania 114
69, 124 Ross, Andrew 41–4, 46–9
post-structuralism 7 Ross, Robert 123, 148
poverty 153, 204 Rotnem, Thomas 147
power, definition of 11 rule of law 108, 155, 182, 197, 206,
power asymmetries 1–2, 4, 15, 49, 117, 222–3, 241–2
143, 251; see also balance of power; Rumsfeld, Donald 122
distribution of power Russet, Bruce 63
Power Transition Theory 4, 8, 15–16, Russia 1–4, 9–10, 14, 17–19, 22, 25–6,
18–23, 40, 47, 49–50, 115–17, 143, 147, 28, 30–2, 40, 42–4, 46–8, 79–81, 84,
166–7, 172, 196, 220, 227, 234, 91–3, 116–17, 119, 129, 141, 143,
237–40, 251 146–8, 178–9, 197, 202–4, 220, 226–7,
precision strike capability 86, 96, 111, 235, 237, 248–52; alignment strategies
130, 136, 138, 145, 149, 210 52–5, 59, 149–54, 165–7, 171–3, 234–5,
primacy 41–3, 45–50, 55, 57, 116, 118, 238–40; ends (of military strategy)
122–4, 144, 146, 155, 165, 167, 171, 154–7, 167–9, 241–2, 246; foreign
197, 200, 203, 221–2, 227–8, 233–6, policy 149, 151, 155, 170;
240, 245, 250 see also Foreign Policy Concept;
property rights 82 means (of military strategy) 157–62,
public opinion 48 168–9, 243–4, 246–7; military/defence
Putin, Vladimir 149–50, 170, 172, 252 expenditure 31, 157–8, 249; strategic
Putnam, Tonya 170 environment 150–4; ways (of military
strategy) 162–4, 169, 244–6
Qatar 114
Quadrennial Defense Review 69, 87–90, Sanders, Bernie 124
93–5, 109, 113 Sarkozy, Nicolas 177, 182, 199–201
Quadrennial Roles and Mission Review satisfied powers 18–21, 23, 31, 148;
100, 105 see also status quo powers
Saudi Arabia 114, 194
Ramm, Aleksei 171 Savill, Matthew 225
realism see classical realism; structural Schmitt, Olivier 201
realism Schweller, Randall 24–5
reconnaissance 65, 67, 97, 100, 105, 128, Scobell, Andrew 148
130, 135–6, 215; see also ISR sea lines of communication 131, 133, 144
regional approach 58–60; China 128–30; Second World War 4, 20, 57
France 179–80; Russia 151–2; UK second-strike capability 14, 30–1, 44
204–5; US 81–4 selective engagement 41–5, 47–50, 55,
regional balancing 17, 51, 55–6 118, 144, 146, 166–7, 197, 200, 221–2,
regional security complexes 59 228, 233–4, 236–40, 250
religion 11, 20, 24, 62–3, 81–2, 116, Senegal 193–4
153, 180 separatism 129–30, 132–4, 145, 153,
Renz, Bettina 170 156, 168
Republic of Abkhazia 155–6 Serbia 115, 194
Index 261
Sergunin, Alexander 171 strategic bombers 66–7, 103–4, 124, 138,
Shanghai Cooperation Organization 52, 158, 161, 168, 190
129, 133, 142, 149, 163, 165, 169, 203 Strategic Defence Review 202, 209–10
Shanghai Five 151 strategic environment 195; China
Shangri-La Dialogue 133 127–31; France 178–81; Russia 150–4;
Shevchenko, Alexei 25–6 UK 202–6; US 79–87; see also actor
Siberia 166, 203 approach; regional approach;
Sierra Leone 225 thematic approach
Singapore 114 strategic mobility 101, 120, 135–6,
SIPRI 64 189, 198
situation (ways) 69, 244–6; China 146; Strategic Support Force 139
France 191–3, 199–200; Russia 162–3, structural realism 1, 3, 7–10, 17, 20, 24,
169; UK 215–16, 224–5; United States 57–8, 62, 226, 240; basic premises of
106–10, 121–2 10–14; defensive realism 8, 12, 20–1,
social creativity 26 24, 33, 240; offensive realism 8, 11–12,
Social Identity Theory 25 19–22, 24, 41, 234, 240
social mobility 25–6, 143, 147, 165, 238, submarine-launched ballistic missiles
240, 252 30–1, 66–7, 102–4, 160–1, 190
soft balancing 3, 51–3, 56 Sub-Saharan Africa 81–4, 204–5
soft power 62–3 Sudan 140–1, 164
Somalia 114 surface-to-surface ballistic nuclear
Sørensen, Georg 7 missiles 177
South Africa 79, 165, 172, 216 surveillance 67, 100, 104, 130;
South Korea 92, 114 see also ISR
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization 42 Swaine, Michael 147
sovereignty 23, 41, 43, 58, 93, 95, 132–4, Sweden 53, 184, 196
144–5, 155–6, 158, 167, 183, 185, 194, Switzerland 53
197, 242 Syria 22, 46, 114, 164, 166, 169, 172,
Soviet Union 1, 3, 9, 16, 20, 46, 66 194–5, 238
space see outer space
Spain 114, 184, 196 Taiwan 46, 82, 116, 128–9, 132–3, 143,
Special Forces 65, 67, 96–9, 137, 159, 149, 203
164, 169, 187–8, 210, 212–13, 223, 246 Tajikistan 151, 164
spectrum-of-conflict model 67–8 Taliban 90
SSBNs 30–1, 103, 186, 189–90, 198, Tammen, Ronald 19, 22–3
214, 243 Tangredi, Sam 67–8
SSNs 65, 212; see also attack submarines Taylor, Maxwell 39
standards of living 155 Tellis, Ashley 147
Starr, Harvey 63 Tenenbaum, Élie 201
status competition 23–6 Terpan, Fabien 200
status quo powers 2–5, 8, 11, 15, 17, terrorism 9, 43, 79–80, 82–4, 87, 89–91,
19–21, 23, 40, 42, 47–50, 54–7, 70, 118, 93–4, 96–7, 107–10, 116, 119, 121,
123, 143, 147, 172, 177, 196, 200, 220, 128–30, 133–4, 157, 163, 168, 180–1,
226–7, 234, 238–41, 249, 251–2; 196–7, 200, 202, 205, 207, 209, 215–16,
see also France; United Kingdom 220, 222, 247; 9/11 attacks 9, 87, 93–4,
Stewart-Ingersoll, Robert 59 128, 200, 207, 215–16, 220–5, 234–6,
stockpiling 124, 160, 168, 243 248; Global War on Terror 9, 94, 113,
Strachan, Hew 225 234–5; see also extremism
strategic arms limitation talks 66 Thailand 114
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 45, 66 thematic approach 58–60; China 130;
strategic autonomy 54, 56, 143–4, 165, France 180–1; Russia 152–4; UK
177, 184, 195–201, 227–8, 234, 236, 205–6; US 84–7
239, 246 Thomas, Timothy 171
262 Index
threats (ends) 64, 69, 241–2; China 132, 28–32, 40, 66, 129, 142–4, 146–7, 149,
144; France 182–3, 197; Russia 167–9, 151, 160, 165, 168, 171–2, 178–9, 183,
242, 246; UK 222; US 89–91 185, 196, 200–1, 203, 210, 216, 218–21,
Tibet 128, 132 224–8, 246–7, 249–52; 9/11 attacks 9,
trade wars 143 87, 93–4, 128, 200, 207, 215–16, 220–5,
traditional means 67, 69, 243–4, 248; 234–6, 248; alignment strategies
China 134–7, 145–7, 244, 246; France 41–51, 69, 115–17, 167, 197, 222,
186–8, 198; Russia 158–9, 168–9, 244, 234–41; see also cooperative security;
246; UK 209–13, 223; US 95–100 neo-isolationism; primacy; selective
Treaty on the Limitation of Anti- engagement; alignment strategies in
Ballistic Missile Systems 160 relation to 51–7; ends (of military
Trump, Donald 69, 88–9, 91, 93, 95–6, strategy) 87–95, 118–19, 122, 241–2,
98–9, 101, 103, 106, 113, 117–22, 124, 246–7; foreign policy 22, 79; means (of
134, 146, 157, 166, 186, 200, 210, 221, military strategy) 95–117, 119–23,
228, 234, 237–9, 243, 247 243–4, 246–7; military/defence
Turkey 81, 114, 204, 238 expenditure 31, 95, 236; strategic
environment 79–87; ways (of military
Ukraine 10, 22, 31, 46, 48, 59, 93, 114, strategy) 106–17, 121–2, 244–6
151, 164, 166, 169–72, 180, 203–4, 216, universalism 62–3
238, 246 unmanned aerial vehicles 65, 96–7, 121,
unconventional warfare 107, 113, 190–1, 199, 215, 223, 244, 249
121, 201 urbanisation 84, 181
unemployment 82–3 US Cyber Command 105
unilateral balancing 52, 165–7, US Department of Defense 69, 87–92,
234–5, 238 94–8, 100–13, 116, 118, 121–2
unilateralism 48, 51, 53, 128, 143, US Joint Chiefs of Staff 78, 94, 98,
165, 171 101–4, 106–7, 109, 111–13
uni-multipolar system 14 US Joint Forces Command 105
unipolar system 1–5, 8–9, 18, 20, 25, 33, US Strategic Command 102, 104–5, 121
147, 196, 201, 234, 240, 250–1; USSR see Soviet Union
stability of 14–18; see also United
States values (ends) 64, 69, 241–2; China 131–2,
United Arab Emirates 114, 194 144; France 182, 197; Russia 154–6,
United Kingdom 1–5, 9, 17–18, 21, 23, 167–8; UK 206–8, 221–3, 225, 242,
28–32, 40, 115, 184, 192, 196, 201, 246; US 87–9, 118–19, 122, 242, 246
246–50; alignment strategies 202–6, Van Evera, Stephen 47
220–1, 226–8, 234, 236, 239–40; Brexit Vendil Pallin, Carolina 170
84, 221, 226–7, 239; ends (of military Vietnam 164
strategy) 206–9, 221–3, 225, 242, 246; violent extremist organisations 90
means (of military strategy) 209–15, von Clausewitz, Carl 61
223–5, 243–4, 246; military/defence vulnerabilities (ends) 64, 69, 242; China
expenditure 31, 209–10, 228; Overseas 133–4, 145–7, 242, 246; France 184–5,
Territories 207–8, 215, 222, 226, 236, 198, 200, 242, 246; Russia 157, 168;
242; strategic environment 202–6; UK 209, 223; US 93–5, 119
ways (of military strategy) 215–25, 246
United Nations 20, 23, 45, 63, 139–41, Wæver, Ole 26–7, 59
143, 151, 155, 163, 167, 178, 183–4, Walt, Stephen 12, 44, 51–3, 55,
193–6, 198–201, 203, 218–19, 123–4, 143–4
221, 237–8 Waltz, Kenneth 7–8, 10–16, 19, 21, 39,
United Nations Security Council 14, 22, 51, 57, 62, 226
27, 31, 53, 116, 129, 151, 153, 165, 200, Washington Treaty 197, 200, 235
218–19, 228, 235–6 ways (of military strategy) 67–9, 244–6;
United States 1–5, 9–10, 12, 14–22, 26, China 139–42, 145–7, 244–6; France
Index 263
191–5, 199–200, 245–6; Russia 162–4, Wilson, Woodrow 57
169, 244–6; UK 215–25, 246; US Wohlforth, William 1, 9, 14–18, 21,
106–17, 121–2, 244–6; 24–5, 27–30, 47, 65, 123–4
see also behaviour; employment; world peace 44–5, 50, 131–2, 144,
situation 183, 206
Weapon States 1, 9, 43 World Trade Organization 58, 178, 203
weaponisation 130, 139 Wortzel, Larry 148
weapons of mass destruction 1, 9, 42–4, Wuthnow, Joel 147
47–8, 65, 79, 85–7, 89–90, 92, 94, 96–7,
102, 104, 107–10, 116–17, 119–20, 150, xenophobia 44
153, 162–3, 168–9, 181, 205, 207, 222, Xi Jinping 147
235–6, 243
weapons trafficking 153 Yang, Yi Edward 147
Westberg, Jacob 57 Yeltsin, Boris 149–50
Western Pacific Naval Symposium 133 Yugoslavia 21–2, 115, 164, 194

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Cass Military Studies

Håkan Edström and Jacob Westberg

This book explores the military strategies of the five system-determining

Håkan Edström is an Associate Professor of Political Science and a Senior

Jacob Westberg is an Associate Professor of War Studies and a Senior

Understanding Insurgent Resilience

For more information about this series, please visit: https://www.routledge.com/

Håkan Edström and Jacob Westberg

ISBN: 978-0-367-74319-2 (hbk)

1 The diversity of great powers’ strategies 1

2 Exploring great power strategies 7

3 Operationalising the dependent variable 39

4 The US and the strategy of the unipole 78

5 The strategies of the contesters 127

6 The strategies of the conservators 177

7 Managing power asymmetry and structural change 233

2.1 The structure of the international system in the present

2.1 Indicators of the economic capabilities of six potential

ABM Anti-Ballistic Missiles

Contrary to mainstream research informed by structural realism, this book

2.1 Change and stability in the post-Cold War international

2.1.1 Basic premises of structural realism

2.1.2 The stability of unipolar systems

2.2 System stability and great power interaction processes

2.2.1 Basic premises of power transition theory

2.2.2 Status competition

2.2.3 The distribution of power in the present international system

Table 2.1 Indicators of the economic capabilities of six potential system-determining

Country GDP (billion USD) GDP per capita (USD)

The US 21,433 65,254

Source: International Monetary Fund.

Concerning military capacities, we are also interested in both quantity and

Country Accumulated military expenditures 2010–2019 (billion USD)

Sources: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

Access to nuclear weapons is important both as a defensive deterrent and

Great power 1 Great power 2 Great power 3

A national security strategy, like any strategy, must be a combination of ends

3.1 Alignment strategies of great powers

Table 3.1 Four alternative unipolar alignment strategies

Power imbalances as a Balance of power strategies

Multilateral & status quo- Cooperative security Selective engagement

• To which extent do the US presidential administrations’ analyses of the

3.1.2 Alignment strategies of secondary great powers

Table 3.2 Alternative alignment strategies towards the unipolar power

Revisionist strategies/opposing the Unipole Status quo strategies/supporting the Unipole

Balance of power Isolation Hedging Bandwagoning

Hard-balancing Distancing Leash-slipping Offensive (for profit)

3.1.3 Exploring the alignment strategy – security environment

Military security concerns the […] offensive and defensive capabilities of

Furthermore, according to Buzan, each of these themes or sectors should be

3.2 Military strategies of great powers

Grand strategy is a political-military, means-ends chain, a state’s theory

3.2.1 Ends and objectives

The concept of a universal civilization is a distinctive product of

3.2.2 Military means

3.2.3 Using military force – ways

the defender’s choice between deep, reserve-oriented dispositions and

3.2.4 Summary – operationalising military strategy