DOROTEO M. SALAZAR, complainant, vs. JUDGE ANTONIO D.

MARIGOMEN, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 61, Bogo, Cebu, respondent.
[A.M. No. RTJ-06-2004. October 19, 2007.]
Facts: Zenaida F. Salazar, wife of complainant, and a mayoralty candidate
in the Municipality of Madridejos, Cebu in the May 2001 elections, filed
on July 4, 2001 an election protest against the proclaimed winner Lety
Mancio (Mancio) before the Regional Trial Court, Bogo, Cebu.
The election case was first heard by then Acting Presiding Judge
Jesus S. dela Peña who, on April 1, 2002, issued an order directing the
revision of the contested ballots in the premises of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) where the ballot boxes were
being kept. Respondent took over and started presiding over the election
case on June 3, 2002.
By Decision of August 8, 2003, respondent dismissed the election
protest and declared Mancio as the duly elected municipal mayor of
Madridejos, Cebu with total votes of 5,214.
On appeal, the COMELEC First Division, by Resolution of March 25,
2004, reversed and set aside the August 8, 2003 Decision of respondent and
declared complainant's wife Zenaida Salazar as the duly elected mayor.
Petitioner’s Contention: Respondent's partiality was, by complainant's
claim, shown in several instances, viz: When protestant Zenaida Salazar
objected to the presentation of the plain photocopies of the contested
ballots, respondent ordered his Clerk of Court to coordinate with counsel
for protestee and to testify for her; and respondent allowed Atty.
Reinerio Roeles, the co-counsel for the protestee, to testify despite the
protestant's objection on the ground that his testifying would be a
violation of professional ethics and despite respondent's citation of
authorities on the matter.
Complainant further claims that respondent was acting as if he were
the counsel for the protestee, demonstrated during the testimony of the
Clerk of Court when protestee's counsel had difficulty explaining the
nature of the clerk's testimony and respondent laid the basis thereof.
Complainant additionally claims that respondent was "too liberal and
tolerant of the maneuverings and manipulations of the protestee," thereby
dragging the proceedings which started on July 4, 2001 (when it was filed)
up to August 8, 2003 (when it was decided), in violation of the period
provided by the Omnibus Election Code.
Respondent’s Contention: In his Comment, respondent proffers that
complainant is not the real party in interest and, in any event, the
complaint is moot and academic as the election protest had been decided on
appeal by the COMELEC; and if errors were committed, "they pertain to the
exercise of his adjudicative functions [which] cannot be corrected through
administrative proceedings."
On the charge of conduct prejudicial to the interest of the service,
respondent disclaims any intentional delay of the proceedings on his part.
Finally, respondent maintains that his decision clearly stated the
facts and the law on which it was based, and if there are errors therein,
they are correctible by judicial remedies and not by administrative
proceedings.
Issue: Whether or not respondent Judge violated Sec.2 of Canon 5 of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct, which states “Judges shall not, in the
performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct, manifest bias or
prejudice towards any person or group on irrelevant grounds.”
Held: Yes, respondent judge violated Canon 5 and gross ignorance of the
law. The admission of the uncertified or plain photocopies of the
contested ballots by respondent Judge in favor of Mancio betrays his
ignorance of Section 7, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. The Rule,
otherwise known as the Best Evidence Rule, simply provides that as long as
the original evidence can be had, the court should not receive in evidence
that which is substitutionary in nature, such as photocopies, in the
absence of any clear showing that the original writing has been lost or
destroyed or cannot be produced in court.
Respondent judge's bias for Mancio was further shown by respondent
judge when he allowed one of the counsels for Mancio, Atty. Reinerio
Roiles, to testify despite the vigorous objection of Salazar through his
counsel, as the testimony was in violation of Rule 12.08, Canon 12 of the
Canons of Professional Responsibility.
The Court finds the evaluation of the case by the OCA in order.
Respondent's questioned acts do not conform to the following pertinent
canons of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary,
which took effect on June 1, 2004.
 SAPHIA M. MAGARANG, complainant, vs. JUDGE GALDINO B. JARDIN,
SR., respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM :

The case is an administrative complaint filed by complainant Saphia M. Magarang on

January 06, 1999, with the Court Administrator, Supreme Court charging respondent
Judge Galdino B. Jardin, Sr., Regional Trial Court, Branch 05, Butuan City with
corruption, incompetence ignorance of the law, and grave abuse of discretion. The
complaint was subscribed under oath before a notary public. 1 cräläwvirtualibräry

On February 04, 1999, Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo referred the complaint
to respondent judge, requiring him to answer within ten (10) days from receipt. 2 On
March 10, 1999, respondent Judge submitted his answer to the complaint. He denied
the charges against him as false and fabricated.3
cräläwvirtualibräry

On June 23, 1999, the Court referred the case to Court of Appeals Associate Justice
Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis, for investigation, report and recommendation. 4 cräläwvirtualibräry

Justice Magtolis scheduled the case for hearings in September and October, 1999.
Except for the main parties who were required to appear in person, the investigator
allowed the testimonies of witnesses residing in Butuan City to be taken through
deposition.5 cräläwvirtualibräry

The facts may be related as follows:

On July 22, 1998, the President of the Philippines appointed complainant's husband,
Nuruddin-Ali M. Magarang, Director III for Caraga of the Department of Transportation
and Communication (DOTC) vice, Alexander Mama-O.6 On July 30, 1998 he took his
oath of office before Secretary Vicente C. Rivera, Jr.

On August 6, 1998, Alexander P. Mama-O filed with the Regional Trial Court, Butuan
City, assigned to Branch O5 a petition for quo warranto with injunction, damages,
attorney's fees and temporary restraining order, questioning the appointment of
Magarang.7 cräläwvirtualibräry

On August 10, 1998, respondent judge issued a temporary restraining order (TRO),
good for seventy-two (72) hours, enjoining Nuruddin Magarang from assuming the
office of Director III. On August 13, 1998, respondent judge extended the TRO for
seventeen (17) days.

After the hearing of the application for preliminary injunction on August 28, 1998,
complainant went to the house of respondent judge to request the latter to fairly decide
the application for injunction and to deny the preliminary injunction. Respondent judge
expressed his willingness to help complainant, but said that he had to return the
P200,000.00 he received from petitioner Mama-O. The complainant committed herself
to pay the said amount to respondent judge at a later date, to which respondent judge
replied "O sige, tingnan natin bukas. "

The next day, August 29, 1998, respondent judge granted a writ of preliminary
injunction against Nuruddin Magarang, enjoining the latter from entering the DOTC
officeat Capitol Drive, Butuan City and from further assuming the Office of director III
until further orders from the court.8 On September 7, 1998 Nuruddin Magarang's lawyer
filed a motion for reconsideration of the order granting preliminary injunction. 9 cräläwvirtualibräry

During the pendency of the motion for reconsideration, on October 1, 1998,

complainant went to respondent judge's office at the Butuan Hall of Justice. She handed
him P80,000.00 and committed to give P200,000.00 later, in exchange for a favorable
action on her husband's motion for reconsideration. Respondent judge asked the
complainant when she could give the P200,000.00, and further instructed her to return
the following day.

Complainant returned the next day, October 2, 1998, a Friday. Respondent judge told
her that he had yet to finish his "decision" on the motion for reconsideration, and told
complainant to come back in the afternoon. At around 4:00 p. m. of that same day,
respondent judge told complainant that he might not be able to finish the "decision" as
no one was willing to report on a Saturday to type it. Complainant then offered that if
respondent judge could convince one of his staff to do the typing on a Saturday, she
would be the one to pay for his overtime work. Respondent judge acceded and told
complainant to make the request directly to the employee concerned. Complainant then
asked a lady staff member who expressed willingness to work, but respondent judge
did not want her to do theb. The lady staff member told respondent judge that she
could do it, and then the two (2) talked in the Visayan dialect which complainant did
not understand. After that conversation, respondent judge told the complainant to
return the following day, October 3, 1998, a Saturday.

The next day (October 3, 1998), complainant returned to the Hall of Justice but the
security guard told her to wait downstairs. She saw respondent judge before noon, and
the latter said he would just take his lunch. At about 3:00 p. m., respondent judge's
secretary came to tell the complainant that copy of the resolution of the motion for
reconsideration had been delivered to her counsel. Complainant proceeded to the house
of her lawyer, Atty. Dollfuss Go who showed her a resolution dated October 3, 1998
denying the motion for reconsideration.10cräläwvirtualibräry

On November 3, 1998, complainant went to respondent judge's office to recover the

P80,000.00 she gave him. A heated argument ensued between complainant and
respondent judge, with the latter uttering unsavory words tending to malign
complainant's marital fidelity. Angered, complainant poked her index finger at
respondent judge's mouth to stop him from further hurling invectives at her.
Respondent judge, bit complainant's finger, causing her to forcibly pull it off, which
paused respondent judge's tooth to falloff.

On November 11, 1998, the Solicitor General filed a motion for reconsideration of the
August 29 and October 3, 1998 orders (granting the preliminary mandatory injunction
and denying the motion for reconsideration, respectively); 11 however, on December 9,
1998, respondent judge denied the motion.12 cräläwvirtualibräry

The Solicitor General thereafter filedwith the Court of Appeals a petition to annul the
August 29 and October 3, 1998 orders of respondent judge in Spl. Civil Case No. 887.
On March 24, 1999, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision nullifying, and setting
aside the orders of respondent judge in Spl. Civil Case No. 887. 13 cräläwvirtualibräry

On his part, respondent judge denied receiving P80,000.00 from the complainant, or
that there was a commitment for her to give him P200,000.00 in consideration of the
denial of the application for writ of preliminary injunction. To prove his good moral
character, respondent judge presented several citations/awards given by private
organizations, viz:

1. Concerned Media, Inc. - a plaque for "Golden Leadership National Award" on March
7, 1999;

2. Jesus Nazareno Parish of Cagayan de Oro City-plaque of recognition for diplomatic

and dedicated service as President of the Parish Pastoral Council: Development of
Filipino Youth- a letter informing that the respondent has been selected to receive the
Dakilang Haligi ng Tahanan Award" on June 29, 1999. (Pls. Note: a Sponsorship
Agreement is attached to the letter, asking the supposed awardee to sign a sponsorship
agreement for the price P50,000.00);

3. Philippine Experimental Educational Research Society, Inc., with address at 451-A

Republic Supermarket Bldg., Rizal Ave. cor. Soler St., Sta. Cruz, Manila- letter dated
May 3, 1999, informing the respondent of his selection as "Outstanding RTC Judge of
the Year;

4. The Philippine Media Research and Progress Report, Inc., likewise with address at
Rm. 541-A Republic Supermarket Building, notifying the respondent that he was chosen
to receive an award as Outstanding Judge of the Year; and

5. Holy Redeemer Parish- a letter dated June 30, 1999, expressing gratitude to the
respondent for his love offering to the parish.

6. Plaque of Appreciation given by the Municipality of Jasaan, Misamis Oriental for his
exemplary service during his term as mayor of the municipality. 14 cräläwvirtualibräry

Further, respondent judge presented three (3) of his co-judges in Butuan City to attest
to his character. Judge Rosarito Dabalos of Regional Trial Court, Branch 02 testified that
respondent had been serving as "sacristan" or acolyte in their parish at Bukidnon. He
had no personal knowledge of any derogatory remarks about respondent judge. He saw
the respondent judge after he was attacked on November 3, 1998, and his mouth was
bloodied.

Judge Cipriano Alviso, Jr. of Branch 04 testified that he was one of those consulted by
respondent judge about the application for a TRO, and he advised him to issue one to
preserve the status quo. As to respondent's reputation as a judge, he stated, "x x x he
works, he tries to dispose of his cases as early as possible. 15 When he heard of the
commotion on November 3, 1998, he went to Branch 05, where the trouble was. He
saw complainant Magarang about to go out of respondent judge's chamber. He asked
her not to leave. He also asked the Security Guard who followed him to look for the
man mentioned by Judge Jardin as the one who attacked him, because he saw
respondent's mouth bloody. He ordered an investigation because he considered the Hall
of Justice as sacred.

Judge Victor A. Tomaneng of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 testified that he had
known respondent judge since May 1996 when he came in as a new judge. He looked
up to respondent not only as a brother but also as a father, being the eldest among
them. As to respondent's reputation, he is fatherly, very humble and very soft-spoken.
He also saw respondent after the incident on November 3, 1998 when he came to the
judge's chamber at Branch 05, and he saw respondent's mouth bleeding, and there
were also bloodstains inside the toilet. When he asked what happened respondent
judge answered that a woman and her brother who appeared to be a hunchback
assaulted him. He asked why, and respondent answered that they wanted him
(respondent) to reconsider his order in Spl. Civil Case No. 887. When he (witness)
came, the persons who assaulted respondent judge were no longer there.

"The career of a judge, as required in the Code of Judicial Conduct, entails the highest
degree of competence, integrity and independence, because a judge ought to be the
embodiment of all that is good, efficient, competent, honest and reliable. Woe unto the
magistrate who is wanting in any of these virtues. In view of the adversarial nature of
our system of administering justice, a judge is almost always the object of hate,
venom, and contempt--and of administrative or criminal charges--feigned or illusory. It
is thus the policy of this court that administrative charges against a judge must be
heard with utmost care and circumspection."16 cräläwvirtualibräry

After careful scrutiny of the records, we find respondent judge guilty of corruption in
office.

The corruption consists in respondent judge's receiving P200,000.00 from petitioner

Mama-0 in Spl. Civil Case No. 887 and P80,000.00 from complainant Magarang in
consideration of favorable action on complainant's request for "justice" for her husband
in the same case.

Complainant and her witness, Naima Capangpangan, proved these facts vividly and
convincingly. The latter is a simple woman who reached only the fourth grade. She
drew a clear picture of what transpired on August 28, 1998, when she went, with
complainant to respondent judge's house, and on October 1, 1998, when she saw
complainant prepare and count P80,000.00 and later accompanied complainant to
respondent judge' office at the Hall of Justice in Butuan City which amount complainant
personally brought to respondent judge's chambers. The witness withstood the rigors of
a thorough cross-examination conducted by respondent judge's counsel. 17 Moreover,
there was no evidence showing that witness Naima Capangpangan had been impelled
by ill motive to adversely testify against him.

On the other hand, the defense interposed by respondent judge is denial and alibi. He
claimed that on August 28 and October 2, 1998 (both dates were a Friday), he went
home to Cagayan de Oro City, a distance of more than two hundred kilometers and
returned the next day (Saturday) to sign the orders. The investigating justice found this
incredible.18 She also found the testimonies of complainant and witness Naima
Capangpangan to be credible. We agree.

The findings of investigating magistrates on the credibility of witnesses are given great
weight by reason of their unmatched opportunity to see the deportment of the
witnesses as they testified.19 The alibi of respondent judge necessarily crumbles in the
face of his positive identification, by complainant and her witness Naima
Capangpangan.20 cräläwvirtualibräry

It is worthy to note that none of the colleagues of respondent judge categorically and
positively testified that he was a man of integrity and probity. When asked about the
character and reputation of the respondent judge, all that they said were the following:

Judge Dabalos: "Well, I would rather not make an opinion regarding his person because
as a judge it is improper for me to make an opinion on what we hear or what we see.
But so far I have no personal knowledge on the basis of which I can say some
derogatory remarks about him."21 cräläwvirtualibräry

Judge Tomaneng: "Well, I look at him as not only a brother of the profession, not only
as a member of the PJA but look at him as our father here in Butuan he being the
eldest among the RTC judges."22 cräläwvirtualibräry

Judge Alvizo: "Well, as a judge, he works, he tries to dispose of his cases as early as
possible."23
cräläwvirtualibräry

Obviously, all of them avoided saying that respondent judge was a man of
unquestioned or unblemished integrity and probity.

"While every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a
greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in
the judiciary. Hence, judges are strictly mandated to abide with the law, the Code of
Judicial Conduct and with existing administrative policies in order to maintain the faith
of our people in the administration of justice."24 cräläwvirtualibräry

Judges must adhere to the highest tenets of judicial conduct. They must be the
embodiment of competence, integrity and Independence. 25 A judge's conduct must be
above reproach.26 Like Caesar's wife, a judge must not only be pure but above
suspicion.27 A judge's private as well as official conduct must at all times be free from
all appearances of impropriety, and be beyond reproach. 28 cräläwvirtualibräry

In Vedana vs. Valencia,[29] the Court held:

"The code of judicial ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a
whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but
also to his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. There is no dichotomy
of morality: a public official is also judged by his private morals. The Code dictates that
a judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. As we have recently explained, a
judge's official life can not simply be detached or separated from his personal existence.
Thus:

"Being the subject of constant public, scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly
accept, restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary
citizen.

"A judge should personify, judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service. The
personal behavior of a judge, both in the performance of official duties and in private
life should be above suspicion."

Respondent judge miserably failed to measure up to stringent judicial

standards.30 Complainant has sufficiently established the corrupt acts of respondent
judge in connection with Spl. Civil Case No. 887. He received a bribe from both
sides, "lagaring hapon". He has no place in the judiciary.31 He dishonored the judicial
robe he wore. His acts could even be criminal in nature. 32 We have unhesitatingly
removed from office judges and court employees for less serious transgressions. 33 We
removed a deputy sheriff from office for asking a bribe of only P1,500.00. 34 We have no
reason to depart from this ruling. Respondent judge's acts of corruption clearly show,
his unfitness to remain any minute longer in his judicial robe.
We are disappointed with the recommendation of the investigating justice to impose on
respondent judge only suspension from office for one, (1) year despite her finding that
respondent judge committed acts of corruption in office by receiving a bribe of
P80,000.00 from complainant and P200,000.00 from the other party to the case before
him. Surely, she could not be unaware of extant jurisprudence that such corrupt acts,
no matter how minimal the amount involved, deserve not less than outright removal
from office.35 "Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper
conduct of judges."36cräläwvirtualibräry

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS respondent Judge GALDINO B. JARDIN, SR., Regional Trial

Court, Butuan City, Branch 05 from the service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits
and leave credits, if any, with prejudice to reinstatement or reemployment in any
branch, instrumentality or agency of the government including government owned or
controlled corporations.

Judge Jardin shall immediately vacate his position as Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 05, Butuan City as well as any position in the judiciary to which he may be
presently assigned, and desist from deciding or resolving any case or incidents therein
upon receipt of notice hereof.

A.M. No. RTJ-08-2124 August 27, 2009 [Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2631-
RTJ]
JUDGE RIZALINA T. CAPCO-UMALI, RTC, Br. 212, Mandaluyong
City, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE PAULITA B. ACOSTA-VILLARANTE, RTC, Br. 211, Mandaluyong
City, Respondent.
Ponente: Carpio Morales, J.

Facts:

Judge Capco-Umali stated that after having been designated by the Supreme Court a
new executive judge and vice-executive judge, Judge Cancino-Erum and herself agreed
to pay a courtesy call/visit to Mayor Gonzales II of Mandaluyong City. They were warmly
greeted until the topic switched to low allowance. Judge Cancino-Erum showed Mayor
Gonzales the payroll for month of April 2007 for early approval considering most judges
would take their vacation. Mayor Gonzales noticed that Judge Acosta- Villarante was
receiving additional three thousand pesos (P 3,000.00) on top of her regular allowance
as Executive Judge and additional five thousand pesos (P 5,000.00) on top of her
allowance as Acting Judge of Br. 209 and that Judge Cancino-Erum and Judge Capco-
Umali were also receiving additional two thousand pesos (P 2,000.00) on top of their
allowances. Judge Cancino-Erum replied stating that for their part, Judge Villarante
requested for it and it was approved by said Mayor. The Mayor however, replied that he
had no idea of said increase.

On the day of the Monthly Judges Meeting, when the topic of local allowance had been
touched, Judge Acosta Villarante said, “Kayo, simula ng maupo sa pwesto, wala ng
ginawa kundi kutkutin at maghanap ng evidencia para ako masira, nagsusumbong,
nagmamanman. Wala naman pakialaman sa allowance kanya kanya yan dapat.” Judge
Capco-Umali tried to explain their side but Judge Acosta-Villarante kept talking too
much and even shouting at the top of her voice towards the former visibly irked by the
former’s revelation and calling her a liar repeatedly. Judge Capco-Umali once stated
that, “Matanda ka na, halos malapit ka na sa kamatayan gumagawa ka pa ng ganyan,
madadamay pa kami” to which Judge Acosta-Villarante replied, “Bog, sana mangyari sa
iyo, bog!” Judge Capco-Umali welcomed the challenge and replied,“Handa akong
mamatay kahit anong oras dahil wala akong ginagawang masama.”

Judge Acosta-Villarante then wrote a memorandum to Judge Cancino-Erum about said

incident stating that Judge Capco-Umali marred the event by conduct very
unbecomingof a judge by uttering unsavory remarks and epithets or words of the same
import designed to humiliate herself.

Due to the stated memorandum, Judge Capco-Umali filed a complaint for Libel against
Judge Acosta-Villarante before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City.
On the other hand, Judge Acosta-Villarante filed an Administrative Complaint against
Judge Capco-Umali for violating Canon 4, Sections 1 and 2 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct and a complaint for Grave Oral Defamation and Grave Threats before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City. The OCA recommended that Judges
Capco-Umali and Acosta-Villara

Issue:
Whether or not Judge Acosta-Villarante violated Canon 4, Sections 1
and 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

Held:

The Court upheld the decision of OCA. The OCA stated that both have individual
liabilities in violation of Section 1, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct which
enunciates the rule that “Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all of their acitivies.” “Judge Capco-Umali failed to live up to the standard
of propriety entrenched in the afore quoted code of conduct. While, she might have
been provoked by Judge Acosta-Villarante’s referral to her as a liar, she should have
maintained her composure instead of shouting back at a fellow judge. She should have
exercised self-restraint instead of reacting in such a very inappropriate manner
considering that she is in the presence of fellow Judges and other employees of RTC,
Mandaluyong City. She should have put more consideration and effort on preserving
the solemnity of the said meeting, and on giving those who are present the courtesy and
respect they deserved. Judge Acosta-Villarante should also be required to answer for
her failure to observe the basic norm of propriety demanded from a judge in relation
with the aforementioned 23 March 2007 incident. At the outset, it was Judge Acosta-
Villarante’s unseemly behavior, calling Judge Capco-Umali “sinungaling” in front of their
fellow Judges that initiated the altercation between the two Judges. Judge Acosta-
Villarante should have been more cautious in choosing the words to address the
already volatile situation with Judge Capco-Umali.” Courts are looked upon by the
people with high respect. Misbehavior by judges and employees necessarily diminishes
their dignity. Any fighting or misunderstanding is a disgraceful occurrence reflecting
adversely on the good image of the Judiciary. By fighting within the court premises,
respondent judges failed to observe the proper decorum expected of members of the
Judiciary. More detestable is the fact that their squabble arose out of a mere allowance
coming from the local government.

A.M. No. RTJ-08-2136 September 21, 2010

SUSAN O. REYES, Complainant,

vs.
JUDGE MANUEL N. DUQUE, Regional Trial Court, Branch 197, Las Piñas City, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Facts

In her Verified Complaint, Susan O. Reyes (Reyes) charged respondent Judge Manuel N. Duque
(Judge Duque) of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 197, Las Piñas City (RTC-Branch 197), with
Impropriety, Corruption and Gross Misconduct. Reyes alleged that she was a party-in-intervention in
Land Registration Case No. 06-005 entitled "In re: Petition of Philippine Savings Bank for Issuance
of a Writ of Possession under Act No. 3135 over Properties covered by TCT Nos. T-85172 and T-
84847" filed by the Philippine Savings Bank (bank) against the spouses Carolyn Choi and Nak San
Choi (spouses Choi). In a Decision dated 6 November 2006, Judge Duque granted the motion for
the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the bank and ordered the spouses Choi and all those
claiming rights under them to vacate the properties covered by TCT Nos. T-85172, T-84848, and T-
84847 situated in BF Resort Village, Talon 2, Las Piñas. On 13 August 2007, Reyes filed an "Urgent
Petition for Lifting and Setting Aside of Writ of Possession and Quashal of Notice to Vacate" claiming
that she bought the subject property covered by TCT No. T-85172 from the spouses Choi and that
she was in actual possession of the property with full knowledge of the bank.

At the hearing of Reyes’ petition, Atty. Herminio Ubana, Sr., (Atty. Ubana) the lawyer of Reyes,
introduced her to Judge Duque who allegedly gave Reyes 30 days to settle matters with the bank.
Reyes was unable to re-negotiate with the bank. On the first week of December 2007, Reyes
allegedly received a phone call from Judge Duque and the latter instructed Reyes to go "to his house
and bring some money in order that he can deny the pending motion to break open." As she did not
have the money yet, Reyes allegedly told Judge Duque that she would see him the following day as
her allotment might arrive by that time. The following day, when her allotment arrived, Reyes went to
the PNB Cubao Branch in Quezon City to withdraw ₱20,000. She, her secretary, and driver went to
the house of Judge Duque at No. 9 CRM Corazon, BF Almanza, Las Piñas. The son of Judge
Duque opened the gate. At his house, Judge Duque demanded ₱100,000. Reyes gave him ₱20,000
and she asked for time to give him the balance. After a week, Atty. Ubana called Reyes telling her
that Judge Duque was asking for her and waiting for the balance he demanded. On 21 December
2007, Reyes went to the house of Judge Duque with ₱18,000 on hand. Judge Duque allegedly
scolded her for not bringing the whole amount of ₱80,000. Reyes explained that she had difficulty
raising the amount. Judge Duque locked the main door of his house and asked Reyes to step into
his office. Judge Duque pointed to a calendar posted on the wall and pointed to December 26 as the
date when she should complete the amount. All of a sudden, Judge Duque held the waist of Reyes,
embraced and kissed her. Reyes tried to struggle and free herself. Judge Duque raised her skirt,
opened her blouse and sucked her breasts. He touched her private parts and attempted to have
sexual intercourse with Reyes. Reyes shouted for help but the TV was too loud. As a desperate
move, Reyes appealed to Judge Duque saying: "kung gusto mo, huwag dito. Sa hotel, sasama ako
sayo." Judge Duque suddenly stopped his sexual advances and ordered Reyes to fix her hair.

In his Comment,1 Judge Duque averred that since the complaint of Reyes was filed after he retired
on 21 February 2008, he was no longer under the jurisdiction of the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA). He denied the charges hurled against him and claimed the allegations were "fabricated, false
and malicious."

In its Report dated 26 June 2008,2 the OCA found that Reyes actually filed four identical complaints.
First, Reyes filed a complaint dated 16 January 2008 duly subscribed on 23 January 2008. Reyes
was directed to comply with the requirement of verification and she complied by filing on 20 February
2008 verified complaints with the Office of the Chief Justice and the OCA. On 12 March 2008, Reyes
filed for the third time another verified complaint with the OCA which was a mere reiteration of her
previous complaints. The OCA opined that the jurisdiction of the Court at the time of the filing of the
complaint was not lost by the mere fact that Judge Duque had ceased to be in office during the
pendency of the case. Thus, as recommended by the OCA, the case was referred to a Court of
Appeals’ Justice3 for investigation, report and recommendation per Resolution dated 6 August 2008. 4

Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Justice

On the charge of graft and corruption, Reyes presented photocopies of ₱1,000 bills to prove that
Judge Duque demanded and received money from her in consideration of a favorable ruling. The
Investigating Justice, however, found no compelling evidence to corroborate Reyes’ accusation as it
was doubtful whether these were the same bills used to pay off Judge Duque. 5

On the charge of impropriety and gross misconduct, the Investigating Justice opined that the act of
Judge Duque in embracing and kissing Reyes, sucking her breasts and touching her most intimate
parts were certainly acts of lewdness that were downright obscene, detestable, and unwelcome.
These acts were established by substantial evidence. The Investigating Justice, however, stated that
Reyes’ description of the sexual assault could not be deemed as attempted rape. 6

The Investigating Justice found Judge Duque guilty of impropriety and gross misconduct constituting
violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct and recommended the imposition of fine of ₱40,000 which
should be deducted from the retirement benefits of Judge Duque.

Report of the Court Administrator

In his Memorandum,7 the Court Administrator8 confirmed that Judge Duque compulsorily retired from
the judiciary on 21 February 2008. He opined that the conduct of Judge Duque bore the marks of
impropriety and immorality. The actions of Judge Duque fell short of the exacting standards for
members of the judiciary. Judge Duque failed to behave in a manner that would promote confidence
in the judiciary. The Court Administrator recommended that a ₱40,000 fine be imposed on Judge
Duque which should be deducted from his retirement benefits.

The Court’s Ruling

We agree with the recommendation of both the Investigating Justice and the OCA for the imposition
of a fine of ₱40,000 on Judge Duque.

First, on the question of jurisdiction as Judge Duque is no longer a member of the judiciary having
retired from the service on 21 February 2008, the records show that Reyes filed four similar
complaints against Judge Duque. A complaint dated 18 January 2008 addressed to then Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno and subscribed on 19 February 2008 was received by the OCA on 20
February 20089 and by the Office of the Chief Justice also on 20 February 2008,10 or one day before
the date of retirement of Judge Duque. A similar complaint subscribed on 19 February 2008 was
received by the OCA on 12 March 2008.11 An identical complaint addressed to the OCA and
subscribed on 23 January 2008 was filed and received by the OCA on 25 January 2008. 12 As pointed
out by the OCA, Judge Duque was "inadvertently sent" a copy of the complaint that was filed and
received on 12 March 2008.13 The filing of similar and identical complaints on different dates was due
to the directive of the OCA requiring that the complaint be "verified" or that the "original copy of the
verified complaint" be filed.14 Nonetheless, it is clear from the records that Reyes filed her intended
complaint before Judge Duque retired. Consequently, the Court no doubt has jurisdiction over this
administrative case.

On the charge of graft and corruption, the Investigating Justice and the OCA found insufficient
evidence to sustain Reyes’ allegation that Judge Duque demanded and received money from her in
consideration of a favorable ruling. Thus, this charge should be dismissed for being
unsubstantiated. 1avvphi1

On the charge of impropriety and gross misconduct, and after a thorough investigation conducted by
the Investigating Justice, it was established, and Judge Duque admitted, that Reyes went to his
house.15 Substantial evidence also pointed to Judge Duque’s liability for impropriety and gross
misconduct when he sexually assaulted Reyes.16 There is no need to detail again the lewd acts of
Judge Duque. The Investigating Justice’s narration was sufficient and thorough. The Investigating
Justice likewise observed that Judge Duque merely attempted to destroy the credibility of Reyes
when he insinuated that she could be a "woman of ill repute or a high class prostitute" or one whose
"moral value is at its lowest level." However, no judge has a right to solicit sexual favors from a party
litigant even from a woman of loose morals.17 In Tan v. Pacuribot,18 this Court further stressed:

We have repeatedly reminded members of the Judiciary to so conduct themselves as to be beyond

reproach and suspicion, and to be free from any appearance of impropriety in their personal
behavior, not only in the discharge of their official duties but also in their everyday lives. For no
position exacts a greater demand on the moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a
seat in the Judiciary. Judges are mandated to maintain good moral character and are at all times
expected to observe irreproachable behavior so as not to outrage public decency. We have adhered
to and set forth the exacting standards of morality and decency, which every member of the judiciary
must observe. A magistrate is judged not only by his official acts but also by his private morals, to
the extent that such private morals are externalized. He should not only possess proficiency in law
but should likewise possess moral integrity for the people look up to him as a virtuous and upright
man.

Judges should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities. 19 Judges
should conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office. 20 Judges,
like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly, but in
exercising such rights, they should always conduct themselves in such a manner as to preserve the
dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary. 21
The conduct of Judge Duque fell short of the exacting standards for members of the judiciary. He
failed to behave in a manner that would promote confidence in the judiciary. Considering that a
judge is a visible representation of the law and of justice,22 he is naturally expected to be the epitome
of integrity and should be beyond reproach. Judge Duque’s conduct indubitably bore the marks of
impropriety and immorality. He failed to live up to the high moral standards of the judiciary and even
transgressed the ordinary norms of decency of society. Had Judge Duque not retired, his
misconduct would have merited his dismissal from the service.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Judge Manuel N.

Duque GUILTY of IMPROPRIETY and GROSS MISCONDUCT. We FINE him ₱40,000 to be
deducted from his retirement benefits.
Tormis v paredes
GARY P. ROSAURO vs. JUDGE ALFREDO KALLOS
A.M. No. RTJ-03-1796, February 10, 2006, 482 SCRA 149

FACTS: Rosauro orally agreed to buy the unregistered piece of

land in Legaspi City of respondent Judge Kallos provided that the
respondent would take care of its registration in complainant’s
name, at no additional cost. After making several payments to the
respondent, the latter obtained a loan from the former, which was
payable in 2 months. The respondent failed to pay for the loan.
Moreover, the complainant learned that a receipt and the Deed
of Absolute Sale which the respondent gave him, that a certain
Esplana-Guerrero owned the said property and that Guerrero had
sought the reconstitution of her alleged title to the same in the
RTC of Legaspi City, but her petition was dismissed. Respondent
judge also failed to register the property in complainant’s name. As a
result, the complainant sought to rescind the contract but the
respondent replied, using his sala’s official stationary, that he needs more
time as Guerrero was still raising the amount to refund the
complainant.

ISSUE: Should the judge be held liable for violating the Code of
Judicial Conduct and impropriety?

HELD: YES. Respondent judge violated Rule 5.02 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct as he took part in a commercial transaction falling
delineated that tend to interfere with the proper performance of
judicial activities, and increased his involvement with persons likely
to come before his sala regarding the said property, thus,
increasing the chances of his disqualification from future litigation
concerning the same. As held in Berin vs. Judge, the respondent judge
increased the possibility of his disqualification to act as an
impartial judge in the event that a dispute involving the said
contract of sale arises. Also, the possibility that the parties to the
sale might plead before his court is not remote and his business
dealings with them might not only create suspicion as to his
fairness but also to his ability to render it in a manner
that is free from any suspicion as to his fairness and
impartiality, and also as to the judge’s integrity. Respondent judge
also violated Rule 5.08 of the Code when he served as Guerrero’s
attorney-in-fact. As such, the judge was within the purview of other
fiduciary as used in the rule. He should not serve as fiduciary of
another, except for the estate, trust, or person of a member of
the immediate family, and then only if such service will not
interfere with the proper performance of judicial duties.

Finally, respondent violated Rule 2.03 by using the official

stationery for his correspondence with complainant as it should only
be used for official correspondence. By using his sala’s stationery
other than for official purposes, respondent judge evidently used the
prestige of his office to benefit Guerrero and himself. He is also
liable for impropriety for the non-payment of the loan.

Q: May a lawyer withdraw from a case?

A: YES. The lawyer may withdraw from a case with the consent of
the court, provided that:
 1. There is a failure to pay legal fees;

2. Client pursues an illegal cause of conduct;

3. Client insists pursuance to an act violative of the Conduct

of Professional Responsibility;

4. Appointment of lawyers to public position except when it is

prejudicial to the client;

Q: What is meant by compensation based on “quantum meruit”?

A: The term “quantum meruit” as used in attorney’s fees means

the fee which as much as the lawyer deserves considering the
reasonable value of the services he has rendered. (Teerthdass vs.
Pohoomul Brothers, 15 Phil. 607).

Q: Is indefinite suspension of a lawyer a cruel punishment?

A: NO. Indefinite suspension gives the lawyer the key to the

restoration of his right by giving him a change to purge
himself in his own good time of his contempt of misconduct by
acknowledging his misconduct, exhibiting appropriate repentance, and
demonstrating his willingness and capacity to live up to the
exacting standards required of every lawyer. (Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan,
February 1, 1989).
COREA V BELEN
Facts:
Complainant narrated that he was one of the Co-Administrators appointed by the court
in Special Proceedings No. 660-01C, entitled Intestate Estate of Hector Tan. He
revealed that during the hearing of the case, respondent Judge Belen disagreed with
various items in the Administrators Report, including the audited Financial Report
covering the said estate, and immediately ruled that they should be disallowed.
Complainant added that respondent Judge Belen scolded their accountant, branded her
as an incompetent, and threatened to sue her before the regulatory body overseeing all
certified public accountants.

Issue: Whether or not Judge Belen is guilty of conduct unbecoming a judge?

Ruling: Yes, Judge Belen is guilty of unbecoming a judge.
Pursuant to canon 4 which states that:
CANON 4
PROPRIETY
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the
performance of all the activities of a judge.

SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of

impropriety in all of their activities.

xxx

SEC. 6. Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of

expression, belief, association and assembly, but in exercising such rights,
they shall always conduct themselves in such a manner as to preserve the
dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the
judiciary.

The Code also calls upon judges to ensure equality of treatment to all before the courts.
More specifically, Section 3, Canon 5 on Equality provides

SEC. 3. Judges shall carry out judicial duties with appropriate

consideration for all persons, such as the parties, witnesses, lawyers,
court staff and judicial colleagues, without differentiation on any irrelevant
ground, immaterial to the proper performance of such duties.

Here, the Judge scolded accountant, branded her as an incompetent, and threatened to
sue her.

Therefor, Judge Belen is guilty of unbecoming a judge and fine him P10,000.00, with a
stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more
severely
A.M. No. MTJ-11-1796 June 13, 2012
(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 10-2279-MTJ)

FE D. VALDEZ, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE LIZABETH G. TORRES, METC, Branch 60, Mandaluyong City, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This is an administrative complaint filed by complainant Fe D. Valdez against respondent Judge

Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 60, Mandaluyong City, for
delay in the disposition of Civil Case No. 20191.

Civil Case No. 20191 was an action for damages and attorney’s fees instituted on October 25, 2005
by complainant against Prudential Guarantee & Assurance, Inc. (PGAI) and Charlie Tan (Tan),
which was raffled to the Mandaluyong MeTC-Branch 60, presided over by respondent. Complainant
1

alleged that she bought comprehensive insurance policy for her motor vehicle from PGAI, through
broker Tan; that she had fully paid her premium; that during the validity of her insurance, the insured
motor vehicle was damaged; that the repair of the motor vehicle cost ₱167,278.56; and that PGAI
and Tan refused to pay her claim despite several demands. Complainant prayed for judgment
awarding in her favor ₱167,278.56 as actual damages, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, ₱50,000.00
as exemplary damages, ₱50,000.00 attorney’s fees, plus ₱2,000.00 appearance fees.

Respondent proceeded to hear Civil Case No. 20191 in accordance with the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure. After the parties had filed their respective position papers, respondent
submitted Civil Case No. 20191 for decision on July 19, 2006. 2

Almost a year had passed but Civil Case No. 20191 remained unresolved, prompting complainant to
file a motion for immediate resolution of Civil Case No. 20191 on June 27, 2007. Complainant
3

followed-up with a second motion for immediate resolution filed on October 19, 2007, third motion for
4

immediate resolution filed on December 11, 2007, fourth motion for immediate resolution filed on
5

April 15, 2008, fifth motion for immediate resolution filed on June 11, 2008, sixth motion for
6 7

immediate resolution filed on July 7, 2008, seventh motion to resolve filed on April 21, 2009, and
8 9

eighth motion to resolve filed on January 17, 2010. 10

Frustrated by the long wait for the resolution of Civil Case No. 20191, complainant filed the present
administrative complaint on June 4, 2010 against respondent, alleging unreasonable delay by the
latter in the disposition of said case to the damage and prejudice of the former.

Through a 1st Indorsement dated June 10, 2010, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
informed respondent of the administrative complaint against her and required her to submit her
comment thereon within 10 days from receipt of said indorsement. The Registry Return Receipt
11

showed that respondent received the 1st Indorsement on July 5, 2010 but she failed to file her
comment within the period prescribed.

The OCA sent a 1st Tracer dated September 15, 2010 reiterating the order for respondent to submit
her comment to the administrative complaint against her within 10 days from receipt of said tracer,
otherwise, the complaint shall be submitted for resolution without her comment. The Registry Return
12

Receipt established that respondent received the 1st Tracer on October 22, 2010, yet she still did
not comply with the same.
In the meantime, complainant filed a letter before the OCA on September 8, 2010, requesting action
on her administrative complaint given that respondent has still not decided Civil Case No. 20191.

On November 23, 2010, this Court promulgated its Decision in three other consolidated
administrative cases against respondent, Lugares v. Gutierrez-Torres, already dismissing her from
13

service.

In its report dated August 25, 2011, the OCA made the following recommendations:
14

RECOMMENDATION: Premises considered, it is most respectfully recommended for the

consideration of the Honorable Court that:

1. The instant administrative complaint be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter

against respondent Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres, former presiding judge of the Metropolitan
Trial Court, Branch 60, Mandaluyong City;

2. Respondent Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres be found GUILTY of INSUBORDINATION, GROSS

INEFFICIENCY, and GRAVE and SERIOUS MISCONDUCT;

3. In view of her previous dismissal from the service, a FINE OF ₱20,000.00 instead be
imposed upon her, to be deducted from her accrued leave credits;

4. To effect the same, the Employee’s Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services-OCA
be DIRECTED to compute respondent Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres’ earned leave credits; and

5. The Leave Division, thereafter, be DIRECTED to forward respondent Lizabeth Gutierrez-

Torres’ total accrued leave credits to the Finance Division, Fiscal Management Office-OCA,
for the latter to compute the monetary value of the said leave credits and deduct therefrom
the amount of the fine herein imposed, without prejudice to whatever penalty the Court may
impose on other remaining and/or pending administrative cases, if any. 15

The Court then issued a Resolution dated October 3, 2011 re-docketing the administrative
16

complaint against respondent as a regular administrative matter and requiring the parties to manifest
within 10 days from notice if they were willing to submit the matter for resolution based on the
pleadings filed. Following the failure of both parties to submit their respective manifestations despite
notice, the Court deemed the instant case submitted for decision.

At the outset, the Court notes that respondent had been given ample opportunity to address the
complaint against her. The OCA had sent and respondent received the 1st Indorsement dated June
10, 2010 and 1st Tracer dated September 15, 2010, both of which explicitly required her to file her
comment on the complaint. However, up until the resolution of the present case, respondent has not
complied with the OCA directives. Moreover, respondent had also failed to comply, despite due
notice, with the Resolution dated October 3, 2011 of the Court itself requiring the parties to manifest
whether they were willing to submit the present administrative matter for resolution based on the
pleadings filed.

It is true that respondent’s failure to submit her comment and manifestation as required by the OCA
and this Court, respectively, may be tantamount to insubordination, gross inefficiency, and neglect
17

of duty. It is respondent’s duty, not only to obey the lawful orders of her superiors, but also to defend
18

herself against complainant’s charges and prove her fitness to remain on the Bench. As a result of
19

her non-compliance with the directives of the OCA and the resolution of this Court, respondent had
completely lost the opportunity to defend herself against complainant’s charges.

As for the merits of the instant administrative complaint, the pleadings and evidence on record
satisfactorily establish respondent’s guilt for the undue delay in resolving Civil Case No. 20191.
Section 15(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, mandates that cases or matters filed with the lower
courts must be decided or resolved within three months from the date they are submitted for
decision or resolution. With respect to cases falling under the Rule on Summary Procedure, first
level courts are only allowed 30 days following the receipt of the last affidavit and position paper, or
the expiration of the period for filing the same, within which to render judgment.

As a general principle, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, or certain
proceedings taken, are considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays
and the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are
regarded as mandatory. 20

Judges are oft-reminded of their duty to promptly act upon cases and matters pending before their
courts. Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, directs judges to "dispose of the court’s
business promptly and decide cases within the required periods." Canons 6 and 7 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics further exhort judges to be prompt and punctual in the disposition and resolution of
cases and matters pending before their courts, to wit:

6. PROMPTNESS

He should be prompt in disposing of all matters submitted to him, remembering that justice delayed
is often justice denied.

7. PUNCTUALITY

He should be punctual in the performance of his judicial duties, recognizing that the time of litigants,
witnesses, and attorneys is of value and that if the judge is unpunctual in his habits, he sets a bad
example to the bar and tends to create dissatisfaction with the administration of justice.

Administrative Circular No. 1 dated January 28, 1988 once more reminds all magistrates to observe
scrupulously the periods prescribed in Section 15, Article VIII of the Constitution, and to act promptly
on all motions and interlocutory matters pending before their courts.

Prompt disposition of cases is attained basically through the efficiency and dedication to duty of
judges. If they do not possess those traits, delay in the disposition of cases is inevitable to the
prejudice of litigants. Accordingly, judges should be imbued with a high sense of duty and
responsibility in the discharge of their obligation to promptly administer justice.
21

Unfortunately, respondent failed to live up to the exacting standards of duty and responsibility that
her position requires. Civil Case No. 20191 was submitted for resolution on July 19, 2006, yet it was
1avvphi1

still pending when complainant filed the present administrative complaint on June 4, 2010, and
remained unresolved per complainant’s manifestation filed on September 8, 2010. More than four
years after being submitted for resolution, Civil Case No. 20191 was still awaiting decision by
respondent.

Respondent irrefragably failed to decide Civil Case No. 20191 within the 30-day period prescribed by
the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Her inaction in Civil Case No. 20191 is contrary to the
rationale behind the Rule on Summary Procedure, which was precisely adopted to promote a more
expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases, and to enforce the constitutional rights of
litigants to the speedy disposition of cases. Indeed, respondent even failed to decide Civil Case No.
22

20191 within the three-month period mandated in general by the Constitution for lower courts to
decide or resolve cases. Records do not show that respondent made any previous attempt to report
and request for extension of time to resolve Civil Case No. 20191.

Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, classifies undue
delay in rendering a decision as a less serious charge for which the penalty is suspension from office
without salary and other benefits for one month to three months, or a fine of ₱10,000.00 to
₱20,000.00.

The Court is well-aware of the previous administrative cases against respondent for failure to act
with dispatch on cases and incidents pending before her. In Del Mundo v. Gutierrez-
Torres, respondent was found guilty of gross inefficiency for undue delay in resolving the motion to
23

dismiss Civil Case No. 18756, for which she was fined ₱20,000.00. In Gonzalez v.
Torres, respondent was sanctioned for unreasonable delay in resolving the Demurrer to Evidence in
24

Criminal Case No. 71984 and meted the penalty of a fine in the amount of ₱20,000.00. In Plata v.
Torres, respondent was fined ₱10,000.00 for undue delay in resolving the Motion to Withdraw
25

Information in Criminal Case No. 6679, and another ₱10,000.00 for her repeated failure to comply
with Court directives to file her comment on the administrative complaint against her. In Winternitz v.
Gutierrez-Torres, the Court held respondent guilty of undue delay in acting upon the Motion to
26

Withdraw Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 84382, 84383, and 84384, and suspended her from
office without salary and other benefits for one month. In Soluren v. Torres, respondent was once
27

again adjudged guilty of undue delay in acting upon repeated motions to withdraw the information in
Criminal Case No. 100833 for which she was fined ₱20,000.00. In Lugares v. Gutierrez-
Torres, promulgated on November 23, 2010, the Court already dismissed respondent from the
28

service for gross inefficiency, gross ignorance of the law, dereliction of duty, and violation of the
Code of Judicial Conduct, in relation to Civil Case Nos. 19887, 19063, 17765, and 18425; as well as
for insubordination because she defied Court orders by failing to file her comment on the charges
against her. Finally, in Pancubila v. Torres, the Court imposed another fine of ₱20,000.00 upon
29

respondent for undue delay in rendering a decision and violation of a directive in connection with
Civil Case No. 20700. In all the foregoing administrative cases, respondent was sternly warned that
a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.

Given that respondent had been previously dismissed from the service, the penalty of suspension is
already inapplicable herein. Instead, the Court imposes upon respondent, for her undue delay in
resolving Civil Case No. 20191, a fine in the maximum amount of ₱20,000.00, to be deducted from
her accrued leave credits.

WHEREFORE, respondent Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres is found GUILTY of the less serious charge of
undue delay in resolving Civil Case No. 20191, for which she is FINED the amount of ₱20,000.00, to
be deducted from her accrued leave credits, since she had already been dismissed from the service.
To effect the penalty imposed, the Employee’s Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services-
OCA, is DIRECTED to ascertain respondent Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres’s total earned leave credits.
Thereafter, the Finance Division, Fiscal Management Office-OCA, is DIRECTED to compute the
monetary value of respondent Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres’s total accrued leave credits and deduct
therefrom the amount of fine herein imposed without prejudice to whatever penalty the Court may
impose on other remaining and/or pending administrative cases, if any.