JAPANESE MONOGRAPH NO, 7 Tso Philippine Operations Record, Phase IIT Jan. - Aug. 1945PREFACE Through Instruction No. 126 to Jepanese Government, 12 Oct 45, entitled "Institution for war Kecords Investigation", steps were initiated to exploit military historical records and official reports of the Japanese Wer hinistry and the Japanese General otaff.* Upon the dissolution of the fiar Ministry and the General Staff, and the transfer of their former functions to the De- mobilization Bureau, the general research job continued and resulted in the development of a series of historical monographs. letailed instructions covering the preparation of these monographs were included in wemorenda 15 December 1945 and 21 November 1946, subject "Japanese Operational Histories", The basic material contained in this operational.record was developed by former officers, on duty in command and staff unite within major units during the period of operations. It should be noted at once, that the enor mous destruction by aerial bombardment and fire has practically wiped out the Tokyo records; much of this material was reconstructed from memory, The paucity of original orders, plans and unit journals, which are normally essential in the preparation of this type of record, most of which were lost or destroyed during field operations or bonding raids ren- dered the task of compilation most difficult; partioularly distressing has been the complete lack of officiel strength reports, normal in a or G-3 records. dowever, while many of the important orders, plans and estimates have been reconstructed from menory and therefore are not textually identi~ cal with the originals, they are believed to ve generally accurate and re- liable. Further data as a result of continuing rosearca and the occasional recovery of hitherto unavailable original docuients will be covered in tho subsequent publicution of "supplopents” by the venwvbilization oureau, The action under this memorandum end inci.ental detailed instruo- tions, waich followed, were initiated by the Assistant Chief of Staf?, G-2, Gi, charged with responsibility for execution of the progrom under No. 9, SCAP, 2 October 1945, In order to protect the interest of the United States, in the ex- Ploitation of Japanese uilitary Information, sub-paragraph 4 of G,0. lo. 9 further provided for the screening of eaeny documents and established ine ventories in Japanese Governmental archives. Careful examination of the first records submitted by the Japanese Government in the sumer of 1946 detected @ misconception on the part of the Japanese as to what should be included in comparative histories; in @ memorandum issued by assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, on 21 dovenber 1943, the Inperial Japanese Govern- ment was directed to record the operations of the Japanese forces more extensively, The G-2 Section thereafter assumed coordination of the en- tire program, including the establishment of a small historical research section within the aTIS (allied Iranslator and Interproter SoctilVoL, 43 EDORD OF PRILIPPIME OPERATIONS (vou, 5, PART 3) Hote: ‘This doounextt was’ complied in conformity with the momory and private mote-books of Maj, IWANO MASATAKA, a former staff officer of the Imp. G.H.Q. — and Col. AOSHIMA RYOICHERO, the Chief of Staff on Line of Commnication of the 14th Aree Aruy and supplemented by notes of other staff officers of the 14th Area Group.1. Preparations for LUZON Operations -- /. 7 A. Details of the Operation Plans ~/: 7 1, Estimation of the Operations by AMERICAN Armies against os, 7 2. Details of the Plans for LUZON Operations .. /) / B. Principles Laid Down fer the Conduct of the Operations by the froa Aray at the End of December 1944. /°7 C. Battle Orders and Digposition of Troops of the Area Army. = 7/2 1. Battle Orders .. 7, /> 2. Disposition of Troops 2/3 D. Outline of Disposition of Troops on LUZOK from December 1944 te 7 the Beginning of Jamary 1945. * // 1, Partial Change in Disposition of Trocpeyon LOLON at the ben ginning of December. 7/7” 2. Outhine of Disposition of Troops at the Middle of December. //7 3. Outline of Disposition of Troops at the End of December. = 20 de Outline of Disposition of Troops at the beginning of Jamary 194s. - P27 E. Progress of Preparations for LNZ0N Operations = +i” 1, Outline of Preparations for the Operations in the Middle of Decenber 1944 --/. 2f : 2{ Outline of Progress of Preparations for the Operations up to the Middle of Jamary 1945, after the Operatgon Plane were changed. If. ‘he Policy Adopted by the Area Army at the First Stage of LUZON Opera- tions (from Jemuary te February) 72 A, The Situation Before ‘the Landing of the U.S. Arey /. “/ ““L, U.S. army Air Raids et the Beginning of Jamary. ° * 2. Invasion of LINGAYEN by 0.8, Comvoys 7 B. Skmategy Adopted by the Area Ary During the Landing of AMERICANS.” 1. operation Orders of the Aray Group Against LINGAYEN GULF. *' 2, Landing of Army at LISGAYEN, | /°.+# J. Order to Change Direction to the North Teoued to the Tank Division, p45 |4. Countermeasures of the Area Aray Ageinst the Pull Offensive, of 0.8. Arey. 574 7 5. Offensive Taken by « Part of the Area Aray,and Key Points Strengthened Against U.S. Araioe! Invasion of Central LUZON... - 2 6, Intentions of thihres Army at the End @f Jeary... / +7 7. Stvaatton at the End of Jamery.. 7 Z/ 8, Strategy of thehrea Aray at the end of Jamary. p /2 ©, Outline of the Course of Battles on the LINGAYEN Front in Jemary 1945... P67 D. Operation Policy of the Area Army in February 1945. Situation at the Beginning of February... /. 7/ i 1, General Outline of LUZON, ...7.7/ 2. Operation Policy in BAGUIO and BONTOC Districts... 2 7; 3. Situation in the Rear of the Northern Key Position. Situation at the Middle of February... 7/02 1, Outline of thabtroet-Pighting and Counter-attacko 4 MANTLL District. <> f./°9 2, General Situation of CLARK Area, /./0/ 3. Outline of Horthern LZON Area and Operation Palicy of the Area Aray in the Sane Area... //0// Situation at the End of February. f //2 1, Situation at the Horthern Key Position ~///> 2. GLARK Areas: f.//7 3. MANILA Area. ?,/!7 4, Commmication Between the Main Body of the Area Army and its Unite in Bach Combet Area, = //// TII. Operations of the Mein Body of the Area Army since Mapch 1945 /. //7 A, Situation of Operations in March. Situation at the Beginning of March 7 //7 1. Situation in the Western District. (Attack on TACBO by the 19th Division) --/.//7 2. Situation in BANBANG District. (Reinforcement of the 2nd Tank Division)3. aPARRE Distetot, ~-F/2! 4, Situation of the frmy BQ. > //2/ 5. Restoration of the 4th Air Army, ©//2> "Situation et the iddle“of March. Pla B. Situation of the army HQ. <~/,/22 2, Situation in the Northwestern District, - //?~ 3, Situation in BAGUIO District. (Protection of BAGUIO by the 23rd Division and Surprise Attsok on the Enemy Airfield at LINGAYEN ty-same) /, 4, Situation in BAMBANG District. (Counter-attack by the Tank Division and the Retablishment of a Ccabat Zone in BAMBANG Under the Direct Command of the Army) 7/22 5. Situation in CAGAYAN Valley. . 7/25” 6. Shortage of Food in BAGUIO District. and the Repairing of ‘Traffic Houtes there, — /./25 Situation at the End of March, =f /27~ 1, General Situation Pp /2~ 2. Reorganisation of the Air, Shipping and Railway Units. ~/ /26 x 3. Attachment of Ravy Units to the 105th Divicion.. / / B. Situation af Operations in april, . °,/27 Situation at the Beginning of April. - /)/+? : 1. BAGUIO Area (Commnication with BAGUIO by the Group Leader Sent to BAMBANG) ~- /./2/ : 2. BAMBANG Area, 7/27 3. CAGAYAN Valley Area (Commencement of Transportation of Personnel by Night from the TOOBRALAO Mrfteld. ~ £,/27 4. Battle in the vicinity of TMBBO, 4/27 5+ Information of Defeate in CLARK Area, — / oy Situation at the Middle of April... 7/20 1, Moving the Area Army HQ. to BAMBANG, -. ©, VO 2, Invasion of Enemy Tanke Into BAGUIO, % /3/ §. BAMBANG Area (the Second Mountain Pass of SALACSAC is occupted) he Attacks by the 19th Division are checked... ? : 5. Militery Preparations end Situation in the Line of Communication of the Army Combat Zone.ia i a ee Situation at the End of April.-- 7, /34 1, vatl of Baguro, °° /?4 2, Sudden Change of the Situation in BAMBANG Area. - 2/34 3. Concentration of the 103rd Division to the CACAYAN Plain, / /3/ 4e Move of the APARRE Brigade, /.3/° _G, Situation of Operations in May... 7, /4/0 Situation in the Beginning of May, .- /, /¢? 1. Outline of Operation Plans of the Area Army at Northern 1UZ0N.~/*’ 2, Situation in BAMBANG Area, ¢,//? 3. Situation of the 23r: and 19th Division. / /5¢ Situation in the Middle of May, -- © /17 a 1. Situation in BAMBANG Area, © /,/C7 2. Conduct of Battle by the Army in SANTA FE Area. ~ //7 é 3. Situation in the Western District... 6/50 4, CAGAYAN Valley and KTARGAN Area... 7 /{0 5. Mowe of Army HQ. to KIANGAN... p /(2— Situation in the End of May.---7./6> 1. Fall of the SANTA FE free, - £2 /{> 2. Conduct of Battle bf the Aray During the Crisis in the ATATAO( TH?) Area, /, /52 3. Plan of the Army Operations in BAGABAG Plain. © “/6% 4, Situation of the 19th Divislor in the KIANGAY Area.- D, Situation of Operations in June. = /,/4/ Situation in tobecsoning and Middle of Hine. — //// 1, Battles in the BAMBANG and BAGABAG Plaine. —/,// 2. Plan of Operations of the Army in the Upper District of ASIN River, «£772. 3. Battle in the RANUSUKU (TW-?) vicinity. in the Middle of June, Situation at the find of June —/: /7— * 1, Situation in the Upper District of ASIN River = © /7 2. Battle in the KIANGAN vicinity. — 7, /7( 3. Situation in Every Area. ... p /76 f E, Situation of Operations in July. .. ?./77 Conduct f Operations afd of Other Matters by the Army from the Beginning 4Ad¢to the Middle ef July. Situation at the Beginning of duly, ~ /./?/ 1. Move of the Army BQ, to YAMATO. .—P,/?/ 2, Bvacuation\of the 105th Division from KIANCAN, . /:/// 3. Situation in the BANAUE Area, ©. /,/// 4 Evacuation of the 19th Division from BORTOC, = °)//~ 5. Advance of the Enemy Tanks to the Front of the 58th Indepen- dent Mixed Brigade. ... P/¢2 : 6. Situation in the Upper District of ASIN River, Ath Situation at the Middle of July. - 2/63 1. Arrival of Tank Division at ANTIPOLO. . £//3 2. Situation in Enemy Area and Evacuation of the 19th Division from mammaran, 710 ¢ 3. The Argy HQ, Inquires into Strategy fer the Coming Operations. Situation at the End of July. - //?/ 1, Battle of Army Group on the East Front. = / /7/ 2, Evacusticn of the Retrenchments of the Aray Groups on the Western Front. 7/7 3. Situation of Line of Communication. =: /,/1/ 4, Study of Future Operations by the Arpy BQ. P. Situation st-the Beginning of August. /'/77 Situation at the Beginning of August...» /7/ 1. Situation on the Eastern Front... ° (4 2, Adcition of Military Strength to the ARIKI Brigade. - 7 /4— 3. Battle on the Front of the 19th Division. > /7- 4e Other Situations — /, /74 Situation at the Middle of Aygust.-§ °./ 75 1, Situation of Every Arny Group. PLP 2, Situation of Aray BQ, - 7 /4/ G, Chase of Fire and Kegotiations with the U.8, Aray.- 4/9/ 1, Situation at the Time of Cease of Fire. 4/17 2. Aetion of the Area Army BQ. in Accordance with the Cease Fire Order, - /./!7 3. Action of Bvery Unit, ~ "77?be Coutacte with the U.S, Aray after the Cease of Fire Order. ~/) 20° 5. Wegotiations by the Ares Aray HQ, and its Result...» 20° Cs Outiine of the 10th and 103n2)Diviston and the 4th Air Divieton after the Invasion by the U.S. Aray into the BAGABAG Plain, ~ /,1¢/ 1. Situation of the 10th Division. —/,20/ 2, Situation ef the 103d Diyiaton, ~— 4?‘ 3. Situation of the 4th Air Division, /12 ¢/ 4, Situation of Line of Commnication Unite in the CAGATAN Valley and Kavy Unite, © 7, 20f I. Situation of the 6lst Independent Miued Brigade, — 7.7 Spperate Volune A. Record of Operations of the SHIMBU Group (the MANILA pertheastern Key Position): B. Progress of Operations of the KEMBU Group in the CLARK District. Appended Tables A, A Table of Organization of the Enexy Group on LUZON. B, Situation of serial Operations of the Enemy Appended Charts A. 1, A sketch of the Deployment on LUZON (at the Middle of Deo. 44) 2, Deployment of Line of Communication Organizations on LUZON defore the Landing of the U.S. Army. B. A Sketoh of the Deployment on the Coast of LINGAYEN before the Landing of the U.S. Arey. C, A Sketch of the Deployment of the 14th Area Army in Jamary 1945. D. A Sketch of the Situation in-the PHILIPPINE Area at the Beginning of Jamary. E.’ A Sketeh of Enewy Dispositions in the LINGAYEY Area arcund 13 Jan. F, A Sketch of Positions on KUZON (from Jamuary to the middle of February) H. A Sketch of Positions in the PETLIPPINES (from the beginning of Jamary to the Beginning of Febraary) 1. A Sketch of Positions in the Northern LUZON Area (in March)Je A Sketch of Positions in the BAGUIO Area (in March) K. Situation in the BAKBAKG Ares (in March) L.A Sketeh of Positions in the BAGUIO Ares (in April) Ml, Situation in the BAMBARG Area (at the end of Nay) H, 4 Sketoh of the Progress of Battle in the BAMBAMG Area (from March ‘to the middle of June) B.A Skotoh of Dispositions of the latn Fawce of the Army in hhe Northern LUZON Area (in June) ¥.~ A Sketch of Dispositions of the Main Body of the Arny at the Upper Reaches of the ASIN River (from the end of July to August) PARTITE I. Preparations for LUZ0K Operations A. Details of the Operation Plans 1. Rstination of the Operation by AMERICAM Armies Against LUZON. Im March or April 1944, the U.8, Army operations against the PHILT® PPINES were Judged to proceed from the NEW GUINEA area to HALMARERA and MINDANAO, Afterwards, when SAIPAN was occupied by the U.S, Aray, one or nore of the following two routes were expected to be selected by them im reaching the PHILTPPIKESs a route on land (by MACARTHUR), a sea route from SAIPAN to PALAU(NINIIS); or a joint operation of these two routes. Either LUZCH Island or the Central part of the PHILIPPINES was expected to be imediately attacked in cdse of aivance from SAIPAN and PALAU. The Commanding Officer of the Lith Aray judged that the latter route (com- bination of the two) would be picked and believed that U.S, Army will have an advantageous position. Even after the opening of LEYTE Operations, ‘the Area Aruy tock « cerious view of the LUZON Operations, When a U.S. Gonvoy navigated north at the middle of Decenber, « part of the Atay Judged that U.S. ray wight lend immediately on BATANGAS or in MANTLA Area, In view of the situation after the landing on MINDORO Toland, the main force of the U.S.Aruy was expected to land on LUZON Teland at the middle or end of Jamuary, Hain unite of the Aray were expected to land in BATANGAS of LINGAYEN, superior unite in MABTLA Area and a pert in the southern area in the LUCENA vicinity and APARRI in the north, The military strengthFO a of the U.S, Army was judged to be 10 divisions at the least. In order to gain a flying base, one ortwo airborm divisions were expected to Goseoiid in Central LUZON Diotrict together with the landing operations, Tt was feared that the peace and order on 10Z0M Island will be disturbed, Tt was anticipated that the U.S, Aray will convert Ate superior military strength to FORMOSA, southern CHIRA or FRENCH IKDO-CHIMA after defeating our aray to some extent and foreing it into mountainous country. 2. Details of the Plans for LIZON Operations a. The plans ap it was before the opening of LUZON Operations Sinee the spring of 1944, invectigations were-made for militery oper- ations in the PHILIPPINES and preparations pushed for the wame. At the beginning, this was regardedes the preparations for the 11th Operation, as mentioned in part I, When the U.S. Army occupied the PALAU and MOROTAT Area, the commending General of the 14th Aray judged that the main part of the U.S. Army might inmediatdly attekk LUZON Island, The U.S, Aray operation against VISAYA and MINDANAO Districts was regarded as an opera tion to gain a flying base, Against thie operation our army seemed to be unable to make a decisive attack owing to our inferior militery strength and transport facilities. Because of this, cur army planned and prepared for a decisive operation on LUZON Island, General YAMASHITA tock over ‘the conmandiof the Area army on 6 October and for the tine being carried out the plens laid out by his predecessor. ‘b. The Plans during the LEYTE Operations _- When LEYTE Operations opened at the end of October, the Area Army decided to make a decisive battle on LEYTE Tslend, in accordance with the order {esved by the Southern Army Command, as mentioned in Parts I and IT, and for this purposé has transferred the military strength fron LUZON ‘to LETTE Taland, Howefer, the Area Army took LUZON Operations into count ap well, At that time, the Chief of Staff and some staff officers of the ‘Lsth Area Aray considered thet the LUZON Operations could not decide : vhotory or defeat of the whole PHILIPPINE Campaign and eatheF insisted on protracted delaying policy. The defeats on the islands in the Gentral Pactrrc Sout support for this point of view. Fowever, the Area Army Coman!= Ang General had plans to make a decisive battle on LUZON Island, by de~ 7%| | Farner ace ae er Ee eee 5 veloping the strong counterattacks againet the U.8. Amy at the earlier etages of ite landing. ©, Pinal Decision on Operations at the Last Stage of LEYTE Campaign. ‘The LEYTE Operations did not show favourable progress. Great mili- tary strength and quipment thrown into’ these operations could not be transferred back to LUZON, In such circumstances, the LUZOK Operations as conducted by the 1ith Area Arsy needed re-considerstion as from the middle of Hovenber, The Comanding General of theirea Army advocated hie plan to make « decisive battle, | However, when the U.S, Aray lanied on MIFDORO Teland in the middle of Decetber it was decided to ddopt a plan of delaying tactics on LUZON, Tt was planned to occupy three key Positions by placing the main force of the Area Aray in Northern LUZOR, mainly in the BACUIO vicinity, a part in the CLARK Field vicinity and in the mountainous couttry east of MANILA, Thus, our aray aimed: keeping in check the military strength of the enemy on INZON for as long a tine as possible and thus diminishing tts battle potentiality, 4. Arrival of the Chief of the Operation Section of the General Headquarters in thfPRILIPFTIES. At the end of December, the Chief of the Operation Section of the Tuperial General Headquarters and his staff arrived, and agreed with the operationk purposesmintioned adore, Moreover, they have worked out « phan for operations thereafter, : B. Principles Laid Down for the Conduct of the Operations by the Area Aray at the End of Decenber 1944. ‘The outline of the operation principles decided by the Area Army from the middle to the end of Decenber as mentioned in A, is as follow: 411 or parte of the principles were seoretly shown to sone of the Brigade Commanding Generajs and to the Ohief of Staff. Principles to Conduet LUZON Operations 1. Intention The main force of the Area Army will ocoupy the important district tm Northern IOZOH, a part of the Aaj, the moantatnous countries east of MANILA and weet of CLANK Field area, Reorganising units for self-support and delaying actions, they will work for mtusl cooperation to keep down oo‘the main strength of the U.S. army on LUZON and to diminish its battle power. 2, Outline of Conduct . To establish a strong key position in Northern LUZON and kay positions in the mountainous countries east of MANILA and west of CLARK Field as goon as possible, Reorganize for delaying actions. The units in other districts will utilise these positions as their front ‘Mnes and will endeavour to check the eneny's advance and to diminish its ‘battle power. . Coastal units end Sea Raiding Squadron will attack the enemy if he lands on the central and southern parts of LIIZON. dart a eooure firmly key positions and check for as long as possible the ad- vance of the enemy into the interior of the iMlan’. ‘The airfields in Central LUZON wil be secured as long as pessible and must be destroyed under adverse circumstances, c, The Mobile Units will attack the hostile Para-unite descending in Central LUZ0K Plain and will endeavor to secure airfields. 4, Defeat the eneny intending to lend on Northern LUZON District or failing thet check its advance to interior land foreing him ‘to stay in positions on the sea-coast, Under unavoidatde oirounstances, great key positions wil) be secured in the BANEANG and MARCAYAN Districts north of BAGUIO, Tho air bases in the APARRT vicinity and the FCHUAGUE and TUGUEGARAO vicinity will function as long as possible, e. After the main enemy forme has occupied Central LUZON every position mst open persistent and powerful raiding bettles, connect- ing closely with each other and endecvour to hold back the main strength of the eneuy advancing from tho land and ship bases. If the situation changes, the main force may attack the enesy. But must be careful not to exhaust our fighting strength too econ. f, If the enesy profiting by cur uncompleted reorganisation, rushes into interior of the land, the operations sust be conducted in accordance with the situation. The units on the spot, especially the tank division, mst exocite « resclute counter-attacks,& The Area Aruy requests from the Air Force and Navy the following sections: 2) Diminish the enemy's fighting strength by destroy- ing his vessels, Hereafter, air unite will take off from the airfield 4m the BONNAGUE and TUUEGARAO Districts md help the battles of the main body of the Area Aray, 2) aval unite will be responsible for protecting ‘WotitheSESSEEBS the coast and harbours on erthern LUZON. 5) Ground crews of air and naval forces will take pert in battles together with amy units, 3e Duty of Each Army Group 2, The main strength of three infantry bettalions under ‘the command of the 105th Division Command will advance into the district east of MANILA and establish key points there, Preparing for counter~ attacks during the move, b. ‘The Sth Division will endeavour to dimniah enesy's fighting strength at the sea-shore and hereafter, will try to check the advance of the enemy by diminishing ite fighting strength thus cover the deployment of the nain force of the Area Army, Afterwards, the militery strength will be concentrated to the north of LAKE LA@UNA, The MANILA Defence Force of the 105th Division and the 62nd Infantry Brigade of the 105th Division will secure the key positions east of MANILA Wilter the comand of the &th Division. ¢. A part of the 62nd Infantry Brigade will endegvour to @iminish enemy fighting strength at the seashore and then will change its Airection to the district east of MANTLA.WEth the object of securing it. Depending on the current situations on other fronts, prepare for con- verting the ailitery strength to the north side of LAKE LAGUNA in order to avoid the danger of disintegration, Depenting om the situation, the Brigade will be under comand of the 105th Division, The main force of ‘the brigade will be expected to take part in counter-attecks against the frout of TAYABAS and the LIPA areas. 4, The MANILA Defence Force will try to break the eneay's intention of landing in the BATAAN District, at the mouth of the OORRBUTDO LS.2) Diminish the enemy's fighting strength by destroy- ing his vessels, Hereafter, air unite will take off from the eirfield in the EONNAGUE and TUGUEGARAO Districts ad help the battles of the main body of the Area Aray. 2) Naval unite will be responsible for protecting wttircthetSREPD the coast and harbours on lerthern LUZON, 5) Ground crews of air and navel forces will teke pert in battles together with army units. 3. Duty of Bech Army Group a. The main strength of three infantry battelions under ‘the command of the 105th Division Command will advance into the district + east of MANILA and establish key points there, Preparing for counter~ attacks during the move. ‘The Sth Division will endeavour to diminish eresy's fighting strength at the sea-shore and berearter, will try to check the advance of the enesy by diminishing ite fighting etrength thus cover the deploynent of the nain force of the Area Aray. » the military strength will be concentrated to the north of LAKE LAgUIA, ‘The MANILA Defence Force of the 105th Division and the 62nd Infantry Frigade of the 105th Division will secure the key positions east of MANILA Wier the comand of the Sth Division. eo. Apart of the 62nd Infantry Brigade will endegvour to diminish enemy fighting strength at the sea-shore and then will change its direction to the district east of MANILA #Ith the object of securing it. Depending on the current situations on other fronts, prepare for con- verting the military strength to the north side of LAKE LAGUNA in order to avoid the danger of disintegration, Depending on the situation, the Brigade will be under comand of the 105th Division, ‘The main force of ‘the brigade will be expected to take part in counter-attacks against the front of TAYABAS and the LIPA areas, 4, The MANILA Defence Force will try to break the eneny's intention of landing in the BATAAN District, at the mouth of the CORREGIDOR eS aeS ee Chgonel, Mervafter, this force will be put under the comand of the 8th Divieion and will establish the positon east of MANILA, The NAGAYOSHT Unit (the main force of the 39th Inf, Regt.] stationed in the BATAAN District will be expected to change its direction to the ANGELES vicinity, according to the situation, and to secure the position west of CLARK with the aid of air units, = ©. ‘The 2nd Tank Division will be responsible for defeat- ng enemy pare-troope descending on the Central LUZON Plain. According to the situations, this Division will either attack the eneay in the LEMGAYEN and MANILA Areas or chenge the direction of advance to the TUGUEGARAO District with the objet of défending it, The Tank Regt. in MANILA will bo charged with responsibility to prepare to figyt against eneuy para-troope in the MANILA District and if necessary to nove to the? CABANATUAN Vicinity, £. The 23rd Division (containing the 58th Ind, Mixed Brig.) wil try to defeat the eneny intending to land in North SAN FERNANDO on the front of LIMGAYEX Gulf, If the Divieton wiii.be unable to repulse ‘the chemy attacks, « part of 1t will secure the mountaitous country east of North SANTO TOMAS and the main body will secure the positions in the BAGUIO vicinity. A part of the force will stoure the openings weet of SANTO TOMAS, BAYOMBONG and LINGAYEN and check the enemy advance into the Central plain, and if the situation calls, will help in the attacks ty our main force, 6G The main body of the 103rd Division will smash the eneuy intending to land from the APARAI Area in the firet stare. Under unavoidable circumstances, the Division will secure important grounds Rear the sea-shore and hamper the eneuy's use of air bases, A part of “the force will secure important districts on the coast north of SAN FERNANDO. h. The main part of the 10th Division (containing the TSUDA Detachment) will consolidate positions in the SAN-KAKUYAMA vicinity of SAM JOSE preparing for the dtacks on the front of the 23rd Division and for the counter-attacks on the BORCABON and MUNOZ peas. After the main strength of the enemy engage in the middle part of the LUZON plain, this Ao:Divieion will secure the positions mentioned sbove, and check the enemy's advance, According to situation, it will play « vitel role in our attacks. If the enemy attack is not repulsed, the Yivision will secure posittons in the north BAMBANG District. 4. The duty of the 19th Division will) defined in aocordance with situations, In order to be in a position to hold out longer, every army group walt a rule to use ro more than their present stock of ammuni- ‘tion and must not demand ediitional supplies of materials before the occu- pation of positions, except in emergency. C. Battle Order and Disposition of Troops of the Area Army. 1. Battle Order ‘The battle order in the end of December is written in the Appended List no, 1 2. Disposition of Troops The disposition of the Area Army at the end of Decenber is written in the Appended List no. 2, Appended List Ko. 1. Main Parte of the Battle Order of the 14th Area Aruy at the End of Dec. ‘The Commanding General of the Lith Area Aruy, General GGIawE TAMASETTA. Headquarters of the 1,th Area Arny 35th Army let Division 8th Division 10th Division \\19th Division ora Division 26th Division 03rd Bivision ‘105th Division 2nd Tani Division 55th Independent Wixed Brigade 58th Independent Mixed Brigade lst Independent Mixed Brigade 66th Brigade 47Appended List Ne. 1 (contimed) 26th Independent Infantry Reginent ‘Teh, Sth, 9th Independent Tank Companies 26th Independent Machine-Gun Battalion 16ti. and 20th Independent Rapid-Fire Gun Battalions 25th end 26th Independent Rapid-Fire Gun Battalions 59rd and 5éth Field Rapid-Fire Gun Companies 12th Heavy Field Artillery Reginent 22nd Heavy Pheld Artillery Reginent Ath Independent Heavy Artillery Bettalion 20th Independent Heavy Artillery Battalion 65th Independent Engineer Battalion 6th Railway Transport Headquarters * 2nd, Telegraph Reginent 27th Telegraph Reginent . 3rd Independent Radio Company ‘122nd Independent Radio Platoon Uth Area Arny Military Police Force 62nd and 63rd Independent Motér-Transport Battalions Moth and 20th Independent Motor-Transport Companies 6th and 7th Medium Trench Mortar Companies 6th Field Transport Headquarters Sea Raiding Base Battalion Sea Raiding Squadron let Field Replacement Headquarters sth Area Army Line of Communication Headquarters 411 subsunits of the above.Appended List Ho, 2 Outlame of Disposition of Troops of the Lith Area Army at the End of December. 35th aray Attached Unite lst and 26th Divisions 68th Brigade ‘55th Independent Mixed Brivade Sth Infantry Regiment (an artillery battalion and an engineer company attached) A battalion of the 58th Independent Mixed Brigace Other unite SHIMBU Group - Commanding General of the Sth Division, in comand. The Sth Division (the 5th Inf. Regt., an artillery battalion, an enggneer compeny and other unite, excluded) 105th Division (including the 26th Ind. Inf. Regt. and the Sth ind, Tenk Cop exeluding the &2nd Brigade) 62nd Infantry Brigade KOBAYASHI Army Group (MANILA Defense Force) 13th Independent Machine-gun Battalion 23rd Independent Rapid-fire @un Battalion 22nd Heavy Field artillery Reginent Battery of the 4th Independent Heavy Artillery Battalion 20th Indppendent Heavy Artillery Battalion (less « battery) Main body of the Sea Raiding Unit Other Units KEUBU Group Commanding Officer of the lst Raiding Group in comand. Ist Raiding Group A part of the Tank Division The other arsy and naval units stationed in CLARK areaappended List Ko. 2 (contimed) 03rd Division (Excluding two cospantos of the 178th Int. Inf. Bus, 356th Ind. Inf, Bn. and parts of other units) Units Attached: ‘16th Independent Repid-fire Gun Bn. (less a company) 26th Independent Machine-gun fattalion 53rd and 54th Field Repid-fire Gun Companies Two Light~tank Compantes of the 2nd Ind, Tank Division 9th Independent Tank Company 3rd Battalion of the 22nd Field-gun Regiment (les a cozpeny) Other Units 19th Division (excluding tro tne. und one regt. gun unit cf the ™%th Inf. Regt.) A battalion of the 25th Mountain Artillery Reginent, A company of the 19th Engineer Regiment The mein body of the 19th Transrort Regizent 22rd Division Attached Unite: 58th Independent Mixed Brigate (an inf, bn, « acuntain gun battery and a part of other units exolued) 12th Heavy PAalé Artillery Regiment (less 0 be-talion) 4th Independent Reavy értillery Battalion (lese a battery) A battery of the 20th Independent Heavy Artillery Battalion 12th Sea Raiding Base Battalion 12th Bea Raiding Squedron Other Units a. 10th Division (excluding 39th Inf, Regt. (lese a bn.) and parts of other units) Attached Unite: 1lth Independent Infantry Reginent of the 26th Division (miras the 3ra battalion) 26th Independent. Rapid-fire Gun Battalion Other UnitsAppended List No, 2 (continued) ‘2nd Tank Division (exeluding foun light-tank compentes, 3rd battery of the getorised artillery regiment and parts of other units) Attached Unites 356th Independent Infantry Battalion (less 4 trench mortars in ‘two companies) Ath Company of the 178th Independent Infantry Dattelion 6let Independent Mixed Brigade Unite under the direct command of the Arny Aray Signal Units ‘2nd and 27th Telegraph Regiment 3rd Independent Wireless Company 1122nd Independent Yireless Platoon Construction Grcup Railway Units 6th Reilway Transport Headquarters “Oth Railway Reginent Vessel Units Military Police Corps of the 1th irea tray Other Units Line of Communication of the Area Arny Lith Area Army Line of Commnicuticn Headquarters 85th ond 8th Area Line of Commntdation Unite 6th Field Transport Headquarters 62nd and 63rd Independent Motor-transport Bettalions Moth, 2th, 320th, IZlet and 330th Independent kotor-trans- Main body of the Lith Area Aray Field Motor-transport Depot Main body of the 14th Area Aray Field Freight Depot 12th South Army Hospita) ‘Thth, 134th and 139th Line of Commnteation Hospitals Other Uatte Note: Only important units ere listed in this disposition of troops. The air unite that were stationed outside of CLARK area are not mentioned bere. (uly the units stationed in the CLARK area up to 10 Jan. are listed) 4 IfDz Outine of Disposition of Troops on LUZON from Deceaber 194. to ‘the beginning of Jamary 1945. 2. A Change in Disposition of Troops om LUZON at the Beginning of Decenber, Because of the unfavourable progress of LEYTE Operations and in order ‘to orgakhse the preparations for LUZON Operations, the Area Army changed the disposition of « part of force as follows. a, The 103rd Division Commander moved the comand of the 58th Independent Mixed Brigade into new field of operations in order to strengthen the protection of the LACAG, VIGAN and SUYO vicinity. A brigade cmander manfin charge of thts éistrict, The defensive preparations for the district along the SUYO-SABANGAN Road ware connected with the establish- ment of a key position in the rear of BAGUIO, Be The 58th Independent Mixed Brigade Commander moved a part of his brigade into the BAGUIO, in the northern district and in the North SAN FERNANDO vicinity to take over the duties of defensive prepatations made by the 103rd Division, of landing operations and port defense in the North 84M FERNANDO district. 2 . an infantry battalion of the 23rd Division was responsible for the protection of the district west of AGHO River. The Area Aray was to contime direct. control over the construction of rear positions in ‘the BAGUIO district surrounded by DONGOH, SABLAN, TACBO, PIRES, MT.AMUYAO, ORTON and SANTAS. 4, The 2nd Tank Division was recponsible for the protection of the field of operations. e. The 23rd Division Commnder concentrated his division on the district around PANTABANGAN, RIZAL, WUWOZ, SAN ANTORTO, SANTO TOMAS, SANTA MARIA and SAN QUINTIN, where they builq position in the SAN JOSE and MT. SANKAKW (a etretch of hills southwest of UMINGAN vicinity) in pre- aration for operations, The details of construction of the position are shown as follows: Main forces of the aruy group will construct main positions suffi- chent to accomodate dh division by the end of December, the position will iebe consolidated tisss when the group will take then over. Special key posi- tions will be constructed on MT, SANKAKU and in the SAN JOSE vicinity 20 that they will be the strong pointe from which the counter-attacks will be delivered in this eres, Positions in the pointe of crossing of AGO Raver in the BAYOMBONG and MANGATARIM vicinity and hill-positions in ‘the URZA0 vicinity will be strengthened. f. The main part of the 12th Heavy Fheld Artillery Regiment and the 4th Independent Heavy Artillery Battalion will be put under the comand of the 58th Independent Mixed Brigade Commander, A battalion of the 12th Heavy Field Artillery Regizent will be put under the command of the 23rd Division Comender at SAN JOSE. + Bach Army Group will chonge its disposition of troops by the middle of Decesber. 2. Outline of Disposition of Troops at the Middle of December In the middle of December, « powerful U.8, convoy advanced to the north- west of MINDAKAO Sea, On the 15th, about a division of the enemy landed on MINDORO Island, Hereupon, ‘he aray framed the plans for LUZON Operations as mentioned above, The Aray imediately issued the follqwing orders to wove a part of the Aray Group: a. Tho 105th Division will move its main military strength from the WAGA Area to the ANTIPOLO vicinity as soon as possible. . The Sth Divieion will imediately rend a part of force forward and construct positions in the district east of ANTIPULO for the main force of the Army Group, @. The KOBAYASHI Army Group (MANTLA Defense Force) will Phepare to cocupy positions in the IPO vicinity. 4, Toe 23rd Divieion will move to the LINGAYEN area and ‘the 10th Division will take the place of the former. i e. Staff officers will respectively be sent to the ANTIPOLO | and CLARK area and reconroités key positions in there areas. f. The drastic measures for transporting the ailitary strength mst be taken, g. Suspend transportation to LEYIE. L4(3Im accordance with the plan for a new operation, the dispositions above were effected between 15 and 20 Decenber, while the Area Army Headquarters simultaneously formulated operation plans, On the 15th and 16th, U.8. Army was likely to penetrate into MANILA, As the result of the U.S, Army's cecupation of the MINDORO Island, ovr air bases on LUZON, especially in ‘the MANELA and CLARK reas, were vigorously attacked fron thesir. One of the two eneny convoys could not be discovered, Afterrards, the fact bee ame clear that ell the military strength of the U.S. convoys landed on the MINDORO Island. ‘Therefore, it wus judged that the U.S. Army aight land on LUZON between the middle and the end of Jemary. 3, Outline of Disposition of Troops at the End of December Minute details concerning the construction of positions northeast of MANILA and those in CLARK area were worked out at the end of Decenber. ‘The Area Issue of Orders by the Army to each unit: : 2, Composition of the SHIMBU Group on 27 Deceaber, the Area Aray issued orders as follows, 1) The Group will strengthen its fighting capacity in the MANILA vicinity. “I 2) The 8th Divieion Commander will command the SHINBU Group consisting of the following army groupe and unite, In conformity with the Rppended List lio, 1, he will nove his units to the district east of MANILA and proceed with operations in &% Southern LUZON. MANILA Defense Unit 105th Division (excluding the main body of the Sist and 82nd Infantry Brigades and other units) KAWASHIMA Detachment (the main part of the S2nd Infantry Brigade) WOGUCHI Detachment (the main part of the Slst Infantry Bttgade) 3) The MANILA Defense Unit, the 105th Division, the KANABHIMA and NOGUCET Detachments will be put under the command of Bhe SHIMBU Group Commander at noon of 1 Jamary. 4) The SHIMBU Group Commander will conduct operations in Central and Southern LVZON, in accordance with the instructions issumd in the past. Preparations for the operations will be completed by the middle of January, In the meantine, each unit must prepare for the eneay attacks, aw | Y5) The KAWASHIMA and ROGUCHT Detachsents will watch ‘the eneny situation and mcve their military strength step by step toward ‘the main force. 6) The HOGUCHT Detachment will be released fromthe duty of defending the SAN BERNADINO Channel. 7) The operaticn refered to in the Ist, 5th, and 6th items must be Rept secret, 8) In a lend tattle within SHTMBU Group's operation istrict, ite commending officer wil) be in comand over al) SHOBU Group units (excepting ¢hees where « SHOBU unit connarder is of a higher rank) ‘The relations to the command of the navel cnd the air unite wil) be di fined by separate instructions. 9) Separate order wil be issued concerning the at- ‘tachment of signal and line of communication units, ‘The Sumary of the Appended List Kol 1s A, The Strength of Forces under the connand of the 8th Divistont 1, The Division Headquarters 2. Tnfantry Pegimental Headquartore = ? Battalion Neadquarters = 7 “ ‘Infantry Companies - 7 Machine-gun Companti 3. The main force of the reconnaissance reginent 3 4. Awtillery Reginental Headquarters - 1 Bebtalion Headquerters - 2 Field guns = 3 10cm, howitsers - & 15 cm, howitzers - 7 15 en. cannons - 3 5. The main force of Engineer Pecinent (1 company) 6. The sain force of Army Se-vice Feginent (2 motorized com panies and 2 pack horee compantes) 7%. Paeld-hospital - 1, Line of Conmnication hospital - 1 o ot fo8, Anbicgas unit, Ordnance Service unit and Water and Puri- fieation unit, Sick horse Depot. B, Tactics for the Extraction of part of the Forces: 1. Strength on the bench and coast will not be weakened unless At 40 ebsolutely necessary. 2. On tho inland the strength will be left on the uatn traffic 3. To conceal the attempt, « part of strength will be left in each old position. TIT, Remaining Unite hennining unite will be composed as a strong detachments and will . maintain the communication, gether informetion and effect the traffic destruction. : The Atteclzent of an Ar Aray ‘The Commanding General of the 14th Area Army was given « command of the 4th Air arny (exoluding the uni within the operation dirtricts of the 2nd Area Army and/the 37th army) as of gpa JemaryytS. There fore, he issued an order for the air operation in the PHILIPPINES which was entitled: "Principles to be observed in the cperaticn cf the 4th Ady Army" and arranged with the naval air force Supreme Comander in PHTLIS PRIME. ‘The Cooperation Points between the Navy and Army Air forces Prinoiples to be Observed in the Operation of the th Air Aray I. Policy Ae The 4th Air Army wili ain to cash the enemy landing on LUZON and pricr to the landing will seek chances to neutralise “he eneay's ships end air force and will try to reconnoiten the enemy's attempt of attacking Loz. TI, Outline A. The nain purpose of neutralising the enemy ships is to disrupt ‘the line of supplies te HIhOKO. B, The néutralisation of the emeay air force will te exercised mainly on MIMDORO and vccasionally in the LEYTE area ard on aircraft carriers. C, Our ships will be protected ty following the direction mentioned in the preceding item. If necessary, Northern SAN FERNANDO or MANTLA 16| wi % 8, anbicgas unit, Ordnance Service unit and Water and Puri- fication unit, Sick horee Depot. B, Tactics for the Extraction of part of the Forces: 1. Strength on the beach and coast will not be weakened unlese it 1s absolutely necessary. 2. On the inland the strength will be left on the uatn traffie 3. To conceal the attempt, a part of strength will be left in each old position. ‘Ill. Remaining Unite Kemaining units will be composed as a strong detachments and will maintain the communication, gather informetion and effect the traffic destruction. : ‘The Attechzent of ax Air Arny The Comnanding General of the 14th Area Ary was given ¢ oomnani of the 4th Air Aray (excluding the unite within the operation districts of the 2nd Area. Army an the 397th army) an oF 0700}2 Jamary yi, ‘There fore, he fissued an order for the air operation in the PHILIPPINES which was entitled: "Principles to be oteerved in the cperaticn of the 4th ‘Adp Aray" ond arranged with the naval eir force Supreme Commander in PHTLT® Pere. ‘The Cooperation Points between the Navy and Army Air Terces Principles to be Observed in the Operation of the 6th Air Aray I. Poliey ‘A. The 4th Air Aray will aim to cmsh the enemy landing on LUZON and pricr to the landing will seek chances tv neutralize “ho eneny's ships and air force and will try to reconnoite the enemy's attempt of attacking wack. 1. Guthine ‘A. The nein purpose of neutralising the enemy ships is to disrupt ‘the line of supplies to KIM.OhO, B. The néutralisation of the enemy sir force will be exer cised mainly on MIMDORO and occasionally in (he LeY75 area and on aircraft carriers. C, Our ships will be protected by following the direction mentioned 4m the preceding ites, If necessary, Northern SAN FERNANDO or MANTLAHarbor (during navigation, if n>ve3 be) will be directly defended agairst eneay air attacks. D. Watch mst be kept on enemys attempts to land on LUZON. For this Purpose, reconnoit#y the condition and movements of enemy air force and hips in Central and Southern PHILIPPINES and try to gather information conosrning the time, direction, and scale of the enemy attack. B. In case the onony'land, on LUZON, every possible &ffort must mae ‘to emmthilate the enemy, aktps. The main point of attack will be inHcated Jeter as situation demands, F, In case of the enemy's landing, cooperate closely with troops of ‘the Area Army in trying to cmush the enemy's attack. G. To help the air operation in LUZON, arrangements must be made to strengthon the air base in Northern LUZON. TIT, Eoteblishnent of CLARK key position. ‘The 2nd Tank Division Commander started preparations for the etablish- mont of the key point in CLARK area, In planning the operation of the tank @ivision onthe enemy's landing and taking inte consideration the necessity 08 speeding up the construction of the position, the following order of the Area Army, summarised bélew, was tesued on 1 January: Note: The execution of this order 1s mentioned in another book, dealing with the outline of the progress of the KEKBU Group Operation, ‘SHOBU Group Orders A. The 4th Air Aray Comeander will not only perform the present duies ‘but alse establish CLARK key positon in cocperstion with the 2nd Tank Division and the Naval Air Force, as mentioned in another book, dealing with the outline of the cetablishment of CLARK key position. Uni's assigned for the execution o° the work will come under the comand of the 2nd Tank Division Commander. B, The 2nd Tank Division Comender will observe the order nentioned 4m another bock, which deals with the outline of the establishment of CLARK key positéen, The Commanding General cooperating closely with the ith Air Aruy end the Haval Air Foroe, will arrange with the {th Air Army Comander the details of the execution of the work, assigning the necessary arny air forces to the datter,CS. Separate instruction wit Leoued to the 2nd Tank Division Commander outlining the plan of his duties in the operation in Central LUZON. D. The SHOBU Construction Group Commanding Officer will place the strength (the main force of the 2ni and 3ri Engineeri@g Unite) engaged in the construction work in the western highway district coms under com mand of the 2nd Tank Division’ Commander. E. The headquarters of Line of Communication will establish supply depots and sanitary facilities between SAN FERNANDO afd TARLAC and tranefer the main force to O'DONNELL Valley (the new location of CLARK key point supply depot). O'DONNELL needs to be provided with a branch headquarters of Line of Commumication to control sup:ly depots and sanitary factlit: ‘The places suitable for the airfields in O'DONNELL Valley should not be taken over for the establishtant “of above mentioned facilities. Fy Further de‘atle will be issued to the persons on the spot by the assistant chief of the General Sta‘f, alAppended Book: ‘he Essentials of the Establishment of CLAFK Key Position I. Purpose of the CLARK Key Position As In case of operations on LUZON, CLARK airfield group mst keep on functioning as long as possible. 1. If our army cannot use the airfields any longer we must de our Dest to prevent the eneny from using it for as a long period as practicable. "0, Army and Navy Unite, fighting in the Central LUZON district, es pecially in the CLARK airfield vicinity, must jointly hcld the positions wtentngne ‘mountainous country and execute systematic combats. For this purposes 1, A strong retrenchment will .be formed for-e-prolonged combats within the nouhtainous country northwest of CLARK. 2. Several outpost positions will be established on the important ground in front of the retrenchment, for the purpose of stacing repeated and daring counter-attacke, 3s The retrenchaent will gnolude supply depots, hospital and secret airfields (in which some of the repaffhing of equipment will be kept). It SS of CLARK Key Position ‘ A. Maximum Capacity of CLARK Key Positions ~ army = about 20,000 Wavy = about 15,000 Others = about 5,000 Construction of covering facilities for 10,000 fighting men B. Munition to te collected at CLARK Key Position: Ammunition: Most of the ammunition kept by each unit must be collected in the vicinity of each position, Besides, sup: lies suffictent to oustein onedivision's campaign must be collected in ((DONFELL Supply Depot. Pood: A year's supply of rations for 40,000 men, Suprlies for 2 or 3 monthgh will be stored by each unit in their reapective positions Three months supplies mst be kept in installations constructed for that purpose in O'DONNELL Supply Depot. a fF©, Preparation on the airfield against querrilla,warfare and soterised units on airfields against attack by paraunite, or other surprie attacks wit? “Garried out by the air force units, The protection of facilities and equipment outside of CLARK airfield group will be car ied out by the 2nd Tank Division, D. The 2nd Tank Division Commander will plan and direct the ablish- nent of the forward position on the hill west of theaiirfield and the re- trenohment in the mountainous country and will allot the works between ‘the Aray and Naval construction units. E, The construction of installations of the base supply depot will be mainly carried out by the working unit of the 2nd Tank Division, F, The order of priority in construction of base factlities ts as follows: e 1, Retrenchnents 2. Forward positions 3. Supply depots installation. However, all of these works must ‘commence and be executed at the same tine. , the naislwork must be completed ty the end of Jamary, and there- after the strengthening of wenk points rill be proceeded with, TTT. The Working Strength of the CLARK Key Position A. The 2nd Tank Division's Construction Unit Commander «111 control the working strength of Army work#, The compos'tion of the working strength is planned as féllows: 1. From the 2nd Tank Division: 150 persone mainly consisting of the staff engineers of the 2nd Tank “ivision and some of infantry (artillery) o'ficers, ‘The Qn Engineer Unit of the Construction Group: Privates - about 7) Laborers - about 4,000 ‘The 3rd Engineer Unit of the Construction Group: Privates - about 120 Laborers - about 5,900 Buergency Engineer Unit: Privates = about 150 ao!rf « 5 J 2. The Air Force will supply as many men as possible without, effecting the efficiency of the e xecutton of the operation. B, The Naval Unite afe expected to allot as much strength as poneabreh at least 2,009 persons. 1, The Outline of the Disposition of Troops ir Early Part of Samuary, 1945. &. Reinforcenent for BAGUTO, Sinee spring, 1944, the 103rd Division Headquarters were located in BAGUIO, protecting thet area, After it was transferred to the APARHI area, an empeditionary unit of the Arsy Headquerter- and a strong force of the Line of Communication were dispatched there. Then the Area Army Headquarters arrived at the place in early Jamuary, the following orders to reinforce the defenses were issued on 6 January. ‘The Commander of the Line of Com- munication Headqyarters started from MANILA on 7 Jamary, but could not Proceed straight te BAGUIO on account of various hindrances. About 15 Jamary he received at BAMBAM, the order eppointing him ue Defense Commander of the BAGUIO aren, where fe arrived by air at the ond of Jamary. The Outline of the orders 1) The Group will reinforce the defense of the district around BAGUIO, 2) The Commander of the Line of Communication Headquamters will be in charge of defenses of the BAGUIO area and be responsible for the iain of garrison in this area, maintaingng the military Aiocipline of the unite stationed there. He will eucceed the duties of the Chief of the Branch of Line of Conmunicati-n et BiGUTO and becides defending the area boundaries aust at the senefine ghard the MAKI AYAN and BAGUIO Roads, The 6th Emergency Infantry Battalion, the 16th Aeconnaissance Roginent, a MAK: AYAK Anti-atroraft Defense Unit will come under his command, 3) The BAGUIO Defense Commander will be in charge of the area bordered by: CAMP SEVEN, ©T. SAPT0 TOMAS, WT,” CALUGONG, AST, HEIGHT 1554, Qapprox. 4 Filoneters west of TRINIZAD), Northern Heights of ‘TRINIDAD* YAPODOUE (TRe?), ANEANOK and BALATOR, + 2/4) ‘Tho SHOBU BAGUIO Detachment will be dissolved. b. Dispositions of the 10th and the 19th Divisions. "tm onse of Us6. Army's landing, the 10th Division loested in the SAX JOSE vicinity, must be ordered to occupy the position in the mountainous country north of the aforementioned. The 19th Division, which was trans- ferred gradually since late December, mst protect the Northern AN FERNANDO vieinity. The details are described in Section 5, Chapter 1. B. Progress of Preparation for Operations in LUZON Island. In ap mich as the strategy for contucting operations in LUZON Island reached a decision under the circunstancess as stated in the preceding sec- tions, the preparations for operations, though initiated in March 1944, nade very slow progress in spite of efforts rendered by various unite concerned; the munition began to arrive only after July. The preparation tere pushed on for a decisive battle until about the middle of Deceaber, when they were changed for delaying tactics and the main point of fighting otrength wes transferred over to the northern position, Thus we had to meet the landing eneny in a conditipn of imeomplete preparations for operations. 1. Outline of Bperation preparations about the middle of Dec. 1944. a. General situation Disposition of troops in LUZON [eland is shown in the annexed map no. I-1, Fortification works and other preparations in generel for operations of the Ares Army were far from being satisfactory. ‘bd. Situation of the line of commcnication with the rear. Disposition of the rear system is outlined in the annexed map no. ET ‘To each aray group was attached a section of line of communication unit ‘in a respective battle area,when necessity demanded. Aras and ammunition necessary for one engagement or 8/10 thereof; Pfovisions for a month and motor transport fuel for half a month had been allotted to every unit, and stored accordingly to the plan of operations Prevarranged for all the units in the PHILIPPINES. The newly arrived aray Groupe could get no supply excepting what they carried with them, The var materials under the direct control of the Area Aray wese for the most pert transported to ISTTE Island. What was remaining was only enough for half the strength of al] the unite in LU20N Island. NSEN A greater part of the remaining materials was dumped near MANILA and a part 41m LIMOAYEN and some other places. Anti-aircraft protection for these materials was quite insufficient, Bfforte were made to distribute then in underground storages at ANTIPOLO and IPO, northeast of MANILA, but still ‘they were mostly just dumped in the field; only arms and ansunition for helf the strength of a division had so far been stored. Factories for ordnance, motor-ears and other goods were located around MANILA, Efforts were made to distribute then so as to establish a self supplying organs in each locality since sumer, 1944, but there was no such facilities, in the new positions created for the delaying operations excepting BAGUIO. There were some facilities and materiel controlled direct by the Area Ary in the vicinity of CLARK, BAGUIO, SAN JOS® and LOS BANOS, but they were insignificant, = ‘The war materials transported from JAPAN Proper, FORMOSA, STROAPORE ‘and FRENCH TNDO-CHINA wore mostly debarked at MANILA. As the enemy intensi- fled the boubings fron the end of 1944, the materials had to be landed mostly on LINGAYEN Gulf and partly on APAMRIy « large part of then was de- Darlied on LINGAYEN Gulf at that tim. Since summer, we tried by sheer effort to improve our transport organisution, but the transportation from vas at first expected. In about middle of Decenber, the Area Army possessed 13 motor-transport companies (about 300 motor-trucks detestih) and ebout 400 kilolitres of fuel (for JAPAN was not osrried out as efficiently 30 days). ‘The truéks were driven nostly in the night. = ‘The railroads were damaged by enemy bombings duriny December, We could only run one or two trains daily on the southern route, one or two on the northern route to SAN JOSE and 2 or 3 trains on the BAGUIO route, most of them being operated at night. Sanitary unite were established at points as indicated on the afore- said map. The patients numbered about 7,000 of which sbout 1,000 were in- fectious, They were mostly hoppitelized in and near MANILA. There had been neither regular headquarters of line of communication nor regular line of communication troops, until December, when two headquarters anda batte- lion of line of communication troops were opganized.They were composed of patients discharged from the hospitals and of re- Placement personnel staying in MANILA. Food had uitherto been inported fron the FRENCH TXDO-CHIMA gnd other places. Because of shortage of food and insufficient etorage, we started in’December. to buy food in Central and Korthern LUZON, but nothing had yet been added to the storage. The rice collected from CAGAYAN at the beginning of 19/4, was used ‘to supplement the supply on LEYTE, ©. Situation of ali the Aray Groups end the Units under the Direct Ccamand of the Aree Arey. ‘The 103rd and 105th Divisions were stationed in LUZON, With the ex- ception of the 58th Independent Mixed Brigade, all the army groups in LUZON were poorly equipped and badly organised. Especially, the divisional ar ‘illsry which consisted of only 3 bette#es of field and mountain (mortar) guns. sptvtstonte transport consisted only of one notoe-truck company end two transport companies with native horse-drawn wagons, Being very meager in contents, they were tolerably good for the usejin defense of position, but were inadequate for maneuvering in the battlefields. To make the matter worse, the men were poorly trained; they were organised into a d&vision in the sumer of 1944, and deployed in « wide area, hence they had had battalion battle training only once or twice. The Sth and 25rd Divisions and the 2nd Tank Division although gonsistedc of efficient troops that came from MANCHURIA, 2@% were below their normal organisation owing to the difficulties in ship trensportetion and sone of ‘them on the way from MANCHURIA suffered considerable loss of men and arae fron ‘i enony boning. Eapectally, the 23rd Division incurred the 4iegest- loos; it's headquarters lost the chief of staff and most of staff-officere on the sea, it was also deprived of an artillery battelion ond a large pert of the signal equipment. The 10th Division began to arrive from the early part of Decenber, and the 19th Division was expected to be gradually transported foom the end of Deceuber. It was anticipated that both in process of trarsportation will suffer « considerable dancges. ‘The arn organised sone improvised infantry battalions and rear unite from the replacements intended for the southern battle areas and from eed, : oythe patients diecharged from hospitals, but ttmy lecking in unity, equip- nent and tratning) ieoved to be by fer inferior to the aforesaid reorganised Aivisions, It would not be difficult to imagine the strength of the KOBATASHT Unit which was composed of the units being Jastherto in charge of defense of MANILA end of the aforesaid improtived units. dé. Situation of the Positions mi the Traffice and Communication nete of all the Aruy Groups. ‘In areas of APRARI, LINGAYEN BATANGAS, LUCENA, NAGA and LEGASPI, which were the fields of operations of the 10Srd, 23rd, Sth, and 105th Divisions, the positions were constructed df all the key points. Some war materials were dumped in eadh key position and the communication nets, though not quite satisfactory, were established, On the most important roads in Central LUZOH, CAGAYAN Valley and the east and south sides of Lake LAGUNA, main bridges were reinforced with some prope so that they might withstand the passege nediun sae tanks. ‘The transport capacity of the railroad as already stated was very poor. Due to scanty supply of caal, wood and char= coal had to be used instead. Inprovised shelters made at sang (places for trains or loconctives, bit=tiey were fer from being satisfactory. All the works had ¥pitherto been carried out on the principle of "air first®. Hence, the ground forces were provided with only poor facilities in material ‘as well as in man-power. Construction of positions made a very slew pro- gress owing to frequent changes of tactics; vB. at first it te the coastal defense, then the annihilation of enemy at the water's edge and finally ‘the meeting of enexy at strategic points some distance from the coast. @, Situation of JAPANBSE Civilians and Natives roger the JAPANESE Civilian residents, the Area Army tried to repatriate most woment and children from August 1944, but due to transportation not erriving as planned could not be carried out, There remained about 3,000, mostly male, in MANILA and about 1,000 in BAGUIO and gone in other districts, Those engaged in the JAPANESE® managed Mines still contimed their work, Matives in LUZOH, except for a patt of the intellectuals and @ some of those living in the northern and somthern stricts, were not favourably disposed to us, owing to the worsening supply conditions due to the activities of hostile bandits. These bandits hindered our transport, ee, , sverliad utlttery tnfermation to the enmy and condueed native cgntnet ws. Due to the shortage of our occupation forces eine our capture of LUZON and to the incomplete suppression fo bandits, the latter exercteed a etrong influence over the natives. They were gathering strength as cur situation in LEYTE Campaign became unfavorable, In the latter part of ‘the year, 1t was reported repeatedly that ANERTCAN instigators managed to get among the natives supplying them with weapone which were delivered by meane of eirplanos or gubmerines. The prices of commodities had rapidly Figen eines the end of 1943} in Decenber they reached several tines or sbove ten tines of those in the preceding year. Daily necessities tecgne short and were hoarded by natives. 2. Outline of Operation Preparations made towards the Kiddie of Jamery 1945, after the Change of Tactics tn Conducting Operations. ee As already stated, the Area Army Commander decided on the delaying tactics in LUZON about the middle of December, prouptly taking necessary sation for implementation of these tactics, Operation preparations on varicus fronts wore pushed sheet ty the units and organisations concernedy but ‘their progress was eoriouely hampered by damages inflicted on the traffic faoiflities by the eneuy bombings and by the shortgge of cutomobile fuel. “a Maneuvering of troops and construction of position, — 2) Tn Forthern IUZ0N, the 103rd Division concentrated ‘Ate matpsforce im the APARRI ares and transported ite provision and war materials to the sane place, Ite operation preparations were thus encothly Proceeded with, In APARRY and the GADALAN districts to the south, a cave Position was constructed es the key position ani war materials necessary for one campaign ware ntored there, The position of the Séth Indepentont Mixed Brigade on the LIRGAYEN Gulf front constituted a eeires of field fortification within main part made of the cove type, The 23rd Divieton, after having landed @n IN20K, was stationed near SAH JOSE in Central LUZON, but towards the end of Deceuber began moving to the district tithe south of the 58th Independent Mixed Stigede's poottion, completing the move by the beginning of Jamary. Only a seal) part of ite Posttionswas made inthe cave type, Ite poaition requires a lot of work and while ite war materials stored in the position were next to pole.Weapons danaged during the cea voyage were mostly replaced, but 1% had not enough guns end signal equipnent. ‘The 19th Division lanled ite first echelon on Northern SAN FERNAHDO om Decenber, ite second echelon on the 30th and garrisoned the HAGUILIAN area, Ita position was constructed but was not up the stenderd. Pert of ite’ munition debarked on the coast was owing to the leck of transport des= ‘troyed or burnt 4868 upon the ensuy's landing. The division's third echelon dus in § Jamary (1 tm, of the 75th Inf. Regts, 2 tne, of the 76th Inf, Hegt., an artillery bn., the main force of the engineers, a part of transport unit, ete) was left in FORWOSA, The 10th Divisione main foree, consisting of the divisional headquarters, the 39th Infantry Regiment, tho main force of the field gun reginent (its ‘headquarters and one battalion) and the main bedy of engineers and trans~ Port units, landed in MANILA about the middle of December. Its uain force arrived at SAN JOSE befween the last part of Deconber and the first part of Jamary. Tt took over the 23rd Divieton'e position which proved to be very poorly organized, On 8 Jamary, it could not get in touch by Wretess with the Area Aruy Headquarters at BAGUIO, Weither oould it obtain infor= uation about the situation in LINGAYEN Gulf, The TSUDA Detachment of the 26th Division (the main foree of the llth Independent Infantry Regizent end fa battery oe the nucleus) on the coast of BALER Bay was placed under the command of the 10th Division, 4n artillery battalion of the 63rd Infantry Reginent landed in LINGAYEN Gulf towerds the end of Decenber and wes coming up to Join the main force ob Mavision. Ay artillery battalion of the 10th Infantry Regizent lanied in APARRI towards the end of Decenber and uarched southward, reaching BAGABAG about the middle of January. Tho main force of the 2nd Tank Division stationed near CABANATUAR, was ordered to construct the key position arcund CLARK and was preparing to move for this destination eerly in Jamary, But efter the landing of AMERICAN forces in LINGAYEN Gulf, it dispatched only « purt of notile ine fantry to CRARK keeping the nain force for protection of MAXTLA-SAR JOSE Road and cooperating in collection of rice in Central LUZ0! intending there= after to move on. : 2 atThe Area Aruy Comandor was at IPO at the emi of December and moved ‘to BAGUIO on 2 Jammary, ho sain staff was removed fron MANILA to BAGUIO by 8 Jamary, but av a pert of it could not enter BAGUIO it was marched to the BANBANG district about the middle of January. Portion of the Line of communication was dispatched to BAGUIO and Northern BAUBANG towarde 10 Jamery, in order to get the bases esteblished there end ite main force moved to BAGUIO and Northern BAMBANC on 10 Jenvary, Shipping, railroad and MANILA district air reer untts moved to orthern LUZON during the course of January, 2) After the arrival of the let Reiding Group (shuden) in the CLARK district, the position was constructed under supervision of the Group Comander, but the progress of work was rather slow as stated in the appended "Outline of the progress of operation of the KEMEU Group. ~~ BATAAN Peninsular and CORREGIDOR were cecupied by a part of our forces. ‘The old AMERICAN instellationsthere vere repsired, There were no inportant Anstellations, however. 3) The 4th Air army was placed under) the comand of the Area Army Comander on 1 Janusry. It was attacking in cooperation with the neval afr force the enemy convoys as they marched northward. According, hover, to the Area Aruy Commander's order to contime ite fighting in Northern LUZON from MANILA on the 7th and aftervarde towards the end of Jomary moved to FORMOSA. 8) In the position east of MANILA, tHe EANILA Improvised Unit was constructing position since the middle of December, The KOBAYASET Unit, which garrisoned MANTLA, was towards the end of December stationed near IPO. The main 105th Division (3 infantry battalions and an artillery battalion as the mucleus) moved from NAGA to the vicinity of ANTIPOLO ty train or on foot in theflatter part of Decenber, and started to build the Position there. Despite the hindrances by the enemy airplanes towards the ond of works, its mapouver wap carried out smoothly due to the well~denigned plan, : ‘The FOGUCHE Brignde, in charge of the defense of LEGASPI and SAN BER- HADINO Strait, wee ordered to move about the middle of Jamery and arrivedat the north eide of Lake LAGUNA sbout the aiddle of February in defiance of opposition offered by hostile bandite. ‘The KAWASHTUA Brigade of the came division, stetioned in the east and eee TWHOENA, Tt oompleted field fortification with a part of, Gaved=peGaAD. type Later, in early Jemary, it moved to the vicinity of IFO northeast of KANTLA. ‘the Sth Divieton started to move ite main force to tho east of ANTIPOLO i the ond of December, Ito headquarters arrived at the vieinity of HOH- TALBAN to take the conoral comand of the posttion, At firat ‘twas decided not to have Aray hogdquartere, in thie position asa part of the Area Army otaff attached to the Sth Division Headquarters was intended to take the comand of this front as the SHIMBU Group, Later, shout the middle of Merch, At was organized into the Alst ray Headquarters. - The position cast of HANILA was as stated above constructed by units which bogan to arrive there one after another since the end of Decenber. The Area Aray had dug caves to store minitionstiape. In the areas of BA TANOAS and HASUGBO to the south of Lake LAGUNA, we pretendeli to have left anfineiuonttel aray group naned the FUJI Aray Group, with the 17th Infantry Roginent us the mucléas, The unit there was using the installations which wore hitherto used by the Gth Division, After all, most aray groupe were noving in accordance with the now operation tactics since the midéle of Decenber. Transportation of munition was just started when the AMERICAN ‘troops landed. b. Situation in the rear of the Army ‘The general situation in the rear of the Arsy before the middle of Decesber was a8 above-mentioned. Theoretically, the Area Army's Line of Communication, ite operation plans and preparations were actually under way, but practically nothing had been done to materialise the plans until a new pperation ethene was evolved, ‘At 1500 hours on B5 Decenber, the plan of energency disposition of the ‘Lins of commnfcation in Horthern LUZON as stated in the appended sheet wos issued at the SAKURA Barracks (the MANILA Aray Headquarters). ‘The period of the emergency disposition of the Line off Communication ! was sot from the middle of December to 13 Jamary end it vas enthusiastically or 39carried out being guided by principles thet the patients md JANRIESE residents should be moved to the northern bases, especially to the BANBABG district and the munition to the three big bemes, while work on materials urgently needed for future operations, such os the collestion of rice in Central LUZON and the mamufacturing of materials for close combat in the MANILA iotntty should be contimed until KANTLA 40 attacked ty the enemy. Our transport facilities which were ‘the direct command of the Area Aray ot that tine were 13 transport (about 20 effective vehicles in each company, tgp totaling 260). Three companies were assigned for the collection of rice while ten others were alloted to ti emergency transportation. As to railway transport, we liad the facilities of four ‘trains a day, on an average, from MANILA (one train had the capacity of 100 tons), One of thea was assigned for transporting troops south of WANTLA, another for transporting afrial fuel} and ammunition of Aray end Navy in tthe CLARK district and two were appropriated for Wb energency transporteTiew to the northern district, Thus, due to the comparatively short distance, our emergency transpert capacity to SAN JOS! ant BAGUZO Sectors exounted to about 400 tone « day under the best conditions (notor transport and ratl- way each hed the sane capacity of 200/cms). Before the end of December, the transport of serial fuel and commition was given pricrity, but towards (is 10thof Jamary, with the close of the ecrial operations, this transport became unnecessary. fiowever, the enemy air raids gradually becane nore violent and trains could operate only at night. Moreover, the bandits frequently hindered our transport with the result that 200 tone of munition rarely reached ite destinations in a day. ‘The first exergency transport of the above capacity commenced to operate on 17 Decenber and ceased on about 10 Jamary. The munition transported to the BAGUIO Area vas unloaded near Camp One in SAK JOSE and BUNKAN vicinity a in the BAMBANG Area. The anount transported reached the total of about 10,000 tons, but a part of 1t was damaged by air raide and bandite activitios op the way. ‘The earlier project was to move materials to the mountains’ foot of each base ty rail and most of the trucks, thence transfer to sub-arees on trucks and finally heui“into the key positions. During this period , however, ee Vfost of HE we only managed to dump the materials at the pountains In the face of air raids and bandit ectivities, our forces did « good job and transport of such a great anount was possible because of the canm paratively slow enemy landings Difticulty was felt most, at this tine and in later operations, in the moving of auto foslh and provisions, ‘The fuel for motor transport which the Line of communication hed on 3 January, wes about 400 drune (200 litre per drum) and all that was alnest entirely consuned ty about 7 Jamary. Six thousand: drums of gasoline were scheduled to reach Rorthern SAN FERMAKDO fron FORMOSA as the entire supply for future operations, However, the appearence of enesy warships in LINGAYBH Gulf on 6 Jamary nade this impossible apd the forces had to rely on their own small stockh. At that tine, we hed about 100,000 cous of serial gasoline in the PHILIPPINES, but this was not used, , As to the collection of rice, in Central LUZON; t was, after amy changes in Plane, finally decided in the arly part of December, that each aray group would procure and gather their om eupply, but owing yo the shortage in ‘transport capacity, we could not complete its delivery to the appointed places befere the enemy's landing. A considerable anount of our munition landed on the coast of SAN FER® MANDO and in other places was destroyed by the oneny's bombings ona ta! ambararee nts ‘pefore the rest could be removed to the main positions in BAGUIO. In MAXTLA about 100 BANGALORE Torpedoos and 200 hand grenades, both do~ signed for the use in 46. close combat, were being turned out daily, Prov duction was continued until the middle of Yamary, tut s part of the finished goods could not be distributed. As stated before, the rear line of comm~ nication were in the process of transportation or preparetions and were caught unprepared for action when the enesy landed.il a a al el alee iain Appended Shoot General Policy for the Emergency Disposition of Line of Communication in LUZON Area. 1. General Intentions Our chief aim was to form positions for fighting in the LUZON operation with war materials now on hand and concurrently to make efforts to organise the basis fer supporting ourselves in the ocoupation areas for a long period. II. Outline A, In the earlier part of the operation (prior to the cocupation of retrenchnents) each division must,as their principle, must use the war materials at hand end must not be supplied from other aray groupe except 4m special cases. Therefore, each division (esp, the Sth, 195th, 103rd Divisions) must carry the war materials (esp. munition and fuel} with ‘thon in oll their MamaweMimnition suffictent to lest 0.8 of an engagensrit for each division). Be Supply bases for the latter period of operations were established ats | 1, Northern Base BAMBAN District Forthern BAGUIO District 2. Southern Base West of CLARK District Of the abeve three bases the importance and pricrity in construction and collection of sunttion and provisions will conseded to the Northern base, Cy War materials which are alreudy collected in the Wisibetgast of LUON are to be transferred and collected in the above three bases &t the earliest possible dates. (except the munition distributed to each division and collectegls 108 2A108.) The transportation from HANTLA area is to be given the highest priority. , D. Railroads and moter-cars are to be utilised only fer the trans- portation of war materials from MANILA area to each base (esp. northern bases). ‘Transportation of militery personnel is to be restricted to specie eases, To execute the aforementioned, it is requested to maintain the ae 32 :Appenied Sheet (contimed) following transport facilities for the area north of HANTLA. Independent noter-transport companies ~6 Traine starting from MANILA, four trains por day (1 train = 240 tons) Thereby, 600 tons are to arrive in the nerthern bases per day. Loeal transport to each base is not mentioned here. Ite disposition is to be stated elsewhere, “B, Im addition to the previous item, transprtation by emall boats te to be carried out between MANILA and Northern SAN FERNANDO. P, Transportation of War materials from MANILA will be restricted to ‘those considered of utmost importance in combat, of which the following are the main articles; 2. ammunition chiefly service type below 3,500 tons 25 kilgrens 2. weapons chSifly service type 500 tons 3. Ainstrumente aba Amolufes oll signalling 500 tone materials apparatus and materiale 4. power eopecially antitank materials 200 tons 5. spare parts for 1,500 tone vehicles 6. food staple food (non-perishable) side dish ( * ced one raw materials (mostly salt) 3,000 tons 7. clothing and 750 toms materiels for repairs 8 6G. expendable articles 400 tons 9. materiale for ‘A1lumination 60 tons 10, medical stores 250 tons ‘11, veterinary stores 200 tons 12, othere 150 tons of paper currency,40 tons of coins and included 400 tons. totel 12,850 tone (capacity of transportation is 11,850 tons) a 3sEL, TT IRE a ° ‘Tee collection and transportation of fuel will be directed by further G. The eforestated war materials have been allotted upon the following Northern base (§g@UIO and Northern BAMBAK, 211) 7 : Southern base 2 Western base 1 H. About 7,000 patients and $5 JAPANESE women will be transported in traine carrying war materials to the north base and be accomodated there, If necessary, part of the trains will be alloted for their transportation, (one train for 400 persons) 1. The transportation as planned above is to be carried cut #0 as to be completed within a month, J. As a epeciel measue, efforts will be made to secure 10,000 drums of air fuel for the use of sotor transport. K. The collection and purchase of rice will be done according to pre-arranged plans, except in the BIKAL district. Le delaying action in the retrenchnents will be indicated by further order, Fundamental (about 500 tons) equipment for repair and namufacturing will be transported to the northern base simultaneously with ‘the above transportation. M. ‘The efficiency of transport mist be increased by putting the road and traffic in the northern bese vicinity under t% strict control. Hl, ‘The local self-supporting of supply depots must provide everything except the articles mentioned above. 40 3YIT. Area Army operations during the Initial Stage (January to February) of the 1UZ0N Island operation. A. Situation prior to the landing of the U.S. Army. le 2. 6 U.S. Air raids in the first ten days of January, ‘on nearing the completion of their air bases on LET? and MINDORO the 1.8, Air force began its attack on various points of UIZO, especially the airfields in the vicinity of CLARK FIFLD and MANTLA, to rain air supremacy. ‘Task force carrier planes totaling 1,300 attacked FORUNSA on January 3, l, and 5, and cut our supply Lines fron the rear, especially the supply of planes. 2 Fntrance of the U.S, Transport convoy into IT CAY™ cult. The U.S. Transport convoy, which entered UIMANA Sea throuch SURTCAO Strait, sailed to the north after 2 Jaruary, oe @ fleet consisting of at least 12 airoraft carriers as a mcleus. Tt entered ITMCAT ‘EN Gulf on the 6th, and daily shelled the coast. U.S. Air forces cooperating with this attack bombarded landing points in the LINCAYRN and SAN FRNAMO Areas. our air forces tried to counter-attack this by takin; advantae of the early morning and evening dusk and the cood weather. However, we could do little, due to the wide difference in strength between our airforce and the overpowerin; mmbers of eneny plant January ° From early morning, the enemy shelled north Sav “=RNA'M, SUAL and MADTIAO from the sea, the bombardment being concentrated on SAN FERNANDO. bservation planes were continuously emubetey in the air.a Enemy planes which attacked UJZON numbered 288 (inelud= “hy ing 127 carrier planes), with their main force bonbard~ ing CLARK FIRLD and MANTIA. Bombardment of landing points in LINGAY Culf were focused mainly on the northern position of MANAOAC. Jaruary ‘The U.S. Fleet’ concentrated its ships (5 battleships, L cruisers, 3 destroyers, and 29 IST!s) off the coast of SAN FABTAN and LTNCAYRN, ‘They also swept the sea for mines near BAUANC, reconnoitered the SAN FAHTAN ‘Area ani bonbed and demolished the bridres south of MANAOKG. U.S. warships facin¢ DAMORTIS and SA FARTAN shelled the coast from a distance of 10 to 12 ha, between 1100 and 1200, resuaing their shelling at 1530. shelling was directed at the| vicinity of DAUNRTTS red ght depots Sh FAMTANy and the dietrict ast of these places, however, this shelling was not always directed at our positions. Duriny the breake in the Naval shellings, in the fore noon and afternoon,carrier planes were always in the air, persistently bombing our positions and war supplies. Avout 130, our 30 om. howitgers at ROSARTO shelled the U.S. warships faciny DAMORTTS and SAN TARTAN, which then retired out of our range. At 2155, the enewy warships returned and shelled DAM ORTTS and RARON, using white {1lusinous shells. U.S, planes boubed a1 brides in central [1zow in an attempt to cut off our transportation. The highway and railway bridges over PAMPANCA River at CALNUPTT, the Uridge over ANCAT River at BULAITTRL, the MANANAC Bride, royed wore S8Seehie vy vert Las. ani the UMINCAY Brid) 6 we