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2 1
Israel’s Self-Destruction 44
Netanyahu, the Palestinians, and the Price of Neglect
Aluf Benn
Letters 208
“Foreign Affairs . . . will tolerate wide differences of opinion. Its articles will not represent any
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What it does accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear there.”
Archibald Cary Coolidge, Founding Editor
Volume 1, Number 1 • September 1922
Book Reviewers
lisa anderson, barry eichengreen, Richard Feinberg, lawrence d. freedman,
g. john ikenberry, maria lipman, jessica t. mathews, andrew moravcsik,
andrew j. nathan, nicolas van de walle
Board of Advisers
jami miscik Chair
jesse h. ausubel, peter e. bass, john b. bellinger, kenneth chenault,
susan chira, cesar conde, jessica p. einhorn, francis fukuyama,
thomas h. glocer, adi ignatius, jeh charles johnson, william h. mcraven,
michael j. meese, Justin Muzinich, neal s. wolin, daniel h. yergin
t he f ig ht f or a n e w m iddl e east
F
or years, the vision of an Israeli national security officials have repeat-
state and a Palestinian state edly and publicly reaffirmed their
existing side by side in peace belief that it represents the only way
and security has been derided as hope- to create lasting peace among the
lessly naive—or worse, as a dangerous Israelis, the Palestinians, and the Arab
illusion. After decades of U.S.-led countries of the Middle East. And the
diplomacy failed to achieve that out- United States is hardly alone: the call
come, it seemed to many observers that for a return to the two-state paradigm
the dream had died; all that was left has been echoed by leaders across the
to do was bury it. But it turns out that Arab world, the countries of the EU,
reports of the death of the two-state middle powers such as Australia and
solution were greatly exaggerated. Canada, and even Washington’s main
In the wake of the monstrous rival, China.
attack Hamas launched on Israel on The reason for this revival is not
October 7 and the grievous war that complicated. There are, after all, only
Israel has waged on the Gaza Strip a few possible alternatives to the
ever since, the allegedly dead two- two-state solution. There is Hamas’s
state solution has been resurrected. solution, which is the destruction of
U.S. President Joe Biden and his top Israel. There is the Israeli ultra-right’s
8 foreign affairs
Martin Indyk
solution, which is the Israeli annex- dictator Saddam Hussein’s army from
ation of the West Bank, the disman- Kuwait, the United States kick-started
tling of the Palestinian Authority the process that eventually led to the
(PA), and the deportation of Pales- Oslo accords. And yet, as a result of the
tinians to other countries. There is war in Gaza, the United States finds
the “conflict management” approach itself with a stronger need for a cred-
pursued for the last decade or so by ible process that can eventually lead
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin to an agreement, and stronger lever-
Netanyahu, which aimed to maintain age to transform the resurrection of
the status quo indefinitely—and the the two-state solution from a talking
world has seen how that worked out. point to a reality. Doing so, however,
And there is the idea of a binational will take a significant commitment of
state in which Jews would become a time and political capital. Biden will
minority, thus ending Israel’s status have to play an active role in shap-
as a Jewish state. None of those alter- ing the decisions of a reluctant Israeli
natives would resolve the conflict—at ally, an ineffective Palestinian partner,
least not without causing even greater and an impatient international com-
calamities. And so if the conflict is to munity. And because what he will be
be resolved peacefully, the two-state pushing for is an incremental approach
solution is the only idea left standing. that would achieve peace only over a
All that was true before October 7. lengthy period, the two-state solution
But a lack of leadership, trust, and inter- needs to be enshrined now as the ulti-
est on both sides—and the repeated mate objective in a U.S.-sponsored UN
failure of American efforts to change Security Council resolution.
those realities—made it impossible to
conceive of a credible pathway to a THE LONG AND
two-state solution. And doing so now WINDING ROAD
has become even more difficult. The The two-state solution dates back to
Israelis and the Palestinians are angrier at least 1937, when a British com-
and more fearful than at any time since mission suggested a partition of the
the outbreak of the second intifada in British mandate territory then known
October 2000; the two sides seem as Palestine into two states. Ten years
less likely than ever to achieve the later, the UN General Assembly passed
mutual trust that a two-state solu- Resolution 181, which proposed two
tion would require. Meanwhile, in states for two peoples: one Arab, one
an age of great-power competition Jewish. Although the resolution’s rec-
abroad and political polarization at ommended territorial partition left
home, and after decades of failed dip- neither side satisfied, the Jews accepted
lomatic and military interventions in it—but the Palestinians, encouraged by
the Middle East, Washington enjoys their Arab state sponsors, rejected it.
far less influence and credibility in the The ensuing war led to the founding of
region than it did in the 1990s, when, the state of Israel; millions of Palestin-
after the collapse of the Soviet Union ians, meanwhile, became refugees, and
and the U.S.-led eviction of the Iraqi their national aspirations languished.
10 foreign affairs
The Strange Resurrection of the Two-State Solution
The idea of a Palestinian state lay two countries would share control of
mostly dormant for decades as Israel Jerusalem’s so-called Holy Basin, the
and its Arab neighbors became pre- site of the most important shrines of
occupied with their own conflict, one the three Abrahamic faiths.
result of which was the Israeli occu- But a final agreement on those terms
pation and settlement of Gaza and the never materialized. As a member of
West Bank after the 1967 Six-Day the Clinton administration’s negotiat-
War, which placed millions of Pal- ing team at the time, I came to see that
estinians under direct Israeli control neither side was ready to compromise
but without the rights accorded to on the highly emotional question of
Israeli citizens. Eventually, however, who would control Jerusalem or on
terrorist attacks launched by the Pal- the issue of “the right of return” of Pal-
estine Liberation Organization and estinian refugees, which was deeply
an uprising of the Palestinian people threatening to the Israelis. In the end,
against Israeli occupation in the 1980s the edifice of peace that so many had
forced Israel to come to terms with labored so hard to construct was con-
the fact that the situation had become sumed in a paroxysm of violence as
untenable. In 1993, Israel and the PLO the Palestinians launched another,
signed the American-brokered Oslo more intense uprising and the Israelis
accords, recognizing each other and expanded their occupation of the West
laying the groundwork for a phased, Bank. The ensuing conflict lasted for
incremental process intended to even- five years, claiming thousands of lives
tually lead to the establishment of an on both sides and destroying all hopes
independent Palestinian state. The for reconciliation.
two-state solution’s moment appeared Every subsequent American presi-
to have arrived. dent has sought to revive the two-state
By the end of the Clinton admin- solution, but none of their initiatives
istration, the Oslo process had gen- proved capable of overcoming the
erated a detailed outline of what the mistrust generated by the Palestin-
two-state solution would look like: ian return to violence and the Israeli
a Palestinian state in 97 percent of settlers’ determination to annex the
the West Bank and all of Gaza, with West Bank. The Israelis became frus-
mutually agreed swaps of territory trated by the Palestinian leadership’s
that would compensate the Palestin- unwillingness to respond to what they
ian state for the three percent of West regarded as generous offers for Pales-
Bank land that Israel would annex, tinian statehood, and the Palestinians
which at that time contained some never believed that the offers were
80 percent of all the Jewish settlers genuine or that Israel would deliver
on Palestinian lands. The Palestin- if they dared compromise on their
ians would have their capital in East claims. Leaders on both sides preferred
Jerusalem, where predominantly Arab to blame each other rather than find
suburbs would come under Palestinian a way to lead their people out of the
sovereignty and predominantly Jewish miserable morass that the failed peace
suburbs under Israeli sovereignty. The process had created.
12 foreign affairs
Martin Indyk
Arabia, the world’s largest oil producer Since the Saudis needed some political
and the custodian of Islam’s holiest cover for their deal with Israel, they
sites. From a U.S. point of view, there were amenable to Biden’s proposal for
was a compelling strategic logic to significant constraints on West Bank
normalization: Israel and Saudi Arabia settlement activity, the transfer of addi-
could serve as the anchors for a U.S. tional West Bank territory to Pales-
“offshore balancing” role that would tinian control, and the resumption of
stabilize the region while freeing up Saudi aid to the PA.
American attention and resources to By early October 2023, Israel, Saudi
deal with an assertive China and an Arabia, and the United States were on
aggressive Russia. the brink of a regional realignment.
Biden found a willing partner in Netanyahu had not yet accepted the
Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Moham- Palestinian component of the deal, and
med bin Salman, widely known as his coalition’s opposition to any settle-
MBS, who had embarked on an ambi- ment concessions made it unclear how
tious effort to modernize his country much of the proposed agreement would
and diversify its economy. Fearing he survive—as did MBS’s general diffi-
would be unable to defend the fruits dence. Still, had a breakthrough taken
of that investment with Saudi Arabia’s place, the Palestinians would likely have
limited military capabilities, he sought been sidelined yet again, and Netanya-
a formal defense treaty with the United hu’s ultra-right government would have
States, as well as the right to maintain gained greater confidence in pursuing
an independent nuclear fuel cycle and its annexation strategy. But then it all
to buy advanced U.S. arms, using the came crashing down.
prospect of normalization with Israel
to make such an agreement palatable LAST PLAN STANDING
to the heavily pro-Israel U.S. Senate. At first glance, it may be hard to see
MBS cared little for the Palestinians why what happened next would help
and was not willing to condition his resurrect the two-state solution. It is
deal on progress toward a two-state difficult to express in words the trauma
solution. The Biden administration, that all Israelis suffered on October 7:
however, feared that bypassing the Pal- the complete failure of the vaunted
estinians completely could lead to a military and intelligence capabilities
Palestinian uprising, especially because, of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to
in 2022, Netanyahu had formed a coa- protect Israeli citizens; the horrific
lition government with ultranational- atrocities committed by Hamas fight-
ist and ultrareligious parties who were ers that left some 1,200 Israelis dead
bent on annexing the West Bank and and nearly 250 captives in Gaza; the
toppling the PA. The administration ongoing hostage saga that suffuses
also assessed that it could not secure every Israeli home with grief and
the necessary Democratic votes in the concern; the displacement of border
Senate for a defense treaty with the communities in southern and northern
unpopular Saudis without a substantial Israel. In this context, not surprisingly,
Palestinian component in the package. Israelis of all stripes have no interest
14 foreign affairs
The Strange Resurrection of the Two-State Solution
invading in 1982. There is no credible and “martyrs” for terrorist acts against
way to bring the war in Gaza to an end the Israelis. The United States and the
without trying to fashion a new, more Sunni Arab states, including Egypt,
stable order there. But that cannot be Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, are
done without also establishing a cred- already engaged in detailed discussions
ible path to a two-state solution. The with the PA about all these steps and
Sunni Arab states, led by Saudi Arabia, seem satisfied that the PA is willing to
are insisting on that as a condition for undertake them. But it will require the
their support for the revitalization of the active cooperation and support of the
PA and the reconstruction of Gaza, as is Netanyahu government, which ada-
the rest of the international community. mantly opposes a PA role in Gaza and
The PA would need to be able to point has so far refused to make any deci-
to that goal in order to legitimize any sions about the “day after” there.
role it played in controlling Gaza. And Once the revitalization process got
the Biden administration must be able underway, it would probably take
to include the goal of two states as part around a year to train and deploy PA
of the Israeli-Saudi agreement it is still security and civilian cadres in Gaza.
eager to broker. During this period, Israel would
The first step would be for the likely undertake some military activ-
Palestinians to establish a credible ity against residual Hamas forces. In
governing authority in Gaza to fill the meantime, an interim governing
the vacuum left by the eradication body would need to run the territory.
of Hamas rule. This is the opportu- That entity would need to be legiti-
nity for the PA to expand its writ and mized by a UN Security Council reso-
unite the divided Palestinian polity. lution and would oversee the gradual
But with its credibility already at a low assumption of responsibility by the
point, the PA cannot afford to be seen PA. It would control a peacekeeping
as Israel’s subcontractor, maintaining force tasked with maintaining order.
order for the sake of Israel’s security To prevent friction with the IDF, the
interests. Fortunately, Netanyahu’s force would need to be led by a U.S.
opposition to the PA taking control general. But there would be no need
in Gaza seems to have backfired, serv- for American boots on the ground:
ing only to legitimize the idea in the troops could come from other coun-
minds of many Palestinians. tries friendly to Israel that have deep
But in its current state, the PA is experience in peacekeeping operations
in no position to take responsibil- and would be acceptable to the Pales-
ity for governing and policing Gaza. tinians, including Australia, Canada,
As Biden has put it, the PA must be India, and South Korea. Sunni Arab
“revitalized.” It needs a new prime states should be invited to participate
minister, a new set of competent in the force, although it is unlikely that
technocrats who are not corrupt, a they would want to take responsibility
trained security force for Gaza, and for policing the Palestinians.
reformed institutions that no longer But even without contributing
incite against Israel or reward prisoners troops, the Sunni Arab states would
16 foreign affairs
The Strange Resurrection of the Two-State Solution
have a critical role to play. Egypt has infrastructure and control mechanisms
a considerable interest in securing the in place. Washington can try to con-
stability that would allow millions of vince the IDF to shift to a more targeted
Gazans to move away from the Egyp- approach that will produce fewer casu-
tian border, where they pose a con- alties. But for any postwar order to take
tinual threat of flooding into Egypt. shape, Hamas’s command-and-control
Egyptian intelligence has good ground system must be broken—and that out-
knowledge of Gaza, and the Egyptian come is far from guaranteed.
army can help prevent the smuggling On the other side, the survival of
of arms into Gaza from the Sinai Netanyahu’s government coalition with
Peninsula—although it failed to do ultra-right and ultrareligious parties
so before October 7. Jordan has less depends on the rejection of the two-
influence in Gaza than Egypt does, but state solution and any return of the
the Jordanians have ably trained Pales- PA to Gaza. Although speculation is
tinian security forces in the West Bank rife in Israel that Netanyahu will be
and could do the same for PA forces in hounded out of office soon and new
Gaza. The oil-rich Gulf Arab states elections will bring a moderate, centrist
have the necessary resources to rebuild coalition to power, his survival skills
Gaza and fund the revitalization of the are unmatched; he should never be
PA. But none of them will be suckered counted out.
into footing the bill unless they can tell Nevertheless, Biden retains consid-
their own people that doing so will lead erable leverage over Netanyahu. The
to the end of the Israeli occupation and IDF is now heavily dependent on mil-
the eventual emergence of a Palestinian itary resupply from the United States
state—which would prevent another as it contemplates having to fight a
round of war that would leave them two-front war against Hamas in Gaza
holding the bag again. and Hezbollah in southern Lebanon.
Israel has expended massive amounts
A FRIEND IN NEED of materiel in its campaign in Gaza,
There are, of course, two major obsta- requiring two emergency efforts by
cles to such a plan, and they are the the Biden administration to expedite
main combatants in the war. Although resupply by bypassing congressional
its control of northern Gaza is now in oversight, much to the chagrin of some
doubt, Hamas still maintains its under- of the Senate Democrats whom Biden
ground strongholds in the southern will need to support an Israeli-Saudi
cities of Khan Younis and Rafah. As of deal. Even if Israel opts for a more tar-
this writing, it still holds around 130 geted campaign in Gaza, it will have to
hostages whom it intends to use as bar- restock its arsenal and be prepared for a
gaining chips; the longer the fighting resource-intensive war with Hezbollah.
drags on, the more domestic pressure Holding up resupplies is something
will build on Netanyahu to agree to a that Biden is reluctant to do because he
semipermanent cease-fire in exchange does not want to look as if he is under-
for the rest of the hostages, poten- mining Israel’s security. But in a stand-
tially leaving a good part of Hamas’s off with Netanyahu, Biden could drag
his feet on certain decisions by tying was time to withdraw one of the carrier
things up in bureaucratic procedures battle groups, the IDF asked them to
or asking for congressional reviews. keep it in place.
That might lead the IDF to press Net- This heavy tactical and strategic
anyahu to give in. Pressure might also dependence on the United States is
come from the decorated military men a new phenomenon. Washington has
who serve in his emergency war cabi- long served as Israel’s second line of
net: the retired generals Benny Gantz defense. But the deployment of the
and Gadi Eisenkot, who lead the main U.S. carrier battle groups signaled that
opposition party, and Yoav Gallant, the in some ways, the United States has
defense minister. become Israel’s first line of defense.
This dynamic has already begun to Israel is no longer able to “defend itself
play out. Even though it has taken a by itself,” as Netanyahu was fond of
Herculean effort, the Biden admin- bragging before October 7. He may do
istration has succeeded in convincing his best to ignore this new reality, but
the IDF to reshape its strategy and tac- the IDF cannot afford to do so.
tics—limiting the scope of its opera- Meanwhile, Israel is weathering a
tions against Hamas and restraining tsunami of international criticism as its
it from taking on Hezbollah—and indiscriminate use of force in the early
has persuaded it to allow increasing stages of the war, when it was react-
amounts of humanitarian aid into ing out of rage rather than calculation,
Gaza, including opening the Israeli caused massive civilian casualties. The
port of Ashdod to supplies. Gallant has United States alone has stood in the
even publicly stated his support for the breach, repeatedly protecting Israel
PA to assume a role in Gaza, directly from international censure and defend-
contradicting the prime minister. ing its right to continue prosecuting the
In the long run, the IDF will remain war against Hamas despite the almost
heavily dependent on military support universal demands for a cease-fire. This
from the United States to rebuild its serves American interests, too, since
deterrent power, which took a blow Hamas’s destruction is a prerequisite
on October 7. This new dependence for establishing a more peaceful order
is best illustrated by the need for the in Gaza. But Israel is just one Ameri-
United States to deploy two carrier can abstention away from UN Security
battle groups to the eastern Mediter- Council resolutions that could invoke
ranean and a nuclear-powered sub- sanctions. Like its newly acute military
marine to the region to deter Iran and dependence on Washington, this polit-
Hezbollah from joining the fray at the ical isolation makes Israel vulnerable to
outset of the war. Before October 7, U.S. leverage.
Israel’s military capabilities alone had Until now, Netanyahu seemed deter-
served as a sufficient deterrent, and the mined to resist the influence of his only
United States was able to deploy its real friend in the international commu-
major forces elsewhere. But according nity, using outright public rejections of
to reporting by Israel’s Channel 12, in the two-state solution to shore up his
January, when U.S. officials decided it coalition and gain credit with his base
18 foreign affairs
The Strange Resurrection of the Two-State Solution
claim that Israel has to maintain over- Biden would clearly prefer to avoid a
all security control in the West Bank face-off with Netanyahu, but it seems
and Gaza by emphasizing alternative inevitable. As the president contem-
U.S.-supervised security arrange- plates how to get Netanyahu’s atten-
ments, including the demilitarization tion, he needs to find a way to change
of the Palestinian state, which would Netanyahu’s calculus—or, if Netanyahu
reconcile Israeli security needs with continues to balk, to help win Israeli
Palestinian sovereignty—and keep public support for Biden’s preferred
Israelis safer than would a permanent “day after” approach.
military occupation. Saudi Arabia can lend a significant
Caving in to Biden would go against hand in this effort. Before October 7,
all of Netanyahu’s political instincts. Biden thought he was on the cusp of a
The only way Netanyahu can reliably strategic breakthrough on Israeli-Saudi
stay in power now is by maintaining peace. That opportunity still exists, the
his coalition with the ultranationalists, Gaza war notwithstanding. MBS is not
who adamantly oppose the revital- about to let his ambitious trillion-dollar
ization of the PA and the two-state plan for the development of his country
solution. If he gave in, he would run be buried by Hamas. Nor is he happy at
the considerable risk of losing power. the boost that the war has given to Iran
Normally, when he is backed into the and its partners in the “axis of resis-
corner, Netanyahu dances: giving in a tance,” which threatens Saudi Arabia
little to the United States while reas- as much as Israel. Because the deal he
suring his hard-liners that his con- had negotiated with Biden serves the
cessions are not serious. On the issue vital interests of his kingdom, he is
of Israeli settlements in particular, he still interested in forging ahead when
has gotten away with that maneuver things quiet down. But normalization
for 15 years. with Israel is now highly unpopular
But the jig is up. Netanyahu cannot in Saudi Arabia, where public opin-
credibly claim to support a two-state ion, as elsewhere in the Arab world,
solution. He did so before, in 2009, but has turned even more fiercely against
it has since become obvious that he Israel. The only way MBS can square
was lying, as he now boasts of having this circle is to insist on the very
prevented the emergence of a Pales- thing he was indifferent to before
tinian state. But even if Netanyahu October 7: a credible pathway toward
maintains his opposition to that out- a two-state solution.
come, cooperation with a U.S. post- Biden should make clear the choice
war plan for Gaza would commit him facing Israelis. They can continue on
to actions, such as allowing the PA to the road to a forever war with the
operate in Gaza and restricting settle- Palestinians, or they can embrace the
ment activity in the West Bank, that U.S. “day after” plan—and be rewarded
would constitute a credible pathway to with peace with Saudi Arabia and bet-
a two-state solution—and would thus ter relations with the broader Arab and
doom his fragile coalition and likely Muslim worlds. Netanyahu has already
end his career. publicly rejected these terms. But he
20 foreign affairs
The Strange Resurrection of the Two-State Solution
did so after the deal was offered in the horse: the PA must first embark on
private. Biden should try again—but building credible, accountable, trans-
this time, he should pitch the deal parent institutions, demonstrating that
directly to the Israeli public in a way it is a trustworthy “state in the making,”
that would shift its attention from the before it is rewarded with recognition.
trauma of October 7. There is, however, another way to
After the Yom Kippur War in 1973, demonstrate American and interna-
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat tional commitment to the two-state
captured Israelis’ imaginations with solution. The basis for every negotia-
a surprise visit to Jerusalem. MBS is tion among Israel, its Arab neighbors,
unlikely to be as adventurous, but he and the Palestinians is UN Security
might be persuaded to join Biden in Council Resolution 242, which was
appealing directly to the Israeli public passed and accepted by Israel and the
via an interview with a respected Israeli Arab states following the Six-Day
TV journalist. Working together, Biden War in 1967. (In 1998, the PLO also
and MBS could use the Saudi offer of accepted it as the basis for the nego-
peace to enhance a message of hope. tiations that led to the Oslo accords.)
They could point to the Saudi and Resolution 242 is silent, however,
Sunni Arab role in promoting PA rule on the Palestinian issue, except for
in Gaza and the two-state solution as a passing reference to the need for a
ways of ensuring that the Palestinians just settlement of the refugee issue.
will do their part. Biden would need to It makes no mention of any of the
add, in nonthreatening terms, that such other final-status issues, although it
a breakthrough would serve the vital does make an explicit reference to
strategic interests of the United States, “the inadmissibility of the acquisi-
as well as bring peace with Saudi Ara- tion of territory by war” and the need
bia to Israel. He would need to convey for Israeli withdrawal from territo-
that he therefore thinks it’s reasonable ries (although not “the territories”) it
to expect Israel to cooperate—and that occupied in the 1967 war.
he would not understand if its govern- A new resolution that updated Res-
ment refused to do so. olution 242 could enshrine the U.S.
Biden will face a less acute but similar and international community’s com-
problem when it comes to persuading mitment to the two-state solution in
the Palestinians and Arab leaders, who international law. It would invoke UN
have little reason to trust his commit- General Assembly Resolution 181 in
ment to a Palestinian state—especially calling for two states for two peoples
since they know there is a chance that based on mutual recognition of the
Biden will not be in the White House Jewish state of Israel and the Arab
come 2025. Winning them over will state of Palestine. It could also call on
not be easy. Some have suggested that both sides to avoid unilateral actions
the United States should recognize the that would impede the achievement
Palestinian state now, with its borders of the two-state solution, including
negotiated later. But a grand gesture settlement activity, incitement, and
of that sort would put the cart before terrorism. And it could call for direct
22 foreign affairs
Return to Ta b l e of Con te n ts
t he f ig ht f or a n e w m i ddl e e ast
I
srael’s devastating response to killed by Israeli settlers or Israeli troops,
Hamas’s shocking October 7 and more than 3,000 Palestinians were
attack has produced a humanitar- arrested, many without charges.
ian catastrophe. During the first 100 Almost from the outset, it was clear
days of war alone, Israel dropped the that Israel did not have an endgame for
kiloton equivalent of three nuclear its war in Gaza, prompting the United
bombs on the Gaza Strip, killing some States to fall back on a familiar for-
24,000 Palestinians, including more mula. On October 29, just as Israel’s
than 10,000 children; wounding tens ground invasion was getting underway,
of thousands more; destroying or dam- U.S. President Joe Biden said, “There
aging 70 percent of Gaza’s homes; and has to be a vision for what comes next.
displacing 1.9 million people—about And in our view, it has to be a two-state
85 percent of the territory’s inhabitants. solution.” Three weeks later, after the
By this point, an estimated 400,000 extraordinary devastation of northern
Gazans were at risk of starvation, Gaza, the president said again, “I don’t
according to the United Nations, and think it ultimately ends until there is a
infectious disease was spreading rapidly. two-state solution.” And on January 9,
During the same period in the West after more than three months of war,
Bank, hundreds of Palestinians were U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken
took up the refrain again, telling the And Israeli settlements had grown to
Israeli government that a lasting solu- the extent that creating a viable, con-
tion “can only come through a regional tiguous Palestinian state had become
approach that includes a pathway to a almost impossible. For nearly a quarter
Palestinian state.” century, there had also been no serious
These calls to revive the two-state Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, and
solution may come from good inten- no major constituency in Israeli poli-
tions. For years, a two-state solution tics supported resuming them. Hamas’s
has been the avowed goal of U.S.-led shocking attack on Israel and Israel’s
diplomacy, and it is still widely seen as subsequent months-long obliteration of
the only arrangement that could plausi- Gaza have only exacerbated and accel-
bly meet the national aspirations of two erated those trends.
peoples living in a single land. Estab- The principal effect of talking again
lishing a Palestinian state alongside about two states is to mask a one-
Israel is also the principal demand of state reality that will almost surely
most Arab and Western governments, become even more entrenched in the
as well as the United Nations and other war’s aftermath. It would be good if
international bodies. U.S. officials have the Israelis and the Palestinians could
therefore fallen back on the rhetoric negotiate a peaceful division of land
and concepts of previous decades to and people into two sovereign states.
find some silver lining in the carnage. But they cannot. In repeated public
With the unspeakable horrors of the statements in January, Israeli Prime
October 7 attack and of the ongoing Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made
war on Gaza making clear that the clear not just that he opposes a Pal-
status quo is unsustainable, they argue estinian state but also that there will
that there is now a window to achieve a continue to be, as he put it, “full Israeli
larger settlement: Washington can both security control over all of the terri-
push the Israelis and the Palestinians to tory west of the Jordan [River]”—land
finally embrace the elusive goal of two that would include East Jerusalem, the
states coexisting peacefully side by side West Bank, and Gaza. In other words,
and at the same time secure normaliza- Israel seems likely to continue to rule
tion between Israel and the Arab world. over millions of Palestinian noncitizens
But the idea of a Palestinian state through an apartheid-like governance
emerging from the rubble of Gaza structure in which those Palestinians
has no basis in reality. Long before are denied full rights in perpetuity.
October 7, it was clear that the basic Israel’s politicians bear most of the
elements needed for a two-state solu- responsibility for this grim reality as
tion no longer existed. Israel had elected it developed over decades, aided by
a right-wing government that included weak Palestinian leaders and indiffer-
officials who were openly opposed to ent Arab governments. But no exter-
two states. The Palestinian leadership nal party shares more blame than the
recognized by the West—the Pales- United States, which has enabled and
tinian Authority (PA)—had become defended the most right-wing gov-
deeply unpopular among Palestinians. ernment in Israel’s history. The Biden
24 foreign affairs
The Two-State Mirage
administration cannot create peace just presence, control over its land perim-
by calling for it. But it could recognize eter and airspace, and oversight of its
that its rhetoric about a two-state future finances and tax revenues.
has failed and shift toward an approach In 2005, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel
focused on dealing with the situation Sharon decided to unilaterally withdraw
as it is. This would entail making sure from Gaza and dismantle Israeli settle-
that Israel adheres to international law ments there. But that did not change
and liberal norms for all people in the the fundamental realities of occupation.
territories under its control, upholding Although the Palestinians were left to
Biden’s pledge to promote “equal mea- determine the internal governance of
sures of freedom, justice, security, and the strip, Israel retained absolute power
prosperity for Israelis and Palestinians over shared boundaries, shorelines, and
alike.” Such an approach, which would airspace, with Egypt policing Gaza’s
bring U.S. policy more in line with its sole border along the Sinai Peninsula,
avowed aspirations, would be far more closely coordinating with Israel. As a
likely to protect and serve both the result, Israel, with Egyptian assistance,
Israelis and the Palestinians—and sup- controlled everything that went in or
port global U.S. interests. out of Gaza—food, building supplies,
medicine, people.
THE MAKINGS OF MAYHEM After Hamas won elections in Gaza
Hamas’s horrific October 7 attack has in 2006 and then consolidated power
sometimes been described as an “inva- there in 2007, the Israeli government
sion” in which militants breached the found it useful for the Islamist orga-
“border” between Israel and Gaza. But nization to police the strip indefinitely,
there is no border between the territory thus leaving the Palestinians with
and Israel, any more than there is a bor- divided leadership and defusing inter-
der between Israel and the West Bank. national pressure on Israel to negotiate.
Borders demarcate lines of sovereignty Meanwhile, Israel imposed a blockade
between states—and the Palestinians on the territory, effectively cutting it
do not have a state. off from the rest of the world. Hamas,
The Gaza Strip came under Egyp- in turn, significantly expanded the
tian control during the 1948 war, when system of underground tunnels it had
the state of Israel was established. In inherited from Israel to circumvent the
1967, Israel conquered Gaza, along blockade, strengthen its hold on Gaza’s
with the West Bank, the Sinai Pen- economy and politics, and build its mil-
insula, and the Golan Heights. Over itary capabilities. Episodic eruptions of
the next 26 years, Israel directly gov- conflict—usually involving rocket bar-
erned the small, densely packed strip, rages by Hamas followed by retaliatory
introducing Jewish settlements as it did strikes by Israel—allowed Hamas to
in the other territories it captured. In demonstrate its resistance credentials
1993, following the Oslo accords, Israel and Israel to show that it was “mow-
handed over some daily management ing the grass,” degrading Hamas’s
of Gaza to the PA but retained effective military capabilities and infrastructure
domination with a permanent military and often killing hundreds of civilians
26 foreign affairs
The Two-State Mirage
controls over a non-Jewish population ating framework will face. Neither the
that will soon outnumber Jewish Israe- leadership nor the public on either side
lis, or the large-scale transfer of Pales- supports such a process. The facts on
tinians from the land, as some Israeli the ground—a vast and ever-growing
cabinet ministers have openly called for. Israeli security and road infrastructure
On the Palestinian side, the stature of designed to connect and protect Jew-
the PA, which has been key to Washing- ish settlements across the West Bank,
ton’s thinking about postwar Gaza, has combined with the near-complete
crumbled. Along with its inability to destruction of Gaza—make a viable
stem Israeli policies, it is plagued by per- Palestinian state almost inconceivable.
ceptions of corruption and the lack of And the United States has given no
an electoral mandate. Today, hardly any sign that it is willing to exert the power
Palestinians still support PA President necessary to overcome those obstacles.
Mahmoud Abbas. (One poll conducted Some now lament that October 7
in late November during the brief cease- struck mortal blows to both the two-
fire in Gaza placed his support at seven state solution and a just and peaceful
percent.) Meanwhile, Hamas’s popular- one-state alternative. But neither had
ity among the Palestinians, particularly been on offer. The main effect of the
in the West Bank, has risen. Recent war thus far has been to lay bare and
MARK HARRIS; REU TERS
polling shows that there is still some dramatically increase the injustices of
support for a two-state solution among a single state based on the economic,
the Palestinians but virtually no confi- legal, and military subjugation of one
dence in the United States to deliver it. group by another—a situation that
This is the stark political reality that violates international law and offends
those who push for a two-state negoti- liberal values. This is the situation that
28 foreign affairs
The Two-State Mirage
law in tatters. One outcome has been to ignored even the most anodyne requests
isolate Washington and undermine its to minimize the killing of civilians,
claim of defending international norms allow for the delivery of humanitarian
and the liberal international order. The aid, plan for a postwar Gaza, and help
fact that South Africa, one of the leaders rebuild the PA. Israel’s current strategy
of the global South, has accused Israel seems likely to end in either the mass
of the extraordinary charge of genocide expulsion of Gazans or a perpetual,
before the International Court of Jus- costly, and violent counterinsurgency.
tice suggests the extent to which many The United States has actively opposed
parts of the world are no longer in the former, in line with the forcefully
line with Washington and its Western expressed positions of its allies in Jor-
allies, undermining U.S. leadership in dan and Egypt, and the latter would
international institutions. In a prelim- only be made worse the longer Israeli
inary ruling on January 26, the court troops remain in Gaza. But the Biden
determined that some alleged Israeli administration has refused to impose
actions in Gaza plausibly constitute vio- any consequences to attempt to compel
lations of the UN Genocide Convention. Israel to accept those demands.
Although the court did not demand a To overcome Israeli intransigence,
cease-fire, it ordered a sweeping set of the United States must stop shield-
measures Israel must undertake to limit ing Israel from the consequences of
harm to Palestinian civilians. If Wash- severe violations of international law
ington continues unconditional support and norms at the United Nations and
for Israel in Gaza without demanding other international organizations. Such
adherence to those measures, it may a step in itself could start an essential
appear even more complicit in the war. policy debate within Israel and among
It is imperative that the United States the Palestinians, which could open up
support international accountability for new possibilities. At the same time, the
alleged war crimes on all sides. White House should condition further
Following a cease-fire, the United aid to Israel on adherence to U.S. law
States must get serious about pushing and international norms and should
Israel to shift course. So far, U.S. poli- encourage similar efforts in Congress
cymakers’ efforts to outline a postwar instead of opposing them. It should also
plan for Gaza have been repeatedly instruct U.S. government agencies to
rebuffed by Israeli officials. Israel has follow the law and international rules in
dismissed the idea of returning the PA to providing assistance to Israel rather than
Gaza, which is a cornerstone of current seeking creative ways to subvert them.
U.S. strategy. Instead, Israeli politicians Indeed, Biden’s reluctance to tie
talk openly about restoring illegal set- military aid to Israel to human rights
tlements and creating a buffer zone in or even to U.S. law has already led to
northern Gaza and seem intent on forc- extraordinary moves by members of
ing large numbers of Palestinians out of his own party. Consider the resolution
the territory—notions that flout explicit proposed in December by Maryland
American redlines. Meanwhile, Net- Senator Chris Van Hollen, a Democrat,
anyahu’s government has systematically and 12 of his colleagues to condition
30 foreign affairs
The Two-State Mirage
Eroding Territory
Percentage of respondents supporting a two-state solution
70%
60
50
40
30 Israelis
Palestinians
20
10
0
2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022
Sources: Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, with Israel Democracy Institute and Tel Aviv University.
rights standards it expects to be met. States would regain some of the cred-
Washington can use its power to oppose ibility it has lost in the Middle East
conditions and policies it will not sup- and the global South. By bringing
port, whether that is the expulsion of the current reality more in line with
Palestinians from Gaza, the continued international law, Washington could
seizure of Palestinian land in the West begin to create the conditions in which
Bank, or the continuation and deep- a better political landscape could one
ening of an apartheid-like system of day emerge. It’s time for the U.S. gov-
military administration in Palestinian ernment to take responsibility for the
areas. Those limits must be made clear, failed approach that has led to this
and they must be enforced. The United devastating war. Decades of exempt-
States should back international justice ing Israel from international standards
mechanisms and accountability for war while pursuing empty and toothless
crimes by all parties. It should demand talk of an unattainable two-state future
adherence to international human has severely undermined the United
rights law and norms in the treatment States’ standing in the world. Wash-
of all people under Israel’s effective ington should stop using its power to
control, whether or not they are Israeli enable blatant violations of interna-
citizens. And it must refuse to continue tional rights and norms. Until it does
business as usual with any government so, a profoundly unjust and illiberal sta-
that violates these standards. tus quo will continue, and the United
In setting concrete legal boundaries States will be perpetuating the problem
for the present situation, the United rather than solving it.
t he f ig h t f or a n e w m i ddl e e ast
I
n the early weeks of 2024, as the States conducted strikes on weapons
catastrophic war in the Gaza Strip sites in Syria used by Iran’s Islamic
began to inflame the broader Revolutionary Guard Corps; in early
region, the stability of the Middle East January, U.S. forces killed a senior
appeared to be once again at the cen- commander of one of these groups
ter of the U.S. foreign policy agenda. in Baghdad. And in mid-January,
In the initial days after Hamas’s after weeks of attacks on commercial
October 7 attacks, the Biden admin- ships in the Red Sea by the Houthi
istration moved two aircraft carrier movement, which is also supported
strike groups and a nuclear-powered by Iran, the United States, together
submarine to the Middle East, while with the United Kingdom, initiated
a steady stream of senior U.S. offi- a series of strikes on Houthi strong-
cials, including President Joe Biden, holds in Yemen.
began making high-profile trips to the Despite this show of force, it would
region. Then, as the conflict became be unwise to bet on the United States’
more difficult to contain, the United committing major diplomatic and
States went further. In early Novem- security resources to the Middle East
ber, in response to attacks on U.S. over the longer term. Well before
military personnel in Iraq and Syria Hamas’s October 7 attacks, successive
by Iranian-backed groups, the United U.S. administrations had signaled their
DALIA DASSA KAYE is a Senior Fellow at the UCLA Burkle Center for International
Relations and a Fulbright Schuman Visiting Scholar at Lund University.
SANAM VAKIL is Director of Chatham House’s Middle East and North Africa Programme.
32 foreign affairs
Only the Middle East Can Fix the Middle East
intent to shift away from the region States from Middle East conflicts. If
to devote more attention to a rising anything, the war’s increasingly com-
China. The Biden administration has plicated dynamics may result in even
also been contending with Russia’s less U.S. appetite for engagement in
war in Ukraine, further limiting its the region. Doubling down on com-
bandwidth for coping with the Mid- mitments in the Middle East is also
dle East. By 2023, U.S. officials had not likely to be a winning strategy for
largely given up on a revived nuclear either American political party in a
agreement with Iran, seeking instead crucial election year.
to reach informal de-escalation Of course, the United States will
arrangements with their Iranian continue to be involved in the Middle
counterparts. At the same time, the East. If missile strikes on U.S. forces
administration was bolstering the result in American deaths or if a ter-
military capacity of regional partners rorist attack linked to the Gaza con-
such as Saudi Arabia in an effort to flict kills American civilians, it could
transfer some of the security burden force a greater U.S. military engage-
from Washington. Despite Biden’s ment than the administration might
early reluctance to do business with want. But waiting for the United
Riyadh—whose leadership U.S. intel- States to take the lead in effectively
ligence believes was responsible for managing Gaza and delivering a last-
the 2018 killing of the Saudi journalist ing Middle East peace would be like
and Washington Post contributor Jamal waiting for Godot: current regional
Khashoggi—the president prioritized and global dynamics simply make it
a deal to normalize relations between too difficult for Washington to play
Saudi Arabia and Israel. In pursuing that dominant role. That doesn’t mean
the deal, the United States was will- that other global powers will replace
ing to offer significant incentives to the United States. Neither European
both sides while mostly ignoring the nor Chinese leaders have demon-
Palestinian issue. strated much interest in or capacity
October 7 upended this approach, for taking on the job, even as U.S.
underscoring the centrality of the influence wanes. Given this emerg-
Palestinian issue and forcing the ing reality, regional powers—partic-
United States into more direct mili- ularly Israel’s immediate Arab neigh-
tary engagement. Yet remarkably, the bors Egypt and Jordan, along with
war in Gaza has not led to significant Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the
shifts in Washington’s underlying pol- United Arab Emirates (UAE), which
icy orientation. The administration have been coordinating since the war
continues to push for Saudi normal- began—urgently need to step up and
ization despite Israeli opposition to define a collective way forward.
a separate state for the Palestinians, Finding common ground after
which the Saudis have made a con- Hamas’s brutal October 7 attacks
dition of any such agreement. And and Israel’s devastating campaign in
U.S. officials seem unlikely to end Gaza will be exceptionally difficult.
their effort to disentangle the United And the longer the war continues,
the greater the risk of broader frac- administration’s swift diplomatic and
tures across the Middle East. But in military response—and its willingness
the years preceding the attacks, both to use force against Iranian-aligned
Arab and non-Arab states showed the groups—has suggested that the region
potential for new forms of cooper- is once more at the heart of U.S.
ation in what amounted to a major national security concerns. In fact, in
reset of relations across the region. terms of military might, the United
Even after months of war, many of States never left: at the time of the
these ties have remained intact. Now, October 7 attacks, tens of thousands
before this trend reverses, these gov- of U.S. forces were already stationed in
ernments must come together to build the region, and Washington continues
lasting mechanisms for conflict pre- to maintain sizable military bases in
vention and, ultimately, peace. Bahrain and Qatar, as well as smaller
Most urgently, regional powers must military deployments in Syria and Iraq.
support a meaningful political process But the United States’ military and
between the Israelis and the Palestin- diplomatic activity since October 7
ians. But they should also take deci- has not instilled confidence. For one
sive steps to prevent such a cataclysm thing, the administration’s effort to
from happening again. In particular, prevent a wider regional conflict has
they should seek to establish new and been decidedly mixed. At one of the
stronger regional security arrange- most concerning flash points, Israel’s
ments that can provide stability with simmering conflict with Hezbollah
or without U.S. leadership. It is well on the Lebanese border, Washington
past time for the Middle East to have has been unable to prevent growing
a standing forum for regional security violence on both sides. Along with sig-
that establishes a permanent venue nificant military and civilian casualties,
for dialogue among its own powers. tens of thousands of civilians have been
Gleaning opportunity from tragedy forced to evacuate towns in northern
will take hard work and a commit- Israel and southern Lebanon. Hezbol-
ment at the highest political levels. lah has thus far refused to withdraw
But as distant as this vision may seem its forces from the border in exchange
today, the potential exists for Middle for economic incentives, and Israel—
East leaders to arrest the spiral of vio- which has already assassinated a top
lence and move the region in a more Hamas official in Beirut—has signaled
positive direction. that time is running out for diplomacy.
Meanwhile, the United States has
ANXIETIES OF INFLUENCE struggled to contain military pres-
Despite mounting frustration with sure from Iranian proxies in Iraq,
the Biden administration for not Syria, and Yemen. Since the start of
taking decisive action to end the the war, U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria
war, some Arab leaders, along with have faced more than 150 attacks from
pro-interventionists in Washington, these groups. And despite a series of
may be eager to see the United States retaliatory strikes by the United States
“back” in the Middle East. The Biden and the United Kingdom, Washington
34 foreign affairs
Only the Middle East Can Fix the Middle East
has been unable to put an end to the But regional powers, particularly the
Houthis’ relentless missile and drone wealthy Gulf Arab states, have made
attacks in the Red Sea. Already, the clear that they will not endorse such
Houthis have been able to cause sig- plans without irreversible steps toward
nificant disruptions to international Palestinian statehood. After U.S. offi-
trade, forcing major shipping compa- cials began speaking more publicly
nies to avoid the Suez Canal. Notably, about the need for a two-state solution
U.S. attempts to corral a multinational as part of a larger normalization pact
maritime force to counter the threat with Saudi Arabia, Netanyahu flatly
have been unable to attract regional rejected the possibility and insisted
partners such as Egypt, Jordan, and that Israel must remain in full secu-
Saudi Arabia, which remain wary of rity control of Palestinian areas. But
the administration’s Gaza policies. even centrist Israeli officials expressed
As Washington’s military leverage astonishment that the United States
diminishes, its diplomatic muscle has was pressing peace initiatives while the
also weakened. Rather than showing all-out war against Hamas was con-
resolve, the continual visits of senior tinuing. Meanwhile, the administra-
administration officials to the region tion’s backing of Israel in the fighting
have demonstrated how little sway the and its perceived lack of empathy for
United States retains—or in the case of Palestinian suffering have created sig-
Israel, the administration’s unwilling- nificant obstacles to attracting regional
ness to use it. During the initial months support, let alone Palestinian buy-in,
of the war, one of the administration’s for any American-led plan.
few apparent accomplishments was The United States will continue
a one-week pause in fighting in late to be a major player in the region
November, which led to the release of because of its military assets and its
over 100 Israeli and foreign hostages unparalleled relationship with Israel.
and a modest delivery of humanitar- But any expectation that Washington
ian aid to Gaza. But even in that case, will be able to achieve a grand bar-
Qatari and Egyptian mediation was gain that could definitively end the
crucial. Otherwise, the United States Israeli-Palestinian conflict is detached
has been unwilling (at least as of this from the realities of today’s Middle
writing) to call for a cease-fire, and the East. In the end, major diplomatic
administration’s public diplomacy has breakthroughs are most likely to come
mostly been limited to rhetorical efforts from, and depend on, the region itself.
to restrain the worst impulses of Israeli
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu GOING IT ALONE,
and his right-wing government. TOGETHER
The administration has been more The consequences of Washington’s
vocal in promoting “day after” peace diminishing influence in the Middle
ideas focused on what it calls a “revi- East have not been limited to the cur-
talized” Palestinian Authority leader- rent conflict. As U.S. engagement in
ship in the West Bank and Gaza and the region declined in the years leading
regional support for rebuilding Gaza. up to October 7, major regional powers
36 foreign affairs
Dalia Dassa Kaye and Sanam Vakil
for new economic relations and trade. of relations with Arab govern-
Notably, one goal of the accords was ments, the intensifying involvement
to pave the way for new direct secu- of Iranian-backed groups—from
rity relationships between Israel and Hezbollah and the Houthis to var-
the Arab world. Before the October 7 ious militias in Syria and Iraq—has
attacks, the Biden administration had the potential to create new fissures
high hopes that Saudi Arabia, as a between Iran and the Gulf states. Yet
leading member of the Arab world, so far, the emerging realignments have
would also join this group. Building proved surprisingly durable.
on those accords, the March 2022 Rather than derailing relations
Negev Summit brought together between Iran and Saudi Arabia, the
Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, Morocco, the Gaza war seems to have strengthened
UAE, and the United States to encour- them. In November 2023, Iranian
age economic and security cooper- President Ebrahim Raisi attended a
ation in what was intended to be a rare joint meeting of the Arab League
regular meeting. and the Organization of Islamic
Glaringly absent from the normal- Cooperation hosted by Saudi Crown
ization deals, however, was the Pal- Prince Mohammed bin Salman in
estinian issue, which was largely set Riyadh, and the following month, Ira-
aside. As a result, Jordan refused to nian and Saudi leaders met again in
participate in the Negev Summit, and Beijing to discuss the Gaza war. The
as tensions over Israel’s settlements in two countries have also planned an
the West Bank flared in early 2023, exchange of state visits by Raisi and
a further meeting of the group was Mohammed in the coming months—
repeatedly postponed. Now, with meetings that are supposed to formal-
the devastation of Gaza, any further ize new economic and security ties.
progress will be contingent on not just And despite simmering tensions over
ending the war but also building a via- the Houthis in particular, the Iranian
ble plan for a Palestinian state. and Saudi foreign ministers met at the
World Economic Forum in Davos in
RUPTURES AND RESILIENCE January 2024, as well.
In theory, the catastrophic war in Meanwhile, diplomatic ties between
Gaza would seem to pose a grave Israel and its Abraham Accord part-
threat to the Middle East reset. In ners have so far held. The UAE has
most cases, newly established regional made clear that it views dialogue
relations are still fragile and have yet with the Israeli government, even
to address thorny issues such as weap- in the current crisis, as an import-
ons proliferation, the continued back- ant way to make progress on an
ing of militant groups in Libya and Israeli-Palestinian political settle-
Sudan by the UAE, Iran’s support for ment. And although Bahrain’s par-
armed nonstate militia groups across liament has condemned the sustained
the region, and Syria’s export of the assault on Gaza, the country has not
drug Captagon. Along with endan- formally severed ties with Israel. For
gering Israel’s fledging normalization both Arab states, normalization is not
38 foreign affairs
Only the Middle East Can Fix the Middle East
just about strengthening economic For now, there are indications that
bonds with Israel but also reinforcing Middle East leaders seek to tran-
strategic ties with the United States. scend these disputes. For example, to
For despite Washington’s perceived manage growing economic pressure
shift away from the region in recent and unrest at home, Iran has given
years, Gulf Arab states still seek U.S. new priority to regional business and
security guarantees and protection: in trade relations not only with Gulf
January 2022, Biden designated Qatar Arab states but also with Iraq, Tur-
as a “major non-NATO ally,” and in key, and Central Asian countries, as
September 2023, Bahrain and the well as China and Russia. This points
United States signed an agreement to to the pragmatic impulses driving
strengthen their strategic partnership. Tehran’s message that it seeks to
Certainly, the war has created new avoid direct engagement in the Gaza
obstacles to regional cooperation, conflict despite its backing of vari-
particularly when it comes to Israel ous proxy groups. But as tit-for-tat
and neighboring states. Both Tur- attacks mount across the region in
key and Jordan have withdrawn their the absence of a Gaza cease-fire, Iran’s
ambassadors from Israel, and direct calculations could very well shift.
flights between Israel and Morocco
stopped in October. By late January, THE GAZA EFFECT
with more than 26,000 killed in Gaza Paradoxically, one of the strongest
and no cease-fire in sight, Arab public forces holding the region together
opinion was more strongly opposed may be the plight of Gaza itself and
to normalization than ever. Many the Palestinian issue, which the war
also fear that the U.S. and British has so starkly brought to world atten-
military strikes on the Houthis could tion. Facing overwhelming popular
embolden the group in Yemen and anger and the long-term potential
set back efforts to formalize a long- for radicalization and the return of
sought cease-fire in the Houthis’ extremist groups, regional leaders have
nearly decadelong war in Yemen with largely aligned their policy responses
Saudi Arabia. And although Gulf to the war. Despite divergent strate-
Arab states have made a commitment gies toward Israel and the Palestinians
to continue reaching out diplomat- before October 7, governments around
ically to Tehran, few officials in the the Middle East are broadly united on
region are hopeful that Iran will alter demanding an immediate cease-fire,
its approach of “forward defense,” in opposing any transfer of Palestinians
which it relies on militant groups to out of Gaza, calling for humanitarian
build strategic leverage and maintain access to Gaza and for the urgent pro-
deterrence. In mid-January, Tehran’s vision of aid, and supporting negotia-
direct missile strikes on Iraq, Pakistan, tions for the release of Israeli hostages
and Syria in response to Israeli strikes in return for an end to the war. The
and an attack by the Islamic State in question now is whether this unity can
the Iranian city of Kerman increased be steered toward building a legitimate
tensions further. peace process.
For many regional Arab and Mus- the nationalist party that has long
lim countries, the highest priority has controlled the PA, and Hamas, the
been defining a clear plan for Gaza new leadership would jointly run the
and, ultimately, Palestinian statehood. West Bank and Gaza, in view of a
Israeli leaders have suggested that critical regional demand that the dif-
Gulf states with substantial resources, ferent Palestinian territories no lon-
such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, ger be politically separated. This last
might share the cost of rebuilding phase would require Palestinian elec-
Gaza. But Israel’s current govern- tions and the creation of a Palestinian
ment has said it opposes a Palestinian state. Although Israel dismissed the
state, and with the war continuing, plan itself, both for the inclusion of
no Arab governments are willing to Hamas and over the issue of state-
make such a commitment or be seen hood, it provided a starting point for
to be underwriting Israel’s war effort. further discussion.
Instead, they have unveiled their own In turn, Turkey has floated the
proposals for a postwar peace. concept of a multicountry guarantor
In December 2023, Eg ypt and system, with states in the region
Qatar put forward a plan that began protecting and bolstering Palestin-
with a cease-fire contingent on ian security and governance and the
MARK HARRIS; REU TERS
phased hostage releases and prisoner United States and European coun-
exchanges. After a transition period, tries providing security guarantees
these confidence-building steps for Israel. Others have proposed that
would, in theory, lead to the creation the United Nations run a transitional
of a Palestinian unity government. authority in the West Bank and Gaza,
Composed of members of both Fatah, an approach that would allow time
40 foreign affairs
Only the Middle East Can Fix the Middle East
to overhaul the Palestinian gover- pens, Israel will need to have open
nance structure and ultimately lay the diplomatic channels with, and secure
groundwork for Palestinian elections. funding and security guarantees from,
For its part, Iran has repeatedly stated Arab governments, as well as retain
that it will reinforce any outcome Washington’s engagement through
that is supported by the Palestinians the process.
themselves—suggesting that there is It may take years to establish the
a renewed opportunity to persuade necessary political conditions for
Tehran to support a deal and forestall a serious peace process after such a
its usual spoiler role. terrible war. Nonetheless, the con-
Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia has been flict and its regional spillover are a
developing a peace plan with other stark reminder that although the
Arab states that would condition Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not the
normalizing ties with Israel on the only cause, regional stability will be
creation of an irrevocable path to a at constant risk as long as it contin-
Palestinian state. Riyadh’s approach is ues. And regional governments are
underpinned by the 2002 Arab peace increasingly aware that they cannot
initiative that committed to Arab rec- rely on the United States alone to pro-
ognition of Israel in exchange for the vide a viable peace process for them.
creation of a Palestinian state in East
Jerusalem, Gaza, and the West Bank. RIVALS INTO NEIGHBORS
The current Saudi plan aligns with Even as it has thrust the Palestinian
Washington’s push for Israeli-Saudi issue back to the forefront of the inter-
normalization. It remains unclear, national agenda, the war in Gaza has
however, whether the Saudis would underscored the important new politi-
agree with their American counter- cal dynamics in play across the Middle
parts on what constitutes credible East. On the one hand, the United
and irreversible steps toward a Pales- States appears to have less influence.
tinian state, particularly given strong But at the same time, regional powers,
Israeli resistance. including those previously at odds, are
Under Netanyahu, the Israeli gov- taking the initiative, involving them-
ernment continues to reject all these selves in mediation, and coordinating
proposals. But as of late January, Israel their policy responses. Whereas before
remained far from accomplishing its October 7, regional powers—in par-
war aim of eradicating Hamas, and it ticular, Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi
had yet to secure the release of more Arabia, Turkey, and the UAE—were
than 100 remaining hostages. There less aligned on the Palestinian issue,
were also rising tensions in both the they are now acting with impressive
war cabinet and the Israeli public unity, coordination, and planning. To
about the future course of the mili- turn this shared resolve into a last-
tary campaign. Moreover, the coun- ing source of collective leadership,
try has deferred any serious public or however, these powers must embrace
political debate on its future security more permanent regional institutions
until the war is over. When that hap- and arrangements.
Most critically, these should include smaller number of key states could
a standing dialogue forum for the start an official process, holding open
entire region. Episodic summits for the prospect of wider participation
cabinet ministers and ad hoc “mini- down the road. Since several Arab
lateral” groupings such as the East states and Turkey have relationships
Mediterranean Gas Forum and I2U2 with both Israel and Iran, their par-
will no doubt continue to define the ticipation will be especially valuable
regional landscape in the years ahead. at the outset.
But a permanent forum for regional The new organization, which could
security is lacking. In other parts of the be called the MENA Forum, to encom-
world, cooperative security forums, pass the broadest understanding of
such as the Organization for Secu- the Middle East and North Africa
rity and Cooperation in Europe and region, should initially focus on
the Association of Southeast Asian cross-cutting issues on which there
Nations, have been able to develop is broad consensus, such as climate,
alongside bilateral and regional secu- energy, and emergency responses to
rity alliances, enhancing communi- crises. Although the resolution of the
cation even among adversaries and Gaza war and the Israeli-Palestinian
helping prevent conflict. There is no conflict will likely need to be led
reason for the Middle East to remain through a separate Arab initiative,
the global exception. And given the the forum could coordinate positions
region’s pressing need to coordinate on postwar Gaza through its emer-
and de-escalate, the current crisis pro- gency response agenda, including
vides a crucial opportunity to begin humanitarian support and recon-
such an initiative. struction aid for Palestinians. The
Although leaders have been skepti- forum would not directly mediate
cal about the idea of a forum embrac- conflicts itself: cooperative security
ing the entire region, there are several dialogues have proved most effective
ways that new cooperative security when focused on improving commu-
mechanisms could be built. For exam- nication and coordination to defuse
ple, ever since the Madrid peace pro- tensions and on providing mutual
cess was launched in the early 1990s security and socioeconomic benefits
to address the Israeli-Palestinian to members. But through regular con-
conflict, such arrangements have tacts and a gradual building of trust,
been informally proposed in dia- such a process could support conflict
logues among experts. Over the past resolution in the Israeli-Palestinian
few years, numerous policymakers arena and beyond.
and others have made clear that this Indeed, standing regional meet-
approach is ripe for implementation ings can provide important oppor-
at an official level. Although such tunities, not to mention political
a forum should ultimately aim to cover, for dialogues on contentious
include the entire region—all Arab disputes among rivals and adversaries
states, Iran, Israel, and Turkey—that who otherwise lack direct channels of
won’t immediately be feasible. But a communication. These could include
42 foreign affairs
Only the Middle East Can Fix the Middle East
not only Israelis and Palestinians but provide the decisive leadership or the
eventually also Israelis and Iranians, leverage needed to push through a
who could meet in technical working lasting Israeli-Palestinian settlement.
groups on noncontroversial issues of It will be up to the Middle East’s own
mutual concern. Such interactions leaders and diplomats to take charge.
have already quietly unfolded on the By capturing the region’s attention
sidelines of other multilateral forums and diplomatic energy, the war has
focused on climate and water, sug- provided a rare opportunity for new
gesting that more inclusive regional forms of cooperative leadership.
cooperation is ultimately possible. A regional security forum cannot
Establishing a Middle East secu- by itself deliver Middle East peace—
rity forum will require political will at no single initiative can do that. And
the highest levels, as well as a strong without accountable governance, gen-
regional champion that is considered uine long-term stability will remain
a neutral party. One possibility is to elusive. Nor is an organization like
announce the new organization at a this going to replace all the compet-
meeting of foreign ministers, possibly itive power balancing that has long
on the margins of another regional been a hallmark of Middle East
gathering, like one of the economic statecraft. Even in Asia and Europe,
sessions that have been held at the cooperative arrangements have not
Dead Sea in Jordan. The initiative supplanted national strategic rival-
will be more likely to succeed if it is ries or been able to foreclose military
both created and led from the region. confrontation, as the war in Ukraine
Middle powers in Asia and Europe has so painfully demonstrated. None-
could provide political and technical theless, a regular forum would add
support in areas where they may have a crucial layer of stability to the
valuable expertise, for example. At conflict-prone Middle East. Such a
least at the outset, China, Russia, and project is also increasingly urgent.
the United States should have lim- Although October 7 has not yet
ited roles to prevent the forum from reversed all the regional currents
turning into another platform for favoring de-escalation and accom-
great-power competition. Nonethe- modation, time may be running out
less, support from both Washington to capitalize on this reset. Leading
and Beijing will be critical to ensure Arab states, together with regional
that the forum becomes a useful sup- powers such as Turkey, must seize the
plement, rather than a threat, to their moment to lock in some of the rap-
own diplomacy in the region. prochement that preceded Gaza and
the coordination that has arisen since.
A TIME TO LEAD The Middle East is facing a moment
Among the difficult realities that the of reckoning. If it becomes paralyzed
war in Gaza has exposed, one of the by the horrific bloodshed in Gaza,
starkest may be the limits of American it could further descend into crisis
power. As much as it may be wished and conflict. Or it can start building
for, the United States is unlikely to a different future.
t he f ig h t f or a n e w m i ddl e e ast
Israel’s Self-Destruction
Netanyahu, the Palestinians, and the Price of Neglect
Aluf benn
O
ne bright day in April 1956, on the murderers,’’ Dayan said. “For
Moshe Dayan, the one-eyed eight years, they have been sitting in
chief of staff of the Israel the refugee camps in Gaza, and before
Defense Forces (IDF), drove south to their eyes we have been transforming
Nahal Oz, a recently established kib- the lands and the villages where they
butz near the border of the Gaza Strip. and their fathers dwelt into our estate.”
Dayan came to attend the funeral of Dayan was alluding to the nakba, Ara-
21-year-old Roi Rotberg, who had bic for “catastrophe,” when the major-
been murdered the previous morning ity of Palestinian Arabs were driven
by Palestinians while he was patrolling into exile by Israel’s victory in the
the fields on horseback. The killers 1948 war of independence. Many were
dragged Rotberg’s body to the other forcibly relocated to Gaza, including
side of the border, where it was found residents of communities that eventu-
mutilated, its eyes poked out. The ally became Jewish towns and villages
result was nationwide shock and agony. along the border.
If Dayan had been speaking in Dayan was hardly a supporter of the
modern-day Israel, he would have used Palestinian cause. In 1950, after the
his eulogy largely to blast the horri- hostilities had ended, he organized
ble cruelty of Rotberg’s killers. But as the displacement of the remaining Pal-
framed in the 1950s, his speech was estinian community in the border town
remarkably sympathetic toward the of Al-Majdal, now the Israeli city of
perpetrators. “Let us not cast blame Ashkelon. Still, Dayan realized what
44 foreign affairs
Aluf Benn
many Jewish Israelis refuse to accept: enmity that produced the attack—or
Palestinians would never forget the what policies might prevent another.
nakba or stop dreaming of returning Its silence comes at the behest of Israeli
to their homes. “Let us not be deterred Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu,
from seeing the loathing that is inflam- who has refused to lay out a postwar
ing and filling the lives of hundreds of vision or order. Netanyahu has prom-
thousands of Arabs living around us,’’ ised to “destroy Hamas,” but beyond
Dayan declared in his eulogy. “This is military force, he has no strategy for
our life’s choice—to be prepared and eliminating the group and no clear plan
armed, strong and determined, lest the for what would replace it as the de facto
sword be stricken from our fist and our government of postwar Gaza.
lives cut down.’’ His failure to strategize is no acci-
On October 7, 2023, Dayan’s age-old dent. Nor is it an act of political expe-
warning materialized in the bloodiest diency designed to keep his right-wing
way possible. Following a plan mas- coalition together. To live in peace,
terminded by Yahya Sinwar, a Hamas Israel will have to finally come to
leader born to a family forced out terms with the Palestinians, and that
of Al-Majdal, Palestinian militants is something Netanyahu has opposed
invaded Israel at nearly 30 points along throughout his career. He has devoted
the Gazan border. Achieving total sur- his tenure as prime minister, the lon-
prise, they overran Israel’s thin defenses gest in Israeli history, to undermining
and proceeded to attack a music fes- and sidelining the Palestinian national
tival, small towns, and more than 20 movement. He has promised his people
kibbutzim. They killed around 1,200 that they can prosper without peace.
civilians and soldiers and kidnapped He has sold the country on the idea
well over 200 hostages. They raped, that it can continue to occupy Pales-
looted, burned, and pillaged. The tinian lands forever at little domestic
descendants of Dayan’s refugee camp or international cost. And even now,
dwellers—fueled by the same hatred in the wake of October 7, he has not
and loathing that he described but now changed this message. The only thing
better armed, trained, and organized— Netanyahu has said Israel will do after
had come back for revenge. the war is maintain a “security perim-
October 7 was the worst calamity eter” around Gaza—a thinly veiled
in Israel’s history. It is a national and euphemism for long-term occupation,
personal turning point for anyone liv- including a cordon along the border
ing in the country or associated with that will eat up a big chunk of scarce
it. Having failed to stop the Hamas Palestinian land.
attack, the IDF has responded with But Israel can no longer be so blin-
overwhelming force, killing thou- kered. The October 7 attacks have
sands of Palestinians and razing entire proved that Netanyahu’s promise was
Gazan neighborhoods. But even as hollow. Despite a dead peace process
pilots drop bombs and commandos and waning interest from other coun-
flush out Hamas’s tunnels, the Israeli tries, the Palestinians have kept their
government has not reckoned with the cause alive. In the body-camera foot-
46 foreign affairs
Israel’s Self-Destruction
48 foreign affairs
Israel’s Self-Destruction
far less salient. Terrorist attacks fell to also moved the American embassy in
new lows, and periodic rocket fire from Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, and
Gaza was usually intercepted. With his administration recognized Israel’s
the exception of a short war against annexation of the Golan Heights from
Hamas in 2014, Israelis rarely needed Syria. Under Trump, the United States
to go head-to-head with Palestinian helped Israel conclude the Abraham
militants. For most people, most of the Accords, normalizing its relations
time, the conflict was out of sight and with Bahrain, Morocco, Sudan, and
out of mind. the United Arab Emirates—a prospect
Instead of worrying about the Pal- that once seemed impossible without
estinians, Israelis began to focus on an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement.
living the Western dream of prosper- Planeloads of Israeli officials, military
ity and tranquility. Between January chiefs, and tourists began frequenting
2010 and December 2022, real estate the swank hotels of Gulf sheikdoms
prices more than doubled in Israel as and the souks of Marrakech.
Tel Aviv’s skyline filled with high- As he sidelined the Palestinian issue,
rise apartments and office complexes. Netanyahu also worked to remake Isra-
Smaller towns expanded to accommo- el’s domestic society. After winning a
date the boom. The country’s GDP grew surprise reelection in 2015, Netanyahu
by more than 60 percent as tech entre- put together a right-wing coalition to
preneurs launched successful businesses revive his old dream of igniting a con-
and energy companies found offshore servative revolution. Once again, the
natural gas deposits in Israeli waters. prime minister began railing against
Open-skies agreements with other “the elites” and initiated a culture war
governments turned foreign travel, a against the erstwhile establishment,
major facet of the Israeli lifestyle, into which he viewed as hostile to himself
a cheap commodity. The future looked and too liberal for his supporters. In
bright. The country, it seemed, had 2018, he won passage of a major, con-
moved past the Palestinians, and it had troversial law that defined Israel as “the
done so without sacrificing anything— Nation-State of the Jewish People” and
territory, resources, funds—toward a declared that Jews had the “unique”
peace agreement. Israelis got to have right to “exercise self-determination” in
their cake and eat it, too. its territory. It gave the country’s Jewish
Internationally, the country was also majority precedence and subordinated
thriving. Netanyahu withstood U.S. its non-Jewish people.
President Barack Obama’s pressure to The same year, Netanyahu’s coalition
revive the two-state solution and freeze collapsed. Israel then sank into a long
Israeli settlements in the West Bank, political crisis, with the country dragged
in part by forging an alliance with through five elections between 2019
Republicans. Although Netanyahu and 2022—each of them a referendum
failed to stop Obama from concluding on Netanyahu’s rule. The intensity of
a nuclear deal with Iran, Washington the political battle was heightened by a
withdrew from the pact after Donald corruption case against the prime min-
Trump won the presidency. Trump ister, leading to his criminal indictment
in 2020 and an ongoing trial. Israel raison d’être. These religious Zionists
split between the “Bibists” and “Just remained committed to their dream of
not Bibists.” (“Bibi” is Netanyahu’s Judaizing the occupied territories and
nickname.) In the fourth election, in making them a formal part of Israel.
2021, Netanyahu’s rivals finally man- They hoped that if given the opportu-
aged to replace him with a “change nity, they could drive out the territories’
government” led by the right-wing Palestinian population. They had failed
Naftali Bennett and the centrist Yair to prevent an evacuation of Jewish set-
Lapid. For the first time, the coalition tlers from Gaza in 2005 when Ariel
included an Arab party. Sharon was prime minister, but in the
Even so, Netanyahu’s opposition years since, they had gradually captured
never challenged the basic premise of key positions in the Israeli military, civil
his rule: that Israel could thrive without service, and media as members of the
addressing the Palestinian issue. The secular establishment shifted their focus
debate over peace and war, tradition- to making money in the private sector.
ally a crucial political topic for Israel, The extremists had two principal
became back-page news. Bennett, who demands of Netanyahu. The first, and
began his career as Netanyahu’s aide, most obvious, was to further expand
equated the Palestinian conflict to Jewish settlements. The second was to
“shrapnel in the butt” that the country establish a stronger Jewish presence on
could live with. He and Lapid sought the Temple Mount, the historic site of
to maintain the status quo vis-à-vis the both the Jewish Temple and the Mus-
Palestinians and simply focus on keep- lim mosque of al Aqsa in Jerusalem’s
ing Netanyahu out of office. Old City. Since Israel took control of
That bargain, of course, proved the surrounding area in the Six-Day
impossible. The “change govern- War in 1967, it has given the Palestin-
ment” collapsed in 2022 after it failed ians quasi-autonomy at the site, out of
to prolong obscure legal provisions fear that removing it from Arab gover-
that allowed West Bank settlers to nance would incite a cataclysmic reli-
enjoy civil rights denied their non- gious conflict. But the Israeli far right
Israeli neighbors. For some of the has long sought to change that. When
Arab coalition members, signing on Netanyahu was first elected in 1996, he
to these apartheid provisions was one opened a wall at an archaeological site
compromise too many. in an underground tunnel adjacent to
For Netanyahu, still facing trial, al Aqsa to expose relics from the times
the government’s collapse was exactly of the Second Temple, prompting a
what he had been hoping for. As the violent explosion of Arab protests in
country organized yet another election, Jerusalem. The second Palestinian inti-
he fortified his base of right-wingers, fada in 2000 was similarly sparked by a
ultra-Orthodox Jews, and socially con- visit to the Temple Mount by Sharon,
servative Jews. To win back power, he then the opposition leader as the head
reached out in particular to West Bank of Netanyahu’s party, Likud.
settlers, a demographic that still saw In May 2021, violence erupted
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as its again. This time, the main provocateur
50 foreign affairs
Israel’s Self-Destruction
his partners to build an autocracy and decline in prestige that had shadowed
might even have spared him from his the IDF since the invasion of Lebanon
corruption trial. in 1982. Reservist pilots, who are cru-
The judicial reform bills were, with- cial to the air force’s preparedness and
out doubt, extraordinarily dangerous. combat power, threatened to withdraw
They rightfully prompted an enor- from service if the laws were passed.
mous wave of protests, with hundreds In a show of institutional opposition,
of thousands of Israelis demonstrating the IDF’s leaders rebuffed Netanyahu
every week. But in confronting this when he demanded that they disci-
coup, Netanyahu’s opponents again pline the reservists.
acted as if the occupation were an unre- That the I D F would break with
lated issue. Even though the laws were the prime minister was not surpris-
drafted partly to weaken whatever legal ing. Throughout his long career, Net-
protection the Israeli Supreme Court anyahu has frequently clashed with
would give Palestinians, demonstrators the military, and his strongest rivals
shied away from mentioning the occu- have been retired generals who became
pation or the defunct peace process out politicians, such as Sharon, Rabin, and
of fear of being smeared as unpatriotic. Barak—not to mention Benny Gantz,
In fact, the organizers worked to side- whom Netanyahu made part of his
line Israel’s anti-occupation protesters emergency war cabinet but may even-
to avoid having images of Palestinian tually challenge and succeed him as
flags appear in the demonstrations. prime minister. Netanyahu has long
This tactic succeeded, ensuring that rejected the generals’ vision of an Israel
the protest movement was not “tainted” that is strong militarily but flexible dip-
by the Palestinian cause: Israeli Arabs, lomatically. He has also scoffed at their
who make up around 20 percent of the characters, which he views as timid,
country’s population, largely refrained unimaginative, and even subversive. It
from joining the demonstrations. But was therefore no shock when he fired
this made it harder for the movement his own defense minister, the retired
to succeed. Given Israel’s demograph- general Yoav Gallant, after Gallant
ics, center-left Jews need to partner appeared on live television in March
with the country’s Arabs if they ever 2023 to warn that Israel’s rifts had left
want to form a government. By dele- the country vulnerable and that war
gitimizing Israeli Arabs’ concerns, was imminent.
the demonstrators played right into Gallant’s firing led to more sponta-
Netanyahu’s strategy. neous street protests, and Netanyahu
With the Arabs out, the battle over reinstated him. (They remain bitter
the judicial reforms proceeded as an rivals, even as they run the war together.)
intra-Jewish affair. Demonstrators But Netanyahu ignored Gallant’s warn-
adopted the blue and white Star of ing. He also ignored a more detailed
David flag, and many of their leaders warning delivered in July by Israel’s
and speakers were retired senior mil- chief military intelligence analyst that
itary officers. Protesters showed off enemies might strike the country. Net-
their military credentials, reversing the anyahu apparently believed that such
52 foreign affairs
Israel’s Self-Destruction
intelligence and the head of Shin Bet, Yet these changes, although under-
was that Hamas was deterred and was standable, are accelerations, not shifts.
seeking an arrangement.” (He later Israel is still following the same path
apologized for the post.) that Netanyahu has guided it down for
But military and intelligence incom- years. Its identity is now less liberal and
petence, dismal as it was, cannot shield egalitarian, more ethnonationalist and
the prime minister from culpability— militaristic. The slogan “United for Vic-
and not only because, as head of the tory,’’ seen on every street corner, public
government, Netanyahu bears ultimate bus, and television channel in Israel, is
responsibility for what happens in Israel. aimed at unifying the country’s Jewish
His reckless prewar policy of dividing society. The state’s Arab minority, which
Israelis made the country vulnerable, overwhelmingly supported a quick
tempting Iran’s allies to strike at a riven cease-fire and prisoner exchange, has
society. Netanyahu’s humiliation of the been repeatedly forbidden by the police
Palestinians helped radicalism thrive. to carry out public protests. Dozens of
It is no accident that Hamas named its Arab citizens have been legally indicted
operation “al Aqsa flood” and portrayed for social media posts expressing soli-
the attacks as a way of protecting al Aqsa darity with Palestinians in Gaza, even
from a Jewish takeover. Protecting the if the posts did not support or endorse
holy Muslim site was seen as a reason to the October 7 attacks. Many liberal
attack Israel and face the inevitably dire Israeli Jews, meanwhile, feel betrayed
consequences of an IDF counterattack. by Western counterparts who, in their
The Israeli public has not absolved view, have sided with Hamas. They are
Netanyahu of responsibility for rethinking their prewar threats to emi-
October 7. The prime minister’s party grate away from Netanyahu’s religious
has plummeted in the polls, and his autocracy, and Israeli real estate com-
approval rating has tanked as well, panies are anticipating a new wave of
although the government maintains Jewish immigrants seeking to escape
a parliamentary majority. The coun- the rising anti-Semitism they have
try’s desire for change is expressed in experienced abroad.
more than just public opinion surveys. And just as in prewar times, almost
Militarism is back across the aisle. The no Israeli Jews are thinking about how
anti-Bibi demonstrators rushed to fulfill the Palestinian conflict might be solved
their reserve duties despite the protests, peacefully. The Israeli left, traditionally
as erstwhile anti-Netanyahu organiz- interested in pursuing peace, is now
ers supplanted the dysfunctional Israeli nearly extinct. The centrist parties of
government in caring for evacuees from Gantz and Lapid, nostalgic for the
the country’s south and north. Many good old pre-Netanyahu Israel, seem
Israelis have armed themselves with to feel at home in the newly militaristic
handguns and assault rifles, aided by society and do not want to risk their
Ben-Gvir’s campaign to ease the regula- mainstream popularity by endorsing
tion of private small arms. After decades land-for-peace negotiations. And the
of gradual decline, the defense budget is right is more hostile to Palestinians
expected to rise by roughly 50 percent. than it has ever been.
54 foreign affairs
Israel’s Self-Destruction
Netanyahu has equated the PA with the PA is weak. Israel, too, is weak:
Hamas and, as of this writing, has its wartime unity is already crack-
rejected American proposals to make ing, and the odds are high that the
it the postwar ruler of Gaza, knowing country will further tear itself apart
that such a decision would revive the if and when the fighting diminishes.
two-state solution. The prime minis- The anti-Bibists hope to reach out
ter’s far-right buddies want to depop- to disappointed Bibists and force an
ulate Gaza and exile its Palestinians early election this year. Netanyahu,
to other countries, creating a second in turn, will whip up fears and dig
nakba that would leave the land open in. In January, relatives of hostages
to new Jewish settlements. To fulfill broke into a parliamentary meeting
this dream, Ben-Gvir and Smotrich to demand that the government try
have demanded that Netanyahu reject to free their family members, part of
any discussion of a postwar arrange- a battle between Israelis over whether
ment in Gaza that leaves the Pales- the country should prioritize defeat-
tinians in charge and demanded that ing Hamas or make a deal to free
the government refuse to negotiate for the remaining captives. Perhaps the
the further release of Israeli hostages. only idea on which there is unity is in
They have also ensured that Israel opposing a land-for-peace agreement.
does nothing to halt fresh attacks by After October 7, most Jewish Israe-
Jewish settlers on Arab residents of lis agree that any further relinquish-
the West Bank. ment of territory will give militants a
If past is precedent, the country is launching pad for the next massacre.
not entirely hopeless. History suggests Ultimately, then, Israel’s future may
there is a chance that progressivism look very much like its recent history.
might come back and conservatives With or without Netanyahu, “con-
might lose influence. After prior flict management” and “mowing the
major attacks, Israeli public opinion grass” will remain state policy—which
initially shifted to the right but then means more occupation, settlements,
changed course and accepted terri- and displacement. This strategy might
torial compromises in exchange for appear to be the least risky option, at
peace. The Yom Kippur War of 1973 least for an Israeli public scarred by
eventually led to peace with Egypt; the horrors of October 7 and deaf to
the first intifada, beginning in 1987, new suggestions of peace. But it will
led to the Oslo accords and peace with only lead to more catastrophe. Israelis
Jordan; and the second intifada, erupt- cannot expect stability if they con-
ing in 2000, ended with the unilateral tinue to ignore the Palestinians and
pullout from Gaza. reject their aspirations, their story, and
But the chances that this dynamic even their presence.
will recur are dim. There is no Pal- This is the lesson the country should
estinian group or leader accepted have learned from Dayan’s age-old
by Israel in the way Egypt and its warning. Israel must reach out to Pal-
president were after 1973. Hamas is estinians and to each other if they want
committed to Israel’s destruction, and a livable and respectful coexistence.
T
his spring, India is scheduled to hold its 18th general election.
Surveys suggest that the incumbent, Prime Minister Narendra
Modi, is very likely to win a third term in office. That triumph
will further underline Modi’s singular stature. He bestrides the country
like a colossus, and he promises Indians that they, too, are rising in the
world. And yet the very nature of Modi’s authority, the aggressive control
sought by the prime minister and his party over a staggeringly diverse and
complicated country, threatens to scupper India’s great-power ambitions.
A leader of enormous charisma from a modest background, Modi
dominates the Indian political landscape as only two of his 15 pre-
decessors have done: Jawaharlal Nehru, prime minister from Indian
independence in 1947 until 1964, and Nehru’s daughter, Indira Gandhi,
prime minister from 1966 to 1977 and then again from 1980 to 1984.
In their pomp, both enjoyed wide popularity throughout India, cutting
58 foreign affairs
Ramachandra Guha
60 foreign affairs
India’s Feet of Clay
PORTRAIT IN POWER
Between 2004 and 2014, India was run by Congress-led coalition gov-
ernments. The prime minister was the scholarly economist Manmohan
Singh. By the end of his second term, Singh was 80 and unwell, so
the task of running Congress’s campaign ahead of the 2014 general
elections fell to the much younger Rahul Gandhi. Gandhi is the son
of Sonia Gandhi, a former president of the Congress Party, and Rajiv
Gandhi, who, like his mother, Indira Gandhi, and grandfather Nehru,
had served as prime minister. In a brilliant political move, Modi, who
had previously been chief minister of the important state of Gujarat
for a decade, presented himself as an experienced, hard-working, and
entirely self-made administrator, in stark contrast to Rahul Gandhi,
a dynastic scion who had never held political office and whom Modi
portrayed as entitled and effete.
Sixty years of electoral democracy and three decades of market-led
economic growth had made Indians increasingly distrustful of claims
made on the basis of family lineage or privilege. It also helped that
Modi was a more compelling orator than Rahul Gandhi and that the
BJP made better use of the new media and digital technologies to reach
remote corners of India. In the 2014 elections, the BJP won 282 seats,
up from 116 five years earlier, while the Congress’s tally went down
from 206 to a mere 44. The next general election, in 2019, again pitted
Modi against Gandhi; the BJP won 303 seats to the Congress’s 52. With
these emphatic victories, the BJP not only crushed and humiliated the
Congress but also secured the legislative dominance of the party. In
prior decades, Indian governments had typically been motley coalitions
held together by compromise. The BJP’s healthy majority under Modi
has given the prime minister broad latitude to act—and free rein to
pursue his ambitions.
Modi presents himself as the very embodiment of the party, the gov-
ernment, and the nation, as almost single-handedly fulfilling the hopes
62 foreign affairs
Ramachandra Guha
and ambitions of Indians. In the past decade, his elevation has taken many
forms, including the construction of the world’s largest cricket stadium,
named for Modi; the portrait of Modi on the COVID-19 vaccination certif-
icates issued by the government of India (a practice followed by no other
democracy in the world); the photo of Modi on all government schemes
and welfare packages; a serving judge of the Supreme Court gushing that
Modi is a “visionary” and a “genius”; and Modi’s own proclamation that
he had been sent by god to emancipate India’s women.
In keeping with this gargantuan cult of per-
sonality, Modi has attempted, largely success-
Modi has worked fully, to make governance and administration
diligently to an instrument of his personal will rather than
a collaborative effort in which many institu-
centralize and tions and individuals work together. In the
personalize Indian system, based on the British model, the
political power. prime minister is supposed to be merely first
among equals. Cabinet ministers are meant to
have relative autonomy in their own spheres of authority. Under Modi,
however, most ministers and ministries take instructions directly from
the prime minister’s office and from officials known to be personally
loyal to him. Likewise, Parliament is no longer an active theater of
debate, in which the views of the opposition are taken into account
in forging legislation. Many bills are passed in minutes, by voice vote,
with the speakers in both houses acting in an extremely partisan man-
ner. Opposition members of Parliament have been suspended in the
dozens—and in one recent case, in the hundreds—for demanding that
the prime minister and home minister make statements about such
important matters as bloody ethnic conflicts in India’s borderlands and
security breaches in Parliament itself.
Sadly, the Indian Supreme Court has done little to stem attacks on
democratic freedoms. In past decades, the court had at least occasion-
ally stood up for personal freedoms, and for the rights of the provinces,
acting as a modest brake on the arbitrary exercise of state power. Since
Modi took office, however, the Supreme Court has often given its tacit
approval to the government’s misconduct, by, for example, failing to
strike down punitive laws that clearly violate the Indian constitution.
One such law is the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, under which
it is almost impossible to get bail and which has been invoked to arrest
and designate as “terrorists” hundreds of students and human rights
64 foreign affairs
India’s Feet of Clay
A HINDU KINGDOM
For all their similarities in political style, Indira Gandhi and Modi
differ markedly in terms of political ideology. Forged in the crucible
66 foreign affairs
India’s Feet of Clay
68 foreign affairs
India’s Feet of Clay
70 foreign affairs
India’s Feet of Clay
by both the Congress and the BJP have granted a free license to coal
and petroleum extraction and other polluting industries. No govern-
ment has so actively promoted destructive practices as Modi’s. It has
eased environmental clearances for polluting industries and watered
down various regulations. The environmental scholar Rohan D’ Souza
has written that by 2018, “the slash and burn attitude of gutting and
weakening existing environmental institutions, laws, and norms was
extended to forests, coasts, wildlife, air, and even waste management.”
When Modi came to power in 2014, India ranked 155 out of 178
countries assessed by the Environmental Performance Index, which
estimates the sustainability of a country’s development in terms of the
state of its air, water, soils, natural habitats, and so on. By 2022, India
ranked last, 180 out of 180.
The effects of these varied forms of environmental deterioration
exact a horrific economic and social cost on hundreds of millions of
people. Degradation of pastures and forests imperils the livelihoods of
farmers. Unregulated mining for coal and bauxite displaces entire rural
communities, making their people ecological refugees. Air pollution in
cities endangers the health of children, who miss school, and of workers,
whose productivity declines. Unchecked, these forms of environmental
abuse will impose ever-greater burdens on Indians yet unborn.
These future generations of Indians will also have to bear the costs
of the dismantling of democratic institutions overseen by Modi and his
party. A free press, independent regulatory institutions, and an impartial
and fearless judiciary are vital for political freedoms, for acting as a check
on the abuse of state power, and for nurturing an atmosphere of trust
among citizens. To create, or perhaps more accurately, re-create, them
after Modi and the BJP finally relinquish power will be an arduous task.
The strains placed on Indian federalism may boil over in 2026, when
parliamentary seats are scheduled to be reallocated according to the
next census, to be conducted in that year. Then, what is now merely a
divergence between north and south might become an actual divide. In
2001, when a reallocation of seats based on population was proposed,
the southern states argued that it would discriminate against them for
following progressive health and education policies in prior decades
that had reduced birth rates and enhanced women’s freedom. The BJP-
led coalition government then in power recognized the merits of the
south’s case and, with the consent of the opposition, proposed that the
reallocation be delayed for a further 25 years.
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India’s Feet of Clay
In that period, prime ministers had to bring other parties into gov-
ernment, allocating important ministries to its leaders. This fostered
a more inclusive and collaborative style of governance, more suitable
to the size and diversity of the country itself. States run by parties
other than the BJP or the Congress found representation at the center,
their voices heard and their concerns taken into account. Federalism
flourished, and so did the press and the courts, which had more room
to follow an independent path. It may be no coincidence that it was
in this period of coalition government that India experienced three
decades of steady economic growth.
When India became free from British rule in 1947, many skeptics
thought it was too large and too diverse to survive as a single nation and
its population too poor and illiterate to be trusted with a democratic sys-
tem of governance. Many predicted that the country would Balkanize,
become a military dictatorship, or experience mass famine. That those
dire scenarios did not come to pass was largely because of the sagacity
of India’s founding figures, who nurtured a pluralist ethos that respected
the rights of religious and linguistic minorities and who sought to bal-
ance the rights of the individual and the state, as well as those of the
central government and the provinces. This delicate calculus enabled
the country to stay united and democratic and allowed its people to
steadily overcome the historic burdens of poverty and discrimination.
The last decade has witnessed the systematic erosion of those var-
ied forms of pluralism. One party, the BJP, and within it, one man,
the prime minister, are judged to represent India to itself and to the
world. Modi’s charisma and popular appeal have consolidated this
dominance, electorally speaking. Yet the costs are mounting. Hindus
impose themselves on Muslims, the central government imposes itself
on the provinces, the state further curtails the rights and freedoms
of citizens. Meanwhile, the unthinking imitation of Western models
of energy-intensive and capital-intensive industrialization is causing
profound and, in many cases, irreversible environmental damage.
Modi and the BJP seem poised to win their third general election
in a row. This victory would further magnify the prime minister’s aura,
enhancing his image as India’s redeemer. His supporters will boast
that their man is assuredly taking his country toward becoming the
Vishwa Guru, the teacher to the world. Yet such triumphalism cannot
mask the deep fault lines underneath, which—unless recognized and
addressed—will only widen in the years to come.
Spycraft and
Statecraft
Transforming the CIA for an
Age of Competition
William J. Burns
F
or as long as countries have kept secrets from one another, they
have tried to steal them from one another. Espionage has been
and will remain an integral part of statecraft, even as its tech-
niques continually evolve. America’s first spies spent the Revolutionary
War using ciphers, clandestine courier networks, and invisible ink to
correspond with each other and their foreign allies. In World War II,
the emerging field of signals intelligence helped uncover Japanese
war plans. During the early Cold War, the United States’ intelligence
capabilities literally went into the stratosphere, with the advent of the
U-2 and other high-altitude spy planes that could photograph Soviet
military installations with impressive clarity.
The simple stars etched on the memorial wall at the CIA’s head-
quarters in Langley, Virginia, honor the 140 agency officers who gave
their lives serving their country. The memorial offers an enduring
reminder of countless acts of courage. Yet those instances of heroism
74 foreign affairs
Spycraft and Statecraft
and the CIA’s many quiet successes remain far less well known to the
American public than the mistakes that have sometimes marred the
agency’s history. The defining test for intelligence has always been
to anticipate and help policymakers navigate profound shifts in the
international landscape—the plastic moments that come along only
a few times each century.
As President Joe Biden has reiterated, the United States faces one
of those rare moments today, as consequential as the dawn of the Cold
War or the post-9/11 period. China’s rise and Russia’s revanchism pose
daunting geopolitical challenges in a world of intense strategic compe-
tition in which the United States no longer enjoys uncontested primacy
and in which existential climate threats are mounting. Complicating
matters further is a revolution in technology even more sweeping than
the Industrial Revolution or the beginning of the nuclear age. From
microchips to artificial intelligence to quantum computing, emerging
technologies are transforming the world, including the profession of
intelligence. In many ways, these developments make the CIA’s job
harder than ever, giving adversaries powerful new tools to confuse us,
evade us, and spy on us.
And yet as much as the world is changing, espionage remains an
interplay between humans and technology. There will continue to be
secrets that only humans can collect and clandestine operations that
only humans can conduct. Technological advances, particularly in sig-
nals intelligence, have not made such human operations irrelevant, as
some have predicted, but have instead revolutionized their practice. To
be an effective twenty-first-century intelligence service, the CIA must
blend a mastery of emerging technologies with the people-to-people
skills and individual daring that have always been at the heart of our
profession. That means equipping operations officers with the tools
and tradecraft to conduct espionage in a world of constant technolog-
ical surveillance—and equipping analysts with sophisticated artificial
intelligence models that can digest mammoth amounts of open-source
and clandestinely acquired information so that they can make their
best human judgments.
At the same time, what the CIA does with the intelligence it gath-
ers is also changing. “Strategic declassification,” the intentional pub-
lic disclosure of certain secrets to undercut rivals and rally allies, has
become an even more powerful tool for policymakers. Using it doesn’t
mean recklessly jeopardizing the sources or methods used to collect
the intelligence, but it does mean judiciously resisting the reflexive urge
to keep everything classified. The U.S. intelligence community is also
learning the increasing value of intelligence diplomacy, gaining a new
understanding of how its efforts to bolster allies and counter foes can
support policymakers.
This is a time of historic challenges for the CIA and the entire intel-
ligence profession, with geopolitical and technological shifts posing as
big a test as we’ve ever faced. Success will depend on blending tradi-
tional human intelligence with emerging technologies in creative ways.
It will require, in other words, adapting to a world where the only safe
prediction about change is that it will accelerate.
PUTIN UNBOUND
The post–Cold War era came to a definitive end the moment Russia
invaded Ukraine in February 2022. I have spent much of the past
two decades trying to understand the combustible combination of
grievance, ambition, and insecurity that Russian President Vladimir
Putin embodies. One thing I have learned is that it is always a mistake
to underestimate his fixation on controlling Ukraine and its choices.
Without that control, he believes it is impossible for Russia to be a
great power or for him to be a great Russian leader. That tragic and
brutish fixation has already brought shame to Russia and exposed its
weaknesses, from its one-dimensional economy to its inflated mili-
tary prowess to its corrupt political system. Putin’s invasion has also
prompted breathtaking determination and resolve from the Ukrainian
people. I have seen their courage firsthand on frequent wartime trips to
Ukraine, punctuated by Russian air raids and vivid images of Ukrainian
battlefield tenacity and ingenuity.
Putin’s war has already been a failure for Russia on many levels. His
original goal of seizing Kyiv and subjugating Ukraine proved fool-
ish and illusory. His military has suffered immense damage. At least
315,000 Russian soldiers have been killed or wounded, two-thirds of
Russia’s prewar tank inventory has been destroyed, and Putin’s vaunted
decades-long military modernization program has been hollowed out.
All this is a direct result of Ukrainian soldiers’ valor and skill, backed
up by Western support. Meanwhile, Russia’s economy is suffering long-
term setbacks, and the country is sealing its fate as China’s economic
vassal. Putin’s overblown ambitions have backfired in another way, too:
they have prompted NATO to grow larger and stronger.
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Spycraft and Statecraft
Although Putin’s repressive grip does not seem likely to weaken any-
time soon, his war in Ukraine is quietly corroding his power at home.
The short-lived mutiny launched last June by the mercenary leader
Yevgeny Prigozhin offered a glimpse at some of the dysfunction lurking
behind Putin’s carefully polished image of control. For a leader who
painstakingly crafted a reputation as the arbiter of order, Putin looked
detached and indecisive as Prigozhin’s ragtag mutineers made their way
up the road to Moscow. For many in the Russian elite, the question
was not so much whether the emperor had
no clothes as why he was taking so long to
get dressed. The ultimate apostle of payback, Ukraine’s
Putin eventually settled his score with Pri- challenge is to
gozhin, who was killed in a suspicious plane
crash two months to the day after starting his
puncture Putin’s
rebellion. But Prigozhin’s biting critique of the arrogance.
lies and military misjudgments at the core of
Putin’s war, and of the corruption at the heart of the Russian political
system, will not soon disappear.
This year is likely to be a tough one on the battlefield in Ukraine,
a test of staying power whose consequences will go well beyond the
country’s heroic struggle to sustain its freedom and independence. As
Putin regenerates Russia’s defense production—with critical compo-
nents from China, as well as weaponry and munitions from Iran and
North Korea—he continues to bet that time is on his side, that he can
grind down Ukraine and wear down its Western supporters. Ukraine’s
challenge is to puncture Putin’s arrogance and demonstrate the high
cost for Russia of continued conflict, not just by making progress on
the frontlines but also by launching deeper strikes behind them and
making steady gains in the Black Sea. In this environment, Putin might
engage again in nuclear saber-rattling, and it would be foolish to dis-
miss escalatory risks entirely. But it would be equally foolish to be
unnecessarily intimidated by them.
The key to success lies in preserving Western aid for Ukraine. At less
than five percent of the U.S. defense budget, it is a relatively modest
investment with significant geopolitical returns for the United States
and notable returns for American industry. Keeping the arms flowing
will put Ukraine in a stronger position if an opportunity for serious
negotiations emerges. It offers a chance to ensure a long-term win for
Ukraine and a strategic loss for Russia; Ukraine could safeguard its
sovereignty and rebuild, while Russia would be left to deal with the
enduring costs of Putin’s folly. For the United States to walk away
from the conflict at this crucial moment and cut off support to Ukraine
would be an own goal of historic proportions.
78 foreign affairs
William J. Burns
the United States. Such connections have served the two countries
and the rest of the world remarkably well, but they have also created
critical vulnerabilities and serious risks for American security and pros-
perity. The COVID-19 pandemic made clear to every government the
danger of being dependent on any one country for life-saving medical
supplies, just as Russia’s war in Ukraine has made clear to Europe the
risks of being dependent on one country for energy. In today’s world,
no country wants to find itself at the mercy of a single supplier of
critical minerals and technologies—especially if that supplier is intent
on weaponizing those dependencies. As American policymakers have
argued, the best answer is to sensibly “de-risk” and diversify—securing
the United States’ supply chains, protecting its technological edge, and
investing in its industrial capacity.
In this volatile, divided world, the weight of the “hedging middle”
is growing. Democracies and autocracies, developed economies and
developing ones, and countries across the global South are increasingly
intent on diversifying their relationships to maximize their options.
They see little benefit and plenty of risk in sticking to monogamous
geopolitical relationships with either the United States or China. More
countries are likely to be attracted to an “open” geopolitical relationship
status (or at least an “it’s complicated” one), following the United States’
lead on some issues while cultivating relations with China. And if past
is precedent, Washington ought to be attentive to rivalries between
the growing number of middle powers, which have historically helped
spark collisions between major ones.
A FAMILIAR ENTANGLEMENT
The crisis precipitated by Hamas’s butchery in Israel on October 7,
2023, is a painful reminder of the complexity of the choices that the
Middle East continues to pose for the United States. Competition
with China will remain Washington’s highest priority, but that doesn’t
mean it can evade other challenges. It means only that the United
States has to navigate with care and discipline, avoid overreach, and
use its influence wisely.
I have spent much of the last four decades working in and on the
Middle East, and I have rarely seen it more tangled or explosive.
Winding down the intense Israeli ground operation in the Gaza Strip,
meeting the deep humanitarian needs of suffering Palestinian civilians,
freeing hostages, preventing the spread of conflict to other fronts in the
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Spycraft and Statecraft
region, and shaping a workable approach for the “day after” in Gaza are
all incredibly difficult problems. So is resurrecting hope for a durable
peace that ensures Israel’s security as well as Palestinian statehood and
takes advantage of historic opportunities for normalization with Saudi
Arabia and other Arab countries. Hard as it may be to imagine those
possibilities amid the current crisis, it is even harder to imagine getting
out of the crisis without pursuing them seriously.
Key to Israel’s—and the region’s—security is dealing with Iran.
The Iranian regime has been emboldened by the crisis and seems
ready to fight to its last regional proxy, all while expanding its nuclear
program and enabling Russian aggression. In the months after Octo-
ber 7, the Houthis, the Yemeni rebel group allied with Iran, began
attacking commercial ships in the Red Sea, and the risks of escalation
on other fronts persist.
The United States is not exclusively responsible for resolving any of
the Middle East’s vexing problems. But none of them can be managed,
let alone solved, without active U.S. leadership.
SPIES LIKE US
Geopolitical competition and uncertainty—not to mention shared
challenges such as climate change and unprecedented technological
advances such as artificial intelligence—make for a fiendishly compli-
cated international landscape. The imperative for the CIA is to transform
its approach to intelligence to keep pace with this rapidly transforming
world. The CIA and the rest of the U.S. intelligence community—led by
Avril Haines, the director of national intelligence—are working hard to
meet this moment with the urgency and creativity it requires.
This new landscape presents particular challenges for an organiza-
tion focused on human intelligence. In a world in which the United
States’ principal rivals—China and Russia—are led by personalis-
tic autocrats operating within small and insular circles of advisers,
gaining insight into leaders’ intentions is both more important and
more difficult than ever.
Just as 9/11 ushered in a new era for the CIA, so did Russia’s inva-
sion of Ukraine. I’m deeply proud of the work that the CIA and our
intelligence partners have done to assist the president and senior U.S.
policymakers—and especially the Ukrainians themselves—to thwart
Putin. Together, we provided early and accurate warning of the com-
ing invasion. That knowledge also enabled the president to decide to
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Spycraft and Statecraft
SMARTER SPIES
Meanwhile, we’re transforming our approach to emerging technol-
ogy. The CIA has been working to blend high-tech tools with age-old
techniques for collecting intelligence from individuals—human intel-
ligence, or HUMINT. Technology is, of course, making many aspects of
spycraft harder than ever. In an era of smart cities, with video cameras
on every street and facial recognition technology increasingly ubiq-
uitous, spying has become much harder. For a CIA officer working
overseas in a hostile country, meeting sources who are risking their
own safety to offer valuable information, constant surveillance poses
an acute threat. But the same technology that sometimes works against
the CIA—whether it’s the mining of big data to expose patterns in the
agency’s activities or massive camera networks that can track an oper-
ative’s every move—can also be made to work for it and against others.
The CIA is racing against its rivals to put emerging technologies to
use. The agency has appointed its first chief technology officer. And it
has established another new mission center focused on building better
partnerships with the private sector, where American innovation offers
a significant competitive advantage.
IN THE SHADOWS
Every day, as I read through cables from stations around the world,
travel to foreign capitals, or speak with colleagues at headquarters, I’m
84 foreign affairs
Spycraft and Statecraft
reminded of the skill and courage of CIA officers, as well as the unrelent-
ing challenges they face. They are doing hard jobs in hard places. Espe-
cially since 9/11, they have been operating at an incredibly fast tempo.
Indeed, taking care of the CIA’s mission in this new and daunting era
depends on taking care of our people. That’s why the CIA has strength-
ened its medical resources at headquarters and in the field; improved
programs for families, remote workers, and two-career couples; and
explored more flexible career paths, especially for technologists, so that
officers can move into the private sector and
later return to the agency.
We’ve streamlined our recruiting process Disaffection
for new officers. It now takes a quarter of in Russia is
the time it took two years ago to move from
application to final offer and security clear-
creating a once-
ance. These improvements have contributed in-a-generation
to a surge of interest in the CIA. In 2023, we recruiting
had more applicants than in any year since opportunity for
the immediate aftermath of 9/11. We’re also
working hard to diversify our workforce,
the CIA.
reaching historic highs in 2023 in terms of
the number of women and minority officers hired, as well as the num-
ber promoted into the agency’s most senior ranks.
By necessity, CIA officers operate in the shadows, usually out of sight
and out of mind; the risks they take and the sacrifices they make are rarely
well understood. At a moment when trust in the United States’ public
institutions is often in short supply, the CIA remains a resolutely apolitical
institution, bound by the oath I and everyone else at the agency have
taken to defend the Constitution and by our obligations under the law.
CIA officers are also bound together by a sense of community, and
by a deep, shared commitment to public service at this crucial moment
in American history. They know the truth in the advice I got many
years ago from my father, who had a distinguished military career. As
I was wrestling with what to do with my professional life, he sent me a
handwritten note: “Nothing can make you prouder than to serve your
country with honor.” That helped launch me into a long and fortunate
career in government, first in the Foreign Service and now at the CIA.
I’ve never regretted the choice I made. I take enormous pride in serving
with thousands of other CIA officers who feel the same about theirs—
and are rising to the challenge of a new era.
A
merican politicians and analysts have long argued that it
is dangerous to politicize U.S. foreign policy and national
security. “U.S. foreign policy is stronger when it enjoys
bipartisan support,” wrote Democratic Senator Chris Coons in a
2020 Foreign Affairs article. “For the United States to play a steady,
stabilizing role in world affairs, its allies and adversaries must know
that its government speaks with one voice and that its policies won’t
shift dramatically with changing domestic political winds.” Follow-
ing the 2016 election, former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright,
former National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley, and Nancy
Lindborg, the president of the U.S. Institute of Peace, argued that
a “bipartisan approach to foreign policy is achievable and remains
essential for our security.” Such statements invoke the words of U.S.
86 foreign affairs
Elizabeth N. Saunders
88 foreign affairs
Politics Can’t Stop at the Water’s Edge
party leaves power. The political system can once again reward can-
didates for engaging with foreign policy elites and demonstrating
interest or experience in international affairs—a former hallmark of
the Republican Party that has all but vanished. It can create partisan
and career incentives that ensure there are diverse views in national
security. And it can make space for people with differing perspectives
to share and exercise power.
These shifts cannot guarantee good decisions in foreign policy;
nothing can. But they can, at least, make bad decisions less likely,
helping the United States as it navigates an uncertain future.
DIVIDED WE STAND
U.S. foreign policy has been political since the founding. During
Washington’s administration, officials were divided over their fledg-
ling nation’s stance in the war between France and Great Britain. In
the late 1800s, Democrats and Republicans in Congress pressured a
reluctant President William McKinley to go to war with Spain on
behalf of Cuban independence.
Even the emergence of the so-called Cold War consensus—a
bipartisan commitment to build and use American military power
to contain communism—was the product of intense political bar-
gaining. To get the European rearmament program he deemed nec-
essary to counter the Soviet Union, President Harry Truman had to
negotiate with isolationist Asia-first Republicans, who opposed new
international commitments in Europe; internationalist Europe-first
Republicans such as Vandenberg, who generally supported Truman’s
national security agenda but wanted to use their political leverage;
and southern Democrats, who opposed his domestic agenda. Truman
largely succeeded, but only by bolstering Taiwan, making concessions
on military strategy in the Korean War, and jettisoning his efforts
to expand civil rights and the social welfare system.
Even after Truman set this basic direction for national security, the
Cold War continued to involve fierce political disagreements. Some of
these policy fights reflected real differences of opinion on policy, such
as the merits of arms control. But personal ambition and electoral
motivations also shaped foreign policy. During the Cuban missile
crisis, President John F. Kennedy and his advisers feared Republican
political attacks if he did not follow through on his promise to keep
offensive weapons out of Cuba. President Richard Nixon wanted the
90 foreign affairs
Elizabeth N. Saunders
TOP DOWN
To understand why the politics of national security is both neces-
sary and deeply flawed, analysts must look to elites: the presidents
and appointees who shape the bureaucracy, the military leaders
who advise on and implement decisions, and members of Congress.
Although the democratic process can help keep foreign policy on
an even keel, the role of voters is limited. The general public cannot
judge every policy issue closely, and people pay closer attention to
issues that affect them directly, such as health care or tax policy, than
to international relations. Even voters who do care deeply about
international affairs have only the blunt tool of infrequent elections
to try to shape policy.
When it comes to international affairs, voters tend to be led by
their parties instead of the other way around. As the political scientists
92 foreign affairs
Politics Can’t Stop at the Water’s Edge
Adam Berinsky and John Zaller have shown, people look to elites on
matters of national security, trusting those with whom they share a
partisan affiliation. They often take their cues from major politicians,
choosing their preferred leaders and then adopting those politicians’
views as their own. Trump’s rise to power in 2016 dramatically illus-
trated this phenomenon. Republicans have traditionally been more
hawkish than Democrats, but as Trump won the GOP nomination
and presidency, Republican opposition to foreign interventions rose
sharply. As the political scientist Michael
Tesler has shown, Trump voters were hawkish
in their opinions of U.S. military campaigns in Voters trust hawks
Afghanistan and Syria before 2015, but they more than doves
completely reversed their views after Trump
won the presidency. The party’s voters were
on national
sharply critical of Russian President Vladimir security issues.
Putin, but Trump’s praise led Republican vot-
ers to view Putin and Russia more favorably.
That elites make national security decisions is not, by itself, bad.
Given how much of foreign policy is hidden, elites make prudent
choices more often than the public might realize. They can also make
decisions quickly and efficiently in crises. Elites who are knowledge-
able or care intensely about an issue or a country can also provide
valuable insights, monitor events, and process information more
effectively than both ordinary people and practitioners with a dif-
ferent set of interests. Elites who have a strong affinity or bias can
play a particularly important role in the policy process: for example,
scholars have found that high-stakes diplomacy can be more effective
when ambassadors are political appointees with the president’s ear
or when they are biased toward their host country and thus elicit
more trust from that country’s leaders.
Elites can also hold politicians accountable in ways that ordi-
nary voters cannot. They can pass information on to other elites
or the media, criticize policy in front of audiences that matter to
policymakers, and resign in protest. The information unearthed
and publicized by the January 6 committee—whose very existence
resulted from partisan political maneuvering—is a good example.
The insurrection threatened U.S. foreign policy and national security
by undermining the peaceful transition of power, straining civil-
military relations to the near-breaking point, shaking global leaders’
94 foreign affairs
Politics Can’t Stop at the Water’s Edge
Dissenting doves: Fulbright holding a Senate hearing about the Vietnam War, 1966
game” elites must play can lead to wars the public might not choose
and prolong ones that voters want to end sooner.
The source of hawkish bias lies in the credibility gap that dovish
leaders face when making foreign and security policies. For better
or for worse, voters trust hawks more than doves on national secu-
rity issues, so hawks have more leeway on matters of war and peace.
Research by the political scientists Michaela Mattes and Jessica
Weeks suggests leaders want to signal that they are moderate,
96 foreign affairs
Elizabeth N. Saunders
PARTY FOUL
These pathologies are not new, and they are important reminders that
there is no perfect baseline for national security decision-making. Even
a well-run Washington will follow bad processes and make mistakes.
But a clear-eyed view of the national security politics of the past, and
how it was both flawed and invaluable, is essential to understanding
what is really ailing foreign policy today.
Consider the issue of expertise, especially in Congress. In the past,
major foreign relations or armed services committee membership
was politically valuable and a source of real influence. Committee
chairmen, especially, wielded significant power over policy specifics,
and so they sweated the details. During the latter stages of the Cold
War, for example, nuclear policy had to go through Democratic
Senator Sam Nunn, the knowledgeable chairman of the Senate
Armed Services Committee. If Nunn endorsed a defense bill, he
could bring along the votes of other members of his party who were
skeptical or who simply did not follow defense issues closely. In the
post–Cold War years, he used his defense clout to team up with
Republican Senator Richard Lugar and push through funding for
the Cooperative Threat Reduction initiative, designed to safeguard
nuclear material and know-how in the former Soviet Union.
But now, this nexus between power and expertise has melted
away. Changes in committee membership rules have disincentivized
learning by increasing turnover and weakening the once power-
ful congressional committees, while presidential and congressional
leaders have increased their power since September 11. If commit-
tees can no longer influence policy, representatives have far fewer
incentives to invest scarce time and political resources in learning
about a region or a national security issue.
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Politics Can’t Stop at the Water’s Edge
Institutional changes are only one reason why elites are now
less capable of making foreign policy. The bigger culprit is intense
partisan polarization. By pulling elected representatives to extremes,
polarization reduces the pool of moderates who can make the kind
of bargains that guided Washington through the Cold War. Instead,
it incentivizes officials to shoot down ideas tabled by the opposing
“team” irrespective of the policy merits. And as the political scientist
Rachel Myrick has argued, polarization undermines U.S. credi-
bility by making it harder for Washington
to commit to policies that last beyond the
current administration. Even a well-
Polarization, however, has not done equal run Washington
damage to both parties. These dynamics have
affected Republicans far more than Demo-
will follow bad
crats, thanks to Trump’s capture of the GOP processes and
and his delegitimization of its traditional make mistakes.
internationalism, as well as right-wing media
pressure to take oppositional stances and avoid policy debates. This
toxic combination of forces has changed incentives for Republican
presidential and congressional candidates so much that they no
longer feel the need to demonstrate their capability on foreign pol-
icy. Ironically, even though the Democratic Party has increased its
share of the country’s national security professionals in Congress,
the GOP retains the advantage in public opinion polls in terms of
national security competence.
The GOP has dismantled much of its pipeline of foreign policy
talent by becoming actively disdainful of expertise. When Trump
campaigned for president in 2016, he did so on an explicitly anti-
experience platform, and once in office, he drove many of his party’s
most talented officials out of government. Other officials refused to
even consider serving. Trump has continued to rail against expertise
in his 2024 campaign and has plans to—in the words of the leading
pro-Trump think tank—“destroy” parts of the civil service. A sec-
ond Trump term could prompt even more foreign policy officials to
voluntarily leave government.
The Republican Party, of course, still has many experts, and there
is sincere internal debate within the GOP about whether some form
of isolationism or restraint is preferable to the party’s more tra-
ditionally hawkish stance. Although there is nothing wrong with
arguing for reducing U.S. commitments around the world, many GOP
elected officials are likely most interested in falling in line behind
Trump’s positions and in opposing Biden’s. The sight of Repub-
lican candidates refusing to take a strong stand against Russia at
last September’s presidential primary debate at the Reagan Library
underscores this dynamic.
The GOP’s problems will not be easy to solve. Many of the party’s
talented national security professionals sat out the Trump years and
would likely do so if he wins again. At a minimum, that means a
large share of the Republican Party’s experienced officials will have
been out of power for two Obama terms, a Trump term, a Biden
term, and then, presumably, either a second Biden or Trump term—a
total of 20 years. Even if a traditional Republican wins the presidency
in 2028, the newly elected leader will have few top-level officials
to appoint who both share the president’s views and have recent
experience in a presidential administration. This president will have
fewer junior officials, too. Because traditional, top-level GOP foreign
policy experts have gone so long without power, they have not been
able to hire deputies, and those deputies have not had the chance to
hire staffers who can then move up the ranks.
Whatever one’s party affiliation, this broken GOP pipeline should
be of great concern, and restoring it is in the national interest. As
Kori Schake has written in these pages, “The United States needs
a strong and vibrant Republican Party.” It helps Democrats to have
another party that will bargain, share blame, and subject it to scrutiny
and opposition—and whose support can be earned when the United
States confronts a crisis. But this process only works if the parties
believe they benefit from having and publicly discussing substantive
views about foreign policy. It is no indictment of the Biden team or
the pipeline of Democratic officials behind him to say that if tra-
ditional conservative Republicans continue to remain out of power,
the Democratic Party’s ideas are likely to stagnate.
The Age of
Amorality
Can America Save the Liberal Order
Through Illiberal Means?
Hal Brands
H
“ ow much evil we must do in order to do good,” the theo-
logian Reinhold Niebuhr wrote in 1946. “This, I think, is a
very succinct statement of the human situation.” Niebuhr
was writing after one global war had forced the victors to do great evil
to prevent the incalculably greater evil of a world ruled by its most
aggressive regimes. He was witnessing the onset of another global
conflict in which the United States would periodically transgress its
own values in order to defend them. But the fundamental question
Niebuhr raised—how liberal states can reconcile worthy ends with the
unsavory means needed to attain them—is timeless. It is among the
most vexing dilemmas facing the United States today.
U.S. President Joe Biden took office pledging to wage a fateful contest
between democracy and autocracy. After Russia invaded Ukraine, he
A DIRTY GAME
Biden has consistently been right about one thing: clashes between great
powers are clashes of ideas and interests alike. In the seventeenth century,
the Thirty Years’ War was fueled by doctrinal differences no less than by the
struggle for European primacy. In the late eighteenth century, the politics
of revolutionary France upheaved the geopolitics of the entire continent.
measures they had used to win the Cold War. The question is whether
they can do without them as global rivalry heats up again.
IDEAS MATTER
Threats from autocratic enemies heighten ideological impulses in U.S.
policy by underscoring the clash of ideas that often drives global ten-
sions. Since taking office, Biden has defined the threat from U.S. rivals,
particularly China, in starkly ideological terms.
The world has reached an “inflection point,” Biden has repeatedly
declared. In March 2021, he suggested that future historians would be
studying “the issue of who succeeded: autocracy or democracy.” At root,
Biden has argued, U.S.-Chinese competition is a test of which model can
better meet the demands of the modern era. And if China becomes the
world’s preeminent power, U.S. officials fear, it will entrench autocracy
in friendly countries while coercing democratic governments in hostile
ones. Just witness how Beijing has used economic leverage to punish
criticism of its policies by democratic societies from Australia to Norway.
In making the system safe for illiberalism, a dominant China would make
it unsafe for liberalism in places near and far.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine reinforced Biden’s thesis. It offered a case
study in autocratic aggression and atrocity and a warning that a world led
by illiberal states would be lethally violent, not least for vulnerable democ-
racies nearby. Coming weeks after Chinese President Xi Jinping and Rus-
sian President Vladimir Putin had sealed a “no limits” strategic partnership,
the Ukraine invasion also raised the specter of a coordinated autocratic
assault on the liberal international order. Ukraine, Biden explained, was the
central front in a “larger fight for . . . essential democratic principles.” So the
United States would rally the free world against “democracy’s mortal foes.”
The shock of the Ukraine war, combined with the steadying hand of
U.S. leadership, produced an expanded transatlantic union of democ-
racies. Sweden and Finland sought membership in NATO; the West
supported Ukraine and inflicted heavy costs on Russia. The Biden admin-
istration also sought to confine China by weaving a web of democratic
ties around the country. It has upgraded bilateral alliances with the likes
of Japan and Australia. It has improved the Quad (the security and
diplomatic dialogue with Australia, India, and Japan) and established
AUKUS (a military partnership with Australia and the United Kingdom).
And it has repurposed existing multilateral bodies, such as the G-7, to
meet the peril from Beijing. There are even whispers of a “three plus one”
CONTROVERSIAL FRIENDS
Consider the situation in Europe. NATO is mostly an alliance of
democracies. But holding that pact together during the Ukraine war
has required Biden to downplay the illiberal tendencies of a Polish gov-
ernment that—until its electoral defeat in October—was systematically
eroding checks and balances. Securing its northern flank, by welcoming
Finland and Sweden, has involved diplomatic horse-trading with Tur-
key’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who, in addition to frequently undercutting
U.S. interests, has been steering his country toward autocratic rule.
In Asia, the administration spent much of 2021 and 2022 carefully
preserving U.S. ties to the Philippines, at the time led by Rodrigo
Duterte, a man whose drug war had killed thousands. Biden has assid-
uously courted India as a bulwark against China, even though the gov-
ernment of Prime Minister Narendra Modi has curbed speech, harassed
opposition leaders, fanned religious grievances, and allegedly killed dis-
sidents abroad. And after visiting New Delhi in September 2023, Biden
traveled to Hanoi to sign a “comprehensive strategic partnership” with
Vietnam’s one-party regime. Once again, the United States is using
some communists to contain others.
Then there is the Middle East, where Biden’s “free world” coalition
is quite the motley crew. In 2020, Biden threatened to make Saudi
Arabia a “pariah” over the murder of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi.
The United States should also avoid the fallacy of the false alternative.
It must evaluate choices, and partners, against the plausible possibilities,
not against the utopian ideal. The realistic alternative to maintaining ties
to a military regime in Africa may be watching as murderous Russian
mercenaries fill the void. The realistic alternative to engaging Modi’s
India may be seeing South Asia fall further under the shadow of a China
that assiduously exports illiberalism. Similarly, proximity to a Saudi
regime that carves up its critics is deeply uncomfortable. But the realistic
alternative to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is probably
a regime that remains quite repressive—and is far less committed to
empowering women, curbing religious zealots, and otherwise making
the country a more open, tolerant place. In a world of lousy options, the
crucial question is often: Lousy compared with what?
Another guiding principle: good things don’t all come at once. Cold
War policymakers sometimes justified coup making and support for
repressive regimes on grounds that preventing Third World countries
from going communist then preserved the possibility that they might go
democratic later. That logic was suspiciously convenient—and, in many
cases, correct. Countries in Latin America and other developing regions
did eventually experience political openings as they reached higher levels
of development, and democratic values radiated outward from the West.
Today, unseemly bargains can sometimes lead to better outcomes.
By not breaking the U.S.-Philippine alliance during Duterte’s drug
war, Washington sustained the relationship until a more cooperative,
less draconian government emerged. By staying close to a Polish gov-
ernment with some worrying tendencies, the United States bought
time until, late last year, that country’s voters elected a coalition prom-
ising to strengthen its democratic institutions. The same argument
could be made for staying engaged with other democracies where
autocratic tendencies are pronounced but electoral mechanisms remain
intact—Hungary, India, and Turkey, to name a few. More broadly,
liberalism is most likely to flourish in a system led by a democracy. So
simply forestalling the ascent of powerful autocracies may eventually
help democratic values spread into once inhospitable places.
Similarly, the United States should remember that taking the broad
view is as vital as taking the long view. Support for democracy and
human rights is not an all-or-nothing proposition. As Biden’s state-
craft has shown, transactional deals with dictators can complement
a strategy that stresses democratic cooperation at its core. Honoring
F
ew words are more closely associated with the late Henry
Kissinger than “détente.” The term was first used in diplomacy
in the early 1900s, when the French ambassador to Germany
tried—and failed—to better his country’s deteriorating relationship
with Berlin, and in 1912, when British diplomats attempted the same
thing. But détente became internationally famous only in the late
1960s and 1970s, when Kissinger, first as U.S. national security adviser
and then also as U.S. secretary of state, pioneered what would become
his signature policy: the easing of tensions between the Soviet Union
and the United States.
Détente should not be confused with amitié. It was not about strik-
ing up a friendship with Moscow but about reducing the risks that a
cold war would become a hot one. “The United States and the Soviet
Union are ideological rivals,” Kissinger explained in his memoirs.
ON THE BRINK
These days, the more sophisticated of Kissinger’s academic critics
don’t complain that the Soviets got more out of détente than the
United States did. Instead, they argue that Kissinger repeatedly made
the mistake of seeing every issue through the lens of the Cold War
and treating every crisis as if it were decisive to the struggle against
Moscow. As the historian Jussi Hanhimaki has written in a book-
length broadside, Kissinger took it “as a given that containing Soviet
power—if not communist ideology—should be the central goal of
American foreign policy.”
This critique reflects the efforts historians have made in recent
years to focus on the sufferings of people who lived in the countries
caught in the Cold War crossfire. But it underestimates just how
threatening the Soviet Union was to the United States in the Third
World. Whatever the crafty Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin
might have said to Kissinger, the Kremlin did not regard détente
as anything other than cover for its strategy to gain the advantage
over Washington. As a 1971 report to the Politburo made clear, the
Soviet Union wanted the United States to “conduct its international
affairs in a way that did not create a danger of direct confrontation,”
but only because doing so could make Washington “recognize the
need for the West to realize the interests of the USSR.” To achieve
this objective, the report called on the Politburo “to continue to use
the U.S. government’s objective interest in
maintaining contacts and holding negotia-
There was tions with the USSR.”
“no alternative Kissinger was not privy to this document,
but it would not have surprised him. He had
to coexistence,” no illusions about the game being played by
Kissinger said Dobrynin’s masters. After all, the Soviets
in 1975. also stated publicly in 1975 that détente did
not preclude their continued “support of the
national liberation struggle” against “the social‐political status quo.”
As Kissinger told the columnist Joe Alsop in 1970, “If the Soviets
think an agreement on nuclear parity will serve their interests, they
are perfectly capable of reaching for such an agreement with one
hand, while trying to cut our gizzards out with the other hand.”
Nevertheless, although Kissinger knew that the Kremlin had ulte-
rior motives, he still advanced détente for one simple reason: the
conservative alternative, a return to the brinkmanship of the 1950s
and 1960s, risked nuclear Armageddon. There was “no alternative
to coexistence,” Kissinger told an audience in Minneapolis in 1975.
Both the Soviet Union and the United States “have the capacity to
destroy civilized life.” Détente was, therefore, a moral imperative.
“We have an historic obligation,” Kissinger argued the following
year, “to engage the Soviet Union and to push back the shadow of
nuclear catastrophe.”
These concerns did not make Kissinger an advocate of nuclear
disarmament. Having risen to prominence as a public intellectual
with a book titled Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, he remained
as interested in the possibility of a limited nuclear war as he was
horrified by the prospect of an all-out one. In the spring of 1974,
Kissinger even requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff formulate a
limited nuclear response to a hypothetical Soviet invasion of Iran.
But when he was briefed on the draft plan a few weeks later, he was
appalled. The Pentagon proposed firing some 200 nuclear weapons
at Soviet military installations near the Iranian border. “Are you out
of your minds?” Kissinger shouted. “This is a limited option?” When
the generals returned with a plan to use only an atomic mine and two
nuclear weapons to blow up the two roads from Soviet territory into
Iran, he was incredulous. “What kind of nuclear attack is this?” he
asked. A U.S. president who used so few weapons would be regarded
in the Kremlin as “chicken.” The problem, as he well knew, was that
there could never be certainty that the Soviets would respond in a
limited way to any kind of American nuclear strike.
Kissinger’s views on nuclear arms rankled his conservative critics,
particularly those in the Pentagon. They were especially infuriated
by how Kissinger approached the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks,
which began in November 1969 and paved the way for the first major
U.S.-Soviet arms control agreement. In September 1975, the Defense
Intelligence Agency circulated a ten-page intelligence estimate assert-
ing that the Soviet Union was cynically cheating on its SALT com-
mitments to gain nuclear dominance. The debate flared again in the
last days of the Ford administration, when reports by the CIA and
the Defense Intelligence Agency suggested that Moscow was seeking
superiority, not parity, when it came to nuclear weapons. Government
officials claimed that Kissinger knew this but had chosen to ignore it.
These criticisms were not entirely wrong. The Soviets had already
achieved parity in the raw numbers of intercontinental ballistic mis-
siles by the late 1960s and had a huge lead in megatonnage by 1970.
Some of these ICBMs carried large, multiple independently targetable
reentry vehicles, which could fire a cluster of warheads at more than
one target. But the United States retained a five-to-one advantage
in submarine-launched ballistic missiles in 1977. The U.S. advantage
in bomber-carried nuclear weapons was even greater: 11 to one. And
Moscow never came anywhere close to acquiring enough ballistic mis-
siles to carry out a strike against U.S. nuclear assets that would have
made it impossible for Washington to respond with its own nuclear
attack. In fact, interviews with senior Soviet officers after the Cold War
revealed that by the early 1970s, the military leadership had dismissed
the notion that the Soviet Union could win a nuclear war. The subse-
quent growth of the country’s nuclear arsenal was mainly the result of
inertia on the part of the military-industrial complex.
Train-track diplomacy: Kissinger and Ford negotiating arms control with Soviet Premier
Leonid Brezhnev and others near Vladivostok, Russia, November 1974
peace of the grave. All I can see is what other nations the world over
see: collapse of the American will and the retreat of American power.”
Unlike the allegation of Soviet nuclear superiority, Kissinger never
denied that Soviet expansionism in the Third World posed a threat
to détente and U.S. power. “Time is running out; continuation of an
interventionist policy must inevitably threaten other relationships,”
he said in a speech in November 1975. “We will be flexible and coop-
erative in settling conflicts. . . . But we will never permit détente to
turn into a subterfuge of unilateral advantage.” Yet the reality was that
in the absence of congressional support—whether for the defense of
South Vietnam or the defense of Angola—the Ford administration
had little choice but to accept Soviet military expansion, or at least
GERALD R . FORD LI BRARY / REU T ERS
DÉTENTE 2.0
Considering the troubles the United States was facing by the start of
1969, détente as Kissinger conceived of it made sense. Unable to defeat
North Vietnam, afflicted by stagflation, and deeply divided over every-
thing from race relations to women’s rights, Washington could not play
hardball with Moscow. Indeed, the U.S. economy in the 1970s was in no
condition to sustain increased defense spending overall. (Détente had a
fiscal rationale, too, although Kissinger seldom mentioned it.) Détente
did not mean—as Kissinger’s critics alleged—embracing, trusting, or
appeasing the Soviets. Nor did it mean allowing them to attain nuclear
superiority, permanent control over Eastern Europe, or an empire in the
Third World. What it meant was recognizing the limits of U.S. power,
reducing the risk of thermonuclear war by employing a combination
of carrots and sticks, and buying time for the United States to recover.
It worked. True, Kissinger did not secure the “decent interval”
between the U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam and the South’s
conquest by the North, an interlude he had hoped would be long
enough to limit the damage to Washington’s credibility and reputa-
tion. But détente allowed the United States to regroup domestically
and to stabilize its Cold War strategy. The U.S. economy soon inno-
vated in ways that the Soviet Union never could, creating economic
the communist state blockading the nearby contested island and the
United States having to run the blockade, with all the attendant risks.
That is certainly what Kissinger believed in the last year of his long
life. It was the main motivation for his final visit to Beijing shortly
after his 100th birthday.
Like détente 1.0, a new détente would not mean appeasing China,
much less expecting the country to change. It would mean, once again,
engaging in myriad negotiations: on arms control (urgently needed
as China frantically builds up its forces in every domain); on trade;
on technology transfers, climate change, and artificial intelligence;
and on space. Like SALT, these negotiations would be protracted
and tedious—and perhaps even inconclusive. But they would be the
“meeting jaw to jaw” that British Prime Minister Winston Churchill
generally preferred to war. As for Taiwan, the superpowers could do
worse than to dust off their old promise, hammered out by Kissinger,
to agree to disagree.
Détente, of course, does not work miracles. In the 1970s, it was
both oversold and overbought. The policy unquestionably provided
the United States with time, but it was a chess strategy that perhaps
required too many callous sacrifices of lesser pieces on the board.
As one Soviet analyst, puzzled by U.S. opposition to his country’s
intervention in Angola, remarked, “You Americans tried to sell
détente like detergent and claimed that it would do everything a
detergent could do.”
Critics ultimately succeeded in poisoning the term. In March 1976,
Ford banned its use in his reelection campaign. But there was never
a workable replacement. Asked then if he had an alternative term,
Kissinger gave a characteristically wry response. “I’ve been dancing
around myself to find one,” he said. “Easing of tensions, relaxation of
tensions. We may well wind up with the old word again.”
Today, the Biden administration has settled for its own word:
“de-risking.” It is not French, but it is also barely English. Although
the starting point of this cold war is different because of the much
greater economic interdependence between today’s superpowers, the
optimal strategy may turn out to be essentially the same as before. If
the new détente is to be criticized, then the critics should not misrep-
resent it the way Kissinger’s détente was so often misrepresented by
his many foes—lest they find themselves, like Reagan before, doing
essentially the same when they are in the Situation Room.
W
hen policymakers consider national security, they tend
to think first of military capabilities: the weaponry and
ammunition a country possesses, the state of its armed
forces, its border defenses, its surveillance and cybersecurity. Since 2020,
however, U.S. national security strategy has taken a sharply commercial
turn. The COVID-19 pandemic and its huge disruptions of economies
made strategists more conscious of supply chains’ fragility. Where, exactly,
are all the chips and ball bearings that go into weapons manufactured?
The pandemic also illuminated just how much U.S. companies
depend on China in the multistep manufacturing processes that bring
products to consumers, including items crucial for national security and
for the transition to green energy. China currently processes 85 percent
of the critical minerals that go into high-tech devices. China also boasts
SHANNON K. O’NEIL is Vice President of Studies and Nelson and David Rockefeller
Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and author of
The Globalization Myth: Why Regions Matter.
benefit from unifying the way they set technology standards, screen their
foreign investments, and move toward more environmentally friendly
and labor-friendly sourcing of all kinds of goods. But Europe will never
become a strong source of critical minerals or an affordable supplier of
inputs to semiconductors or electric vehicles. Other than Australia, few
U.S. allies in the Indo-Pacific have significant critical mineral reserves.
And it will be enormously hard to pry Asian electric vehicle, semicon-
ductor, and pharmaceutical supply chains free of Chinese influence.
In terms of geographical proximity, Latin America, by contrast, is a
Goldilocks option for U.S. manufacturers. It is not so close to the United
States that moving production there would dangerously concentrate risk
from natural or manmade disasters, but it is not so far that it creates com-
plicated long-distance logistics problems. The United States has a great
deal to gain broadly from helping Latin American countries strengthen
their economies. Most of those countries are democracies, and economic
growth and democratic consolidation in the region would create new
investment opportunities and middle-class consumers for U.S. compa-
nies. And Latin America is the one region in the world with which the
United States has an existing trade and market advantage, having already
inked free trade agreements with 11 countries there.
Yet the United States is failing to engage Latin America’s nations
commercially or strategically, missing an opportunity to shore up national
security and wasting built-in geopolitical advantages. Indeed, the United
States cannot afford to overlook the opportunities Latin America offers.
China already recognizes Latin America’s potential. It is swooping in fast,
expanding its trade with the region from $12 billion in 2000 to nearly
$500 billion in 2022. Its mining and refining companies are moving to
lock up access to the region’s natural resources.
When it comes to the countries south of the U.S. border, some Amer-
ican leaders may simply feel that good fences make good neighbors.
Taking that stance would be a big, counterproductive mistake. If the
United States fails to integrate Latin America substantially into U.S.
supply chains and keeps looking farther afield for economic allies, it will
only help bring more Chinese influence closer to its doorstep.
vehicles. Mexico can provide a further lift to the United States’ ambi-
tion to build out resilient electric vehicle supply chains: its factories
are already pillars of the North American car industry, and electric
vehicle components manufactured in Mexico or Canada are eligible
for the IRA’s full set of subsidies.
Brazil, Costa Rica, Mexico, and Panama are well positioned to
take the place of Asian countries in testing, packaging, and other less
capital-intensive and technologically intensive semiconductor steps:
investments and initial facilities and pilot training programs are already
underway in these countries. And to quickly boost resilience in its phar-
maceutical supply, the United States need not look further than the West-
ern Hemisphere. The region already produces tens of billions of dollars’
worth of vaccines, active pharmaceutical ingredients, and consumer-ready
medications every year and hosts sophisticated research and development
institutes: Brazil’s Butantan Institute and Oswaldo Cruz Foundation are
among the 15 largest vaccine manufacturers in the world.
Mexico already produces a variety of medicines and medical devices,
exporting $800 million in pharmaceuticals to the United States each
year. Even smaller producers such as Argentina and Uruguay make over
30 percent of the drugs they consume. These manufacturing bases could
become robust alternative suppliers.
With the right investments in training and infrastructure, within a
decade, American companies could be sourcing all the lithium they need
from a vibrant Latin American “lithium triangle”—Argentina, Bolivia,
and Chile—and partnering with busy factories in Mexico to produce
electric vehicle batteries, plastic casings, and chargers. When U.S. patients
ask their doctors where their children’s mumps, measles, and rubella shots
come from, the answer could be Brazil. American smartphones could
feature chip technology tested and packaged in Panama. Most important,
many more stages of the production cycles for America’s most critical
national security technologies could unfold close to U.S. borders.
OPPORTUNITY COST
Over the last two decades, China has recognized opportunities in Latin
America that the United States has overlooked. It has assiduously courted
Latin American governments by making loans, at times coercing them to
withdraw diplomatic recognition from Taiwan. China is now the largest
trading partner for Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Uruguay and the second largest
trading partner for a score of other nations, accounting for nearly 20 per-
cent of Latin America’s total trade. Beijing has also become a significant
banker in the region. China is now one of the only sources of outside
financing available to Argentina, Ecuador, and Venezuela. Beijing has
curtailed its international lending since 2020, but it still comes through
in emergencies: in 2023 alone, China stepped in twice to offer currency
swaps to help Argentina meet its International Monetary Fund repay-
ments during a volatile election season.
Through its Belt and Road Initiative and
With the right other commercial forays, China has also
investments, become a big funder and builder of Latin
American infrastructure. Its banks finance
U.S. companies the mostly Chinese companies now building
could source all highways, ports, hydropower dams, solar power
the lithium they plants, and electricity grids in over 20 countries.
need from Latin It bankrolls energy and mining projects across
the region, including an $8 billion nuclear
America. power plant in Argentina and a nearly $10
billion copper mine in Peru. During the first
two decades of the twenty-first century, these growing trade, financial,
and infrastructure ties filled many Latin American governments’ coffers
and brought in much-needed capital.
Yet China’s growing role in the region has not been an unalloyed
good. As Latin America’s trade with China ballooned, many Latin
American economies simultaneously became less diverse, less sophis-
ticated, and less equal. China’s economic activity in the Americas is
lopsided: between 2015 and 2019, just five commodities—iron ore,
copper ore, refined copper, soy, and crude oil—accounted for nearly 70
percent of Latin America’s exports to China. China then sold finished
goods back to the region, undercutting local manufacturers.
Chinese investments tell a similarly ambiguous story. Beijing’s for-
eign direct investment in the continent remains somewhat limited, at
just six percent of the foreign capital that has flowed into the region
over the last 20 years. This investment was concentrated primarily in
natural resources, energy, and mining, only recently shifting a bit toward
utilities and power generation.
The loans that China provides are often opaque and onerous. They
can feature high interest rates and provisions for immediate repayment
if China or its companies feel slighted. The loans are often secured with
natural resources as collateral at fixed and disadvantageous rates: between
2009 and 2021, when Ecuador had to send more than a billion barrels of
oil to China to service some $20 billion in loans, it sacrificed nearly $5
billion it could have received on the open market. Many Chinese lenders
to Latin America subordinate other creditors by demanding that they
receive payments first in the event of a default, stymieing multilateral
solutions to unsustainable sovereign debt loads. Chinese mining and
other infrastructure projects are not known for their transparency—or
for their adherence to domestic or international labor or environmental
standards. Indeed, local communities and NGOs in Chile, Colombia,
Ecuador, and Peru are fighting Chinese companies, citing deforestation,
water pollution, environmental degradation, and poor working condi-
tions in their numerous legal complaints.
And China has used its growing importance to the region to pres-
sure Latin American nations. In 2020, aligning himself with U.S. Pres-
ident Donald Trump, Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro intimated that
Huawei would be excluded from Brazil’s 5G network. China then
threatened to withhold COVID-19 vaccines from the country, and Bol-
sonaro had to relent.
already differ sharply from those that Beijing has built. Latin America’s
exports to the United States are more diverse and lean toward more
BETTER TOGETHER
U.S. leaders must wake up to Latin America’s potential. The January 2023
Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity was a start: 11 Latin
American and Caribbean countries signed on to a U.S.-led initiative to
boost trade, investment, and integrate regulations across the Western
Hemisphere. In November of that year, APEP unveiled an agenda to
expand and strengthen regional supply chains for clean energy, medical
supplies, and semiconductors. It announced new financing mechanisms
from the IDB and the U.S. International Development Finance Cor-
poration (DFC) to build trade and energy infrastructure, $5 million in
new USAID support to Western Hemisphere entrepreneurs, and $89
million in additional outlays for migrant-receiving nations such as Chile,
Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru.
These initiatives are positive steps. But much more must be done to
unlock Latin America’s great promise. First, the United States needs to
change the rules and practices that structure lending. The DFC is largely
prohibited from lending to the higher-income countries that would be
vital to building out successful Western Hemisphere supply chains. The
IDB, meanwhile, leans toward blue-chip investments to maintain its
triple-A bond rating. But for APEP to work, it will have to invest in risk-
ier ventures that create and expand new industries and build the supply
chains they entail. Through an act of Congress, the United States should
give the IDB a substantial capital increase to help APEP fulfill its mission.
Access to financing is just one hurdle. If U.S. companies want to
compete with China on infrastructure or on other government con-
tracts in Latin America, they need to be provided with more transparent
RESPONSES
A
ny review that calls the book accumulation of trillions of dollars of
in question “captivating” trade deficits. This policy has made
and “clear-eyed” and that the country weaker and poorer.
describes its author as the “most con- The book also raises the alarm about
sequential U.S. trade representative the threat that the Chinese Commu-
of the last 30 years” cannot be all bad, nist Party poses to the United States.
and Gordon Hanson’s review of my China is an increasingly aggressive,
book, No Trade Is Free, is no exception. totalitarian, and hostile state that
I admire his scholarship on the impact believes it should be number one
of import competition on American in the world. It intimidates the U.S.
communities, which I cite in the book. military in international waters and
I only wish he could further undock space and challenges American dip-
himself from academic rigidity and lomats around the world. It steals
allow current global economic reali- U.S. technology, engages in contin-
ties to challenge old dogma. ual espionage, funnels fentanyl past
No Trade Is Free lays out a vision for U.S. borders, and effectively funds
U.S. trade policy and details its imple- two proxy wars against the United
mentation during the Trump admin- States—backing Russia’s efforts in
istration. I believe trade policy should Ukraine and providing oil revenues
help working-class Americans find to Iran that end up with Hamas.
and maintain good-paying jobs. But Worst of all, China has for decades
waged an economic war that pulls in
trillions of dollars of American wealth
ROBERT E. LIGHTHIZER served as through trade surpluses. The Trump
U.S. Trade Representative from 2017 to administration took on this challenge
2021 and as Deputy United States Trade and set U.S. relations with China on
Representative from 1983 to 1985. a new course.
traders’ argument that the trade deficit because four European countries got
expanded during the Trump years. In together, spent billions in subsidies,
fact, before the COVID-19 pandemic, and created a world-class company.
the deficit with the world was down in The same, of course, could be said his-
four of the previous quarters, and the torically about many manufacturing
deficit with China was down in the sectors in the United States, as well
previous five straight quarters. But that as in Germany, Japan, and the United
all changed when the pandemic closed Kingdom. Indeed, it is difficult to find
the economy and forced the release an example of a great manufacturing
of trillions of dollars in stimulus. It economy that did not create much of
takes time to right the ship, but the its comparative advantage through
Trump administration had corrected state intervention.
its trajectory. Further, manufacturing is about
more than economics. It is about the
MORE THAN ECONOMICS kind of country that Americans want.
Hanson goes most astray, however, The allocation of scarce resources, price
when he argues that focusing on the optimization, and efficiency—things
restoration of American manufactur- that preoccupy economists—are not as
ing is misguided because “the United important as issues of family stability,
States has little comparative advan- strong communities, income equity,
tage in most areas of manufacturing.” and worker pride and satisfaction.
Hanson contends that “the future of About two-thirds of American work-
American prosperity lies in the ser- ers do not have a college degree. For
vice sector, not in the furnaces and many in this group, a manufacturing
assembly lines of the past.” But this job, or one created by it, is a ticket to
is a false choice: the country can and the middle class. These jobs generally
should have both. pay better and offer more benefits than
Comparative advantages are not jobs in service sectors, such as health
necessarily inherent in a country, as he care, tourism, and hospitality. As Han-
assumes. They can be created, usually son himself notes, when manufacturing
through industrial policy, subsidies, workers lose their jobs, “they tend to
and trade restrictions. South Korea is suffer a permanent decline in earnings
competitive when it comes to making relative to those who keep their posi-
steel, but it does not enjoy cheap power, tions,” and when enough manufactur-
iron ore, or other natural advantages in ing jobs vanish, “entire regions suffer.”
this sector. Its comparative advantage is Maintaining a vigorous manufactur-
entirely the result of government policy. ing sector is important for other reasons,
The same can be said of Taiwan and too. First, there are obvious national
semiconductors. The Taiwan Semicon- security implications in relying on other
ductor Manufacturing Company today countries, particularly hostile ones, for
has a comparative advantage, but it was the United States’ defense and related
created by subsidies and tax breaks. needs. The pandemic offered a glimpse
The airplane manufacturer Airbus is of these dangers. Once a war begins, it is
very competitive, but that is entirely too late to build manufacturing capacity.
Second, despite only accounting for Robert Lighthizer, who played an out-
around 11 percent of GDP, manufac- size role as U.S. trade representative in
turing drives 70 percent of Ameri- Trump’s first term, is likely an influ-
can R & D investment; it employs as ential voice on all matters related to
many scientists, engineers, and other trade and industrial policy. His reply
so-called super-STEM workers as the to my review, like his book, is replete
much larger health-care industry with insight. Yet it also contains several
and more than any other sector; and tendentious arguments that are worth
it accounts for 35 percent of annual putting under the microscope.
increases in U.S. productivity. In fact, Lighthizer suggests that I, and
for every manufacturing job created, presumably other economists study-
seven to 12 jobs are created elsewhere ing globalization, should “undock
in the American economy. Manufac- [myself ] from academic rigidity and
turing firms are also important cus- allow current global economic reali-
tomers for many of the high-value- ties to challenge old dogma.” I heartily
added service providers economists agree. Indeed, those of us who first
so cherish. documented the profoundly adverse
Finally, let’s return to the question impacts of import competition from
of China. The United States will China on American workers were
struggle in a postindustrial world received poorly by think tanks, prom-
when its lethal adversary, bent on its inent academics, and The Wall Street
demise, is the dominant manufac- Journal editorial page for casting free
turer. Do the proponents of Hanson’s trade in a purportedly bad light. Such
view really understand the nature of research helped reveal the dark side of
the threat China poses? These are the globalization. Now, the public policy
concerns that must shape a new eco- debate revolves around what to do
nomic theory. I appreciate Hanson’s about the downsides of free trade. As
review and hope that he and other U.S. trade representative, Lighthizer
top economists update economic the- concluded that the answer was to con-
ories to prioritize U.S. workers and front China, abandon the World Trade
communities and, most important, Organization, and raise tariffs on U.S.
factor into their thinking the existen- imports. But he was right about only
tial threat that is communist China. the first of these three solutions.
Lighthizer argues that academics
and think tankers have not taken the
economic threat from China seri-
Hanson Replies ously enough. Here again, I agree.
My review praises Lighthizer for
A
s the possibility of Donald calling attention to China’s many
Trump returning to the trade travesties. He is both scathing
White House grows, it is all and thorough in cataloging China’s
the more important to pay attention economic policy sins. But it is fair
to his top advisers, who are surely pre- to ask whether U.S. efforts to pun-
paring an agenda for a second term. ish China have worked. The United
States is now six years into a trade war Pittsburgh’s steel to make cars. Break-
with China, which Trump began and ing with decades of GOP economic
U.S. President Joe Biden has eagerly doctrine, Lighthizer contends that
continued. Rather than bowing to governments can readily conjure up
U.S. pressure, China seems ever more second-nature advantages, citing Tai-
emboldened to aggressively pursue wan’s success in semiconductors as an
its nationalistic trade agenda. It is example. In his telling, it was “subsidies
also fair to ask whether U.S. opposi- and tax breaks” that turned the Taiwan
tion to China would have been more Semiconductor Manufacturing Com-
effective had Trump acted in concert pany into the world’s dominant chip
with U.S. allies rather than imposing producer. But the more likely cause was
tariffs on some of the United States’ Taiwan’s massive investments in higher
most reliable trading partners, thereby education in engineering. These invest-
wasting political capital. To date, the ments directed the island’s technologi-
go-it-alone approach to China has cal progress generally toward electron-
borne little fruit. As Lighthizer pre- ics, with TSMC’s specific success being
pares Trump for a possible redo of the something of an accident. Getting
presidency, he should reckon with the industrial policy right depends cru-
ineffectiveness of recent U.S. trade cially on whether governments should
policy on China. focus on cultivating industries, which
Core to Lighthizer’s reading of his- requires identifying future TSMCs
tory is how he understands the origins before they have become successful,
of comparative advantage, a subject that or target talents, which means invest-
may seem arcane but is at the heart of ing widely in human capital and then
debates about U.S. industrial policy. A letting the chips, so to speak, fall where
country or region has a comparative they may. Many economists have come
advantage in an industry if it can produce around to supporting the second type
the associated goods more cheaply than of industrial policy, but not so much
its competitors. If market forces are left the first. Let’s hope for the sake of
to themselves, comparative advantage the American worker that Lighthizer
tends to determine who exports what. closely follows the debates on the ori-
Lighthizer suggests that comparative gins of comparative advantage and the
advantage is created and not inherited, limits of industrial policy.
which is partly true. Economists distin-
guish between the “first-nature advan-
tages” of regions, which include the sup-
plies of natural resources that fuel their
initial economic development—think
of how Pittsburgh, with its ready access
to coal and iron ore, came to dominate
the steel industry—and “second-nature
advantages,” which regions acquire
through experience and experimen-
tation—think of Detroit ’s use of
r e v ie w e ssay
Liberalism Against Itself: Cold War Intellectuals and the Making of Our Times
By Samuel Moyn. Yale University Press, 2023, 240 pp.
I
t has become trite to say that lib- in this camp argue that liberal concep-
eralism is in crisis. As long ago tions of the social and political order
as 1997, in an article in these are fatally flawed. Liberalism, they
pages, Fareed Zakaria warned of the say, is responsible for many of the ills
rising threat of “illiberal democracy” that afflict the world today, including
around the world. Since then, count- rampant globalization, the destruction
less essays, articles, and books have of communal bonds, rising economic
tried to explain the growing threats to insecurity, environmental degradation,
the liberal world order posed by pop- and other perceived defects of twenty-
ulism, authoritarianism, fundamental- first-century society.
ism, and nationalism. Scholars have Now, the British political philos-
also devoted a great deal of thought opher John Gray and the Yale intel-
to the human dislocations—be they lectual historian Samuel Moyn, two
economic, political, demographic, cul- academics turned public intellectu-
tural, or environmental—that seem to als, have both weighed in on what
have given rise to these threats. they see as the self-inflicted decline
In the last ten years or so, another of the liberal project. Although they
theme has emerged. A small but vocal agree that liberal democracy has, in
group of thinkers claim that the source some sense, failed, what they mean
of the crisis lies within liberalism itself. by liberalism and what they see as
Often referred to as “postliberals,” those its prospects diverge sharply. In The
New Leviathans, Gray contends that but disaster in its wake. The future is
liberalism is a fundamentally errone- bleak, he asserts. Societies will not be
ous creed built on dangerous myths able to arrest climate change or pre-
and illusions. Rather than bringing vent environmental destruction. New
freedom, it has led to unfettered gov- technologies will not save civilization.
ernment power that has brought much The English economist Thomas Mal-
of the world to the brink of totalitar- thus’s dire eighteenth-century predic-
ianism—not only in Vladimir Putin’s tions about overpopulation may yet
Russia and Xi Jinping’s China but also be proved right. Western capitalism,
in advanced Western democracies. Gray says, is “programmed to fail.”
By contrast, in Liberalism Against Perhaps most disastrous of all,
Itself, Moyn argues that liberal thought Gray argues, market forces, and the
is fundamentally sound, based as it resulting connection between wealth
is on ideals that are both laudable and political leverage, are making
and realizable. As Moyn sees it, the our states more, not less, totalitarian.
present crisis has been caused not by “Instead of China becoming more
liberalism but by its betrayal, by none like the West,” he writes, “the West
other than the architects of the liberal has become more like China.” More-
order themselves. Abandoning their over, there is no reason to think that
core values and principles, he argues, in the future, liberal governments will
liberalism’s champions have become be any more successful than other
timid and anxious—more concerned forms of political order. Instead, he
with fending off their enemies than foresees “disparate regimes interact-
winning new converts. Where Gray ing with one another in a condition
sees liberal states growing into ever of global anarchy.”
more controlling monsters, Moyn For Gray, liberalism is based on faulty
finds them reduced and enfeebled, premises. Liberals flatter themselves
having presided over the tragic dis- when they assert that humans are better
mantling of the welfare state. than animals. They are not. Humans
persecute for pleasure. Liberal dreams
THE NEW THOUGHT POLICE of making the world a better place are
The pessimism of The New Leviathans just that: dreams, and hazardous ones at
should not come as a surprise. Long that. The idea of humanity, Gray writes,
known for his criticism of liberalism is a “dangerous fiction” that allows some
and gloomy forebodings, Gray posits people to be identified as less human
that the contemporary liberal order than others and can provide a justifica-
was constructed around the delusion tion for eliminating them. The notion
that “where markets spread, freedom that history is a story of progress is
would follow”—that market capital- another self-flattering illusion. He sin-
ism and liberal values were destined gles out the political theorist Francis
to triumph everywhere. Instead, he Fukuyama and the cognitive psychol-
writes, these forces were simply a ogist Steven Pinker for special rebuke
temporary “political experiment” that for their assumptions about society’s
has “run its course” and left nothing inexorable advancement.
But the liberal myth Gray most wants is headed toward totalitarianism. After
to shatter is that people in the West all, tsarist Russia had its own “lumpen
live in free societies. He acknowledges intelligentsia” that turned against the
that for much of the modern period, society that nurtured it, and look what
liberal states set out to extend freedom happened there.
and safeguard against tyranny. With What any of this history really has
the fall of the Soviet Union, however, to do with liberalism, however, is left
these same states increasingly “cast off ” unexplained. Gray also does not make
traditional restraints on power in the clear what he means by liberalism. At
pursuit of material progress, cultural the beginning of the book, he lists
conformity, and national security. “Like four key liberal principles he iden-
the totalitarian regimes of the twenti- tified in 1986: that individuals have
eth century,” he writes, liberal states moral primacy over any social collec-
today “have become engineers of souls.” tivity; that all people have equal moral
If governments have become total- worth; that moral values are universal
itarian, so has society. Gray sees per- for all humans and take precedence
vasive efforts in Western countries to over specific cultural forms; and that
control thought and language, and he all social and political arrangements
is especially agitated by what he calls can be improved. But Gray does not
the “woke religion” on college cam- acknowledge that these principles
puses across the United States today. can mean different things to different
Indeed, his distress over “wokeism” people at different times. Today, there
seems to feed both his fear of totali- are people who call themselves “clas-
tarianism and his penchant for hyper- sical liberals,” “social liberals,” “lib-
bole. The American university, he eral socialists,” or just plain “liberals.”
writes, has become “the model for an Although they may share a number
inquisitorial regime.” Wokeism and of beliefs, the policies they support
identity politics, he continues, are the can vary radically. Which variety of
products of “a lumpen intelligentsia liberalism is proto-totalitarian? For
that is economically superfluous” yet Gray, as for many other postliberals,
eager to become society’s guardians. liberalism seems to mean whatever he
The New Leviathans is studded with wants it to mean.
occasional insights and curious bits of
information. Gray writes that Putin BAD AUTHORITY
admires an obscure nineteenth-century Gray’s jaundiced view of the liberal
Russian thinker named Konstantin tradition partly explains his odd use
Leontyev, who revered feudalism and of the seventeenth-century English
wanted the tsar to impose an “auto- philosopher Thomas Hobbes. Each
cratic socialism” on Russia. Gray, in chapter of The New Leviathans
fact, devotes more than 70 pages to begins with a quotation from Levia-
Russian or Bolshevik topics whose than, Hobbes’s major treatise on state
purpose, one surmises, is to remind us power, as if to provide the reader
how random and full of horrors life is with a kernel of truth and an omi-
and to make clear that liberal society nous warning about what is to come.
Culture wars: protesting a far-right campus speaker in Berkeley, California, September 2017
Among liberals, Gray writes, Hobbes erful state, one that will devolve into
is “the only one, perhaps, still worth totalitarianism. By calling Hobbes
reading.” Hobbes is worth reading, it the only liberal worth reading, Gray
seems, because of his exceedingly dark implies that liberals are really closet
view of human nature, a view Gray totalitarians—and know it.
shares. Hobbes famously referred to But Gray is wrong here. Hobbes was
the state of nature as a state of war, in no liberal. Although twentieth-century
which life was “solitary, poor, nasty, political philosophers often recog-
brutish and short.” Men, he reasoned, nized Hobbes, along with John Locke
would willingly submit to an absolute a generation later, as one of the found-
sovereign—they would form a social ing fathers of liberalism, this Anglo-
contract to give up their liberty in centric tradition ignores the actual
exchange for safety—to escape such language and ideas that both men
an existence. In other words, govern- used, as well as the stark differences in
ment with unlimited power is neces- their conceptions of liberality. Nota-
sary for society to flourish. bly, Leviathan was published over 150
J U S T I N S U L L I VA N / G E T T Y I M A G E S
Through Hobbes’s eyes, Gray invites years before there was anything called
readers to see for themselves where “liberalism”; and no self-identified
the world is headed. He insists that liberal has ever recognized Hobbes
no matter what liberals may say, they as a founder, or even a member, of the
actually fear freedom and, to relieve liberal canon. Had Gray begun his
them of its burdens, seek protection book with a true early liberal thinker,
from the state. Supporters of liberal- he would have been obliged to tell a
ism will thus inevitably create a pow- different story.
“anxious” and “minimalist,” adopting a idealism set the stage for spiraling in
negative view of liberty in which free- equality and the assault on welfare in
dom was defined as noninterference the generations that followed. Rather
by the state. According to Moyn, they than challenging this tradition after
shrank their aspirations for human the fall of communism, Moyn sees a
progress, and liberalism eventually new generation of writers and theo-
“collapsed into neoliberalism and rists extending Cold War liberalism
neoconservatism.” to a range of new perceived threats to
Moyn devotes separate chapters democracy, from Islamist extremism
to representative Cold War liberals, to the MAGA right to what he calls
including the Oxford political theo- “‘woke’ tyranny.” This later genera-
rist Isaiah Berlin, the Austrian British tion, he writes, has continually failed
philosopher Karl Popper, the Ameri- to make clear the qualities that might
can historian of ideas Gertrude Him- give liberalism “enthusiastic backing”
melfarb, the German Jewish émigré in the first place.
political theorist Hannah Arendt, and Notably, Moyn’s account of what
the American literary critic Lionel happened to liberalism is diametri-
Trilling. Along the way, he introduces cally opposed to Gray’s. In Moyn’s
others, including the libertarian Aus- view, Cold War liberals and their con-
trian economist Friedrich Hayek and temporary successors have weakened
the American theologian Reinhold the state, not, as Gray insists, made
Niebuhr. Moyn takes special interest it grow. One is even tempted to read
in Judith Shklar, a political theorist Moyn’s book as a response to Gray.
who taught at Harvard through much Moyn disagrees with those who insist
of the Cold War and whose work that liberalism is “poised on the prec-
shows how liberalism became down- ipice.” He believes that it is precisely
graded, its ambitions diminished. this kind of catastrophism that has led
Thus, in her 1957 book, After Utopia, people astray and made them afraid,
she lamented a new liberal order that fatalistic, and despondent when action
had abandoned many of its original is needed. It is such thinking that has
Enlightenment precepts. Yet by the caused liberalism to take a wrong turn.
later decades of her career, she, too,
viewed liberalism as, in Moyn’s words, CRISIS OR CATALYST?
“less a basis for the construction of a Even skeptics and critics must admit
free community of equals and more as that Liberalism Against Itself is clearly
a means of harm reduction.” written and argued. Moyn does not
“Cold War liberalism was a catastro- make the mistake of anchoring liber-
phe,” Moyn writes. By overreacting alism in the thought of an antiliberal
to the Soviet threat, it failed to pro- such as Hobbes. Instead, he draws
duce a liberal society “worthy of the on the ideas of true liberals such as
name.” The world is living with the Constant and his younger contem-
consequences. Even if these think- poraries John Stuart Mill and Alexis
ers did not oppose the welfare state, de Tocqueville. Moyn also brings to
Moyn argues, their rejection of liberal light something that is often left out
of histories of liberalism, namely its in crisis, the crisis of the French Revo-
moral optimism and what could even lution. It has faced formidable enemies
be called its moral agenda. A central before and has reinvented itself several
purpose of nineteenth-century liber- times, as well. It can certainly do so
alism was to create the conditions that again. Exactly how it should do so is
would allow people to grow intellec- up to a new generation of thinkers,
tually and morally. policymakers, politicians, and, ulti-
But Moyn picks and chooses the mately, voters themselves to decide.
principles of early liberalism with They are more likely to find success,
which he agrees. He favors a social- however, if they aspire to a vision of
istic form of liberalism, but there was liberalism in which a well-governed
another, libertarian form that he leaves society does not come at the expense
out. It is something of a simplification of individual liberty but rather serves
to say that nineteenth-century liber- to further it.
als saw the state as a “device of human
liberation.” Some of them, such as the
British idealist philosopher T. H. Green
and the French politician Léon Bour-
geois, did, but others, such as the British
philosopher and social scientist Her-
bert Spencer and the French economist
Frédéric Bastiat, did not. These latter
thinkers, who would be called “classical”
or “orthodox” liberals, also believed in
progress and emancipation and were
optimistic about the future, but they
had less confidence in the state.
The New Leviathans, unlike Liber-
alism Against Itself, is a sad book, one
that suggests there is no way out of
the present predicament. As Gray sees
it, to try to save liberalism—or what
he calls “the moth-eaten musical bro-
cade of progressive hope”—would be
pointless. Instead, Western democra-
cies should simply lower their sights
and “adjust.” Moyn rejects such fatal-
ism. People have important choices to
make about how they should live their
lives and what kind of society they
wish to live in. He thinks it is time to
reinvent liberalism, not bury it.
Liberalism has faced multiple crises
throughout its history. It was even born
REV I EW ES S AY
S
ometimes foreign policy lies on Iran and Saudi Arabia to keep
downstream from technology. oil supplies flowing. After the 1979
When navies ran on wind, the Iranian Revolution flipped Tehran
lumber that could produce sailing from friend to enemy, however, Wash-
ships was a prized natural resource. ington put its hopes in a balance of
The arrival of steam power turned power, manipulating aid to both Iraq
mines and coaling stations into cru- and Iran during their brutal war to
cial strategic assets. Then the switch prevent either country from dominat-
from steam to oil made petroleum ing the Persian Gulf. But this strategy
deposits treasures beyond measure. collapsed in 1990, when Iraq seized
The oil riches of the Middle East Kuwait and threatened Saudi Arabia.
were first discovered in 1908, and At this point, the George H. W. Bush
soon the region was essential to the administration stepped in to man-
global economy. At first, order in the age the situation directly, leading
area was maintained by the United an international coalition to reverse
Kingdom, the dominant colonial Iraq’s aggression and restore Kuwait’s
power, but in the decades after World sovereignty. But Iraq’s leader, Saddam
War II, the United States took over Hussein, managed to sur vive the
the role. In the 1970s, Washington war and regain control of most of
tried farming out the job of regional his country. So the administration
security to local contractors, relying backed into a policy of sanctions and
Gideon Rose is an Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and
the author of How Wars End. During the Clinton administration, he worked on Middle
Eastern issues at the National Security Council.
dialogue might have eased tensions, America knew the truth but nonetheless
but such hopes are belied by the story faked claims that he was still hiding
of invincible ignorance he tells so well. illicit arms, he reasoned, what did this
imply? It meant that the Zionists and
Saddam emerges from this book as a
spies lined up against him were using
paranoid, self-deluded megalomaniac, the WMD issue cynically to advance their
someone almost impossible to deal with conspiracy to oust him from power. He
constructively. Ekeus put the problem saw no reason to play their game or deal
squarely: “Saddam Hussein has a very with their prying inspectors.
limited point of view. He deals largely
with a small set of people, virtually all Yet Coll shows that even high-ranking
Iraqis.” His thinking, Ekeus added, was Iraqi officials were unsure about the
“bizarre and screwed up.” state of their country’s WMD programs.
These traits emerged in the actions At one meeting before the invasion
the Iraqi government took during in 2003, for example, Ali Hassan
the 1990s, which are even more al-Majid—the notorious “Chemical
astonishing now that the full story is Ali” who oversaw the gassing of Iraq’s
known. Having largely reconstituted Kurds in the 1980s—asked bluntly,
his domestic position following the “Do we have WMD?” “Don’t you know?”
Gulf War, Saddam had no regrets Saddam asked in reply. “No,” said Ali.
about anything and was determined “No,” Saddam told him. But even then,
to wait out his enemies, regain his in the face of an impending American
military strength and full freedom attack predicated on the existence of
of action, and continue taking on such weapons, the Iraqis inexplicably
the world. He recognized that being made no real attempt to come clean.
caught with WMD would be problem-
atic, and so in mid-1991, he got rid of FROM CONTAINMENT
most of his programs—but without TO ROLLBACK
telling anybody about it or keeping It would be easy to read Coll’s book
records of what had been done. “We as support for the argument that the
didn’t know what was destroyed and cause of the Iraq war was the rising
what was not,” the leader of the Iraqi threat Saddam seemed to pose and
nuclear program later said. “It was all the fear that this instilled in Wash-
a big mess.” ington. The Achilles Trap paints the
Having thus guaranteed utter con- Iraqi leader as an unrepentant serial
fusion, and while continuing to deny aggressor determined to rebuild his
any charges against him that had not military power. Several of those in
already been proved, Saddam then the West who advocated for lift-
acted as if everybody should have ing sanctions, meanwhile, were on
understood what had happened. In his payroll, making their arguments
Coll’s words: suspect. Even without the faked evi-
dence peddled by charlatans such as
He assumed that an all-powerful C.I.A. the Iraqi exile Ahmed Chalabi, there
already knew that he had no nuclear, were ample grounds for believing
chemical, or biological weapons. . . . Since that someday Saddam would once
again plunge his strategically critical President Dick Cheney and Secre-
region into conflict. tary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld,
And yet all this had been true for or had chosen to empower different
years, so it cannot explain why early ones among those he did appoint,
in the new century, the United States such as Secretar y of State Colin
decided to change course and deal Powell. Yet even with Bush elected
with the threat through preventive and his administration stocked with
war. Nor did 9/11 have to lead to such hard-liners, there was no move to
an outcome, since what happened attack until 9/11, which ended up
that day had nothing to do with setting the administration on a path
Iraq. What produced the war was the to war not just in Afghanistan but in
underlying challenge of maintaining Iraq as well.
Gulf security, combined with Sadd- During the Clinton administration,
am’s bizarre behavior, combined with independent radical Islamist terrorist
the psychological impact of 9/11 on groups had emerged as an increasingly
a handful of idiosyncratic, uncon- worrisome threat. They bombed the
strained American officials. World Trade Center in New York in
Had Al Gore won the U.S. presi- 1993, the U.S. embassies in Tanzania
dency in 2000 instead of George W. and Kenya in 1998, and the USS Cole
Bush, there might well have been in Yemen in 2000. During the pres-
another war between the United idential transition, outgoing Clinton
States and Iraq, given Saddam’s officials told their incoming Bush
regional ambitions and the United counterparts that such groups con-
States’ determination to thwart them. stituted the most urgent threat the
But it would have been a replay of the country faced, but the Bush team dis-
Gulf War, with Saddam doing some- counted such warnings—along with
thing outrageous and Gore mobilizing those of its own, increasingly fran-
a coalition to respond. The Clinton tic intelligence officials—because it
administration did not like the messy believed that rogue states posed much
containment policy it inherited from greater dangers.
its predecessor, but it could never find When al Qaeda struck New York
a better alternative. As vice president, and Washington on 9/11, therefore,
Gore was on the hawkish side of the the administration’s senior figures were
Clinton administration’s Iraq debates, devastated by grief, anger, and guilt.
but he never came close to advocating “I was not on point,” Bush said. “We
an unprovoked invasion, and there is missed it,” Cheney agreed. Still, truly
no reason to think he would ever have accepting responsibility was too much
launched one as president. to bear. That would have meant con-
A similar scenario would have played fronting the uncomfortable fact that
out had George W. Bush appointed others had not missed it and should
different Republican national secu- now be listened to rather than ignored.
rity grandees to key positions in his To escape the humiliation of deferring
administration, such as Brent Scow- to their critics and the cognitive disso-
croft and Robert Gates instead of Vice nance produced by seeing themselves
as incompetent failures, Bush and his administration got around that prob-
senior advisers reframed the situation. lem by ignoring it. Its war plan lacked
Rather than trying to learn why they an ending—and so, unsurprisingly,
had been wrong about this attack, they the war never really ended, with the
looked for future ones they could pre- conflict lurching from one battle to
vent and in so doing recast themselves another for years to come.
as prescient heroes. “Your response isn’t It is now clear that several people
to go back and beat yourself up about were responsible for that glaring omis-
9/11,” National Security Adviser Con- sion. A weak national security adviser
doleezza Rice would put it. “It’s to try didn’t coordinate administration policy.
to never let it happen again.” A rogue secretary of defense demanded
From this perspective, Iraq repre- control over postwar planning, got it,
sented not only a danger but also an and then didn’t do any worthy of the
opportunity. The country was strong name. An overmatched theater com-
enough to pose a threat but weak mander never thought beyond the
enough to be conquerable, and if not operational level of war. But the buck
involved in 9/11, then at least plausibly has to stop at the incurious commander
imaginable as the source of materiel for in chief, who didn’t think through the
another mass-casualty attack. Toppling foreseeable consequences of the deci-
Saddam would remove the threat, make sions he was making.
a statement, and settle old business all Last year, in his book Confront-
at once. Two weeks after the catastro- ing Saddam Hussein, the diplomatic
phe, accordingly, Bush asked Rumsfeld historian Melvyn Leffler went over
to review war planning for Iraq. By the ground similar to Coll’s, giving the
end of 2001, Tommy Franks, the head view from Washington and defend-
of the U.S. military’s Central Com- ing the Bush administration from its
mand, had delivered a blueprint for an conspiracy-minded critics. But even he
invasion. And by mid-2002, Bush had offered a damning indictment. “Bush
decided to strike unless Saddam indis- disliked heated arguments, and, there-
putably confirmed his disarmament. fore, did not invite systematic scrutiny
of the policies he was inclined to pur-
TO BAGHDAD AND BEYOND sue,” Leffler wrote, adding “He was
Other administrations had dreamed unable to grasp the magnitude of the
of being rid of Saddam, but none enterprise he was embracing, the risks
had gone to war for it, because none that inhered in it, and the costs that
wanted the responsibility of manag- would be incurred.”
ing his country afterward. As Cheney Why an entire government full
said in 1994, in defense of the U.S. of officials who knew better meekly
decision to not topple Saddam during executed an obviously bad plan is a
the Gulf War, “Once you got to Iraq separate question. When that kind of
and took it over, took down Saddam thing happens in dictatorships like
Hussein’s government, then what are Saddam’s Iraq or Vladimir Putin’s
you going to put in its place? . . . It’s Russia, observers naturally assume it is
a quagmire.” The George W. Bush because of the terrible costs of dissent.
The Art of Military Innovation: Lessons From the Israel Defense Forces
By Edward N. Luttwak and Eitan Shamir
Harvard University Press, 2023, 288 pp.
O
n a hot, dry afternoon, a The scene is not from the pages of
wave of aircraft surges into military science fiction, nor is it from
the sky. They are hunting the war in Ukraine. Instead, this lop-
the enemy’s surface-to-air missile sided battle, known as Operation Mole
batteries. The SAM batteries scoot Cricket 19, took place between Israel
around every ten minutes—aerial and Syria more than 40 years ago, in
surveillance photos taken earlier in the early days of Israel’s 1982 invasion
the day are useless. But the attackers of Lebanon. For Edward Luttwak and
have a solution. They send in decoy Eitan Shamir, the authors of The Art of
drones, simulating the radar cross Military Innovation, the battle exempli-
section of jets, prompting the SAM fies the sort of military inventiveness at
operators to turn on their radars. As which Israel excels.
they light up, another set of drones Luttwak is an eccentric 81-year-old
beams back real-time video footage. strategist who consults for govern-
The video is sent to a cutting-edge ments and has written books on the
command-and-control computer that grand strategy of the Roman Empire,
knows which attacking plane—100 an irreverent guide to launching a coup,
are airborne at the peak of the bat- and several tomes on warfare. This most
tle—is where and armed with what. recent book’s acknowledgments nod to
This orchestra of air power, conducted his picaresque career: he thanks various
by an algorithm, smashes the SAMs. Israeli generals, one of whom helped him
wander the Sinai front in the Yom Kip- about the intentions and capacity of its
pur War of 1973, another who let him adversaries—a complacency that was
tag along in the invasion of Lebanon, and exposed, brutally, on October 7. A third,
a third whom he cryptically describes and one admittedly beyond the purview
as having invited him “to participate in of this book, is that tactical and opera-
the design of a special operations unit.” tional innovation—designing a superb
Shamir runs the Begin-Sadat Center for tank, building a new missile-defense sys-
Strategic Studies, a think tank in Israel. tem at breakneck speed, or discovering
It is awkward timing for a book novel ways to use these weapons—alone
extolling Israeli military prowess. On cannot win a war.
October 7, Israel’s armed forces were
caught by surprise, suffering a terrorist LEAN, MEAN,
attack that resulted in the bloodiest day FIGHTING MACHINE
for Israel since its independence in 1948 Luttwak and Shamir’s basic propo-
and the bloodiest for Jews anywhere sition is simple. In 1962, Israel had a
since the Holocaust. In an assault led by largely agricultural economy, virtually
the Palestinian militant group Hamas, no electrical or mechanical industry,
around 1,200 people were killed, includ- and a population less than half that of
ing 332 Israeli soldiers, and some 240 Sicily. By 1973, it had developed the
were taken hostage, including an esti- world’s first sea-skimming missile and
mated 18 soldiers. The resulting war has used it to sink 19 Egyptian and Syrian
had mixed results for Israel. Hamas has vessels. Less than a decade later came
been weakened but not destroyed. The the computerized aerial blitzkrieg over
group has enjoyed a surge of popularity Lebanon. These were not one-offs.
among Palestinians in the West Bank, Israel developed world-class tanks, pio-
and much of Gaza lies in ruins. neering tank-protection methods, and
Yet despite its failures on October 7, air defense systems that are the envy of
Israel’s military has punched above its the world. Israel has sold arms to China,
weight since its founding. Luttwak and India, and the United States, and offi-
Shamir chalk up the success of the Israel cers from many of the world’s militaries
Defense Forces to its ability to innovate, flock to Israeli training centers.
explained not only by operating in an The secret of this success, according
environment of constant peril but also to Luttwak and Shamir’s engaging and
by its relaxed culture and streamlined eclectic book, begins with the IDF’s egal-
structure. The authors give too much itarianism. One of the first things that
credence to innovation and technology, foreign military officers notice about the
however, and understate three aspects IDF is its laid-back culture. Most offi-
of war. One is the interplay between cers, other than defense attachés abroad,
technology and tactics: the IDF’s secret wear field dress rather than gold-braided
weapon has been its ability to adapt uniforms. Soldiers address officers by
swiftly on the battlefield when crisis their first names, and saluting is unusual.
strikes. The second is that Israel’s appar- Women fill roles such as combat instruc-
ent superiority in weaponry and intelli- tor that are normally performed in other
gence has sometimes bred complacency armies by what the authors call “ultra-
masculine drill sergeant types.” The attack should instead take place at 8 AM,
reliance on reservists also means that when the pilots took their breakfast. His
know-how can move from the civilian commanders listened, and the attack was
world into the military more easily than a spectacular success.
in other countries. Another reason that Israel’s military
Such a relaxed atmosphere makes it excels at innovation is the relative youth
easier for good ideas to flow up. Lutt- of its members. Israel’s full-time army is
wak and Shamir’s book is full of com- small and promotes personnel quickly.
pelling details, one of which emerges Luttwak and Shamir note that Israeli
from their account of Israel’s stunning officers tend to be a decade younger than
eve-of-war air offensive against Egypt in their American or European counter- M A R I O D E B I A S I S ERG I O D EL G R A N D E / G E T T Y I M AG ES
1967. In the space of around four hours, parts. The United Kingdom’s Royal
the Israeli air force destroyed the bulk of Air Force, which has fewer fighter jets
the Egyptian, Jordanian, and Syrian air than Israel, is led by a four-star general
forces on the ground—some 450 planes with several three-stars and more than
in all—paving the way for Israel’s ground a dozen two-stars under him. By con-
forces to win a sweeping victory in less trast, Israel’s air force is commanded by
than a week of fighting. The conven- a two-star major general, served by a far
tional wisdom was that attacking jets slimmer staff that has no choice but to
should swoop at dawn or dusk, when the devolve authority downward.
approaching planes would be less visible The result of this compressed hier-
to observers on the ground. A 19-year- archy is that big decisions are made
old Israeli corporal familiar with the rou- by officers in their 30s who are “much
tines of Egyptian pilots argued that the less shaped by the past and much more
open to the future,” according to the MOVE FAST AND WIN WARS
authors. In combat, junior commanders These cultural factors play out in a
can take the initiative without med- context of constant threat. Since its
dling from phalanxes of staff officers establishment, Israel has fought five
at higher levels. During the IDF’s first large conventional wars, including the
large-scale offensive, in 1948, the IDF present one in Gaza, and many smaller
general staff ordered Yigal Allon, the campaigns between them. The specter
frontline commander, to drive out of war accelerates innovation. Consider
Egyptian forces; the instructions they the case of the Iron Dome missile
gave him fit on a single page. defense system. During the October 7
The structure and history of Israel’s attack and in the months since, Hamas
military have also contributed to its suc- has launched more than 10,000 rockets
cess. Israel’s armed forces emerged in into Israeli territory. But only a handful
1948 from the two major Jewish mili- of people have died in those strikes,
tias that had fought the British and the thanks in large part to Iron Dome,
Arabs. Instead of re-creating the model which tracks incoming rockets, works
of Western militaries, with separate— out where they will land, and intercepts
and feuding—armies, navies, and air those that are headed for built-up areas
forces, the fledgling IDF opted for a sin- or other valuable targets.
gle service with one commander. One The Lebanese militant group Hez-
benefit was that funds for research and bollah compelled Israel to develop this
development were not diluted among system after the militants fired 4,000
separate branches that, as in the United rockets at Israel in 2006. “As happened
States, might otherwise have designed repeatedly and on all sides during the
and built the same weapons in parallel. second world war,” write Luttwak and
The absence of a standalone air Shamir, “groups of engineers and scien-
force—Israel instead had a lesser “air tists personally committed to an urgent
command,” now an “air and space arm,” national mission that might avert the
subordinate to the general staff—was deaths of loved ones achieved a critical
particularly important. In other coun- mass of dynamic creativity otherwise
tries, pilots have resisted the notion that not only unattainable but unimag-
they ought to be removed from cockpits inable.” Most missile projects take 15 to
in favor of remotely piloted or uncrewed 20 years to reach fruition, so develop-
aircraft, which allow for smaller air- ing such a sophisticated system in such
frames, longer flights, and riskier mis- a short time—Israel managed to create
sions. Israel, then a poor country of a Iron Dome in four years, from 2007 to
few million people, pioneered the use 2011, albeit with significant financial
of drones in the 1970s. Eighteen years help from the U.S. government—was
later, during the first Gulf War, a con- “unheard of,” they write, given that the
flict in which technology had a starring system’s radar, software, and interceptor
role, the United States had no drones, missiles were all entirely new.
the authors point out, other than those Iron Dome also illustrates how the
that the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps line between bottom-up initiative
imported from Israel. and outright insubordination is often
But some scholars have questioned and they see everything we are doing. In
the primacy of technology in such order for us to break this deadlock we
military outcomes. In a seminal book, need something new, like . . . gunpowder.”
Military Power, the political scien- The problem is that this is a dan-
tist Stephen Biddle argues that what gerously deterministic way of looking
really mattered was tactics. Well-drilled at technology. Zaluzhny was right in
armies built around small, cohesive units suggesting that new—perhaps hitherto
capable of using the terrain for cover undiscovered—means of clearing mines,
and concealment could still survive in jamming drones, or locating Russian
the face of modern weaponry. Biddle artillery batteries would smooth the
points to the example of al Qaeda’s abil- path out of the stalemate. But as Biddle
ity to evade massive U.S. bombardment has pointed out in these pages, the same
in Afghanistan’s eastern Shah-i-Kot technological environment can produce
Valley and Arma mountains in March dramatically different outcomes. In
2002. One dug-in al Qaeda command World War I, Germany’s initial inva-
post was ringed by five craters caused by sion of Belgium and France made huge
large U.S. precision-guided bombs. Its progress despite the existence of the
garrison survived and had to be cleared same machine guns and artillery that
out by infantry. later produced the Battle of the Somme
The war in Ukraine has given a twist in 1916, in which the Allies advanced
to that debate. The technologies of the a mere seven miles at the cost of more
revolution in military affairs have, in one than one million casualties on all sides.
sense, fulfilled their promise. Sensors are Later, in its spring offensive of 1918,
better than ever and have proliferated Germany took 4,000 square miles of
widely—Ukraine has access to radar ground without using tanks.
satellites, capable of spotting Russian
tanks in woodland, that most large mil- RISK AND RETURNS
itary powers could only have dreamed Luttwak and Shamir argue that the
of 25 years ago. Artificial intelligence is culture of the IDF has encouraged bold
fusing data such as electronic emissions and daring tactics, often involving tre-
detected by satellites and mobile phone mendous risks. That is partly because
signals to find high-value targets, includ- smaller armies facing larger foes must
ing Russian generals and Hamas leaders. rely on guile over brawn. It is also to do
Yet in Ukraine, at least, the result has with which skills are rewarded. “In the
not been a fluid war of shock and awe. IDF the commando element . . . is not
The frontlines seem viscous. Ukraine’s peripheral,” they write, “because many
counteroffensive last year resulted in pal- senior officers are promoted from the
try territorial gains. In October 2023, commando units.” Israel’s prime min-
Valery Zaluzhny, Ukraine’s top general, ister and defense minister are former
gave his own diagnosis for this state of special forces officers. The IDF’s chief
affairs. “Just like in the First World War, of staff, as well as his predecessor, were
we have reached the level of technology both paratroopers.
that puts us into a stalemate,” he said. Israel’s early leaders, experiment-
“We see everything the enemy is doing ing with armored warfare, opted to
send troops to West Germany’s mil- Luttwak and Shamir argue that the
itary schools—not without some debacle of 1973 reinforced the IDF’s
reluctance—rather than British ones culture of egalitarianism. In Unit 8200,
because they believed they had more to Israel’s equivalent of the U.S. National
learn from a military that had managed Security Agency, even rookies are free
dynamic maneuvers in the deserts of to contact senior officers regardless of
North Africa during World War II, an the chain of command. AMAN estab-
environment similar to the Negev des- lished a “devil’s advocate” department
ert, as opposed to a military that, in the that reports directly to the head of
IDF’s estimation, had relied on firepower, military intelligence. Yet there is now
attrition, and superior numbers. copious evidence that such dissenting
Many of Israel’s greatest military tri- channels failed in the months before
umphs have indeed come from auda- October 7, when Israeli sentries and
cious tactics such as the aerial bolt from junior intelligence officers picked up
the blue in 1967 and Sharon’s dash many signs of an impending Hamas
across the canal six years later. But the attack, such as exercises to blow up the
same attributes that produced such suc- border fence and enter kibbutzim, only
cesses have also contributed to Israeli for their warnings to be dismissed as
vulnerabilities. In October 1973, Israel “imaginary scenarios.”
convinced itself that Egypt would not It is too early to say conclusively why
launch an attack. That was, in large part, senior officers were so resistant to evi-
a political misjudgment, but one rooted dence for a likely attack. Intelligence
in deeper pathologies. Israeli military failures are complex, but many of the fac-
intelligence, AMAN, failed to predict not tors at work in the lead-up to October 7
just the war but also Egypt’s innovative likely echo those that afflicted the IDF
tactics and the training that had occurred in 1973: a rigid political conception of
since its defeat in 1967. “A common fac- what the enemy would or would not do,
tor behind all these failings,” writes the a systematic underestimation of the ene-
journalist Abraham Rabinovich, in his my’s competence to conduct a military
book on the war, “was the contempt for raid deep into Israel, and a conviction
Arab arms born of that earlier war, a con- that high-tech means of surveillance and
tempt that spawned indolent thinking.” defense, such as vibration sensors and
The question, one left unaddressed by border cameras strung along the perim-
Luttwak and Shamir, is whether tech- eter with Gaza, would be adequate.
nology reinforced that complacency. In Indeed, focusing on Israel’s successes
1973, AMAN experts believed they would can distract from what really matters: the
be able to provide a warning four to six response to failures. Israel’s armor corps
days before the beginning of war, thanks was shocked in 1973 by the onslaught
to battery-powered signals-intelligence it faced from new Soviet antitank weap-
devices planted in the sand outside ons and Arab tanks. The IDF eventually
Cairo and in the hills west of Suez City. realized that its tanks were vulnerable
But these sensors were switched on too by themselves, so it placed mortars on
late and did not alert Israeli officials to them to fire at locations where antitank
the coming assault. squads might be hiding and used smoke
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Return to Ta b le of Con te n ts
r e v ie w e ssay
I
n 2023, Hunan TV, China’s sec- time,” suggesting that his thinking had
ond-most-watched television always been harmonious with tradi-
channel, unveiled a series called tional Chinese worldviews.
When Marx Met Confucius. The con- The series was backed by the Chi-
ceit was literal: actors playing the two nese Communist Party and formed
thinkers—Confucius dressed in a tan part of President Xi Jinping’s sweep-
robe and Karl Marx in a black suit and ing political project to reconceptual-
a leonine white wig—met at the Yuelu ize his country’s ideological identity.
Academy, a thousand-year-old school Since taking office in 2012, Xi has
renowned for its role in developing made it imperative for Chinese peo-
Confucian philosophy. Over five epi- ple to understand his interpretation
sodes, Marx and Confucius discussed of Chinese ideology, which he calls
the nature of politics, arriving at the “Xi Jinping Thought.” Bureaucrats,
conclusion that Confucianism and tycoons, and pop stars have been
Marxism are compatible—or that required to endorse it; students now
Marx may have subconsciously drawn learn it in school; CCP members must
his theories from a Confucian well. In use a smartphone app that regularly
one episode, Marx noted that he and communicates its precepts. Key to
his companion “share a commitment Xi’s thought is pairing Marxism with
to [political] stability,” adding that “in Confucianism: in October 2023, he
reality, I myself was Chinese for a long declared that today’s China should
RANA MITTER is S. T. Lee Chair in U.S.-Asia Relations at the Harvard Kennedy School
and the author of China’s Good War: How World War II Is Shaping a New Nationalism.
consider Marxism its “soul” and “fine But erasing the past in a country with
traditional Chinese culture as the root.” so rich a history was always a strug-
Xi’s efforts to redefine China’s ideo- gle. It has consistently also seemed
logical underpinnings feel increas- to matter to Chinese thinkers, and
ingly urgent as a slowdown in growth Chinese people in general, that their
has fed doubts among investors and country should be seen as respond-
public distrust at home. He leads a ing to political change with methods
country whose economic might is far derived from a recognizably Chinese
more respected than its form of gov- source. Even as many of China’s early-
ernment: China has now won a place twentieth-century political theorists
among the world’s major economies condemned Confucianism, other
but remains an aspirant within the thinkers strove to show that China did
international order. To the frustration not have to imitate Western ideas—be
of Xi and other Chinese leaders, West- they nationalist, liberal, or Marxist—
ern countries will be reluctant to accept to modernize. They found a road map
China’s global influence unless China for a different but potentially effective
conforms to modern liberal values. But kind of modernization within the uni-
his attempted synthesis of Marx and verse of traditional Chinese ideas.
Confucius has prompted bafflement, In The Rise of Modern Chinese
even mockery, among observers outside Thought, his magnum opus, Wang
and inside China. Hui, a scholar of Chinese language
Over the past century, Chinese com- and literature at Tsinghua University,
munist thinkers have tended to believe returns to the late-nineteenth-century
that a flourishing future demands a thinkers who worked to reshape Chi-
complete break from the past. China’s nese philosophy. First published in
formative early Marxist thinkers, in Chinese in 2004, it appeared last year
particular, generally condemned Con- in a new English edition, the work of
fucianism, a philosophy that stresses several translators under the direction
hierarchy, ritual, and a return to an of Michael Gibbs Hill. Although the
idealized past. Mao Zedong and other translation clocks in at over 1,000
Chinese Marxists believed that Confu- pages, it represents just over half of the
cianism was theoretically incompatible four-volume Chinese original. Wang
with Marxism, which celebrates revo- analyzes the connections between
lution and perpetual change, and that political theory and more concrete
its practical influence on politics had issues of governance over a millennium
made China weak. Confucian thinking, of Chinese history. But he notes that
in their view, had generated a mori- “explanations of modern China can-
bund bureaucracy that failed to adapt not avoid the question of how to inter-
to the challenges of modernity; this pret” the Qing dynasty, which ruled
renunciation found its ultimate expres- China from 1644 to 1912. Wang’s deep
sion during Mao’s Cultural Revolution, exploration of the work of a group of
when the Chinese Red Guards dyna- late Qing thinkers implies that Chi-
mited the philosopher’s tomb before na’s embrace of Marxism did not, in
hanging a naked corpse in front of it. fact, arise from a wholesale rejection of
the British in the Opium Wars had ideologies such as capitalism, liberal-
brought China to a point of existen- ism, and nationalism. Confucianism’s
tial crisis. After China was forced to emphasis on tradition and respect for
sign humiliating treaties with a host of hierarchy had justified an entrenched,
rising powers including Japan, Russia, sometimes corrupt bureaucracy that
and the United States, it appeared as failed to respond deftly to foreign
if it might simply be unfit to flourish invasions and internal revolts or to
in the modern era. maintain sufficient tax revenue to
One potential conclusion was that maintain security and infrastructure.
Chinese traditions were antiquated But Wang also suggests that this
and had to be jettisoned in favor of kind of stagnation is not inherent
Western ideas, including nationalism in Confucianism. In fact, the Con-
and Marxism. Wang argues that the fucian thought-world was capacious
problem that bedeviled the late Qing and flexible. Confucian thinkers often
empire was not just a geopolitical one relished encounters with foreign ideas,
in which other states had secured incorporating or synthesizing them to
material advantages over China. It adapt China to new historical condi-
was a crisis of worldview. Scholars tions. Notably, toward the end of the
CRISTIANA COUCEIRO
have long asserted that the ways in nineteenth century, thinkers in the
which Confucianism was applied to “New Text ” movement—so called
nineteenth-century Chinese politics because it drew on texts written in
had left the country sclerotic—unable a new script unveiled by the ancient
to engage with modern Western Han dynasty—explored ways in which
in fiscal crisis and beset by internal Today, the word that many Chinese
rebellions; many of its rural areas were professionals often use to describe
deeply impoverished, and its sover- themselves is “depressed.” In a cul-
eignty had been hugely compromised ture in which acknowledging mental
by foreign invasions and the impo- health problems is profoundly stig-
sition of biased treaties. China now matized, 35 percent of respondents
boasts immense economic and mili- to a 2020 national survey said they
tary strength. There are no meaning- were experiencing distress, anxiety, or
ful threats to its national sovereignty. depression. On social media, young
But like many countries on the rise Chinese people express disillusion-
today, China does not feel a sense ment and disaffection, declaring
of ownership over the world’s inter- that they are “lying flat” (tangping) or
national norms, which were largely “rotting away” (bailan). The COVID-19
created by the West in the twentieth lockdown period eroded trust in
century. Chinese elites believe that the state.
these norms and their universalist More and more, young Chinese
intellectual premises have largely been professionals in business, academia,
imposed on China. And despite Chi- and the media are confronted with
na’s strength, it is increasingly afflicted restrictions that they find baffling.
by a sense of crisis. This sentiment is (For instance, many Chinese students
partly a reaction to material circum- are eager to study abroad, but many
stances. China’s urban youth unem- are also told that if they do, their rise
ployment, now estimated at 20 percent in the Chinese bureaucracy will be
or higher, and a growing rural-urban hampered.) As China’s population
inequality are rooted in economics. starts to age, young people are becom-
So, too, is the difficulty that Chinese ing aware that the costs of looking
families now have in meeting their after elderly parents will fall heavily
mortgage payments or coping with on their shoulders.
inadequate health care and pensions. Such developments do not make
China’s sense of anomie is also life in China intolerable, as it was for
sociological, however, especially for the late–Qing dynasty thinkers. But
young people. It cannot be resolved they do make it unsatisfying. China
by economic fixes alone. The recent may be able to go on creating solid
era of spectacular economic growth economic growth. “Solid but not
generated a self-concept among Chi- spectacular,” however, is unexciting.
nese citizens: China is a daring, ris- “Weak and fragile” would be worse.
ing power, and being Chinese means Many Western observers point to
being on the cutting edge. The core Japan as a warning to China about
of that understanding is now being what happens when a property bub-
challenged. China’s astonishing ble collapses and a country enters a
growth trajectory appears to have period of aging. Yet Japan remains
crested, leaving not only people’s bank a powerful global economy with an
accounts hollowed out but their sense important regional role and a reputa-
of identity, as well. tion for being one of the best places
in the world to live. China may well Confucianism than Marxism to me.
be able to follow Japan’s track by Perhaps she had simply absorbed
adjusting its domestic economy to some of Xi’s growing emphasis on
create new service-sector jobs and traditional culture. But perhaps, intu-
concentrating on elder care. Such a itively, it seemed to her that elements
China could be a decent place to live. of the two philosophies were compat-
But it would not provide the heroic ible—and it was comforting to her to
energy that underpins a rising power. feel that her own culture had some
answers to her generation’s dispiriting
TRADITIONAL MEDICINE sense of uncertainty and driftlessness.
In this context, it makes a bit more If a sincere effort at a Marxism-
sense that Xi has begun trying to Confucianism fusion could get off
present a refreshed ideology that the ground, it might help address
fuses a Marxist view of society with this anomie by allowing China to
a Confucian one. Marxism promotes hold two ideas at once. A Marxist
self-criticism, and when applied to real worldview anticipates a future that
politics has tended to lead to purges. continues to be shaped by dramatic
These are phenomena Xi wishes to changes and convulsive confronta-
avoid at a fragile political moment. On tions with, for instance, the chal-
the surface, his synthesis may appear lenges of a clean energy transition,
to be just an effort to defend himself U.S. hegemony, or the liberal interna-
and the party against criticism, since tional order. A worldview informed
Confucianism prioritizes stability and by Confucianism can accommodate
respect for authority. the idea that China will need more
Wang’s study, however, implic- calm, predictability, and stability in
itly suggests that Confucianism the future—and that direct military
and Mar xism may not be inher- confrontations would likely undercut
ently incompatible. His analysis has China’s own interests.
immense relevance for China today, Chinese political thought retains
even if he does not address contempo- liveliness and diversity: it is a work
rary China directly. His work shows in progress. In 2019, Bai Tongdong,
that the effort to use traditional Chi- a philosopher at Fudan University
nese philosophy to face emerging in Shanghai, published a book called
challenges has a precedent. Recently, I Against Political Equality. Despite
spoke to a student enrolled in a prom- the provocative title, the work is a
inent school of Marxism-Leninism in strong defense of liberalism, arguing
China. “What does Marxism mean that some forms of nondemocratic
to you?” I asked her. She explained rule, such as a meritocracy based on
that studying Marxism offered her Confucian values, could better pre-
a way of reflecting on her personal serve liberal values than democracy
development. Marxism, she said, gave can. Other Chinese thinkers who
her profound peace of mind. are often considered realists also
I was intrigued, I told her. What wrestle with classical ideas; in his
she described sounded more like 2011 book Ancient Chinese Thought,
Recent Books
H
uman rights have grown human rights. Terman does not
in importance in wor ld deny the importance of upholding
politics, but their enforce- human rights standards, but she
ment remains notoriously erratic and does demonstrate quite elegantly
selective. Terman breaks important that politics and state interests lurk
ground in illuminating when, how, at every turn.
and under what conditions states
engage in “naming and shaming”
other countries to punish them for Making Global Society: A Study of
human rights transgressions. Ter- Humankind Across Three Eras
man’s key insight is that geopoli- By Barry Buzan. Cambridge
tics matters: leaders wield shaming University Press, 2023, 522 pp.
as a weapon in pursuit of power,
status, and legitimacy. States are With characteristic ambition and
more likely to go after the viola- erudition, Buzan tells the sweep-
tions of adversaries than those of ing story of the rise and evolution of
friends and allies because they are modern global society. Over the last
more interested in inflicting rep- two decades, Buzan has been a lead-
utational damage on opponents ing figure urging scholars of inter-
than in addressing the violations national relations to move beyond
themselves. Similarly, leaders are Western-centric approaches to forge
more reluctant to reproach a vio- a truly global discipline. For Buzan,
this means turning to global history, withdraw from the World Health
exploring the large forces and dynam- Organization, and dismissing NATO
ics that have shaped and transformed and other alliances as outdated. The
human societies over millennia. The essayists in this volume are generally
book builds on the so-called English critical of Trump’s “America first”
School that conceives of the interna- foreign policy but offer a great diver-
tional system as a “world society” in sity of views on its long-term con-
which states and peoples craft insti- sequences. Some writers are struck
tutions to manage conflict and the by the resilience of U.S. alliances
unfolding challenges of modernity. and partnerships, whereas others
Buzan explores the ways in which see abiding damage to the country’s
economics, technology, and politics credibility as a global leader. Many of
shape and transform basic human the chapters argue that the “Trump
institutions such as war, sovereignty, effect” is as much a consequence as
state formation, religion, diplomacy, a cause of global disorder. The inter-
nationalism, development, and envi- national relations scholar Emma
ronmental stewardship. The strength Ashford sees Trump’s moves as part
of Buzan’s approach is its universal- of a longer shift in the orientation of
ity, weaving the complex evolution the U.S. foreign policy establishment
of modern society into a single story. from the liberal internationalism of
He ominously speculates that today’s the 1990s to a contemporary fixation
cascading environmental crises could on great-power rivalry. Other authors
bring to an end modern civilization argue that, ultimately, Trump’s pol-
and the quest for human betterment. icies were unsuccessful in achieving
their proclaimed objectives and that
a majority of Americans still support
Chaos Reconsidered: The Liberal Order the country’s historical role as a global
and the Future of International Politics liberal leader. But the historian Jeremy
Edited by Robert Jervis, Diane Adelman offers a trenchant warning:
N. Labrosse, Stacie E. Goddard, Trump may have failed, but deep
and Joshua Rovner. Columbia forces are at work in the world that
University Press, 2023, 544 pp. will prevent the United States from
treating the disruption of his presi-
This lively volume brings together dency as a mere aberration.
45 historians and international rela-
tions theorists to assess the impact
of the Trump presidency on the Liberty and Equality
U.S.-led liberal international order. By Raymond Aron. Translated
In a sharp break with the past, Don- by Samuel Garrett Zeitlin.
ald Trump came to office seemingly Princeton University Press, 2023, 120 pp.
committed to tearing down the
U.S. postwar system, withdrawing In this new translation of Raymond
from multilateral agreements and Aron’s last university lecture, deliv-
the Iran nuclear deal, attempting to ered in 1978, France’s most renowned
A
this valedictory speech, Aron argues lthough there are already
that liberty is the essential feature of several biographies of the
Western democracy. He maps various economist Milton Fried-
types of liberties. Individual liberties man, not to mention Friedman’s own
include freedom of choice and opinion memoirs—written with his wife and
and the expectation of personal safety. scholarly collaborator, Rose Fried-
Political liberties include the right to man—Burns adds color and light
vote, protest, and assemble. Social in this first critical biography of the
liberties involve widely shared access man to be grounded in the archives,
to opportunity and the right to orga- including personal papers. As Burns’s
nize. Paradoxically, liberties are valued fluid prose makes clear, Friedman’s
as protections against the dangers of contributions to economics were fun-
state power, but these same liberties damental: they included the perma-
must ultimately be guaranteed by the nent income theory of consumption,
state. Aron ends his lecture by posing his monetary interpretation of the
a question still relevant today: Liberty causes of the Great Depression, and
within open societies allows people the fixed money-growth rule to con-
to pursue their own paths, but how trol inflation, to mention only a few.
can these free societies remain stable Friedman was more than a theoretical
and legitimate unless they simultane- and empirical economist, however. He
ously find ways to renew their sense of had an equally influential incarnation
shared purpose and their understand- as a public intellectual and political
ing of the responsibilities of citizens? gadfly, advancing arguments for school
vouchers, an all-volunteer army, and a
universal basic income. He lauded the
efficiency of markets in books, mag-
azine columns, and television series
and criticized government interven-
tion in the economy as infringing
on individual liberty and discourag-
ing personal responsibility. His ideas
had a significant influence on British
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher,
U.S. President Ronald Reagan, and the Union should spearhead these reform
Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet, efforts. But left unexplored is the ques-
among others. Burns’s book is not just tion of whether progress is possible
a definitive biography of an influential without the active support of the Chi-
economist but also an account of the nese government, and whether China
development of economics as a disci- is prepared to become a responsible
pline and a tool of public policy over stakeholder.
the twentieth century.
K
other advanced economies facing aszeta explores little-known
demographic challenges are similarly campaigns waged by patriots
doomed to this malaise of low growth. from the Baltic states of Esto-
The structure of Italian industries nia, Latvia, and Lithuania against the
compounds the problem: Italy has invading Nazis during World War II
an abundance of vigorous small- and and then against the returning Sovi-
medium-sized firms but lacks the ets. They fought the forcible incor-
large global corporations required to poration of their territories into the
meet the competitive challenges of Soviet Union after World War II, a
the twenty-first century. Successive resistance that continued well into the
governments papered over underly- Cold War even in the face of severe
ing structural problems by enacting repression. Scholars have struggled to
generous social and industrial policies find primary source materials about
financed by excessive borrowing. The these struggles and been dissuaded
economic consequences materialized from studying them by often credible
in the 1980s, with growth markedly Soviet claims that these movements
slowing once the country had made were ultranationalist and collaborated
the easy gains in catching up to more with the Nazis. Kaszeta has done a
advanced economies. Uncertainty remarkable job in telling the story,
then spiked with the multifaceted cri- separating myth from fact and pro-
sis of 1992, when corruption scandals viding a rounded picture of the Forest
upended politics, currency speculators Brotherhood, so called because these
destabilized the lira, and the sustain- rebels tended to hide in forests. Kaszeta
ability of the government’s finances shows how these patriots moved from
came into doubt. The result was a dev- waging haphazard guerrilla warfare to
astating loss of confidence, creating an publishing clandestine literature and
keeping the idea of nationhood alive ing investigation into the “Fat Leonard”
until it became real after the collapse scandal, in which many officers of the
of the Soviet Union. Seventh Fleet accepted money, luxury
items, and the services of prostitutes in
return for helping a private company
Generals and Admirals, Criminals and secure lucrative contracts, including by
Crooks: Dishonorable Leadership in the sharing classified material.
U.S. Military
By Jeffrey J. Matthews.
University of Notre Dame Press, Fierce Ambition: The Life and Legend of
2023, 432 pp. War Correspondent Maggie Higgins
By Jennet Conant.
The U.S. armed forces might pride Norton, 2023, 416 pp.
themselves on the highest standards of
leadership, but Matthews demonstrates War correspondents have privileged
in a series of disturbing and forensic opportunities to observe the course of
case studies how military leaders often a conflict and shape the popular under-
fall short. In successive chapters, he standing of the key events and actors
explores seven forms of unprofessional involved. The desire to be first with the
behavior, including war crimes, insub- big story also means that their profes-
ordination, moral cowardice, toxic sion is an intensely competitive one.
leadership, obstruction of justice, sex In this lively biography of Marguerite
crimes, and public corruption. Some- “Maggie” Higgins, Conant explores
times these failings are lapses in other- how an ambitious, hardworking woman
wise exemplary careers, such as Colin used all the means at her disposal to get
Powell’s role in obscuring the transfer the right assignments. The highlights
of arms from the U.S. military to the of her career included reporting on
CIA during the Iran-contra affair in the liberation of the Dachau concen-
the 1980s. Others show the dark side tration camp in 1945, the Nuremberg
of driven personalities: how General trials from 1945 to 1946, the Berlin air-
Douglas MacArthur’s preening ego- lift from 1948 to 1949, and the Korean
tism led to his rank insubordination, War in the early 1950s. There, despite
for example, or how Admiral Hyman being told by a U.S. general that women
Rickover constantly bullied and humil- did not belong on the frontlines, Hig-
iated his staff in his single-minded pur- gins showed she could more than cope
suit of nuclear power for the U.S. Navy. and won a Pulitzer Prize in 1951 on the
Yet the most disturbing cases involve a back of her dispatches. When she got
collective institutional failure of lead- to Vietnam, her hawkish anticommu-
ership. Matthews recounts the details nism put her at odds with a younger
of the bacchanalian Tailhook confer- generation of more skeptical reporters.
ence in 1991, which took a tradition of Before she saw any need to doubt her
loutish behavior to alarming levels and own beliefs, she was cut down in 1966,
led to the alleged sexual abuse of 83 at the age of 45, by a parasitic illness she
women and seven men, and the ongo- contracted while covering the war.
A
Military Buildup, 1981–1985 n anthology of classic texts
By Edward C. Keefer. Office of the on fascism combined with
Secretary of Defense, 2023, 768 pp. analyses by contemporary
writers on the present situation in the
Caspar Weinberger was one of the United States, this volume is intended
most controversial and consequential to shed light on what its editor calls
U.S. secretaries of defense. This latest “the fascist debate.” That debate pro-
volume in an invaluable and always ceeds on two very different planes. One
season) that Howe believes began with candidates and sitting presidents to
the 2008 global market crash and sub- take hawkish positions and abjure any
sequent recession and will end in the notion of compromise to indicate that
early 2030s. He focuses on the roles they will stand up to foreign adversar-
of different generations—boomers, ies. Ironically, these positions often
Gen X, millennials, and Gen Z—in conflict with voters’ preferences in
shaping each turning. Notwithstand- what Friedman terms an “issue-image
ing the ambition of the book’s thesis tradeoff.” Conventional polling on
and the enormous scope of its sup- where voters stand on issues therefore
porting material, the writing has a misses the point. Friedman concludes
light, almost chatty tone that makes it that, writ large, over many issues and
highly digestible. But to find its argu- years, issue-image tradeoffs have led
ment compelling, the reader will need the United States to craft policies that
an open-mindedness to grand, cyclical are more unilateral, militaristic poli-
patterns as determinants of history and cies than what voters actually want—
a willingness to accept some elasticity with costly consequences.
in timelines.
If Trump Wins
The Commander-in-Chief Test: Public The Atlantic, January/February 2024,
Opinion and the Politics of Image- 121 pp.
Making in U.S. Foreign Policy
By Jeffrey A. Friedman. Cornell The Atlantic magazine has produced
University Press, 2023, 234 pp. a valuable special issue that examines
in detail the consequences of Donald
Friedman combines quantitative data Trump returning to the presidency
with archival material on notable for- in 2025. Two dozen tightly written
eign policy decisions to examine the pieces delve deeply into concerns
connection between public opinion usually presented as headlines, teas-
and foreign policy. Spanning 1960 ing out second- and third-order
to 2004, the book offers case studies consequences. Anne Appelbaum, for
from years in which foreign policy instance, looks into the possibility
was particularly salient in a national that Trump will withdraw the United
election. He finds that, contrary to the States from NATO. Even if carrying
conventional wisdom, voters in those through such a move faces legal chal-
years wanted a candidate who they lenges, “the damage will have been
perceived as a competent commander done,” she writes, because NATO’s
in chief more than they wanted a can- most important influence is not “legal
didate whose policy positions they or institutional, but psychological.”
agreed with. Voters assess compe- Once the Kremlin (and by extension,
tence by deciding whether a candidate Beijing) sees that the United States
appears to be a strong, independent is no longer firmly committed to col-
leader who will vigorously pursue lective defense, the alliance will lose
U.S. interests. This test encourages its deterrent power. She then traces
the effects that would have on South damning and unsentimental indict-
Korea, Taiwan, and Ukraine and on ment that seems almost socialist in
Europe more broadly. Even close allies its zeal. Narrow opportunism, she
such as Israel and Japan would have says, explains why the speaker of the
to reassess their dependence on the House of Commons, hard-core Brex-
United States, and more and more iteers, and Northern Irish politicians
states would have to hedge their bets. scotched a reasonable compromise deal
Eventually, the appearance of the on Brexit, why EU negotiators pressed
United States in retreat would also their advantage, and why Johnson ulti-
weaken the country’s economic influ- mately signed a deal that was worse for
ence. Other articles give comparable the United Kingdom. She also lam-
treatment to specific issues, including bastes private-sector entities, including
threats to the military, to Democratic social media outlets and pharmaceu-
cities and states, the Department tical companies, for failing to uphold
of Justice, abortion, women’s rights, their end of the social contract. No
efforts to address climate change, and self-criticism follows. Instead, in the
immigration, to name just a few. Even final chapter, May professes a naive
the most well-informed reader can faith that all this can only be solved if
count on learning a great deal from careerist politicians and state officials
this important contribution. adopt an ethic of public service. This
position ignores the deeper material
and institutional sources of elite power
Western Europe and thus evades the central irony: most
of the elite bad actors May criticizes
Andrew Moravcsik in this book are core constituents of
the Conservative Party that she has
supported for decades.
The Abuse of Power: Confronting
Injustice in Public Life
By Theresa May. Headline, 2023, Beyond the Wall: A History of
352 pp. East Germany
By Katja Hoyer. Basic Books,
T
he author, who served as Brit- 2023, 496 pp.
ish prime minister from 2016
to 2019, is remembered as a In this engaging book, a journalist
stodgy and ineffective “one nation” and historian born in East Germany
conservative who failed to secure a re-creates the ambivalence of life in
parliamentary majority in 2017, forge the German Democratic Republic.
an agreement on Brexit, and block Thirty-five years after East Germany
the rise of her erratic successor, Boris collapsed, the vanished country con-
Johnson. Surprisingly, her memoir tinues to inspire in Germans a curious
is a passionate call to defend society combination of loathing and longing.
from privileged elites who have ele- Today, few defend the GDR’s use of
vated personal over public interest—a torture, incarceration, and constant
The Rise and Fall of the People’s Parties: On average, cities and towns account
A History of Democracy in Western for over 20 percent of public spend-
Europe Since 1918 ing in developed countries. In most
By Pepijn Corduwener. Oxford places, much of the ordinary person’s
University Press, 2023, 272 pp. quality of life depends on investments
in schools, police, fire departments,
Contemporary threats to democracies health care, and other services, as
from populist far-right parties, this well as roads, public spaces, and other
book argues, are simply the effects local infrastructure. In recent years,
of a deeper problem: the decline many countries have decentralized
of the mass centrist parties of the further, and studies generally show
center-right and center-left. In post- that the more decentralized countries
war Europe, Christian Democratic are, the more satisfied their citizens
and Socialist parties moderated their are. Yet the United Kingdom seems
ideologies to win support outside their an anomaly. Traditionally a very cen-
traditional political bases—the church tralized country, it radically slashed
and organized labor, respectively. This subsidies in the wake of the 2008
practice created a broad and stable financial crisis, leaving localities to
consensus that upheld liberal democ- fund themselves through spending
racy, the welfare state, and private cuts, tax increases, privatization, or
financial manipulation. The results the 20 percent of the French with the
of British decentralization have been lowest income enjoy more upward
at best uneven, and at worst harm- mobility than their counterparts in
ful. Funding gaps widened, services the United Kingdom or the United
declined, and speculative financial States (especially if they live in cities),
schemes rushed to fill the breach. the children of immigrants to France
Inequality, both within and across have greater chances to rise than
jurisdictions, has grown markedly. their nonimmigrant counterparts,
Today, the British government faces a and France offers a level of universal
difficult dilemma: allow urban bank- social support exceeded only by a few
ruptcies or reverse policy once again. of its neighbors.
P
als of “liberty, equality, and fraternity.” ounded mercilessly by U.S.
French politics has become an elitist sanctions and grappling with
preserve of white men from the best a contracting economy, severe
schools. French economy and society shortages of food and fuel, and massive
are unequal and self-dealing. Cities emigration, Cuban society is unravel-
institutionalize neocolonial segrega- ing. In this indispensable compendium,
tion, with those of immigrant origin 29 leading experts, including many
banished to dreary suburbs, hemmed young Cuban scholars, delve deeply
in by brutal police and overseen by into this precipitous disintegration.
corrupt officials. Upward mobility is They blame the wizened, out-of-touch
all but impossible, and access to edu- leadership of the Cuban Communist
cation uneven. France can save itself Party and an inefficient, self-serving
only by setting aside its commitment bureaucracy for slow-walking struc-
to republican ideals and by adopting an tural reforms. Economists point to
explicitly Anglo-Saxon identity-based the inherent flaws of central planning
view and, with it, affirmative action. and the government’s reluctance to
Perhaps. Yet one wonders if Ramdani partner with an ambitious if incipient
would have reached a different con- private sector. U.S. sanctions have also
clusion had this screed been leavened impeded independent entrepreneur-
by statistical data, which shows that ship. Various chapters underscore the
transformative role of social media but emigrated, but some retain their blind
also the government’s apparent capac- devotion to Chavismo. Venezuela
ity to quash any organized dissent. The offers a lesson to the world: beware of
novelist Leonardo Padura Fuentes divisive populist demagogues who prey
notes widespread “cynicism” and “resig- on deep-seated social resentments and
nation” at the sight of government offi- misdirected patriotism and who ped-
cials “wearing fancy linen guayaberas.” dle magical solutions. Also, excessively
LeoGrande, a co-editor of the book, generous welfare states grounded in
starkly warns that “the public’s desper- the exploitation of natural resources
ation and alienation” could very well are economically unsustainable and
reach “a tipping point.” The volume politically explosive. Venezuela’s ordeal
avoids speculating on the possibility reverberates in the author’s argumen-
of a post-socialist transition, but the tative family: its members’ painful
social scientist Ailynn Torres Santana dependencies, moral shortcomings, and
observes that “the anticommunist and monetary mismanagement reflect their
anti-leftist narrative in Cuba is clearly country’s breakdowns.
gaining ground.”
between humans and the natural abuse alcohol, and a few locals are
world influenced European philos- treacherous scammers. Many youth-
ophies. Norton rejects the anthropo- ful emigrants from Guatemala are not
centrism that separates humans from running from gang violence or military
animals in the biblical myths; rather, repression, as some pro-immigration
she prefers indigenous epistemolog- activists in the United States insist
ical systems in which “animals and they are, but rather leaving in search
plants were relations, not resources.” of economic opportunity. The indig-
More radically, she would replace enous communities view the tour-
the divisive European categories of ists—a mixed bag of yoga aficionados,
“human” and “animal” with indig- lost souls, honeymoon couples, and
enous understandings of “wild and real estate speculators—with curiosity
tame,” which honor the personhood and as a crucial source of income; if
of all creatures. Consequently, Norton the indigenous Guatemalans harbor
decries contemporary agribusiness deep-seated anti-white resentments,
practices—but without suggesting such tensions are not apparent in
how the planet might otherwise feed Maynard’s creative imagination.
its eight billion human inhabitants.
Eastern Europe
The Bird Hotel: A Novel
By Joyce Maynard. Arcade and Former Soviet
Publishing, 2023, 432 pp. Republics
Maria Lipman
This lyrical and finely crafted novel
takes place on the shores of the leg-
endary Lake Atitlán in Guatemala,
where Maynard has owned a rustic The Showman: Inside the Invasion
retreat for many years. She confesses That Shook the World and Made a
that many publishers rejected her Leader of Volodymyr Zelensky
novel, which follows a traumatized BY SIMON SHUSTER. William
young American woman seeking Morrow, 2024, 384 pp.
redemption, because they feared it was
R
risky for a white American author to eporting for Time, Shuster
write about indigenous people and began to cover Volodymyr
themes. She proves herself fully capa- Zelensky shortly before his
ble of creating Maya characters with election as president of Ukraine, in
gentle empathy, neither sensationaliz- 2019, and therefore had unique access
ing nor patronizing them. In The Bird to him when Russia launched its full-
Hotel, the Guatemalan characters are scale invasion of the country in 2022.
mostly hard-working, skilled, resilient, In this illuminating and gripping book,
and honest, devoted to family and he lauds Zelensky’s amazing bravery
church, but women get pregnant too and improbable transformation from
young and too often, some mothers showman to wartime national leader.
Russia into more recent times is less enthusiastic than others about govern-
convincing. Unlike the Soviet state, ment policy; older people and women
which continued, until its collapse, are more appreciative of government
to celebrate the overthrow of tsarist largess. It is gratifying to see surveys
Russia, President Vladimir Putin and quantitative techniques deployed
proclaims the 1,000-year history where only a few decades ago legal
of Russia as a continuum of impecca- restrictions and poor data made such
ble greatness with the Soviet victory methods virtually impossible. One can
in World War II as the pinnacle of quibble with this approach—Maza-
Russian glory. Besides, in today’s Rus- heri’s confidence in the reliability of
sia, the empire is embraced as a sym- an online survey might be misplaced
bol of formidable force rather than when digital surveillance is wide-
cultural refinement. spread—but the author is admirably
transparent in describing his meth-
odology and analysis, and in doing
Middle East so supports a nuanced version of the
conventional wisdom.
Lisa anderson
A
nalysts have long attributed counter the dismal and often dismis-
the autocr ac y that pre- sive portrayal of refugees around the
vails in Midd le Eastern world, Hanna tells the stories of the
oil-producing countries to an “author- small businesses founded by three
itarian bargain”: in return for generous women in Zaatari, the large Syrian
government-sponsored benefits, the refugee camp in Jordan. After being
people acquiesce to autocracy. Maza- chased out of Daraa, one of the earli-
heri finds statistical evidence that this is est Syrian towns to revolt against the
indeed the case, drawing on data from regime of President Bashar al-Assad in
surveys conducted by the research net- 2011, the three find themselves housed
work Arab Barometer between 2006 in cramped trailers, grateful to be alive
and 2019 and two online surveys of cit- but disoriented, destitute, and worried
izens of Saudi Arabia and the United about their families and their future.
Arab Emirates that he administered Soon enough, however, Asma opens
in 2018. More interesting, however, an afterschool program, Malak opens
are the distinctions among his survey an art gallery, and Yasmina restarts
respondents. Both poorer people and her bridal services business. They help
better-educated people tend to be less support their families while finding
E
who was fighting whom and why vangelista has written an
grew increasingly convoluted. This intense, emotional lamentation
chaos, she suggests, shaped the use for the thousands of suspected
of violence. No longer was bloodshed drug pushers, users, and innocent vic-
merely an instrument or consequence tims—including children—extraju-
of combat; it also became a public dicially executed by corrupt cops and
relations device, deliberately drawing vigilantes during the rule of Filipino
attention to partisan stories of valor President Rodrigo D uterte from
and fortitude on the battlefield. The 2016 to 2022. She covered Duterte’s
films of carefully staged beheadings drug war at great personal risk as a
that were produced and disseminated reporter for the online news service
by the Islamic State had less polished Rappler, whose CEO, Maria Ressa, was
counterparts in arcade-game-like awarded a Nobel Peace Prize in 2021.
battle videos issued by local factions Evangelista describes the killings
and “made for TV” segments easily in gruesome detail and portrays the
picked up by mainstream media. Per- grief of the victims’ families. In 2016,
haps most intriguing were the “thank as he launched his bloody crackdown,
you” messages sent to international Duterte derided his targets: “Are they
donors by local proxy forces, showing human?” he asked. Evangelista shows
the good uses to which their funds that they were. Her larger theme is
were put in videos of exploding build- the complicity of the Filipino public
ings and battlefield carnage—violence in Duterte’s lawlessness. She describes
carried out not so much to advance a the ecstasy with which crowds wel-
political narrative as to bolster a pitch comed his profanity- and threat-laden
for further funds. speeches at election rallies and the
complacency of citizens who were sure
that other people, not they, were the
targets of his wrath.
Fire and Rain: Nixon, Kissinger, and Shadows at Noon: The South Asian
the Wars in Southeast Asia Twentieth Century
By Carolyn Woods Eisenberg. By Joya Chatterji. Yale University
Oxford University Press, 2023, Press, 2023, 880 pp.
632 pp.
This historiographic plum pudding is
Eisenberg recounts the last phase full of delights, ranging from memo-
of the U.S. war in Vietnam with ries of Chatterji’s childhood in a mul-
new details and caustic moral clar- tigenerational compound in Bengal to
ity, based on declassified papers and a deep history of the violent politics of
transcripts of taped conversations division that separated Pakistan from
between President Richard Nixon and India in 1947 and Bangladesh from
his national security adviser, Henry Pakistan in 1971. With empathy for
Kissinger. When Nixon took office all the thinkers, leaders, and common
in 1969, the antiwar movement led people caught up in the torturous
by students and disaffected veterans events, Chatterji shares her encyclo-
had created the political imperative pedic knowledge of ideologies, laws,
to find a way out of Vietnam. Eisen- caste, class, cities, labor, cuisine, gen-
berg writes that Nixon and Kissinger der, sex work, rice cultivation, snake
“were prone to self-deception.” Their charmers, and even the best South
“Vietnamization” policy sought to Asian movies. She seeks to challenge
cover the drawdown of U.S. troops the conventional view that “ignoble
by handing battle duties to a South fratricidal strife” is the leitmotif of
Vietnamese army that was not willing South Asian life. Instead, the book
to fight. They engineered diplomatic demonstrates how much South Asians
breakthroughs with Beijing and Mos- have always had in common, even as
cow that produced important results their politicians tried to construct
but no substantial help in pressuring national identities by making enemies
Hanoi to negotiate. Nixon ordered the of each other’s peoples.
bombing of civilians in North Viet-
nam and neighboring Cambodia and
Laos to force concessions from Hanoi,
but the resulting tweaks to the peace
deal reached in Paris in 1973 did not
change the situation on the ground.
It was a fig-leaf agreement that fore-
seeably led to the fall of the feckless
South Vietnamese regime just two
years later. Peace was achieved, but
not, as the administration claimed,
“with honor.”
close factories that don’t meet the integrating with the needy, puritanical
standards for their technological North. Cha and Pacheco Pardo offer
modernization. Bureaucrats seeking a sure-footed guide to the two coun-
promotion need to score at least 80 tries’ divergent paths and their fraught
out of 100 points in a multi-item fraternal relationship. The stalemate is
assessment matrix. Software engineers further cemented by the surrounding
work overtime to meet performance major powers, who created the divi-
indicators. Migrant workers accumu- sion of the peninsula in the first place.
late points through skill certifications The authors determine that unifica-
to qualify for urban resident status and tion would serve the interests of the
get their children into public schools. United States and Japan. But Russia
Food delivery platform workers race and China continue to shore up the
to fulfill on-time targets. Such man- North’s struggling economy.
ifestations of “techno-development”
and “scientific management ” add
to the stress of exam-based college Africa
admissions, high youth unemploy-
Nicolas van de Walle
ment, and soaring real estate prices,
making China perhaps the world’s
most intense pressure-cooker society.
The Rebel’s Clinic: The Revolutionary
Lives of Frantz Fanon
Korea: A New History of By Adam Shatz. Farrar, Straus and
South and North Giroux, 2024, 464 pp.
By Victor Cha and Ramon
T
Pacheco Pardo. Yale University he anticolonial revolutionary
Press, 2023, 288 pp. Frantz Fanon’s life was marked
by continual transformation—
The harder North and South Korea and was far too short. (He died of leu-
work to reunify, the more entrenched kemia in 1961 at the age of 36.) He
their separation seems to become. moved from a conventional bourgeois
Pyongyang has allowed relations to upbringing in Martinique to fighting
thaw from time to time in order to for the Free French Forces in World
receive economic help from the South War II to studying psychiatry in France
but pulls back from any real opening, to being posted in a hospital in Algeria,
sensing an existential threat to its where he became a fervent supporter
repressive dynastic regime. The gov- of the Algerian revolution, for which
ernment in Seoul oscillates between he served as a roving ambassador and
hair-trigger deterrence policies and propagandist until his death. Shatz
conciliatory “sunshine” policies toward discusses all this ably, but the book’s
the North. But it has become a wealthy real triumph is to link Fanon’s life to
country in the meantime—and a global the development of his ideas. Shatz
cultural powerhouse to boot—whose describes in vivid strokes the ferment
citizens have less and less interest in of the time, from Fanon’s encounter
with “negritude”—the affirmation of That said, the colony could not meet
an essential Black and African culture their heightened expectations, and the
and identity—in Martinique to his colonial state treated them much worse
dabbling in the Parisian existential- than it did the returning white veterans.
ism of Jean-Paul Sartre. Fanon also
sought to adapt his psychiatry practice
to address the cruelties of colonialism. Using Force to Protect
Shatz shows well how Fanon’s ideas Civilians: Successes and Failures
about race relations, colonialism, and of United Nations Peace Operations
the purpose of violence, for which he in Africa
now enjoys enormous influence, came By Stian Kjeksrud. Oxford
directly from these experiences. University Press, 2023, 240 pp.
not just a military one. I wrote that when a defensive-minded state tries to
Hamas does not endeavor to match strengthen its own security in a way that
the Israeli military directly because inadvertently makes another state feel
that would be a self-defeating strategy less secure. That dynamic results in an
for any terrorist group. And if Hamas escalating spiral that leaves both sides
had used drone attacks “to march to primed for war.
Jerusalem and plant its flag there,” the China and the United States may be
group would have triggered a massive trapped in such a vicious cycle, but China
U.S. military intervention. and Taiwan certainly are not. Beijing’s
Those who pursue the “age-old tac- intentions, particularly under its leader,
tic of terrorism” never seek to go toe to Xi Jinping, are clear and unequivocal:
toe with state military power. Terrorist China wants to assert political control
groups win by leveraging states’ own over Taiwan. Offering concessions to
strengths against them, as Hamas has a determined revisionist such as Bei-
effectively done with Israel. That’s a jing will only invite further aggression.
rather strategic approach, as might be Instead, clear redlines reinforced by
taught (and I did teach, for years) at credible threats of unacceptable pain are
professional military schools, including needed. Taiwan does not need to assure
the U.S. National War College. China. It needs to show strength.
The authors also draw a false equiv-
alence. They make the common but
Scared Strait illogical suggestion that political moves
by the United States and Taiwan—
including visits by senior U.S. officials
To the Editor: to Taiwan and rhetorical gaffes by U.S.
In “Taiwan and the True Sources of officials who accidentally describe Tai-
Deterrence” ( January/February 2024), wan as a country—are somehow as
Bonnie Glaser, Jessica Chen Weiss, and damaging to cross-strait peace as Chi-
Thomas Christensen argue that Wash- nese belligerence. In truth, Beijing is
ington and Taiwan are not doing enough the actor threatening and carrying out
to assure Beijing of their intentions, in military provocations, including large-
the process undermining deterrence scale offensive exercises and simulations
in the Taiwan Strait. We agree that of blockades, as well as massive air and
deterrence requires threats as well as naval intrusions.
assurances, and we support their call for These actions undermine and violate
strengthening Taiwanese defenses while the agreements that frame the status quo
pursuing increased cross-strait dialogue. in the Taiwan Strait. Implying that the
But the authors make several errors United States and Taiwan must shoul-
that together generate counterproduc- der the onus of assurance serves only to
tive policy recommendations. The first legitimize China’s preferred narrative
and most important error is that they that Beijing is blameless while others
claim that China, the United States, and are responsible for damaging cross-
Taiwan are caught in a so-called secu- strait relations. It also loses the plot. The
rity dilemma. Such a scenario transpires main issue is not errant American or
Taiwanese rhetoric but the mounting Washington can no longer rely on its
threat of very real Chinese violence. existing policies in the hopes that what
Moreover, Washington has already worked in the past will yield success in
tried an “assurance first” approach. the future.
Decades of economic, political, and Where there is a security dilemma,
even security engagement from the assurances can indeed help to assuage
1990s on failed to mollify Chinese tensions while reinforcing deterrence.
concerns about Taiwan. Instead, these But when deterrence is needed against a
policies set the stage for a militarily determined and capable rival, assurances
powerful China that increasingly vio- that are not reciprocated can quickly
lates international security norms. become concessions. In the process, a
Of the three parties, China is the policy intended to de-escalate will serve
least constrained and the most able to only to appease.
renege on its commitments, and it has Raymond Kuo
made the fewest binding agreements. Senior Political Scientist and Director
It is therefore incumbent on Beijing to of the Taiwan Policy Initiative
present assurances that it will follow RAND Corporation
the rules. Without those assurances, the Michael A. Hunzeker
appropriate response is punishment or Associate Professor
ostracization. Washington could sup- George Mason University
port more bilateral military coordina- Mark A. Christopher
tion with Taiwan, as well as between Affiliate Professor
Taiwan and other regional partners; George Mason University
push for further internationalization of
cross-strait security issues; and further
clarify that the United States demands Glaser, Chen Weiss, and Christensen reply:
a peaceful resolution to Taiwan’s status. Contrary to what Kuo, Hunzeker, and
Conditional, credible consequences are Christopher argue, we did not down-
now essential to encouraging a less bel- play the increasing threat that Beijing
licose Chinese policy. poses to Taiwan. Nor did we advocate
The authors’ analytic errors matter: an “assurance first” strategy that offers
misdiagnosing the problem can lead “concessions” to appease Beijing or
to inappropriate, perhaps even coun- draw a “false equivalence” in sketching
terproductive, solutions. In this case, the dangers posed by Beijing, Wash-
providing more assurances will sim- ington, and Taipei.
ply embolden Beijing to continue its In fact, we opened our essay by defin-
threatening behavior. ing the core problem in the region as
U.S. policy to date has helped avert Beijing’s increasing threat to Taiwan,
a cross-strait conflict and by this mea- and we underlined the importance of
sure is a success. But the foundations of strengthening the United States’ and
Washington’s long-standing approach Taiwan’s military posture. We and
to cross-strait relations are crumbling others have offered such prescriptions
in the face of growing Chinese mili- in more detail elsewhere. Our article
tary power and aggression. As a result, focused on the assurances that must
allies and partners, such as Japan, the Because of an editing error, “The Case
Philippines, and South Korea, will for Conservative Internationalism”
likely be less willing to grant the U.S. ( January/February 2024) incorrectly
military the increased access it needs if identified the state that Nikki Haley
Washington or Taipei, rather than Bei- led; she is a former governor of South
jing, are seen as undermining stability Carolina, not North Carolina.
in the Taiwan Strait. “The Crisis of African Democracy”
Kuo, Hunzeker, and Christopher ( January/February 2024) mischarac-
insist that we mischaracterize the situ- terized an index published by the Mo
ation faced by China, Taiwan, and the Ibrahim Foundation. It is released
United States as a security dilemma. biennially, not annually.
Foreign Affairs (ISSN 00157120), March/April 2024, Volume 103, Number 2. Published six times annually ( January,
March, May, July, September, November) at 58 East 68th Street, New York, NY 10065. Print subscriptions:
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THE ARCHIVE
Five years after Israeli and Palestinian leaders signed the first
Oslo accord, an agreement that was meant to mark the
beginning of the end of decades of conflict, the Palestinian
scholar Khalil Shikaki offered a warning: with Israeli Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s right-wing government in
power and the Palestinian Authority (PA), led by Yasir Arafat,
riddled with corruption, Islamist groups were poised to gain
power if the peace process failed to deliver two states soon.
I
f the talks with Israel remain stale- Above all, one should not write Hamas
mated and the PA remains corrupt, off. . . . In the spring of 1997, some senior
disdainful of civil liberties, and mis- Palestinian officials were wary of holding
managed, backing for Oslo will continue local elections for fear that the Islamists
to dwindle. Arafat’s presence at the might win. A memorandum written to
helm minimizes the risk of such rever- Arafat in April 1997 by a senior security
sals. But if the deadlock of the peace official warned of a new Hamas strategy
process is coupled with a Palestinian of winning control of local councils and
failure at the task of national municipalities—the same plan
reconstruction and, crucially, the Islamists used in Algeria.
Arafat’s departure from the The memorandum cautions
scene, any remaining Palestin- that this would be the first
ian constituency for the peace step toward the creation of a
process will quickly evaporate. parallel authority that would
The countdown to violent eventually usurp the PA. Ara-
confrontations and regional fat faces a painful dilemma: if
instability would begin. Inevitably, the he limits democracy to thwart Islamist
young and educated—the most active, infiltration into local government, he
idealistic, disillusioned, and uncom- will further alienate one of the peace
promising, and the least burdened with process’ key constituencies, the national
personal responsibilities—would ignite bourgeoisie. But the more open Palestin-
any future violent outbreak. The next ian politics are, the more susceptible they
few years are crucial. are to permeation by Hamas.