I.

RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

1. SCOPE OF PROTECTION.

A. JOSE BURGOS, ET AL., petitioners, vs. THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ET AL., respondents.
G.R. No. L-64261 December 26, 1984.

FACTS:

Two search warrants were issued against the petitioners for the search and seizure of the
"Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers. The said search and seizure included the
office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles, and other articles
used in the printing, publication, and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numer
ous papers, documents, books, and other written literature alleged to be in the possession
and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper. Th
e petitioners further request that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunctio
n be issued for the return of the seized articles and that respondents be enjoined from using
the articles thus seized as evidence against the petitioner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the general search warrants were validly issued.

HELD:

NO. In Stanford v. State of Texas the search warrant which authorized the search for "books,
records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings and other writte
n instruments concerning the Communist Party in Texas," was declared void by the U.S. Sup
reme Court for being too general. In like manner, directions to "seize any evidence in conne
ction with the violation of SDC 13-3703 or otherwise" have been held too general, and that
portion of a search warrant which authorized the seizure of any "paraphernalia which could
be used to violate Sec. 54-197 of the Connecticut General Statutes [the statute dealing with
the crime of conspiracy]" was held to be a general warrant, and therefore invalid. The descri
ption of the articles sought to be seized under the search warrants in question cannot be ch
aracterized differently.

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In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme Courts calls to mind a notable chapter in English hist
ory: the era of disaccord between the Tudor Government and the English Press, when "Offic
ers of the Crown were given roving commissions to search where they pleased in order to su
ppress and destroy the literature of dissent both Catholic and Puritan Reference herein to s
uch historical episode would not be relevant for it is not the policy of our government to su
ppress any newspaper or publication that speaks with "the voice of non-conformity" but po
ses no clear and imminent danger to state security.

B. HARRY S. STONEHILL, ET AL., petitioners, vs. HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, ET AL.,

respondents.
G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967.

FACTS:

A total of 42 search warrants were issued against the petitioners directed to any peace office
r, to search the petitioners’ premises of their offices, warehouses, and/or residences, and t
o seize and take possession of the following personal property. It was alleged that the petiti
oners violated the Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code), an
d the Revised Penal Code. Petitioners argued that the search warrants issued against them
were null and void as those were contravened with the constitutional requirement of proba
ble cause and particularity. The respondent-prosecutors alleged that the contested search
warrants are valid and have been issued in accordance with law. The Court issued the writ o
f preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition, but later, the writ was partially lifted or di
ssolved.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made under
the authority are valid.

HELD:

NO. Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely:
(1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in th
e manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the t
hings to be seized.

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None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the
same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein na
med had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Rev
enue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged i
n said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abst
ract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have fo
und the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of compete
nt proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committ
ed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, th
e applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petit
ioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation
of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal
Code," — as alleged in the aforementioned applications — without reference to any determ
inate provision of said laws or To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to
wipe out completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for
it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspon
dence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the ev
il sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted — to outlaw the so-c
alled general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of keen pol
itical strife, when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though
by legal means.

C. ERWIN LIBO-ON DELA CRUZ, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, responden
t.
G.R. No. 209387. January 11, 2016.

FACTS:

Dela Cruz was an on-the-job trainee of an inter-island vessel. He frequently traveled, “comi
ng back and forth taking a vessel.” On May 11, 2007, Dela Cruz was at a pier of the Cebu Do
mestic Port to go home to Iloilo. While buying a ticket, he allegedly left his bag on the floor
with a porter. It took him around 15 minutes to purchase a ticket. Dela Cruz then proceeded
to the terminal entrance and placed his bag on the x-ray scanning machine for inspection. T
he Cutie Pie Flores, an operator of the x-ray machine saw firearms inside Dela Cruz’s bag.
Upon seeing the suspected firearms, she called the attention of port personnel Archie Igot, t

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he baggage inspector. Igot confirmed with Dela Cruz whether he was the bag owner which D
ela Cruz affirmed and consented to Igot’s manual inspection of the bag.

Igot informed the Port Police Officer Adolfo Abregana that a certain Dela Cruz owned firear
ms inside the bag. Dela Cruz admitted that he was the owner of the bag. The bag was inspec
ted which found inside: three (3) revolvers; NBI clearance; a seaman’s book; other persona
l items; and four (4) live ammunitions placed inside the cylinder. When asked whether he ha
d the proper documents for the firearms, Dela Cruz answered in the negative. Consequently,
he was arrested and informed of his violation of a crime punishable by law. He was also inf
ormed of his constitutional rights.

In the Information dated November 19, 2003, Dela Cruz was charged with violation of Repub
lic Act No. 8294 for illegal possession of firearms.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a valid search and seizure.

HELD:

NO. With regard to searches and seizures, the standard imposed on private persons is differ
ent from that imposed on state agents or authorized government authorities. In People v. M
arti, the private forwarding and shipping company, following standard operating procedure,
opened packages sent by accused Andre Marti for shipment to Zurich, Switzerland and dete
cted a peculiar odor from the packages. The representative from the company found dried
marijuana leaves in the packages. He reported the matter to the National Bureau of Investig
ation and brought the samples to the Narcotics Section of the Bureau for laboratory examin
ation.98 Agents from the National Bureau of Investigation subsequently took custody of the
illegal drugs.99 Andre Marti was charged with and was found guilty of violating Republic Act
No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.

This court held that there was no unreasonable search or seizure. The evidence obtained ag
ainst the accused was not procured by the state acting through its police officers or authoriz
ed government agencies. The Bill of Rights does not govern relationships between individu
als; it cannot be invoked against the acts of private individuals: If the search is made upon t
he request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the test
of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the propriet

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or of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and wit
hout the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizur
e cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved.
In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to a
cts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful in
trusion by the government. Hence, by virtue of Marti, items seized pursuant to a reasonable
search conducted by private persons are not covered by the exclusionary rule.

D. RUBEN DEL CASTILLO @ BOY CASTILLO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
G.R. No. 185128. January 30, 2012.

FACTS:

According to confidential information that the petitioner, Ruben del Castillo was engaged in
selling shabu, the police officers, led by SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon, after conducting surve
illance and testbuy operation at the house of petitioner, secured a search warrant from the
RTC. They headed to the house of the petitioner to execute the search warrant. However, up
on arrival, someone shouted "raid," prompting them to disembark from the jeep they were
riding and went directly to del Castillo's house. But before they could search the area, SPO3
Masnayon claimed that he saw petitioner run towards a small structure, a nipa hut. Masnay
on chased him but to no avail as they were not familiar with the place. Subsequently, one of
the barangay tanods was able to confiscate four plastic packs containing white crystalline s
ubstance from the nipa hut. The confiscated items were sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory f
or examination, which confirmed the presence of shabu.

In defense, the petitioner, del Castillo was installing the electrical wirings and airconditionin
g units by the time the police officers arrived at their house. He only learned from his wife th
at police operatives searched his house and found nothing. According to him, the small stru
cture, 20 meters away from his house where they found the confiscated items, was owned b
y his older brother and was used as a storage place by his father.

RTC found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable of the charge against him in the Informat
ion. Del Castillo appealed his case with the CA, but the latter affirmed the decision of the RT
C.

ISSUE:

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Whether or not there was no probable cause to issue the search warrant, considering that S
PO1 Reynaldo Matillano, the police officer who applied for it, had no personal knowledge.

HELD:

YES. The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present;
(2) such probable cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge must exa
mine, in writing and under oath or affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he or she
may produce; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to th
em; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be
seized. According to petitioner, there was no probable cause. Probable cause for a search w
arrant is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet an
d prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought i
n connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. A finding of probable c
ause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been co
mmitted and that it was committed by the accused. Probable cause demands more than ba
re suspicion; it requires less than evidence which would justify conviction.14 The judge, in d
etermining probable cause, is to consider the totality of the circumstances made known to
him and not by a fixed and rigid formula,15 and must employ a flexible, totality of the circu
mstances standard.16 The existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion
of the judge conducting the examination. This Court, therefore, is in no position to disturb t
he factual findings of the judge which led to the issuance of the search warrant. A magistrat
e’s determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid great defe
rence by a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis for that determination.

E. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILLIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BASILIO DAMASO @ Berna

rdo/BERNIE MENDOZA @ KA DADO, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 93516 August 12, 1992.

FACTS:

On June 18, 1988, Lt. Candido Quijardo, a Philippine Constabulary officer and some compa
nions were sent to verify the presence of CPP/NPA members in Barangay Catacdang, Dagup
an City. In said place, the group apprehended several persons allegedly NPA members. Whe
n interrogated, the persons apprehended revealed that there was an underground safe hou
se at Gracia Village in Urdaneta, Pangasinan. After coordinating with the Station Commande

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r of Urdaneta, the group proceeded to the house in Gracia Village. They found subversive do
cuments, a radio, a 1 x 7 caliber .45 firearm, and other items.

After the raid, they proceeded to Bonuan, Dagupan City, and put under surveillance the rent
ed apartment of Rosemarie Aritumba, sister of Berlina Aritumba whom they earlier arrested
They interviewed Luzviminda Morados, a visitor of Rosemarie Aritumba. She stated that sh
e worked with Bernie Mendoza, herein appellant. She guided the group to the house rented
by the appellant, however, they found out that the house had already been vacated. They lo
oked for the Barangay Captain to ask the place and requested him to point out the new hou
se rented by appellant. The group saw Luz Tanciango which an alleged NPA member. Upon
entering the house, the group, as well as the Barangay Captain, saw subversive materials, ill
egal firearms and ammunitions and other items. They confiscated the articles and brought t
hem to their headquarters for final inventory. They likewise brought the persons found in th
e house to the headquarters for investigation. Said persons revealed that appellant was the
lessee of the house and owned the items confiscated therefrom.

ISSUE:

Whether there was waiver on the part of Damaso to allow the warrantless search of his hous
e.

HELD:

NO. Damaso was singled out as the sole violator of PD 1866, in furtherance of, or incident to,
or in connection with the crime of subversion. There is no substantial and credible evidenc
e to establish the fact that the appellant is allegedly the same person as the lessee of the ho
use where the M-14 rifle and other subversive items were found or the owner of the said ite
ms. Even assuming for the sake of argument that Damaso is the lessee of the house, the cas
e against him still will not prosper, the reason being that the law enforcers failed to comply
with the requirements of a valid search and seizure proceedings. The constitutional immuni
ty from unreasonable searches and seizures, being a personal one cannot he waived by any
one except the person whose rights are invaded or one who is expressly authorized to do so
in his or her . The records show that Damaso was not in his house at that time Luz Tanciangc
o and Luz Morados, his alleged helper, allowed the authorities to enter it. There is no eviden
ce that would establish the fact that Luz Morados was indeed Damaso’s helper or if it was t
rue that she was his helper, that Damaso had given her authority to open his house in his ab
sence. The prosecution likewise failed to show if Luz Tanciangco has such an authority. With

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out this evidence, the authorities’ intrusion into Damaso’s dwelling cannot be given any
color of legality. While the power to search and seize is necessary to the public welfare, still i
t must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of t
he citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifferenc
e to the basic principles of government. As a consequence, the search conducted by the aut
horities was illegal. It would have been different if the situation here demanded urgency wh
ich could have prompted the authorities to dispense with a search warrant. But the record i
s silent on this point. The fact that they came to Damaso’s house at nighttime, does not gr
ant them the license to go inside his house.

F. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent-appellee, vs. VICTOR COGAED, accused-ap

pellant.
G.R. No. 200334. July 30, 2014.

FACTS:

On November 25, 2005, Police Senior Inspector Sofronio Bayan received information from a
n unidentified civilian informer” that one Marvin Buya (also known as Marvin Bugat) “ wo
uld be transporting marijuana” from Barangay Lun-Oy, San Gabriel, La Union to the Poblac
ion of San Gabriel, La Union. With this, PSI Bayan organized checkpoints in order “to interc
ept the suspect.” The police organized checkpoints to intercept the suspect and set up a c
heckpoint in the waiting area of passengers from San Gabriel bound for San Fernando City.
A passenger jeepney from Barangay Lun-Oy arrived at SPO1 Taracatac’s checkpoint. The je
epney driver disembarked and signaled to SPO1 Taracatac indicating the two male passeng
ers who were carrying marijuana. SPO1 Taracatac approached the two male passengers wh
o were later identified as Victor Romana Cogaed and Santiago Sacpa Dayao. Cogaed was ca
rrying a blue bag and a sack while Dayao was holding a yellow bag. SPO1 Taracatac asked C
ogaed and Dayao about the contents of their bags. Cogaed and Dayao told SPO1 Taracatac t
hat they did not know since they were transporting the bags as a favor for their barriomate
named Marvin. After this exchange, Cogaed opened the blue bag, revealing three bricks of w
hat looked like marijuana. Cogaed and Dayao were arrested and brought to the police statio
n, where further search revealed more suspected marijuana. The trial court initially found C
ogaed's arrest illegal but stated that Cogaed waived his right to object to the irregularity wh
en he did not protest when asked to open his bag. The trial court found Cogaed guilty of ille
gal possession of dangerous drugs and sentenced him to life imprisonment. Cogaed appeal
ed the decision, but the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.

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ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a valid search and seizure of marijuana as against the appellant.

HELD:

NO. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects again
st unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be invi
olable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the c
omplainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be s
earched and the persons or things to be seized.

This provision requires that the court examine with care and diligence whether searches an
d seizures are “reasonable.” As a general rule, searches conducted with a warrant that me
ets all the requirements of this provision are reasonable. This warrant requires the existence
of probable cause that can only be determined by a judge. The existence of probable cause
must be established by the judge after asking searching questions and answers. Probable c
ause at this stage can only exist if there is an offense alleged to be committed. Also, the warr
ant frames the searches done by the law enforcers. There must be a particular description o
f the place and the things to be searched.

However, there are instances when searches are reasonable even when warrantless. In the
Rules of Court, searches incidental to lawful arrests are allowed even without a separate wa
rrant. This court has taken into account the “uniqueness of circumstances involved includi
ng the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the ma
nner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the charac
ter of the articles procured.” The known jurisprudential instances of reasonable warrantles
s searches and seizures are: 1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest . . . ; 2. Seizure
of evidence in “plain view,” . . . ; 3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the gov
ernment, the vehicle’s inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when it
s transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to prob
able cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity; 4. Consented warrantless searc
h; 5. Customs search; 6. Stop and frisk; and 7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.

G. MARCELO G. SALUDAY, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

G.R. No. 215305. April 3, 2018

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FACTS:

On May 5, 2009, Davao Metro Shuttle (Bus No. 66) was flagged down by Task Force Davao of
the Philippine Army at a checkpoint. SCAA Junbert M. Buco, a member of the Task Force, re
quested all male passengers to disembark from the vehicle while allowing the female passe
ngers to remain inside. He then boarded the bus to check the presence and intercept the en
try of any contraband, illegal firearms or explosives, and suspicious individuals. While searc
hing, a small, caught his attention by the gray-black pack bag on the seat at the rear of the b
us. SCAA Buco noticed petitioner Marcelo G. Saluday peeping through the window towards
the bag. Afterwards, SCAA Buco asked who the owner of the bag was, to which the bus cond
uctor answered that petitioner and his brother were the ones seated at the back. SCAA Buco
then requested petitioner to board the bus and open the bag. Petitioner obliged and the ba
g revealed the following contents: (1) an improvised .30 caliber carbine bearing serial numb
er 64702; (2) one magazine with three live ammunitions; (3) one cacao-type hand grenade;
and (4) a ten-inch hunting knife. SCAA Buco then asked petitioner to produce proof of his au
thority to carry firearms and explosives. Unable to show any, petitioner was immediately ar
rested and informed of his rights by SCAA Buco.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the search conducted by Task Force Davao was legal.

HELD:

YES. The constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition. Rather, it operates against
“unreasonable” searches and seizures only. Conversely, when a search is “reasonable,”
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution does not apply. x x x The prohibition of unreasonabl
e search and seizure ultimately stems from a person’s right to privacy. x x x To illustrate, in
People v. Johnson, the Court declared airport searches as outside the protection of the sear
ch and seizure clause due to the lack of an expectation of privacy that society will regard as
reasonable. Similarly, in Dela Cruz v. People, the Court described seaport searches as reaso
nable searches on the ground that the safety of the traveling public overrides a person’s ri
ght to privacy x x x In People v. Breis, the Court also justified a bus search owing to the reduc
ed expectation of privacy of the riding public[.]

Indeed, the reasonableness of a person’s expectation of privacy must be determined on a

case-to-case basis since it depends on the factual circumstances surrounding the case. Othe
r factors such as customs, physical surroundings and practices of a particular activity may di

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minish this expectation. x x x Concededly, a bus, a hotel and beach resort, and a shopping m
all are all private property whose owners have every right to exclude anyone from entering.
At the same time, however, because these private premises are accessible to the public, the
State, much like the owner, can impose non-intrusive security measures and filter those goi
ng in. The only difference in the imposition of security measures by an owner and the State i
s, the former emanates from the attributes of ownership under Article 429 of the Civil Code,
while the latter stems from the exercise of police power for the promotion of public safety.
Necessarily, a person’s expectation of privacy is diminished whenever he or she enters pri
vate premises that are accessible to the public.

In view of the foregoing, the bus inspection conducted by Task Force Davao at a military che
ckpoint constitutes a reasonable search. Bus No. 66 of Davao Metro Shuttle was a vehicle of
public transportation where passengers have a reduced expectation of privacy.

H. SPOUSES BILL AND VICTORIA HING, petitioners, vs. ALEXANDER CHOACHUY, SR., et a
ll, respondents.
G.R. No. 179736. June 26, 2013

FACTS:

On August 23, 2005, petitioner-spouses Bill and Victoria Hing filed a complaint for Injunctio
n and Damages with prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction/T
emporary Restraining Order (TRO) against respondents Alexander Choachuy, Sr. and Allan C
hoachuy. The petitioners claimed that they were the registered owners of a parcel of land a
djacent to the respondent’s property. The respondents had constructed an auto-repair sh
op building on the subject property. On the other hand, Aldo filed a case against the petitio
ners claiming that they were constructing a fence without a valid permit that would destroy
the wall of its building. The Court denied Aldo’s application for failure to substantiate its al
legations. With that, the respondents illegally installed surveillance cameras facing the petit
ioners’ property with their consent and even took pictures of the petitioners’ ongoing co
nstruction. The petitioners argued that this violated their right to privacy. The Regional Trial
Court (RTC) granted the petitioners' application for a temporary restraining order and later i
ssued a writ of preliminary injunction. However, the Court of Appeals (CA) granted the respo
ndents' petition for certiorari and annulled the orders of the RTC.

ISSUE:

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Whether or not there is a violation of the petitioners’ right to privacy.

HELD:

YES. The right to privacy is enshrined in our Constitution and in our laws. It is defined as “t
he right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of one’s person or from intrusion into on
e’s private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a person’s ordinary sensibili
ties.” It is the right of an individual “to be free from unwarranted publicity, or to live witho
ut unwarranted interference by the public in matters in which the public is not necessarily c
oncerned.”46 Simply put, the right to privacy is “the right to be let alone.” The Bill of Rig
hts guarantees the people’s right to privacy and protects them against the State’s abuse
of power. In this regard, the State recognizes the right of the people to be secure in their hou
ses. No one, not even the State, except “in case of overriding social need and then only un
der the stringent procedural safeguards,” can disturb them in the privacy of their homes.

I. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), petitioner, vs. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD, et al., res
pondents.
G.R. No. 157870. November 3, 2008

FACTS:

Petitioners question the constitutionality of Section 36 of RA 9165, otherwise known as the

Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. It requires mandatory drug testing of candida
tes for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of p
ublic and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with certain
offenses, among other personalities, is put in issue. On December 23, 2003, COMELEC issue
d Resolution 6486, which provides the rules on the mandatory drugs testing of candidates f
or public office. It requires the COMELEC offices and employees concerned to submit two se
parate lists of candidates: one for those who complied with the mandatory drug testing and
the other of those who failed to comply.

Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., one of the petitioners sought to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and C
OMELEC Resolution No. 6486 for being unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification f
or candidates for senators in addition to those already provided for in the 1987 Constitutio
n; and to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 6486. Subsquently, petiti
oner Social Justice Society (SJS), a registered political party, seeks to prohibit the Dangerou

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s Drugs Board (DDB) and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from enforcing pa
ragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that they are constitutionall
y infirm. One of the provisions breached a person’s constitutional right against unreasona
ble searches.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 are unconstitutional as
those provisions violated the right against unreasonable searches and seizure.

HELD:

The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone. In context, the right to privacy means the
right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of one’s person or from intrusion into on
e’s private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a person’s ordinary sensibili
ties. And while there has been general agreement as to the basic function of the guarantee a
gainst unwarranted search, “translation of the abstract prohibition against ‘unreasonabl
e searches and seizures’ into workable broad guidelines for the decision of particular case
s is a difficult task,” to borrow from C. Camara v. Municipal Court. Authorities are agreed th
ough that the right to privacy yields to certain paramount rights of the public and defers to t
he state’s exercise of police power.

As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched and as has been hel
d, “reasonableness” is the touchstone of the validity of a government search or intrusion.
And whether a search at issue hews to the reasonableness standard is judged by the balanci
ng of the government-mandated intrusion on the individual’s privacy interest against the
promotion of some compelling state interest.

2. REQUISITES OF A VALID WARRANT

A. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JERRY SAPLA y GUERRERO a.k.a.

ERIC SALIBAD y MALLARI, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 244045. June 16, 2020

FACTS:

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In the morning of 10 January 2014, an unnamed officer at the Regional Public Safety Battali
on in Tabuk, Kalinga received a text message from an informant an individual will be transp
orting marijuana from Kalinga to Isabela. PO2 Jim Mabiasan then relayed the information t
o the deputy commander who coordinated with the PDEA.

About 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon of the same day, a follow up information via text mess
age was received by the RPSB this time detailing the description of the drug courier, to wit:
malewearing collared white shirt with green stripes, red ball cap, and carrying a blue sack; h
e will be boarding a passenger jeepney bearing plate number AYA 270 bound for Roxas, Isab
ela. Based on this information, a checkpoint was organized by the PNP At around 1:20 o’cl
ock, the jeepney arrived. The police officers stopped the jeepney and inside they saw the pe
rson described in the text message they received. They approached said person and asked
him if the blue sack in front of him was his. The person answered yes. The police officers th
en requested the person to open the blue sack. The person hesitated but he e
ventually complied. The content of the blue sack was four bricks of marijuana. The person
was later identified as Jerry Sapla.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was valid search and seizure conducted by police officers.

HELD:

NO. The sole reliance on tipped information, on its own, furnished by informants cannot pr
oduce probable cause, the Court held that exclusive reliance on information tipped by infor
mants goes against the very nature of probable cause. A single hint hardly amounts to "the
existence of such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prud
ent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in conn
ection with the offense are in the place to be searched."

Without objective facts being presented here by which we can test the basis for the officers'
suspicion about the block-shaped bundle contained marijuana, we should not give unquest
ioned acceptance and belief to such testimony. The mere subjective conclusions of the offic
ers concerning the existence of probable cause is never binding on the court whose duty re
mains to "independently scrutinize the objective facts to determine the existence of probab
le cause," for, indeed, "the courts have never hesitated to overrule an officer's determinatio
n of probable cause when none

14 | P a g e
B. LARRY SABUCO MANIBOG, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
G.R. No. 211214. March 20, 2019.

FACTS:

Larry Sabuco Manibog was convicted by the Regional Trial Court and upheld by the Court of
Appeals for carrying a firearm in public during an election period without securing the nece
ssary permit from the Commission on Elections. This was in violation of the Omnibus Electi
on Code and related laws. On the morning of March 17, 2010, after receiving a tip, Police Chi
ef Inspector Randolph Beniat and a team spotted Manibog outside the Municipal Tourism O
ffice of Dingras, Ilocos Norte, with a suspected gun bulge at his waistline. Upon confirmatio
n, Manibog was disarmed and arrested. Manibog contested the arrest and subsequent searc
h, arguing that they were done without a warrant and thus violated his constitutional rights
against unreasonable searches and seizures.

ISSUE:

Whether the warrantless search and seizure of Manibog's firearm was lawful under the circu
mstances, making the evidence admissible in court.

HELD:

YES. The Supreme Court upheld the lower court's decision, finding the search and arrest val
id under the "stop and frisk" exception to the warrant requirement. It was determined that t
he police officers had reasonable suspicion based on specific and articulable facts observed
at the scene that Manibog was committing an illegal act by carrying a firearm during the ele
ction period. This justified a stop-and-frisk search without a warrant. Therefore, the gun sei
zed during the search was admissible in court, leading to Manibog’s conviction. The searc
h was deemed reasonable under the circumstances, fitting within exceptions to the warrant
requirement outlined in jurisprudence and the Rules of Court.

C. JAMAR M. KULAYAN, et al., petitioners, vs. GOV. ABDUSAKUR M. TAN, et al. respondents
G.R. No. 187298. July 3, 2012.

FACTS:

15 | P a g e
On January 15, 2009, three International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) members were
kidnapped by Abu Sayyaf Group members in Sulu. In response, a task force comprising milit
ary, police, and a Civilian Emergency Force (CEF) was formed under the command of Sulu Pr
ovincial Governor Abdusakur Mahail Tan. Following further threats by the kidnappers, Gove
rnor Tan declared a state of emergency via Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009, authorizing s
earches, seizures, and arrests without judicial warrants.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the proclamation and its implementing guidelines, authorizing general sear
ches and seizures, and the creation of CEF, violate the constitutional protections against unr
easonable searches and seizures.

HELD:

YES. The Supreme Court ruled that the proclamation and its guidelines were unconstitution
al. The court held that only the President, as the Commander-in-Chief, has the authority to c
all upon the armed forces and declare a state of emergency involving law enforcement pow
ers that could restrict constitutional freedoms. The actions taken under the proclamation w
ere deemed an overreach of the governor’s authority as they amounted to exercising pow
ers reserved for the President. Additionally, the general searches and seizures authorized w
ere contrary to the Constitution, which requires judicially sanctioned warrants for such acti
ons. The Court declared the proclamation and its guidelines null and void due to grave abus
e of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction

D. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. ROBERTO REY E. GABIOSA, SR., respon
dent
G.R. No. 248395. January 29, 2020.

FACTS:

On January 20, 2017, P/Supt Leo Tayabas Ajero applied for a search warrant against Roberto
Rey E. Gabiosa, Sr., alleged to be selling methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) from his
residence. The application was supported by the affidavit of Police Officer 1 Rodolfo M. Gev
erola, which detailed a controlled purchase of shabu from Gabiosa. After a preliminary exa
mination of the witness (Geverola), Judge Arvin Sadiri B. Balagot of Kidapawan City issued
Search Warrant No. 149-2017. However, Gabiosa contested the validity of the search warran
t, arguing that its issuance violated his constitutional rights against unreasonable searches

16 | P a g e
and seizures because the judge did not examine the applicant (P/Supt Ajero), only the witne
ss. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) upheld the validity of the warrant, which was subsequentl
y challenged and overturned by the Court of Appeals (CA), leading to the present Petition fo
r Review filed by the People of the Philippines.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA err in granting the Petition for Certiorari filed by Gabiosa by declaring
the search warrant null and void based on the grounds that the judge did not personally exa
mine the applicant, only the witness.

HELD:

YES. The Supreme Court ruled that the CA erred in invalidating Search Warrant No. 149-201
7. The right against unreasonable searches and seizures, enshrined in the Constitution, prot
ects individuals from arbitrary intrusions by the State into their persons, houses, papers, an
d effects. However, the Constitution also recognizes exceptions, such as when a warrant is o
btained based on probable cause determined by a judge. The Court held that the primary c
onsideration is whether the judge issuing the warrant was personally satisfied that probabl
e cause existed. The judge's examination, whether of the applicant or the witness/es, serves
the purpose of establishing this probable cause.

Contrary to the CA’s ruling, the Constitution's use of the conjunction "and" does not neces
sitate the examination of both the applicant and the witnesses. As long as probable cause is
established through the examination of either the applicant or the witness/es, the requirem
ent is fulfilled. Moreover, the Court finds that Judge Balagot's examination of PO1 Geverola
was sufficient. The questions posed were probing and exhaustive, aimed at ascertaining the
witness's personal knowledge of the facts. The judge's discretion in conducting the examin
ation is recognized, and his findings deserve great weight unless proven otherwise.

E. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. AMADOR PASTRANA and RUFINA ABAD, respondents.
G.R. No. 196045. February 21, 2018.

FACTS:

On 26 March 2001, a Search Warrant (No. 01-118) was issued by the RTC, Makati City, Branch
63 to investigate the office premises of Amador Pastrana and Rufina Abad at 88 Corporate C
enter, Makati City. Allegations were made by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Spec

17 | P a g e
ial Investigator Albert Froilan Gaerlan that the respondents were involved in a scheme to de
fraud foreign investors by pretending to sell shares of a foreign-based company, a scheme a
mounting to estafa under the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and a violation of the Securities Reg
ulation Code (R.A. No. 8799). Despite the detailed items listed for seizure, the RTC later nulli
fied the warrant, stating it was overly broad and covered more than one specific offense, th
ereby violating procedural rules and constitutional rights against unreasonable searches an
d seizures.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Search Warrant No. 01-118 was validly issued in accordance with the constit
utional and procedural requirements concerning the specificity of the offense and particula
rity of the items to be seized.

HELD:

NO. The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the lower courts, holding that Search War
rant No. 01-118 was invalid. The Court found that the warrant failed to specify a single speci
fic offense as required by law, citing violations of both the Securities Regulation Code (R.A.
No. 8799) and estafa under the Revised Penal Code, which are distinct offenses with differen
t elements. Additionally, the search warrant lacked particularity in describing the items to b
e seized, which rendered it a general warrant and gave the executing officers undue discreti
on, violating the constitutional requirement of reasonable particularity. As such, the search
warrant was quashed, and all seized items were ordered returned, emphasizing that any evi
dence obtained through the invalid warrant was inadmissible in any proceeding.

2.1 PROBABLE CAUSE

A. JOSE BURGOS, ET AL., petitioners, vs. THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ET AL., respondents.
G.R. No. L-64261 December 26, 1984.

FACTS:

Two search warrants were issued against the petitioners for the search and seizure of the
"Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers. The said search and seizure included the
office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles, and other articles
used in the printing, publication, and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numer
ous papers, documents, books, and other written literature alleged to be in the possession

18 | P a g e
and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper. Th
e petitioners further request that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunctio
n be issued for the return of the seized articles and that respondents be enjoined from using
the articles thus seized as evidence against the petitioner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the search warrants were supported by probable cause.

HELD:

NO. Equally insufficient as basis for the determination of probable cause is the statement c
ontained in the joint affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, "that the eviden
ce gathered and collated by our unit clearly shows that the premises above-mentioned and
the articles and things above-described were used and are continuously being used for sub
versive activities in conspiracy with, and to promote the objective of, illegal organizations s
uch as the Light-a-Fire Movement, Movement for Free Philippines, and April 6 Movement."

In mandating that "no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by
the judge, ... after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnes
ses he may produce; the Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge by the com
plainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be ju
stified. In Alvarez v. Court of First Instance, this Court ruled that "the oath required must refe
r to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, b
ecause the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual ma
king the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable caus
e." As couched, the quoted averment in said joint affidavit filed before respondent judge ha
rdly meets the test of sufficiency established by this Court in Alvarez case.

B. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ESTELA TUAN y BALUDDA, accused-appellant.

G.R. No. 176066. August 11, 2010

FACTS:

Accused-appellant, Estela Tuan was charged with illegal possession of marijuana and a fire
arm. On January 24, 2000, two male informants reported at the office of the Regional CIDG
(Criminal Investigation and Detention Group) in Baguio City that the accused-appellant had
been selling marijuana. To verify the report of Tudlong and Lad-ing, he gave Tudlong and L
ad-ing P300.00 to buy marijuana and then accompanied the two informants to the accuse

19 | P a g e
d-appellant’s house. The obtained marijuana was sent to the laboratory for examination
which came out with a positive result. SPO2 Fernandez applied for a Search Warrant before
Judge Iluminada Cabato-Cortes. The judge personally examined the information filed and l
ater she issued the search warrant. Upon receipt of the Search Warrant, SPO2 Fernandez an
d the other police officers executed the search warrant which they found the said illegal dru
gs and firearm. They found nine (9) bricks of marijuana and a firearm.

In defense, the accused-appellant declared that she worked as a vendor in Hangar Market.
She explained that the room where the green paper bag of marijuana was found was previo
usly rented by boarders. The boarders padlocked the room because they still had things ins
ide and they had paid their rent up to the end of January. Also, Tuan disputed when the poli
ce officer informed her about the illegal firearm in her room. Beniasan supported the testim
ony of his wife, accused-appellant. One of the witnesses, Magno testified that he resided on
the first floor of Tuan’s residence. He was present when the search was conducted but de
nied that the Search Warrant was shown to him The RTC found Estela Tuan guilty on both c
harges. The appellate court affirmed the conviction of accused-appellant for illegal possess
ion of marijuana. However, modified the appealed RTC judgment by acquitting accused-ap
pellant of the charge of illegal possession of a firearm.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a probable cause for the judge to issue the search warrant.

HELD:

YES. The validity of the issuance of a search warrant rests upon the following factors: (1) it
must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the jud
ge himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probabl
e cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witn
esses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the p
lace to be searched and persons or things to be seized.

In People v. Aruta, the Court defined probable cause as follows:

Although probable cause eludes exact and concrete definition, it generally refers to the exis
tence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the item(s), article(s) or object
(s) sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in t
he place to be searched.

20 | P a g e
Judge Cortes found probable cause for the issuance of the Search Warrant for accused-app
ellant’s residence after said judge’s personal examination of SPO2 Fernandez, the applic
ant; and Lad-ing and Tudlong, the informants. SPO2 Fernandez based his Application for Se
arch Warrant not only on the information relayed to him by Lad-ing and Tudlong. He also ar
ranged for a test buy and conducted surveillance of accused-appellant.

2.2 PERSONAL DETERMINATION BY THE JUDGE

A. HONESTO OGAYON y DIAZ, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent

G.R. No. 188794. September 2, 2015

FACTS:

Police Chief Inspector Elmer Ferrera, together with the other members of the police, procee
ded to Ogayon's house to enforce Search Warrant for the seizure of shabu and drug paraph
ernalia allegedly kept and concealed in the premises of Ogayon's house. Led by SPO4 Carit
os, some members of the police team went to the comfort room located about five meters
away from Ogayon's house. When they searched the area, they found two (2) small, heat-se
aled transparent plastic sachets that the police team suspected to contain shabu. The searc
h of the comfort room also uncovered four (4) disposable lighters, one (1) knife measuring s
ix inches long, used aluminum foil, one (1) roll of aluminum foil, and a "Dorco" blade.

The RTC rendered a joint judgment convicting Ogayon of the two criminal charges against h
im in violation for his unlawful possession of prohibited drugs and drug paraphernalia. Oga
yon appealed to the CA questioning the validity of the search. He argued that the search wa
rrant was defective for lack of transcript showing that the issuing judge conducted an exam
ination of the applicant for search warrant and his witnesses. The CA affirmed RTC’s decisi
on and upheld the search warrant's validity due to Ogayon's failure to make a timely object
ion against the warrant during the trial. It concluded that Ogayon is deemed to have waived
the right to question the legality of the search warrant.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the search warrant is valid despite the lack of transcript showing that the iss
uing judge conducted an examination of the applicant and other witnesses

21 | P a g e
HELD:

NO. Under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, the existence of probable cause for the is
suance of a warrant is central to the right, and its existence largely depends on the finding o
f the judge conducting the examination. To substantiate a finding of probable cause, the Rul
es of Court specifically require that “T he judge must, before issuing the warrant, personall
y examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the c
omplainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and atta
ch to the record their sworn statements, together with the affidavits submitted. “

Personal examination by the judge of the applicant and his witnesses is indispensable, and
the examination should be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary or a rehash of the
affidavits. Ideally, compliance with the examination requirement is shown by the depositio
ns and the transcript. There must be, in the records, particular facts and circumstances that
were considered by the judge as sufficient to make an independent evaluation of the existe
nce of probable cause to justify the issuance of the search warrant. Apart from the stateme
nt in the search warrant itself, nothing in the records of this case indicating that the issuing
judge personally and thoroughly examined the applicant and his witnesses.

A search warrant must conform strictly to the constitutional requirements for its issua
nce; otherwise, it is void. Based on the lack of substantial evidence that the search warrant
was issued after the requisite examination of the complainant and his witnesses was made,
the Court declares Search Warrant a nullity.

B. MAYOR BAI UNGGIE D. ABDULA, et al. PETITIONERS, VS. HON. JAPAL M. GUIANI, RES
PONDENT.
G.R. No. 118821. February 18, 2000.

FACTS:

This case involves the murder of a former COMELEC Registrar whereby a case was filed agai
nst the petitioners and six other persons. The Provincial Prosecutor dismissed the case but r
ecommended the filing of case against one of the six persons. After reinvestigation, an infor
mation for murder was filed against the petitioners and three other respondents in which a
warrant of arrest was issued the following day by respondent Judge Guiani.

22 | P a g e
Petitioners contend that the warrant of arrest should be declared null and void as Judge Gui
ani failed to personally determine probable cause. They claim that the judge relied solely o
n the certification of the investigating prosecutor as to the existence of the probable cause.
The respondent judge, on the other hand, is firm on his stand that there was no reason for h
im to doubt the validity of the certification made by the Assistant Prosecutor that a prelimin
ary investigation was conducted and that probable cause was found to exist as against thos
e charged in the Information filed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the search warrant should be declared null and void on the basis that the ju
dge did not personally determine the probable cause of the information filed

HELD:

YES. What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the is
suing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable caus. The judge is not required to
personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. The Court furthered, following esta
blished doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the suppor
ting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on t
he basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable
cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidav
its of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.

Whether there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense char
ged and should be held for trial is what the prosecutor passes upon. The judge, on the other
hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused, i.e., wh
ether there is a necessity for placing him under immediate custody in order not to frustrate t
he ends of justice. Since their objectives are different, the judge cannot rely solely on the re
port of the prosecutor in finding probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
Hence, he must have supporting evidence, other than the prosecutor's bare report, upon w
hich to legally sustain his own findings on the existence (or nonexistence) of probable cause
to issue an arrest order.

23 | P a g e
In the case at bench, respondent admits that he had no reason to doubt the validity of the c
ertification made by the investigating prosecutor has abdicated his duty under the Constitu
tion to determine on his own the issue of probable cause before issuing a warrant of arrest.
Consequently, the warrant of arrest should be declared null and void.

2.3 ONE SPECIFIC OFFENSE

A. JAYLORD DIMAL and ALLAN CASTILLO, petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
G.R. No. 216922. April 18, 2018.

FACTS:

A search warrant was issued in connection with the kidnapping and multiple murders of thr
ee individuals. The search warrant was executed and several items were seized from Dima
l’s place. Petitioners seek to quash the search warrant based upon the following grounds:
1.) it was issued in connection with, not just one single offense, but two crimes, i.e., kidnapp
ing and multiple murder; 2.) there’s no basis for a finding of probable cause; 3.) t the searc
h warrant was invalidly implemented in the absence of two witnesses; and 4.) some of the it
ems seized which are not covered by the search warrant.

On the contention that the search warrant was invalid as it was issued not just on one single
offense but two crimes, the RTC ruled that the nature of the case and the circumstances at t
he time the search warrant was applied for, justify the issuance of such warrant as the two o
ffenses are allied or closely related to each other because it was reported to the applicant th
at the victims were kidnapped for ransom and murdered. The CA also ruled that the crimes
of kidnapping and murder are interrelated and points to the commission of a single comple
x crime known as kidnapping with murder. They cannot be treated as separate crimes.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the search warrant issued for two unrelated offenses is in violation of the rul
e that such warrant must be issued in relation to one offense

HELD:

24 | P a g e
NO. There is no merit to petitioners' contention that the search warrant was applied for in c
onnection with two unrelated offenses, i.e., kidnapping and murder, in violation of Section
4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which requires that such warrant must be issued in relation
to one offense.

Suffice it to state that where a person kidnapped is killed or dies as a consequence of

the detention, there is only one special complex crime for which the last paragraph of Articl
e 267 of the Revised Penal Code provides the maximum penalty that shall be imposed, i.e.,
death. In People v. Larrañaga, the Court explained that this provision gives rise to a special c
omplex crime: Where the person kidnapped is killed in the course of the detention, regardl
ess of whether the killing was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the kidnapp
ing and murder or homicide can no longer be complexed under Art. 48, nor be treated as se
parate crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime under the last paragraph of
Art. 267, as amended by R.A. No. 7659.

There is no dispute that Search Warrant was applied for and issued in connection with the c
rime of kidnapping with murder. Asked by the judge during the hearing as to what particula
r offense was committed, search warrant applicant testified that Dimal "allegedly committe
d the crime of kidnapping and multiple murder of Lucio and Rosemarie Pua and one Gemm
a Eugenio on September 6, 2010." It is not amiss to add that a search warrant that covers se
veral counts of a certain specific offense does not violate the one-specific-offense rule.

B. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. AMADOR PASTRANA and RUFINA ABAD,
respondents.
G.R. No. 196045. February 21, 2018.

FACTS:

A search warrant was issued for the purpose of conducting a search of the office premises of
the respondents allegedly engaged in a scheme to defraud foreign investors. Respondent A
bad moved to quash such warrant as it was issued in connection with two (2) offenses, one f
or violation of the SRC and the other for estafa under the RPC, which circumstance contrave
ned the basic tenet of the rules of criminal procedure that search warrants are to be issued
only upon a finding of probable cause in connection with one specific offense.

25 | P a g e
Petitioner argues that violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC and estafa are so intertwined that
the punishable acts defined in one of them can be considered as including or are necessaril
y included in the other thus, the issuance of a single search warrant did not violate the "one
specific offense rule."2. Respondents counter that the lower court was correct in ruling that t
he subject warrant was issued in connection with more than one specific offense; that estaf
a and violation of the SRC could not be considered as one crime because the former is punis
hed under the RPC while the latter is punished under a special law; that there are many viol
ations cited in the SRC that there can be no offense which is simply called "violation of R.A.
No. 8799;" and that, similarly, there are three classes of estafa which could be committed th
rough at least 10 modes, each one of them having elements distinct from those of the other
modes.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the search warrant issued is null and void as it violates the rule that it must
be issued in connection with one specific offense only

HELD:

YES. In the landmark case of Stonehill v. Diokno (Stonehill), the Court stressed two points w
hich must be considered in the issuance of a search warrant, namely: (1) that no warrant sh
all issue but upon probable cause, to be determined personally by the judge; and (2) that th
e warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. Moreover, in Stonehill, on accou
nt of the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the search warrants
involved in that case, the Court deemed it fit to amend the former Rules of Court by providi
ng that "a search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with on
e specific offense."

The one-specific-offense requirement reinforces the constitutional requirement that a searc

h warrant should issue only on the basis of probable cause. Since the primary objective of a
pplying for a search warrant is to obtain evidence to be used in a subsequent prosecution fo
r an offense for which the search warrant was applied, a judge issuing a particular warrant
must satisfy himself that the evidence presented by the applicant establishes the facts and
circumstances relating to this specific offense for which the warrant is sought and issued.

26 | P a g e
In this case, Search Warrant was issued for "violation of R.A. No. 8799 (The Securities Regula
tion Code) and for estafa (Art. 315, RPC)." First, violation of the SRC is not an offense in itself
for there are several punishable acts under the said law. Even the charge of "estafa under Ar
ticle 315 of the RPC" is vague for there are three ways of committing the said crime. For thes
e reasons alone, it can be easily discerned that Search Warrant suffers a fatal defect.

C. HARRY S. STONEHILL, ET AL., petitioners, vs. HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, ET AL.,

respondents.
G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967.

FACTS:

A total of 42 search warrants were issued against the petitioners directed to any peace office
r, to search the petitioners’ premises of their offices, warehouses, and/or residences, and t
o seize and take possession of the following personal property. It was alleged that the petiti
oners violated the Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code), an
d the Revised Penal Code. Petitioners argued that the search warrants issued against them
were null and void as those were contravened with the constitutional requirement of proba
ble cause and particularity. The respondent-prosecutors alleged that the contested search
warrants are valid and have been issued in accordance with law. The Court issued the writ o
f preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition, but later, the writ was partially lifted or di
ssolved.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the search warrants issued are invalid as it contravene the requirement of t
he “specific offense” rule

HELD:

YES. Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely:
(1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in th
e manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the
things to be seized.

None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the
same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein na
med had committed a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal R
evenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleg

27 | P a g e
ed in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were
abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to hav
e found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of com
petent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or com
mitted specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fac
t, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein
petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "viola
tion of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised P
enal Code," — as alleged in the aforementioned applications — without reference to any de
terminate provision of said laws.

2.4 Examination Under Oath

A. Cupcupin v. People, November 19, 2002

FACTS:

The petitioner, Pedro Cupcupin was charged with the crimes of the Dangerous Drugs Act an
d the Unlawful Possession of Firearms and Ammunition. In the information filed by the pros
ecutor, Pedro Cupcupin is engaged in selling methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and
illegally possessing firearms and ammunition without the necessary license. The NBI Agent
conducted surveillance on the vicinity of petitioner’s residence. NBI Agent Rejano applied
for the issuance of warrants after he had confirmed the confidential information.

On March 3, 1993, Judge Romeo J. Callejo issued two search warrants. Thereafter, the NBI o
fficers raided the Cupcupin’s residence wherein they found illegal firearms and ammunitio
n, a crystalline substance, and other paraphernalia. The petitioner argued that he was fram
ed up and the charges against him were purely harassment. RTC rendered its decision convi
cting the petitioner. On appeal, the judgment of conviction was affirmed, but modified as to
the penalties.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the issued warrants comply with the constitutional and statutory requireme
nts for the issuance of a valid search warrant.

HELD:

28 | P a g e
YES. In determining probable cause in the issuance of a search warrant, the oath required
must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant or his wit
nesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the indiv
idual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of proba
ble cause. Search warrants are not issued on loose, vague or doubtful basis of fact, nor on m
ere suspicion or belief.

In the case at bar, NBI Agent Timoteo Rejano who applied for the issuance of Search Warran
t Nos. 56-93 and 57-93, had personal knowledge of the circumstances on which the warrant
s were based. Admittedly, Rejano’s knowledge of petitioner’s illegal possession of firear
ms and prohibited drugs came from a confidential informant, and therefore, initially hearsa
y. Nevertheless, the surveillance and investigation he conducted on the basis of said confid
ential information enabled him to gain personal knowledge of the illegal activities of petitio
ner. Hence, his testimony was sufficient justification for the examining judge to conclude th
at there was probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant.

B. Columbia Pictures v. Judge Flores, 233 SCRA 76

FACTS:

Motion Picture Association of America, Inc. (MPAA) complained to Director Antonio Carpio o
f the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) against certain video establishments in violation
of the Decree on Protection of Intellectual Property in connection with its anti-piracy campa
ign. In the said complaint, alleging the unauthorized sale, rental, reproduction and/or dispo
sition of copyrighted film. With this, NBI and private agents conducted surveillance operatio
ns on certain video establishments, among them private respondent FGT Video Network, In
c. (FGT). An NBI agent went to FGT and had copyrighted films reproduced or retaped. Conse
quently, the NBI agent applied for a search warrant based on the obtained pieces of evidenc
e in which Judge Alfredo Flores issued a search warrant. The NBI executed the search warra
nt and seized various copyrighted motion pictures, machines, equipment, and other items f
rom FGT.

The private respondent, FGT filed an urgent motion for the immediate release of equipment
and accessories not covered" by the search warrant. They argued that as a licensed video re
producer, FGT had the right to maintain possession of the seized reproduction equipment a
nd paraphernalia which are not contraband or illegal. The lower court granted FGT's motion
and ordered the immediate release and return of the "television sets, video cassette record

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ers, rewinders, tape head cleaners, accessories, equipment, and other machines or paraphe
rnalia, as reflected in the 'Receipt for Properties Seized'

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of ju
risdiction in ordering the immediate release and return of some of the items seized by the s
earch warrant.

HELD:

NO. In issuing a search warrant, the judge must strictly comply with the constitutional and s
tatutory requirements. He must determine the existence of probable cause by personally ex
amining the applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions (Silva vs. Presidi
ng Judge, RTC of Negros Oriental, Br. XXXIII (203 SCRA 140 [1991]). The search warrant must
contain a specific description of the place to be searched and the articles sought to be seize
d must be described with particularity (Pendon vs. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 429 [1990]).
Withal, measured by the foregoing constitutional and legal provisions as well as the existing
jurisprudence on the matter, we find that Search Warrant No. 45 fails to satisfy the test of leg
ality. More so because the Court has previously decided a case dealing with virtually the sa
me search warrant.

The language used in paragraph (c) of Search Warrant No. 45 is thus too all-embracing as to
include all the paraphernalia of FGT in the operation of its business. As the search warrant is
in the nature of a general one, it is constitutionally objectionable (Corro vs. Lising, 137 SCRA
541 [1985]). In consequence, respondent court was merely correcting its own erroneous con
clusions in issuing Search Warrant No. 45 when it ordered the return of the seized television
sets and other paraphernalia specified in the motion filed by FGT.

2.5 Particularity of Description

A. Laud v. People,
G.R. No. 199032, November 19, 2014

FACTS:

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On July 10, 2009, Police Senior Superintendent Roberto Fajardo applied with the RTC for a
warrant to search three (3) caves located inside the Laud Compound in Davao City where th
e alleged remains of the victims were summarily executed by the so-called “Davao Death S
quad.” To support the application, the NBI agent presented Ernesto Avasola who testified t
hat he personally witnessed the killing of six (6) persons in December 2005. Judge Peralta is
sued a search warrant which was later executed by the the PNP-Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group. The search of the Laud Compound caves yielded positive results for the pr
esence of human remains. The petitioner, retired SPO4 Bienvenido Laud filed an urgent mot
ion to quash and suppress illegally seized evidence as Judge Peralta had no authority to act
on the application for a search warrant, and that the warrant lacked probable cause and vio
lated various procedural rules.

Manila-RTC granted the motion of Laud. With this, the respondent, People of the Philippine
s filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied. The case was elevated to CA and late
r granted.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the constitutional requirements that there be a particular description of the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized were violated.

HELD:

NO. The Court similarly concludes that there was compliance with the constitutional requir
ement that there be a particular description of “the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized.”

“[A] description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, wi
th reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other
places in the community. Any designation or description known to the locality that points o
ut the place to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry leads the officers unerringly to it, s
atisfies the constitutional requirement.”

Search Warrant No. 09-14407 evidently complies with the foregoing standard since it particu
larly describes the place to be searched, namely, the three (3) caves located inside the Laud
Compound in Purok 3, Barangay Ma-a, Davao City: You are hereby commanded to make an i

31 | P a g e
mmediate search at any time [of] the day of the premises above describe[d] particularly the
three (3) caves (as sketched) inside the said Laud Compound, Purok 3, Brgy. Ma-a, Davao Cit
y and forthwith seize and take possession of the remains of six (6) victims who were killed a
nd buried in the just said premises. For further guidance in its enforcement, the search warr
ant even made explicit reference to the sketch contained in the application. These, in the Co
urt’s view, are sufficient enough for the officers to, with reasonable effort, ascertain and id
entify the place to be searched, which they in fact did.

B. People v. Tuan.
G.R. No. 176066, August 11, 2010 .

FACTS:

Accused-appellant, Estela Tuan was charged with illegal possession of marijuana and a firea
rm. On January 24, 2000, two male informants reported at the office of the Regional CIDG (C
riminal Investigation and Detention Group) in Baguio City that the accused-appellant had b
een selling marijuana. To verify the report of Tudlong and Lad-ing, he gave Tudlong and La
d-ing P300.00 to buy marijuana and then accompanied the two informants to the accused-a
ppellant’s house. The obtained marijuana was sent to the laboratory for examination whic
h came out with a positive result. SPO2 Fernandez applied for a Search Warrant before Judg
e Iluminada Cabato-Cortes. The judge personally examined the information filed and later s
he issued the search warrant. Upon receipt of the Search Warrant, SPO2 Fernandez and the
other police officers executed the search warrant which they found the said illegal drugs an
d firearm. They found nine (9) bricks of marijuana and a firearm.

In defense, the accused-appellant declared that she worked as a vendor in Hangar Market.
She explained that the room where the green paper bag of marijuana was found was previo
usly rented by boarders. The boarders padlocked the room because they still had things insi
de and they had paid their rent up to the end of January. Also, Tuan disputed when the poli
ce officer informed her about the illegal firearm in her room. Beniasan supported the testim
ony of his wife, accused-appellant. One of the witnesses, Magno testified that he resided on
the first floor of Tuan’s residence. He was present when the search was conducted but den
ied that the Search Warrant was shown to him

The RTC found Estela Tuan guilty on both charges. The appellate court affirmed the convicti
on of accused-appellant for illegal possession of marijuana. However, modified the appeale

32 | P a g e
d RTC judgment by acquitting accused-appellant of the charge of illegal possession of a fire
arm.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Search Warrant issued was invalid in failing to particularly describe the p
lace to be searched.

HELD:

NO. Equally without merit is accused-appellant’s assertion that the Search Warrant did no
t describe with particularity the place to be searched. A description of the place to be search
ed is sufficient if the officer serving the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and id
entify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. A designati
on or description that points out the place to be searched to the exclusion of all others, and
on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement
of definiteness. In the case at bar, the address and description of the place to be searched in
the Search Warrant was specific enough. There was only one house located at the stated ad
dress, which was accused-appellant’s residence, consisting of a structure with two floors a
nd composed of several rooms.

In view of the foregoing, the Court upholds the validity of the Search Warrant for accused-a
ppellant’s house issued by MTCC Judge Cortes, and any items seized as a result of the sear
ch conducted by virtue thereof, may be presented as evidence against the accused-appellan
t.

C. Castillo v. People,
G.R. No. 185128, January 30, 2012

FACTS:

According to confidential information that the petitioner, Ruben del Castillo was engaged in
selling shabu, the police officers, led by SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon, after conducting surve
illance and testbuy operation at the house of petitioner, secured a search warrant from the
RTC. They headed to the house of the petitioner to execute the search warrant. However, up
on arrival, someone shouted "raid," prompting them to disembark from the jeep they were

33 | P a g e
riding and went directly to del Castillo's house. But before they could search the area, SPO3
Masnayon claimed that he saw petitioner run towards a small structure, a nipa hut. Masnay
on chased him but to no avail as they were not familiar with the place. Subsequently, one of
the barangay tanods was able to confiscate four plastic packs containing white crystalline s
ubstance from the nipa hut. The confiscated items were sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory f
or examination, which confirmed the presence of shabu.

In defense, the petitioner, del Castillo was installing the electrical wirings and airconditionin
g units by the time the police officers arrived at their house. He only learned from his wife th
at police operatives searched his house and found nothing. According to him, the small stru
cture, 20 meters away from his house where they found the confiscated items, was owned b
y his older brother and was used as a storage place by his father.

RTC found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable of the charge against him in the Informat
ion. Del Castillo appealed his case with the CA, but the latter affirmed the decision of the RT
C.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Search Warrant issued was invalid as the search warrant did not include
the same nipa hut as one of the places to be searched.

HELD:

NO. A designation or description that points out the place to be searched to the exclusion of
all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the constitutiona
l requirement of definiteness. In the present case, Search Warrant No. 570-9-1197-2420 spec
ifically designates or describes the residence of the petitioner as the place to be searched. I
ncidentally, the items were seized by a barangay tanod in a nipa hut, 20 meters away from t
he residence of the petitioner. The confiscated items, having been found in a place other th
an the one described in the search warrant, can be considered as fruits of an invalid warrant
less search, the presentation of which as an evidence is a violation of petitioner’s constitut
ional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure.

D. JAYLORD DIMAL AND ALLAN CASTILLO, PETITIONERS, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPIN
ES, RESPONDENT.
(G.R. No. 216922, April 18, 2018)

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FACTS:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reve
rse and set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision. On September 6, 2010, Lucio Pua, Rose
marie Pua, and Gemma Eugenio visited Jaylord A. Dimal in Echague, Isabela, for palay nego
tiations. Later, Lucio's nephew, Edison Pua, couldn't find them, reported them missing, and
sought police assistance. Edison, accompanied by two policemen, allegedly observed Dima
l's premises but found no evidence of their whereabouts. Subsequently, Allan Castillo was a
llegedly tortured to implicate Dimal in the killings. Eduardo Sapipi confessed to Dimal's inv
olvement. Dimal, Castillo, and others were arrested and charged. On October 8, 2010, a sear
ch warrant was issued for Dimal's compound, listing specific items to be seized. The search
yielded incriminating evidence. Petitioners moved to quash the warrant, arguing its invalidi
ty due to dual offenses, lack of probable cause, and procedural flaws in execution. Despite t
heir objections, the court upheld the warrant's validity, considering the interrelated nature
of the crimes. Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the lower cour
t's decision. Their subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied. Thus, they filed a pet
ition for review on certiorari.

ISSUES:

Petitioners argue that the CA gravely erred in failing to pass upon petitioners' allegations (1)
that the search warrant is void and its quashal imperative; and (2) that the items seized on t
he basis of the void search warrant are inadmissible in evidence.

HELD:

The petition is partly meritorious. The search warrant was validly issued as it complied with
the constitutional and procedural requirements. However, most of the seized items are inad
missible in evidence as they were not particularly described in the search warrant and were
not seized under the "plain view doctrine."

The search warrant was validly issued as it was based on probable cause and the judge con
ducted a searching and probing examination of the applicant and the witnesses. The search
warrant particularly described the place to be searched and the items to be seized. However
only two items were particularly described in the search warrant, and therefore, only those
items are admissible in evidence. The other items seized were either not described in the w
arrant or were seized in violation of the "plain view doctrine."

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E. WORLDWIDE WEB CORPORATION and CHERRYLL L. YU, petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF T
HE PHILIPPINES and PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, respondents.
(G.R. No. 161266. January 13, 2014.)

FACTS:

Petitioners filed a Rule 45 petition to overturn the Court of Appeals' decision and resolution
reversing the quashal of search warrants issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Police Chi
ef Inspector Napoleon Villegas applied for warrants to search the offices of Worldwide Web
Corporation (WWC) and Planet Internet Corporation (Planet Internet), alleging illegal toll by
pass operations damaging the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT). Witne
sses testified about the bypass operations and the use of PLDT lines for international calls w
ithout going through PLDT's facilities. The RTC granted the search warrants, leading to the s
eizure of various items from the petitioners' offices. Petitioners moved to quash the warrant
s, arguing lack of probable cause and the warrants' nature as general warrants. The RTC gra
nted their motions, deeming the warrants as general warrants. PLDT's motion for reconside
ration was denied due to procedural flaws.

ISSUES:

Whether the CA seriously erred in holding that the assailed search warrants were not genera
l warrants.

HELD:

The search warrants were not general warrants because the items described in the warrants
bore a direct relation to the offense for which the warrants were sought. A search warrant d
oes not need to describe the items to be seized in precise and minute detail, as long as the d
escription enables the police officers to readily identify the properties to be seized and leav
es them with no discretion regarding the articles to be seized.

The Court emphasized that while search warrants must ideally specify the place and items t
o be seized, absolute precision isn't required. As long as the warrant enables officers to iden
tify the items easily and leaves no room for discretion in what to seize, it suffices. The difficu
lty in pinpointing every item precisely shouldn't hinder law enforcement. The warrants in q
uestion adequately linked the items to be seized with the crime of theft of telephone service

36 | P a g e
s. Before applying for the warrants, Rivera's inspection confirmed that the telecommunicati
ons equipment on the premises directly supported illegal toll bypass operations.

F. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. AMADOR PASTRANA AND RUFINA ABAD,
respondents.
G.R. No. 196045. February 21, 2018.

FACTS:

A search warrant was issued for the purpose of conducting a search of the office premises of
the respondents allegedly engaged in a scheme to defraud foreign investors. Respondent A
bad moved to quash such warrant as it was issued in connection with two (2) offenses, one f
or violation of the SRC and the other for estafa under the RPC, which circumstance contrave
ned the basic tenet of the rules of criminal procedure that search warrants are to be issued
only upon a finding of probable cause in connection with one specific offense.

Petitioner argues that violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC and estafa are so intertwined that
the punishable acts defined in one of them can be considered as including or are necessaril
y included in the other thus, the issuance of a single search warrant did not violate the "one
specific offense rule."2. Respondents counter that the lower court was correct in ruling that t
he subject warrant was issued in connection with more than one specific offense; that estaf
a and violation of the SRC could not be considered as one crime because the former is punis
hed under the RPC while the latter is punished under a special law; that there are many viol
ations cited in the SRC that there can be no offense which is simply called "violation of R.A.
No. 8799;" and that, similarly, there are three classes of estafa which could be committed th
rough at least 10 modes, each one of them having elements distinct from those of the other
modes.

ISSUE:

Whether or not that said warrant was issued in connection with the crime of violation of sec
tion 28.1 of R.A. No. 8799 is valid.

HELD:

The search warrant was null and void. The court emphasized the importance of protecting t
he right against unreasonable searches and seizures, highlighting that a search warrant mu
st be issued for one specific offense and must particularly describe the things to be seized. I

37 | P a g e
n this case, the warrant was issued for multiple offenses and lacked specificity in describing
the items, rendering it null and void. Its broad scope granted implementing officers unlimit
ed discretion, violating the requirement for specificity. As a result, the rulings of the lower c
ourts were upheld, and the court ordered the return of all seized items.

3. CONDUCT OF SEARCH

A. People v. Benny Co, September 12, 2003

FACTS:

A raiding team armed with a warrant entered the home of appellant Benny Go in search of e
vidence for the violation of Republic Act 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act), otherwise known as th
e Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 . Upon their entry, they met Jack Go, son of t
he Go and restrained him. As the former was the only one present at the time they then call
ed on two baranggay kagawads to act as witnesses on the said search. They then seized pro
perties and objects even those which were not included in the warrant. When they were alm
ost finished with their search Go arrived and immediately together with the two witnesses
was made to sign the inventory receipt.

Based on the evidence taken from the search Go was charged for violation of R.A. 6425. Upo
n hearing, testimonies as well as evidences were presented by the prosecution against Go.
However, the two witnesses questioned the validity of some of the evidence presented such
as the inventory receipt as well as the illegal drugs said to have been seized from the search.

The Regional Trial Court of Manila convicted Go for violation of the offense cahrged. On app
eal, Go assails the decision of the RTC as well the validity of the search performed by the rai
ding team and the admissibility of the evidence taken therefrom. Go also asks for the return
of the properties seized that were not included in the search warrant.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the properties not included in the search warrant may be returned to Go.

HELD:

It bears reiterating that the purpose of the constitutional requirement that the articles to be
seized be particularly described in the warrant is to limit the things to be seized to those, an
d only those, particularly described in the search warrant - to leave the officers of the law wi

38 | P a g e
th no discretion regarding what articles they should seize. At the same time, the raiding tea
m characterized the seizure of the assorted documents, passports, bankbooks, checks, chec
k writer, typewriter, dry seals and stamp pads as ―seizure of evidence in plain view. Under t
he plain view doctrine, objects falling in the ―plain view‖ of an officer who has a right to b
e in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.

To be sure, the policemen also filed a complaint against Go for alleged possession of instru
ments or implements intended for the commission of falsification under paragraph 2 of Arti
cle 176 of the Revised Penal Code on the basis of dry seals and rubber stamps also found in
appellant‘s residence.

The counterfeit nature of the seals and stamps was in fact not established until after they ha
d been turned over to the Chinese embassy and Bureau of Immigration and Deportation for
verification. It is, therefore, incredible that SPO1 Fernandez could make such determination
from a ―plain view‖ of the items from his vantage point in the sala.

In sum, the circumstances attendant to the case at bar do not warrant the application of the
―plain view‖ doctrine to justify the seizure and retention of the questioned seized items. T
he things belonging to appellant not specifically mentioned in the warrants, like those not p
articularly described, must thus be ordered returned to him.

Be that as it may, considering that the two (2) dry seals and eight (8) of the rubber stamps h
ave been certified to be counterfeit by the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, they ma
y not be returned and are hereby declared confiscated in favor of the State to be disposed of
according to law.

Moreover, the various bankbooks and passports not belonging to appellant may not be ord
ered returned in the instant proceedings. The legality of a seizure can be contested only by t
he party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and the objection to an unlawful search
and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties.

4. VALID WARRANTLESS ARREST

A. People v. Sison, G.R. No. 238453, July 31, 2019

FACTS:

39 | P a g e
An indictment was lodged against Sison, Yanson, and Bautista in the Regional Trial Court, Br
anch 16, Kabacan, Cotabato City, accusing them of violating Section 4 of the Dangerous Dru
gs Act of 1972. Upon arraignment, all defendants entered pleas of not guilty. Subsequently,
a trial ensued.

The prosecution alleged that on May 31, 1996, at 8:30 a.m., the Municipal Police Station of
M'lang, North Cotabato, received a radio report regarding a silver gray Isuzu pickup—with pl
ate number 619—carrying three individuals, suspected of transporting marijuana from Pikit
Acting on this information, the Chief of Police directed the alert team to establish a checkp
oint at the riverside police outpost along the road from Matalam to M'lang.

Around 9:30 a.m., the vehicle in question arrived at the checkpoint and was halted by the w
aiting police officers. Upon inquiry, the driver disembarked, and, prompted by an officer, op
ened the hood of the pickup, revealing two sacks of marijuana beside the engine.

In a Joint Judgment issued on March 11, 2013, the Regional Trial Court found Yanson, Sison,
and Bautista guilty of the offense. The court upheld the validity of the search conducted on
the vehicle, deeming it a lawful warrantless search, as the defendants purportedly consente
d.

Only Yanson pursued an appeal before the Court of Appeals. In its January 23, 2018 Decisio
n, the Court of Appeals upheld the Regional Trial Court's ruling, affirming that there was su
fficient probable cause to conduct the search, considering the accuracy of the information p
rovided to the police officers.

ISSUE:

Whether the warrantless search conducted on the vehicle was valid.

HELD:

Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution mandates that warrants must be obtained befo
re a search can be legally conducted, based on probable cause and with specific description
of the place to be searched and items to be seized. However, exceptions to this rule exist, in
cluding warrantless searches incidental to lawful arrests, seizures of evidence in plain view,
searches of moving vehicles, consented searches, customs searches, stop and frisk, and exi
gent circumstances. Regarding searches of moving vehicles, while warrants are impractical
due to the vehicles' mobility, probable cause remains necessary. Law enforcement must ha
ve reasonable suspicion supported by strong circumstances to justify a warrantless search.

40 | P a g e
The court held that the warrantless search conducted on the vehicle was invalid because it
was based solely on a solitary tip, which is insufficient to establish probable cause. The cour
t emphasized that probable cause requires the confluence of several suspicious circumstan
ces, not just a single tip.

4.1 SEARCH INCIDENTAL TO A LAWFUL ARREST

A. FRANKLIN B. VAPOROSO AND JOELREN B. TULILIK, PETITIONERS, V. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 238659, June 03, 2019

FACTS:

The prosecution alleged that while patrolling along National Highway of Panabo City, he no
ticed two (2) men aboard a motorcycle with the back rider holding a lady bag which appear
ed to have been taken from a vehicle parked on the side of the road. They saw petitioners c
ome out and decided to approach them. Petitioners, however, attempted to flee, but were a
ble to apprehend them.

After successfully recovering the belongings from petitioners, the police officers conducted
two searches on the latter, an initial cursory body search and a "more thorough" search on
petitioners, which yielded (5) plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance and fou
r (4) plastic sachets with similar white crystalline substance. PO1 Malibago then marked the
said items in the presence of petitioners and conducted the requisite photo-taking and inve
ntory in the presence of DOJ representative and a media representative. The seized items w
ere turned over to the Provincial Crime Laboratory of Tagum City, where tested positive for t
he presence of shabu. The subject sachets were delivered to the court. During arraignment,
petitioners pleaded not guilty to the charges.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the two searches conducted by police officers may be considered as a searc
h incidental to a lawful arrest

HELD:

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NO. The subsequent and second search made on petitioners at the Panabo Police Station is
unlawful and unreasonable. Resultantly, the illegal drugs allegedly recovered therefrom con
stitutes inadmissible evidence pursuant to the exclusionary clause enshrined in the 1987 Co
nstitution. Given that said illegal drugs is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, petiti
oners must necessarily be acquitted and exonerated from criminal liability.

B. MARIO VERIDIANO y SAPI, Petitioner vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

G.R. No. 200370

FACTS:

A concerned citizen informed the police that Veridiano, was on the way to San Pablo City to
obtain illegal drugs. They immediately set up a checkpoint. The police officers at the checkp
oint personally knew Veridiano. They allowed some vehicles to pass through after checking
that he was not on board. At around 10:00 am, the police officers encountered Veridiano insi
de a passenger jeepney and flagged down the vehicle. During the search, the police officers
found a tea bag in Veridiano's possession that contained what appeared to be marijuana. V
eridiano argued that the search and seizure violated his right against unreasonable searche
s and seizures and that his arrest was illegal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the warrantless search was incidental to a lawful arrest.

HELD:

NO. Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court pertains to a hot pursuit arrest. The rule req
uires that an offense has just been committed. An arrest under Rule 113, Section 5(b) entails
a time element from the moment the crime is committed up to the point of arrest. In this ca
se, petitioner's arrest could not be justified as an inflagrante delicta arrest under Rule 113, S
ection 5(a) of the Rules of Court. He was not committing a crime at the checkpoint. Petition
er was merely a passenger who did not exhibit any unusual conduct in the presence of the l
aw enforcers that would incite suspicion. In effecting the warrantless arrest, the police offic
ers relied solely on the tip they received. Reliable information alone is insufficient to suppor
t a warrantless arrest absent any overt act from the person to be arrested indicating that a c

42 | P a g e
rime has just been committed, was being committed, or is about to be committed. The warr
antless arrest cannot likewise be justified under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure. The law enforcers had no personal knowledge of any fact or circumst
ance indicating that petitioner had just committed an offense.

C. MARLON DOMINGUEZ Y ARGANA, PETITIONER, V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESP

ONDENT.
G.R. No. 235898, March 13, 2019

FACTS:

A police officer was conducting monitoring and possible arrest of violators of Comprehensiv
e Dangerous Act (RA 9165). He saw Dominguez holding with his left hand a small transparen
t plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance suspected to be shabu. The police o
fficer grabbed the hands of Dominguez and seized the suspected shabu. He introduced him
self as a police officer, and informed him of his violation and his rights under the law. Howev
er, seeing that there was already a crowd gathering in the area, SPO1 Parchaso and PO2 Gen
ova decided to leave the scene, and brought Dominguez and the seized item to their office.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the warrantless arrest is incidental to a lawful arrest in plain view doctrine

HELD:

NO. The plain view doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforc
ement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a posi
tion from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view
is inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes ma
y be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.[67] The law enforcem
ent officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he
can particularly view the area.[68] In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadverte
ntly across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye a
nd hand, and its discovery inadvertent.

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In the case at hand, while it can be said that the presence of the police officers was legitimat
e as they were patrolling the area and that discovery of the plastic sachet was inadvertent, i
t should be emphasized that, as to the third requisite, it was clearly not apparent that such
plastic sachet is an evidence of a crime, a contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.

Despite the fact that Dominguez can no longer question the validity of his arrest, it is crystal
clear that the sachet of shabu seized from him during the warrantless search is inadmissible
in evidence against him. There being no warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest or s
eizure of evidence in plain view, the shabu purportedly seized from Dominguez is rendered i
nadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. As the confiscat
ed shabu is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, Dominguez must be acquitted and
exonerated from all criminal liability.

D. ONGCOMA HADJI HOMAR, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

G.R. No. 182534

FACTS:

The petitioner was approached aggressively by police officers when they saw him crossing
a "no jaywalking" portion of Roxas Boulevard. The police officers told him to cross at the pe
destrian area, but when he picked up something from the ground, they frisked him and fou
nd a knife. They then conducted a thorough search and found a plastic sachet containing su
spected shabu (methamphetamine). The petitioner was found to possess 0.03 grams of sha
bu. The petitioner pleaded not guilty during arraignment.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a lawful search incident to a lawful warrantless arrest

HELD:

NO. In the light of the discussion above, the respondent’s argument that there was a lawf
ul search incident to a lawful warrantless arrest for jaywalking appears to be an afterthough
t in order to justify a warrantless search conducted on the person of the petitioner. In fact, t

44 | P a g e
he illegality of the search for the shabu is further highlighted when it was not recovered im
mediately after the alleged lawful arrest, if there was any, but only after the initial search res
ulted in the recovery of the knife. Thereafter, they conducted another search on the person
of the petitioner resulting in the alleged confiscation of the shabu. Clearly, the petitioner's ri
ght to be secure in his person was callously brushed aside twice by the arresting police offic
ers.

E. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, V. MARLON CRISTOBAL Y AMBR

OSIO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
G.R. No. 234207, June 10, 2019

FACTS:

Police officers were conducting "Oplan Sita" in a checkpoint along Ortigas Extension corner
GSIS Road. Accused-appellant before reaching his destination was stopped by a police offic
er at a checkpoint. After giving his driver's license, he was asked to produce the OR/CR of th
e motorcycle. While the police officer is preparing the ticket for traffict violation, the latter ra
n away but the other police officers were quick to apprehend him. He was brought back to t
he checkpoint where he was searched for deadly weapon but the latter found nothing. How
ever, PO2 Ramos noticed that accused-appellant's pocket was full and ordered him to remo
ve that object from his pocket which accused-appellant obliged by pulling-out a small plasti
c bag therefrom. He was found in possession of seven (7) plastic sachets of shabu. PO2 Ram
os immediately arrested accused-appellant and informed him of his constitutional rights. H
e was charged with Violation of Section 11 R.A. 9165 despite his denial thereof.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the search conducted was a search incidental to a lawful arrest

HELD:

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NO. The court found that the search conducted on the accused was illegal because there wa
s no valid arrest to speak of. The accused was apprehended for traffic violations that were p
unishable only by a fine, and there was no reason to arrest him. Therefore, the search condu
cted on him was not a search incidental to a lawful arrest. The court held that the evidence
seized during the search was inadmissible, and the accused was acquitted of the crime char
ged.

4.6 Stop and Frisk Search (Terry Search)

A. Manalili v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 113447, October 9, 1997

FACTS:

At about 2:10 o'clock in the afternoon of April 11, 1988, policemen from the Anti-Narcotics U
nit of the Kalookan City Police Station were conducting a surveillance along A. Mabini street,
Kalookan City, in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery. Upon surveillance of the said place, t
hey chanced upon a tricycle driver and a passenger whom they ordered to stop and was sea
rched, they both were ordered to follow him to the police headquarters along with 2 neighb
or, after reaching the headquarters, the accused MANALILI was ordered to take off his pants
and was searched for Marijuana and the patrol man did not find anything but dirt. At 5:30 in
the afternoon in the same day, the accused was brought in the office of an inquest Fiscal, w
here he was told by the latter to not say anything. The Trial court convicted the accused of il
legal possession of Marijuana residue largely on the strength of the arresting officers testim
ony.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the The Court of Appeals erred in upholding the findings of fact of the trial c
ourt

HELD:

NO. That the admission of the Marijuana leaves found in his possession was a product of a l
egal search, being akin to a stop and frisk. In the case of Terry v. Ohio a stop-and-frisk was d
efined as the vernacular designation of the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the st
reet, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s):

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. . . (W)here a police officer observes an unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to con
clude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with
whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investig
ating this behavior he identified himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, an
d where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for
his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to
conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to dis
cover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search un
der the Fourth Amendment, and any weapon seized may properly be introduced in evidenc
e against the person from whom they were taken.

B. People v. Binad Sy Chua

G.R. Nos. 136066-67, February 4, 2003

FACTS:

Accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua was charged with violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A.
6425, as amended by R.A. 7659, and for Illegal Possession of Ammunitions and Illegal Posse
ssion of Drugs in two separate Information.

SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag received a report from their confidential informant that accuse
d-appellant was about to deliver drugs that night at the Thunder Inn Hotel in Balibago, Ang
eles City. So, the PNP Chief formed a team of operatives. The group positioned themselves
across McArthur Highway near Bali Hai Restaurant, fronting the hotel. The other group acte
d as their back up. Afterwards, their informer pointed to a car driven by accused-appellant
which just arrived and parked near the entrance of the hotel. After accused-appellant alight
ed from the car carrying a sealed Zest-O juice box, SPO2 Nulud and P02 Nunag hurriedly acc
osted him and introduced themselves as police officers. As accused-appellant pulled out hi
s wallet, a small transparent plastic bag with a crystalline substance protruded from his rig
ht back pocket. Forthwith, SPO2

Nulud subjected him to a body search which yielded twenty (20) pieces of live .22 caliber fir
earm bullets from his left back pocket. When SPO2 Nunag peeked into the contents of the Z
est-O box, he saw that it contained a crystalline substance. SPO2 Nulud instantly confiscate
d the small transparent plastic bag, the Zest-O juice box, the twenty (20) pieces of .22 calibe
r firearm bullets and the car used by accused-appellant. SPO2 Nulud and the other police o
peratives who arrived at the scene brought the confiscated items to the office of Col. Guttie

47 | P a g e
rez at the PNP Headquarters in Camp Pepito, Angeles City. Accused-appellant vehemently d
enied the accusation against him and narrated a different version of the incident.

Accused-appellant alleged that he was driving the car of his wife to follow her and his son t
o Manila. He felt sleepy, so he decided to take the old route along McArthur Highway. He sto
pped in front of a small store near Thunder Inn Hotel to buy cigarettes and candies. While a
t the store, he noticed a man approaches and examines the inside of his car. When he called
the attention of the onlooker, the man immediately pulled out a .45 caliber gun and made h
im face his car with raised hands. The man later on identified himself as a policeman.

During the course of the arrest, the policeman took out his wallet and instructed him to ope
n his car. He refused, so the policeman took his car keys and proceeded to search his car. At
this time, the police officer's companions arrived at the scene in two cars. PO2 Nulud, who j
ust arrived at the scene, pulled him away from his car in a nearby bank, while the others sea
rched his car. Thereafter, he was brought to a police station and was held inside a bathroo
m for about fifteen minutes until Col. Guttierez arrived, who ordered his men to call the me
dia. In the presence of reporters, Col. Guttierez opened the box and accused-appellant was
made to hold the box while pictures were being taken.

The lower court acquitted Sy Chua for the Illegal Possession of Ammunitions, yet convicted
him for Illegal Possession of 1,955.815 grams of shabu. Hence, this appeal to the Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the arrest of accused-appellant was lawful.

HELD:

No. The arrest was unlawful. The rule is a peace officer, or even a private person, may effect
an arrest without a warrant: But to constitute a valid in flagrante arrest. It is necessary that
two requisites concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating th
at he had just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and
(2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. The Cou
rt find the two aforementioned elements lacking in the case at bar. Accused-appellant did n
ot act in a suspicious manner. For all intents and purposes, there was no overt manifestatio
n that accused-appellant has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to co
mmit a crime. "Reliable information" alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious e
nterprise in the presence and within theview of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to con
stitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest.

48 | P a g e
Wherefore, accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua is hereby Acquitted.

C. Sanchez v. People,
G.R. No. 204589, November 19, 2014

FACTS:

Rizaldy Sanchez was charged with violating Sec. 11 of Article Il of RA 9165 for the possessio
n of shabu. SPO1 Elmer Amposta and other CSUs discovered Rizaldy Sanchez's tricycle carr
ying a match box containing a white crystalline substance. The group seized Sanchez and t
he driver, who were taken to the police station. The forensic chemist from NBI found the su
bstance to be shabu. Sanchez pleaded not guilty. Sanchez denied the prosecution's allegati
ons and claimed he and Darwin Reyes were stopped by armed men who frisked him and Da
rwin. They had just bought drugs from Alapan. Sanchez admitted it was his first time seeing
police officers. The RTC ruled Sanchez was in possession of shabu, and the CA upheld the c
onviction. The police officers had reasonable grounds to believe Sanchez was in possession
of the dangerous drug. The confiscation of narcotics was deemed valid and probable cause
for the arrest.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Sanchez was caught in flagrante delicto hence a search warrant was no l
onger necessary

HELD:

NO. It is observed that the Court of Appeals confused the search incidental to a lawful arres
t with stop-and-frisk principle.

A stop-and-frisk search is entirely different from and should not be confused with the searc
h incidental to a lawful arrest envisioned in Sec. 13 Rule 126.

49 | P a g e
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, arrest determines the validity of the incidental sear
ch. The law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made, the proc
ess cannot be reveresed. The arresting officer may search the person of the arrestee and th
e area within which the latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize
any money or property found which was used in the commission of the crime. As held in Ter
ry v. Ohio, the Terry stop-and-frisk serach is a limited protective search of outer clothing for
weapons. Where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him to reasonably c
onclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons w
ith whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of inve
stigating this behavior he identifies himself as apoliceman and makes reasonable inquiries,
he is entitled for the protection of himself.

The two-fold interest of stop-and-frisk are: 1.)The general interest of effective crime preven
tion and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under approp
riate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of inves
tigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and 2.) The more pressing
interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police office to take steps to assur
e himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that coul
d unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.

D. People v. Cristobal, G.R. No. 234207, June 10, 2019

FACTS:

Marlon Cristobal was arrested by police for driving without a helmet and failing to provide h
is license. Despite being ticketed, he was apprehended and searched for a deadly weapon.
However, he was found with seven plastic sachets of shabu in his pocket, leading to his war
rantless arrest and illegal possession charges. Cristobal couldn't produce OR/CR due to lost
key. PO2 Ramos instructed him to empty his pockets, revealing P18,000 for wedding. Ramo
s returned, checked, and frisked him, finding nothing else.

The RTC-Pasig City found accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged holding that his se
arch was justified under the "stop and frisk" doctrine, or otherwise called the Terry search.
The CA affirmed the assailed decision. Hence, this instant appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not accused-appellant's warrantless arrest and its subsequent search was valid.

50 | P a g e
HELD:

No. The law requires a lawful arrest before a search can be made, and there was no valid arr
est in the case at bar. The doctrine of stop and frisk search, based on Terry v. Ohio, allows p
olice officers to conduct a limited search of armed individuals' clothing for protection. How
ever, the law requires advance judicial approval for searches and seizures, except in exigent
circumstances. In People vs. Cogaed, the officers' search of Cristobal's body, despite their a
dmittance of not finding any weapons, is considered invalid and unconstitutional.

5. Valid Warrantless Arrest

5.1 In flagrante delicto arrest; requisites

A. People v. Edano, G.R. No. 188133, July 7, 2014

FACTS:

The prosecution charged the appellant and Godofredo Siochi with violation of Section 11, A
rticle II of R.A. No. 9165 under two separate Informations, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Q-
02-111200 and Q-02-112104.

It was established that on the evening of August 6, 2002, members of the Metro Manila Drug
s Enforcement Group, consisting of PO3 Corbe, PO3 Nelson Javier, PO3 Dennis Padpad, and
PO3 Marcelo Alcancia, Jr., along with a female informant, went to the McDonald's parking lo
t on West Avenue to conduct an entrapment operation against a specific alias "Nato."

Around 7:00 p.m., the appellant arrived in a space wagon driven by Siochi. The informant ap
proached the appellant and spoke with him inside the vehicle. After that, the informant wav
ed at PO3 Corbe. As PO3 Corbe approached the appellant, he exited the vehicle and fled. PO
3 Corbe, PO3 Padpad, and PO3 Alcancia pursued the appellant; PO3 Corbe was able to grab
him and knock him to the ground. PO3 Corbe removed a "knot-tied" transparent plastic bag
from the appellant's right hand, while PO3 Alcancia seized a gun hidden in the appellant's
waistband. Siochi was detained by other police officers. The police then transported the ap
pellant, Siochi, and the seized items to the police station for processing.

The RTC, however, acquitted Siochi on the ground of reasonable doubt.

51 | P a g e
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision in toto. The CA found PO3 Corbe to be a credib
le witness. The CA also found the appellant’s warrantless arrest to be valid; it explained th
at the appellant’s act of running when PO3 Corbe was approaching him reinforced the latt
er’s suspicion that "something was amiss."

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellants warrantless arrest is valid.

HELD:

NO. The Supreme ruled that After due consideration appellant’s warrantless arrest is inva
lid and the seized items inadmissible

Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a peace officer or a p
rivate person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to
be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
This is known an arrest in flagrante delicto.2

"For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto to be valid, two requisite
s must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he ha
s just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such o
vert act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer."21

In the present case, there was no overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise that could be
properly attributed to the appellant to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO3 Corbe that he (ap
pellant) had just committed, was actually committing, or was attempting to commit a crim
e. In fact, PO3 Corbe testified that the appellant and the informant were just talking with ea
ch other when he approached them.

As testified to by PO3 Corbe himself, the appellant and the informant were just talking to ea
ch other; there was no exchange of money and drugs when he approached the car. Notably,
while it is true that the informant waved at PO3 Corbe, the latter admitted that this was not
the pre-arranged signal to signify that the sale of drugs had been consummated. PO3 Corbe
also admitted on cross-examination that he had no personal knowledge on whether there
was a prohibited drug and gun inside the space wagon when he approached it.

That the appellant attempted to run away when PO3 Corbe approached him is irrelevant an
d cannot by itself be construed as adequate to charge the police officer with personal know

52 | P a g e
ledge that the appellant had just engaged in, was actually engaging in or was attempting to
engage in criminal activity.

As the Court explained in People v. Villareal:

Furthermore, appellant’s act of darting away when PO3 de Leon approached him should
not be construed against him. Flight per seis not synonymous with guilt and must not alwa
ys be attributed to one’s consciousness of guilt.It is not a reliable indicator of guilt withou
t other circumstances, for even in high crime areas there are many innocent reasons for flig
ht, including fear of retribution for speaking to officers, unwillingness to appear as witnesse
s,and fear of being wrongfully apprehended as a guilty party.Thus, appellant’s attempt to
run away from PO3 de Leon is susceptible of various explanations; it could easily have mea
nt guilt just as it could likewise signify innocence.

In other words, trying to run awaywhen no crime has been overtly committed, and without
more, cannot be evidence of guilt.

Considering that the appellant’s warrantless arrest was unlawful, the search and seizure t
hat resulted from it was likewise illegal. Thus, the alleged plastic bag containing white cryst
alline substances seized from him is inadmissible in evidence, having comefrom an invalid
search and seizure.

B. People v. Racho, G.R. No. 186529, August 3, 2010

FACTS:

Appellant was charged in two separate Information, one for violation of Section 5 of R.A. 91
65, for transporting or delivering; and the second, of Section 11 of the same law for possessi
ng, dangerous drugs.

On May 19, 2003, a confidential police agent conducted a shabu purchase transaction with a
ppellant via cellular phone. The agent later reported the transaction to police authorities, w
ho immediately formed a team comprised of members of the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA), the Philippine Army's Intelligence group, and the local police force to appre
hend the appellant.4 The agent provided the police appellant's name and physical descripti
on. He also assured them that appellant would be in Baler, Aurora, the next day.

53 | P a g e
On May 20, 2003, at 11:00 a.m., appellant called the agent and informed him that he was on
a Genesis bus and would arrive in Baler, Aurora, at any time during the day while wearing a r
ed and white striped T-shirt. The team members then positioned themselves along the nati
onal highway in Baler, Aurora. At about 3 p.m. That same day, a Genesis bus arrived in Baler.
When the appellant stepped off the bus, the confidential agent recognized him as the perso
n with whom he had previously conducted business. After getting off the bus, the appellant
stood near the highway, waiting for a tricycle. As the appellant was about to board a tricycle
the team approached him and invited him to the police station on suspicion of possessing s
habu. The appellant immediately denied the accusation, but as he reached into his pants p
ocket, a white envelope slipped out, revealing a small sachet containing the suspected drug.

The team then transported appellant to the police station for questioning. The confiscated s
pecimen was handed over to Police Inspector Rogelio Sarenas De Vera, who labeled it with
his initials and the appellant's name. The contents of the confiscated sachet tested positive
for methamphetamine hydrochloride both in the field and in the laboratory.6ycle to take hi
m to his final destination.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the arrest and warrantless search was valid.

HELD:

NO. As to the arrest the Supreme Court held that recent jurisprudence holds that in searche
s incident to a lawful arrest, the arrest must precede the search; generally, the process cann
ot be reversed. Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can pr
ecede the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the sea
rch. Thus, given the factual milieu of the case, we have to determine whether the police offi
cers had probable cause to arrest appellant. Although probable cause eludes exact and con
crete definition, it ordinarily signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circum
stances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the pers
on accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.

The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that "reliable information" alone is not sufficien
t to justify a warrantless arrest. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform som

54 | P a g e
e overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempti
ng to commit an offense. We find no cogent reason to depart from this well-established doc
trine.

As in the above cases, appellant herein was not committing a crime in the presence of the p
olice officers. Neither did the arresting officers have personal knowledge of facts indicating t
hat the person to be arrested had committed, was committing, or about to commit an offen
se. At the time of the arrest, appellant had just alighted from the Gemini bus and was waitin
g for a tricycle. Appellant was not acting in any suspicious manner that would engender a re
asonable ground for the police officers to suspect and conclude that he was committing or i
ntending to commit a crime. Were it not for the information given by the informant, appella
nt would not have been apprehended and no search would have been made, and conseque
ntly, the sachet of shabu would not have been confiscated.

Obviously, this is an instance of seizure of the "fruit of the poisonous tree," hence, the confi
scated item is inadmissible in evidence consonant with Article III, Section 3(2) of the 1987 C
onstitution, "any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be ina
dmissible for any purpose in any proceeding."

Without the confiscated shabu, appellant’s conviction cannot be sustained based on the r
emaining evidence. Thus, an acquittal is warranted, despite the waiver of appellant of his ri
ght to question the illegality of his arrest by entering a plea and his active participation in th
e trial of the case. As earlier mentioned, the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction
of the court over the person of the accused. A waiver of an illegal, warrantless arrest does n
ot carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantles
s arrest.

C. Reyes v. People, G.R. No. 229380, June 6,

FACTS:

The prosecution alleged that at around eight (8) o'clock in the evening of November
6, 2012, a group of police officers from Cardona, Rizal, including Police Officer 1 (PO
1) Jefferson Monteras (PO1 Monteras), was patrolling the diversion road of Baranga
y Looc, Cardona, Rizal when two (2) teenagers approached and informed them that
a woman with long hair and a dragon tattoo on her left arm had just bought shabu i
n Barangay Mambog. After a few minutes, a woman, later identified to be Reyes, wh

55 | P a g e
o matched the said description and smelled like liquor passed by the police officers.
The latter asked if she bought shabu and ordered her to bring it out. Reyes answere
d, "Di ba bawal kayong magkapkap ng babae?" and at that point, turned her back, p
ulled something out from her breast area and held a small plastic sachet on her righ
t hand.8 PO1 Monteras immediately confiscated the sachet and brought it to the pol
ice station where he marked it with "LRC-1." Thereat, he prepared the necessary do
cuments, conducted the inventory and photography before Barangay Captain Mano
lito Angeles.9 Thereafter, PO1 Monteras proceeded to the Rizal Provincial Crime Lab
oratory and turned over the seized item for examination to Police Senior Inspector
Beaune Villaraza (PSI Villaraza), who confirmed10 that the substance inside the sac
het tested positive for 0.04 gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a d
angerous drug.

For her part, Reyes denied the charges, claiming that the incident happened on Nov
ember 5, 2012 and not November 6. On said date, she came from a drinking spree a
nd was about to board a jeepney, when a man approached and asked if she knew a
certain person. After answering in the negative, she rode the jeepney until it was blo
cked by two (2) civilian men in motorcycles whom she identified to be one PO1 Dim
acali. The latter ordered her to alight and bring out the shabu in her possession whi
ch she denied having. She was then brought to the police station where the police o
fficers extorted from her the amount of P35,000.00 in exchange for her freedom. But
since she failed to give the money, the police officers took her to Taytay for inquest
proceedings.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Reyes's conviction for Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs under
Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 should be upheld.

HELD:

NO. "Section 2,24 Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and sei
zure must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predic
ated upon the existence of probable cause, absent which, such search and seiz
ure [become] 'unreasonable' within the meaning of said constitutional provisio
n. To protect the people from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3 (2),25

56 | P a g e
Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that evidence obtained from unreason
able searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in
any proceeding. In other words, evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasio
n of such unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should be ex
cluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree.

One of the recognized exceptions to the need [of] a warrant before a search may be
effected is a search incidental to a lawful arrest. In this instance, the law requires
that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made – the process can
not be reversed.

On the basis of the foregoing, the Court finds that no lawful arrest was made on Rey
es. PO1 Monteras himself admitted that Reyes passed by them without acting suspi
ciously or doing anything wrong, except that she smelled of liquor.38 As no other ov
ert act could be properly attributed to Reyes as to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO
1 Monteras that she had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a
crime, the arrest is bereft of any legal basis. As case law demonstrates, the act of wa
lking while reeking of liquor per se cannot be considered a criminal act.39

Neither has the prosecution established the conditions set forth in Section 5 (b), Rul
e 113, particularly, that the arresting officer had personal knowledge of any fact or c
ircumstance indicating that the accused had just committed a crime. "Personal kno
wledge" is determined from the testimony of the witnesses that there exist reasona
ble grounds to believe that a crime was committed by the accused. As ruled by the
Court, "[a] hearsay tip by itself does not justify a warrantless arrest. Law enforcers
must have personal knowledge of facts, based on their observation, that the person
sought to be arrested has just committed a crime." In this case, records failed to sho
w that PO1 Monteras had any personal knowledge that a crime had been committe
d by Reyes, as in fact, he even admitted that he merely relied on the two (2) teenage
rs' tip and that, everything happened by "chance." Surely, to interpret "personal kn
owledge" as to encompass unverified tips from strangers would create a dangerous
precedent and unnecessarily stretch the authority and power of police officers to e
ffect warrantless arrests, rendering nugatory the rigorous requisites under Section 5
(b), Rule 113.

57 | P a g e
Moreover, the Court finds the version of the prosecution regarding the seizure of the
subject item as lacking in credence. To recapitulate, the prosecution, through the te
stimony of PO1 Monteras, claimed that when the police officers asked Reyes if she p
urchased shabu, she turned her back and voluntarily showed the plastic sachet con
taining the same which she retrieved from her brassiere. According to jurisprudence,
the issue of credibility of a witness's testimony is determined by its conformity with
knowledge and consistency with the common experience of mankind. As the Court
observes, it is rather contrary to ordinary human experience for a person to willfully
exhibit incriminating evidence which would result in his or her conviction for a crim
e, absent any impelling circumstance which would prompt him or her to do so.

In addition, the Court notes the inconsistencies in the claim of the Office of the Solic
itor General (OSG) that Reyes consented to the search when she voluntarily showed
the sachet of shabu to the police officers. In their Comment,45 the OSG stated that
at the time of arrest, Reyes was so intoxicated that she "simply let her senses down"
and showed the shabu to PO1 Monteras;46 but later, in the same Comment, the OS
G argued that Reyes was actually "in her right senses when she reminded the police
officers" that they were not allowed to frisk a woman.47 These material inconsisten
cies clearly render suspect the search conducted on Reyes's person and likewise, de
stroy the credibility of the police officers who testified against Reyes.48 In order to d
eem as valid a consensual search, it is required that the police authorities expressly
ask, and in no uncertain terms, obtain the consent of the accused to be searched
and the consent thereof established by clear and positive proof,49 which were n
ot shown in this case.

In fine, there being no lawful warrantless arrest, the sachet of shabu purportedly sei
zed from Reyes on account of the search is rendered inadmissible in evidence for be
ing the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree.50 And since the shabu is the very corp
us delicti of the crime charged, Reyes must necessarily be acquitted and exonerated
from criminal liability.

7. Exclusionary Rule

A. People v. Cogaed y Romana, G.R. No. 200334; July 30, 2014

Facts:

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The accused, Victor Cogaed y Romana, was arrested by police officers based on information
from an unidentified civilian informer. The informer informed the police that Marvin Buya w
ould be transporting marijuana from Barangay Lun-Oy, San Gabriel, La Union to the Poblaci
on of San Gabriel, La Union. The police organized checkpoints to intercept the suspect and
set up a checkpoint in the waiting area of passengers from San Gabriel bound for San Ferna
ndo City. A passenger jeepney arrived at the checkpoint, and the driver signaled to the polic
e that two male passengers were carrying marijuana. The police approached the two male
passengers, identified as Victor Romana Cogaed and Santiago Sacpa Dayao. Cogaed was ca
rrying a blue bag and a sack, while Dayao was holding a yellow bag. The police asked Cogae
d and Dayao about the contents of their bags, and Cogaed opened the blue bag, revealing t
hree bricks of what looked like marijuana. Cogaed and Dayao were arrested and brought to
the police station, where further search revealed more suspected marijuana. The trial court
initially found Cogaed's arrest illegal but stated that Cogaed waived his right to object to th
e irregularity when he did not protest when asked to open his bag. The trial court found Cog
aed guilty of illegal possession of dangerous drugs and sentenced him to life imprisonment.
Cogaed appealed the decision, but the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.

Issue:

 Whether the evidence seized as a result of an unlawful warrantless search and seizur
e is admissible.
 Whether the arresting officer complied with the requirements for the proper custody
of seized dangerous drugs.
 Whether the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized dangerous drugs were pres
erved.

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the accused, finding that the warrantless search and se
izure conducted by the police officers were unreasonable and violated Cogaed's constitutio
nal right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The court held that the evidence obta
ined through the illegal search and seizure is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceedin
g. The decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals were reversed, Cogaed was acqui
tted, and his release from confinement was ordered. For a warrantless search to be consider

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ed reasonable, there must be a genuine reason based on the personal knowledge of the poli
ce officer that the person detained has weapons or is involved in criminal activity.

In this case, there was no genuine reason to suspect Cogaed of carrying drugs, as the suspic
ion was based on the jeepney driver's identification, not the personal observation of the pol
ice officers. Cogaed's silence or lack of objection to the search cannot be considered as a val
id waiver of his constitutional rights, as it was a natural reaction to the coercive environmen
t created by the police officers. The court emphasized the importance of upholding the cons
titutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures to protect the individual's priva
cy and prevent abuse of power by law enforcement.

The court also highlighted the need to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of seized
dangerous drugs, which can only be achieved through strict compliance with the requireme
nts for the proper custody of such evidence.

In this case, the court found that the arresting officer failed to comply with the necessary pr
ocedures, further undermining the admissibility and reliability of the seized drugs as eviden
ce. As a result, the court concluded that the evidence seized during the unreasonable and w
arrantless arrest of Cogaed is inadmissible, leading to his acquittal.

B. People v. Comprado, G.R. No. 213225, April 4, 2018

Facts:

Accused-appellant Renante Comprado y Bronola was charged with illegal possession of ma

rijuana. On July 15, 2011, the police received information from a confidential informant abo
ut an alleged courier of marijuana in Cabanglasan, Bukidnon. The informant stated that the
courier, together with a female companion, would be traveling from Bukidnon to Cagayan d
e Oro City and would be carrying a backpack with marijuana. The police set up a checkpoint
and stopped a bus matching the description given by the informant. Accused-appellant, wh
o matched the description, was found seated at the back of the bus with a backpack on his l
ap. Upon opening the backpack, the police officers discovered dried marijuana leaves. Accu

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sed-appellant denied ownership of the bag and marijuana, claiming that he was asked by s
omeone to carry the bag to Cagayan de Oro City.

Issue:

 Whether accused-appellant's arrest was valid.

 Whether the seized items are admissible in evidence.
 Whether accused-appellant is guilty of the crime charged.

Held:

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of accused-appellant and acquitted him of the charge of il
legal possession of marijuana.

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unr
easonable searches and seizures is inviolable. Warrantless searches and seizures are only al
lowed in certain exceptions, such as a stop-and-frisk search. In this case, the Court found th
at there was no genuine reason to justify a stop-and-frisk search on accused-appellant. The
police officers did not observe any overt physical act that would indicate accused-appellan
t's involvement in criminal activity. Therefore, the search conducted by the police officers w
as deemed invalid.

The search incidental to a lawful arrest must precede the arrest. Accused-appellant's warra
ntless arrest was not valid because there was no overt act indicating that he had just commi
tted a crime. The arresting officers did not have personal knowledge of facts indicating his i
nvolvement in an offense. As a result, the search conducted after the arrest was also deeme
d invalid.

The evidence obtained from an illegal search and seizure is inadmissible. Since the search a
nd seizure were found to be invalid, the evidence obtained from the illegal search, which inc
ludes the seized marijuana, was deemed inadmissible. Without the confiscated marijuana, t
here was no evidence left to convict accused-appellant.

Therefore, he was acquitted of the crime charged.

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In conclusion, accused-appellant Renante Comprado y Bronola was acquitted of illegal poss
ession of marijuana because the stop-and-frisk search conducted by the police officers was
not justified, and the evidence obtained from the illegal search and arrest was deemed inad
missible.

8. Reasonable Administrative Search

A. People v. O'Cochlain, G.R. No. 229071, December 10, 2018

Facts:

Eanna O'Cochlain, an Irish national married to a Filipina, was convicted of illegal possession
of marijuana. The case originated from a lawful search conducted by airport authorities at t
he Laoag City International Airport. Security Screening Officer Dexter Suguitan received info
rmation that the parking area in front of the departure area smelled like marijuana. Suguita
n observed a male Caucasian lighting something unrecognizable at the parking area. Suguit
an was instructed to conduct a pat down search on Eanna. During the search, Suguitan foun
d two rolled sticks of dried marijuana leaves in Eanna's pocket. The confiscated items were
turned over to the police investigator, PO3 Javier, and were subjected to laboratory examin
ation, confirming that they were marijuana.

Issue:

 Whether the search conducted on Eanna was lawful.

 Whether the chain of custody of the seized items was properly established.

Held:

The search conducted on Eanna was lawful. There was substantial compliance with the chai
n of custody rule.

Airport screening searches are constitutionally reasonable administrative searches conduct

ed to ensure public safety and prevent the carrying of weapons or explosives onto aircraft. E
anna voluntarily consented to the search, and there was no evidence of coercion or duress.

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The prosecution was able to establish a complete account of the custody of the seized items
from the time of seizure to their presentation in court. The integrity and evidentiary value o
f the seized items were properly preserved, with no evidence of tampering or contaminatio
n.

Eanna O'Cochlain was convicted of illegal possession of marijuana. The search conducted o
n him was lawful, and there was substantial compliance with the chain of custody rule.

B. Pollo v. Constantino-David, G.R. No. 181881

Facts:

Briccio "Ricky" A. Pollo, a government employee, was dismissed from service after his perso
nal files on his office computer were used as evidence against him. The search and copying
of his files were conducted by the government employer, the Civil Service Commission (CS
C), without his knowledge or consent. Pollo filed a petition for review on certiorari to revers
e the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) which dismissed his petition for certiorari to nulli
fy the proceedings conducted by the CSC. Pollo was a former Supervising Personnel Special
ist of the CSC Regional Office No. IV and the Officer-in-Charge of the Public Assistance and Li
aison Division (PALD) under the "Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na" program of the CSC.
An anonymous letter-complaint was received by the CSC Chairperson Karina Constantino-D
avid, alleging that Pollo was "lawyering" for individuals with pending cases in the CSC. Chai
rperson David formed a team to investigate the allegations and ordered the back-up of all fil
es in the computers of the PALD and Legal divisions. The team informed Pollo and the head
of the LSD about the ongoing copying of computer files. The files were examined and found
to be draft pleadings or letters related to administrative cases in the CSC and other tribunal
s. Based on this finding, Pollo was charged with dishonesty, grave misconduct, conduct prej
udicial to the best interest of the service, and violation of the CSC Computer Use Policy.

Issue:

Whether the search and copying of Pollo's personal files on his office computer violated his
constitutional right to privacy.

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Held:

The search and copying of Pollo's personal files were reasonable and did not violate his con
stitutional right to privacy.

The court cited relevant rulings of the United States Supreme Court, particularly the cases o
f O'Connor v. Ortega and United States v. Mark L. Simons, which held that government empl
oyers can conduct warrantless searches in the workplace without meeting the "probable ca
use" or warrant requirement for search and seizure. The court also considered the CSC Com
puter Use Policy, which explicitly stated that employees have no expectation of privacy in a
nything they create, store, send, or receive on the computer system.

C. Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board, G.R. No. 157870, November 3, 2008

Facts:

The case involves the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Comprehensive Dangero
us Drugs Act, particularly Section 36. The petitioners are Social Justice Society (SJS), Atty. M
anuel J. Laserna, Jr., and Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. The petitioners challenged the constituti
onality of Section 36, which mandates drug testing for candidates for public office, students,
and officers and employees of public and private offices. The petitioners argued that the m
andatory drug testing violated their constitutional rights, particularly the right to privacy an
d the right against unreasonable search and seizure.

Issue:

 Whether Section 36 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act is constitutional.

 Whether the mandatory drug testing violates the right to privacy and the right agains
t unreasonable search and seizure.
 Whether the drug testing requirements are narrowly drawn and meet the standards
of reasonableness.

Held:

Section 36 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act is partially unconstitutional.The man

datory drug testing for candidates for public office, students, and officers and employees of

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public and private offices is constitutional. The mandatory drug testing for candidates for p
ublic office, students, and officers and employees of public and private offices is constitutio
nal because it serves a legitimate government interest in promoting the safety and well-bei
ng of the public. The drug testing requirements are reasonable and narrowly drawn, and th
ey do not violate the right to privacy or the right against unreasonable search and seizure.

The mandatory drug testing for persons charged with a criminal offense is unconstitutional
because it is not random or suspicionless. The mandatory drug testing of accused individua
ls is a violation of their right to privacy and their right against self-incrimination. The drug te
sting of accused individuals is not necessary for the prosecution of criminal offenses.

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